Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy

Cameron Thomas Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Westminster Hall

[Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I hope that the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) enjoyed the email that I sent him this afternoon.

Carl von Clausewitz described war as a continuation of politics by other means. In the Kremlin, the reverse is true and every lever of statehood is a machine of war. Vladimir Putin has been prosecuting that war against the United Kingdom and our allies for 26 years—whether or not we understand that. NATO and the European Union are two major barriers to Putin’s ambition for expansion and the UK is a crucial partner to both.

In November 2025, Nathan Gill, Reform UK’s erstwhile leader in Wales, was convicted of taking Russian bribes in return for favourable statements in the European Parliament. The hon. Member for Clacton, and leader of Reform UK, described his once close associate as a “bad apple”, but I suspect that the real rot is at the heart of the orchard.

The hon. Member for Clacton also made pro-Kremlin statements as a Member of the European Parliament, most notably in 2014, the year that Russia first invaded Ukraine, when he spoke of Europe poking

“the Russian bear with a stick”.

The previous year, he had met the Russian ambassador, Alexander Yakovenko, at the Russian embassy in London. He later denied that that meeting took place, but a photograph of the pair betrays the falsehood.

Arron Banks also met Yakovenko on at least four occasions between 2015 and 2016, a period within which he donated at least £8 million to a campaign to leave the European Union. He has subsequently given conflicting accounts as to the origin of that donation. Banks is known to have explored the possibility of raising foreign donations through an email copied to Steve Bannon in 2015, and in 2025, Reform UK received a donation of £9 million from the co-owner of cryptocurrency Tether, Christopher Harborne. Tether is understood by the National Crime Agency to be used by the Kremlin to launder its money, evading international sanctions and keeping its war machine running.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

My hon. and gallant Friend is right to highlight the threat from hostile states such as Russia and most importantly from individuals with Russian links. That is exactly why I introduced a private Member’s Bill last year to cap political donations and close the loopholes that allow foreign-linked dark and dirty money to flow into our politics. Does my hon. Friend agree that wealthy individuals with opaque international links can exert damaging influence on our democracy, particularly when our political finance rules still allow very large donations—including crypto donations—with limited scrutiny?

[Cameron Thomas]

I absolutely agree, and I look forward to the Rycroft review hopefully making some recommendations along those very lines.

The case of Bradshaw and others v. the United Kingdom at the European Court of Human Rights judged in 2025 that the UK’s decision to leave the European Union was subject to Russian interference, but neither MI5 nor MI6 has ever properly explained its dereliction of duty in failing to inform Parliament of that activity. Last year, I asked the Security Minister to release the full, unredacted Russia report, which Prime Minister Boris Johnson suppressed in 2019 against the advice of those security services. The Minister declined, but did not elaborate on his reasoning.

I recalled that interaction last week, after Peter Mandelson and Jeffrey Epstein were linked to Putin’s friend, oligarch Oleg Deripaska. Mandelson was also a non-executive director at the Russian company Sistema. Last week, the leader of the Liberal Democrats called for a full inquiry into Mandelson’s links to Russia. That is the same inquiry that the petitioners are asking for.

Ours is an era in which war rages in Europe, the great partnerships of NATO and the European Union have been ruptured, and Russian hybrid warfare has targeted every aspect of UK statehood, from the Ministry of Defence to the NHS and the BBC. Disinformation has for years been interwoven with news to undermine public trust in UK politics—disinformation that now feeds artificial intelligence algorithms distorting the truth that will inform tomorrow.

I have scratched the surface, but there is simply too little time, in any number of Back-Bench debates, to lay out the case for this inquiry. This issue transcends political allegiance. The breadth and depth of Russian influence is so vast and so dangerous to our democracy that no single political party has either the credibility or capacity to fully investigate it. Only a judge-led statutory public inquiry will suffice. The Government have the responsibility to deliver; the future of our democracy requires that they do so.

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[Claire Young (Thornbury and Yate) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I thank the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for setting out the issues so clearly.

Protecting democracy must be a national security priority for all of us in this place. Many of us across the country recognised that by signing the petition, including 208 from my Thornbury and Yate constituency. Over recent years, these concerned citizens have watched Russian interference in democracies across the world—in the United States, across Europe, and here in the United Kingdom—and now they are demanding answers.

The petition calls for an inquiry into the depth and breadth of possible Russian influence in our country. Although in December last year the Government launched an independent review of foreign interference, led by Philip Rycroft, that is not enough. I welcome any scrutiny of foreign interference, but the review falls short on the transparency and information that the public deserve. We need a thorough and independent inquiry to understand fully the extent of foreign interference in the UK’s political system.

Parliament’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy previously warned that the UK has faced a sustained pattern of attempted interference from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. That assessment was reinforced by the Government’s 2025 strategic defence review, which concluded that the UK is subject to daily hostile activity, ranging from espionage and cyber-attacks to manipulation of information. The review called Russia an immediate and pressing threat.

Despite that recognition of Russian influence in the UK, successive Governments have failed to act decisively to protect our democratic process. The threats are real and documented: Russian money has flowed into UK politics; foreign oligarchs have bought property and influence; Chinese surveillance operations target our institutions; and, as has been mentioned repeatedly, Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, was jailed for accepting bribes from a pro-Kremlin operative to make pro-Russian speeches and statements. That is utterly shocking.

That is why, following Gill’s conviction, my Liberal Democrat colleagues and I are calling on the Intelligence and Security Committee to launch a new probe to investigate Russian interference in British politics. The investigation should look into potential ties between other members of Reform UK and Russia, which has been a recurring concern in the debate. The Reform UK leader, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), was paid to appear on “Russia Today” until it was banned in the UK, and he once declared that Putin was the world leader he admired the most.

We must move with urgency. The inquiry should be completed and laid before Parliament before the next general election, avoiding a repeat of the last Russia report, which the Conservative party shamefully suppressed until after the country went to the polls. Voters deserve to know about threats to our democracy before they cast their ballots, not after. This is not about one bad apple; it is about systematic failures and how we protect our democracy, given how successive Administrations have failed to address fundamental weaknesses.

We hope that we will soon have the opportunity to tackle these weaknesses through an elections Bill. The Liberal Democrats believe that the Bill must include a comprehensive ban on cryptocurrency donations to political parties, building on the policy paper that the Government published last year, which proposed tighter rules on political donations. Crypto creates the perfect vehicle for hostile states and foreign oligarchs to funnel money into British politics while evading scrutiny.

Transparency International UK has warned that the anonymity that can come with these donations provides a “backdoor for foreign interference”. Analysis from Spotlight on Corruption shows that only three parties have indicated that they will accept cryptocurrency donations: Reform UK, the Homeland party and the Other party. Reform UK even has a dedicated page for cryptocurrency donations.

The elections Bill must cap political donations to stop foreign oligarchs from interfering. It must also ensure transparency in political advertising and prevent foreign and dark money from influencing UK elections. Past loopholes have allowed opaque and corrupt funding of political parties, enabling foreign money to distort British politics. Transparency International has said that a foreign interference review is “welcome”, but that donation caps are

“the only way to break the stranglehold of big money over British politics”.

[Cameron Thomas]

The hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) has described a gentleman, George Cottrell, as “like a son” to him, despite that individual being a convicted money launderer. Does my hon. Friend share my suspicion? What does she make of the potential connection between money laundering and cryptocurrency?

[Claire Young]

It is extremely concerning, and that is why we would ban cryptocurrency donations. Alongside the new elections Bill, we must address the issues that the previous Conservative Government created and restore the independence of the Electoral Commission, as it had pre-2022. We must also ensure that the commission has real enforcement powers and the resources it needs to deploy them. As others have mentioned, we must also reform our electoral system. We must take a robust stance towards hostile states, such as China and Russia, and recommit to international partnerships that promote democracy and stability, including working with European and other democratic allies to co-ordinate our response to Russian interference.

The Government hold a substantial majority in the House, so they can push through legislation rapidly when they choose to. Few things can be more urgent than protecting our democracy. We call for a wide-ranging and properly funded public inquiry into potential Russian interference, including in the 2016 EU referendum, with the report to be published as soon as possible. A public inquiry with the power to compel witnesses to appear and documents to be released is the only way to get to the bottom of these serious allegations. Transparency must be prioritised.

Lord Mandelson

Cameron Thomas Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Corbyn]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Following the answer we have just heard, if the Intelligence and Security Committee comes across evidence of commercial misdemeanours as well as intelligence and international relations misdemeanours, what powers does it have to do anything about that? Where will it refer those concerns and where will those inquiries lead? The issues of lobbying and potential corruption in the handing out of Government contracts are massive, and I would not want that swept under the carpet on the basis that the Committee is dealing with international relations and national security.

[Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. We have heard this evening from the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe), who celebrated Elon Musk—rather tactlessly, I believe—in this debate. Notwithstanding the fact that like Mandelson, Musk had a relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, and in fact was found to have been practically begging for a visit to his island, the hon. Member declined to include—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. That is not a point of order; it is a point of debate. I do not think it is appropriate during points of order specifically on the Intelligence and Security Committee to raise that matter. It is not for the Chair to rule on comments by other Members during the course of the debate.

[Cameron Thomas]

I am grateful to you for allowing me to continue, Madam Speaker. The hon. Member for Great Yarmouth declined in his intervention to declare his interest: he is, in fact, bought and paid for by Elon Musk.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. He has very clearly brought into question the probity of the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe). He might want to withdraw that. It is of course a matter for the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth to declare that, which he could now do by putting any interest on the record.

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[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I did ask the Member to withdraw his comments. He now has the opportunity to do so.

[Cameron Thomas]

Madam Deputy Speaker, I withdraw the remark that the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth was bought and paid for. I regret the tone that I used.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I thank the hon. Member for putting that on the record. If there are no more points of order, I call Wendy Morton.

Civil Service Pension Scheme: Administration

Cameron Thomas Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2026 Westminster Hall

[Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. All credit to the hon. Member for Blackpool North and Fleetwood (Lorraine Beavers) for securing this important debate. She can so often be found calling out injustice. As is clearly the case for many MPs, recent weeks have brought forth an abundance of correspondence from constituents frustrated by unsatisfactory communication from Capita, with the anxiety borne of missed pension payments. Many of those who have experienced missed pension payments have given years or even decades of their lives to public service across key Departments, not least the Ministry of Defence and Crown Prosecution Service.

One such constituent of mine expressed that she had completed her MyCSP application in July 2025, but had then received no further communication until discovering in November that the portal had closed. Having then created a Capita account in December, she has sent three messages via the portal and attempted to call the hotline four times—to date, all without a response. Another is a retired Ministry of Defence civil servant who had worked at RAF Innsworth, now Imjin barracks, home to the Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre. She told me that she submitted all her documentation as required, but at the end of November all telephone lines were ceased, her emails bounced back undelivered and the portal was closed. She said that her experience only worsened when Capita reopened the portal, which was apparently untested and did not allow her to log in at all. The absence of meaningful communication significantly compounded my constituent’s stress. Those affected still have no timeline for seeing their pensions paid.

Capita’s initial explanation—that these symptoms were merely teething troubles—should do nothing to convince any of us that the organisation fully understands the implications of the missed payments. It has more recently admitted to serious issues: the true scale is apparently a backlog of 86,000 cases. None of that should surprise the Government or anybody else here. I recall significant delays in the armed forces recruitment process during a period in which Capita mismanaged medical assessments. Issues similar to those faced currently were reported in the administration of the teachers’ pension scheme, again by Capita. In October 2025, the Public Accounts Committee warned the Government of a clear risk that Capita would not be ready to take on full administration in December, and it called on the Cabinet Office to explain how it would ensure sufficient staffing and resourcing.

At the heart of this issue are 1.7 million current and former civil servants who just want peace of mind from knowing that the pensions they have earned through years of public service will be handled fairly, with dignity and, if at all possible, with a base level of competence. The Liberal Democrats therefore have questions for the Minister and the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire (Mike Wood). I hope that in their closing speeches, they will answer some of the following.

In the light of this situation, what steps are the Government taking to support individuals who have mortgages to pay, families to feed and all manner of expenses for which they are currently being denied payment? Perhaps the shadow Minister will tell us how his Government assessed Capita’s role in the administration of the teachers’ pension scheme, where similar issues were reported. Will he explain whether Capita’s role in the administration of the teachers’ pension scheme factored in the awarding of this contract? Capita claims that the backlog it inherited was more than twice the size that it anticipated. Will the Minister tell us who is responsible for that—MyCSP, Capita, this Government or the last one?

Perhaps the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire, the solitary Conservative representative, will answer the following. The value of the contract is £239 million over seven years. Given Capita’s history of mismanagement, by what metrics was it determined to have won the contract? Could the Minister answer this question? Hauntingly, the contract includes an option to extend it from seven to 10 years. Will this mismanagement factor into the Government’s determination about whether to extend it?

My final question is for the Government. We can all sit here, empathise and complain about Capita, but we must learn the lessons. What lessons will the Government take from this fiasco?

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[Mike Wood]

I am sure that the hon. Lady will accept that because I was not a Minister in the previous Government, I did not have access to the tendering process, and do not have the details of the bid. However, there was a clear failure by the previous providers and there have been many opportunities since the last general election to review that contract in light of the clear failure—

[Cameron Thomas]

The hon. Gentleman is probably quite right to note that there were significant failings by the previous provider. Does he accept that there were clear failings by the previous Government?

[Mike Wood]

No. The hon. Gentleman is obviously trying to hide from the fact that his party was part of the Government that awarded that contract in 2012 to the mutual joint venture. He may wish to look at his own party’s part in that if he thinks that it was a mistake. Sadly, the information provided by the Minister for the Cabinet Office to the House last week fell well short of what is required. It failed to address the fundamental question of how the Government allowed Capita to take over the contract in December despite the repeated warnings and the signs that it had clearly failed in its key milestones.

UK-EU Common Understanding Negotiations

Cameron Thomas Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are mutual benefits and mutual objectives—I am afraid to say that, in modern-day Europe, the UK and the EU also face mutual threats—and closer co-operation to deliver results is absolutely crucial.

[Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)]

This deal will not give back the futures that were stolen from so many young people by Boris Johnson’s Government, but it does offer such futures to people going forward. It is good work. That said, small, medium-sized and large businesses in Tewkesbury and the economy at large need the Government to stop fumbling around the edges. It is time for the Minister to speak to the Government and get us a customs union with the European Union, is it not?

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

It is time to deliver concrete results, and that is exactly what I am doing.

Digital ID

Cameron Thomas Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Westminster Hall

[Robbie Moore]

I agree. The attitude of control strikes at the very heart of our political traditions. We are a representative democracy, not a command-and-control state. A Government exist by the will of the people, not the other way round. Put simply, we are not a “papers, please” society.

One of the most terrifying elements of the Government’s proposals is that these IDs are to be digital. The national database on which our identities are to be held is a true honeypot for hackers all over the world. To those who say that it will be secure, I say, “Name me a company or Government body that has not had a hacking crisis in recent years.” The NHS, the Co-op, Jaguar Land Rover—I could go on. Even Estonia’s Government lost 280,000 digital ID photos in 2021.

[Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)]

Does the hon. Gentleman share my concerns that the scheme could put constituents’ most sensitive data into the hands of private, perhaps overseas, individuals who might have neither our constituents’ nor our country’s interests at heart?

[Robbie Moore]

I completely agree. In the case of One Login, cyber-security specialists were able to infiltrate and potentially alter the underlying code without being noticed by the team working on the project. In fact, the existing system could be compromised as we speak. We are assured by advocates of digital ID that clever technology will protect the data, but as I have outlined, the temptation to further integrate data within the system will be extremely strong. How long before someone suggests that security features be removed to make the system more efficient?

Digital data brings me back to consent. I will finish on this point: digital ID is an ever more intrusive evolution of traditional ID cards—one that promises to be more oppressive. Coupled with the powers of digital databases, increasing widespread facial recognition, digitalised public services and the looming prospect of a central bank’s digital currencies, digital ID threatens to create an all-encompassing digital surveillance state that even George Orwell’s “Nineteen Eighty-Four” could not predict. In every aspect of public life, we give over our data with consent. Yet digital ID turns that notion on its head, insisting that we hand over data to simply function in society, and potentially for reasons to which we cannot consent in advance.

National Security Strategy

Cameron Thomas Excerpts

Tuesday 24th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Pat McFadden]

The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware that there has been a common travel area between Ireland and the United Kingdom for many years, which the previous Government and this Government were determined to keep. That is why there is an open border between the two countries, as he says. I refer him to the immigration White Paper published just a few weeks ago, which set out reforms to the legal immigration system. Immigration makes an immense contribution to UK society, but we know that people want a proper set of rules around it, and that is what the immigration White Paper provides.

[Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)]

I echo the comments made by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) about the Chinese Communist party. The national security strategy recognises that UK security is tied to that of our allies. Do the Government acknowledge that lasting peace in Europe means terminating Putin’s European ambitions in Ukraine, and if so, how will the Government get that through to the US Administration?

[Pat McFadden]

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, we have stood by Ukraine. The strategy sets out the degree of support that this country has given Ukraine over the past four years. We continue to stand by Ukraine, and we continue to support its right to decide its own future. That will remain a core part of our strategy. With regard to China, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will make a statement shortly setting out the China audit in greater detail.