Undercover Policing

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Wednesday 13th June 2012 Westminster Hall

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to hold this debate under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I am very grateful for the opportunity to raise the issue of the rules governing undercover police infiltrators and informers.

I am sure the House will agree that when it comes to the deployment of undercover police officers, transparency and accountability are of the utmost importance. In recent months, however, a number of cases have come to light that seem to expose serious abuses of any guidelines that we might reasonably assume inform what police officers working undercover can and cannot do. The cases raise important questions about whether such guidelines are ever enforced, whether individuals who breach them are properly held to account, and the extent to which infiltration of campaign groups is a legitimate, or even effective, tactic. Also, I have details of new allegations relating to the behaviour of one undercover officer that I believe require immediate investigation and raise questions about the convictions of two individuals.

Since at least the 1968 protests against the Vietnam war, police chiefs, backed by successive Governments, have used the tactic of infiltration to secure more reliable intelligence about political demonstrations than could be provided by informants. Undercover police officers pose as political activists over several years, to gather reliable intelligence and perhaps disrupt campaigners’ activities. In the early days, such officers were part of a super-secret unit within special branch, called the special demonstration squad; more recently they have been under a second unit, the national public order intelligence unit.

Up to nine undercover officers have been unmasked following the exposure of Mark Kennedy in late 2010. I will say more about his case later, but the officers include Bob Lambert, know by the alias Bob Robinson. That officer pretended to be a committed environmental and animal rights campaigner between 1984 and 1988. By the summer of 1987, he had successfully infiltrated the Animal Liberation Front, a group that operated through a tightly organised underground network of small cells of activists, making it difficult to penetrate. In October 2011, after he was exposed as an undercover officer, Bob Lambert admitted:

“In the 1980s I was deployed as an undercover Met special branch officer to identify and prosecute members of Animal Liberation Front who were then engaged in incendiary device and explosive device campaigns against targets in the vivisection, meat and fur trades.”

Lambert has also admitted that part of his mission was to identify and prosecute specific ALF activists:

“I succeeded in my task and that success included the arrest and imprisonment of Geoff Sheppard and Andrew Clarke.”

The men Lambert referred to were ALF activists who were found guilty of planting incendiary devices in two Debenhams stores. Allegations about exactly what kind of role Lambert might have played in their convictions have come to light only recently.

In July 1987, three branches of Debenhams, in Luton, Romford and Harrow, were targeted by the ALF in co-ordinated, simultaneous incendiary attacks, because the shops sold fur products. Sheppard and Clarke were tried and found guilty, but the culprit who planted the incendiary device in the Harrow store was never caught. Bob Lambert’s exposure as an undercover police officer has prompted Geoff Sheppard to speak out about the Harrow attack. He alleges that Lambert was the one who planted the third device and that he was involved in the ALF’s co-ordinated campaign. Sheppard has made a statement, which I have seen, in which he says:

“Obviously I was not there when he targeted that store because we all headed off in our separate directions but I was lying in bed that night, and the news came over on the World Service that three Debenhams stores had had arson attacks on them and that included the Harrow store as well. So obviously I straightaway knew that Bob had carried out his part of the plan. There’s absolutely no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Bob Lambert placed the incendiary device at the Debenhams store in Harrow. I specifically remember him giving an explanation to me about how he had been able to place one of the devices in that store, but how he had not been able to place the second device.”

In the same interview, Sheppard says that two months after the three Debenhams stores were set on fire, he and another person were in his flat making four more fire bombs when they were raided by police. Sheppard alleges that the intelligence for the raid was so precise that it is now obvious that it “came from Bob Lambert”. Lambert knew that the pair were going to be there making another set of incendiary devices.

Sheppard was jailed for four years and four months, and Clarke for more than three years. For Lambert, it was a case of job done—in fact, so well had he manipulated the situation that he even visited Sheppard in prison, to give him support before disappearing abroad. Until recently Sheppard had no reason whatever to suspect the man he knew as Bob Robinson—he assumed that Robinson had got away with it, fled the country and built a new life.

It seems that planting the third incendiary device might have been a move designed to bolster Lambert’s credibility and reinforce the impression of a genuine and dedicated activist. He successfully went on to gain the precise intelligence that led to the arrest of Sheppard and Clarke, without anyone suspecting that the tip-off came from him, but is that really the way we want our police officers to behave?

The case raises new questions about the rules governing undercover police infiltrators and informers, particularly when it comes to those officers committing a crime—an area in which the law is especially grey. Police chiefs can authorise undercover officers to participate in criminal acts to gain the trust of the groups they are trying to infiltrate and, in theory, to detect or prevent a more serious crime, but usually they are not allowed to be involved in planning or instigating the crime. As I understand it, the specific law on that is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and that before its enactment, at the time of the Debenhams attacks, the rules were vague. They have not so far been made public.

If Sheppard’s allegations are true, someone must have authorised Lambert to plant incendiary devices at the Harrow store, and presumably that same person may also have given the officer guidance on just how far he needed to go to establish his credibility with the ALF. We simply do not know, and in the absence of any proper framework or rules, the task of holding Lambert to account is very difficult. Even if strict protocols are in place to try to control the actions of undercover officers, who decides what the protocols say, and how can we hold those people to account, given the secrecy that surrounds such activities?

[Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Caroline Lucas]

Yes, but very briefly, as I am short of time.

[Mark Reckless]

Is not an alternative explanation that there were no protocols in place and that decisions were taken at the discretion of this officer, who was not properly controlled? To the extent that there were protocols, is it not clear that the guidance for undercover officers was coming from the Association of Chief Police Officers, which is an entirely unaccountable organisation?

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. The truth is that we simply do not know, and that is the problem. We need clarity, which is what I hope the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice can help us with later.

There is no doubt in my mind that anyone planting an incendiary device in a department store is guilty of a very serious crime and should have charges brought against them. That means absolutely anyone, including, if the evidence is there, Bob Lambert, or, indeed, the people who were supervising him.

Ironically, as we have seen, the use of undercover police infiltrators can make it much more difficult to secure successful convictions. Three Court of Appeal judges have overturned the convictions of 20 environmental protestors, ruling that crucial evidence recorded by an undercover officer, Mark Kennedy, operating under the false name of Mark Stone, was withheld from the original trial. The judges said that they had seen evidence that appeared to show that Kennedy was

“involved in activities that went further than the authorisation he was given”,

and that he was “arguably, an agent provocateur.” The latest allegations concerning Bob Lambert and the planting of incendiary devices prompt us to ask: has another undercover police officer crossed the line into acting as an agent provocateur, and how many other police spies have been encouraging protestors to commit crimes?

Mark Kennedy’s exposure in 2010 has shone a light on how officers behave when they go undercover, and especially on the rules governing whether they are permitted to form intimate relationships with those on whom they are spying. Jon Murphy, Chief Constable of Merseyside and the police chiefs’ spokesman on the issue, claims that that is “grossly unprofessional” and “never acceptable”, yet one undercover police officer, Pete Black, claims that superiors knew officers had developed sexual relationships with protestors to give credibility to their cover stories and help gather evidence.

Eight women who say that they were duped into forming long-term loving relationships with undercover policemen have started a legal action against the police. They have a copy of a letter from a Metropolitan police solicitor that asserts that the forming of personal and other relationships by a “covert human intelligence source” to obtain information is permitted and lawful under RIPA, so either rogue undercover officers have been breaking the rules set by senior officers, or senior officers have misled the public by saying that such relationships are forbidden. We need to know what the truth is, and we need any rules of engagement to be published and open to public and parliamentary scrutiny or challenge.

The eight women allege that the men’s actions constitute a breach of articles 3 and 8 of the European convention on human rights. Article 3 asserts that no one shall be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment, and article 8 grants respect for private and family life, including the right to form relationships without unjustified interference by the state. The women go on to allege that the actions amount to common law tortious acts of deceit, misfeasance in public office and assault.

Bob Lambert is one of the five men named in the legal action, as is Mark Kennedy. The Guardian has also reported that Bob Lambert secretly fathered a child with a political campaigner whom he had been sent to spy on, and later disappeared completely from the life of the child, concealing his true identity from the child’s mother for many years. Lambert has admitted having had a long-term relationship with a second woman to bolster his credibility as a committed campaigner, and he subsequently went on to head the special demonstration squad and mentor other undercover officers who formed deceitful relationships with women.

The police authorities have made virtually no attempt to hold those or other men to account, or to examine whether they have broken any rules on relationships when undercover. The solicitors instructed by the Metropolitan police have taken a totally obstructive approach to the litigation, threatening to strike out the claims as having no foundation. Furthermore, police solicitors argue that cases can be heard only by the investigatory powers tribunal, in secret—a move that would prevent the women, whose privacy was invaded in the most intrusive manner imaginable, from hearing the evidence, such as the extent to which intimate moments were reported back to police chiefs. It seems that the police do not want anyone to be able to challenge their version of events or to scrutinise their actions. To paraphrase one of the women involved, it is incredible that in most circumstances the police need permission to search someone’s house, but if they want to send in an agent who may sleep and live with activists in their homes, that can happen without any apparent oversight.

The rules governing undercover police infiltrators and informers are also remarkably deficient when it comes to giving false evidence in court to protect a secret identity. For example, Jim Boyling, who was exposed last year for infiltrating groups such as Reclaim the Streets using the pseudonym Jim Sutton, concealed his true identity from a court when he was prosecuted alongside a group of protestors for occupying a Government building during a demonstration. It is alleged that from the moment Boyling was arrested, he gave a false name and occupation, maintaining this fiction throughout the entire prosecution, even when he gave evidence to barristers under oath.

Boyling was reported to have been present at sensitive discussions between other activists and their lawyers to decide how they would defend themselves in court, undermining the fundamental right of the activists to hold legally protected consultations with a lawyer and illicitly obtaining details of private discussions. A lawyer representing activists who were charged alongside Jim Boyling has noted:

“This case raises the most fundamental constitutional issues about the limits of acceptable policing, the sanctity of lawyer-client confidentiality, and the integrity of the criminal justice system. At first sight, it seems that the police have wildly overstepped all recognised boundaries.”

Yet Boyling’s actions may well have been authorised. Pete Black, who worked with Boyling in the same covert unit penetrating political campaigns, said that the case was not unique and that, from time to time, prosecutions were allowed to go ahead to build up credibility with the activists being infiltrated.

The Metropolitan commissioner, Bernard Hogan-Howe, has defended undercover officers’ use of fake identities in court, claiming that there is no specific law that forbids it. However, I echo the concerns of Lord Macdonald, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, who said that Hogan-Howe’s defence was “stunning and worrying”. He commented that

“at the very least, the senior officers who are sending these undercover PCs into court to give evidence in this way are putting them at serious risk of straying into perjury.”

Bob Lambert, Mark Kennedy and Jim Boyling, as well as two other officers named in current legal actions against the police, John Barker and Mark Cassidy, have all crossed a line. Similarly, other undercover police officers may well have crossed such a line. The assumption is that they have been authorised and instructed to do so, or at least, if that is not specifically the case, that a blind eye has been turned to some of their actions.

Activists who have been infiltrated have called for one overarching, full public inquiry to examine what has gone on. Lord Macdonald has also called for such an inquiry to consider how we should control undercover operations, but the Government have ignored calls to set one up. Instead, the authorities have set up 12 different inquiries since January 2011, each held in secret and looking at only one small aspect of an undercover operation. Those inquiries have not been particularly thorough and have not resulted in follow-up action. For example, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, ordered an investigation and report on allegations that the Crown Prosecution Service suppressed vital evidence in the case of the Ratcliffe-on-Soar environmental protestors. A key criticism of the CPS in that report is of the

“failures, over many months and at more than one level, by the police and the CPS.”

Nick Paul, the senior CPS lawyer who specialises in cases involving police misconduct, was not even interviewed as part of the investigation, and senior CPS staff have evaded disciplinary action. The CPS shows an ongoing reluctance to investigate past possible miscarriages of justice, and Keir Starmer is among those resisting calls for a more far-reaching inquiry.

The new allegations that I have raised today make the case for a public inquiry even more compelling. So many questions remain unanswered, including whether Bob Lambert planted the third incendiary device and, if he did, who authorised him to do so and why. More widely, the public have a right to know why money is being spent on infiltrating campaign groups, with no apparent external oversight of the decision to infiltrate or of whether the methods used are necessary or proportionate. Why are the rules on such practices open to such abuse? Why are high-ranking police officers and, presumably, politicians sanctioning operations that put police officers at risk and undermine basic human rights?

We need to have faith that police officers are beyond reproach, that robust procedures are in place to deal with any transgressions and that those making decisions about the deployment of police officers are accountable and subject to proper scrutiny. I hope the Minister will take this opportunity to review the various concerns I have raised, and that he can tell us that the Government will agree to set up a far-reaching public inquiry into undercover police infiltrators and informers, which will look back over past practices as well as look forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the situation as he sees it, but does RIPA allow undercover police to have sexual relationships with those they are trying to infiltrate? That is one of the points at issue: some say that it does and some say that it does not.

[Nick Herbert]

I will try to respond to the hon. Lady’s question before the end of my speech.

One factor is how we target the type of deployment that causes concern, without imposing an unnecessary or burdensome bureaucracy across a much wider field where the regime may be said to be working as Parliament intended. We need to ensure that we do not deter members of the public from coming forward to help the police in what can be difficult work. We also need to make sure that officers charged with sensitive, intrusive and dangerous policing in the community are given the support and protection they require. Above all, we need to avoid the mistakes identified in the HMIC report being made again. Our response, when we make it, will have that uppermost in mind.

On the hon. Lady’s call for a public inquiry, the independent HMIC review looked at the broad issues raised by the Kennedy case, and made clear recommendations as to how the system should be strengthened—a system that was not, in any case, in place when Lambert was deployed. We are considering our precise response to those recommendations. I do not think that it is necessary to conduct a public inquiry.

The hon. Lady raised a number of specific issues, one of which was whether RIPA can be used to authorise a covert human intelligence source to break the law. In a very limited range of circumstances, an authorisation under RIPA part II may render lawful conduct that would otherwise be criminal, if it is incidental to any conduct falling within the Act that the source is authorised to undertake. That depends, however, on the circumstances of each individual case, and consideration should always be given to seeking advice from the legal adviser of the relevant public authority when such activity is contemplated. A covert human intelligence source who acts beyond the limits recognised by the law will be at risk of prosecution, and the need to protect the covert human intelligence source cannot alter that principle.

The RIPA statutory guidance does not explicitly cover the matter of sexual relationships, but it does make it clear that close management and control should be exercised by the undercover officer’s management team. That will be a relevant factor. The absence of such management gave rise to concern in the Kennedy case.

[Caroline Lucas]

Does the Minister agree that that sort of fudged, grey area means that for women who have had such an experience, and for women and, indeed, men who might have such an experience in the future, this is incredibly unsatisfactory? We simply do not have clear guidelines on whether the action and going that far are legitimate, and that undermines confidence in the system. The Minister has referred to other inquiries that have been conducted, but what has not been conducted is a public, overarching inquiry to consider all the relevant areas.

Moreover, the Minister’s response to the case of Bob Lambert is extraordinarily complacent. Yes, RIPA was not in place at that point, so there can be no criticism that its guidance was not followed, but what is the Minister going to do now, given that the issue is in the public domain and that there could have been serious miscarriages of justice? How will he follow up on that case in particular?

[Nick Herbert]

I am happy to pursue the matter further with the hon. Lady, if she likes, but I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to issue specific statutory guidance under RIPA about sexual relationships. What matters is that there is a general structure and system of proper oversight and control, rather than specific directions on behaviour that may or may not be permitted. Moreover, to ban such actions would provide a ready-made test for the targeted criminal group to find out whether an undercover officer was deployed among them. Specifically forbidding the action would put the issue in the public domain and such groups would know that it could be tested.

The Government are certainly not complacent about the Lambert case. We were keen for an independent, wider review of the deployment of undercover officers by HMIC, which is now independent of the Government and reports to Parliament. We are satisfied that its recommendations will further strengthen the proper system of safeguards for the deployment of undercover officers that did not operate when Lambert was deployed.

Oral Answers to Questions

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Blunt]

I hope that my hon. Friend will ultimately judge us on the effect we have both on crime and reoffending figures. When people are in the justice system, the effect on them should be when they leave it they are less likely to offend than when they came in.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

16. What plans he has to use restorative justice to divert more children and young people away from the criminal justice system.

[The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Nick Herbert)]

The proper goal should be to divert people from crime. When offending takes place, the criminal justice system should respond effectively, and we are keen to promote restorative justice to deliver better outcomes.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the Minister, but the issue is that the Government’s approaches to restorative justice for children are embedded in the youth justice system so they deal with children only once they are inside that system. Why are the Government not investing in diverting young people from the criminal justice system, for example by rolling out the very successful youth restorative disposal pilots?

[Nick Herbert]

We certainly want to make more use of restorative disposals, which can be valuable. They give greater victim satisfaction when the victim consents, and they can reduce reoffending. We have plans to announce more in relation to our neighbourhood justice proposals, which we will say more about at the beginning of next year. There have been many expressions of interest in that. The goal of the criminal justice system should be to deal with offending when it has taken place. I disagree with the contention that we should be diverting offenders from the criminal justice system. We should be diverting people from crime.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Blunt]

That is not strictly within the terms of what is proposed here. The effect would be to criminalise those who are squatting in residential premises and to create a new offence. As a first step we intend to limit the new offence to squatting in residential buildings. We consider that this option strikes the best balance. It will protect those who are likely to suffer most from squatting—those whose homes are taken over by squatters.

I shall turn now to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington. I know that he is a supporter of the campaign group Squatters Action for Secure Homes, and I also know that he agrees with the arguments put forward by homelessness charities, such as Crisis, that criminalising squatting will impact on homeless people who squat. I fully understand why he tabled the amendments, but I will take this opportunity to explain why I do not agree with them.

On amendment (a), many squatters claim that they do not cause any harm to anybody because they look for empty properties to occupy. In the responses to our recent consultation exercise, that point was made by squatters and squatters groups, but respondents who made that argument were missing one rather important point: the houses are not theirs to occupy. There are many reasons why a house might be left empty for more than six months without any steps being taken to refurbish, let or sell the building. For example, somebody might decide to do charitable work in another country for a year, or they might visit their second home during the summer months only. It is the owner’s prerogative to leave the house empty in those circumstances. To say that property owners or occupiers should not be protected by the criminal law in these circumstances would be unjust and it would considerably weaken our proposed new offence.

Consultation responses highlighted a concern about the number of properties that are left empty on a long-term basis. They argued that such properties can crumble into disrepair and might be seen as a blight on the local neighbourhood. But permitting squatters to occupy derelict, crumbling, unsafe houses cannot be the answer. We are doing a number of things to encourage absent owners to make better use of their properties.

We want to increase the number of empty homes that are brought back into use as a sustainable way of increasing the overall supply of housing, and to reduce the perception of neglect that can blight neighbourhoods. Reducing the number of empty homes will also help to reduce the incidence of squatting. That is why we have announced £100 million of capital funding within the affordable homes programme to tackle problematic empty homes—that is properties that are likely to remain empty without extra direct financial assistance from the Government. This programme will deliver at least 3,300 affordable homes by March 2015, as well as engaging local communities in dealing with empty homes in their area.

Amendment (c) is designed to exempt squatters from the offence if they occupy residential buildings before the date of commencement. Let me be clear that we have no plans to punish people retrospectively. If they have squatted in the past but are no longer squatting when the offence comes into force, the offence will not apply. However, we would be creating a significant loophole if we exempted squatters who initially entered the building as a trespasser in the run-up to commencement even though after commencement of the offence they remain in the building as a trespasser, they know or ought to know that they are a trespasser and that they are living there or intend to live there. Such an occupation would be no less painful for the property owners concerned.

I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman and others are concerned that the new offence might penalise vulnerable, homeless people who squat in run-down residential properties. One of the reasons they remain in this state is, as I said, because the owners cannot get in to renovate them. It would be much better for us to introduce an offence that is capable of protecting law-abiding property owners and occupiers on the one hand, while working with other Government Departments, local authorities, the police and homelessness charities to continue to address the root causes of homelessness and to mitigate any impacts the new offence might have on the levels of rough sleeping.

We are prioritising spending on homelessness prevention, investing £400 million over the next four years, with the homelessness grant being maintained at the 2010-11 level. For the first time, we have also brought together eight Departments through the ministerial working group on homelessness to tackle the complex causes of homelessness. The group published its first report “Vision to end rough sleeping” in July 2011, which sets out joint commitments to tackle homelessness and to ensure that nobody has to spend more than one night out on our streets—“No Second Night Out”. This includes actions to prevent homelessness for those people without a stable home who may be at risk of rough sleeping. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendments.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

It feels as though we are in a different world when the Minister describes these as measures to tackle homelessness and when one considers everything that the Government have been doing with their housing benefit cuts and with their cuts in shared room rate, which organisations say will cause thousands more people to become homeless. Is he not cognisant of those arguments being put forward very forcefully by those charities?

[Mr Blunt]

I absolutely support the measures being brought forward by my colleagues at the Department for Communities and Local Government. The Minister for Housing and Local Government is absolutely right. One cannot but be impressed by his huge determination in chairing the ministerial group to address this issue. It is the other side of the equation, and I hope that it addresses the amendments and answers the question from the hon. Member for Islington North.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked about linking up with the utility providers. It is already an offence under the Theft Act 1968 to use electricity without authority and the maximum penalty for that is five years’ imprisonment.

I hope that the House will welcome this move to protect home owners and lawful occupiers of residential property from squatters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

I rise to support new clause 26 and I start by paying tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Hove (Mike Weatherley) and for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer) who, along with myself, have moved this matter up the agenda. I am grateful that the Minister has listened and that we now have some clarification over this area of law.

I have practised as a solicitor and I can tell the House that, regardless of the 1977 Act, this area of law is completely unclear. It is unclear to the police, to lawyers and to home owners and it certainly is not working. Millions of home owners will be grateful that the new clause is, I hope, going to reach the statute book. There could be nothing worse for someone returning from a holiday than to find that their home has been occupied by squatters. Insult is then added to injury if they are told by their lawyer that they need to embark on a long and complicated civil law procedure, and a costly procedure at that.

I note the point that has been made by Opposition Members about there being doubt about the exact numbers of properties that are occupied by squatters, but the fact remains that if a home owner returns to their property to find it occupied by squatters, it is 100% occupied by squatters and the overall statistics are, frankly, irrelevant.

Let me make one further point about the amendment on which I understand we are to divide. It provides that an offence would not be committed

“where the building has been empty for six months or more”.

One point that has already been touched on is of real concern to many people. When a family member dies and leaves a property empty the personal representatives might have to wait many months—often longer than six months—before they can obtain a grant of letters of administration. There are many instances of properties being occupied by squatters in that time and, for that reason if no other, I hope that the House will reject the amendment. The new clause is a great step forward. It is often said that an Englishman’s home is his castle and I hope that this will help to reinforce that.

[Caroline Lucas]

I share the concerns that have been expressed by many Opposition Members about the Government’s proposals further to criminalise squatting. I want to highlight just a few of them. My first concern is the justification for the proposals. Squatting can have devastating impacts, and I want proper redress and protection for anyone who returns from a two-week holiday to find their house squatted, or for someone trying to sell their house who leaves it empty only to find squatters have moved in. But the law already stands to protect people in those instances. The major problem in dealing with cases of squatting is not the law itself but the enforcement of the law, including the time it can take for the courts to issue an interim protection order, for example.

In theory, there is no reason why such an order cannot be issued far more swiftly. In practice, I accept that things can take far too long, often compounded by what appears to be a lack of understanding of the law by many police, who are the first port of call for home owners. That is unacceptable and it needs to be addressed, but those delays in implementing the law often result in cases being highlighted in the media, wrongly creating the impression that home owners are not protected in any way from squatting.

The law clearly states when a criminal act has taken place. For example, section 7 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 makes it clear that squatters asked to leave by home occupiers are committing a criminal offence if they fail to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

The legal redress is to ask them to leave. If the squatters refuse to leave, they are committing a criminal offence. That is the point.

In September 160 housing lawyers wrote an open letter accusing Ministers and politicians of distorting public debate by making inaccurate statements about the law on squatting. I claim that that is exactly what is going on in the House tonight.

Even the Metropolitan police and the Association of Chief Police Officers believe that the current squatting law is sufficient and that a new one would be a waste of police resources that could impact negatively on community relations. We need to see instead efforts increased to enforce the current law properly and swiftly, including better training for police officers.

As many Opposition Members have said, many homeless people are pushed into squatting and do not do so out of choice. The appalling and often dangerous conditions in many squats are hardly attractive. Research by Crisis shows that 40% of single homeless people escape the horrors of rough sleeping by squatting, mostly in disused properties. These are the people who are most likely to be affected by the proposed new law, and who will be unnecessarily criminalised.

Often homeless people will suffer from multiple diagnoses, with a combination of mental ill health, substance abuse and other problems. The challenge is to ensure that practical measures are put in place so that people with the most complex multiple needs can be supported more effectively and squatting avoided in the first place.

[Joan Ruddock]

(Lewisham and Deptford): In my surgeries now for the first time I am seeing people who are not in the categories that the hon. Lady has just described. I am seeing people in work who are losing their accommodation; they cannot keep going in the private sector on the wages that they earn. Those people are becoming homeless without any access to other provision, and some of them will turn to squatting, and I can well understand why.

[Caroline Lucas]

That is exactly the point I was about to come on to. In my surgeries in Brighton, Pavilion we are seeing levels of homelessness rising. People are coming to me in exactly the situation that the right hon. Lady describes. According to figures from the Department of Work and Pensions, 840 people in Brighton and Hove risk losing their homes as a result of the proposed changes to the shared accommodation rate of housing benefit, making this area of Brighton one of the worst affected in the whole country. So Government efforts must focus much more on tackling the root cause of the problem, not on penalising vulnerable homeless people, including those living in buildings that have been empty for long periods and are not about to be brought back into use.

Part of the solution is investment in affordable housing and so, too, are measures to bring empty properties back into use as soon as possible. Brighton and Hove city council was named 2011 practitioner of the year by the Empty Homes Network for bringing 154 properties back into use over the past 12 months alone. The council’s amazing success is down to the hard work it has put into identifying empty private properties and its commitment to working with the owners of those properties where possible.

Insufficient work is still being done about empty properties nationally. The Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Andrew Stunell), admitted in response to my oral question that only 46 empty home management orders had been issued in the full five years since they were brought in. That and other steps to tackle the lack of affordable housing in my constituency and elsewhere must be given far more priority than playing political football with the roofs over people’s heads.

As many other Members have pointed out, the way the proposal has been brought to the House is completely unacceptable. To say that it was rushed is no exaggeration. This is not proper scrutiny; laws made in this way can only end in problems. The Government’s consultation on squatting closed only three weeks ago and I am sure I am not the only person who suspects that the 2,217 responses have not yet been fully analysed, especially as I understand that more than 96% of them expressed real concern about the impact of criminalising squatting. What is more, the option we are asked to consider today was not even included in the consultation.

In conclusion, there is no denying that some high-profile cases raise serious concerns about the need to enforce better existing laws on squatting, but criminalising vulnerable homeless people is inhumane, undemocratic and, crucially, unnecessary.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

I really must make some headway. If the right hon. Lady will give me a few minutes, I might allow her to intervene again.

We will continue to provide civil legal aid where a person is applying for an order for protection against domestic violence, as with a non-molestation order or an occupation order. We will also continue to waive the financial eligibility limits in these cases. We will still spend an estimated £120 million a year on private family law, including on domestic violence, after our proposed changes. This includes funding for about a quarter of the private family law cases that currently receive legal aid to go to court. We expect to continue to fund them where domestic violence or child abuse results from those cases.

Amendments 92 and 23 would put parts of the definition of domestic violence used by the Association of Chief Police Officers on the face of the Bill in paragraph 10 of schedule 1 in place of the existing definition of abuse. Identical amendments were debated in Committee. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, explicitly not limited to physical violence. It is used elsewhere in paragraph 3 of schedule 1, which provides for legal aid to be available in relation to abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, and paragraph 11, which provides for legal aid to be available for a person seeking an order to protect a child at risk of abuse. Any consideration of the definition in one paragraph should not be undertaken entirely in isolation from the others—lest confusion should result.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Will the Minister explain why a different definition is being used here from that used in other Home Office and Ministry of Justice documents? A lot of concern has arisen among women’s organisations that there is an agenda here; we would love to know what that agenda is.

[Mr Djanogly]

If the hon. Lady will allow me to get on, I will clarify precisely that.

The definition should also be seen in the light of the Bill’s structure and the purpose of the paragraph in which it appears. Paragraph 10 reflects the underlying policy of ensuring that a party to private law family proceedings who has been subjected to domestic violence by the other party and is likely to be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in presenting his or her case should, as a result, be able to have access to legal aid. It does not provide that any individual who has been the subject of, or who is at risk of being the subject of, abuse as defined in that paragraph will qualify regardless of what evidence of abuse might exist. Not every such individual will be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in the way the paragraph is intended to address. It establishes a description of legal services and whether an individual qualifies for those services in any specific case. It requires that an individual not only falls within the category in paragraph 10, but meets the criteria to be established in regulations made under clause 10.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Llwyd]

Yes, and I wonder about the quality of the evidence coming out of that flawed process.

I was assisted in drafting amendment 93 by the Bar Council, which has said that the effect of preventing such distressing and costly consequences is worth looking into urgently. Amendments 94 to 102 relate to proceedings involving children’s welfare. As the Bar Council has said:

“It is not understood why, under Schedule 1, the provision of legal aid is limited to proceedings relating to the children, and not the associated financial remedy proceedings. The child’s economic welfare is important in abuse cases; particularly given the higher incidence of abuse in low-income households.”

Amendments 96, 97 and 98

“would have the effect of bringing within scope…proceedings leading to an order under the Children Act 1989 section 37…and…all subsequent steps in family proceedings once a section 37 order has been made. They would also ensure…that…the person against whom allegations of abuse are made is within scope.”

Amendments 94 and 95 are consequential amendments.

The Minister said in Committee that cases involving financial provision are not a priority for legal aid. I firmly believe that all private family cases should be retained within the scope of legal aid. It is difficult to overestimate the damaging effects on children caught up in untidy, bitter and lengthy disputes. Protecting the interests of children is at the heart of amendments 99 to 102. As the Bar Council has said:

“Paragraph 13 provides for the provision of legal aid for the child parties in cases which come under subsection (1)(a)-(e), but not for the adult parties,”

which, as I have said, will

“result in unrepresented adults being forced to cross-examine expert witnesses and, in many instances, the child concerned.”

Amendments 99 to 102 would have the effect of

“bringing within scope the provision of legal aid for adult parties in such cases.”

I want to talk briefly about amendment 83, my final amendment, which deals with judicial review. I thank the Immigration Law Practitioners Association for its help in briefing me on this amendment. We know that immigration-specific exclusions have been made. In their Green Paper, the Government set out a robust defence of judicial review and the need for retaining legal aid in such cases, saying:

“In our view, proceedings where the litigant is seeking to hold the state to account by judicial review are important, because these cases are the means by which individual citizens can seek to check the exercise of executive power by appeal to the judiciary. These proceedings therefore represent a crucial way of ensuring that state power is exercised responsibly.”

None the less, the Government have compromised their position in immigration cases. My amendment 83 seeks to rectify that anomaly. In explaining why immigration cases are to be exempted from legal aid for judicial review claims, the Government say that they have drawn on the response to the Green Paper by the senior judiciary, who raised concerns about unmeritorious judicial reviews, but in so doing the Government have ignored three key aspects of the judiciary’s proposals.

First, the judiciary’s proposals were advanced only on the basis that

“careful further consideration would need to be given”

before the proposals that the Minister is now pushing could be taken up. However, no consultation has been held on those proposals. What is more, the judiciary also advanced their proposals on the basis that, in principle, legal aid should be available for appeals before the first-tier tribunal. However, the Bill removes legal aid in such non-asylum appeals. Finally, the proposals were advanced on the basis that legal aid should not generally be excluded, but instead be available where a positive decision was made in favour of granting legal aid in any individual case—for example, because the judge decided that it had merit. However, the Bill removes legal aid for such immigration cases, regardless of the merit of any individual case. All in all, this is a sorry state of affairs.

The Government seek to justify the new exclusions for judicial review in immigration cases by stating that public funding is not merited in cases that have

“already had…one full oral hearing,”

yet the provisions exclude legal aid even where there has been no oral hearing. The Government have effectively reversed their position that holding the state to account was of especial importance—hence the need to retain legal aid for judicial review. As a consequence, legal aid will not be available to hold the state to account at any stage, because immigration applications and appeals are also being removed from the scope of legal aid—a Catch-22 situation, or perhaps “Kafkaesque” would be a better description.

To remind ourselves, the changes will affect cases involving non-asylum claimants who face removal from the UK, and therefore from their families, homes and communities. Such claimants include trafficking victims receiving rehabilitative care and treatment; British children and spouses facing permanent separation from their parents or partners; children who have lived in the UK for many years—sometimes all their lives—facing removal to countries that they have never seen and do not know, and where they do not speak the language; adults who have lived in the UK for many years, and sometimes decades, facing removal to countries that they do not know; and victims of torture and other trauma who are no longer at risk of persecution in their home countries, but who are reliant on professional care and treatment.

The position now advanced by the Government is not supported by their stated principles or by the position advanced by the senior judiciary, and would leave a powerful agency of the state—the UK Border Agency—free from effective judicial oversight when exercising powers to remove people from their families, homes and communities, including where doing so will harm their welfare, health or life prospects. For those reasons, sub-paragraphs (5), (6) and (7) of paragraph 17 of schedule 1 have no place in any legislation with any regard for human rights or humanitarian issues.

[Caroline Lucas]

I rise to speak to my amendments 23 and 113. I shall be brief, because we have much business to get through, but let me say at the outset that I support Labour’s amendment 74. However, I still want to speak to my amendment 23, because I am yet to hear anything from the Government to explain why there is such resistance to ensuring that the definition of “domestic violence” set out in the Bill reflects the working definition currently used across Departments, including the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, and by the UK Border Agency.

In a debate earlier this month, the Minister for Equalities assured me that the Government had

“not sought to change the accepted definition of domestic violence. We are including all forms of domestic violence, physical and mental, in legal aid criteria.”—[Official Report, 12 October 2011; Vol. 533, c. 136WH.]

That commitment is incredibly important to thousands of women in my constituency who have experienced physical and emotional violence, as well as those who have suffered sexual violence, and to all women across the country who desperately need legal aid to try to protect themselves from domestic violence. However, I fail to understand why, having made that commitment, the Government are using a definition of abuse in the Bill that departs from the current, widely accepted definition. My fear—and that of many campaigners working on the issue, including the women’s institute, Rights of Women and Gingerbread—is that using a different definition will weaken protection for women and result in legal aid being unjustly denied in some domestic violence cases.

In the debate on 12 October, the Minister for Equalities pledged to continue to support the robust cross-departmental approach to tackling violence against women and girls—a position also detailed in the Government’s strategy, published last year. However, surely having the same definition of “domestic violence” in use in all relevant legislation and across all Departments is the cornerstone of a joined-up approach. Problems can arise for women if a robust cross-departmental definition is not adopted. For example, in the case of Yemshaw v. London borough of Hounslow, the local authority refused to recognise Ms Yemshaw as homeless as a result of domestic violence, because, although she had been subject to emotional, psychological and financial abuse by her husband, she had not experienced physical abuse. Not until the case reached the Supreme Court was Ms Yemshaw recognised to have experienced domestic violence and thus deemed to be eligible for housing assistance. I appreciate that the definition in the Bill addresses mental abuse, but the key point is consistency. Responding effectively to domestic violence relies on clarity, uniformity and consistency. There is a perfectly good definition already in widespread use, so let us include it in the Bill. If not, may we please have a much more rigorous response from the Government about why not?

Let me say a few words about amendment 113, the purpose of which is comprehensively to preserve legal aid in immigration cases for a person subject to domestic violence. It is also designed to highlight the inadequacy of Government amendment 59, which fails to provide legal aid for a specific group of individuals, namely those subjected to domestic abuse whose immigration status is dependent on their partner, where they have not been granted limited leave to remain for a probationary period at the end of which they may apply for indefinite leave to remain.

In July, the Minister undertook to bring forward a Government amendment that would bring immigration cases involving domestic violence within the scope of clause 10. Of course that is welcome, as was the Minister’s undertaking to consider the first part of my amendment 113, which he made when he got up to speak quite some time ago. What I would love to know from him is exactly when and how he is going to consider it. We are now in the last few days of debate on this really important Bill. At this stage, for Ministers to say that they are going to consider provisions in some unspecified way is simply not sufficiently reassuring.

--- Later in debate ---

[Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)]

There is another element in the situation to which the hon. Lady refers. Indeed, I have more than one constituency case where the individual being abused comes, as members of their family have told me, from a culture where such attacks are never reported to the police and these women are expected to suffer in silence. In many instances, these are elderly women.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, which raised a really important point. It underlines the fact that we need from the Government a fuller explanation of exactly how they are going to consider the first half of amendment 113.

Let me finish by saying that the people I have particularly in mind are victims of domestic abuse who are not necessarily probationary partners. They might be a partner of someone with limited leave or of a person exercising European free movement rights. Although they do not fall within the domestic violence immigration rule, they might well face the very same problems as those who do. I look forward to hearing more from the Minister about how he intends to take forward the concerns raised in amendment 113 and that have been mentioned by other Opposition Members tonight. I very much hope that he can offer some serious reassurance for the future.

[Kate Green]

I speak in support of amendment 74 and endorse many of the comments made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) about her amendments. I shall add a couple of points about the definition of domestic violence and abuse and say a little more about the appropriate role of mediation.

We are all at a loss to understand exactly what distinction the Minister is drawing between the definition given by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the definition in the Bill. He variously says that there are differences and that different standards are required in cases where an investigation is taking place rather than action in court. Then he says that there is not much difference and he described the definitions earlier as broadly similar. Frankly, I think this definition is simply all over the place. That matters significantly, because it will put extra uncertainty and pressure on victims of domestic violence and abuse at precisely the time when they do not need to be uncertain. They have become brave enough to speak up and pursue their case, but it is not clear whether they will be covered by the scope of legal aid.

I am particularly concerned that the Minister seems to be putting in an extra hurdle for women who are victims of domestic violence but who are nevertheless able to make a case that they should be in receipt of legal aid. They can make an application saying that theirs is an exceptional case. They will presumably have to go to the new decision-making authority set up in the Bill, but we have no understanding of how that will be done, how much delay it might cause or what sort of evidence will be required to get access to exceptional funding to bring a case. All that is left unclear and simply adds further pressure and difficulty for victims of domestic abuse.

Amendment 74 is designed to be more precise about some of the evidential factors that should be considered. I would like to respond to the important point raised by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) when he asked my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) whether it would be helpful to have some sort of national register of agencies, from which such evidence could be received. I am sure that that will not be of any great attraction to the Minister, but the UK Border Agency is already well placed to accept evidence from such voluntary sector and third sector agencies. That provides a model that could apply here.

Oral Answers to Questions

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 13th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Blunt]

This agenda has to apply to women as well as to men. The sad fact is that, overall, too many of our prisoners are under-occupied, whether women or men, and the same attention must be paid to the women’s estate as to the men’s estate.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

3. What his policy is on the right of overseas victims of alleged human rights abuses by UK multinational companies to access justice in the UK.

[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

7. What recent discussions he has had with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on his proposed reform of access to justice for overseas victims of corporate harm.

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Kenneth Clarke)]

Overseas victims of alleged corporate harm by UK international companies are, where appropriate, able to bring civil claims in the UK now, and that will continue to be the case following implementation of our reforms to civil litigation funding and costs. My officials and I are in contact with the Foreign and Colonial Office—[Laughter]—the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as and when necessary to discuss the impact of our proposed reforms to legal costs in this class of case in this country, the Commonwealth or the colonies.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the Secretary of State for that interesting reply. Notwithstanding his response, he will be aware that the United Nations Special Representative on Business and Human Rights has said that clauses 41 to 43 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill will present a major barrier to justice for overseas victims of human rights abuses by UK multinationals, not least because of the significant increased cost burdens. Will he therefore withdraw those clauses from the Bill?

Oral Answers to Questions

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 20th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Crispin Blunt)]

There are already a number of schemes to encourage foreign national prisoners to go home and serve their sentences there. As I said in the last Justice questions, we will have to work very hard in this respect. I have noted the comment of the Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee about the fact that some 700 people in the UKBA are working on it, which gives some idea of the priority that it has. I assure my hon. Friend and all hon. and right hon. Members that that level of priority will continue. We need to save the money that we should not be spending on imprisoning foreigners in our jails.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Following the revelations at the weekend that some quite shocking restraint methods are authorised in the “Physical Control in Care” manual for use by staff in secure training centres for children, will the Secretary of State introduce an explicit ban on corporal punishment in secure training centres and other youth offender institutions? Will he establish a public inquiry, chaired by a member of the judiciary, to establish the compatibility of practices in secure training centres with article 3 of the European convention on human rights?

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

Of course, we keep under review the very careful guidance about the use of restraint techniques in those circumstances, and it is a matter of regret that such guidance has to be issued. However, the hon. Lady should bear it in mind that we are talking about children and young people, some of whom are much bigger than I am and who probably have a problem with drug abuse and a history of violent crime. The completely unarmed staff have to be given some instructions in how to control those young people when they are getting out of control and it is not always easy or possible to use totally restrained methods.