Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Calvin Bailey Excerpts(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
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Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
I pay tribute to the hon. Members for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green (Florence Eshalomi) and for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell), who both spoke very movingly on behalf of the victims of this tragedy who want to see justice done. I venture to suggest that what they want above everything is to know that nothing like this will ever happen again—that whatever happened that night, there will be some glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel and that some good will come of it.
I praise the Secretary of State for recognising that it is the system itself that needs the most fundamental reform, and that the failures of individuals—whatever incentives existed and whatever conflicts were unresolved—were system failures. The cultural shift will come about as a result of a systemic review—a system change.
Hon. Members might well ask why I am taking an interest in this debate. I do not think I represent any community in a high-rise building with cladding problems in leafy Essex. The only interest I have to declare is that it turned out that my late mother was living in a block with unsafe cladding, so, to a very limited and minor extent, my family are suffering the loss of being unable to sell her flat. That is very small beer, but I put that down as an interest I should declare.
I have long taken an interest in safety management systems—ever since I was shadow Secretary of State for Transport at the time of the Ladbroke Grove disaster, when I took an interest in what was being submitted to the inquiry and made a submission of my own, recommending that there should be a systemic approach to the safety system. That resulted in the formation of the rail accident investigation branch of the Department for Transport, with the result that no inquiry into a rail accident has ever taken place again.
Similarly, as Chairman of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, I took a close interest in patient safety because we received the reports from the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. We had Mid Staffordshire and all the maternity scandals, and we had public inquiry after public inquiry, until somebody suggested that there should be an investigation body accountable and answerable to the Secretary of State to look at why things go wrong in patient care and investigate the causes of incidents—without blame, incidentally—to find out what went wrong in order to make recommendations and put it right. Those are the lessons drawn from all the effective safety regimes in other industries, which should perhaps be applied in this case.
I co-authored a submission to the Grenfell inquiry with three others. The first was former Labour Housing and Fire Minister Nick Raynsford, who, at the time, was chairman of the Construction Industry Council approved inspector’s register—CICAIR—which relates to the private sector building control surveyors the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington (Gideon Amos) spoke about. I will come on to that conflict, which the hon. Gentleman is very concerned about.
Another co-author was Kevin Savage, a leading figure in the building control profession; he happens to be a constituent of mine, but that was a coincidence. The third was Keith Conradi, the former chief investigator of the air accidents investigation branch of the Department for Transport—who, as it happens, became the first chief investigator for the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, which, as a result of the inquiry conducted by my Committee, is now a statutory body. He helped set that body up; he is now retired. He helped with the submission.
Keith Conradi in particular enabled us to understand building safety management as a safety management system. The events leading to the Grenfell disaster were not just the random failings or crimes of individuals. Where there is culpability, prosecutions must certainly follow, but that is not the main point. Grenfell and previous fires, such as Lakanal House, demonstrated that there was a comprehensive failure of the safety system that should exist to keep buildings as safe as possible.
We made our submission in September 2021. After seven years—a disadvantage of public inquiries is that they take a very long time—I was disappointed that the inquiry did not really find time to engage with our recommendations. It did publish our submission, but from the recommendations, I think it is fair to say that a number of issues have been handed back to the Department to be resolved. Paragraph 113.58, entitled “Implementing change”, simply suggests that the London Fire Brigade should
“establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents”.
That is an odd recommendation when we think about it, because the London Fire Brigade was itself very, very severely criticised in the report. That it should be left responsible for marking its own homework and making recommendations about itself underlines that the lacuna in the recommendations is the lack of an investigation body. There were two other paragraphs about building control that I shall come to: paragraphs 113.37 and 113.38. Those were our two urgent priorities to be addressed in our submission.
By the way, I am very grateful to the Minister for accepting our request for a meeting, which the Prime Minister promised on the Floor of the House when he announced the outcome of the inquiry. We had a very good meeting with the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention. I think she was taken with our recommendations but I think that they fall to the Minister’s Department, so I look forward to meeting him later this week.
Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)
The delays in addressing the fire safety issues that pertain to the Grenfell tragedy are having significant consequences for those who reside in buildings that are not being remediated in a timely fashion, particularly in my constituency. For example, the residents of Johnston Court have faced more than four years of uncertainty following a B2 rating, and the progress of remediation has stalled due to disputes between the developer and freeholder. The deadlock has left residents unable to sell, remortgage or feel safe in their homes, so we need faster action and accountability from all parties involved. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Government’s actions and interventions will be critical to ensure that disputes do not keep delaying this urgently needed work, and that, as he is discussing, this is fundamentally about leadership?
Sir Bernard Jenkin
I am very happy to agree with the hon. Gentleman and to welcome the Secretary of State’s announcements today about accelerating all of this and ensuring that action is taken much more quickly. I hope that that will result in much quicker action for his constituents.
I was addressing the first major recommendation in our submission to the inquiry, which is that there should be established an independent building safety investigation branch of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, reporting directly to the Secretary of State. That removes any possible conflict that investigations have with any other part of the system. The idea that the Health and Safety Executive or the new Building Safety Regulator should be conducting investigations is absolutely fine, but we can never guarantee that they will not come across a failing of their own and be conflicted in that investigation. The public will not have confidence in any investigation that they conduct unless there is an independent investigation that looks at all the elements of the system. The Hackitt review rather overlooked this issue. It failed to underline how future fire incidents would be investigated. This is a gap that is still to be addressed.
The current system of resort to public inquiries, as the hon. Member for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green confirmed, takes far too long. I feel for those who were caught up in the tragedy directly. They have waited far too long. An air accident investigation rarely takes more than a few months because the capability exists. In the Grenfell case, the Housing Ombudsman still felt that
“residents’ complaints were dismissed and devalued.”
I think the inquiry was overwhelmed with so much material and so many different elements. In a way, its terms of reference were too wide to be able to capably come up with a comprehensive set of safety system recommendations.
It is also notable that although there was an inquiry into the Lakanal House fire, we had another inquiry into Grenfell. Public inquiries do not seem to resolve problems. A building safety investigation branch would transform that. It would operate independently, modelled on similar bodies for air, marine and rail. These bodies have proven their worth in both the rail and aviation. No public inquiry has taken place into an aviation accident since 1972 and there has not been a public inquiry into a rail accident since the Ladbroke Grove inquiry, because people have confidence in the new independent arrangements. They conduct rapid investigations. They focus not on blame, but on understanding failures and issuing binding recommendations for the future.
Sir Bernard Jenkin
I am sure that may be a very good suggestion, but the point I am making is that we need an apex to our safety system. Whatever else the Government do to remediate the safety system as it exists at the moment, they need an independent safety investigator as the apex of the system, which is like a guardian angel over the whole system. The hon. Member for Kensington and Bayswater said there should be—I think I quote him correctly—an independent oversight body. Well, this is the body he seeks. It would be constantly looking for risks in the system, not just investigating accidents, and following up directly with the Secretary of State to say, “This has not been done.”
Crucially, the independence of the bodies is what commands public confidence. They also provide a very significant capability that no other regulator can do—a safety investigation body is not a regulator, of course. They provide a legal safe space where anybody can go and say anything without fear or favour. Witnesses have protection and, if necessary, anonymity, so they can openly speak without fear of retribution of being sued or the words they give in evidence being used against them in court. This creates a culture of openness that accelerates the learning process while maintaining accountability.
The introduction of a BSIB would not trespass on any other part of the safety system, such as the HSE or the Building Safety Regulator. It is an essential additional capability which needs to exist, otherwise we do not have that ultimate check over the whole system. Regulators, if necessary, can still run their investigations, as I was saying before. The safe space in the safety investigator does not protect anyone from legal culpability, as we saw when the air accidents investigation branch investigated the Shoreham air crash. It passed a file to the police, because it believed there had been negligence. The pilot was prosecuted. The safe space does not protect someone from wrongdoing.
Sir Bernard Jenkin
I will give way once more, but I have rather a lot to say and I do not want to take up too much time.
Mr Bailey
The fundamental difference between an air accident investigation and a public inquiry is that as culpability is identified it is then passed on for action. This lies at the heart of the problem, which is the slow pace of bringing about justice. An extended period for a public inquiry has prevented and inhibited the delivery of justice for the people of Grenfell. Does the hon. Gentleman—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. I remind Members that interventions need to be pithy and short.
Representation of the People
Calvin Bailey Excerpts(1 month, 1 week ago)
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Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)
I welcome this statutory instrument, which puts right an inconsistency that should never have arisen in the first place. I am grateful to the Government for their rapid work to get us to this point, including that done by the Minister for the Armed Forces. I recognise wider concerns about voter ID rules, but the Government are right to prioritise this measure as a first step, and keep to our manifesto promise while the wider review continues. As we know, many veterans face particular challenges in proving their identity in many aspects of civilian life. We veterans are more likely to have moved around regularly, and may not have the records, or the experience of engagement with civilian authorities, such as councils. That creates barriers that we need to remove.
In my career, my home base moved around constantly for many years. My driving licence gave my parents’ address, because it was the only fixed abode I could refer back to. That is typical for many of our service personnel. We should recognise that service personnel have fewer fixed connections to rely on when they leave the forces. It can be confusing to go from having a MOD 90—a core part of life that shapes how service personnel engage with all the services and authorities that they encounter—to being out in the civilian world, with a blizzard of forms and applications that service personnel are simply not used to dealing with. The least we can do is to make sure that these processes are easier.
Obviously, the right first step was the veterans card, but it is of limited use unless it can make life easier and less hostile for people leaving our military after completing their service to us all. Society trusts our military IDs. In time, we must learn to continue valuing service, and must come to trust our veteran IDs in the same way.
We have to ask why it has taken action from this Government to correct this mistake and create parity between veterans cards and the MOD 90. It is shameful to read in leaked reports that the previous Prime Minister deliberately pushed to keep this barrier to veteran voting, based on nothing more than a vague fear that giving in on the veterans card would make it harder to say no to student ID cards. That says it all about the decision making on voter ID. It is welcome that the rules will be subject to continuing wider review.
I must also address the point made by the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) about service personnel, because I was impacted by the issue he mentioned. While serving in the United States, upholding democracy, I lost the ability to vote. That is a terrible affront, and I urge the Government to give due consideration to the issue. Fairness and doing right by those who have served us is vital, and it is what our communities want. Securing a sense of fairness and integration between the forces and our communities is important because of the impact on recruitment and retention, which have been degraded over the past 14 years, with real cost to our national defence.
I finish with the recognition, which I know Ministers share fully, that this is just one step among many that will need to be taken if we are to remove the barriers that many veterans face when trying to access their rights and play a full role in our communities. We can now look forward to working together on a wider agenda, which is so important for keeping all our people safe.