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Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateConor McGinn
Main Page: Conor McGinn (Independent - St Helens North)Department Debates - View all Conor McGinn's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to close the debate on behalf of the Opposition. The serious and sombre tone of the debate, which is appropriate given the measures we are discussing, was set by the Security Minister and the shadow Home Secretary. The debate has been well informed and enhanced by the contribution of former Cabinet Ministers, particularly Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, who have a working knowledge of these matters, and also the former Attorney General and the Chairs of the Intelligence and Security Committee and Justice Committee.
As the Leader of the Opposition has made clear, security is a top priority for the Labour party under his leadership. As I have said before from this Dispatch Box, we will be forceful and robust in supporting the fight against terrorism and crime in all its forms. We consider it our first responsibility to keep this country, its citizens and our communities safe. We will meet our duty to support those who put their own safety and lives at risk to protect us. We acknowledge and understand the purpose of this Bill, which seeks to put on a statutory footing the activity of those working to disrupt some of the most vile crimes imaginable, including terrorism, the activities of violent drug gangs, serious and organised crime, and child sexual exploitation.
We know that the threat from criminal and terrorist activity is very real and that the ability to gather intelligence is a vital tool in disrupting this activity, preventing further crime and bringing those responsible for it to justice. Since March 2017, the security services and counter-terror police have thwarted 27 terror attacks. In 2018, covert human intelligence sources helped to disrupt over 30 threats to life, leading to the arrest of numerous serious organised criminals and the seizure of more than 3,000 kilograms of class A drugs, and taking more than 50 firearms off the street.
During the course of those operations, it is inevitable that agents will at times transgress existing laws in a limited way. This activity has been happening for a long time. It is not always comfortable for us in this House to think about what we need people to do to protect us and prevent harm coming to us, but real life is not a film. There is no Superman, it is not a fairy tale and there is not always a happy ending. That is why it is a step forward that this activity will now be properly covered by statute and open to greater transparency, accountability, regulation and safeguarding in a way that it has not been before.
We are told that under this legislation covert human intelligence sources will not be given carte blanche—the Minister made that very clear. It is therefore absolutely vital that during the passage of the Bill we get those safeguards and the processes and structures for accountability and proportionality absolutely right, both for the maintenance of our country’s hard-won civil liberties and human rights and for the protection of those who undertake such activity, as my hon. Friends the Members for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) and for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) outlined so eloquently.
The Bill is certified as compliant with the Human Rights Act, as the Minister set out. All public authorities are bound by it to act in a way that is compatible with the rights protected by the European convention on human rights, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture or subjecting someone to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Human Rights Act is specifically mentioned in the Bill, providing important and necessary protection. However, it is right that during the Bill’s progress we will be pressing the Government on safeguards as to what acts can be carried out. I therefore take this opportunity to let the Government know, as the hon. Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson) and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) have, about those areas where we believe the Bill requires scrutiny and can be strengthened on its journey.
We need to explore in greater detail how we might get closer to the specifics of what offences can be allowed, as has been done in, for example, Canada and indeed the United States. There is nothing in the Bill to limit or specify the kinds of offences covered, only that they are to be necessary and proportionate. Despite the fact that the Human Rights Act is applicable in all circumstances, we will be pressing the Minister for an understanding as to why offences such as murder, torture and sexual violence are not explicitly ruled out in this legislation.
Moreover, the Bill certifies that an authorisation may be given only if it is deemed necessary
“in the interests of national security…for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; or…in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.”
These are broad statements that could have wide-ranging interpretations, particularly the last of the three, by a large list of agencies. We want to explore some of that and will press for assurances.
We also want to look at levels of accountability and sign-off for authorisation. As the Bill stands, the use of such powers will be overseen by the independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who can report on an annual basis. We believe the Bill needs to go further and that each and every authorisation should be notified to the commissioner in real time, so that scrutiny can be robust and ongoing. I also welcome indications from the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee that they too will seek to bring forward safeguards in that respect through amendments.
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s comments and, indeed, the tone of his contribution, but he must surely acknowledge that being very specific about what covert agents can and cannot do would expose them to great risk, for those they infiltrate would know what their parameters of activity are likely to be.
The right hon Gentleman makes a very fair point. I completely appreciate that and have taken into account the comments that have been made by Ministers and those with experience of this, but I just seek simply to see whether there is a way that we can add more reassurance for people around some of the specificity of these matters without exposing people to the dangers that have been rightly outlined.
My hon. Friend is doing very well. He has been in the Chamber for only 20 minutes and this is his third intervention, but I will, of course, give way to him.
Order. The hon. Gentleman said that he had been refused permission to speak by the Speaker’s Office, but if he had submitted his name in time, he would have been on the list, so I do not quite understand. Perhaps he would like to come and see me and explain exactly what happened.
Sorry, Madam Deputy Speaker, I did not mean to start a discussion with the Speaker’s Office. My hon. Friend makes an important point, which is why I specifically referenced Canada and the United States in terms of the model that we would probe.
I wish to make some progress now and draw to a conclusion. We also have concerns over the potential use of these powers in relation to retrospective action. It says that approval will be sought as soon as it is practically possible. Our view is that there should be a time limit on that, and we would look to a period of around a month. I am happy to discuss this with the Minister as there does need to be some sort of a hard deadline on retrospective authority. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent retrospective action, which could see it being abused. Where there are allegations of historical injustices involving law enforcement and the security services, justice must take its course and the Bill cannot interfere with that.
We will also be carefully scrutinising the number and nature of the public agencies approved for this activity, which was a point very well made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). These are serious powers—granting the ability for an individual to break the law—so there must be a clear and substantial case for the many agencies listed in the Bill. We also want assurances that the powers are not to be used to undermine the legitimate activities of trade unions, civil society groups or campaigns. Opposition Members are very clear that there can be no repeat of the historical attitudes and, frankly, the moral and legal corruptions that led to workers being blacklisted, to political interference or, indeed, to inappropriate relationships as the Spycops inquiry will examine. Similarly, it must also be the case that victims who have been wronged are not inadvertently prevented from seeking adequate forms of redress or fair compensation. On the issue of trade unions specifically, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which is the only legal basis for the use of powers to obtain communications, specifies that the monitoring of trade unions is not grounds for such activity, so will the Solicitor-General assure the House—if he cannot do it now, perhaps he might write to me if he would be so good—that nothing in this Bill changes that? Furthermore, the process of blacklisting trade unionists has been unlawful since 2010, with the passing of the Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010, and, again, will he confirm that nothing in this Bill would affect that?
I want to turn briefly to the issue of legacy in Northern Ireland. I welcome the Minister’s assurance that this Bill in no way impinges on or affects that process. I urge the Treasury Bench to take into account the comments that were made both by the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) and the hon. Member for Belfast South (Claire Hanna). Let me say this: I know Pat Finucane’s wife, Geraldine, and I know her sons John and Michael and her family. For 10 years, before I came into the House and since I have been in the House, I have steadfastly admired and supported them in their quest for justice, and that is not something that I will resile from at this Dispatch Box now. Let me also say that I do not need to be convinced about the consequences of the state exceeding its power in this arena. I do not need to read a briefing about it. I do not need to hear it in a meeting because I and the community in which I grew up lived with the consequences of it, which is why we need to get this right.
In summary, we on the Opposition side of the House understand the importance of this Bill. I have set out the areas of concern that we have, and where we would like to see the Bill strengthened, we will work with the Government constructively to try to do so robustly and effectively. This legislation puts existing practice on a clear and consistent statutory footing. It acknowledges the need for the role of covert human intelligence sources and, above all else, it must keep the public safe. I believe that security and human rights are not incompatible, but co-dependent, and that will govern the approach that I take as this Bill proceeds through the House.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateConor McGinn
Main Page: Conor McGinn (Independent - St Helens North)Department Debates - View all Conor McGinn's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI do share that concern. I really do not understand—others have eloquently made this point—why organisations indulging in lawful activity, such as trade unions and, indeed, other green activists, are required to be infiltrated by these sorts of covert human intelligence sources.
It is all very well to say that there is guidance. I listened carefully and with respect to those who are members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, because I know that they have information that the rest of us do not, but guidance is not good enough; it needs to be in the Bill. We are dealing with a Government who recently made commitments in an international agreement that they now evince the intention to break, so I will not apologise for saying that I do not have much trust in them. I want to see proper protections for civil liberties in the Bill. Without them, the Scottish National party will vote against it.
It is a pleasure, as always, to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and to speak with you in the Chair, Dame Rosie. I rise to speak to the amendments in my name and that of my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the Opposition and other honourable colleagues.
As I said on Second Reading, my right hon. and learned Friend has made it clear that security is a top priority for the Labour party under his leadership. We will be robust in supporting the fight against terrorism and crime in all its forms. We consider it our first responsibility to keep this country, its citizens and our communities safe, and we are grateful to those in the police, the security services, the National Crime Agency and wider law enforcement. They put their own safety and lives at risk to protect us, and we will meet our duty to support them.
It is worth noting that, since 2017, 27 terror plots have been uncovered and attacks foiled, and last year covert human intelligence sources helped to disrupt 30 threats to life. That is the sobering context of the debate, so we acknowledge and understand the Bill’s purpose, and recognise the need to put on a statutory footing the activity of those working to disrupt some of the most vile crimes imaginable, including terrorism, the activities of violent drug gangs, serious and organised crime, and child sexual exploitation.
It cannot be right, for those we ask to undertake that work, for those who might be affected by it or indeed for society as a whole, that that work continues in the shadows, and without boundaries and safeguards. In that vein, our amendment 7 seeks to ensure that the granting of criminal conduct authorisations may not take place until a warrant has been issued by a judge. We believe that it would provide reassurance to have independent judicial oversight of that process.
Whatever we think of the progress later on of the Bill, we have to agree that judicial oversight is really important. When a Labour Government get in, we will hopefully move towards that, but does my hon. Friend agree that the cases that he has just outlined are serious and severe, so these powers should be for agencies that are investigating them, not every Tom, Dick and Harry of the Food Safety Agency?
I am sorry that, having been present for the whole debate, my hon. Friend did not get to make a full speech, so I am happy to take his intervention. I hope that the Minister will reply to the valid and valuable point that he makes.
We understand that in a fast-changing intelligence landscape, a degree of operational flexibility is right and necessary, but I urge the Minister to provide some clarity and assurances that the requirements for certification will not simply become catch-all terms, and that there are clear and robust limits to their applicability.
The Bill already states that authorisation may not be granted unless the person believes that the conduct is proportionate to what is sought, but our amendment 11 intends to create a proper framework for that assessment. It ensures that the person must take into account several important questions before being granted any criminal conduct authorisation and provides rigorous assessment to ensure that such decisions are not taken lightly. Similarly, our amendment 10 is specifically about ensuring that the circumstances in which a criminal conduct authorisation is necessary must not include the activities of trade unions.
May I caution my hon. Friend? The excellence of his speech and the amendments should be an argument that says, “Without these, this Bill cannot be supported.” If he is not careful, his argument will encourage Labour Members to go through the No Lobby and vote against the Bill, should the Government not relent and accept these excellent amendments.
I always take seriously the advice of a senior and distinguished Member of the House. I am confident that, given the amendments that we have tabled today, as the Bill makes further progress through the House, our colleagues in the other place will be cognisant and take note of that. That is why we are asking the Government to listen carefully to what we propose in our amendments.
In that vein, I give my strong support to new clause 5, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy). It seeks to ensure that a CCA cannot be applied to a trade union and, specifically, to blacklisted workers. Of course, it was the previous Labour Government who made blacklisting illegal in 2010.
On the issue of oversight and accountability, I wish briefly to mention new clause 3, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and members of the Intelligence and Security Committee. With the additional scrutiny, oversight and accountability that are at the heart of the right hon. Gentleman’s sensible proposal, the Secretary of State would be compelled, at the end of each relevant 12-month period, to make a report to the ISC that contains key information on both the number of CCAs authorised and the categories of the conduct authorised. That seems to me to be an eminently reasonable and sensible proposal.
On new clause 2, given the nature of some of the networks that the Bill looks to disrupt, there are clear concerns about its impact on communities and vulnerable individuals throughout our country. One important example is the gendered impact of actions taken by covert human intelligence sources. The Minister must commit, today, that the Government will seek to uphold the highest possible standards on gender impact.
New clause 8 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy). I have some experience of campaigning with her and know how formidable she can be on these issues. Her new clause raises another crucial point, which is the need to safeguard the welfare of children, vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery and trafficking. It would achieve that by ensuring that a CCA is authorised for a child or vulnerable adult only in certain exceptional circumstances, and by ensuring that an appropriate adult is present at meetings between the source and those representing the investigating authority.
As outlined in new clause 2, we propose to compel the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual equality impact assessment on the use of criminal conduct authorisations in covert operations involving women, children and black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. A motion should then be put to the House within three months of the assessment being published.
In conclusion, the Opposition are committed to working in the national interest to keep people, their families, our communities and the country safe. I entirely understand that some colleagues on both sides of the Chamber have an interpretation of what the Bill does that is different from mine and have arrived at a different view. I think they are wrong, but that does not mean that I do not respect the arguments they put forward. That is particularly the case in relation to my hon. Friend—and my actual friend—the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Dan Carden). He will know that I once resigned on a point of principle. I hold him and his family in high esteem. The decision he took today to make the points he made was a difficult one. He has my respect, continuing friendship and affection.
This is uncomfortable territory for the whole House. Many of the issues raised by the Bill are felt deeply personally. All I would say, gently, is that those who oppose the Bill in its entirety do not have the monopoly on principles, nor are they the sole moral arbiters when it comes to forming a view on the measures in the Bill. The position reached by the Leader of the Opposition—who literally wrote the book on human rights—and me is a principled one and comes after careful consideration and detailed discussion of the Bill.
It is also our view that we have a duty, as legislators, to meet our responsibility and acknowledge that it is not just the Government who have to make difficult decisions. We want to be in government so we have to take difficult decisions, too. When we are in government, we will return to the Bill based on the principles that I have outlined. That is why we have taken the approach that we have taken: to acknowledge the importance of putting CHIS activities on a statutory footing; to robustly and responsibly scrutinise the way in which that is done; and to place national security, human rights and support for victims at the centre of our attempts to improve the safeguards in the Bill. We will continue to do that as it progresses through Parliament and are confident that the other place will assist us in that task if our amendments are not made today.
This has been a very informed, considered and thoughtful debate on the various amendments to the Bill that have been tabled for consideration. As right hon. and hon. Members will know, covert human intelligence sources play a crucial part in preventing, and safeguarding the public from, many very serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. In performing that role, it is essential that they can build credibility and gain the trust of those under investigation. At times, that may mean they have to commit criminality in order to maintain that cover.
I hear very clearly the points that have been made about needing to see those powers put on an express legal basis. Indeed, that is the essence of what this Bill is all about. It puts that on a clear statutory footing, putting beyond doubt Parliament’s intentions on the matter. From the contributions we have heard on all sides of the House, I think that that point is recognised—the seriousness of that and its implications for our own security in ensuring that the capability is maintained in order to keep us safe in the future, as it has done in the past, but also recognising the need for confidence in and assurance about how those agencies that act to protect us do so in an appropriate way.
Let me deal with the various amendments, because I do want to make as much progress on that as possible, and where I can I will give way to right hon. and hon. Members in doing so. First, in that context, there is the issue of oversight. The Government’s priority is to provide these public authorities with the powers they need to keep the public safe, while also ensuring that there are appropriate safeguards. This is the balance that the Bill seeks to provide. We do not believe that prior judicial approval, as proposed in amendment 7 and new clause 7, strikes that balance, as it risks the effective operation of the capability. This is a point we discussed at length on Second Reading. There are ways in which we can provide that safeguard and assurance, and prior judicial approval is not the only way to provide effective oversight of investigatory powers.
Members may find it helpful if I set out in more detail why this capability is different from other powers, such as interception or equipment interference. Put simply, human beings are more complex. Any decision on how to use a CHIS has immediate real-world consequences for that covert human intelligence source and the people around them. This requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal strengths and weaknesses of the individual, which then enables very precise and safe tasking. These are not decisions that have the luxury of being remade. It is even more critical than for other powers that these decisions are right and are made at the right time.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateConor McGinn
Main Page: Conor McGinn (Independent - St Helens North)Department Debates - View all Conor McGinn's debates with the Attorney General
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberInitially, I will not be putting a time limit on Back-Bench contributions, but if Members could be concise, that would be welcome.
It is a pleasure to follow the Solicitor General, but I am sure he will understand when I say that I would much prefer to have been following the Minister for Security, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire). We wish him well, and I want to thank him for his engagement with me and the shadow Home Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), on the progress of the Bill throughout its passage. I am grateful to colleagues in the other place who have shown their customary high standards of diligence and ensured that the Bill contains some robust and vital checks. It returns to us in substantially better shape than when it left us.
As I have said throughout the Bill’s passage, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) has made it clear that security is a top priority for the Labour party. Under his leadership and that of the shadow Home Secretary, we will support a robust policy in fighting terrorism and crime in all its forms. We consider it our first responsibility to keep this country, its citizens and our community safe. We are, of course, grateful to those in the police, the security services and wider law enforcement who put their own safety and lives at risk to protect us, and we will meet our duty to support them.
It is the responsibility of Members of Parliament to ensure that there is a system in place that allows our law enforcement to uncover, disrupt and ultimately bring to justice illegal and dangerous activity that threatens the safety and security of the British people. The Solicitor General reminded us of the sobering context of this debate, given the number of terror plots that have been disrupted. The latest figures show that in the last year alone covert human intelligence sources foiled 30 threats to life. It is therefore right that, finally, we should put on a statutory footing the activity of those who work to disrupt some of the vilest crimes imaginable. It is vital that through this process, in creating a statutory framework for the operation of the CHIS, we seek to make sure that there are formal checks, balances and safeguards that ensure that the Bill is fair and protects those who work under its jurisdiction, as well as innocent parties who may be affected by their activity.
Lords amendment 1 was proposed by Cross-Bench peers, and it seeks to ensure a fair and reasonable frame- work for those making an authorisation. It adds the word, “reasonably” so that, with an order to grant an authorisation, the person authorising would need reasonably to believe that it was necessary and proportionate. Without confusing the House with the use of too many “reasonables”, that would seem eminently reasonable. When dealing with sensitive matters of this nature, that places trust in those authorising the activity required, but ensures that their judgment is guided by the parameters of what is deemed appropriate or reasonable.
Lords amendment 2 progresses an amendment that we tabled in the Commons on Report, and which has received support in both Houses. It adds so-called Canada-style limitations to the Bill, including on death, grievous bodily harm, perverting the course of justice, sexual offences, torture and the deprivation of liberty. The Solicitor General has sought to assure us that the Bill is explicit about the fact that the Human Rights Act is applicable in all circumstances, but there is merit at least in exploring the setting-out of specific limitations on the Bill for the sake of clarity and reassurance. Like him, I do not want to see circumstances in which these horrendous offences are set as a test for the CHIS in the field—I know that that view is shared by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones)—but if countries that are our allies, with similar criminal justice systems and with whom we co-operate on security matters, can do this, the Government need to set out a little more forcefully why we should not.
Lords amendment 3 builds on amendments that we introduced in the Commons, and ensures that victims of violent crime in particular are not ineligible for criminal injuries compensation by virtue of the fact that the crime was the subject of a criminal conduct authorisation. We heard many powerful arguments for the amendment during the passage of the Bill. It is vital that, as well as clarifying permissible action for agents working to keep us safe, the Bill ensures that victims are properly protected and can seek redress and compensation if those boundaries are broken. The amendment would ensure that victims can seek adequate redress from the criminal injuries compensation scheme. All victims deserve an unimpeded pass to attaining justice. Despite the unique and rare circumstances of what we are discussing, the provision none the less protects victims of any criminal acts with proper and due process.
Lords amendment 4 makes a change to the Bill that would ensure an authorisation involving children and vulnerable people could be authorised only in exceptional circumstances. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), as the Solicitor General has done, for her strong campaigning, along with the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), other Government Members and the shadow Home Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen, who has taken part in intensive discussions and lobbied on these incredibly important matters.
The amendment has also been supported by the Children’s Commissioner, because it provides the necessary safeguards. The Children’s Society urged the Government to look at the complex interrelationships between different forms of exploitation and abuse, and suggested that they need to be properly considered in policy, policing and child protection. The anomaly that would see 16 and 17-year-olds treated differently if they commit a criminal offence of their own volition, rather than one they are instructed to commit as CHIS, needs to be addressed. I hope the Government listen to the concerns of Parliament, as the Solicitor General outlined, and to those of experts, children’s advocates and wider civil society on this issue.
It is welcome that, under new management in the Labour party, the country can probably rest assured that after an interlude the Labour party have returned to the attitude that prevailed under the Blair and Brown leaderships and can be trusted on security issues. I hope therefore, in that spirit of bipartisanship, the Labour party will think carefully about dividing the House and recognise that many of the arguments promoted by the Solicitor General actually made a lot of sense. We might put our agents’ lives at risk if we were to set limits on what could be authorised, so I hope the hon. Gentleman can give me a reassuring reply on that.
I think I might put the first part of what the right hon. Gentleman said on my election leaflets the next time around. On the second part of what he said, I respect entirely the point he made. I listened carefully to the Solicitor General and I will explain in my conclusion our approach to the Bill, which I think has been one where we have sought to co-operate, given its serious and sensitive nature. We rightly and understandably wanted to scrutinise the Bill in its entirety and would seek to improve it were we in the position of introducing it. I hope that will make sense in the next few minutes.
Before I come to that conclusion, let me say that it is unfortunate and disappointing that the Government and the Scottish Government have not been able to reach an agreement. We encouraged those discussions from the outset to ensure that the Bill covered the entirety of the United Kingdom. Even at this late stage, I urge them to work together, because it is important that the public in Scotland have confidence not only that their safety and security is protected, but that they have the safeguards that other parts of the United Kingdom will have, too.
In conclusion, we feel that the Bill has been improved by the amendments. It is not perfect—far from it—but it does provide an important legal framework for activity that previously operated with none. We recognise that it provides formal safeguards and protections for those who operate in this field at this precise moment and who seek to keep us all safe. It provides clarity and guidance for those who have to make difficult decisions in the interests of law enforcement in areas of serious and highly organised terrorism and crime, and it provides protection and the potential for recompense for those who may be adversely affected.
As I have said before, this is uncomfortable territory for the whole House and for many of us personally. It covers activity that operates, frankly, in the shadows, tackling serious and deadly crime and some of the most heinous and awful offences imaginable. The Opposition are committed to working in the national interest to keep people, their families, our communities and the country safe. We know that it is not just the Government who have to make difficult decisions to do this but us as well. I want to be clear: we would and will put forward a different Bill with the safeguards we have outlined at its heart. But when it comes to national security and keeping the public safe, we are not prepared to allow these matters to remain outside parliamentary scrutiny and without any statutory footing. We have a duty to the public and to those who keep us safe.
We acknowledge the importance of putting CHIS activities on a statutory footing, and we have unapologetically worked to scrutinise robustly and responsibly the way in which that is done. We have hopefully ensured some vital safeguards, accountability and protections, and we will continue, as always, to place national security, human rights and support for victims at the centre of our approach to these matters.
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I entirely endorse the tributes and good wishes paid by the Solicitor General and the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) to my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire). His professionalism, calmness and dedication as Security Minister and in other roles are a model for us all. We admire him greatly and wish him the best of health.
Despite extraordinary technical advances in surveillance and espionage methods, human sources in intelligence operations remain indispensable, especially in the counter-terrorist work of our Security Service. Going undercover to join terrorist groups or remaining in a terrorist group, having become disillusioned with its objectives, in order to frustrate them, calls for courage of the highest order. The Intelligence and Security Committee has been briefed by MI5 on specific instances of this, and we accept that, without the use of covert human intelligence sources, many of the attacks foiled in recent years would have succeeded in their horrific aims. That is what justifies the authorisation of specified criminal acts, on occasion, in order to maintain an agent’s cover and in proportion to the potential harm that he or she is working to prevent.
As pointed out on Second Reading on 5 October, the report on Northern Ireland-related terrorism compiled by our predecessor Committee and presented to Parliament that same day firmly concluded at paragraph 39:
“While there are, rightly, concerns that criminal activity may somehow be being legitimised, the need for such authorisations is clear. What is key is that authorisations are properly circumscribed, used only when necessary and proportionate, and subject to proper scrutiny.”
Precisely because covert human intelligence sources are so effective, ruthless terrorist organisations have no qualms in devising tests of the utmost depravity to flush out agents infiltrating their ranks. That is why the provisions of Lords amendment 2 to prohibit the granting of criminal conduct authorisations, or CCAs, are certain to be as counterproductive as they are well-intentioned.
What the amendment proposes, if enacted, would soon come to constitute a checklist of atrocities that could be used to expose undercover agents known to be forbidden from carrying them out. As sure as night follows day, it would also increase the number of such atrocities committed. In order to flush out MI5 agents by putting suspects to the test, paranoid extremists would resort to testing more and more of their group members, if they felt that their organisation was coming under pressure and suffering setbacks.
With your leave, Madam Deputy Speaker, I would now like to make some closing remarks. I thank colleagues from across the House for the thoughtful and considered contributions made this afternoon.
First, I shall address remarks about limits and the conduct that can be authorised under the Bill. I make the point again, because it is important: the limits on what could be authorised under this legislation are provided by the requirement for all authorisations to be necessary, proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act. There are limits, and they are defined in that way. Nothing in the Bill seeks to undermine the important protections in the Human Rights Act; the Government have been consistently clear on that. Public authorities will not and cannot act in a way that breaches their legal obligations under the Human Rights Act. I say this clearly on the record, from the Dispatch Box: any authorisation that was not compliant with the Human Rights Act would be unlawful.
Let me take this opportunity to thank my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) for the important oversight role that his important Committee plays and in particular for his remarks about the difficulties concomitant on placing, or seeking to place, limits in a Bill such as this—he articulated those with typical clarity. Those points were also well made by the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), as is usually the case. As we know, both right hon. Members contribute insight from their roles on the Intelligence and Security Committee.
The hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) asked me to set out why we cannot have limits in this legislation similar to those in the legislation of some of our partners, such as our great ally Canada. I do not think it particularly useful or helpful to compare UK legislation with legislation in other countries because each country has its own unique laws, public authorities and current threat picture.
We know that covert human intelligence source testing takes place in the United Kingdom, particularly in relation to the unique challenges that we face in Northern Ireland. It is important that we legislate for the particular circumstances in which we need our operational partners to operate, to keep the public safe. Our advice on this issue is based solely on the advice of our operational partners. I hope that all Members place the weight that the Government have placed on their assessment of this issue.
I greatly respect the vast experience of my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) in these areas. He is not in his place at the moment, but he raised information presented in argument to the Court of Appeal today. The House will understand that my position as Solicitor General means that I cannot comment on ongoing legal proceedings, but I can confirm that MI5 did not say what my right hon. Friend articulated it had said.
Let me respond now to the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) on this issue of putting reasonable belief into the Bill.
I will, if I may, confirm again that the Government do not dispute that the test for these authorisations should be one of reasonable belief. We do not support the amendment simply because we need to ensure that legislation is consistent across the board. We cannot have some Acts of Parliament using one form of words, and other Acts of Parliament using another form of words, because then others might interpret those Acts of Parliament to mean different things.
My hon. Friend also asked about civil redress. The Bill does not prevent those who have been impacted by a criminal conduct authorisation from seeking redress where that is appropriate. Any person or organisation can make a complaint, for example, to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which is a judicial body that operates totally independently of the Government and provides a right of redress for anyone who believes that they have been a victim of unlawful action by a public authority that has been using covert intelligence or investigative techniques. With regards to the criminal injuries compensation scheme, let me confirm that, in practice, access to that scheme is unaffected by this Bill.
Let me turn now to the important issue of juveniles, which many colleagues have raised, and respond to the points raised on the authorisation of juvenile CHIS. This Bill is not providing a new power for juveniles to be authorised as CHIS. What it does is seek to place on an explicit statutory basis the framework and safeguards for the very rare occasions where a juvenile may participate in criminal conduct in their role as a covert human intelligence source. There are also additional safeguards in place for the authorisation of juvenile CHIS and any authorisation of a juvenile as a source requires additional safeguards, as set out in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000 and considered by Parliament in 2018. That authorisation is required before a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted. Equally, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will consider every authorisation of a juvenile.
I note that the High Court of Justice considered the safeguards for juvenile CHIS in 2019, as noted by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) in her virtual contribution. I also note that the court expressly found them to be lawful. In fact, Mr Justice Supperstone explicitly rejected the contention that the scheme is inadequate in its safeguarding of the interests and welfare of juvenile CHIS.
The High Court also set out its view that it was clear that the principal focus of the framework for juvenile CHIS is to ensure that appropriate weight is given to a child’s best interests and that the practical effect of the enhanced risk assessment is that juveniles are utilised only in extreme circumstances and when other potential sources of information have been exhausted. The IPC has concluded similarly.
Let me say specifically that police CHIS handlers are separate from their operational teams and they have a duty to safeguard and promote the best interests of the child as a primary consideration, and the aim of an authorisation is to remove them from the harm that they are already in, not to put them in greater harm.
I appreciate the Solicitor General giving way and I am reassured by much of what he says, but having just said that the Government would not accept amendment 1 because of the need to be consistent across the law, will he comment on the fact that it is still an anomaly that 16 and 17-year-olds who commit a crime of their own volition are entitled to different protections from 16 and 17-year-olds who commit a crime as a result of a criminal conduct authorisation?
The reality, of course, is that the safeguards that I have adumbrated in regard to CHIS are very relevant here and, as I have mentioned, there are considerable safeguards that form the protections that we can say with confidence mean that those 16 and 17-year-olds will have very good protection.
I will now turn specifically to the point raised by the requirement for an appropriate adult to be placed for sources aged 16 or 17, which I would like to explore a little bit more. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order sets out a requirement for an appropriate adult to be in attendance at all meetings between a public authority and a source below the age of 16. It must be considered on a case-by-case basis for sources aged 16 or 17, and this is the case for any general authorisation of the CHIS and any specific additional authorisation for participation in criminal conduct, which is what we are debating in this Bill.
Let me be clear, though, that when each case is being considered carefully, there is a presumption that there will be an appropriate adult in place—that is the default position, unless there is a justification for not having an appropriate adult in place. An example of such a justification might be that doing so would not be in the best interests of the child. The best interests of the child are always at the heart of the decision making. If the authorising officer believes that an appropriate adult should not be in place, that justification must be documented, and can be considered by the IPC.
I would caution the House against using examples, whether real or hypothetical—it does tend to be risky to do so, and puts young people at risk—but criminal gangs will seek to apply the scenario that has been set out to their own experience, which could result in them wrongly identifying and putting at risk of harm anyone suspected of being a CHIS. As such, the example suggested by the hon. Member for Walthamstow and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden does not fit with the framework of safeguards that is in place for juvenile CHIS. This could not happen, and we do not recognise the example given.
However, as I said in my earlier remarks, the Government are listening. We will continue to listen, and will do so by means through which we can provide further reassurance about these authorisations. I hope these conversations can continue, and that we can find a means of providing additional reassurance while not risking the safety of a juvenile CHIS. While it is not appropriate to put all 74 pages of the code of practice into the Bill—I think I said “hundreds” earlier, but it is actually only 74 pages— I agree with the right hon. Member for North Durham that it may be appropriate to include some of those safeguards, including confirmation that a juvenile could only be authorised in exceptional circumstances. Not all of the code of practice applies to this Bill, but some parts may, so the right hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly good point.
Turning briefly to Lords amendment 5, I think there is consensus that the additional oversight provided by the requirement to notify a judicial commissioner is reassuring. The commissioner will see all authorisations of juvenile CHIS, and likewise will be able to confirm that all authorisations are compliant with the Human Rights Act.
In response to the question posed by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, let me offer reassurance about what would happen if the IPC or a judicial commissioner did not agree with an authorisation when notified of its grant. A judicial commissioner would flag any concerns to the authorising officer, and they would work collaboratively to address such concerns. If an authorisation has been granted but the activity not yet started, the judicial commissioner and authorising officer will work together to address those concerns. If the activity has started, the authorising officer must take into account any concerns that have been raised, and will continue to discuss these with the judicial commissioner. It would not be the case that a public authority would simply ignore feedback from the IPCO: it is a collaborative process, and the views of the commissioners carry serious weight. However, ultimately, it would be a matter for the court to determine.
Finally, in response to the right hon. Member for North Durham, who asked whether any concerns raised by the IPC will feature in the annual report, I can confirm that the IPC must include statistics on the use of this power, including any errors and areas where improvement has been recommended.
I hope that I have been able to provide additional clarity and reassurance on these issues, and that the House will vote to reject these amendments.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateConor McGinn
Main Page: Conor McGinn (Independent - St Helens North)Department Debates - View all Conor McGinn's debates with the Attorney General
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the Solicitor General. Given the seriousness and sensitivity of these matters, it is right to recognise the challenging but constructive engagement that we have had with the Government throughout the passage of this Bill. I again pay tribute to colleagues in the other place. The experience and expertise that so well informs their scrutiny has, without a shadow of a doubt, strengthened this legislation and the protections and safeguards in it. I think the whole House can agree that the Bill before us is in much better shape. We welcome the Government concessions that the shadow Home Secretary and Labour Members, as well as other colleagues, have secured during the Bill’s parliamentary passage.
Turning to the amendments in lieu, Lords amendment 3B relates to the criminal injuries compensation scheme and the vital matter of redress for innocent victims. It would properly ensure that victims were protected and unimpeded in obtaining justice if harm came to them during authorised conduct. Throughout this process, we and colleagues across both Houses have stressed the importance of a viable route to redress for innocent victims if boundaries are broken, and we have tabled and supported amendments to that effect. It is an important principle in law that victims of crime can seek recompense, and these circumstances should be no exception. We therefore welcome the amendment and the Government’s change of heart on the need to make it explicit in the Bill that individuals can access criminal injuries compensation whenever appropriate. I pay tribute to colleagues on the Joint Committee on Human Rights for the work that they have carried out on this alongside Lord Anderson and his colleagues in the other place.
Lords amendments 4B to 4J relate to safeguards for juveniles and vulnerable adults. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), noble lords in the other place and many civic society groups, charities and experts who have worked tirelessly on this issue. We maintain that the protections could go further, but none the less welcome movement on this issue. It was very important to Labour Members and colleagues across the House that the heightened protections for children and vulnerable adults outlined in these amendments should make it clear that criminal conduct authorisations can be granted to minors only in exceptional circumstances, and should take into account any potential physical or psychological harm and wider safeguarding issues, as well as the results of an appropriate risk assessment. The amendments also provide that an appropriate adult must be present at meetings with individuals under 16 years old; most 16 and 17-year-olds will have this right, too. I echo Lord Rosser, who said:
“On this issue, we have not achieved everything that was asked for”,—[Official Report, House of Lords, 9 February 2021; Vol. 810, c. 201.]
but we are pleased to see the Government have listened to our and others’ concerns, and gone beyond prior commitments.
Labour Members will continue to monitor these matters and work to assess their impact. In addition, following the Bill’s passage, we will keep a close eye on the upcoming consultation on the CHIS code of practice to ensure and, if necessary, enhance safeguards in this arena and make them as effective as possible.
As I have said in this House previously, this is not the Bill that we would have proposed or passed. It is far from perfect, but it has been vastly improved during its passage. The amendments in lieu being considered—and, I hope, accepted—today are proof of that. I reiterate that Labour Members recognise the importance and significance of putting CHIS activities on a statutory footing for the first time through this Bill, while ensuring vital safeguards, accountability and protections.
We are eternally grateful to those in the police, the security services, the National Crime Agency and wider law enforcement who put their safety and life at risk to protect ours—as indeed do covert human intelligence sources. Through this Bill, we have sought to meet our duty to support them. The resolute focus on national security, on tackling serious and organised crime, on human rights and on supporting victims that has guided us throughout this Bill’s passage will continue to be a central tenet of our approach as we seek to keep this country, its citizens and our communities safe.
We have until 6.56 pm to conclude proceedings on the Bill, so if Back-Bench contributions were less than five minutes long, that would enable us to get as many Members in as possible. I do not want to impose a time limit, but I hope that colleagues will be considerate of one another. I call Dr Julian Lewis, Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.