Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Members for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green (Florence Eshalomi) and for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell), who both spoke very movingly on behalf of the victims of this tragedy who want to see justice done. I venture to suggest that what they want above everything is to know that nothing like this will ever happen again—that whatever happened that night, there will be some glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel and that some good will come of it.

I praise the Secretary of State for recognising that it is the system itself that needs the most fundamental reform, and that the failures of individuals—whatever incentives existed and whatever conflicts were unresolved—were system failures. The cultural shift will come about as a result of a systemic review—a system change.

Hon. Members might well ask why I am taking an interest in this debate. I do not think I represent any community in a high-rise building with cladding problems in leafy Essex. The only interest I have to declare is that it turned out that my late mother was living in a block with unsafe cladding, so, to a very limited and minor extent, my family are suffering the loss of being unable to sell her flat. That is very small beer, but I put that down as an interest I should declare.

I have long taken an interest in safety management systems—ever since I was shadow Secretary of State for Transport at the time of the Ladbroke Grove disaster, when I took an interest in what was being submitted to the inquiry and made a submission of my own, recommending that there should be a systemic approach to the safety system. That resulted in the formation of the rail accident investigation branch of the Department for Transport, with the result that no inquiry into a rail accident has ever taken place again.

Similarly, as Chairman of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, I took a close interest in patient safety because we received the reports from the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. We had Mid Staffordshire and all the maternity scandals, and we had public inquiry after public inquiry, until somebody suggested that there should be an investigation body accountable and answerable to the Secretary of State to look at why things go wrong in patient care and investigate the causes of incidents—without blame, incidentally—to find out what went wrong in order to make recommendations and put it right. Those are the lessons drawn from all the effective safety regimes in other industries, which should perhaps be applied in this case.

I co-authored a submission to the Grenfell inquiry with three others. The first was former Labour Housing and Fire Minister Nick Raynsford, who, at the time, was chairman of the Construction Industry Council approved inspector’s register—CICAIR—which relates to the private sector building control surveyors the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington (Gideon Amos) spoke about. I will come on to that conflict, which the hon. Gentleman is very concerned about.

Another co-author was Kevin Savage, a leading figure in the building control profession; he happens to be a constituent of mine, but that was a coincidence. The third was Keith Conradi, the former chief investigator of the air accidents investigation branch of the Department for Transport—who, as it happens, became the first chief investigator for the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, which, as a result of the inquiry conducted by my Committee, is now a statutory body. He helped set that body up; he is now retired. He helped with the submission.

Keith Conradi in particular enabled us to understand building safety management as a safety management system. The events leading to the Grenfell disaster were not just the random failings or crimes of individuals. Where there is culpability, prosecutions must certainly follow, but that is not the main point. Grenfell and previous fires, such as Lakanal House, demonstrated that there was a comprehensive failure of the safety system that should exist to keep buildings as safe as possible.

We made our submission in September 2021. After seven years—a disadvantage of public inquiries is that they take a very long time—I was disappointed that the inquiry did not really find time to engage with our recommendations. It did publish our submission, but from the recommendations, I think it is fair to say that a number of issues have been handed back to the Department to be resolved. Paragraph 113.58, entitled “Implementing change”, simply suggests that the London Fire Brigade should

“establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents”.

That is an odd recommendation when we think about it, because the London Fire Brigade was itself very, very severely criticised in the report. That it should be left responsible for marking its own homework and making recommendations about itself underlines that the lacuna in the recommendations is the lack of an investigation body. There were two other paragraphs about building control that I shall come to: paragraphs 113.37 and 113.38. Those were our two urgent priorities to be addressed in our submission.

By the way, I am very grateful to the Minister for accepting our request for a meeting, which the Prime Minister promised on the Floor of the House when he announced the outcome of the inquiry. We had a very good meeting with the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention. I think she was taken with our recommendations but I think that they fall to the Minister’s Department, so I look forward to meeting him later this week.

[Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)]

The delays in addressing the fire safety issues that pertain to the Grenfell tragedy are having significant consequences for those who reside in buildings that are not being remediated in a timely fashion, particularly in my constituency. For example, the residents of Johnston Court have faced more than four years of uncertainty following a B2 rating, and the progress of remediation has stalled due to disputes between the developer and freeholder. The deadlock has left residents unable to sell, remortgage or feel safe in their homes, so we need faster action and accountability from all parties involved. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Government’s actions and interventions will be critical to ensure that disputes do not keep delaying this urgently needed work, and that, as he is discussing, this is fundamentally about leadership?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I am very happy to agree with the hon. Gentleman and to welcome the Secretary of State’s announcements today about accelerating all of this and ensuring that action is taken much more quickly. I hope that that will result in much quicker action for his constituents.

I was addressing the first major recommendation in our submission to the inquiry, which is that there should be established an independent building safety investigation branch of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, reporting directly to the Secretary of State. That removes any possible conflict that investigations have with any other part of the system. The idea that the Health and Safety Executive or the new Building Safety Regulator should be conducting investigations is absolutely fine, but we can never guarantee that they will not come across a failing of their own and be conflicted in that investigation. The public will not have confidence in any investigation that they conduct unless there is an independent investigation that looks at all the elements of the system. The Hackitt review rather overlooked this issue. It failed to underline how future fire incidents would be investigated. This is a gap that is still to be addressed.

The current system of resort to public inquiries, as the hon. Member for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green confirmed, takes far too long. I feel for those who were caught up in the tragedy directly. They have waited far too long. An air accident investigation rarely takes more than a few months because the capability exists. In the Grenfell case, the Housing Ombudsman still felt that

“residents’ complaints were dismissed and devalued.”

I think the inquiry was overwhelmed with so much material and so many different elements. In a way, its terms of reference were too wide to be able to capably come up with a comprehensive set of safety system recommendations.

It is also notable that although there was an inquiry into the Lakanal House fire, we had another inquiry into Grenfell. Public inquiries do not seem to resolve problems. A building safety investigation branch would transform that. It would operate independently, modelled on similar bodies for air, marine and rail. These bodies have proven their worth in both the rail and aviation. No public inquiry has taken place into an aviation accident since 1972 and there has not been a public inquiry into a rail accident since the Ladbroke Grove inquiry, because people have confidence in the new independent arrangements. They conduct rapid investigations. They focus not on blame, but on understanding failures and issuing binding recommendations for the future.

[Dame Meg Hillier]

The hon. Gentleman has spent a lot of time in this House thinking about how systems work. Does he not think that there is now an argument for the Government to have a proper review process of all coroners’ recommendations and all public and other inquiry recommendations, so they do not just get responded to in the moment and then not followed up in the months and years that follow?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I am sure that may be a very good suggestion, but the point I am making is that we need an apex to our safety system. Whatever else the Government do to remediate the safety system as it exists at the moment, they need an independent safety investigator as the apex of the system, which is like a guardian angel over the whole system. The hon. Member for Kensington and Bayswater said there should be—I think I quote him correctly—an independent oversight body. Well, this is the body he seeks. It would be constantly looking for risks in the system, not just investigating accidents, and following up directly with the Secretary of State to say, “This has not been done.”

Crucially, the independence of the bodies is what commands public confidence. They also provide a very significant capability that no other regulator can do—a safety investigation body is not a regulator, of course. They provide a legal safe space where anybody can go and say anything without fear or favour. Witnesses have protection and, if necessary, anonymity, so they can openly speak without fear of retribution of being sued or the words they give in evidence being used against them in court. This creates a culture of openness that accelerates the learning process while maintaining accountability.

The introduction of a BSIB would not trespass on any other part of the safety system, such as the HSE or the Building Safety Regulator. It is an essential additional capability which needs to exist, otherwise we do not have that ultimate check over the whole system. Regulators, if necessary, can still run their investigations, as I was saying before. The safe space in the safety investigator does not protect anyone from legal culpability, as we saw when the air accidents investigation branch investigated the Shoreham air crash. It passed a file to the police, because it believed there had been negligence. The pilot was prosecuted. The safe space does not protect someone from wrongdoing.

[Mr Bailey]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I will give way once more, but I have rather a lot to say and I do not want to take up too much time.

[Mr Bailey]

The fundamental difference between an air accident investigation and a public inquiry is that as culpability is identified it is then passed on for action. This lies at the heart of the problem, which is the slow pace of bringing about justice. An extended period for a public inquiry has prevented and inhibited the delivery of justice for the people of Grenfell. Does the hon. Gentleman—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. I remind Members that interventions need to be pithy and short.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I have got the point. The problem with a public inquiry is that it starts from ground zero. It assembles a group of people who may be expert, but most of the lawyers will not be expert and will have to learn everything from scratch. The advantage of a standing capability is that there are experts who are permanently employed and who really understand everything about building safety, as it would be in this case. There would be human factors analysts, structural engineers, architects—key people with key skills, fully knowledgeable about the safety system that exists. They would start immediately after a tragedy, and they would conclude much more quickly on the basis of much better expertise.

I had hoped that the inquiry would adopt this recommendation, as did the Cullen inquiry into Ladbroke Grove, and also the inquiry into offshore safety following the Piper Alpha disaster. It now falls to the Government and Parliament to get this right.

The second recommendation in our submission is for a comprehensive reform of building control. Building control is the inspection system which should ensure that building regulations are followed, but Grenfell demonstrated its failure. I accept that there has already been some reform here since we wrote our submission. Much has been said, as we heard earlier, about how private sector building inspectors are endemically conflicted because they are appointed and paid by constructors and others, but that misses a horrible truth about the Grenfell case. Ironically, it was the building control function of a local authority, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, that failed so disastrously in Grenfell’s case. Despite that, everyone’s emphasis still seems to be more focused on restricting private sector involvement than on reform of the whole building control sector.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

My hon. Friend is making an important speech. One of the facts that the phase 2 report has established is that the system is too fragmented, and needs to be brought together under a single construction regulator, as he recommends. Does he envisage the functions that he has described, involving investigations of incidents, not falling to the responsibility of that regulator?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

No, because a regulator is a part of the system, whereas a safety investigation body stands above the system. It is very simple. If you are a regulator, you are a participant. You are capable of making mistakes, and you need to be independently investigated, or checked, to confirm that you are not breaching rules, or failing in some way—through no fault of your own, perhaps. Everyone makes mistakes. Most bad things happen because of human error, not because of bad people doing bad things.

[Gideon Amos]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way so many times. Is it not the case that when you set profit-making companies against local authorities, you end up with a race to the bottom, across the board? Is that not the evidence from the inquiry? I had cause to look at the report of the original debate, in the 1980s, about bringing in private inspectors. A less than entirely left-wing organisation, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, said that it was opposed to building control being taken away from local authorities.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I am not in favour of taking building control away from local authorities, but if we go down the route recommended by the hon. Gentleman, we will not succeed in making buildings safer, not least because of the shortage of capacity in the sector. If it is decided that there cannot be any private sector building control surveyors, there will be even less capacity, and remediating all this will take even longer.

An approach that relies entirely on local government or a state body of building control risks worsening a situation that we are already experiencing. The building control workforce is ageing, and recruitment struggles to keep up with demand. Restricting private sector competition would exacerbate these problems, driving skilled professionals not back into local authorities—because they cannot afford them—but into consultancy roles in which they would be working for the construction companies directly, not inspecting what those companies are doing. Rather than narrowing the pool of inspectors, we should be raising the standards of building control across the board.

Private sector approved inspectors were already subject to a strict licensing regime through the Construction Industry Council approved inspectors register, with a code of conduct, regular auditing and a complaints process. Moreover, the local authority, not the private sector building control sector, was responsible for the problem at Grenfell. Our recommendation suggests a fully integrated building control service involving both local authorities and registered building control approvers working to common standards within a framework designed to promote continuous improvement. That, I think, is the right answer. To deal with high-rise blocks, multidisciplinary teams would be set up to perform the building control function, recruited on the basis of proven skills and experience from both public and private sectors on a level playing field without the choice being biased in favour of the former. That, I submit, should be the Government’s objective.

We welcome the steps taken to require all building inspectors, whether working for local authorities or registered building control approvers, to be individually registered by the BSR, but further steps can and should be taken to drive up standards and to maximise much-needed capacity. However, recommendations 113.37 and 113.38 in the final report of the inquiry could undermine this process. Implicit in recommendation 113.37 is the assumption that it is inappropriate for private sector commercial organisations to be involved in building control work at all, although no evidence is advanced to support that assumption. It is an assumption that many people make, but there is no evidential basis for it. Recommendation 113.37 proposes that there should be a panel to consider the matter, which I hope will happen, but if it decided to ban private sector building control, that would seriously aggravate the capacity problem.

[Joe Powell]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I will certainly give way, because this is a crucial point.

[Joe Powell]

I simply wanted to ask for a clarification. Surely the issue, which was raised earlier, is that there is a conflict of interests when you are paying to have your product assessed. As we know from Sir Martin’s report, there was a cover-up of testing results. If you accept that, how do you get around the “conflict of interests” issue?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. I am not going to admonish the hon. Member for using the word “you”, but, Sir Bernard, you have now spoken for longer than both Front Benchers put together, and many other Members wish to get in.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I will be as quick as I can, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I am extremely grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s question, because that was a failure of regulation. The crucial point is this. In other safety-critical industries, such as the civil aviation, rail and marine sectors, there is no ban on the private sector being selected to perform inspections. Employees of airlines, of aircraft manufacturers and of aircraft engine manufacturers perform the inspections, but they are independently regulated, overseen and certified by the Civil Aviation Authority. The fact that they are employed by the airlines or by commercial interests does not make them incapable of objective judgment. The whole aviation sector flies incredibly safely on the basis of aircraft being inspected not by Government inspectors or public employees, but by the private sector.

[Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)]

My experience in the aviation industry includes overseeing and being part of the record-keeping process for inspections. Does the hon. Member agree that the requirement to record and store all successful and unsuccessful testing results would resolve some of the issues that we saw in the Grenfell disaster, where unsuccessful test results were hidden and not made accessible to the public?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I completely agree. The record keeping of airlines, air engine manufacturers and aircraft maintenance companies has to be absolutely meticulous. It is inspected by the CAA, but the information originally comes from inspections conducted by people who are employed by the private sector. I think the hon. Gentleman agrees that we need to tackle the regulation, not indulge in shorthand for saying that anybody making a profit must be guilty. I abhor the idea of people making a profit at the expense of safety, but that is not what happens in other industries.

The success of independent accident investigation and safety investigation branches in other sectors speaks for itself. Aviation and rail safety has much fuller public confidence and a lower accident rate under such models, delivering safety improvements faster, more effectively and at lower cost than traditional public inquiries. Reforming building control would ensure that all inspectorates operate under consistent and rigorous oversight, regardless of whether they are in the public or private sectors.

Our proposals are not just about learning from the Grenfell tragedy, but about preventing the next disaster. The inquiry shows the systemic failures in building safety and regulation that led to an avoidable tragedy. I regret to have to warn the House that if we do not get this right, and do not finish working on what the inquiry has presented to us and fill in the gaps, there will one day be another Grenfell, just as Grenfell was a repeat of earlier safety failures. We have an obligation to get this right finally for the Grenfell community, for the memory of those who died and for future communities. The Government now have the opportunity to follow up the inquiry, to build on its findings and to put in place institutional arrangements that will embed learning and safety improvement in residential building management in a comprehensive safety system that matches those of other safety-critical industries.