Health Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th July 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Helen Morgan]

The amendment was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt) on behalf of the approximately 1.2 million people in England who live with myalgic encephalomyelitis, because five years after the introduction of National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guideline NG206, little has changed. Service provision according to NG206 remains patchy and poor, with many patients having traumatic experiences. The amendment would require a period to be set in which integrated care boards and other health bodies must comply with the guideline, and the Secretary of State must publish an annual statement on compliance with NG206 across the NHS in England.

The introduction of the guideline after sustained campaigning represented a major reform after years in which ME was treated as a psychiatric condition and patients were pushed to follow graduated exercise therapy. Often, GET had disastrous consequences, precipitating serious deteriorations that patients never recovered from. Credit is due to the hon. Member for Washington and Gateshead South (Mrs Hodgson), the current Minister for Public Health and Prevention, for her determination when in opposition to bring about the change.

In a written answer published last week, the Minister for Public Health and Prevention confirmed that all ICBs have a statutory obligation to ensure sufficient care provision for their population, but the experience of those with ME is that that obligation is far from being fulfilled. In some ICBs, no services for ME are commissioned; in others, the provider has a history of providing services that reflect not NG206, but the old and condemned approach of GET. Some services are provided out of psychiatry departments, which is a huge red flag for those with ME, and information on the quality of services is patchy. Results from a big survey of more than 5,000 people with ME or long covid in late 2025 painted a bleak picture: more than half said that they had been disbelieved by an NHS healthcare official, one in three had been made to feel that their ME was their own fault, and almost two in five had had an encounter with a clinician that was traumatic or traumatising.

Five years after its introduction, NG206 is far from being complied with, and so members of the ME community—approximately 1.2 million people, as I said—are desperately asking that something be done to address the situation. The amendment represents a route that offers hope for many long-neglected and mistreated people. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us about improving the consistency of provision for people with ME.

Moving to the clause generally, we broadly support the intention, but think that more safeguards need to be built into the principle, given the powers that are being handed to the Secretary of State. The clause makes provision for the period for compliance with a NICE recommendation, but gives no detail of how that will work in practice or how often the Secretary of State will change the standard three-month rule that NICE requires. No ceiling is put on the compliance period, no criteria govern when the period may be extended, and there is no duty to consult or set out reasoning.

What will the process be when the Secretary of State intervenes in the period of time for compliance with a NICE recommendation? We thought that there would be some mix of evidence requirements, consultation, statement of reasons, impact assessment and some kind of parliamentary scrutiny. The Secretary of State should at least have to set out their reasoning why the new power has been used. The value of the current requirement is almost entirely due to the compliance period being short and fixed. The three-month rule gives a positive NICE recommendation practical force. A power to lengthen or vary that period without constraint weakens the requirement in substance while leaving it formally intact. The right is not removed but its timing is made discretionary. For a patient awaiting treatment, that does not amount to the same thing.

A variation power is not new. Since the introduction of the budget impact test in 2017, NHS England has been able to apply to NICE to extend the funding period for medicines with a budget impact above a defined threshold, but, importantly, that period is criteria-based, triggered by a defined financial threshold, subject to a defined process and time-limited in effect. We are not overtly opposed to the power in principle, but more safeguards should be built into the criteria for its application. I would be grateful for some guidance from the Minister on that.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I have sympathy with the principle behind amendment 58, in the name of the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills. The hon. Member for North Shropshire is right to say that individuals with ME have not always received the best quality care. In many cases, ME is a debilitating and incredibly frustrating condition, and around 10% to 25% of sufferers have severe ME, meaning that they are housebound or bedbound. We know that some patients are sadly not believed by medical professionals.

In 2021, NICE said that most medical students have little or no training on the condition. The Government have previously committed to increasing the uptake of ME modules among NHS professionals. What progress has been made on that in the last couple of years? The Government also committed in the ME/CFS action plan to develop and run a public awareness initiative, with implementation expected by May this year. Has the Department developed that initiative yet? If not, what is responsible for the delay? It is not marked as complete on the Government website.

The amendment would put guidance for medical professionals into legislation, though, and my concerns about that are twofold. First, it may slow down improvements in the future. If individuals have to legally follow that guidance, how can they innovate and improve treatment without having to come back to Parliament for more primary legislation? That will take time and may mean that people with ME get worse rather than better care in the short term.

The requirement would also limit clinical judgment. A patient may have a particular set of symptoms or conditions or be on a particular set of medications that mean that the doctor or clinician looking after them needs to vary from the guidance. NICE intends the guidance to be just that, guidance, not law, but if guidance becomes law, the doctor or clinician will not be able to vary from it. My concern is that the amendment would be overly restrictive. Although it is well-intentioned, and it is a good idea to ensure that guidance is followed where possible, it would be too rigid. I therefore do not support the amendment, while continuing to support the aim of better treatment.

Clause 58 amends the Health and Social Care Act 2012 by inserting a new section 237(8A), which states:

“Provision made under subsection (8)(b) may include provision about the period within which a recommendation is to be complied with (including provision for the period to be determined by NICE or the Secretary of State).”

At the moment, NICE technology appraisals check the value of a product, whether a drug or a technology, then NICE makes a recommendation. It is then supposed to be the case that within 90 days or three months, ICBs ensure that those technologies are available, but we know that in the real world it can take longer—sometimes 12 to 24 months—for some things to become available. That could be because technology needs to be bought or training needs to take place.

I understand why there could be variation and why the Government may want to consider varying the period, but it is not clear why they need to do so in legislation, because it is possible now to vary the period on an individual basis. For example, the Government imposed a five-year limit rather than a 90-day limit for the introduction of hybrid closed loop systems for diabetes, because that is a technology that requires proper training and they were never going to be rolled out in such a short period. The other product that notably has a longer time is tirzepatide, which is more commonly known as Mounjaro. I suspect that that is down to cost, but I am not certain.

Why do the Government want to change the 90 days? The patient’s right to treatment with a NICE-approved product within 90 days will become a right to getting the product when the Secretary of State says so. That is not really a right at all, because it does not give patients any comfort and may mean that products are received later. The Government have put this power into the Bill, so they clearly intend to use it. Given that they have the power to vary on an individual basis, why do they need the power to vary on a blanket basis? Do they intend to extend the 90-day limit across the board? If so, by how much? There is no ceiling. The Committee received written evidence from Henry Burkitt from Oxygen Strategy, who made the point that there is no ceiling, no maximum time, no duty to consult and no necessity for the Secretary of State or NICE to give reasons why a delay has occurred.

The life sciences industry talks about how it wants products to be rolled out. When it is investing and doing research in this country, it wants to see new products rolled out as quickly as possible once they have been approved, and the clause is a sign that roll-out might be delayed. I understand that the Government might want to be able to vary on certain products, but they already can; why do they want to vary on a more general basis? It is presumably to slow down roll-outs, but by how much?

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am a parliamentary patron and champion of Action on ME. I feel I ought to put that on the record, as we have an amendment on ME.

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[Karin Smyth]

Of course, patient safety is what we need to get right. I will come on to that point, but there is a lot to get through with this clause. We can see its importance from the number of organisations and channels that exist. I have said that before, and I am sure we have all struggled as constituency MPs to support our constituents—either patients or staff—through the system and to understand the best route forward on patient safety. We all have the same aim, and we should be clear that the issue is how best to achieve that aim. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The test is about impact, learning and making the system and the culture change.

My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East asked me about confidence, and the fear that staff sometimes have about speaking up, which is obviously an important part of that landscape. We want to make sure that we take forward the learning on both those points into the new body.

The new framework ensures that the essential characteristics of safety investigations are preserved. The commission will have a flexible power to investigate qualifying incidents that have or may have implications for patient safety, with a clear statutory purpose of identifying risks and improving systems and practices. We are maintaining the principle of safe space and introducing strong safeguards in the process, so that staff and the public can trust that they can speak of their experiences openly, without fear or favour, to provide learnings for the system.

We have included protections for safe space materials and restrictions on disclosure, including within the regulatory functions of the CQC, and limits on the use of reports in legal proceedings. That is designed to support openness and candour, and to provide confidence in the impartiality and independence of patient safety investigations. There are clear mechanisms for transparency and accountability, including the publication of reports, requirements to respond to recommendations, and oversight through a statutory review of the commission’s investigatory functions.

Clause 59 also provides the commission with the necessary powers to carry out investigations effectively, including powers to require information, enter premises and co-ordinate with other bodies while maintaining appropriate protections such as legal privilege and safeguards against self-incrimination. Although the commission will decide which incidents to investigate, the clause preserves a power for the Secretary of State to direct it to investigate a specific qualifying incident or category of incidents. That ensures that where issues of significant public concern arise, or where urgent scrutiny is needed or there is particular risk, there is a clear mechanism to ensure that issues are investigated.

The struggles of the Care Quality Commission have been well documented. We will only commence these provisions when we are satisfied that the CQC has improved. The CQC has been supported and held to account to recover its effectiveness, and we will continue to support it and work closely with the newly appointed chair on its journey to rebuild. We will work closely with the CQC to ensure its readiness to receive the investigations functions from the Health Services Safety Investigations Body. Maintaining a centre of excellence for investigations will be integral to the CQC’s culture. Without the clause, the opportunity to deliver the ambitions of the 10-year health plan would not be realised, nor would the broader patient safety landscape, as set out in the Dash review, be fully addressed. It is therefore a necessary and integral reform.

Clause 60 makes provision for the transfer of property rights and liabilities from the Health Services Safety Investigations Body to the Care Quality Commission in connection with the abolition of the former and the assumption of its functions by the latter. It is a key technical provision to ensure an orderly and legally complete transition between the two bodies. Where functions are transferred between public bodies, it is essential that all associated assets, obligations and legal arrangements are also transferred in a way that ensures continuity and legal certainty. The clause provides the statutory mechanism to achieve that.

The clause provides a flexible framework to enable the continuation of HSSIB’s actions and ongoing matters, including legal proceedings, and ensures that references to HSSIB in existing documents are treated as references to the Care Quality Commission to avoid legal uncertainty. The clause provides for staff protections equivalent to TUPE and allows for shared ownership or use of property where needed, supporting a smooth and effective transition.

The overall effect of the clause is to enable a smooth, comprehensive and legally robust transfer of HSSIB’s property rights and liabilities to the Care Quality Commission, ensuring continuity of function and avoiding disruption to ongoing operations. Without the provision, there would be risk of legal uncertainty and operational disruption during the transfer process.

Clause 61 is a necessary and practical provision. At its core, it provides a power through regulations for His Majesty’s Treasury to ensure that transfers made from HSSIB to the CQC are delivered smoothly and on a tax-neutral basis. Like the equivalent provision for the NHS England transfer in clause 3, it allows the Treasury, by regulations, to vary the way in which relevant tax legislation applies in relation to anything transferred under a transfer scheme or anything done in connection with such a transfer. That will ensure that the tax consequences of the transfer can be properly aligned with the policy intention of a smooth and orderly transition.

Importantly, the scope of the clause is limited to specified “relevant taxes”, including income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax, VAT, stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax. As with clause 3, without this power there is a risk that the transfers could trigger unintended tax liabilities that would divert public money away from frontline services and undermine the policy intent of the legislation. Clause 61 therefore protects value for money and ensures that organisational change does not come with avoidable fiscal cost.

Clauses 59 to 61 and schedule 8 are necessary to strengthen the framework for patient safety investigations and ensure a more coherent and, crucially, effective system for learning from incidents across health services to make all our constituents and patients safer. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

These clauses are about patient safety. As has been pointed out this morning, patient safety is the absolute key here: that is well recognised across the House, among the public and across the national health service. Before going any further, I declare an interest as a patient of the NHS, a member of the British Medical Association, a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and a consultant paediatrician.

When I was interviewed in 2012 for my current consultant role, I was asked to deliver a presentation about how I could demonstrate to the trust board that the paediatric services in the hospital were safe. The first question I posed—Members will be pleased to know that I will not go through the whole presentation—was: “What is safe?” Are football stadiums safe? Is the London underground safe? Are aeroplanes safe? Broadly, yes, I think we would say they are safe, but they have not been without incident or safety issues.

Healthcare is similar. It involves millions of people, clinical judgment, human decision making and huge variability in the way that patients can present with different symptoms for different problems at different times. Is healthcare safe? Yes, it is safe. Again, however, we know from the many reports we have read that there is a long way to go to make it better and we need to prepare for that. We need to make sure that we design out room for error—that we design processes that limit the opportunities for error—use technology to limit the risk of error, and train people in a way that reduces the risk of error.

One of the key factors in that work is accepting that where there is human decision making, mistakes can happen, and that we need to identify and learn from those mistakes. One of the main ways of doing that is striking a balance between accountability and blame. If there is insufficient accountability, there can be an unclear escalation process, such that people do not know who to go to when they identify a problem. There can be a careless culture, which can develop in places where there is not enough accountability. However, if there is too much focus on fault and determining whose fault something is, we can get a blame culture. That can lead to a failure for people to come forward and therefore to a failure to learn from mistakes. It can lead to a culture of cover-up, whereby people try to avoid getting either themselves or their colleagues into trouble.

That is where HSSIB comes in because, like the air accidents investigation branch and the similar bodies for rail and shipping, it provides a safe space. That safe space is important in ensuring that people can speak up freely without fear, and know that we can get to the bottom of a problem and understand why and how something went wrong, because that is how we fix it.

At the time that HSSIB was established, there was consensus about it. The General Medical Council said:

“We support the creation of a ‘safe space’ approach to investigation. This is consistent with our guidance to doctors about their responsibilities to learn from mistakes and reflect on their practice, and their duty to take part in systems of quality assurance and quality improvement to promote patient safety.”

The British Medical Association told Parliament:

“We welcome the establishment of the HSSIB…Doctors must feel able to report errors and reflect on their own mistakes openly, without the fear of these reflections being used against them at a later stage. Only then can true improvements to patient safety be made.”

Similarly, NHS Providers told Parliament:

“NHS Providers welcomes the creation of the HSSIB as an opportunity to develop a just culture in the NHS and a focus on learning…For the HSSIB to succeed in contributing to improved patient safety, any investigations associated with it must be carried out independently and without conflict of interest, and be perceived as such.”

Indeed, the Minister for Secondary Care herself is on the record as having said:

“HSSIB is a really important new body…It must absolutely be built on the highest standards of trust when it comes to the wider system and the general public.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2021; c. 564-565.]

I think that I have demonstrated that the creation of HSSIB was a matter of consensus and it was confirmed that it was the right thing to do.

In order to work, HSSIB needed to be independent and without conflict of interest. NHS staff backed it, the providers backed it, the patients backed it and even the Minister backed it. That is what makes the Government’s plans for HSSIB so perplexing. I am not aware of a single royal college or union that supports folding it into the CQC.

Essentially, Ministers have said that this is being done because of the Dash review. “The Dash review says so,” they argue, “so that’s what we’re going to do.” I have huge respect for people who say, “I’ve asked for some experts’ advice, and they have given it, and therefore I should follow it.” However, Ministers also commissioned the report by Lord Darzi, which said that

“a top-down reorganisation of NHS England and integrated care boards is neither necessary nor desirable”,

and yet here we are, doing exactly that. It is perfectly possible for Ministers to take one report as gospel and another as guidance. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain that.

The other reason given for this measure is that it will declutter the landscape, yet few people outside Government seem to think that HSSIB is responsible for cluttering the landscape. For example, the Health Foundation wrote in its submission that

“the government needs to do more to explain how the abolition of HSSIB and transfer of its functions to CQC will meet its aim of reducing complexity and, most importantly, maintain the essential focus on improving patient safety.”

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[Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)]

This subject is of particular interest to me. For quite a few years I was a trustee of a charity that supported evidence-based medicine and quality improvement. The hon. Lady talked about a no-blame culture. We now tend to use the term “just culture” but it is the same kind of thing: we must have a safe space for people to come forward, like in the airline industry. We want to encourage reporting not only of mistakes but of near misses so that improvements can be delivered without tragic incidents having to take place. If we are to create a culture in which people will come forward to admit even potential mistakes and near misses, they cannot in any way fear punitive punishment under regulations. Does the hon. Lady agree that folding HSSIB into the CQC will make it difficult to create a culture in which people feel confident enough to want to come forward with and overtly discuss mistakes and errors?

[Dr Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman is right. When someone comes forward, they need to have trust in the system. If they think that coming forward will harm their job or career, or perhaps their colleagues’, they may be more reluctant to do so. There is a difference between a mistake and a reckless act. If people behave recklessly and badly, that needs to be dealt with for the sake of accountability, but if an individual is aware of a mistake, or aware of a loophole through which a mistake could have been made if only something else had not happened at that moment, they need to come forward and say so. It would be much more difficult for them to do so if there was a culture of fear.

Dr Benneyworth made it clear to the Committee that

“we are still working in a culture of fear”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 24, Q40.]

and that makes it difficult for people to come forward. People come forward now because they know that HSSIB is independent, but they will be less likely to come forward when HSSIB is an office in the CQC that is independent in name only. The Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), said that

“people cannot sit at desks near other people who are making decisions and at the same time be perceived as entirely independent. The perception of independence cannot be legislated for—the perception is everything”.—[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 915.]

[Gregory Stafford]

As my hon. Friend said earlier, the problem comes when this new body within the CQC has to investigate the CQC. In the oral evidence session, I asked Dr Dash what would happen if the problem was CQC, and she gave what is probably the most extraordinary answer out of the many extraordinary answers she gave. It is worth repeating:

“Well, we then have to deal with that as a problem. That is the same as saying, ‘What happens if the problem is this organisation or that one?’…What if the GMC is a problem? What if the Nursing and Midwifery Council is a problem?”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 8, Q9.]

She did not answer my question at all. In fact, she entirely sidestepped it. How can we have confidence in the Government’s proposal if the architect of the procedure cannot answer the most basic questions about the investigatory framework?

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That answer was quite shocking, really. The pause before it and the reaction was remarkable. The purpose of HSSIB is to investigate without fear or favour, and to enable people to come forward in a safe way, but if it was folded into the CQC, as the regulator, and the problem was the regulator, how would it investigate itself? How would it make recommendations to itself? What if it thinks the board that it works for is incompetent? Is it going to tell its boss that it is incompetent? How does that work? No one seemed to know the answer.

It also seems that Ministers have not thought about how the HSSIB unit will be vulnerable to political pressure. Under the Bill as drafted, the Government are planning to direct the “vast majority”—according to the impact assessment—of the investigations, and the quality board is going to have some influence over the recommendations, again under the direction of the Secretary of State.

The Liberal Democrats have tabled amendment 5, which would require the appointment of a committee. That idea is well intentioned, and we recognise the same problems and the same flaws in the Government’s approach, but I do not think it is enough to solve the problem. Even if the law says that the oversight of the investigative units will remain operationally independent, I just do not see how that is possible. I can see that the hon. Member for North Shropshire is trying to help by creating something better than what the Government have produced, but I do not think it is enough.

We have also tabled some amendments, including new clause 42, which would ensure that there is some operational independence in the choice of investigation by requiring the Secretary of State to adequately fund and resource patient safety investigations, including some of those initiated by this unit within the CQC.

Amendment 55 is a probing amendment. We noticed that much of the legislation has been lifted and shifted from the previous Act, but some things are missing, including national security grounds. We want to understand why that ground has not been included in the Bill. Very occasionally, health events have national security connotations—the Salisbury chemical weapons attack, for example. In such circumstances, restrictions on investigatory capabilities could be necessary. I do not know—I was just interested in why the Government have chosen deliberately to remove that particular clause.

Amendment 56 would allow

“the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.”

The HSSIB programme is world-leading. People look at it from across the globe, and some have asked for training or information on it, for which we have been able not just to recoup costs but actually charge. I do not understand why the Government have removed that provision, because it is an opportunity for them to get extra money without taking it off people in taxes. Do the Government want HSSIB to lose its international standing, or do they want British taxpayers to subsidise training for foreign health services? It is not clear. I would be grateful if the Minister explained that.

We need to come back to what the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket said at the beginning: what is the purpose? The purpose is patient safety.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

The point about patient safety is absolutely important, as every Bill Committee member would agree. The number of patient safety incidents has been going up for the last 10 years. Between 2015 and 2022, there was a 62% increase in patient safety incidents in this country, and since the creation of HSSIB, the number of incidents has again gone up. Does the hon. Member agree that the CQC, which has access to all patient records and all documentation in any healthcare settings in real time, would be able to monitor the improvement and progress that each provider is making following the learning from each incident? That would be important and helpful, as the HSSIB has limited ability to look into documentation and clinical notes.

[Dr Johnson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but I think this comes to part of the problem. When producing a list of faults—of things that are wrong with the service—and saying, “We need to improve the culture; it needs to be better”, we need to ask, “Okay, but how? What will be the deliverable, measurable way of doing that? How will we go about improving things?” For example, let us say that there is a problem with patients with aortic dissection, so how will we prevent that? The benefit of HSSIB is that it produces a plan, the plan is implemented and patients are safer. Part of this is about the delivery plan.

As for the other part, the hon. Member talked about monitoring progress, but that is not the job of HSSIB. If a mistake or an event happens, it is investigated by HSSIB—HSSIB produces a set of investigations based on understanding how and why it happened, because of the safe space—and then those recommendations are put forward to the Government. The Government then, ideally, implement those changes. The Minister is there to ensure that those are implemented. It will be her job to ensure, having decided which recommendations are to be implemented, that that is done fully and properly. It is a separate function. The CQC is a regulator, HSSIB is an investigator, and the Minister is there to ensure that things are delivered properly.

Going back to patient safety, at the end of my interview, I essentially told the panel, “I cannot tell you that anything is 100% safe”. The assurances that can be provided are that the staff and equipment are available, that training is available for people to do the job, and that processes are in place to identify shortcomings and learn from them, so that they are not repeated. That is key: to find the learning and spread it more widely. As the hon. Gentleman said, implementation is a challenge. It is possible to implement this on an individual basis or to implement a lesson in a unit that has had an error or mistake. Spreading it more widely, so that this is heard in every unit across the country, is more challenging. Fundamentally, I do not think I have heard anything from any of the Ministers, and I do not think it is in the Dash report either, to explain why the Government believe that rolling HSSIB into the CQC with all the problems that it might cause—the risk of it suing itself over whether the safe space is available or not—makes patients any safer.

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[Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)]

I am particularly keen to speak on clauses 59 to 63, because HSSIB was a key part of the Health and Care Act 2022, which I took through as a Minister. At that time, I was grateful for not only the fearless and tough questioning from the now Minister, who was on the Opposition Benches, but for her support. She said:

“HSSIB is a really important new body”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2021; c. 564.]

She also said that it is a

“new and important body, which we are all desperate to ensure works well.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2021; c. 566.]

It is fair to say that it does work well, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon set out clearly in his detailed remarks. The thread running through his remarks, which is particularly important in this context, was trust. People who have had something go wrong and have reported a problem need to trust that it will be looked at independently and dispassionately.

I fear that what is proposed here results from a deeply misguided decision, which has at the heart of its logic a fundamental flaw. As the hon. Member for North Shropshire set out, the decision fails to recognise that HSSIB’s role is fundamentally different from the role of CQC. It is an independent investigator; it is not a regulator or an enforcer, yet that somehow seems to be conflated in what the Government are trying to do here. They have simply failed to make a logical case for the change.

The hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, who I always listen to with great interest on these matters, highlighted that patient safety should be at the heart of this legislation. That is absolutely right, but patient safety goes hand in hand with the confidence of those working in the system to speak out and put forward evidence that will improve patient safety. It is not an either/or; one is complementary to the other. It is important that this safe space remains, because that provides the conditions in which patient safety can be improved.

In her evidence during the first session of this Committee, Dr Dash stated that she found more than 150 organisations operating in this space when she undertook her review. However, in Hansard, she went on to say:

“I was asked by the Department of Health and Social Care to look at that landscape. I was asked to focus on six organisations”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 5, Q2.]

Only six out of 150? That does not ring true. That is not a tidying-up of the landscape but a very narrow focus. When the Minister comes to her concluding remarks, can she answer who specifically determined those six organisations for Dr Dash and told her to look only at those, ignoring the other 144-plus organisations? We all know that what a review comes up with is, to a large degree, determined by the scope set for it. By picking a mere six out of 150-plus organisations, I fear there is a risk that the scope has effectively, to a degree, stacked the outcome of what would be looked at and what would be concluded.

Before addressing specific concerns about the approach being adopted with the abolition of HSSIB, I want to highlight a real challenge with—even if one accepted the premise, which I do not—where it is proposed the functions are transferred to, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon set out.

Dr Dash said in her evidence that the CQC

“still has a way to go, and we all need to acknowledge that.”

She went on to say:

“I would have hoped that, by now, many of those challenges had been addressed. Some of them have been, but some of them have struggled.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 4, Q2.]

We are talking about moving an effective organisation into another organisation which, quite apart from whether the merger is appropriate given their different remits, is—by the review author’s own admission in evidence—basically not in a fit state to receive those new functions. I think that has been tacitly acknowledged by the Minister in saying it will only be done at an appropriate time, when the CQC is ready. Therefore, why make those changes at all? At the moment, it does not look like the CQC will be ready, at least in the near future, based on the evidence we have heard.

[Dr Johnson]

My right hon. Friend will be aware that it is not the only thing that the CQC is being asked to take on. It is also being asked to take on the regulation of event healthcare, which is another new function for the CQC, all at a time when, as he says, it has its own difficulties to manage.

[Edward Argar]

My hon. Friend the shadow Minister is right to highlight, for want of a better way of putting it, the cumulative challenges that will potentially be piled on the CQC, on top of the pre-existing challenges with how that organisation is functioning.

I read with great care the Adjournment debate that took place last night in the Chamber, which has been referred to by a number of hon. Members, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, and I pay tribute to him for his work in this space. I worked closely with him in the context of the passage of the Health and Care Act 2022, and I know that the issue of patient safety is fundamental to what he seeks to improve and achieve in this House. I agree with him: I fear the Dash review simply fails to make the case for those changes. Also, as hon. Members have set out, it sadly appears to contain a number of errors and assumptions that are inaccurate, which I will turn to in a moment.

The fundamental challenge is to establish a way for people to feel confident and trusting in challenging a culture of denial and blame. We have seen this most recently in the context of maternity failings and scandals. The need for that safe space, and for an organisation able to challenge the institutions, is very clear, and I fear that this change actually weakens the ability to do that. Dr Dash’s review, I fear, fails to fully recognise just how important the safe space concept is—not just in how it is drafted and framed legally but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon said, in how it is perceived by those who need to use it. The CQC, of course, has a legal duty to act on information it receives, but that risks being conflated here.

I saw this illustrated last night, for example, in the Adjournment debate, in a comment made by the Minister’s colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the hon. Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), when she was responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex. She was talking about the criteria for disclosing protected information outside the investigative function. She said:

“Those criteria set a high bar for any disclosure—as high as it is currently with HSSIB—and the CQC will publish further guidance setting out much more detail.”

This is the key point. She went on to say:

“As the Bill sets out, the CQC will appoint a responsible person who will decide whether the case matches the criteria and whether it warrants information sharing outside the safe space.”

And this is the crux of it:

“That person is likely to be the CQC’s chief executive officer.”—[Official Report, 6 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 147.]

That is an inherent conflict. If the person who is the head of the regulatory body is making the decision on whether information should be disclosed by HSSIB in its folded-in form, that will do nothing to inspire confidence in disclosure and the safe space provisions. I fear that drives a coach and horses through some of the arguments being made that there are sufficient safeguards within this merger to ensure HSSIB can continue as it has done thus far.

The crux of some of Dr Dash’s arguments appears to be that there are, as the Minister also alluded to, too many recommendations being made and that it is a complex landscape. Yet HSSIB, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex set out yesterday, has made 56. He went on to say that the 30 or so public inquiries and other investigations have delivered 1,400, so it simply does not follow that HSSIB is the problem in that complex landscape.

What was made very clear by, again, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon is that, of course, the concern is not the recommendations. It is not the organisation making the recommendations that is responsible for the fact that they are not implemented. It is the NHS itself, its inertia, its unwillingness and the Department’s unwillingness to take them forward in a coherent fashion—to drive the recommendations through and monitor whether they have been delivered on by the NHS.

[Dr Johnson]

On pages 8 and 9 of the Dash review, Dr Dash talks about this. She states:

“Recommendations are…focused on inputs, rather than outputs or outcomes, and fail to…balance…risks within organisations and across systems…the existence of so many recommendations causes considerable confusion for staff. They result in more clinical staff moving into supervisory roles to check that other…staff are adhering to the recommendations. The overwhelming majority of recommendations lack data as to the cost of implementation or the expected impact.”

She recognised, did she not, that there was a problem with people being asked to check up on one another’s work and check up on their work? But the recommendations do not deal with that, perhaps because the scope, as my right hon. Friend has described, is so narrow.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

It is, of course. I have been focusing on public perception, and my right hon. Friend is absolutely correct that that is only one part of it—an important part of it. Probably, the most important part is what actually happens, and that requires the NHS to learn and improve, which is very unlikely to be improved by this proposal.

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend is making a very important case about the importance of the perception of independence and the safe space actually being safe. There is a risk that people feel that they will be hounded or—

[The Chair]

Order.