John Bercow
Main Page: John Bercow (Speaker - Buckingham)Department Debates - View all John Bercow's debates with the Home Office
Investigatory Powers Bill
John Bercow ExcerptsTuesday 7th June 2016
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 7 June 2016 - (7 Jun 2016)
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 390, page 95, line 27, leave out clause 119.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 391, page 96, line 36, leave out clause 120.
Amendment 392, page 97, line 15, leave out clause 121.
Amendment 393, page 98, line 20, leave out clause 122.
Amendment 394, page 98, line 38, leave out clause 123.
Amendment 275, in clause 123, page 99, line 10, leave out from “must” to end of line 11, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners.
Amendment 395, page 99, line 19, leave out clause 124.
Amendment 396, page 99, line 24, leave out clause 125.
Amendment 9, in clause 125, page 99, line 33, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) The operational purposes specified in the warrant must be ones specified, in a list maintained by the heads of the intelligence services, as purposes which they consider are operational purposes for which intercepted content or secondary data obtained under bulk interception warrants may be selected for examination.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to amend the Bill to provide for a designated list of operational purposes, such that only a purpose on that list may be specified in a warrant relating to bulk powers.
Amendment 10, page 99, line 37, leave out from “issued” to end of line 39 and insert
“are specified in the list mentioned in subsection (4).
(5A) An operational purpose may be specified in the list mentioned in subsection (4) only with the approval of the Secretary of State.
(5B) The Secretary of State may give such approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 121 subsections (1)(b) or (2).”
To make clear that the Secretary of State must approve all operational purposes specified on the list.
Amendment 11, page 99, line 39, at end insert—
“(5C) The list of operational purposes mentioned in subsection (4) must be reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.”
To ensure that the list of Operational Purposes is reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.
Amendment 12, page 99, line 39, at end insert—
“(5D) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) will be kept informed of any changes to the list of Operational Purposes in a timely manner.
(5E) Subject to subsection 201(7), the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must include in his Annual Report a summary of those Operational Purposes which, during the period of his report, have been specified in any warrants issued under Parts 6 and 7.”
To ensure that the ISC and Commissioners are kept informed of changes to the list of Operational Purposes. To ensure that a summary of the Operational Purposes are published each year.
Amendment 397, page 100, line 2, leave out clause 126.
Amendment 398, page 100, line 10, leave out clause 127.
Amendment 22, in clause 127, page 100, line 12, leave out
“before it would otherwise cease to have effect”
and insert “during the renewal period”.
See amendment 20.
Amendment 23, page 100, line 34, at end insert—
“(2A) ‘The renewal period’ means the period of 30 days ending with the day at the end of which the warrant would otherwise cease to have effect.”
See amendment 20.
Amendment 153, page 101, line 9, leave out clause 128.
Amendment 154, page 102, line 25, leave out clause 129.
Amendment 401, page 103, line 8, leave out clause 130.
Amendment 402, page 103, line 31, leave out clause 131.
Amendment 403, page 104, line 19, leave out clause 132.
Amendment 404, page 105, line 44, leave out clause 133.
Amendment 405, page 106, line 24, leave out clause 134.
Amendment 406, page 108, line 1, leave out clause 135.
Amendment 407, page 108, line 29, leave out clause 136.
Amendment 408, page 108, line 39, leave out clause 137.
Amendment 409, page 109, line 16, leave out clause 138.
Amendment 410, page 110, line 40, leave out clause 139.
Amendment 212, in clause 139, page 110, line 42, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 213, page 111, line 7, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 278, page 111, line 7, leave out from “must” to end of line 8, and insert “subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 212 and 213 (which are a package).
Amendment 411, page 111, line 16, leave out clause 140.
Amendment 412, page 111, line 21, leave out clause 141.
Amendment 413, page 112, line 2, leave out clause 142.
Amendment 414, page 112, line 10, leave out clause 143.
Amendment 155, page 113, line 9, leave out clause 144.
Amendment 156, page 114, line 19, leave out clause 145.
Amendment 417, page 115, line 2, leave out clause 146.
Amendment 418, page 115, line 25, leave out clause 147.
Amendment 419, page 116, line 7, leave out clause 148.
Government amendments 44 to 47.
Amendment 420, page 116, line 35, leave out clause 149.
Amendment 421, page 117, line 11, leave out clause 150.
Amendment 422, page 118, line 39, leave out clause 151.
Amendment 423, page 119, line 8, leave out clause 152.
Amendment 424, page 119, line 36, leave out clause 153.
Amendment 425, page 120, line 10, leave out clause 154.
Amendment 426, page 121, line 33, leave out clause 155.
Amendment 427, page 122, line 4, leave out clause 156.
Amendment 428, page 123, line 1, leave out clause 157.
Amendment 214, in clause 157, page 123, line 3, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 215, page 123, line 15, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 281, page 123, line 15, leave out from “must” to end of line 16, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners.
Amendment 429, page 123, line 24, leave out clause 158.
Amendment 430, page 123, line 41, leave out clause 159.
Amendment 431, page 124, line 34, leave out clause 160.
Amendment 432, page 125, line 3, leave out clause 161.
Amendment 433, page 125, line 25, leave out clause 162.
Amendment 434, page 126, line 3, leave out clause 163.
Amendment 157, page 127, line 1, leave out clause 164.
Government amendments 127 and 128.
Amendment 158, page 128, line 14, leave out clause 165.
Amendment 437, page 129, line 1, leave out clause 166.
Amendment 438, page 129, line 25, leave out clause 167.
Amendment 439, page 130, line 14, leave out clause 168.
Amendment 440, page 131, line 33, leave out clause 169.
Amendment 441, page 132, line 3, leave out clause 170.
Government amendment 129.
Amendment 442, page 133, line 30, leave out clause 171.
Amendment 443, page 134, line 12, leave out clause 172.
Amendment 444, page 134, line 19, leave out clause 173.
Government amendment 130.
Government new clause 14—Health records.
New clause 3—Restriction on use of class bulk personal dataset warrants—
“(1) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, a bulk personal dataset in reliance on a class bulk personal dataset warrant if the head of the intelligence service considers—
(a) that the bulk personal dataset includes a large quantity of sensitive personal data, or
(b) that the nature of the bulk personal dataset, or the circumstances in which it was created, is or are such that its retention, or retention and examination, by the intelligence service raises issues which ought to be considered by the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner on an application by the head of the intelligence service for a specific BPD warrant.
(2) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, greater than twenty distinct bulk personal datasets in reliance on any class BPD warrant.
(3) In subsection (1) ‘sensitive personal data’ means personal data consisting of information about an individual (whether living or deceased) which is of a kind mentioned in section 2(a) to (f) of the Data Protection Act 1998.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to place greater restrictions on the use of Class BPD warrants in relation to the retention/examination of sensitive personal data (relating to race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health, or sexual orientation). To cap the number of datasets which may be covered by any Class warrant.
Amendment 445, page 135, line 4, leave out clause 174.
Amendment 446, page 135, line 21, leave out clause 175.
Amendment 447, page 135, line 37, leave out clause 176.
Amendment 448, page 136, line 9, leave out clause 177.
Amendment 303, in clause 177, page 136, line 44, at end insert—
“(5) Subsection (6) applies where a warrant application under this section relates to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
(6) The Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of material referred to in subsection (5); and
(b) specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material”.
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 449, page 137, line 1, leave out clause 178.
Amendment 24, in clause 178, page 137, line 17, leave out “and” and insert—
“(aa) a statement outlining the extent to which sensitive personal data as defined by section [Restriction on use of class BPD warrants] is expected to be part of the bulk personal dataset, and”.
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to require specific BPD warrant applications to set out the extent to which datasets may include sensitive personal data (relating to race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health, or sexual orientation), in order that the Secretary of State may properly assess the proportionality of obtaining the dataset.
Amendment 304, page 138, line 2, at end insert—
“(8) Subsection (6) applies where a warrant application under this section relates to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
(9) The Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of material referred to in subsection (5); and
(b) specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material.”
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 450, page 138, line 3, leave out clause 179.
Amendment 216, in clause 179, page 138, line 5, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 217, page 138, line 22, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 284, page 138, line 22, leave out from “must” to end of line 23, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 216 and 217 (which are a package).
Amendment 451, page 138, line 31, leave out clause 180.
Amendment 452, page 139, line 4, leave out clause 181.
Amendment 453, page 140, line 1, leave out clause 182.
Amendment 454, page 140, line 15, leave out clause 183.
Amendment 455, page 141, line 4, leave out clause 184.
Amendment 456, page 141, line 26, leave out clause 185.
Amendment 159, page 142, line 13, leave out clause 186.
Amendment 160, page 143, line 22, leave out clause 187.
Amendment 459, page 144, line 7, leave out clause 188.
Amendment 460, page 144, line 25, leave out clause 189.
Amendment 461, page 146, line 2, leave out clause 190.
Amendment 462, page 147, line 5, leave out clause 191.
Amendment 463, page 147, line 21, leave out clause 192.
Amendment 305, in clause 192, page 147, line 42, at end insert—
“(4A) A direction under subsection (3) may only be made for material relating to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 if the Secretary of State considers that—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of such material; and
(b) that specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material.”
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 464, page 148, line 37, leave out clause 193.
Anne McLaughlin
Part 6 of the Bill, on bulk powers, is perhaps one of its most controversial parts. The Scottish National party is calling for part 6 to be shelved along with part 7 until such time as an argument for their inclusion has been demonstrated by an independent review of their proportionality and operative necessity—that is to say that we believe that the powers in part 6 should be removed from the Bill until a satisfactory operational case is made for them.
The review the Government have agreed to is most welcome but they must get it right. It must be conducted properly if it is to be of any value to the process of parliamentary scrutiny or is to secure the public’s confidence in its conclusions. Yesterday we had sight of some more detail about the review, in a letter from the Minister to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). We were particularly pleased to note that one of the review team will be a barrister who has a great deal of experience working as a special advocate acting against the Government in terrorism cases. That degree of balance is good and is to be welcomed.
The review needs to be given the time to do a thorough job, however, and we simply do not believe that three months is long enough. Even if it were, it would not be the first time we have been promised a date by which a report will be published, only then to be given another, and another.
Mr Speaker
Order. I wish to say, before the hon. Gentleman develops his case, that although I absolutely understand that he speaks for his party from the Front Bench and is entitled to develop his case, I would gently point out that another seven Members wish to contribute, several of whom sat on the Committee, and I most certainly wish to include the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It is not a criticism, but I am sure he will tailor his contribution to take account of that fact.
Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Will there be time for us to have a Third Reading debate and for those of us opposed to the Bill to show our opposition?
Mr Speaker
It depends on how many Divisions there are. As the hon. Gentleman will know, only one hour is allocated for Third Reading, and votes will eat into that, so it is a function of the demand for votes. I am sorry that I cannot give him a more precise answer, but I always have his interests uppermost in my mind, and I will try to accommodate him and others.
Mr Alistair Carmichael
Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. The House agreed a timetable motion yesterday, since when substantial amendments and concessions have been made by those on the Treasury Bench. The Bill is very different now. Can you confirm for me that it would still be within the Government’s competence to bring forward an amended timetable that would allow us to have Third Reading on another day?
Mr Speaker
The answer to the right hon. Gentleman, who has considerable experience in these matters, not least from when he was on the other side of the fence, as a very senior Whip, is that it is always open to the Government to table an alternative programme motion. That is not a matter for the Chair. The amendments were, of course, all on the paper at the point at which the House agreed the programme motion.
I ought just to say for the avoidance of doubt that the hon. Gentleman who has the floor is not in any way being criticised; I simply wanted to make him aware of the level of demand. I think we ought now to proceed. I would happily sit here all night for colleagues to debate these matters, but I rather doubt there would be the same enthusiasm among Government Whips for such a proposition.
Gavin Newlands
Thank you very much, Mr Speaker; I have almost forgotten what the intervention was—[Interruption.] I do not doubt that, but to answer it, we do not know what ICRs are at the moment. They are not clearly defined—the shadow Home Secretary made that point himself earlier; nor do we know how effective they will be. People in the industry tell me that current technology, such as Tor, virtual private networks and what have you, may render them useless. We do not know what ICRs are at the moment, so I have to be honest with the shadow Home Secretary: I do not have all the answers.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Speaker
Order. I would like to call the Solicitor General no later than 5.48 pm, and there are three people whom I wish to accommodate before then—Members can do the arithmetic for themselves. We have just under nine minutes to go. I call Matt Warman.
Matt Warman (Boston and Skegness) (Con)
I rise to talk briefly about both journalists and internet connection records. I have heard an awful lot of comments about journalism, and I agree with all of them. Indeed, had the Government not moved some of the material from the codes of practice into the Bill, I might have struggled to support it. At every stage, we will struggle to construct anything useful unless we define what a journalist is, and I find it hard to see how that is possible. In this modern age, I am painfully conscious that, in some senses, we are all journalists ourselves. Almost all of us write columns for our local paper. Arguably, we could all be regarded as journalists simply because we commentate via Twitter on what is going on in politics. I struggle to see what more the Government can do—as much as I would like them to do it and as much as I would like to support new clause 27. Unless we come up with a workable definition of journalism, I struggle to see how we will make what I regard as genuinely very necessary and very helpful progress on a hugely important issue.
On the second point on internet connection records, it strikes me that although they have frequently been compared with a telephone record or an itemised phone bill, it is simply not a sensible comparison in the modern world when we make far fewer voice calls. That sense of an ICR telling us simply that a user has gone to Facebook misunderstands the fact that knowing that someone has gone to Facebook if they are a missing person, for example, allows us then to go to Facebook and make that crucial next step to find that person. Although an ICR does not tell us a huge amount of information, it tells us enough. We in this House have a duty to do everything that we possibly can in this regard and to bear it in mind that it is not us but communications providers who hold that information. I very much welcome what the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) said about having concerns about access, rather than about the principle of what I hope we can all agree is a potentially vital tool in this vital battle against both crime and missing persons.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Alistair Carmichael
I rise to speak to the amendments standing in my name, particularly amendment 3. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands) said that the amendments tabled by the SNP that sought to remove internet connection records from the Bill had not been selected. I notice that he and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) have also added their names to amendment 3. It was not my intention at the start of this debate, but I have heard so little by way of comfort from the Government Front-Bench team that I intend to press amendment 3 to a vote. It is surely unacceptable, at this stage in proceedings, that we still have no proper definition of what exactly is an internet connection record. Others have touched on that during the course of our debates.
It is 15 years to the day since I was elected at the 2001 general election. I have seen a few things in this House in that time, and one thing that I have learned to recognise is a well-rehearsed line exchanged between the two Front-Bench teams. I think we saw that when the shadow Home Secretary was getting his assurances from the Minister for Security. I have to say that he has got assurances which, frankly, miss the whole point. The assurances on threshold, for example, do absolutely nothing to address the problems that are inherent in the riskiness of retaining such data in the first place. I cannot improve on the definition or the expression that was used by the Joint Committee when it reported on the draft Bill. It said that the collection of internet connection records would be a
“honeypot for casual hackers, blackmailers, criminals large and small from around the world, and foreign states.”
David Anderson QC described the expanded data collection by internet service providers as “overstated and misunderstood”—to the point and understated. There is no other “Five Eyes” country in which operators have been forced, or are being forced, to retain similar internet connection data. That surely tells us all that we need to know. The case has not been made. It is always open to the Government to come back on some future occasion to make a case and to put these provisions in another Bill. They have not made the case, and the provisions should not be in this Bill.