Arms and Military Cargo Export Controls: Israel

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Trade Policy and Economic Security (Mr Douglas Alexander)]

I am responding on this issue on behalf of the Government tonight, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr (Steve Witherden) for securing this important and timely debate. Let me address the House this evening by first setting out the Government’s policy, and then setting out our approach to transparency, which formed a key part of my hon. Friend’s contribution.

It is accepted on all sides of this House that, as the Government have made clear, what was witnessed on 7 October 2023 was not an act of liberation, but an act of barbarism by Hamas. Over the many months of this conflict, the UK Government have made the case for an immediate ceasefire, the release of all the hostages detained, the protection of civilians, access for aid and aid workers to Gaza, and the need for a path to long-term peace and security in the region. The responsibility of Hamas is clear, but so too is the appalling humanitarian crisis that has since unfolded in Gaza as a result of Israel’s subsequent actions. The way in which Israel is conducting its operations is indefensible, disproportionate, and—in the view of the UK Government—counterproductive to any lasting peace settlement.

The Government’s policy remains that the only way to secure peace and stability is through an immediate ceasefire, the release of the hostages held captive by Hamas, the protection of civilians, and the lifting of all Israeli restrictions on aid being sent into Gaza. Last month, at the United Nations Security Council, the UK Government made the case for urgent humanitarian aid to enter Gaza, and expressed our outrage at both the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the strikes on the UN Office for Project Services compound in March. We also issued a statement with 27 international partners on the mechanisms needed to deliver those vital aid supplies, and together with the leaders of France and Canada, we made clear our strong opposition to the latest expansion of Israel’s military operations.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Alexander]

Let me make a little progress, and then I will be open to interventions.

I turn next to the actions taken by this Government in support of those statements. We have supported the restoration of funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency; we have suspended arms licences; we provided £129 million in humanitarian assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the last financial year; and we have decided to suspend negotiations on the upgraded free trade agreement with this Israeli Government.

[Shockat Adam (Leicester South) (Ind)]

In the week before last, the Foreign Secretary said that we were suspending arms negotiations with the Israeli Government, yet just last week, we had a trade envoy—Lord Austin—visiting Israel and saying how wonderful it was to be there. Can the Minister please explain how those two matters do not contradict each other?

[Mr Alexander]

There are long-standing relationships of trade and economics with Israel—for instance, as I understand it, one in eight of the prescribed drugs available through the national health service is provided by an Israeli company. We have taken a clear position of not upgrading the free trade agreement but recognising, for example, that those supplies are important. The trade envoy roles are accountable to the Secretary of State in the Department for Business and Trade, and we were clear that Lord Austin would not directly deal with the Israeli Government when he was there and has no responsibility for the free trade agreement negotiations that otherwise would have been taking place in the coming months.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Alexander]

Let me make a little more progress, then I will be happy to take further interventions.

I will turn to the specific issue of export licences. On coming into office, the Foreign Secretary commissioned an immediate assessment into Israel’s compliance with international humanitarian law. On the basis of that assessment, on 2 September, we suspended arms export licences for items to the Israel Defence Forces that could be used in military operations in Gaza.

As a result of that decision, licences were suspended for a range of military equipment, stopping the export of F-16 fighter aircraft components, of targeting systems and of licensable parts that make unmanned aerial vehicles. That measure is still in place. I reiterate that based on our current assessment of potential breaches of international humanitarian law, we are not licensing military equipment provided directly to the IDF that could be used for military operations in Gaza.

It is right to acknowledge that our export licences granted in relation to Israel cover a wider remit than simply those items that may be used in Gaza. There are a relatively small number of licences for the IDF relating to equipment that we assess would not be used in the current conflict, including, for example, parts for air defence systems that defend Israel from acts such as the major aerial attack from Iran in April 2024.

We also think it is right to continue to provide military grade body armour used by non-governmental organisations and journalists, and to provide parts of the supply chain that are ultimately re-exported out of Israel to support the defence of our NATO allies. The Government are fully committed to upholding our responsibilities under domestic and international law, and have acted in a manner consistent with our legal obligations, including under the arms trade treaty and the genocide convention.

On the global F-35 programme, we are of course facing a critical moment of European security, with war on the continent at our neighbours’ doorsteps. Undermining the F-35 programme at this juncture would, in the Government’s view, disrupt international peace and security, NATO deterrence and European defence as a whole.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Alexander]

Let me finish the explanation, then I will be happy to take interventions.

Our exporters provide components for the F-35 aircraft to a global spares pool and the common production line for new aircraft, where they have no sight and no control over the specific ultimate end users for their exports. Put plainly, it is not possible to suspend licensing of F-35 components for use by one F-35 nation without ceasing supply to the entire global F-35 programme. It was therefore judged necessary by the Government to exclude F-35 components from the scope of the suspension.

Let me be very clear, however, that the UK Government are not selling F-35 components directly to the Israeli authorities. The licence that allows the export of F-35 components was amended in September to specifically make it clear that direct shipments to Israel for use in Israel are not permitted.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr (Steve Witherden) mentioned the Government’s red lines. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade said that there were red lines that would make the Government stop sending F-35 parts, but the Minister has just been clear that it is not possible to stop sending those parts. If the Secretary of State says that there are red lines—and how are we not at those red lines, given what is happening in Gaza—what exactly is going on?

[Mr Alexander]

We are not directly sending parts to Israel for the F-35s. We are continuing to support the global component pool of the F-35 programme for the reason that I have set out. We as a Government judge that there is a material risk to the security of our NATO allies, and more broadly to European security, if the F-35 aircraft that are used by a number of our allies were no longer able to secure the supplies and the aircraft were therefore no longer able to fly.

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

I want to understand who is making the rules about the spare parts pool. Surely if we are trading into that pool, we have a right to set the rules. If those components are going on to F-35s that are being bought by Israel, we have a right to block those parts or to kick Israel out, as we did with Turkey in 2019.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

We make approximately 15% of the components that contribute to the F-35 programme; it is an international programme of which we are but one partner. We continue to supply the programme because our judgment as a Government is that not doing so would undermine the continuing functioning of the programme, which is in the Government’s view, as I say, of critical importance to European and global security.

[Richard Burgon]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Alexander]

I have given way several times on that point, so I am keen to make some progress. The Government have made these judgments calmly and soberly, and will continue to do so with full awareness of our responsibility.

Let me now turn to the question of transparency. As the UK Government, we publish quarterly official statistics and an annual report about export licences granted and refused. We provide a searchable database allowing users to produce bespoke reports, drawing on this data, and we are committed to openness on strategic export licensing, which provides the means for Parliament and the public to hold us to account.

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Alexander]

I am keen to make a little more progress before I take further interventions.

Because these are exceptional circumstances, the Government have heard requests from Members on both sides of the House for us to release further details, including information on licence applications in progress, and as full information as we can disclose on the types of equipment that are covered by each extant licence. Recognising the exceptional nature of this issue and the importance of providing transparent and robust information to ensure that Parliament and the public can hold the Government to account, in December we laid in the Library of the House an exceptional release of export licensing data focused specifically on Israel, setting out plainly how many licences remained extant at that time, how many had been granted since June 2024, and how many had been refused.

In summarising that release, let me assure Members that remaining licences relate to non-military items, military items for civilian use, or items not for use in military operations in Gaza. These licences also extend to components in items for re-export to other countries—that is, those that then leave Israel. Ongoing licensing applications are also decided on that basis. In fact, of the 352 licences extant for Israel, as of 6 December 191 were non-military. They included commercial aircraft components, equipment for private manufacturing firms, and parts for submersible vessels for use in scientific research. That left 161 licences relating to military equipment. However, less than half those related to the Government of Israel or the IDF. Most related either to UK components that private Israeli companies would incorporate before re-exporting an item to a third country, or to military-grade equipment for civilians such as body armour for journalists and NGOs.

I can advise the House that recent reporting on this topic does not provide distinctions between items for civilian and for military use, or between items remaining in Israel and those for re-export. The UK is not allowing the direct export of arms for use in Israel’s military operations in Gaza.

[Richard Burgon]

The Minister is giving a detailed response, but may I return him to the issue of the international pool of F-35 spares? Is it the Government’s contention that a conditional licence is impossible—that is, that we could provide F-35 spares, but on the basis that they are not then sent to Israel to be used in Gaza?

[Mr Alexander]

I am acutely conscious of the time, Madam Deputy Speaker. The exclusion from the suspension decision for F-35 components should not, in principle, apply to licences for F-35 components that could be identified as going to Israel for use by Israel. Exports of F-35 components directly to Israel are therefore suspended unless they are for re-export.

Let me return to the specific point that I know has been the subject of much scrutiny in relation to recent reporting outside the House. The majority of military licences approved last year are for components of military items for re-export to third countries, including the UK’s NATO allies, of about £142 million-worth of military goods licensed for Israel and in 2024. The vast majority of that overall value was supporting the production of items for use outside Israel. That includes more than £120 million, or about 85% of the total licence value, for components to support exports of military items from Israeli companies to a single programme for a NATO ally.

These remaining licences have no utility in military operations in Gaza. The suspension of such licences was not required by our export licence criteria, and would have done nothing but harm UK companies and UK businesses engaged in authorised and legal trade. Since September, we have refused all licence applications for military goods that might be used by Israel in the current conflict in line with the suspension decision. More applications were refused in 2024 than in the preceding four years combined.

Question put and agreed to.