Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Tuesday 3rd November 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry]

It is great to have you finishing up the Committee for us, Dr Murrison.

I have tabled amendment 69 in relation to clause 50 and part 1. That area of the Bill gives the Secretary of State quite broad power to make regulations that are consequential to the Bill. As it stands, the Bill has quite a range of implications for Scottish trafficking laws and how they are carried out. The amendment aims to ensure that the Government receive consent from Scottish Ministers before introducing regulations affecting slavery and human trafficking.

The amendment refers in particular to clause 11, which creates a new legal procedure for claim notices requiring people to notify the Home Office of any reasons or grounds for why they should be allowed to enter, remain or not be removed from the UK. In that respect, the Bill tries to shift the burden of responsibility on to survivors by creating the obligation to treat a failure to disclose relevant details at the earliest opportunity as damaging to one’s credibility.

The way things are looked at in Scottish law seem to be different from the English approach. This kind of restrictive approach to vulnerable groups seeking sanctuary in the UK seems to contradict the commitments in Scotland to the UN refugee convention and the UK’s obligations under the inter-agency co-ordination group against trafficking. Those obligations require victim identification procedures to take into account the possibility of trauma, coercion and subsequent delayed disclosure. The amendment would help by forcing the Government to look again at how clause 11 might interfere with the obligation placed on Scottish Ministers via the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 to provide support to victims of trafficking.

Section 9 of that Act requires Scottish Ministers to secure necessary support and assistance for adult victims of human trafficking, and gives Scottish Ministers their own statutory duty. That duty is triggered by a reasonable grounds decision. The new credibility penalty in clause 11 seems therefore to conflict with the statutory framework established by the 2015 Act and with the approach enshrined within it—a fundamental human rights approach to believing survivors.

That statutory inconsistency between the two provisions poses a question of how reserved powers within the Bill and devolved functions will interact. Consideration must be given to the Bill’s implications for those devolved powers, particularly in relation to trafficking frameworks, and to whether the Bill’s provisions can be enacted without undermining existing statutory duties in Scotland.

I worked with the Scottish Refugee Council on the amendment. It recommends that Scotland should maintain its greater flexibility to provide secure immigration status for trafficking survivors, and its goals of supporting recovery and reducing the risk of re-trafficking. To do that, the Bill should explicitly protect the operation of the 2015 Act and preserve Scottish Ministers’ discretion to provide support. The amendment is therefore needed to ensure that UK immigration measures do not impede the fulfilment of devolved duties on trafficking.

Although I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote, I hope that the Government will look again and discuss this matter further with Scottish Ministers before the Bill’s final stages.

[Blake Stephenson]

We have reached the final provisions of the Bill—“Hurrah!”, I hear everyone say. These provisions cover regulations, extent and commencement. Such clauses are often treated as housekeeping, but how and when the Bill comes into force decides whether anything in it actually happens. And here the Government’s amendments tell a revealing story.

Government amendment 134 would mean that regulations made under the core protection powers are subject to affirmative procedure where they amend primary legislation. That is right; where Ministers change Acts of Parliament, Parliament should be able to vote. I only wish that the Government had applied that principle consistently. My amendment 142 would have done the same for regulations exempting further categories of people from contributing to the cost of their asylum support. As drafted, Ministers can widen those exemptions by negative procedure without a single vote. If the principle is good enough for Government amendment 134, it is good enough for amendment 142.

Government amendments 127 to 129 and 136 deal with extent to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, and with aligning commencement dates with the provisions that they amend. They are technical amendments, and you will be pleased to hear, Dr Murrison, that we do not intend to divide the Committee on them.

Government amendment 135 deserves the Committee’s attention, however. As the Bill was introduced, part 3—on core protection—would have come into force automatically two months after Royal Assent. Under Government amendment 135, it will come into force only when the Secretary of State chooses to make regulations. A fixed date of implementation has become an open-ended discretion. Government amendment 46 gives the Lord Chancellor a new power to rewrite tribunal rules around the start of the new appeals authority, again by negative procedure and with no vote required.

The Government can move quickly when they want to. Government amendment 47 brings the new deportation provisions into force on Royal Assent. The question, then, is not whether Ministers can set a firm date, but why, on the central reforms of the asylum system, they are now choosing not to. The Government’s message on asylum has been about urgency: “The system is broken and must be fixed.” Yet when it comes to the provisions that are meant to fix it, the start date slips from a certainty to a maybe. We saw the same pattern on settlement this week. It started with a policy announced a year ago; it was delayed from April to the autumn; and when it finally arrived, it was softened. There is tough language, but the Government are quietly kicking the can down the road.

Amendment 69 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion would require the Secretary of State not only to consult Scottish Ministers, but to obtain their consent before making any regulations under the Bill that affect the identification or support of victims of modern slavery in Scotland or the duties of Scottish public authorities.

I recognise that victim support in Scotland operates within a devolved framework. Ministers should talk to their Scottish counterparts, but consultation and consent are very different things indeed. Consent is a veto. Immigration is a reserved matter and the national referral mechanism is a UK-wide system—one that is too often used by those facing removal to delay it. Handing the Scottish Government a block on changes to that system would create precisely the kind of divergence that people smugglers and those rigging our laws are quick to exploit. There has been an obvious pattern throughout the Committee where the Green party has tabled amendments to leave out clause after clause of the Bill. Amendment 69 is another attempt to slow down a system that already moves far too slowly, and we will oppose it.

Earlier in the Committee, we sought to put deadlines in the Bill, requiring the first time period regulations to be made within six months of the new authority being established and limiting how long cases could be routed back to the first-tier tribunal. The Government did not accept them. Amendment 135 shows why they were needed. Without dates in law, there is nothing to hold Ministers to. I therefore ask the Minister two questions. First, will she set out a timetable for commencing each part of the Bill? In particular, when does she expect part 3 to come into force? Secondly, why have the Government moved part 3 from automatic commencement to commencement by regulations, and will she commit to publishing that date before Report? If the Government are serious about fixing the system, they should be willing to say when.

As this is likely to be the last time I speak in this Committee, I thank you, Dr Murrison, and the Chairs of previous sittings; the Clerks, for their very patient work indeed on a substantial amendment paper; and the Minister and Members on all sides for this debate. We have disagreed—often sharply, but politely. The Committee has given these issues the scrutiny they deserve and we will no doubt return to many of them on Report.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Tuesday 3rd November 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry]

I am afraid that I am not convinced that the Home Office has the right protections in place under current law or through the Bill. I detect that the Minister is not completely sure of the grounds that she has given for dismissing the new clauses, or that safeguards are in place for privacy and the most sensitive personal data in current and future use of AI.

I suspect that I have made the Minister think more about this today, so I hope that she will seek further information and consider introducing further measures to the Bill in its next stages. For now, pending further debate, I am happy not to press these two new clauses. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 39

Further provisions relating to the prevention of slavery and human trafficking in organisations and value chains

“After section 54 (transparency in supply chains etc) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, insert—

‘54A Duty to prevent slavery and human trafficking in organisations and value chains

(1) A relevant organisation must take reasonable and proportionate steps to prevent slavery and human trafficking arising or occurring in—

(a) its own operations;

(b) the operations of any franchisee or subsidiary undertaking; and

(c) the operations, products or services of any person in its supply or value chain or other business relationship.

(2) In determining what are to be considered reasonable and proportionate steps for the purposes of this section, regard must be given to guidance issued by the Secretary of State under this section.

(3) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on what are to be considered reasonable and proportionate steps for the purposes of this section within 12 months of passing of this Act.

(4) The Secretary of State must by regulations designate an enforcement authority with responsibility for ensuring that relevant organisations comply with the requirements of this section.

(5) The enforcement authority may, where it is satisfied that a relevant organisation has failed to comply with any of the requirements of this section—

(a) issue a public censure notice;

(b) require the organisation to take specified compliance, prevention, restoration or remediation steps within a specified period;

(c) require the organisation to compensate any persons adversely affected by the noncompliance;

(d) impose a monetary penalty of up to 5% of the organisation’s global turnover;

(e) exclude the organisation from participation in public procurement procedures for a period determined by the Secretary of State.

(6) For the purposes of this section—

“relevant organisation” means—

(a) a body corporate or partnership, wherever incorporated or formed, which carries on a business or part of a business in the United Kingdom, supplies goods or services, and has, inclusive of any subsidiary undertaking, total turnover of £36 million or more;

(b) a public undertaking within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Procurement Act 2023;

“value chain” includes all activities undertaken by any entity during the lifecycle of a good or service upstream and downstream of the commercial organisation, including but not limited to material sourcing, processing, production, manufacturing, development, sale, warehousing, logistics, marketing, finance, use and end of life disposal.

54B Responsibility for slavery or human trafficking in organisations and value chains

(1) Where slavery or human trafficking occurs or is identified in the supply or value chains of a relevant organisation (“O”), O is responsible for such slavery or human trafficking if—

(a) any activity of O causes or contributes to the occurrence of the slavery or human trafficking, or

(b) the occurrence of slavery or human trafficking is directly linked to O’s operations, products or services by O’s business relationships.

(2) O is not responsible for the slavery or human trafficking if it is proved that O had taken reasonable and proportionate steps under section 54A.

(3) Where O is responsible for slavery or human trafficking, O commits an offence.

(4) Where an offence under subsection (3) is committed with the consent or connivance of a director, manager, partner or other senior officer of O, that person also commits the offence.

(5) A party guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) in the case of a relevant organisation, and any director, manager, partner or other senior officer of that organisation who commits an offence under subsection (4), to an unlimited fine;

(b) in the case of an individual—

(i) on summary conviction, to an unlimited fine, with such a fine being proportionate to the degree to which they were responsible for slavery or human trafficking;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, or to an unlimited fine, or to both.

(6) A person adversely affected by any slavery or human trafficking for which a relevant organisation is alleged to be responsible may bring civil proceedings against that organisation, whether or not criminal proceedings have been commenced or concluded in respect of the same conduct.

(7) Civil proceedings under this section may be brought by the person who claims to have been adversely affected by slavery or human trafficking (a “victim”), the Secretary of State, or any person acting on behalf of a victim.

(8) For the purposes of this section, “relevant organisation” has the meaning given in section 54A.’”—(Blake Stephenson.)

This new clause would require organisations to take steps to prevent slavery and human trafficking in their operations, and make organisations or individuals responsible for slavery or human trafficking liable to fines or imprisonment unless they have taken reasonable steps to prevent it.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Committee stage
Thursday 29th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 10 would give asylum seekers the right to work after three months, and the Green party’s new clause 24 would give them an automatic, unrestricted right after six months that lasts through every appeal. We oppose both new clauses.

People who enter the UK illegally should not be able to claim asylum here at all. The new clauses go in the opposite direction. They would make the UK a more attractive destination for people deciding whether to pay a smuggler to cross the channel. Everybody wants to reduce pull factors so that we can reduce dangerous crossings, and I am afraid that the new clauses would introduce additional pull factors.

I will keep my remarks brief and just ask the Minister a question. How many asylum seekers currently have permission to work, and what assessment have the Government made of the effect that earlier work rights would have on the number of claims?

[Siân Berry]

The right to work does not impact only those seeking sanctuary; the impact also falls on their children and on communities. Giving people seeking sanctuary the right to work—or, rather, restoring their agency—is a matter of basic dignity and human rights. People who have fled war or persecution should have the opportunity to rebuild their lives in the UK with dignity and independence. That means that they need a safe place to live, access to support and a genuine right to work, as set out in new clause 24. It is important to stress that this debate is about restoring choice and agency to people seeking sanctuary, not imposing new requirements on those who are not ready or able to work.

As it stands, the law permits a person seeking asylum to request permission to work if they have been waiting more than 12 months for a Home Office decision on their asylum claim through no fault of their own. That may be 12 months after they initially claimed asylum or 12 months after they made further submissions, which are then considered as a fresh claim.

It has been more than two decades since those seeking asylum could apply to work after six months. People repeatedly raise the issue of enforced worklessness while claims are processed. My new clause 24 would simply restore the previous time limit and match the Home Office’s own targets for decision making. The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 10 would grant the right to work at three months, which is also perfectly reasonable. New clause 24 goes into more detail about how the proposal should be implemented. It states that the right should be automatic, without the need for an application, and that there should be no restrictions on the type of employment. It also states when the right should end, if a decision on the application is made one way or the other.

More often than not, vulnerable people are left waiting for months, and often years, for a decision. For that entire period, however qualified and willing they are, they are not permitted to work. That is profoundly felt by people who arrive with real skills, a keen willingness to contribute and a desire to rebuild their lives. Instead, the current rules require them to survive on a small weekly allowance. They are unable to contribute, build a life and often even volunteer in their communities without navigating endless bureaucratic red tape.

The most potent and poisonous rhetoric of the far right plays up the dependence that people are left in; it stokes conflict between people in the asylum system, who are denied the ability to earn, and others in society. Members can hear the voices I am referring to in their heads right now. There is absolutely no need to leave in place the restrictions that fuel that kind of rhetoric and racism, and that badly harm the acceptance and integration of refugees.

Work can bring not only integration and community strength but genuine benefits to people fleeing war, trauma or oppression. That is because people seeking sanctuary in the UK are five to six times more likely than the general population to have mental health needs. A review of the impact of asylum processes on mental health found that policies restricting work contributed to psychological distress and social exclusion. The mental health cost of robbing vulnerable groups of the ability to exercise their agency and provide for themselves and their loved ones is far too high.

Many people seeking asylum in the UK and elsewhere are living with trauma. That contributes to their poor mental health. They might also be recovering from illness or caring for family members. It is important that a humane and just system recognises the structural barriers to finding work that many of these people will face. We must recognise that some people will want to work immediately, while others may need time and support to rebuild their lives. Therefore, my new clause is set out as a right to work. If the Government make any moves in this direction, they must refrain from making it a mandate to work.

Despite the clear and mounting evidence in favour of the right to work, successive UK Governments have closed their minds to the idea and refused to implement it. The usual response, which has already been aired in this debate, is that permitting work sooner risks acting as a pull factor to further migration, but that does not hold water given the evidence. The UK maintains one of the strictest systems in Europe concerning the right to work for people seeking asylum. The international evidence is unequivocal and the difference in waiting times across comparable countries is enlightening.

In 2018, Ireland opted in to the recast EU reception conditions directive and allowed work after nine months. That was subsequently reduced to six months in 2021. Comparable countries in Europe have far more lenient policies on the right to work. In Germany, it is granted after three months, with the only restriction being on self-employment. There is a similar policy after 60 days in Greece. In Italy the period is two months, in Spain it is six months, in Belgium it is four months, and in Denmark it is six months—all with no restrictions. In Sweden someone can apply to work immediately in limited sectors, and in France there are restricted types of work that someone can do after six months. All this is evidence that an alternative can be imagined that is intensely practical, would not have the knock-on effects that other parties have suggested, and can work.

Alongside the moral arguments, there is a strong economic angle to be considered. The Lift the Ban coalition, which has already been quoted in this debate, estimates that lifting the ban could save the Treasury over £280 million per year, and recent research by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research found that lifting the ban after six months could save the Government a total of £4.4 billion per year, increase tax revenue by £880 million and add £1 billion to GDP.

Restricting access to legal work inevitably increases the risk of exploitation. When people are prevented from supporting themselves lawfully, they can be pushed towards unsafe and illegal forms of work. Granting people the right to work therefore extends itself to protecting vulnerable people from further exploitation and abuse, and extends the ability to maintain community cohesion and safety.

In my view, though, the greatest cost of the current policy is the human cost—years of wasted potential, lost independence and lives left on hold while awaiting a decision. The Government should heed the approach taken by much of mainland Europe already and accept these amendments.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. My amendment would introduce a public interest test for survivors of violence against women and girls, domestic abuse and sexual violence into the considerations. I will also speak to the matter of leaving out the clause. I will start with the clause and what it does.

The clause will fundamentally alter the balance that has long existed between article 8 rights and the public interest by restricting the courts’ ability to assess the individual circumstances of each case. Our courts and tribunals carefully balance the right to private and family life against the public interest in an effective immigration system. Our judiciary performs that task every day, helping to deliver justice, uphold the rule of law and guard against abuse. Yet the clause assumes that the balance is being struck wrongly, without the Government having demonstrated that. The main evidence is only a 2022 internal sample of Home Office decisions.

The existing statutory framework already strongly favours the public interest, in particular in deportation cases. While preserving the ability to consider individual circumstances, the clause will replace that with a more prescriptive framework. Here are my views on the main changes in the clause: first, it will require courts to predict whether a person will remain financially independent. That is an inherently speculative exercise, because it fails to consider the uncertainties of ordinary life, including illness, disabilities, caring responsibilities or economic downturns. The effect is likely to discriminate most heavily against disabled people, as well as those with long-term health conditions and caring responsibilities.

Secondly, the clause will discount genuine family life, because of immigration status. Family life formed while a person was here with no leave to remain would be given no weight at all, and family life formed while people’s status was precarious would be given little weight. Precarious migration status covers everyone with anything short of indefinite leave to remain or citizenship—care workers, skilled workers, international students, refugees and partners on the family route.

Under the earned settlement proposals, the qualifying period to become eligible for settlement would be extended to a baseline of 10 years, and in some cases 15 or even 20 years for refugees. Many people will therefore remain on in a precarious position for years, during which the relationships they form and the children they raise would count for little or nothing under the clause. The reality is that family relationships do not cease to exist or be formed just because an immigration status is uncertain.

Strasbourg accepts that precarious status can reduce the weight that is given to family life, but it has not said that it counts for nothing. In an important case, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation—even when the applicant had remained without leave for years—because of the impact on her children. With a “No weight” rule, as in clause 19(4), there will be no space to assess such cases and to retain flexibility. It will weaken protection for children.

Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, when courts assess a child’s best interests they do not look at one factor in isolation—they examine the full picture: a child’s age, health, education, friendships, cultural identity, family circumstances, personal development and connection to the UK—and the children are not defined by a checklist; yet clause 19 would introduce a closed checklist, under which it would be unreasonable

“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”

they would receive no education abroad, face “very significant obstacles” to integrating in the new country, or suffer

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”.

Each is a very high bar. Remarkably, the Government’s impact assessment describes those factors as a “non-exhaustive” list, but subsection (7) uses the phrase “if and (only if)”. It is very clearly a closed list. The Bill therefore goes even further than the Government say they intend, in terms of its effect on children.

I am also concerned that the clause applies to British children too. As drafted, it could result in a British child with a migrant parent either being separated from their parent or having to leave the UK to preserve the family unit. That results in two-tier British citizenship. The Government’s own impact assessment lists family separation among the consequences of these reforms, and says—with little humanity—that the new test will allow decision makers

“to consider whether parents can maintain their relationship with a child from outside the UK”

or whether a British child can

“successfully adapt to life abroad”.

The existing framework is not perfect, but it already places substantial weight on the public interest and has safeguards allowing courts to consider the facts of each case. Clause 19 risks upsetting that balance. At its heart, the issue here is a simple one: do we trust our courts to weigh the facts before them, or do we seek to predetermine the outcome through statutory presumptions? I believe that the existing approach better serves both justice and the rule of law, and for that reason clause 19 should not stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 61 would reduce the harm of this clause, if it remains, by inserting a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s article 8 rights is justified. In my view, without the amendment the Bill will remove or weaken application grounds or causes of appeal relied on by many women living in abusive or exploitative conditions, making them even more vulnerable. That may leave victim-survivors at risk of being refused leave to stay, removed or deported for factors that are a direct consequence of the abuse to which they have been subjected.

To bring that point home, I will provide some examples from organisations that are currently supporting such women. My first example shows how the stricter public interest considerations risk undermining evidence for financial dependency and contact with the criminal justice system being usual results of an experience of violence against women and girls. Julianne was living in another country when she began her relationship with a British man. While visiting him in the UK, she became pregnant with his child and he encouraged her to stay, promising to support her and secure her immigration status. Trusting those assurances, Julianne stayed and became an overstayer. Once her status became insecure, her partner’s behaviour changed dramatically. He subjected her to domestic abuse, isolated her from friends and family overseas, and exploited the fact that she had no support network in the UK. The abuse escalated after the birth of their child.

Julianne eventually fled with her child after a violent assault. She sought medical treatment, reported the abuse to the police and received emergency support from the local authority. Traumatised and destitute, Julianne was left to navigate a complex immigration system alone, as she had been unable to secure legally aided advice and could not afford to pay for a solicitor. She lives with the constant fear of removal. I have changed Julianne’s name.

Julianne had a pathway to regularisation as the parent of a British child; however, if clause 19 becomes law the barriers to regularising her immigration status would be raised significantly, potentially preventing her from qualifying to remain in the UK as the parent of a British child. Re-emphasising the weight of financial independence without reliance on state support and public services will create pressure on victim-survivors like Julianne to stay in abusive and exploitative situations instead of leaving and claiming support, as she did.

Women who have been subject to economic and immigration abuse will be penalised due to their lack of financial independence. The public interest considerations would weigh heavily against Julianne because she accessed support from the local authority while protecting herself and her children from domestic abuse, and because no weight would be given to her family life, as it was established when she overstayed. Without amendment 61, there would be no discretion to consider the role her abuser played in causing her to overstay.

In respect of the redefinition of family, I have a further example of where limiting family life to core cohabiting family and replacing a judicial assessment with a checklist will ignore nuances and external factors forcing a family not to cohabit, such as coercive and controlling behaviour. More broadly, women who are convicted of criminal offences would also be put at increased risk of deportation, as a high evidential standard is needed to prove a disproportionate impact on them or a family member.

That includes women who are coerced or pressured into criminal activity—those driven to engaging with the criminal justice system due to unmet needs, such as being unable to afford food or having unaddressed mental health problems, and those who retaliated against the person abusing or exploiting them, or who had a counter-allegation made against them falsely. All those women are vulnerable and deserving of protection and support, not the further punishment of possible deportation.

My second case study is Blanca. Blanca came to the UK with a visa to work, and while here, she married a British man and had a baby. He had a good job, so they agreed she would stop working, and they then had two more children together. Over time, he became more controlling. Although the children’s benefits were registered in her name, he controlled the payments and did not give her access to the money.

As Blanca did not have her own income, he gave her money for the family’s food, but he would demand that she provide receipts and the exact change. If she bought anything he considered unnecessary, he would be angry and make her return it. That included sanitary products, which Blanca found humiliating and confusing. He also became verbally and later physically abusive towards Blanca, and she became more and more scared of him.

One day, when she was in the supermarket, her period started. She did not know what to do, and she was scared of her husband seeing that she had bought something he thought was unnecessary. She stole a box of sanitary pads, but on her way out of the shop, she was stopped by security who reported her to the police. She was charged and later convicted of theft.

If part 2 of the Bill were fully implemented, Blanca’s conviction would put her at high risk of deportation. No consideration would be given to the abuse that she experienced, which pushed her to commit the crime, nor would it be given to her vulnerability and trauma. In addition, as she did not have lawful status for much of the time she was in the UK, her private and family life may be deemed to hold no weight—or, at best, little weight—if it were held to have been established when she arrived with precarious status.

The Committee can see that clause 19 has all these knock-on effects into further parts of the Bill, and that this additional public interest consideration is necessary. I hope the Committee will discuss and support amendment 61, if clause 19 is to remain in the Bill. I am happy for this to be a probing amendment, if the Government will consider these risks and make their own similar changes to the Bill later.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. As we discussed in the last sitting, clause 18 asks who counts as family, but clause 19 asks what weight that family should carry against the public interest. The clause goes to the heart of public concern, as it considers people who build a life here, while they have no right to be here, only to rely on that recently constructed life as a reason to stay in the UK indefinitely.

I will speak to amendments 104 to 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and I, as well as amendment 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, and clause 19. The Opposition support the broad direction of travel in which the Government are going with the clause; however, to our reading, much of it is unfortunately drafted in a way that means it will be all too easy for the courts to set aside. Furthermore, the evidence behind the clause has not yet been published. I will take the Committee through both aspects.

First, clause 19 amends section 117B of the 2002 Act, which deals with the public interest considerations that apply in every article 8 case. Subsection (2) replaces the requirement to be financially independent with a three-part, forward-looking test, which is that a person must be, and is

“likely to remain, financially independent…able to house themselves…without reliance on state support”

and is not

“reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term”.

Subsection (3) adds a new public interest in people who have not been convicted of an offence anywhere, have co-operated with the immigration authorities and

“are otherwise of good character.”

Subsection (4) changes “little weight” to “no weight” being given to a

“private or family life established by a person”

who is here without leave, or with leave obtained by deception, or who is in “serious breach” of its conditions. Subsection (5) extends “little weight” for precarious status to family life as well as private life. Subsections (6) and (7) tighten the rule on parents with qualifying children. There must now be

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”

on a child who stays, and it is unreasonable

“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”

one of three conditions is met.

On the evidence base, the Home Office told the Committee that 71% of those newly granted article 8 leave

“had entered illegally or overstayed”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 73, Q130.]

and that grants made in 2025 cost the taxpayer an incredible £4.9 billion. If those figures are correct, the case for this clause is overwhelming and undeniable; however, the Committee has not seen the evidence behind them. If the Government want the House to legislate on the strength of the 71% and the £4.9 billion cost figures, it is our view that they should publish the sample, definitions and method before Report.

On financial independence, subsection (2) is, in our view, right in principle. The Library records that the Home Office’s aim is

“increased refusals or unsuccessful appeals in cases where applicants impose avoidable burdens on public resources”.

I certainly think the public will agree, but the test is a prediction about the future, and the Bill says nothing about how it is to be made. In its evidence, the Law Society told us:

“No detail has been provided on how the elements of this test are to be determined”.

Over what period will future reliance be assessed? What evidence will be required, and will guidance be published before commencement?

There is a further difficulty, which is whether this subsection will be able to survive the courts. Again, according to the Law Society,

“the Government’s human rights memorandum at paragraph 27”

acknowledges that the new criteria are

“likely to result in discriminatory outcomes for…older or disabled people”.

The Bar Council makes the same point. A test that the Government themselves expect to operate unequally is one that will in all likelihood be litigated under the Equality Act 2010 and perhaps article 14—and one that the courts may well soften as a result. I ask the Minister: what mitigation does the Government propose to avoid that?

On good character and amendment 104, subsection (3) sets out a new public interest in people who have not offended, have co-operated with the authorities and are “of good character”. Again, we support the direction of travel, but “good character” is not defined in the Bill or the explanatory notes, which seems an extraordinary gap, though I recognise that it is quite difficult to define it in the Bill. This is another example of the Government potentially setting themselves up for failure in the Bill. The Bar Council says that it hands the Home Office

“a general evaluative test that is highly subjective in scope”.

The Law Society and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association made similar points in their evidence. An undefined test is an invitation to future litigation.

There is a ready answer, though, to which I shall point the Committee: the good character guidance used in naturalisation decisions, which is detailed and demanding, with periods that taper according to the length of sentence. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government will apply that guidance here? Amendment 104 would add that to the Bill. What will count as a failure to co-operate with immigration processes—absconding, the destruction of documents, ignoring a claim notice under clause 11, et cetera? It would be helpful to understand what the Government’s understanding is.

On amendments 105 and 106, the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from the weightings under section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act. The Law Society says that the change

“appears to be an attempt to bar a full proportionality assessment”,

and sets up a conflict with the duty on the Home Secretary and the courts to

“act compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

We are here to legislate, so I do not think it is unreasonable for us to be defining what is right and wrong. Perhaps we can leave it to the Minister to respond.

The unfortunate reality is that, with this Bill, the Government are falling into the very same trap that the previous Government fell into. The legislation may be designed to work around the constraints imposed by the ECHR, but it will ultimately run up against the very same problems. The courts will default to the positions that they have consistently taken, enabling individuals with no right to remain in this country to delay or prevent their removal. Indeed, when the Bill fails to enable the Government to address the extensive range of grounds for resisting removal that flow from the ECHR, will the Minister finally accept that—as we have long argued—the real problem lies outside the drafting of the legislation, however robust it might be, and however robust the Government intend it to be today?

As I have already noted, the Minister described discussions about leaving the ECHR last week as unnecessary and counterproductive. If she genuinely believes that deterrence must sit at the heart of the response to these challenges, I struggle to see how removing the ability of foreign criminals to rely on the convention to delay or prevent their removal could reasonably be considered as either unnecessary or counterproductive.

The Opposition will not oppose clause 20. Extending these rules to all deportation cases and restoring the balance against the public interest are steps in the right direction that we support. However, the clause removes the clear lines that protected the public from the most serious offenders, and it gives these criminals access to exceptions that cannot be used today. We will seek to press amendments 107 and 108 to a vote, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the various questions I have asked.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak very briefly on clause 20, specifically subsection (4). At present, it will expand the scope of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that it automatically applies to everyone whose deportation the Home Secretary has decided is conducive to the public good, regardless of the objective seriousness of their offence, under the Immigration Act 1971 and its use of the word “deems”, which I think is very important.

I hope the Minister can answer three questions on the clause. First, do the proportionality qualification and the exceptions in the clause offer any protection for those whose criminality is as a result of exploitation or abuse, particularly those who face immigration-related domestic abuse and have been convicted of crimes related to that? On that theme, the new clauses tabled by the official Opposition would clarify the word “serious” so that some offences would be considered serious automatically. I see the point they are trying to make, but if we made that automatic, it would not be possible for those who are exploited and drawn into criminality to face a proportionate, human-rights-based public interest test. I do not support those new clauses, nor do I support amendments 108 to 111.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was correct to say that I was far too generous in taking it; I should have just closed my speech.

The hon. Member for South Norfolk clearly recognises that the Opposition commissioned Lord Wolfson to conduct a very serious legal analysis of the benefits or otherwise of leaving the ECHR, which he has done. I go back to the comment I made earlier about how there are no legal barriers to us departing the ECHR. There is no risk to the Union and there is no risk to the Good Friday agreement in a legal sense. It will, of course, result in a political discussion, and that will be had at the appropriate time, but the political questions that will arise are not insurmountable.

I will now close. The Opposition support the aim of clause 18 and will not oppose it standing part of the Bill. We support Government amendments 44 and 45, but a definition that is qualified by “normally” applied through a duty only to “have regard to”, with the excluded factors let back in by clause 18(6), is a definition that the courts can step around. I will seek to press amendments 98 and 99 to a Division.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair today, Mr Twigg.

I take completely the opposite position from the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire in almost every respect. I am going to speak against clause 18 and its inclusion in the Bill, and I am going to oppose the Government amendments that would put further tests on parent-child relationships and parental involvement for refugees. I will also be opposing the Conservative amendments, which would put even tighter constraints on family life.

I am here to defend our article 8 protections—I say “our”, because I believe it is really important that we set laws for refugees and asylum seekers that we would happily be subject to ourselves. That is absolutely at the core of the universal nature of human rights and the international agreements we have made to respect human rights around the world in the way that we would want them to be respected should we be in the horrible position of needing to claim asylum.

Article 8 protects the right to family life specifically for us under the European convention on human rights. Although it is not absolute, it requires any state interference in these rights to be lawful, necessary and proportionate. I do not agree with the Government when they say in their human rights memorandum that they are taking

“proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aims.”

To me, paragraph 26 in the memorandum clearly admits that there is interference in our rights with this legislation. The Government are using the argument that they are taking “proportionate means” of “achieving the legitimate aims”, but the legitimate aims they lay out are:

“maintaining effective immigration control, economic wellbeing and the prevention of disorder or crime.”

I honestly do not see how clause 18, on family life and people making claims for reuniting their families and maintaining this essential human right protected under article 8, comes into those “proportionate means”. It is about reducing the ability of families to reunite. The impact assessment clearly says that many thousands of people who would be able to come here under current laws will be denied their claims. This is a reduction in human rights and it seriously needs looking at. I am neither equipped nor planning to add further arguments relating to Northern Ireland and the Windsor framework, but further conversations are needed about what is currently in the Bill, never mind what would happen if we withdrew from the ECHR.

Everybody on the Committee wants a fair, robust and effective immigration system—one that works and upholds the rule of law and on in which people have confidence. Article 8 is not an abstract concept within all this; it is the law that decides whether a parent can stay in the country where their children live or whether a British child grows up with both parents. We do not want to see families separated or children separated from the parents who care for them, yet that is precisely the risk posed by clause 18, according to the Government’s own impact assessment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I disagree wholly with that. During the speeches made by Opposition Members earlier in the debate, I kept thinking about the people who, due to natural disasters or wars, are left without core family, and have to find another family member who will take them in and take that place. There is an inherent danger in putting in place these limits, and in the amendments tabled by Conservative Members that would add rigid definitions. Given the stories about the different ways in which people have experienced refugee status over the years, which all hon. Members will have heard about in casework and read about in memoirs and novels, the need for this change does not ring true. We should keep the system as it is now, where the reality of every single case needs to be looked at.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady described our amendments as “rigid definitions”, but is it not right that we as legislators make sure that our definitions have certainty? We want to have a system that the British public have confidence in, and that is not the case at the moment—in good faith, the Government are trying to deal with that. Do we not need rigid definitions and certainty to achieve that?

[Siân Berry]

I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Member. We need to look at individual cases individually, as no two families are the same. We could imagine many circumstances for which we would want exceptions to this rule. The Government have rightly left caveats in the Bill, but the Opposition are arguing against them. Putting in rigid criteria on top of what is already in the Bill is absolutely the wrong way to go about addressing the issue. The best way to deal with any problems we might see is to do so in the initial decision making.

Clause 18 says that financial or emotional dependence, illness, or living in a conflict zone alone is not enough to establish family life, yet families routinely support each other financially, emotionally and practically. Ministers say that those factors can still be weighed at the public interest stage, but once family life is ruled out, that stage is never reached. What will that mean in practice? As I have hinted at, the Government’s impact assessment says that their article 8 reforms will mean 14,000 more refusals every year. Even after appeals, around 11,700 people more will be refused each year. Under the law as it stands, those people would succeed. That shows that clause 18 does not simply clarify existing principles, but is intended to change outcomes at a substantial scale. The clause does diminish human rights for refugees in this country, as is admitted in the Government’s human rights memorandum.

The way the clause is doing that is very troubling for two main reasons. First, it suggests that family relationships deserve protection only when they fit a model chosen by the state, but article 8 has never worked that way. The European Court has always looked at the substance of an individual relationship, not its form. Indeed, the very cases the Government cite require an individualised assessment of all the circumstances. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we have been here before. The examples we are hearing from the Home Secretary and the Minister come as part of what is now a mini-tradition of Home Secretaries using exaggerated anecdotes to add to toxic rhetoric about migrants.

[Blake Stephenson]

This might be an opportune moment to intervene and allow the hon. Lady to get to the right place in her notes. She mentioned that we have been here before; that was a central part of my speech. In order to break this cycle, would she not agree that the right thing to do is to depart from the ECHR?

[Siân Berry]

I thank the hon. Member for trying, but he is talking to a person who cannot read the universal declaration of human rights without welling up, and I will never give up making arguments of this sort.

Previous legislation on these matters, to which the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire referred, followed on directly from the infamous 2011 party conference speech of the then Home Secretary—now Baroness May of Maidenhead. She repeated false claims from newspapers that judges had permitted a man to escape deportation because he had a pet cat—something she says she did not make up. In reality, neither of the judges’ decisions in the case was based on the man having a pet, and the second and final decision was not based on any human rights consideration at all. It was straightforwardly based on a failure by the Home Office to apply its own policy.

Amnesty International gave us more information in its written evidence:

“This—together with the readiness of many political commentators to cherry pick often minor or irrelevant facts that are mentioned in tribunal or court judgments and present these as if the main or sole reason for a decision that may have little or nothing to do with them—continues to underpin criticism of Article 8 in immigration-related decision-making. That criticism is plainly misinformed, often careless and, in some cases, on its face, clearly ill-intended—including out of dogmatic hostility to the ECHR and other political motivations.”

On Second Reading of the Bill, the current Home Secretary summarised an unnamed case. She said:

“In 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him. She was not his wife or life partner—instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before.”—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 675.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

It is pretty clear that I think the Bill is a result of the Government responding to toxic rhetoric coming from other parties, and that it is an attempt to be seen to be doing something.

[Blake Stephenson]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will finish my point. In an evidence session, we challenged the National Crime Agency on the roots of the organised crime that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes mentions, which is doing huge harm. I will not argue that the small boats system is the best way to bring people to this country. Small boat numbers started to grow the moment safe routes were closed. We need safe routes, and that is the approach the Government could take to reduce small boat crossings. The law that protects our rights does not need to be undermined. I would absolutely argue that.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady refers to other parties and their toxic rhetoric. Perhaps she could give some examples. If she wishes to call out those parties, will she do so by giving clear examples rather than by making throwaway comments? That would really help the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

I am happy to clarify that I am talking primarily about Reform UK. That party is not represented on this Committee and can answer for itself in other ways, but it has, until recently, been taking votes from the Government on the right. I am happy to come back in future sittings with further examples of anecdotes being used instead of evidence. I chose to highlight two examples of Home Secretaries doing that, because the Minister is here to represent a Home Secretary.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry]

The Bill currently states that the IIAA procedure rules board must

“have regard to the desirability of”

ensuring that justice is done and that it is accessible, fair and independent. The amendment would simply strengthen that duty and ensure that it must act “with a view to” securing those things rather than merely considering them “desirable”. Importantly, the amendment would make the IIAA’s duties equivalent to the duties of the Tribunal Procedure Committee, so it would prevent the watering down that the clause represents.

Watering down and undermining fairness is a golden thread that runs through the Bill. We saw it originally with the watering down of the duty to be independent and fair, which was made an aim rather than a requirement, and we see it again in the IIAA’s powers over its procedure rules, which will govern the processes by which the IIAA hears and decides appeals.

Currently, the Tribunal Procedure Committee, which makes rules for the tribunals, has an obligation in section 22(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to make procedure rules

“with a view to securing…that…justice is done”.

By contrast, clause 4(5) of the Bill says that the IIAA will have an obligation only to

“have regard to the desirability”

that justice is done. That is clearly an attempt at watering down and weakening obligations of fairness—from “duty” to “aim”, from “duty” to “desirable”. The amendment would ensure that the IIAA has equivalent obligations to ensure fairness as the Tribunal Procedure Committee currently does—no more, but certainly no less. In such high-stakes appeals as asylum, that is the least of what claimants, Ministers and the public should expect.

I will briefly quote the Bar Council’s written evidence, because it brings home that there are real people behind this. It says that on account of errors by the IIAA,

“a British citizen may wrongly be deprived of British citizenship, a refugee be returned to a place where they risk persecution or torture, a British family with a foreign member may be broken up, or an EU citizen be denied Withdrawal Agreement rights.”

Those are all serious consequences. We must strengthen this clause. It is not sufficient for this to be left to chance, to the courts or to later guidance on the IIAA produced by Ministers. It is so basic to fairness that it should be on the face of the Bill.

Amendment 68 fixes an omission from the Bill by the Government. It proposes preventing an IIAA adjudicator from reviewing their own decision. Under clause 6, the IIAA currently has the power to review its own decisions. In principle, there is nothing objectionable in this. The mechanism could provide a cheaper, quicker way to overturn inaccurate decisions than an appeal to the upper tribunal and provides a way for mistakes to be corrected quickly and without fuss. However, there is no provision in the Bill to say that an individual IIAA adjudicator cannot review their own decision when it is challenged.

I should note that the first-tier tribunal currently has the power to review its own decisions but adjudicators will not have the independence, experience and legal expertise of tribunal judges—at least if the Government have their way. It would be against fairness for such a non-judicial adjudicator to be in effect a judge in their own case. The adjudicator reviewing their own decision would also have an uncomfortable conflict of interest: either validate their own professional competence or vindicate the rule of law. No adjudicator should be put in that position and no asylum appellant should have their appeal dealt with in this unfair and potentially biased way.

Any internal review of an IIAA asylum decision should be heard by a different adjudicator who is as independent as possible from the original adjudicator. Amendment 68 is the best way to secure the psychological and emotional distance needed to conduct a fair review. It is perhaps indicative of the lack of serious thought that has gone into the Government’s proposals that the Bill does not contain a safeguard so basic and so clearly needed. The amendment would prevent an adjudicator from reviewing their own decision in any circumstances, thus increasing the chances of a fair and independent review. I hope it will be supported by us all today.

Government amendment 29 provides for information to be given on legal representation. That is an improvement on the original Bill, but a lot more should be done to prevent an appellant from being disadvantaged because they cannot obtain legal representation.

I welcome new clause 2, which inserts some concrete steps to provide some assistance in some cases, and the Government’s recognition of the significant issues when it comes to the availability of legal advice for people in different parts of the asylum system, which I have seen with my own eyes. It would be helpful, though, to know more about the Government’s thinking and their plans for providing this advice. How much additional funding and resource will the Home Office provide to deliver it? Will the Government commit to consulting with relevant groups and organisations that support people seeking asylum on how this advice can best be provided and routed to those most in need?

[Blake Stephenson]

The procedure rules will determine how fast the appeals authority works in practice, time limits, hearings, evidence and late claims. As Professor Ekins warned in oral evidence, they are also the part of this scheme most exposed to legal challenge. The group that we are considering includes clause 4, schedule 3 and clause 5, which cover the rules and the board that makes them, together with amendments 63 and 68 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, a set of Government amendments to schedule 3 and Government new clause 2 on advice and representation, so there is a lot in there.

Clause 4 provides for the appeals authority procedure rules, made by the procedure rules board after consultation, with regard to the objectives in clause 1. They are to be made by statutory instruments subject to the negative procedure. Schedule 3 sets out what they may contain, including time limits, restrictions on fresh applications, decisions without a hearing and the treatment of late evidence. Clause 5 sets up the board that will write the appeals authority’s procedure rules, including the chief executive, the chief appeals officer, the professional standards officer and standing members appointed by the chair.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank my hon. Friend for those very kind words about how powerful my arguments are. I am sure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion will respond to that when she has the opportunity.

[Siân Berry]

My arguments were not that it should be longer, but that it should be the right amount of time to achieve fairness and justice. I am sure that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East would not disagree that the right amount of time is essential, and that shorter is not necessarily better.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention.

The Opposition will support clause 8 and oppose amendment 83. We want deadlines that are set, met and reported on. If the Minister can tell us when the first regulations will be made and that extension rates will be published, we will not press amendment 89 to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 13 brings the authority within the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, with an annual report and the chief executive’s response laid before Parliament. The Opposition support accountability to Parliament, as we have discussed on several occasions today.

Amendment 92 is another probing amendment. The inspection regime in clause 13 focuses on process: premises, technology and training. Parliament will also want to know whether the authority is working. Dr Sumption told us that the data needed to judge those reforms—what happens to refused cases and how many decisions are overturned—largely does not exist.

Amendment 92 would require the chief inspector’s report to cover two outcomes: the proportion of the authority’s decisions set aside by the upper tribunal, and the number of people removed after the appeals authority dismisses their appeal. Will inspection reports cover those outcomes? What additional resources will the chief inspector receive? Is one report a year enough in the first years? When would material be omitted from published reports?

New clause 28, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require quarterly publication of data of the authority’s work on appeals, outcomes, representation, the backlog, timings, withdrawals and reviews. It overlaps with our amendment 88 on decision quality. Transparency around whether the new body is working is in everyone’s interest. I hope the Government will say whether they intend to publish data of that kind.

We support clause 13. Scrutiny should measure results, not just process. If the Minister can give assurances on the outcome data, we will not press amendment 92.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the shadow Minister that amendment 92 and new clause 28 are quite compatible. They both ask for more data from the Government and the IIAA about its work and what is going on. That is essential.

My new clause 28 would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter—that timing is the same as for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal—of data relating to the work of the appeals authority. It sets out properly detailed requirements for quarterly data publication. It includes requirements for information on decisions, appeals and outcomes, including where the appeals authority has reviewed decisions ahead of appeals and where appellants withdraw; information about who has had legal representation; and information about backlogs, timelines and delays on decisions.

The new clause also ensures that we can see that data broken down by nationality, gender and age, and what kind of appeal grounds are being made. Given the concern about the discriminatory and human rights impact of the Bill on people claiming asylum and our obligations under international agreements, all that information is essential.

We cannot have a publication scheme only set out by the appeals authority itself or by Ministers. It is important that Parliament should put such essential reporting information into the Bill; otherwise, we will simply not know the consequences of those changes or their consequences will become a matter of contention and further politicise the lives of those seeking asylum here. I have a related new clause that asks for a report in a similar fashion on current decision making, and the comparison between the two is vital.

I asked the Minister for some baseline data on the current situation during the oral evidence sessions. The reason I asked is that until March 2023 we had quite a lot of details, including around nationality, in the Home Office’s own quarterly statistics release. However, for over three years now, the appeal statistics have not been included, and we do not see the information about nationality broken down. The letter we received from the Minister on 6 October gave some information about the breakdown of different human rights grounds, which was useful, but unless comprehensive information is provided about the current situation and the changes that will take place when we introduce the appeals authority, we will not really see the impact of the Bill. This is absolutely essential.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

Q What changes would you like to see to clause 21? Just to make sure that I do not go off track, what changes does your organisation want to see to clause 21 and why? What would the implication be for the potential number of asylum seekers claiming in the UK compared with today?

Angela Afzal: Clause 21 seeks to introduce the core protection framework. Our concern is that the clause gives the Home Office very broad powers to introduce changes of entitlements for refugees.

The core protection framework, set out in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement last year, indicates that there is an intention to reduce entitlements for refugees. Our concern is that the core protection framework would have a detrimental impact on refugee integration, rather than deterring people from arriving.

I can explain in more detail why we feel that the temporary protection, removing the right to family reunion and having the work and study pathway would impact refugee integration from our experience of delivering integration in the UK.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q I have some questions about family reunion. In your submission, you said that the measure will have a negative impact on integration. You also expressed concern that what you consider to be a right to family reunion is being made conditional, in clause 19, on socioeconomic factors—the ability of someone to support themselves. Can you tell us more about why you think family reunion should remain a right?

Angela Afzal: The core protection framework sets out that refugees would not be granted family reunion as a protection right. Our experience is that the family framework is the best basis for a refugee to integrate. It is the best support network that there can be. Our experience is that refugees have a much better integration outcome when they have their families with them.

For example, family reunion has been suspended since September last year. For a whole year, many clients have not been able to reunite with their families or apply for that, and that has really impacted their ability to focus on accessing language and employment. They are deeply concerned about their families—often a spouse and young children in places of danger. We are concerned that that could cause those families to resort to smugglers to reunite, when they do not see another option.

The proposal is that people would get family reunion on transitioning to a work and study pathway. We have questions about the eligibility criteria for that and the support that there will be for refugees so that they can access the pathway, given that it gives them those entitlements. To what extent will people be able to access family reunion through that pathway? Those are our main concerns.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Blake Stephenson and Siân Berry

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q I have some further questions to Vicky. In your observations, you do say that efficiency should not be pursued at the expense of “procedural fairness” but also of

“access to protection and successful integration.”

You also warn that the Bill could

“undermine conditions that support successful integration for those ultimately recognised as refugees.”

Could you outline how you think the Bill, in practice, will harm integration?

Vicky Tennant: I would say the key area is the recovery of asylum support. We understand that what is envisaged is potentially up to £10,000 per person to be recovered. Imagine that a refugee has gone through a long and difficult set of experiences before arrival in the UK, and has then gone through the uncertainty of the asylum process, potentially for an extended period of time, where they are unable to work or to start the process of getting back on their feet. Then, just as they are getting into employment and starting to rebuild their lives, the prospect of having to repay a potentially large sum of money could impede that. That was the main element that we felt was relevant to integration.

The article 8 point and the ability to reunite with family members is also relevant. Many times when talking to asylum seekers and refugees, I have seen the anguish, the disruption and the sense of something that is unfinished. Being reunited with family and able to restart family life is an element that is fairly fundamental to integration, from the perspective of not only the refugee, but the UK public and communities. We think that giving refugees the possibility to start afresh and moving them as quickly as possible into the integration journey is important, and we know that that is also one of the Government’s stated objectives.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

Q Given the concerns that you have raised, how likely is it that the Bill will restore confidence in the asylum system? If that is not likely, what else would you like to see in it that would restore confidence?

Vicky Tennant: I go back to what I said: legislation is only part of the answer. There are elements of the Bill—particularly those that focus on trying to ensure the quality, efficiency and sustainability of the appeals process—that, if made to work successfully, could contribute to building public confidence in the system. As I said, UNHCR recognises that public confidence is what underpins the refugee convention; we can all speak about the law and the refugee convention, but what is needed to deliver these things in practice is public support for welcoming refugees and for a well-functioning system.

On what would be needed in addition, there is a lot of work under way, particularly to make the first instance decision-making process quicker and to improve the quality of decision making. UNHCR has been working directly with the Home Office on that front for some time, and we have been encouraged by the progress. As I said, it is also about the ability to remove people who are found not be in need of international protection. One can do that only if there is a well-functioning system and there is confidence that it gets the decisions right.

Safe, regular routes are a big part of a well-functioning, fair system. From the public perspective, what we see consistently in the polling and the various surveys that have been done is that the British people want to welcome refugees. There is support for maintaining the UK as a place of refuge, and the more safe, regular, managed pathways there are to do that, the more it can be delivered and that confidence can be sustained.

That cannot be a replacement for access to territorial asylum, which is where it can sometimes be very challenging. As UNHCR, we recognise the challenges the Government face in addressing the crossings in the channel. Nobody wants to see a situation where people are forced into dangerous journeys and where the business is essentially controlled by smugglers and criminals. What is really essential is that you have a good, functioning system for considering asylum claims quickly and removing people who are not in need of asylum, and that also involves the management of arrivals in a sensible way.

Partnership with international partners is an absolutely critical aspect of that, including with France but also with other international partners. That is about co-operation upstream to make sure people have alternatives and do not feel they have no alternative but to move onwards, but it is also about co-operation around the management of arrivals at UK borders. The international standards, the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights provide that common baseline that enables the UK to work with international partners in trying to find solutions to these common challenges.