Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [Lords]

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, and in answer to the amendment that was tabled but not selected, Ministers are obliged to act in accordance with our ECHR obligations. Throughout this process, we have a legal duty under the Human Rights Act 1998 to act compatibly with convention rights, including article 1 of the 13th protocol, which was incorporated in schedule 1 to the Human Rights Acts 1998 through the Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order 2004. Were Ministers to act unlawfully in making subordinate legislation under subsection 5(b) that was incompatible with the convention rights, it would be open to the courts to strike down that legislation by applying ordinary public law principles.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

First, I want to confirm what my right hon. Friend has said. This treaty being negotiated with United States has taken a long time to achieve. I remember being connected with it when I was Attorney General, and raising the matter subsequently on visits to the United States when I was Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is quite apparent that the treaty is essential to prevent crime in this country. It is equally clear that attaching the proposed strings to it would destroy it; I have no doubt about that at all. I also endorse the point that the European convention on human rights has to govern everything that we do. In my view, in regard to the sort of data we are seeking to access and share for the purpose of fighting crime, the issue of whether the death penalty might result from an eventual criminal proceeding, which would be speculative at that stage, is entirely irrelevant.

European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Wednesday 5th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Anne Marie Morris]

My hon. Friend has asked a very sensible question, to which I will give an answer.

I am afraid that I reject the description of what will happen as crashing out or as falling over the precipice. We will go out on a World Trade Organisation deal, and that will be very much to our benefit. We do 98% of our trade on WTO arrangements. I do not agree that the Government are not prepared, because they are. I have listened to proposals from most Government Departments, and I do not agree that suddenly there will be chaos. I do not dispute that there will be a bumpy ride, but we are prepared. I can also tell hon. Members that, from the evidence I have seen on the Public Accounts Committee, those on the other side in Calais are no more in favour of chaos than we are in Dover, so please—

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Anne Marie Morris]

No, I will not.

[Mr Grieve]

Why not? You get another minute. I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way.

I have just two points. First, my hon. Friend talks about the WTO. If I understand her correctly, she therefore expects to get a whole series of deals from the EU around the WTO arrangements. Otherwise, she has not answered the question of our hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Alberto Costa). Secondly, I assume she also believes that the Belfast agreement should simply be ripped up, disregarded and reneged upon by the UK Government.

[Anne Marie Morris]

As one lawyer to another, I say to my right hon. and learned Friend that he has misrepresented the way the WTO works. It does not require lots of other deals. It takes us out and enables us to look at all sorts of options—we could move into a Canada-style free trade agreement. There are many things that we could do.

I take issue with the amendment my right hon. and learned Friend tabled yesterday. Many people think that, at the end of the day, it will empower us to say, “Okay, if you don’t like this withdrawal agreement, this House has the power to stop us going out”—as he would say—“with no deal.” As I have said, there is no such thing as no deal. As a matter of law, as I understand it—from lawyer to lawyer—the power of such a motion cannot bind this House and cannot stop article 50 triggering on 29 March.

I say to those who are thinking of supporting the arrangement put forward by the Prime Minister because it is the only way: “Think again. That is not Brexit. There is another way.” Rather than buying time and extending the uncertainty, we should go out on WTO arrangements. We will then be free to trade and free to get the sort of deal that this country absolutely needs and deserves.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 28th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

I am very grateful, Mr Deputy Speaker, to catch your eye in this debate on this important Bill, which contains necessary provisions on the use of corrosive substances and on knives. I think the whole House would applaud that. What the Government should be doing, as I will demonstrate in the few words that I have to say, is acting on the basis of real evidence.

As the hon. Member for Bristol South (Karin Smyth) said, this is the third time that the Government have listed for debate this Bill’s remaining stages. For me, as the lead signatory to amendments trying to remove .50 calibre weapons from the Bill, this is third time lucky. After extensive negotiations with the Government, I persuaded them that there was, as I will demonstrate, no real evidence to ban these weapons, and that they should remove them from the Bill and have a proper evidence-based consultation as to whether these weapons do or do not form a danger to the public.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

My hon. Friend may have seen that I sought to intervene on the shadow Minister on this earlier. He may wish to confirm that it is also the case that there are legitimate reasons for wishing to possess these weapons.

[Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. Of course, those who possess these weapons use them for entirely peaceful purposes. They are some of the most law-abiding people in this country. To ban these weapons on the basis of, as I will demonstrate, very little evidence, if any, is a completely illiberal thing for a Conservative, or indeed any, Government to do.

I thank my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary very much indeed for reviewing the evidence on these rifles. He listened to everything that I and other colleagues had to say. My amendments attracted no fewer than 75 signatures from across the House. I thank every single one of my colleagues who signed them. I particularly thank and pay tribute to the Democratic Unionist party of Northern Ireland, all of whose Members signed them.

There is very little evidence for banning these weapons. The press seemed somehow to think that my amendments were all about Brexit and assumed that all those who had supported them did so to achieve Brexit. Nothing could be further from the truth. We were genuinely—I speak as chairman of the all-party shooting and conservation group—trying to do the right thing by a group of citizens who, as I indicated to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), are some of the most law-abiding in the country.

Foreign Fighters and the Death Penalty

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Monday 23rd July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I am not going to take a lecture about being better from a right hon. Gentleman who sat in a Government when people were being rendered from Libya and across to Libya. I think that is outrageous. As I have said to other Opposition Members, I cannot go into the exact details of this case because it is currently under investigation and to do so would risk undermining the operation. The OSJA is the guidance that Ministers have followed in the past and will follow in future. That is absolutely the case.

The right hon. Gentleman asks questions about the semantics of the letter and whether we asked or did not ask. We have said in this case that it is the judgment of Ministers, based on the operation, the investigation and the evidence before us, that we will not seek assurances in this matter.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It was my understanding that it was a policy decision of the United Kingdom Government—which I do not criticise in any way—that we would not seek the return of these two individuals to the United Kingdom for public interest reasons, and indeed have deprived them of their UK nationality. However, is it not the case that to move on from there to facilitate their going to the United States to face trial for capital offences is a major departure from normal policy, if we are doing so by providing evidence under a request for mutual legal assistance? When was the last time that we departed from these principles—I am not aware of this ever having happened before—and why have we not asked for an assurance when it would be perfectly proper to do so? Those are the two key questions, and until they are answered, I have to say to my right hon. Friend that this issue will continue to haunt the Government.

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. and learned Friend, having produced plenty of advices in his previous role as Attorney General to Her Majesty’s Government, will recognise the challenges that Ministers face in balancing the need for making the decision about trial—[Interruption.] Opposition Members chunter from a sedentary position. The reality, as my right hon. and learned Friend said, is that we all desire these people to face trial. If Ministers are faced with the prospect of not being able to try them in the United Kingdom but an ally seeks evidence that could lead to them being tried, Ministers have an obligation to the citizens of this country to balance that request and the likelihood of trial with the extent to which they will seek assurances, if we think that is important for keeping people safe in the United Kingdom. In this case, Ministers have made the decision that we are not going to seek assurances, because we do not think we have the evidence here to try them in the United Kingdom and we hope that a trial will be carried out in the United States. That is the balance. My right hon. and learned Friend may disagree with the balance we have chosen to take, but that is the responsibility of the Ministers holding the onerous task of trying to keep us safe, while balancing that with human rights.

Harassment in Public Life

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Monday 18th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Amber Rudd]

I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her constructive comments. By being here to make those points and to stand up against the harassment, she is herself a great example that I hope other women will be inspired to follow. It is so important for other women to have these sorts of role models who have the courage of their convictions to stand up and oppose the abuse, and to say how they will attack it.

The Government have just received the publication. We will look carefully at its recommendations, which are varied. I share some of the concerns raised by the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) about whether additional legislation is required for people in public life. I share her view that people in public life should not necessarily have additional coverage, because all abuse is unwelcome, but we do not yet rule out legislation. I would welcome an early conversation with her, and with the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), to discuss that. The hon. and learned Lady made the very important point that, in a bid to increase diversity in this House, we have an extra duty to combat this abuse.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

We are not exactly shrinking violets in this House, and I think that most of us are perfectly capable of engaging in robust debate. I have to say, however, that I have been shocked by the level of vitriolic abuse that I have received in the past week, and shocked also to realise that actually this is the new normal for large numbers of Members of this House—a sort of hidden unpleasantness that dominates our lives. I am concerned that, while undoubtedly some of it comes from people who may be a little unhinged, the stimulus for it undoubtedly, as has been suggested, comes from some sections of the national media choosing to report the politics of this country in a way that is designed to entertain but also to intimidate. This is all the more remarkable because when, about a year ago, I criticised one national newspaper, the Daily Mail, for its attack on the judiciary over article 50, its response was to threaten to sue me for libel.

One really has to wonder how this extraordinary unpleasantness has crept in. I think that the Home Secretary may agree that we are going to have to stand up for decency in public discourse and face this down. If we do it collectively, then we do not need to change the law—we can prosecute those who cross the boundary. Then we may be able to face down what seems to me to be a deeply unpleasant phenomenon in our society at present.

[Amber Rudd]

I share the view of my right hon. and learned Friend that this must not be allowed to become the new normal. That is why I am here to make this statement. It is also why so many colleagues across the House—and you, Mr Speaker—feel so strongly about this issue. Let us make this a tipping point where we call it out and say “No more”. We in the Government will take action. We have set out elements of the action that is already being taken. We have the Committee’s recommendations, and we will look carefully at them. I will certainly join my right hon. and learned Friend in making sure that we call this out and ask for a new type of behaviour, so that colleagues do not receive the sort of intimidation that they have experienced.

Report on Recent Terrorist Attacks

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 5th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Amber Rudd]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her questions. Let me say in response to her point about the run-up to the decision making on the Manchester attack that David Anderson also said that the decision made by MI5 at the different points during the run-up to that attack was ”understandable”, based on the volume of intelligence that was coming through and the operational decisions that were made.

The right hon. Lady asked about the better sharing of data. There is already substantial sharing of data, but the report signals that more could be done. Learning from the actual attacks and from the attacks that have been foiled gives a particular momentum to that initiative. She also asked about the multi-agency pilots. For some years, people have been saying that we need to ensure that more information about closed subjects of interest, in particular, flows across local authority areas, and we are now addressing that head-on. Of course policing, particularly community policing, plays a key role, but there will also be interaction with health and education authorities. We want to work on pilots that address the multi-agency approach, so that we can collect information in a way that will not only support communities, but ensure that we have more information on the closed subjects of interest.

I would not want the right hon. Lady to imply that the report contains any suggestion that the attacks would not have taken place if there had been more resources. It is fine to ask about more resources, and I have acknowledged that more will be needed, but I should point out that in 2015 the Government recognised the need for more resources, and increased their investment in the counter-terrorism budgets from £11.7 billion to £15.1 billion in 2015-20 to ensure that this country, through this Government, is always properly resourced in that regard.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a truism, but one that I think must sometimes be remembered, that we are in no position to guarantee 100% safety from terrorism for the population of this country. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary may agree with me that what we must strive to do is run a system of counter-terrorism and intelligence that is as efficient and effective as is humanly possible, so that we can provide as much protection as possible against the type of dreadful attack that we have seen in past months.

In that context, does my right hon. Friend agree that what appears to shine through the Anderson report is first that there is a high level of efficiency, which he was able to recognise, and secondly that there is a need for change in the way in which the work of the counter-terrorism agencies and MI5 is linked in the sharing of intelligence? The main focus of the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am Chairman, might most profitably be directed towards ensuring that that happens.

I assure my right hon. Friend that the Committee will undoubtedly review what has been done in considering what lessons are to be learnt. However, rather than just trying to reinvent the wheel in respect of what Mr Anderson has done, we will endeavour to establish whether we can maximise the efficiency of both services.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Terror Attacks

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Thursday 22nd June 2017 Commons Chamber

[Amber Rudd]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her comments and the constructive way in which she is approaching this. The Government look forward to working with her to make sure that we have a constructive, united approach to this enemy that is trying to attack us.

The right hon. Lady asked particularly about new legislation. She is right that Max Hill has said that he does not see the need for new legislation, but he also said that he does see the need for a review of sentences, so we will certainly look at whether we can have tougher sentences. On our potential new legislation and approach, I ask her to hold fire for now on concluding that to be the case until we have done this review. Looking backwards, our review over the next few months into why so many terror attacks took place will be critical. For that, we will have independent assurance in the form of David Anderson. We will also have a review looking ahead to what else we can do.

As I said in my statement, we feel we have entered a new phase. That may mean that we need to introduce new legislation, but we will not rush to do that based on the attacks. We will look at doing that depending on what we find out from these reviews. I ask her to keep an open mind on that, depending on what conclusions the reviews reach.

I yield to no one in my respect for the work of the police, particularly the work of the counter-terrorism police in the past few months. We all recognise the enormous extra work and effort that has gone into following up on the attacks and keeping us safe. We have protected the police budget from 2015. There has been a lot of scaremongering about changes to the budget, and I repeat here, in the House, that it will be protected. We will ensure that we always give the security services and the police who work to keep us safe the resources that they need.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I greatly welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. I want to raise just two or three points. First, I particularly welcome the review of the sentencing guidelines. That should happen because of the evidence that individuals who commit acts preparatory to terrorism may be receiving sentences that are insufficient, although clearly they need to be proportionate.

The second issue concerns the response and how our security services work to deal with the threat. My right hon. Friend will know that the Government have invested considerably in that. The money spent and the number of officers available have been greatly enhanced. Equally, it is right that, because of the classified nature of the work, some details cannot be given to the House. That emphasises to me that one of the problems in the past three and a half months has been that we have not had an Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to provide the sort of scrutiny that might be helpful to hon. Members in understanding what has gone on, what should happen in the future and whether any improvements could be made. I therefore gently urge my right hon. Friend to make representations to the Prime Minister that that should be given priority.

Leaving the EU: Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Brandon Lewis]

As ever, my hon. Friend makes a really important point, and he is absolutely right. Some members of and countries involved with organisations such as Europol are not part of the European Union, highlighting that they see the importance of ensuring that we share information efficiently and proactively to fight crime. It is absolutely right that we work to protect that ability. Whatever shape our future relationship with the EU takes, I hope that we can all agree that it should not compromise the safety of people in the UK or, indeed, the rest of Europe.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The Minister will be aware that one consequence of leaving the European Union, as the Prime Minister has indicated, is that we withdraw from, as she puts it,

“the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice”.

But many of these justice co-operation functions ultimately come under the jurisdiction of the European Court. I find it difficult to understand what arrangement the Government envisage to address that issue—perhaps they wish to have a separate tribunal system set up to apply the rules—because, even for states outside the EU, the ECJ’s rulings on these key areas of security co-operation are very important.

[Brandon Lewis]

I appreciate my right hon. and learned Friend’s point. One piece of work we will do during the negotiations is to ensure that we get something bespoke for the United Kingdom. One temptation is to look at what other countries have done. As I mentioned earlier, there are countries who work with Europol—the United States is a good example—that are not members of the EU and have found ways to make it work. We can look at those examples, but we actually need to develop a bespoke solution for the United Kingdom.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

The Investigatory Powers Bill will ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have the vital powers they need at a time of changing threats and rapidly evolving technology. It will place those powers on a clear statutory footing and achieve world-leading oversight. It will leave no doubt about how seriously we value privacy and individual rights in this country.

Let us not forget why those powers are so important. Every day, our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies use those powers to investigate serious crime and collect evidence to convict offenders. They are particularly crucial in combating human trafficking and child exploitation. For example, in January 2009, Operation Retriever, an organised crime investigation in Derby, uncovered one of the most serious cases of child sexual abuse in recent times, involving multiple offenders and multiple victims.

During the investigation, officers uncovered an elaborate and hideous campaign of sexual exploitation directed against teenage girls who were groomed by people they thought they could trust and were driven around the midlands to houses, hotels and bed-and-breakfasts, where they were raped, often violently. One of the officers involved in the investigation described it as

“a campaign of rape against children”.

The investigation team used a combination of covert policing and communications data, such as mobile phone records, to link group members and their victims to each other, to phone handsets and to downloaded images and videos of sexual abuse taking place. In that investigation alone, 27 female victims aged between 12 and 18 were identified. Communications data evidence helped to secure the convictions of nine defendants. One of the offenders is serving at least 11 years for rape, sexual assault, sexual activity with a child, perverting the course of justice, aiding and abetting rape, false imprisonment and making child pornography. Another is serving at least eight years for rape, sexual assault and other sexual activity. Yet another is serving three years for the supply of cocaine.

Those men could still be on our streets, exploiting innocent children, without the police having access to the important intelligence that communications data provide. It is essential that we give the police the tools they need to investigate and prevent awful crimes such as these. That is what this Bill will do.

I am pleased that the Bill has commanded cross-party support, and I am grateful to all those who helped, in the spirit of consensus, to produce the Bill that we have before us. On Report, the former shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), set out his party’s position:

“We have supported the principle of a modern legal framework governing the use of investigatory powers, recognising that as communications have migrated online, the police and security services have lost capability”. —[Official Report, 6 June 2016; Vol. 611, c. 952.]

On Third Reading, the right hon. Gentleman went on to say:

“The police and security services do incredibly difficult work on our behalf and we thank them for it. Their job has got harder as both the level of the threat has risen and the nature of communication has changed in the modern world. To fail to respond to that would be a dereliction of our duties to them; it would also fail our constituents. The Bill is ultimately about their safety, the safety of their families and their privacy. I think we can look ourselves in the mirror tomorrow and say we have done our level best to maximise both.”—[Official Report, 7 June 2016; Vol. 611, c. 1148.]

The right hon. Gentleman was right. This has been a truly collaborative effort, of which both we and the Opposition can be proud. I note that the Government’s approach has attracted support from some of the Liberal Democrats in the Lords, although Liberal Democrat Members are not present here.

We have before us today a substantial number of changes agreed in the other place—evidence of constructive engagement from all sides to further improve this landmark legislation. Let me list the main changes. Responding to concerns raised by the former shadow Home Secretary, we have replicated changes agreed in this House throughout other parts of the Bill, including protections for trade union activity and amendments to the test applied by judicial commissioners when reviewing warrants, notices and authorisations under the Bill.

We commissioned an independent review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, that comprehensively endorsed the necessity of the bulk powers. As a consequence of that review, we have included provision for a technical advisory panel to advise the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the Secretary of State on the impact of changes in technology. We have added a sentencing threshold for access to internet connection records, so that they could not be used to investigate minor crimes. We have added extra protections and safeguards for journalists, lawyers and parliamentarians.

We have addressed issues raised by the Intelligence and Security Committee by giving the Committee the right to refer matters to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to investigate on behalf of this House; adding a requirement for the commissioner to report on thematic warrants and operational purposes; introducing a criminal offence for the misuse of bulk powers; bolstering safeguards surrounding the modification and renewal of warrants; and clarifying provisions relating to class BPD warrants, improving safeguards, and prohibiting the retention of medical records in bulk personal datasets held under class warrants.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

May I put on record my appreciation for the way that the Minister listened to the representations made by the Intelligence and Security Committee in this matter? It has proved to be a most constructive dialogue and I am extremely grateful to him for having taken on board and acted on the vast bulk of the recommendations that we put forward. May I raise one matter? On the issue of thematic warrants, I know that the Government, for very understandable reasons, were unable to move on some of the safeguards that the Committee wanted. Will the Minister give an undertaking that he will keep that under review as we see how the measure operates in practice?

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his comments. Although it would be nice to take the credit, that belongs to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, who steered the Bill through Committee, and the present Prime Minister, who helped shape and deliver the Bill. I have merely come in at the end, but will take some of the credit nevertheless.

Of course we will keep the matter under review, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee asked. I do understand the concerns about thematic warrants. I know that he will keep the matter under review and the Government will do so as well.

We have made a number of minor and technical changes to improve the clarity and consistency of the legislation. Finally, in the absence of legislative consent from the Northern Ireland Assembly, we have removed measures that would have brought oversight of devolved investigatory powers in Northern Ireland within the remit of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Many amendments have been accepted and we have worked together to produce the Bill that is before us today. I hope it will command the support of the whole House.

In closing, I remind the House that one of the aims of this legislation is to update investigatory powers for the digital age. It is worth contemplating briefly the consequences that would have come from failing to achieve that aim. Police forces across the country are increasingly struggling to pursue investigations because they cannot uncover crucial information as criminals’ activity moves online. Alan Wardle of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children told the Public Bill Committee that

“the police’s ability to investigate and prosecute some of the high-profile crimes we have seen in recent years—online grooming of children and the number of people who are viewing illegal images of children online, which has grown exponentially—is increasingly dependent on communications data. I think it is vital that this Bill ensures that the police have the powers and capabilities to continue to do that.”––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 34.]

Investigatory Powers Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Anne McLaughlin]

May I continue? I have already given way to the hon. and learned Lady and am conscious of the need to let other Members speak. I will possibly give way a wee bit later.

The review is welcome—of course it is, not least because it is hoped that David Anderson QC will do what Liberty and others have called for and use the opportunity properly to challenge the evidence and produce a thorough, comprehensive and unbiased examination of the necessity of all bulk powers in the Bill. However, the review was called for long ago by Liberty and other respectable organisations. The Government could and should have completed it before asking MPs to vote for the Bill.

When we are dealing with proposals that are so broad—the proposal is effectively for bulk data harvesting from mainly innocent citizens—it is incumbent on the Government to prove that there is an operational case and that the powers are necessary, and to ensure that the safeguards in place are rigorous. The Government have neither proven the operational case for the powers nor have they delivered safeguards and oversight of sufficient calibre to make the powers justifiable.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Anne McLaughlin]

I will give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman but I am trying not to give way too often.

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady. As I indicated when I spoke on Second Reading, I appreciate that bulk powers are controversial, but I am absolutely sure that we do not conduct data harvesting in this country. It simply does not happen. The use of bulk powers is not for that purpose, but for the purpose of examining material. Even though that may be done in bulk, it is done in a way that does not amount to the generalised harvesting of data for their examination. It simply is not.

[Anne McLaughlin]

My answer to that is simply that if the Bill allows for bulk data harvesting, it can still happen. We cannot sit here and say, “No, it will never happen.”

The SNP argument is not to do down our security services or anyone else working to keep our constituents safe. We argue that we would fail as a Parliament if we assert our power on behalf of our constituents and fail to place proper limitations on the scope of the state to interfere in the lives of innocent private citizens.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

It is a pleasure to be able to participate in today’s debate. I will move the amendments standing in the name of the Intelligence and Security Committee in a moment, but I would not be doing justice to this afternoon’s debate, on a matter of great and legitimate public interest and importance, if I were not to seek briefly to respond to the perfectly reasonable fears expressed by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin).

Those fears highlight the difficulty we have in this country—certainly for Members of Parliament, but I dare say also for members of the public and certainly for non-governmental organisations interested in civil liberties—in reconciling an assessment of what the agencies may be doing in relation to bulk powers, with what those of us who have become privy to classified information by virtue of our work actually see is happening in reality. I am not sure that this is a gap that is very easy to bridge. I can only do my best to explain to the House and to the hon. Lady how I see the system working.

In an ideal world, it would always be better if we used targeted interception. If we know what it is we are trying to intercept and have reasonable grounds that are necessary and proportionate for doing so, then clearly that is what we should be aiming to do. The reality, however, is that the use of the internet today, in respect of the transfer of information, is of such an order that if there were not bulk powers to enable the agencies to look to intercept bulk and then search it to find what they are looking for, it would in practice be very difficult for the agencies to defend our security against espionage and, in particular, terrorism. That is the reality.

That point has been made repeatedly, including in public by agency heads. When Sir Iain Lobban gave evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee, the only time it held a public hearing, he explained that the idea that there is bulk harvesting of data in order to carry out a detailed examination of them is, in fact, fanciful. That is not what is happening. What is happening is that there may be the retention of a bulk group of data in which in reality the vast majority—in fact, probably over 99%—will never be looked at, except in so far as it exists as a few digits on a screen. Ultimately, the agencies are interested in the nugget—or, as he described it, the needle in the haystack—that they are actually looking for. The idea that the privacy of an individual will be compromised if it just so happens that their internet traffic is caught in that particular net is simply not real. That is the reality of what goes on.

If I may say so to the hon. Lady and to the House, I do not really think that that is very different from what was probably going on 100 years ago when somebody suspected there might be a letter in a mailbag coming down from Glasgow to London. They could identify some of the markers on it and the handwriting, so they took an entire mailbag, tipped it out and looked to see if they could find the letter they were looking for. They then put all the other letters back in the mailbag and sent it on. The only realistic difference is that at the moment we do not have to stop the mailbag, because the mail can be transferred and we can simply retain the data somewhere else.

I appreciate that this is an area where people will legitimately be anxious that this could be capable of misuse. Of course, the hon. Lady is right that it could be capable of misuse. Anybody in this House who wants to raise concerns about misuse is raising a perfectly legitimate point. The question is what safeguards we can properly put in legislation, and through the framework we create in a democratic and free society, to try to ensure that that misuse will not and does not occur. The Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am the Chairman, is part of the process of trying to ensure that there is no such misuse.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am listening very carefully to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, because he is very knowledgeable in these areas. Is he aware that during the currency of the Public Bill Committee, The Guardian published an internal newsletter from MI6 from September 2011, which said that individuals within MI6 had been

“crossing the line with their database use…looking up addresses in order to send birthday cards, checking passport details to organise personal travel, checking details of family members for personal convenience…check the personal details of colleagues when filling out service forms on their behalf”?

Is he aware that there is internal recognition of misuse of data within the security services?

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, I was aware of that. That has, I think, been public knowledge for some time. So far as I am concerned, as the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, we take that very seriously. Indeed, I believe the agencies took the matter very seriously as well, and that those involved were disciplined. The point was made that however innocent the activity of looking up one’s friend’s address might appear, it was not an acceptable thing to do. I certainly agree. That was one reason why, yesterday, I highlighted the issue of offences and was pleased to get the response from my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that they were taking this issue seriously. I worry that the penalties attached to some of the potential offences appear to be insufficient. I fully understand the point the hon. and learned Lady makes, but we must be a bit careful before we translate what appears to have happened in such cases into a belief that there is systematic abuse of the data sets that may be held—that is what we are talking about—by agencies, and that the material in them is being misused or put to some nefarious purpose that is not legitimate for the purposes of national security.

[James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)]

Is it not the case that there are many things in public life—the police, computers, firearms and so on—that have the potential for misuse, but that the potential for misuse is not a reason to eradicate them from public life? It is a reason to ensure there is a robust framework and—this is the point my right hon. and learned Friend is making—a proper system of penalties for misuse, rather than just scrapping a whole capability because of potential future misuse.

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, I agree entirely. I am afraid that, because human society is not perfect, eradicating every instance of misconduct by public servants is likely to be impossible. We therefore have to ensure proper safeguards and ethics. Here I simply repeat what I said before. My own experience is that the ethical standards of the agencies are very high; that is not to say that one does not have to be vigilant about maintaining those standards, or that there might not have been instances where their ethical standards slipped, but everything I and, I think, my fellow members of the ISC have seen has constantly reassured us that those ethical standards are at the heart of what they do. I recollect Sir Iain Lobban saying that if he had asked his staff at GCHQ to do something unethical, they simply would not have done it. He said they would have refused, had he made the request of them.

I simply say that about the framework. I now turn to our amendments, the first group of which consists of amendments 9 to 12 and deals with an issue that goes to the heart of bulk powers: operational purposes. In the ISC’s report on the draft Bill, we were critical of what appeared to us to be the lack of transparency around operational purposes, which are of the utmost importance—this picks up on what the hon. Member for Glasgow North East said—as they provide the justification for examining material collected using bulk powers. If it falls outside legitimate operational purposes, one cannot examine it. We therefore recommended that in some form and in a manner consistent with safeguarding security—the two things are often difficult to reconcile—the list ought, so far as possible, to be published. We also recommended that the ISC have a role on behalf of Parliament in scrutinising the full classified list of operational purposes.

We were also concerned, when we investigated the matter further, that in some cases the nature of the list of operational purposes lacked clarity, as did the procedures for managing it, which seemed largely informal, particularly those for adding an operational purpose to the list. As matters stand now, that can effectively be done by a senior officer in the organisation. Our amendments are therefore intended to give effect to our original recommendations for greater scrutiny and transparency, while also trying to create a formal mechanism for the establishment, management, modification and review of the list of operational purposes.

[Mr John Hayes]

I anticipated that my right hon. and learned Friend would raise this matter, given that he puts such emphasis on his report. I am absolutely committed to considering the matter in the way he describes, and I am prepared to say now that we will go away and consider his amendments, with a view to introducing further amendments to the Bill to satisfy him and his Committee on this issue.

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to the Minister and will keep that in mind, but so that the House might understand, I will just take it through what we proposed.

Amendment 9 sets out:

“The operational purposes specified in the warrant must be ones specified, in a list maintained by the heads of the intelligence services, as purposes which they consider are operational purposes for which intercepted content or secondary data obtained under bulk interception warrants may be selected for examination.”

That is to formalise the process, which at the moment we think is too informal. Under amendment 10, an

“operational purpose may be specified in the list…only with the approval of the Secretary of State.”

We think that when an operational purpose is added to the list, it should go through the Secretary of State and be signed off by her. My understanding—I hope that the Minister will confirm this in due course—is that the Government do not see any significant problem with introducing such a system.

[Mr Hayes]

indicated assent.

[Mr Grieve]

I see the Minister nodding; I am grateful to him.

Amendment 10 also states:

“The Secretary of State may give such approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 121”.

That is to ensure that the Minister understands what the agency is asking for in adding an operational purpose to its list.

[Tom Elliott (Fermanagh and South Tyrone) (UUP)]

Going back to amendment 9, is the right hon. and learned Member confident that the list will not be too prescriptive—in other words, that those who want to find a way around it, will be able to do so?

[Mr Grieve]

I do not think the list should be too prescriptive. It will clearly be flexible. From my understanding of the list and what I know about the existing lists, they do have flexibility and can be added to and subtracted from. They are the day-to-day operational purposes for examining bulk data. That is what should be there. At the moment, it is something of an informal process; there is no suggestion that it is not being followed properly, but I think it needs to be formalised a bit more, which is what the amendments are intended to do. Amendment 11 states:

“The list of operational purposes…must be reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.”

Amendment 12, which has caused the Government greater—and understandable—difficulty, would put in place the following requirement:

“The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Intelligence and Security Committee”—

that is us—

“will be kept informed of any changes to the list of Operational Purposes in a timely manner.”

I always stress that the Committee is not there to monitor the activities of the intelligence agencies in real time; it is outside our remit to do so, as the Executive has to get on with its decision making, but we have the power to look at virtually everything we want—unless the Prime Minister denies us access, which has never happened in my time as Chairman—and the right to ask for material and to be briefed on what has happened in the past.

My impression is that the Government have no great objection to letting us see, on an annual basis, how the list has been reviewed, but we took the view that “timely” meant a bit more frequently than that. To make our position clear to the Minister and the Treasury Bench, we think that we ought to be kept informed of any changes not necessarily the day after they happen but certainly within a reasonable timeframe so that we might follow the changes that take place. The merit is that because we can, if necessary, call an evidence session and ask the head of an agency to come and explain to us what has been going on, we could provide reassurance to the House that the system was being operated correctly. I want to emphasise that that is the purpose of the amendment.

I do not expect the Minister to give me a completely positive response to amendment 12 today—he has kindly intervened already—but I would like him to provide an assurance that the Government will give this careful consideration and come up with a solution that enables the ISC to do its job. If he cannot, I might have to press the amendment to a vote, which I do not particularly want to do

[Mr John Hayes]

My right hon. and learned Friend is right to anticipate that this is the issue that has troubled us most of all his Committee’s many sensible proposals. From what he has said, I know he will understand that the balance to be struck is between that kind of proper scrutiny and ongoing security operations, which clearly require that consideration of operational purposes be a dynamic matter. It is critical that we strike that balance, but I hear the tone and tenor of his remarks and I am happy to say that the Government will consider the matter carefully and continue our discussions with him.

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to the Minister. On that basis, I think that these will be probing amendments, but I hope the matter can be properly resolved as the Bill goes through another place.

Amendment 12 states that the

“Investigatory Powers Commissioner must include in his Annual Report a summary of those Operational Purposes”.

Those would likely be more limited than the full list, but it would help to have some broad understanding.

I must take a moment on new clause 3, given that it deals with such an important matter. In the ISC’s report, we recommended that class bulk personal dataset warrants be removed from the Bill on the basis that the potential intrusion into privacy was sufficient to require that each distinct dataset should require specific approval by Ministers. However, we then had further evidence—as has happened in the dialogue with the Government and the agencies—in particular from the Secret Intelligence Service, about the rationale for retaining class warrants in the Bill. In particular, the evidence highlighted the fact that many of these datasets covered the same information or type of information. In those circumstances, we considered that a class warrant would be appropriate, as the privacy considerations were identical.

However, were we to accept class warrants for bulk personal datasets, we would need safeguards to ensure that their use was limited. We therefore proposed three restrictions. The first relates to the most sensitive personal data, using the definitions in the Data Protection Act 1998, and would prohibit the retention of any dataset containing a significant quantity of data relating to a person’s race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, or sexual life. The second restriction relates to bulk personal datasets that are somehow novel or out of the ordinary. In those circumstances, we would not consider a class warrant to be appropriate, so subsection (1)(b) of new clause 3 is designed to ensure that such cases will be referred to the Secretary of State and the commissioners by way of a specific warrant.

Finally, we express concern that we should not end up with bulk personal dataset inflation and have suggested that bulk personal dataset warrants should be limited to 20 individual datasets. I emphasise to the House that that is a completely arbitrary figure in many ways. If the Government have an alternative approach, I am more than happy to listen. I accept that if we impose a limit of 20, it is possible that the Home Secretary might be asked to sign two identical bulk personal dataset warrants in one go, if they are expecting to pick up 40. However, it seems to me that there needs to be some numerical cap, above all to ensure that the Home Secretary or Foreign Secretary, depending on who it is, is aware of what is being collected.

I would emphasise that we have seen the entire list of bulk personal datasets and we have never been of the opinion that anything is being collected that is not legitimate, and some of it, I can tell the House, is pretty mundane as well. That said, it is right that the House should exercise some caution about the expansion of those datasets, because one can see that in some circumstances they could touch upon information that is regarded as highly sensitive.

[Mr Hayes]

I hesitate to intervene again, but I hope these exchanges are proving helpful to the House, as well as to my right hon. and learned Friend and me—and to you, Mr Deputy Speaker. My right hon. and learned Friend touches on an important issue. I think he will acknowledge that it would be undesirable to set an arbitrary figure, but it is certainly the case that the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary would want to take into account the numbers. It seems to me that the numerical case that my right hon. and learned Friend is making is not without merit. I am not sure that this is a matter to be dealt with on the face of the Bill, but it certainly should be dealt with.

[Mr Grieve]

I am again most grateful to the Minister. I entirely accept that if he can produce, for example, an assurance before the passage of this Bill through Parliament that there will be a protocol in place—which we, for example, have access to—that sets out exactly how the process will be managed in practice and that we can provide the House with the reassurance that that is being followed, that would satisfy my concerns.

However, I do think there is an issue here, because frankly the world is made up of more and more bulk personal datasets, largely being collected in digital form, and there needs to be a process in place to ensure that what is there is legitimately held and is not just being added to in a way that could be outside Ministers’ line of vision altogether, unless they specifically started asking questions. That is the sort of approach I am talking about, so on that basis I am happy to accept the Minister’s assurance.

[Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)]

I am less perplexed by the arbitrary nature of subsection (1)(b) of new clause 3 and more interested in subsection (1)(a). What is meant or intended by the word “large”? Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say what proportion or quantum would be considered large when considering a personal dataset? There may be some helpful read-across from the 1998 Act, but it would be useful in considering this amendment to know what is intended by that entirely non-arbitrary and open suggestion?

[Mr Grieve]

Like everything else, I tend usually to say that we give the word its ordinary English meaning. I can accept that one may collect a dataset whose content is entirely innocuous and not really sensitive personal data at all, but which for some reason might contain a nugget of sensitive personal data that has crept in in some strange and perhaps unintended way. I accept that in those circumstances the protections we introduce are unnecessary; indeed, the truth is that the agencies would not even know that that information was there at the time they were acquiring it.

However, if we focus on the points I raised earlier—the Data Protection Act describes sensitive personal data as relating to a person’s race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, or sexual life—we are probably in quite a good place. I do not think a court would have too much difficulty being able to tell what falls one side of the line and what falls the other. However, like everything else, it is all open to a degree of interpretation, so I do not offer that to the hon. Gentleman as 100% perfection, although it is a good way forward and I think most of us would understand what sort of collected bulk data are likely to contain that sort of material.

Amendment 24 concerns specific warrants for bulk personal datasets. We are far less concerned about these, but again this provision would cover data relating to a person’s race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, or sexual life, and would ensure that the Secretary of State authorising the warrant would have the sensitivity of the data highlighted for them as part of their overall consideration of the necessity and proportionality of retaining and examining the dataset. I believe this may well be completely acceptable to the Government. Amendment 24 would mean that if there was an intention, for example, to acquire a dataset that clearly contained a great deal of information about people’s religious or political opinions, that would be specifically drawn to the Secretary of State’s attention in asking her or him to sign off the warrant, so that they were aware that that was being sought.

Finally in this list, I want to mention amendments 22 and 23, which are really carryovers from yesterday and concern the renewal of warrants to prevent two warrants from extending over a 12-month period, which I believe the Government have accepted, although that could not be considered yesterday.

I apologise for taking up so much of the House’s time, but I hope these amendments may help to clarify some of these areas of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

We made good progress in the House yesterday. We now have clarity about the terms of the independent review of bulk powers, which we are looking at today; and we have an overarching privacy clause, a stricter test for the judicial commissioners, protection for trade union activities, and an undertaking from the Solicitor General to consider how to amend the Bill to make it absolutely clear that whistleblowers can make disclosures to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner without fear of prosecution. I hope we can make as good progress today.

One of the amendments made to the Bill yesterday concerned the requirement for judicial commissioners to consider necessity and proportionality with a sufficient degree of care to ensure that they comply with the general duties in relation to privacy—this is the tighter judicial review test. That amendment was made to clause 21, which relates to intercept warrants. Today we are dealing with bulk powers. The judicial commissioners have an important role in relation to bulk powers and are an important safeguard in respect of warrants involving bulk powers. It is therefore important that we have clarity in the House today that the tighter scrutiny that is now in clause 21 applies equally to all other exercises of authorisation or approval carried out by judicial commissioners, including where they are exercising their powers in relation to bulk warrants. I think that otherwise there will be a risk of two tests, one under clause 21 and one under the other clauses applying to bulk powers. There is a real danger relating to combined warrants, in respect of which judicial commissioners would be asked to carry out different tests. It is important for the bulk powers to be scrutinised every bit as closely as the intercept warrants. Perhaps, in his response, the Minister will make it clear that the test applies generally across all the functions of the judicial commissioners, whether in respect of the specific warrants referred to clause 21 or in respect of the warrants relating to bulk powers and other provisions in the Bill. That, I think, would be a helpful extension of the safeguards relating to bulk powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I have no doubt at all that the review done by David Anderson will be valuable and I hope it will also inform the House about how bulk powers work. In that context—and because I have picked this up—there has been a suggestion that the examination of material under a bulk warrant is somehow a free-for-all that is left to the discretion of the official, and it plainly is not. It is subject to the operational purposes in clause 125, and if they are departed from, the official concerned would be acting unlawfully.

[Mr Hayes]

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) made the point, which my right hon. and learned Friend has now amplified, that these powers are subject to a range of safeguards. Let me be clear: the analysis of data intercepted in bulk is subject to automated filtering to ensure that data not of intelligence value are automatically discarded. This is a safeguard set out in the code of practice. There are rigorous safeguards in the Bill for examination, and the suggestion that there are not is, frankly, simply wrong and based on a confusion between the collection of material, as my right hon. and learned Friend has implied, and its examination.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Burnham]

There is an exchange of letters between the Security Minister and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras, which I hope is in the public domain, and which I believe allays the fears of the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). To be clear, it was a sticking point for Labour that the review had to consider necessity and not just utility. That is enshrined in the terms of reference, so I hope I can reassure him on that point.

Clearly, there is further to go on journalistic material and internet connection records, although it appears from what the Minister has said this afternoon that we are heading in the right direction. I stress again that progress on the ICR points that I have made are a personal red line.

That said, I thank the Home Secretary, the Solicitor General and the Security Minister for the constructive way in which they have approached our discussions. Because of the consensus we have been able to find, the legislation is more likely to succeed and to stand the test of time.

[Mr Grieve]

I say to the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) that, as far as the review is concerned, I have no doubt that the Intelligence and Security Committee will respond positively and provide input if David Anderson wants to discuss those matters with us. I certainly look forward to seeing his conclusions in the review on bulk powers, which I hope will be helpful to Parliament in identifying what improvements we can make.

Amendment 13, which is in my name and those of my colleagues on the Intelligence and Security Committee, concerns clause 54, on the additional restrictions on the grant of authorisations of communications data. In the Committee’s report into privacy and security published in March 2015, we recommended that, just like the police, the intelligence agencies should always ensure a separation of roles between those requesting access to communications data and those who provide the authorisation. Previously, that has not been the case. I am grateful that the Government accepted that principle, and that it is enshrined in clause 54(1). That is an important safeguard that the Government have added to the Bill.

I hope the Minister will forgive me, but notwithstanding that, the Committee, having looked carefully at the Government’s amendment, believe that, although it is 90% of the way there, 10% might do with some improvement. The Bill provides that there may be exceptional circumstances in which a separation is not required. I entirely accept that that is the case. There will be a small and probably very infrequent number of such examples where there is an imminent threat to life, which is provided for in clause 54(2) and (3). However, clause 54(3)(b) simply cites

“the interests of national security”,

which I should tell the Solicitor General is rather a broad concept, particularly as it features in all sorts of places in the Bill and can be extended to encompass almost anything that falls within the agencies’ remit.

The Committee believe that it is too vague and potentially too broad. Therefore, in amendment 13, we have proposed a measure that tries to narrow the matter down without in any way affecting operational effectiveness. The amendment would limit exceptional circumstances to those where the operation is so sensitive that knowledge of it must be kept to an absolute minimum, or where there is an unplanned, time-critical but very significant opportunity to obtain information that might be lost owing to any delay in obtaining a separate approval.

The Committee very much hopes that the Government are in a position to accept the amendment.

[The Solicitor General]

There is more debate to be had about whether the phrase “absolute minimum”, as opposed to plain “minimum”, should be used, but I am happy to assure my right hon. and learned Friend that, in principle, we accept the amendment. We will commit to returning with a technically adequate amendment in the other place.

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his comments and I will not take up any more of the House’s time. I think that “minimum” might well be acceptable. The key thing is the next subsection, which I think tries to encapsulate very clearly the sort of exceptions we are talking about.

[Joanna Cherry]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman and I may be on different sides of the House, but I have the highest regard for the clarity and erudition with which he approaches matters. The Intelligence and Security Committee, which he chairs, said in its recommendation I on the draft Bill that the Bill did not make it clear that getting internet connection records

“through a specific request to a Communications Service Provider under Part 3”

is not the only way in which the agencies may have access to internet connection records. He said that that was “misleading” and that

“the Agencies have told the Committee that they have a range of other capabilities which enable them to obtain equivalent data”

to internet connection records. He said the Bill should make that clearer. Has the Bill been amended to his satisfaction on that point?

[Mr Grieve]

The hon. and learned Lady raises a relevant point. The Bill has not been amended, but we received sufficient assurances from the Government that the way in which the system would be operated, in terms of the internal workings of the agency, would be such as to meet the concerns we expressed. Indeed, the Solicitor General or the Minister may be in a position to confirm that. On that basis, despite the fact that we raised the point, we did not table an amendment on it. The hon. and learned Lady is quite right to pick it up. I have not wanted to detain the House for too long, otherwise I could take her through a list of areas on which, having had further discussion, we decided amendments were not required. She is right to focus on that and I hope very much the Minister is able to provide some confirmation. I am grateful to her for having raised it.

[Gavin Newlands]

Along with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), I represented the SNP in Committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to take part on Report.

I have many concerns about the Bill, and my hon. Friends have already outlined a number of areas where the SNP is sceptical about the Government’s case. This is a wide-ranging and complex Bill and time constraints prevent me from speaking to everything I would like to. However, I will focus my contribution on communications data and internet connection records. The measures in the Bill are not limited to internet access, email or telephony and include, explicitly, communication without human intervention. As it stands, the definition of communications data can tell us an awful lot about someone’s life. Stewart Baker, former senior counsel to the NSA in the United States, states that the content of a person’s communications data is redundant when we consider the amount of metadata that is already collected.

Communications data can be key in obtaining leads, solving crimes or preventing crime. However, I have a real issue with the length of the list of public bodies that would be able to access such personal and sensitive information on an individual without sufficient oversight in place. As we heard at the end of the previous debate and again at the start of this debate, from the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), schedule 4 currently provides for a list of bodies that would be able to access retained data, including a range of regulatory bodies. Among them are the Food Standards Agency, the Gambling Commission, the Office of Communications, and the Health and Safety Executive. No fewer than 47 bodies are listed, a reflection of the tightly drawn nature of the Bill—or otherwise. That suggests that access to communications data may be granted for a range of purposes, which will almost certainly be disproportionate and inconsistent with the guidance offered by the European Court of Human Rights.

It is only appropriate that the correct level of protection and oversight is in place. The SNP tabled amendments 320 to 327 and 328 to 350 to ensure sufficient judicial oversight. The relevant public bodies must seek a warrant from a judicial commissioner, replacing the Secretary of State in the process where necessary. They also ensure that a threshold of reasonable suspicion would be necessary before a warrant is issued.

The arguments on judicial warrantry have already been rehearsed at length and I do not intend to detain the House long on this issue, particularly as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West speaks with a lot more authority on that subject than I do. Suffice it to say, I think hon. Members should pause and reflect on the lack of oversight. Decisions concerning necessity and proportionality can only be made properly by someone who is truly independent from the operations of the organisation.

Clause 54 contains the first mention of internet connection records. Subsection (6) defines ICRs in such general terms as to render the definition pointless. In that regard, I welcome some of the comments from the shadow Home Secretary and the Minister in their courting across the Dispatch Box a little earlier.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick). We have co-operated on civil liberties matters in the past, and the hon. Gentleman has shown great courage in many of the approaches that he has taken, including those to legislation when his own party was in government. I hope he will accept, however—just as I accept the principles that underpin his opposition and, indeed, that of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry)—that those of us who will support the Bill on Third Reading are not acting in an unprincipled fashion.

As was pointed out by the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), the simple fact is that this is not just some opportunistic gimmick employed by the Government in an attempt to acquire more power. The existing legislation was doing positive harm; indeed, allowing it to remain would have been far more likely to undermine civil liberties than ensuring that it was properly replaced. It seems to me that, during its passage in the House of Commons, the Bill has been immeasurably improved. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary for listening and responding to the concerns expressed by the Intelligence and Security Committee and for accepting virtually all our amendments, although I recognise that we shall need to negotiate on some areas of detail.

The ISC has always taken the collective view that this legislation is necessary, and that that necessity applies to bulk powers of collection. We look forward to and will accept David Anderson’s report, and will consider whether there are indeed any alternatives that might be advanced, but I have to say that, on the basis of everything that we have seen up to now, we believe that bulk powers are needed, although sensible and proper safeguards are required to ensure that they cannot be abused. The Bill contains such safeguards, and I believe that when it comes back from the other place, it will be in an even better condition. Parliament, it seems to me, has been doing its job rather well.

If I have any complaint to make about the Bill’s passage, it is this: the quantity of amendments tabled on Report has rendered the Order Paper entirely inadequate. Until we have an Order Paper that marries the amendment numbers to page numbers—which is vitally needed—we shall be wasting a great deal of our time in the Chamber faffing around when we might have been doing other things. I hope that that complaint is passed on. I might even suggest that someone should consult GCHQ if there is a difficulty in finding the necessary formula on a computer to do the page numbering and the amendment numbering at the same time.

With that thought, I just want to say that it has been a privilege to participate in the passage of this Bill, and I hope that when it comes back to this House we will be able to reassure the hon. Member for Walsall North and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West that they have a piece of legislation that will actually stand the test of time and be a credit to this House.