Human Rights Act

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), whom I congratulate on securing the debate.

I will not repeat points made by the right hon. Gentleman, particularly his survey of the benefits of incorporating the European convention into our own law through the Human Rights Act. I will concentrate on what I understand the broad thrust of the Government’s proposals to be, because only by doing that can one start a proper analysis of whether benefits might flow from the proposals that outweigh some of the costs—particularly the costs he identified of problems relating to the devolved institutions and Governments—that are undoubtedly present.

It is worth bearing in mind, of course, that there was talk before we created the Human Rights Act of a British Bill of Rights, which was much trawled over by the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats during the early 1990s. The project was not pursued because there was a realisation, as time went by, that it was a highly controversial proposal that inevitably sought to bring into one place all sorts of suggestions about rights that might be included in it. Indeed, it is noticeable that as a result of the renewal of this debate, prompted by the Government’s approach, lots of interesting papers are being produced on the possibility of having a Bill of Rights—I was reading one the other day by Geoffrey Robertson QC—not all of which are likely to commend themselves to the Secretary of State for Justice, because of their content.

It was because of that realisation that the then Labour Government in 1998 adopted what was in many ways a very conservative—with a small “c”—proposal in respect of simply bringing about incorporation and preserving the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, tweaking the text in one place to emphasise that, where there was competition between freedom of expression and anything else, freedom of expression should be given a high priority; but otherwise simply allowing the law, through the convention’s incorporation, to be interpreted in our courts. I have to say that I entirely agree with what the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland said. While there are areas where I have criticisms—I think they are well known—broadly speaking, I think the Act has conferred huge benefits on this country in terms of the accessibility of rights.

It is right that the proposals remain opaque. I do not criticise the Government for that; in so far as they are going away from the proposals published in October, that seems to show a high level of common sense. The question then still arises: what benefits will we get from having a Bill of Rights? I accept that if we wish to have a Bill of Rights that includes rights not protected by the European convention on human rights, such as the right to trial by jury or some practices that might be different in different parts of the United Kingdom, there might be some merit in it; but as long as we remain adherent to the convention, the wriggle room for the Government regarding the convention and its text will be extremely limited—so limited that the ideas prevalent in the Daily Mail that the Bill of Rights would lead to some seismic change in the diminution of rights is simply misleading. We are on dangerous ground indeed if we start to peddle that as a notion to those who seem to be infuriated by the existing rights we have at present.

I was greatly reassured by the Prime Minister’s comments that he had no intention of pulling out of the convention. It would be so contrary to every Conservative philosophical principle of building an international regime for the rule of law and the promotion of rights that I cannot conceive of any mainstream political party embarking on such a course. I was delighted when he confirmed that recently, and I think the Minister may be able to confirm it again this afternoon.

Where does that leave us? The answer is that it leaves us embarking on a project that I am happy to help the Minister with, but one that I think will prove in reality to be extremely difficult, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, and that, at the end of the day, will deliver extremely limited benefits—indeed, so limited that I begin to wonder whether the project is worth pursuing at all.

With those thoughts in mind—I keep them general at the moment—I simply wish to assure the Minister that I am more than happy to continue to engage with him and others from the Department in which he serves on this issue. I have all sorts of ideas that I am happy to put forward, but it is important that we get some idea at the outset of what we are trying to achieve. Without that, we are in serious danger of taking a wrong turn.

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[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. I welcome the Minister to his place in what is the Justice Department’s first debate in Westminster Hall.

At the risk of offending both sides, may I suggest that we need to be a bit less theological? I have much sympathy for the points made by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) in opening the debate, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who is a distinguished lawyer. However, I suspect that the truth is somewhere in the middle.

There were human rights protections before the Human Rights Act came into force. The United Kingdom was a signatory to the European convention, and it is worth observing that although Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, in his subsequent career, was not noted for being on the liberal wing of the Conservative party, he none the less thought that the convention was a good and desirable thing. There were protections in the convention that the British courts took account of. It is fair to say that there were also sometimes practical issues about access and implementation, and we should not lose sight of that. The thought, therefore, that the Human Rights Act is a sort of holy grail is probably misleading, and we should not be afraid to think of looking at it again and reforming it. Equally, we should not assume that the convention is a permanent intrusion on the rights of British courts, because that would be wrong too. Let us try to find a way through the middle.

I serve on the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly and legal affairs committee. Perhaps rather horrifyingly to some people, I also serve on a committee that appoints the judges to the European Court—the idea that a committee of politicians appoints judges may seem odd to us, and that is perhaps an issue we have to look at. The quality of the current Court is, frankly, variable: we have some very good people, and we have some people whose independence does not come from the tradition that we are used to, if I can put it that way. On the other hand, the United Kingdom generally does not have an issue in terms of being at variance with the Strasbourg Court—we have one of the highest rates of compliance with its judgments—so, again, a bit of perspective might be required.

It is perhaps ironic that the Human Rights Act did not seek to create a binding precedent, but the approach taken by our domestic judiciary has frequently got fairly close to that. That is not an issue that withdrawal from the convention, of itself, would address, so we have to be realistic about what can be achieved. In any event, Strasbourg judgments would be regarded as being at least of persuasive value in arguments before our Supreme Court. Simply repealing the Act will not, therefore, make some of the controversy go away, and we have to be realistic about what can be achieved.

On the other hand, bizarre consequences sometimes stem from the Act’s operation, and we perhaps need to look carefully at that. I do not take the view that that would be a signal that we have turned our back on human rights. Britain’s compliance with the convention is rather better than, for example, Russia’s—I do not think we have invaded any of our neighbours recently—so let us put our disagreements with the convention into a bit of perspective.

I hope the Minister will give us a little more assistance on how we go forward. We are committed to a consultation, which is right. In fairness, the Government have committed themselves to a much more significant consultation than that which happened before the Human Rights Act. I would like to know more details of the consultation’s timetable and what form the consultation will take.

[Mr Grieve]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is one thing we need to look at? In the past, where we have found difficulties, we have legislated in separate legislation—we did that with the Immigration Act 2014. Changing the text of the Human Rights Act may not be the best course of action. If there are areas of difficulty, we can see whether there is separate legislation that is still compatible with the convention that we can introduce.

[Robert Neill]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very fair point. I hope the Government will include that as part of the consultation. Some of the things that cause offence to many of our constituents might be remedied more easily in a more appropriate fashion. That is an important point.

The Government are committed to basing a British Bill of Rights on the convention, but we need a little more detail about what “basing” means. For example, are there any rights in the convention that it would not be proposed to include in the Bill? That is critical, because people would be concerned about a diminution of protections. On the other hand, are there areas where the current protections might be enhanced? We need that spelled out at an early stage.

What is the timetable? What is the proposed scope and level of detail of the prelegislative scrutiny? The Justice Committee, which I chair, will be most anxious to be involved in that scrutiny, but other parts of the House will also rightly have to have an input. We also need carefully to address the impact across the whole United Kingdom, because the United Kingdom was a signatory to the convention, and the Human Rights Act was a United Kingdom piece of legislation. It is important that we reflect on all those matters.

I am not perhaps as pessimistic about the prospects for constructive change as my right hon. and learned Friend. Perhaps that is because I am a West Ham supporter, so optimism must come naturally to me—something that you, as a Sheffield Wednesday supporter, will understand very well, Mr Betts.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Dominic Raab)]

It is an honour and a pleasure to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. I congratulate the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) on securing the debate on the future of the Human Rights Act.

I listened with great interest to all the contributions. I shall touch on a few of them, such as that of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who gave a powerful speech about some of the risks involved in this enterprise. I detected that he is perhaps not quite as sympathetic to the concept of a Bill of Rights as he was when he was shadow Justice Secretary, but I was heartened to hear that he was offering creative solutions along the way.

[Mr Grieve]

The Minister is quite right. In 2009 I worked on a paper with him as my chief of staff about the possibility of a Bill of Rights. As was rightly said, such a Bill of Rights is perfectly possible, but it will not solve the problems or issues that have been the driving force behind the Government’s current project unless we intend to decouple ourselves from the European convention, which, mercifully, I understand not to be our policy. There is the conundrum that my hon. Friend will have to grapple with.

[Mr Raab]

I thought I had detected a slight revival of my right hon. and learned Friend’s former enthusiasm, but perhaps I was too optimistic.

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) for his contribution. He always speaks powerfully on these issues—I have listened to him speaking on human rights since I joined this House. He took us back to Magna Carta and its modern-day relevance.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

That may indeed be an option in the courts. I go back to the Richard III case which, the hon. Gentleman may remember, was brought by Plantagenet Alliance Ltd. It is still to this day not clear to me who the Plantagenet Alliance were and who was behind it. It was launched on the basis of it being the family of King Richard III—his descendants—demanding a right to a say in where he was buried. I suspect that most of us in this Chamber are, in some way, shape or form, descendants of King Richard III given the way the generations have spread out. The Department was subject to a case and won that case. The court ruled that I had fulfilled my statutory duties appropriately. None the less, as a result of that case the taxpayer faced a bill, if I recall correctly, in excess of £100,000. To my mind, that is not good use of public money.

My view, therefore, is that at the very least we should know—as I say, I do not know to this day—who the backers of the Plantagenet Alliance are. It is my full intention to put forward a proposal to set a £1,500 threshold, but I will also be considering how to prevent the use of shell companies to provide a shelter for those bringing judicial reviews. I hope that will command the support of the House. I still do not understand why the Labour party is so opposed to it, because I cannot see how it is in anybody’s interest for public bodies to be subject to court cases by bodies that are unknown. We do not know who is behind them, who has set them up, and whether they are a front for an interest group that we would find utterly distasteful.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The process of ping-pong has narrowed the issues. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend that on the other two amendments he has made an effort to restrict matters, but I have to say that I remain unpersuaded that this amendment will not excessively fetter judicial discretion. I also have to say that the concession made in the Lords, when they tabled a fresh amendment, is difficult to criticise. Obviously, it leaves a measure of discretion to the judiciary, but one that is in my view nevertheless correct. I will need a lot of persuading that the route he is currently taking is not excessively restrictive. For that reason, I cannot support it at the moment.

[Chris Grayling]

The key issue is that it is very easy to define a public interest around public authorities fulfilling absolutely the legal terms of their requirements, but if we accept that that is the case there is often very little justification for a case not being brought. Simply having a public interest test without the exceptional qualification would leave open the opportunity for all of these cases continuing. Where a case is brought for reasons of intentional delay, the case will be argued that this is a matter of public interest. The exceptional level, which deliberately raises the bar, ensures that this part of the Bill achieves its objectives.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Kate Green]

What the hon. Gentleman says about other religions may be correct, but it is not the case that all religions are required to go through a dual process. Jews and Quakers are not. My contention is that we should recognise the strong popular support for humanism, just as we recognise popular support for other forms of marriage. Many organisations can perform legal marriages in their own right, and do so for smaller numbers than the humanists would and, indeed, than the humanists do now. While I would not for one minute suggest that our marriage laws should be based on some sort of numbers game—although I believe that some Members sought to suggest as much in Committee, an approach that I found somewhat offensive and regrettable—my contention is supported, in this context, by the fact that not only is practice in relation to humanist marriages already fairly widespread, but the numbers are increasing. The popularity is growing.

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

rose—

[Kate Green]

I will of course give way to the Attorney-General.

[The Attorney-General]

I hope the hon. Lady will accept that I make my comments in a completely neutral way and that I appreciate what she is trying to achieve, but I have absolutely no doubt that the new clause, if passed, would render the Bill incompatible with the provisions of the European convention on human rights, because it identifies a group that is not a religious group and gives it a special status. The first thing that would happen is that all sorts of other secular groups would claim non-discrimination rights under article 14. I realise that that may be capable of being cured, but I can only say to the hon. Lady that the new clause would make it impossible for the Minister to sign a certificate under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, enabling the Bill to proceed to the other place.

[Kate Green]

First, although of course I respect the Attorney-General’s expert advice, I must point out that the narrow drafting of the new clause follows advice from the Government’s own officials. We had been given to understand that it would be possible to prescribe, very tightly, a mode of marriage for humanists, legally recognised, and we are surprised that human rights objections are being raised now.

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[Kate Green]

My hon. Friend—if I may call him that in this context—has raised an excellent point. I hear mutterings from Government Members, who are suggesting that the answer to his question is that in Scotland it is the person who is registered. Let me say, with the greatest respect, that I do not see how that can possibly deal with the human rights point.

[The Attorney-General]

I do my best to provide advice on the law of England and Wales—Scottish law is unquestionably different historically—but, according to my limited understanding of the position, in Scotland it is not just humanists who may be registered for this purpose; pagans and all sorts of other groups may also qualify. I simply make the point that in the context of the Bill as drafted and as proposed today—I realise that the hon. Lady may be upset about this, but I have no role in it—the new clause undoubtedly introduces a serious human rights problem, which I think is obvious because of its discriminatory nature. That is really all that I can say on the matter.

[Kate Green]

I make no great claims for my understanding of Scots law, despite having a rather elderly and unused degree in it, but—

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[Kate Green]

Obviously, I do not answer for the Government, and I will not respond to any specific interventions on that point. The hon. Gentleman may wish to make a speech later.

[The Attorney-General]

rose—

[Kate Green]

I will take one more intervention, and then I am going to develop the compelling case for why we want humanist weddings in this country, not why there are apparently so many legal objections to be overcome.

[The Attorney-General]

The last thing that I want to do is interrupt the hon. Lady’s flow, but I want to reply very briefly to what was just said. I am not suggesting in any way that what is happening in Scotland is unlawful. Instead, I am highlighting that there is a serious defect in the amendment. Given the discriminatory nature of the favour it gives to humanists as opposed to other secular organisations, it would have the consequence of making the measure incompatible with the convention rights. I think that that is obvious when we examine the amendment.

[Kate Green]

It may be challengeable under the convention, but I do not think we know at all whether such a challenge would be successful.

Let me develop some aspects of the case for humanist weddings. So far this has been a rather unpleasant and legalistic debate, and in the same spirit as our debates on same-sex marriage, I want to make the case that the House should feel joyful about humanist weddings and celebrate them.

For those who are concerned about protections, the new clause provides that the Registrar General could issue a certificate to any organisation that

“(a) is a registered charity principally concerned with advancing or practising the non-religious belief known as humanism;

(b) has been in continuous existence for five years; and

(c) appears to the Registrar General to be of good repute.”

That provision addresses some of the wilder claims that unlikely organisations would or could either qualify or mount a human rights challenge.

The details are closely modelled on the existing law, and they were drafted following conversations with the Government—although perhaps not conversations in which both sides fully understood each other—and address the specific points rightly raised by Ministers in Committee, when the hon. Member for Bristol West (Stephen Williams) first proposed the amendment. We have taken as much account as possible of the concerns that we believe the Government have about this proposition, and we are therefore disappointed and startled to see a whole new front of opposition opened up this afternoon.

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[Kelvin Hopkins]

It is bizarre, but I must say that I am not a lawyer—I am only a humble economist—so these things escape me. Perhaps I can look forward to legal explanations later in the debate.

[The Attorney-General]

I will say this one last time. It has nothing to do with the merits or otherwise of wanting to extend marriage to humanist or secular groups. The way the amendment has been drafted confined it to groups promoting humanism, but there are many other secular groups. The local tiddlywinks club might wish to become a registered charity and to conduct weddings, so by its very nature, and for that reason, it is discriminatory, and by being discriminatory it is in serious danger, I suggest, of violating article 14 of the European convention on human rights. I can only say that. It might be curable, and there might be all sorts of other things that can be done—[Interruption.] Well, not in this House. As matters stand, the amendment is in that condition. I made that point simply to help the House.

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[Kate Green]

I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed to this interesting and, at times, passionate debate. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who tabled the amendment that led us to new clause 15, and the hon. Member for Bristol West (Stephen Williams), who first tabled it in Committee, for the work we have been able to do across parties to bring the proposal to the Floor of the House this afternoon.

Despite the fact that the proposal has been before the House in some form or other since 5 February, as the hon. Member for Cambridge pointed out, it seems that the legal doubts expressed this afternoon by the Attorney-General have come to us rather late in the day. That does not mean that we do not take them extremely seriously; of course we do, but it would have been helpful to know that discussions were taking place with officials, whether or not they were proactively suggesting that such changes to the original proposal would help to strengthen it. The fact that discussions took place some weeks ago means that it is a matter of particular regret that the legal difficulties with the proposal were not highlighted earlier.

The Secretary of State said that my amendment and, I think, others in the group were unnecessary. For humanists, it is not unnecessary at all. Yes, they can choose to have a civil marriage and a humanist ceremony, but they do not have available to them a ceremony that they feel would properly recognise them as marrying one another and making that public commitment in front of family and friends. That is the discrimination that we seek to address. However, I take very seriously her wish, which she knows we share very strongly, to see this Bill proceed. We do not want it to be delayed or have its development and progress inhibited by arguments about these proposals.

I want to pick up on one or two of the objections that were raised not only by Ministers but by other hon. Members around the Chamber, suggesting that there are still genuine uncertainties about what is and is not provided for in current law and what we now seek to achieve. If the Secretary of State is willing to come forward with a statement of the Government’s legal concerns, that would be extremely helpful in properly facing off all the objections that have been raised in time for them to be understood and considered before the Bill is debated in the House of Lords. We do not want a re-run of objections arriving late or being raised without justification. It is clear from what has been said today that many hon. Members would like the Government’s position to be fully argued in good time for a fully informed debate in the House of Lords.

Some Members, particularly the hon. Member for Banbury (Sir Tony Baldry) and the Secretary of State, have said repeatedly that these proposals in some way undermine the quadruple lock that has been put in place. The Secretary of State suggested that that is because it is not clear whether the protections that it affords would apply to humanists, and if so, that might undermine the protections for religious organisations. If so, it would be extremely helpful to understand exactly how that is. We would be grateful if the Secretary of State fully clarified that in the letter that she says she will make available to the House.

A misunderstanding has come up repeatedly this afternoon. We recognise that the system in England is different from the system in Scotland, which registers celebrants. The system in England is not based only on the registration of premises for Jews and Quakers, for example. There is no requirement for them to hold their ceremonies in certain premises, but they are required to hold ceremonies in accordance with their usages. What is more, the amendment would not attach registration to celebrants. It is about registering organisations, and one form of organisation in particular—that which is a belief organisation, a charitable organisation or a humanist organisation that secures the approval and authorisation of the Registrar General. It is very clear which kind of institution we are trying to cover.

The most serious objection is the human rights objection, which, sadly, only emerged at the beginning of this afternoon. I would be grateful if any hon. Member who participated during the earlier stages of the Bill and who remembers differently could correct me, but I do not recall the human rights objection being raised at any point before this afternoon. Of course it is vital that we take account of the Attorney-General’s concerns and advice on this matter; it would be utterly irresponsible of us not to do so. However, even the Attorney-General’s advice changed over the course of this afternoon. At the beginning of the afternoon, he said that there was a problem with the proposal because it could apply so widely that any organisation, including a society for the promotion of tiddlywinks, might potentially be discriminated against if it were not authorised to carry out marriages as well. I think that he rowed back from that later on and acknowledged that only belief organisations would be authorised. He was right to say that the possibility of discrimination between different belief organisations is the central human rights issue that must be addressed.

[The Attorney-General]

Let me make it quite clear that it has to be a belief organisation because unless there are some grounds for belief, I assume that there is no reason for carrying out a ceremony. I am sorry if my point sounded flippant, because it was not intended to be. My point was that belief organisations can be very wide in their scope and are certainly not confined to humanism.

[Kate Green]

I appreciate the Attorney-General’s concern that there could be human rights challenges on those grounds. It would be useful to know how he assesses the chances of such a challenge being successful and to understand on what basis a challenge might be argued. It would also be useful to know what precedent there is of such challenges being successful elsewhere.

I am prepared to wait for the fully analysed opinion to be presented to the House. I welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment to provide that in good time before the Bill proceeds through the House of Lords. I hope that she will take note of our interest in having a proactive opinion, as the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) said, that identifies how any defects in the proposal could be cured, as the Attorney-General has mentioned. Given the commitment from the Secretary of State, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 9

Conversion of civil partnership into marriage