Anne McLaughlin
Main Page: Anne McLaughlin (Scottish National Party - Glasgow North East)Department Debates - View all Anne McLaughlin's debates with the Home Office
Investigatory Powers Bill
Anne McLaughlin ExcerptsTuesday 7th June 2016
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 7 June 2016 - (7 Jun 2016)
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 390, page 95, line 27, leave out clause 119.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 391, page 96, line 36, leave out clause 120.
Amendment 392, page 97, line 15, leave out clause 121.
Amendment 393, page 98, line 20, leave out clause 122.
Amendment 394, page 98, line 38, leave out clause 123.
Amendment 275, in clause 123, page 99, line 10, leave out from “must” to end of line 11, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners.
Amendment 395, page 99, line 19, leave out clause 124.
Amendment 396, page 99, line 24, leave out clause 125.
Amendment 9, in clause 125, page 99, line 33, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) The operational purposes specified in the warrant must be ones specified, in a list maintained by the heads of the intelligence services, as purposes which they consider are operational purposes for which intercepted content or secondary data obtained under bulk interception warrants may be selected for examination.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to amend the Bill to provide for a designated list of operational purposes, such that only a purpose on that list may be specified in a warrant relating to bulk powers.
Amendment 10, page 99, line 37, leave out from “issued” to end of line 39 and insert
“are specified in the list mentioned in subsection (4).
(5A) An operational purpose may be specified in the list mentioned in subsection (4) only with the approval of the Secretary of State.
(5B) The Secretary of State may give such approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 121 subsections (1)(b) or (2).”
To make clear that the Secretary of State must approve all operational purposes specified on the list.
Amendment 11, page 99, line 39, at end insert—
“(5C) The list of operational purposes mentioned in subsection (4) must be reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.”
To ensure that the list of Operational Purposes is reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.
Amendment 12, page 99, line 39, at end insert—
“(5D) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) will be kept informed of any changes to the list of Operational Purposes in a timely manner.
(5E) Subject to subsection 201(7), the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must include in his Annual Report a summary of those Operational Purposes which, during the period of his report, have been specified in any warrants issued under Parts 6 and 7.”
To ensure that the ISC and Commissioners are kept informed of changes to the list of Operational Purposes. To ensure that a summary of the Operational Purposes are published each year.
Amendment 397, page 100, line 2, leave out clause 126.
Amendment 398, page 100, line 10, leave out clause 127.
Amendment 22, in clause 127, page 100, line 12, leave out
“before it would otherwise cease to have effect”
and insert “during the renewal period”.
See amendment 20.
Amendment 23, page 100, line 34, at end insert—
“(2A) ‘The renewal period’ means the period of 30 days ending with the day at the end of which the warrant would otherwise cease to have effect.”
See amendment 20.
Amendment 153, page 101, line 9, leave out clause 128.
Amendment 154, page 102, line 25, leave out clause 129.
Amendment 401, page 103, line 8, leave out clause 130.
Amendment 402, page 103, line 31, leave out clause 131.
Amendment 403, page 104, line 19, leave out clause 132.
Amendment 404, page 105, line 44, leave out clause 133.
Amendment 405, page 106, line 24, leave out clause 134.
Amendment 406, page 108, line 1, leave out clause 135.
Amendment 407, page 108, line 29, leave out clause 136.
Amendment 408, page 108, line 39, leave out clause 137.
Amendment 409, page 109, line 16, leave out clause 138.
Amendment 410, page 110, line 40, leave out clause 139.
Amendment 212, in clause 139, page 110, line 42, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 213, page 111, line 7, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 278, page 111, line 7, leave out from “must” to end of line 8, and insert “subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 212 and 213 (which are a package).
Amendment 411, page 111, line 16, leave out clause 140.
Amendment 412, page 111, line 21, leave out clause 141.
Amendment 413, page 112, line 2, leave out clause 142.
Amendment 414, page 112, line 10, leave out clause 143.
Amendment 155, page 113, line 9, leave out clause 144.
Amendment 156, page 114, line 19, leave out clause 145.
Amendment 417, page 115, line 2, leave out clause 146.
Amendment 418, page 115, line 25, leave out clause 147.
Amendment 419, page 116, line 7, leave out clause 148.
Government amendments 44 to 47.
Amendment 420, page 116, line 35, leave out clause 149.
Amendment 421, page 117, line 11, leave out clause 150.
Amendment 422, page 118, line 39, leave out clause 151.
Amendment 423, page 119, line 8, leave out clause 152.
Amendment 424, page 119, line 36, leave out clause 153.
Amendment 425, page 120, line 10, leave out clause 154.
Amendment 426, page 121, line 33, leave out clause 155.
Amendment 427, page 122, line 4, leave out clause 156.
Amendment 428, page 123, line 1, leave out clause 157.
Amendment 214, in clause 157, page 123, line 3, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 215, page 123, line 15, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 281, page 123, line 15, leave out from “must” to end of line 16, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners.
Amendment 429, page 123, line 24, leave out clause 158.
Amendment 430, page 123, line 41, leave out clause 159.
Amendment 431, page 124, line 34, leave out clause 160.
Amendment 432, page 125, line 3, leave out clause 161.
Amendment 433, page 125, line 25, leave out clause 162.
Amendment 434, page 126, line 3, leave out clause 163.
Amendment 157, page 127, line 1, leave out clause 164.
Government amendments 127 and 128.
Amendment 158, page 128, line 14, leave out clause 165.
Amendment 437, page 129, line 1, leave out clause 166.
Amendment 438, page 129, line 25, leave out clause 167.
Amendment 439, page 130, line 14, leave out clause 168.
Amendment 440, page 131, line 33, leave out clause 169.
Amendment 441, page 132, line 3, leave out clause 170.
Government amendment 129.
Amendment 442, page 133, line 30, leave out clause 171.
Amendment 443, page 134, line 12, leave out clause 172.
Amendment 444, page 134, line 19, leave out clause 173.
Government amendment 130.
Government new clause 14—Health records.
New clause 3—Restriction on use of class bulk personal dataset warrants—
“(1) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, a bulk personal dataset in reliance on a class bulk personal dataset warrant if the head of the intelligence service considers—
(a) that the bulk personal dataset includes a large quantity of sensitive personal data, or
(b) that the nature of the bulk personal dataset, or the circumstances in which it was created, is or are such that its retention, or retention and examination, by the intelligence service raises issues which ought to be considered by the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner on an application by the head of the intelligence service for a specific BPD warrant.
(2) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, greater than twenty distinct bulk personal datasets in reliance on any class BPD warrant.
(3) In subsection (1) ‘sensitive personal data’ means personal data consisting of information about an individual (whether living or deceased) which is of a kind mentioned in section 2(a) to (f) of the Data Protection Act 1998.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to place greater restrictions on the use of Class BPD warrants in relation to the retention/examination of sensitive personal data (relating to race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health, or sexual orientation). To cap the number of datasets which may be covered by any Class warrant.
Amendment 445, page 135, line 4, leave out clause 174.
Amendment 446, page 135, line 21, leave out clause 175.
Amendment 447, page 135, line 37, leave out clause 176.
Amendment 448, page 136, line 9, leave out clause 177.
Amendment 303, in clause 177, page 136, line 44, at end insert—
“(5) Subsection (6) applies where a warrant application under this section relates to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
(6) The Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of material referred to in subsection (5); and
(b) specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material”.
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 449, page 137, line 1, leave out clause 178.
Amendment 24, in clause 178, page 137, line 17, leave out “and” and insert—
“(aa) a statement outlining the extent to which sensitive personal data as defined by section [Restriction on use of class BPD warrants] is expected to be part of the bulk personal dataset, and”.
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to require specific BPD warrant applications to set out the extent to which datasets may include sensitive personal data (relating to race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health, or sexual orientation), in order that the Secretary of State may properly assess the proportionality of obtaining the dataset.
Amendment 304, page 138, line 2, at end insert—
“(8) Subsection (6) applies where a warrant application under this section relates to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
(9) The Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of material referred to in subsection (5); and
(b) specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material.”
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 450, page 138, line 3, leave out clause 179.
Amendment 216, in clause 179, page 138, line 5, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 217, page 138, line 22, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 284, page 138, line 22, leave out from “must” to end of line 23, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 216 and 217 (which are a package).
Amendment 451, page 138, line 31, leave out clause 180.
Amendment 452, page 139, line 4, leave out clause 181.
Amendment 453, page 140, line 1, leave out clause 182.
Amendment 454, page 140, line 15, leave out clause 183.
Amendment 455, page 141, line 4, leave out clause 184.
Amendment 456, page 141, line 26, leave out clause 185.
Amendment 159, page 142, line 13, leave out clause 186.
Amendment 160, page 143, line 22, leave out clause 187.
Amendment 459, page 144, line 7, leave out clause 188.
Amendment 460, page 144, line 25, leave out clause 189.
Amendment 461, page 146, line 2, leave out clause 190.
Amendment 462, page 147, line 5, leave out clause 191.
Amendment 463, page 147, line 21, leave out clause 192.
Amendment 305, in clause 192, page 147, line 42, at end insert—
“(4A) A direction under subsection (3) may only be made for material relating to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 if the Secretary of State considers that—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of such material; and
(b) that specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material.”
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 464, page 148, line 37, leave out clause 193.
Anne McLaughlin
Part 6 of the Bill, on bulk powers, is perhaps one of its most controversial parts. The Scottish National party is calling for part 6 to be shelved along with part 7 until such time as an argument for their inclusion has been demonstrated by an independent review of their proportionality and operative necessity—that is to say that we believe that the powers in part 6 should be removed from the Bill until a satisfactory operational case is made for them.
The review the Government have agreed to is most welcome but they must get it right. It must be conducted properly if it is to be of any value to the process of parliamentary scrutiny or is to secure the public’s confidence in its conclusions. Yesterday we had sight of some more detail about the review, in a letter from the Minister to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). We were particularly pleased to note that one of the review team will be a barrister who has a great deal of experience working as a special advocate acting against the Government in terrorism cases. That degree of balance is good and is to be welcomed.
The review needs to be given the time to do a thorough job, however, and we simply do not believe that three months is long enough. Even if it were, it would not be the first time we have been promised a date by which a report will be published, only then to be given another, and another.
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
I thank the hon. Lady for the warm words she is offering, which reflect the spirit in which this debate has been conducted throughout. The review will be conducted in the timeframe she describes because the Government are clear that it should take place while the Bill is live and is enjoying its passage through both Houses of Parliament. It would have been quite inappropriate to have a review once the Bill had passed into law.
Anne McLaughlin
I would argue that the review should have happened before now. Even if it is completed within three months, that will not be while scrutiny of the Bill is taking place here by elected Members; the scrutiny will be in the other place by Members of the House of Lords, who are not elected.
We are also confident that the review’s findings will not be significantly different from those of the reviews carried out by other countries, which I will come on to in a moment. In other words, it is likely to find that bulk powers are not necessary and give us no unique information that could not be garnered by other investigative techniques. Regarding those other techniques, the Government are arguing that new clause 5 will mean that bulk powers will be used only when other investigative techniques show up nothing, because the new clause recognises the importance of privacy to the individual—indeed, new clause 5 has been dubbed the privacy clause.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
Although I served on the Bill Committee, the hon. Lady must forgive my ignorance. She mentioned other means aside from bulk powers. Is she going to delineate those to the House?
Anne McLaughlin
If the hon. Gentleman would care to exercise a little patience, he might get the answer to that. He might not, mind you. [Laughter.] No, he will. I am joking.
I understand that the Government are arguing that new clause 5 is a privacy clause, but how can we trust their commitment to privacy when between the publication of the draft Bill and the publication of this Bill the significant change to deal with the need for privacy to be of primary importance entailed simply changing the name of part 1 from “General Protections” to “General Privacy Protections”? This is not about words, but about intent, action and commitment, and inserting one word appeases no one.
Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
First, is the hon. Lady aware that there is a sunset clause? Secondly, if the powers are not available to be exercised but it is found that they are necessary, there will be a gap in our security services’ ability to combat terrorism and in the police’s ability to combat serious crime.
Anne McLaughlin
I will come on to that point shortly.
The fundamental point is this: why should we as Members of Parliament be expected to vote through legislation that is to be reviewed? That seems an unprofessional way—to say the least—to do business, and I would feel very uncomfortable crossing my fingers and hoping for the best. I also appeal to Labour colleagues to be a little more circumspect about trusting this Government with their votes today.
Let us take a look at one of the countries I mentioned earlier that has already reviewed bulk powers—the USA. The Snowden revelations revealed that the National Security Agency was running a bulk domestic telephone records programme. The NSA and others put up a strong case for maintaining it. The NSA produced a dossier of 54 counter-terrorism events in which, it said, bulk powers contributed to success in countering terrorism, but two entirely independent American bodies reviewed all 54 counter-terrorism cases and determined that only 12 had any relevance to the use of bulk powers under section 215 of the USA Patriot Act 2001.
One of those groups—the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, which is a very well respected, high-powered and independent body, set up under the auspices of President Obama—concluded:
“Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215…was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders.”
The other body—the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—concluded similarly. It said that it had
“not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the program”—
meaning the use of bulk powers—
“made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.”
It went further, saying that it was
“aware of no instance in which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.”
Whatever I think the outcome of the review will be—none of us knows, because it has not happened—it is none the less a recognition that the Government have failed to convince both the House and wider society of the necessity of the powers.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is vital that the independent review looks at the American experience, given that America is one of our chief allies? Does she also agree that the Opposition should seek an assurance from the Government that the independent review will do so?
Anne McLaughlin
It would be very helpful if the Opposition secured that. We should not just follow suit—we support the review, but will not say, “Do as America does.” We must conduct our own review. Given the extent to which the Americans have looked at this, we need the same access.
Anne McLaughlin
May I continue? I have already given way to the hon. and learned Lady and am conscious of the need to let other Members speak. I will possibly give way a wee bit later.
The review is welcome—of course it is, not least because it is hoped that David Anderson QC will do what Liberty and others have called for and use the opportunity properly to challenge the evidence and produce a thorough, comprehensive and unbiased examination of the necessity of all bulk powers in the Bill. However, the review was called for long ago by Liberty and other respectable organisations. The Government could and should have completed it before asking MPs to vote for the Bill.
When we are dealing with proposals that are so broad—the proposal is effectively for bulk data harvesting from mainly innocent citizens—it is incumbent on the Government to prove that there is an operational case and that the powers are necessary, and to ensure that the safeguards in place are rigorous. The Government have neither proven the operational case for the powers nor have they delivered safeguards and oversight of sufficient calibre to make the powers justifiable.
Anne McLaughlin
I will give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman but I am trying not to give way too often.
Mr Grieve
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. As I indicated when I spoke on Second Reading, I appreciate that bulk powers are controversial, but I am absolutely sure that we do not conduct data harvesting in this country. It simply does not happen. The use of bulk powers is not for that purpose, but for the purpose of examining material. Even though that may be done in bulk, it is done in a way that does not amount to the generalised harvesting of data for their examination. It simply is not.
Anne McLaughlin
My answer to that is simply that if the Bill allows for bulk data harvesting, it can still happen. We cannot sit here and say, “No, it will never happen.”
The SNP argument is not to do down our security services or anyone else working to keep our constituents safe. We argue that we would fail as a Parliament if we assert our power on behalf of our constituents and fail to place proper limitations on the scope of the state to interfere in the lives of innocent private citizens.
Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
Will the hon. Lady give way?
Anne McLaughlin
I will not give way at the moment—I have given way too many times and others want to speak.
To use an illustrative analogy, if we were to authorise the opening, scanning and retention of all mail via a particular post office in the hope that one day we could go back once we had found, via another investigative technique, a suspicion about a certain user of that post office, our constituents would rightly be marching on this place demanding that we stop such an outrage. Do the Government really believe that people using that post office would be content to believe that all was well as long as the letters were stored in a big safe to which only the good guys had the key, or that they would be read only after a warrant was required? I do not believe so—people are not that daft and, strangely, for some unknown reason, they are not that trusting—yet the Government are asking us to focus on the issue of access and examination, and to ignore the massive combine harvester in the room, meaning bulk data collection. Government Members may well groan, but we are entitled to express our opinions on the Bill and to scrutinise the legislation rigorously.
On the Government’s own terms, that abuse of public privacy is of very limited use anyway. Targeted powers are far more effective and could resolve many of the privacy concerns. If we have a justifiable case to access information, we already know who we should be targeting for data collection. Why are we wasting time and resources using bulk techniques for that collection?
Seema Kennedy
The hon. Lady referred to known targets, but surely one advantage of bulk data gathering is finding those unknown people out there who wish to do us harm.
Anne McLaughlin
I wonder how the hon. Lady believes we will do that. The evidence reviewed by the Committee showed that bulk powers are counter-productive because the sheer scale of the data makes them impossible to analyse adequately. In fact, I believe the Government used the limited capacity of the security services to analyse bulk quantities of data as a form of assurance, which was strange to say the least.
Mr John Hayes
I say this to be helpful to the hon. Lady. I fear that the debate has moved on and she has not. The truth of the matter is that the bulk powers she describes were considered by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which is chaired by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). It established that there was both validity and necessity. She is arguing a general case on bulk rather than the case for safeguards. The debate we ought to be having is about safeguards, is it not?
Anne McLaughlin
I thank the Minister for that advice and will pass it on to my constituents, who have the same concerns as I do and whose concerns I am expressing.
As we know, the Bill is supposed to be a basis for the use of those techniques for quite some time, and we are not future-proofing the Bill if we say that it is absolutely fine to have intrusive bulk techniques because now, in 2016, we do not have the technical capabilities to analyse all the data. Some present-day practices are reliant on 32-year-old laws—they date back to 1984, of all years. If we get the measure wrong, there is every possibility that we will enshrine in law invasive practices that will become feasible only at some point in the next 32 years.
Perhaps the most worrying powers of part 6 refer to bulk equipment interference, which the Government helpfully outline as follows:
“bulk equipment interference is not targeted against particular person(s), organisation(s) or location(s) or against equipment that is being used for particular activities”.
It is therefore an indiscriminate form of interference that leaves systems vulnerable, not only to our own security services using their powers sparingly and proportionately, but to those looking to cause harm and to profit from broken security. If the front door of someone’s house has been kicked in by the police, criminals are not prevented from entering after their departure.
Our concerns regarding the bulk powers provisions in part 6 are connected to many of our concerns regarding the use of bulk datasets. At the heart of the matter is the retention of intimate personal details regarding the tens of millions of ordinary citizens of this country who do not merit such information being held by the state. We welcome the review of the use of bulk powers and recognise that other parts of the Bill impact on part 6 —it cannot stand in isolation. If bulk datasets are acquired by other mechanisms in the Bill, how are they to be dealt with and properly handled? Therefore, as we have stressed throughout, the Bill should be easy to understand, and should clarify what is permitted and what is not. We should not provide a mechanism whereby we rubber stamp practices that were never previously debated.
Again, the offline analogy is instructive. If we were asked by the state to deposit our membership forms for various organisations—political parties, campaign groups, golf clubs—or forms with our direct debit details, health records and other such bulk information into a big safe on the understanding that only the security services would have access to it, we would rightly baulk at such a proposal. Just because such a system is being proposed online and without the consent of the individuals concerned does not make it acceptable—in many ways, it makes it much worse. I hope the Minister will address that comparison.
Anne McLaughlin
If the review comes back and says that the bulk powers are not necessary, what will the Labour party do then?
Keir Starmer
I will assess that at the time. It depends on what the report says, because if it calls any of the powers into question or makes any recommendations about their exercise, we would all want to consider that. It would be difficult for anybody in this House or the other place to make a case for a bulk power that an independent review has deemed unnecessary. Let us wait until we get to that stage and let us see what the review actually says.
As for confidence in the review, there is a question of publication. It is important that the review’s report is publicly available. I obviously understand that David Anderson and his team will see highly sensitive material, to which they will have unrestricted access, so the detail that can be put in any public report will inevitably be limited. I think everybody understands that. It is important that the report is published in some form, as most of David Anderson’s report have been, so that they can be read not only by Members of this House and of the other place, but by members of the public seeking assurances about and confidence in the review.
Simon Hoare
There is a golden rule in the Hoare household that when in doubt we turn to Kipling—not the exceedingly good baker, but our rather excellent writer. I pray in aid Kipling in order to summarise.
I was not intending to speak on this grouping until I heard the cases deployed by the SNP and by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). On the latter point, I concur and support what he said entirely, but the approach of the SNP, which we have heard since Second Reading—it was certainly a golden thread running through Committee—is one of serious annoyance to me, as I am pretty certain it is to colleagues. I am absolutely certain it is of huge anxiety to our constituents. The hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) obviously has constituents who are very different from mine. She and I served on the Immigration Bill Committee, as did the shadow Minister, some little while ago. According to her, no constituent of hers had ever raised the issue of immigration, yet all constituents have raised with her these huge Glasgow concerns about bulk powers.
Simon Hoare
In a moment, because I want to give the hon. Lady the benefit of the words of Rudyard Kipling. I do not personalise this to her; rather I make it as a general point to her party. The SNP has demonstrated:
“Power without responsibility—the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages.'”
The SNP is using a position of power to malign and undermine, as it has continually sought to do, the confidence of this House and of the country in the robustness and ethics of those in our security services, who, day in, day out, seek to use—I agree with the point made by the shadow Minister that they also require this—the public confidence that they have in order to make sure they have the right skills and tools to keep our constituents safe.
Anne McLaughlin
If the review shows that the bulk powers are not necessary, as the reviews in the USA showed, would the hon. Gentleman expect the powers to be taken out of the Bill?
Kevin Foster
I thank the hon. Lady for that helpful and interesting intervention. First of all, I would not want to prejudge the review. In addition, if the review came back to us and said that these powers were absolutely right, and that they were vital for national security, I hope that we could look forward to the SNP’s immediate and wholehearted support. I have a funny feeling that we might not, however.
Let us not prejudge the review. As the Front-Bench spokesmen touched on in their exchange at the Dispatch Box, it is highly unlikely that if the review stated that something specific was not needed, such a measure would be proceeded with. How do we know what an independent review will come back with? If I knew, and I stood here and said so, the next accusation would be that the review was not independent because we already knew what it would come out with. That point does not support making the amendments, which remove these powers completely.
I have been satisfied by the changes that have been made throughout the process, as the Bill has come out of Committee into Report. Judicial safeguards have been strengthened, and there is now a stronger and more consistent judicial test for review of these warrants. Powers have been increased, as have the offences that apply if someone misuses data. The Government are striking the right balance between what we need in order to get hold of data that could keep our country safe, and the legitimate expectation of privacy. If data have been collected that are of no use, they can be removed and they will not be used for purposes beyond the original basis of the warrant.
Ultimately, in any unjustified use of a warrant, the Secretary of State remains answerable to this Parliament. If, for example, someone decided for some unknown reason that it would make sense to go into detail about political or trade union affiliation, they would be answerable to this House, and a Secretary of State would be most unlikely to survive that.
Mr Hayes
I do not know if the hon. and learned Lady was listening, but I read out three things: 90% of operations in Afghanistan, 95% of cyber-attacks, every single major counter-terrorism investigation over the last decade. I cannot be plainer about the necessity, but because the Government are so determined to ensure adequate safeguards, we have agreed to a further review. As the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), generously said, the review is to be completed in exactly the form that emerged as a result of the discussions between the Opposition and the Government—an illustration of the House behaving at its best. The review, chaired by David Anderson, will be able to look not just at utility—the point I made to the Chair of the ISC—but at necessity, and it will be independent.
Anne McLaughlin
So the Minister is saying that all these counter-terrorism activities were helped by bulk powers, but now we are going to have a review to see whether that is true. As I said, there were two independent reviews in the US. The NSA argued—much as he is arguing now—that all 54 counter-terrorism events had relied on bulk powers, but both independent committees said, “Absolutely not. Not at all. There were other techniques.” What will he do if this review finds the same as the two reviews in the US? Will he then remove the bulk powers from the Bill?
Mr Hayes
It is a bit rich to say, “We want a review and we want the Government to listen and agree”, and then, when they do listen and agree, to say, “You haven’t agreed enough or soon enough.” I accept that the review should be entirely independent—I made that clear in my letter to the shadow Minister. I accept that it will be for David Anderson to decide exactly how he goes about his work. I have further accepted today that he should look at international comparisons, which I think is perfectly reasonable. It will be for David Anderson to decide whether he does that; if he wants to, that will certainly be within his scope. This will be an independent review, with as much information as possible made public, and it will be able to range, in the way the hon. Lady has described, across these powers.
Mr Hayes
I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for his support. I know that the Government Whips will take careful note of it. [Laughter.]
We have listened to the call for independent validation. David Anderson QC will undertake the review, so I will say no more about that.
We have debated at some length, today and previously, the amendments tabled by the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), which contain a number of proposals. I am grateful for his contribution to the debate, generally and, more specifically, today. I am pleased that my right hon. and learned Friend has explained the purposes behind new clause 3 and amendment 24. The Government certainly accept in principle the argument that we should provide further restrictions on the use of class bulk personal dataset warrants. We also accept much of the detail contained in the ISC’s draft clause, including reference to the need for restrictions relating to sensitive personal data.
I have dealt with the issue about which—as my right hon. and learned Friend knows—we are least happy, namely the timescale within which these matters are reported to the ISC. I think that more could be done, and I think that a protocol of the kind that my right hon. and learned Friend described in his brief contribution might provide a way of doing it. We will take that suggestion away and do further work, in the spirit to which he referred.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who is no longer present but who is an old friend of mine, raised issues relating to modifications. I want to make it absolutely clear that in all modifications, a warrant will require the same double lock. Yesterday and in Committee, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras argued that a double lock that applies when a warrant is originally sought must apply to modifications. I entirely accept that point. My hon. Friend made it again today, and I can assure him that the double lock will apply to bulk powers as well.
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised the issue of medical records. It is right for particularly sensitive data to be handled in a particularly sensitive way, and I am pleased that he noted the Government amendment which, I think, deals with that. We will consider the technical points that he raised about social care and mental health, but I am confident that we can find a way forward.
I do not want to delay the House unduly—as you know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that is not my habit, and we have other important matters to consider—but I do want to say that one of my regrets is that we have not had more Proust today, or during our consideration of the Bill more generally. Marcel Proust said:
“The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes”.
The consideration of this Bill has been extensive. Three reports before its publication in draft, three parliamentary Committees once the draft Bill was published, and a very thorough examination in Committee following Second Reading have allowed us to have “new eyes”, and to see more clearly both the need to secure our people and counter the very real threats that we face, and the need to deal with the checks and balances which ensure that the powers we give those who are missioned to keep us safe are used proportionately, and only where necessary. Achieving that balance—a balance that lies at the heart of the Bill—has required the House to take a balanced approach. As I said a few moments ago, Parliament is at its best when it puts national interest beyond party interest, and this is common ground for the common good.
Anne McLaughlin
I have to say that the Minister’s tone does not really reflect that which some of his hon. Friends used when addressing this debate. I have felt completely patronised at times today, because people on the Government Benches have been shouting, “You don’t understand this Bill.” Just because we take a different view or come at things from a different angle does not mean that we do not understand. The right hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Sir Alan Duncan) shakes his head, but it was offensive to have to listen to that nonsense, particularly when it was directed at my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), who is a learned QC and certainly does know what she is talking about.
Anne McLaughlin
No, I will not take any interventions—[Interruption.] Okay, patronise away.
Sir Alan Duncan
May I just say to the hon. Lady and her hon. Friends that there was no intention whatsoever to be patronising? If she wants to take it in that vein, may I apologise and do so graciously? Our view is simply that bulk interception and bulk powers involve a poor use of the word “bulk”. The intrusion on the individual compared with the collective gathering of information is misunderstood in many cases. That is our point, and I hope that she can accept it in that spirit.
Anne McLaughlin
I most certainly will accept the right hon. Gentleman’s apology, but I reiterate that just because we come at this from a different angle does not mean that we are wrong. These are our opinions, and Government Members have their opinions.
I also want to mention the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), who was utterly offensive in his suggestion that we in the SNP quarter—[Interruption.] And the Lib Dem quarter, and everybody else on this side. The hon. Gentleman suggested that we do not care about terrorism or about people affected by paedophilia. Of course we care! He suggests that we do not just because we do not believe that this is the way to go about tackling those things, but we are not the only ones who believe that. It was really, truly offensive and below the belt, and I think the hon. Gentleman should apologise. I will accept it in writing if he is not going to do it here.
Anne McLaughlin
I’ll wait a long time, will I? Okay.
To sum up, we will be pressing the amendment because we have heard nothing today that reassures us. The legislative process in the House of Commons is coming to an end, but how can we be expected to vote when there is to be a review? On that note, I appeal to dear and learned friends in the Labour party to think again about trusting this lot with the review, because not one Government Member—I know that the Labour party has not done this either—will say what they will do if the independent review shows that the bulk powers are unnecessary, as has been shown in the United States—[Interruption.] No, I gave the Minister an opportunity, but instead of answering the question, he took an intervention from the Government Benches. He has not said what the Government will do if the review shows what he is not expecting it to show.
Question put, That the amendment be made.