Government Vision on Prevention

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and I welcome his remarks on the use of medicinal cannabis. I also welcome his comments on the appalling, barbaric abuses of those with learning disabilities and autism. Indeed, my honourable friend Barbara Keeley MP is raising that issue in the Commons right now, as the noble Lord is probably aware, and is asking, as I am, for further information about how to end the long-term seclusion and how to deal with the deaths of autistic people and people with learning difficulties. Everyone is shocked by what we have learned about what has been happening in our hospitals and in these units. Is it now time that these institutions were either closed or completely changed?

I am pleased that the new Secretary of State has discovered at this early stage in his career that prevention is better than cure. I certainly welcome the emphasis and focus on prevention. But as the saying goes, “Fine words butter no parsnips”—although in the case of public health perhaps we should not be buttering anything anyway. In other words, the new Secretary of State and his enthusiasm for prevention can be judged only by actions and results. In that context, he is starting, I am afraid, with some dismal facts that he has to overcome to achieve his ambitions.

The first of those is the £700 million-worth of cuts to public health services, with more cuts to those services being pencilled in for the next year, including £17 million of cuts to sexual health services, £34 million of cuts to drug and alcohol services, £3 million of cuts to smoking cessation services and £1 million of cuts to obesity services. As noble Lords will be aware because it is something that has been mentioned in the House for many years, every single pound spent on prevention provides £14-worth of social benefit. This is not a sensible economic decision.

In the context of obesity, when do the Government plan to outlaw or ban the advertising of junk food on family television as part of the drive to tackle childhood obesity? Immunisation for children has fallen for the fourth year in a row, so a big part of prevention surely has to be a focus on investment in children’s and early years health services. However, health visitor numbers have fallen by more than 2,000, school nurse numbers have gone down by 700 and 11% of babies miss out on mandated health checks. My first question about the prevention programme is this: what are the Government’s plans to reverse these cuts, particularly of health visitors and school nurses?

Yesterday, the Association of Directors of Public Health said that the spending review should allocate an extra £3.2 billion for the public health grant next year. Does the noble Lord accept that figure? As we all know, prevention is not just about public health, as he has said—it is also about social determinants, jobs and housing being the most obvious. According to research by Sir Michael Marmot, the world-recognised authority on public health, improvements to life expectancy have stalled since 2010 and inequality is widening. There is now a life expectancy gap of 13 years between women living in the poorest and the richest parts of the country. Does the noble Lord agree that deficiencies in the funding of our health and social care system along with the availability of resources to provide prevention services are key to this?

Prevention also concerns the availability of, and access to, primary care. GP numbers are now down by 1,000 since 2015, and as I have said, since 2010 district nurse numbers have been cut by 3,000. People with serious mental health problems die on average between nine and 20 years earlier than others. This is one of the starkest inequalities in our country. One in four adults and one in 10 children will experience mental health illness. On social care, some of the most disadvantaged in our communities are the elderly and the disabled. If the Secretary of State intends to lead a drive for better health in later life, how can that be achieved without addressing the parlous state of social care in many areas?

Can I seek clarification from the Minister about the different strategies and Green Papers that are in play at the moment? Is the recent announcement part of the 10-year strategy that is to be drawn up before Christmas, is it separate from that or is it in addition? How is this linked to what seems to be the Green Paper on social care that never arrives? We were promised a national plan after the Budget, hotly followed by a Green Paper, while yesterday the Minister talked about a prevention plan “next year”. I confess myself to be confused because if we add to that the fact that there is a commitment to transform mental health services by 2020, the Minister needs to clarify for the House how all of these are going to be integrated and in what order we can expect them to appear.

We welcome a focus on prevention and we have long called for it. However, a genuine commitment to prevention must start by reversing the public health cuts that we can see before us at the moment because on that basis, I fear that the parsnips really are not going to be buttered.

Cannabis: Medicinal Uses

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Thursday 1st November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is to be welcomed that the Government have today issued guidance on the use and access of cannabis for medical use. Having spoken to several GPs about this matter in the last day or so, to a person they are experiencing an increase in the number of patients requesting access to cannabis medicine in their surgeries for pain management. Some of those requests will probably be justified. My question is: will GPs refer those patients to specialist doctors who are allowed to prescribe this medicine? Will this create additional cost and demand? Who will pay for it? Could the Minister explain and say when this will be reviewed?

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

It is important to state that GPs will not be able to prescribe it; that is part of the new regime. On the specific issue of pain management, the interim guidance from the Royal College of Physicians says there is no evidence to support its use for treating chronic pain. In the meantime, NICE will be providing clinical guidance in about a year’s time, which will take a broader view. So it should not be the case that specialists are providing it in this area—the evidence does not exist and therefore the costs will not occur.

Health: Diabetes

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Wednesday 31st October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble and learned friend for putting this debate before the House this evening. I congratulate him and the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, on their excellent contributions to this debate: they have actually covered most of the waterfront on this. As my noble and learned friend said, in November 2017, flash glucose monitors were made available on the NHS after petitions from various organisations and people who thought that this new technology should be accessible to those living with type 1 diabetes across the UK. I join the other speakers in thanking Diabetes UK and others for their briefing.

Flash glucose monitoring is a major advance over routine finger-prick glucose monitoring. It is easier, quicker and less painful. The density of data and the ability to follow trends in glucose levels, which are not available from less frequent blood glucose testing, have been shown to help patients improve glucose control and reduce hypoglycemia. I have two friends with type 1 diabetes, both of whom use this technology, and both say that it is an enormous improvement in how they manage their conditions. Flash GM can be used alongside routine finger-prick testing to check their blood glucose levels. It can also be used as a management tool to obtain a more detailed picture of an individual’s glucose profile. Flash GM devices should be made available to any adult or child with type 1 diabetes and to people with other forms of diabetes when intensive insulin therapy becomes necessary because of severely reduced pancreatic function.

The short-term use of flash GM by healthcare professionals as a management tool, sometimes referred to as troubleshooting, can help someone who is having difficulty achieving their personalised treatment target or who is troubled by frequent hypoglycemia, hyperglycemia or both. It is clear from the debate that ongoing funding for flash GM sensors should be made available, on the condition that the person demonstrates active management of their glucose levels or progress towards achieving and maintaining their personalised treatment target. This should be assessed at least annually. People who use flash GM should have a good understanding of intensive insulin therapy and how to self-manage their diabetes. The completion of a structured diabetes education programme, as recommended by NICE, is absolutely vital.

People who use flash GM will still need access to test strips and meters for use in certain circumstances; for example, current DVLA regulations stipulate that people should use finger-prick testing of glucose levels before driving. Once flash GM devices are on the NHS Prescription Services drug tariff, local health decision-makers should make sure that flash GM readers and sensors are listed in the local formulary. That is the nub of the matter—and probably the point at which I should say that I am a member of a CCG board—because we are talking about availability becoming a postcode lottery, as my noble and learned friend said. While various CCGs have approved the use of flash glucose monitoring, it is still not available in certain locations due to either being under review, and so only tested on a sample of people, or simply not having been authorised. Local decision-makers have decided against prescribing flash monitoring in 52 areas in England, according to the latest information given to me by Diabetes UK. Thousands more people with diabetes await decisions by 38 CCGs across England and nine health boards in Scotland, which are currently reviewing their policies.

With the knowledge of the benefits of flash GM, and with some people across the country having access to it already, it seems unfair to deprive others of the chance to use it because of their location. During Prime Minister’s Question Time earlier this month, the Prime Minister, who uses one of these devices herself, stated that this is not a one-size-fits-all situation and:

“There is no one system that is right for everyone”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/10/18; col. 634.]


But at the moment not everyone with diabetes even has the chance to test whether or not that is true.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister, in addition to those already asked. Will the Government and NHS England commit to a diabetes technology fund, as my noble and learned friend suggested, as part of the new NHS 10-year plan, to support the rapid rollout of new cost-saving technology? What can they do to ensure that CCGs follow nationally developed guidance on access to technology and treatments? Having to create 200 different policies for every new technology is just duplicating effort and means that it will take years to ensure equitable access—if this is ever achieved. This seems a ridiculous way to respond to the new technologies that are available and will become more widely available. This is a problem that will grow, not decrease. Finally, will the Government look at making funding available, as my noble and learned friend said, in the current NHS spending review, to pump-prime access to these life-changing and cost-effective diabetes technologies?

Health and Social Care (National Data Guardian) Bill

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 26th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, for bringing the Bill before us today. I join her and others in paying tribute to Dame Fiona Caldicott. The Bill has the support of these Benches.

The purpose of the Bill, as noble Lords have said, is to establish a statutory footing for the National Data Guardian for Health and Social Care. This role is responsible for providing advice and guidance to all the relevant parties regarding the processing of health and adult social care data in England. I agree with other noble Lords that the NDG is vital in helping to ensure that confidential health and care data is used and shared appropriately, upholding and protecting high standards for medical confidentiality. As the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said, it is very important that the organisation that is already providing this crucial function has wended its way into this position. We welcome the fact that that is to be recognised in statute.

As noble Lords know, the Information Commissioner’s Office is the regulator for compliance with the general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act, but there is no equivalent national regulator for the confidentiality of personal healthcare data—information provided by a patient to a healthcare professional for the purposes of receiving care or treatment—despite significant public interest in maintaining a confidential healthcare service. We on these Benches support the creation of a statutory basis for the National Data Guardian’s role, given the hugely important role that it plays in this area. I thank noble Lords and the National Data Guardian for the consultation and discussions that all stakeholders have been able to take part in in preparation for the Bill. We have appreciated that.

That is in sharp contrast to the conduct regarding the Mental Capacity Bill. If I might swerve slightly for a moment, I was shocked to learn that the Minister and his colleagues have rejected a freedom of information request about the consultation that they carried out before the Mental Capacity Bill was introduced to the House, which was also in sharp contrast to the level of transparency and consultation by the Law Commission when it looked at mental capacity. I feel I need to say to the Minister that he really could learn a few things about how to manage complex policy issues from the National Data Guardian and indeed the Law Commission.

I return to the Bill. The circuitous route to get here, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, has actually been beneficial to where we have ended up and what we have before us. I welcome the fact that the Bill includes the social care data and the importance of protecting patients’ data wherever they find themselves in the health and social care system. I echo and agree with my noble friend Lord Knight’s remarks and questions, and I share his excitement about the use of data and the benefits that it can bring to patients and their families.

I have received a briefing from the National AIDS Trust. I do not wish to delay the Bill but I think this briefing raises some important points about it. The National AIDS Trust agrees with the rest of us in strongly welcoming and supporting the Bill. Given that HIV stigma and discrimination are still prevalent in society, people living with HIV need to be assured that appropriate protections around confidentiality are in place when they access health and social care services. Indeed, the NDG herself has proved to be an invaluable source of expertise and advice when it comes to the health and social care system maintaining that essential balance between confidentiality and communication for this group.

The concern that the trust wants me to raise on its behalf is that in Clause 1 the Bill provides for a legal duty on relevant public bodies to have regard to guidance published by the NDG,

“about the processing of adult health and social care data in England”.

In Clause 2, “Interpretation”, “health and social care data” is defined. The NAT’s concern is that this definition of health and social care data could be interpreted to exclude non-clinical, demographic data that relates to an individual—for example, home address and family details—from the scope of the NDG’s guidance. Individuals do not distinguish between the kinds of information that they provide to health and social care services and, of course, expect all their information to be treated confidentially. Polling undertaken by NHS Digital recently found that the general public consider it as important that the NHS keeps their address confidential as their clinical information. I would be grateful if the Minister could give a clear assurance that the wording of the Bill, particularly at Clause 2(6), includes within the scope of health and social care data, and thus of the National Data Guardian’s guidance, all data, including non-clinical data, held on individuals by health and social care bodies.

The National AIDS Trust talked about asking to have the Bill amended. That is almost certainly not necessary but I would like the assurance that it seeks. I would also like to be assured that the definition, and the clarity that is required in regulation, is there. This is one of those Bills where the regulations are going to be very important. I hope the Minister will be able to assure the House that, when the regulations are drafted, a proper consultation, including with Members here who have expressed an interest, takes place.

Finally, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, about the value of NHS data. It is of value to patients and families, but it is also hugely valuable to organisations that want to exploit it and, if they do so, that should be for the benefit of the NHS, not for private benefit. I suspect that the Bill is not the place to solve that problem, but the noble Baroness was absolutely right to put that issue on the record. We had a very good debate a few weeks ago about precisely this matter, which a group of us wants to discuss with the Government on a cross-party basis: how we ensure that the nation as a whole benefits from the fantastic NHS database that we have in this country because our NHS has existed for so long. It should benefit not only us but the whole world. I also echo the noble Baroness’s question about PALS and children.

Noble Lords on these Benches absolutely support the Bill. We welcome it, we want it to speed through the House, and we look forward to the discussions that we probably need between now and its final stages.

Antimicrobial Resistance

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2018 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Thornton]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to reduce deaths from antimicrobial-resistant infections.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O’Shaughnessy) (Con)]

My Lords, antimicrobial resistance, or AMR, is a significant global threat and the Government are committed to tackling it domestically and internationally. Over the past five years, we have worked to deliver our strategy and ambitions as set out in response to my noble friend Lord O’Neill’s review. However, we recognise that no country can tackle AMR in a single five-year strategy. That is why we will shortly be setting out our longer-term vision for tackling AMR and setting challenging ambitions for the next five years.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for that Answer. As he rightly said, AMR poses a grave threat to health. Quite simply, if action is not taken to address this growing threat, it is estimated that, by 2050, AMR will kill 10 million people a year, more than cancer and diabetes combined. This week we saw the publication of the Commons Health Select Committee report which outlined the gravity of this issue. It is of concern that the Chief Medical Officer said to that committee that she would like,

“more visible and active Government leadership”,

on AMR. I think I need to press the Minister. When we will see more visible activity and what form will it take to deal with a huge threat to our nation’s health?

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I agree with the noble Baroness about the grave long-term threat AMR poses, but it also poses a threat in the short term. Estimates vary, but between 2,500 and 5,000 people a year in England die because of AMR. In relation to the seriousness with which the UK takes it, I mentioned the new strategy which will be published shortly. I should point out two things that have been a success. First, the UK has taken a very important global leadership role in making AMR a priority for the G20. Secondly, as a consequence of our action plan, we have seen reductions in the prescribing of antibiotics at GP level. That means that we are starting to drill down on the overprescribing and inappropriate prescribing which is driving AMR.

Health: Flu Vaccines

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I do not know and I shall write to my noble friend.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I think the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, is actually that they ran out of jabs. I declare an interest as a member of a CCG. It is true that there has been some confusion about when people could get their flu jabs. How will the Minister ensure that a significant number of the most vulnerable people actually get their flu jabs? He said in his first Answer that the take-up was not as good as it should have been last year, so that seems very important. Secondly, how are we to ensure that NHS staff take up the flu jab as they should, too?

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

First, take-up was actually at its highest level ever last year. The issue was the effectiveness of the vaccine, which is why the committee’s recommendation was to move to this new vaccine. In terms of confusion about who can get the flu jab, it is clear that we have the most comprehensive flu vaccination programme in Europe. Anybody who has gone to a GP’s surgery or pharmacy and has not been able to access it up to now will—or should—have been told when they can come back and when new supplies will be available. As I said, it is about making sure that can happen before the end of November. We had a fantastic take-up among NHS staff this year; the jab is freely available to NHS staff, social care staff and, for the first time this year, hospice staff.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting - (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 22nd October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker]

I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Mark Neary had to resort to the law, not to a code of practice, to get his son out of a place where he should never have been detained. We need to have further discussions about what needs to be in the Bill and the role of regulation and the code of practice. I think she has a fundamentally wrong take on this. This is about legal protection for very vulnerable people. That sometimes has to be in a brief outline in law. It has to be stated in the Bill that a person has to be spoken to face to face. We can then go on to put a load of stuff in the code of practice about how we do that.

To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I think this is a terrible Bill containing huge holes and some real problems. If the Government take the tack they took last time, we may be able to improve it substantially, but we are in danger of putting one bureaucracy in place of another bureaucracy, and the only difference between the two is that there are far fewer protections for the most vulnerable people. We would be somewhat negligent to go ahead on that basis. I cannot approach the Bill in that way.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, for tabling this amendment. I agree with the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about the state of the Bill. I am rather—“disappointed” may not be quite the right word—surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, who has brought discipline to the House to focus on good legislation and how it should work, is suggesting that we have to have something, so this is it. I really hope that that is not the case and that this Committee will have revealed to the Minister, and particularly to the Bill team, that many elements in the Bill need clarification, need to be changed and can be improved. That is our job, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is highlighting but one of those elements. In fact, the amendment that I am due to talk about next refers to the difficulties that the Bill has brought and the differences between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act.

The last month or so has been very revealing. The Bill was sold to us as something really quite simple that was going to streamline things, get rid of the backlog, save some money and so on, and it really needed only one day in Committee. That is certainly how it was sold to me on these Benches and, I am sure, to other people in the House. In fact, what has happened over the last couple of months is that all the stakeholders and people who are writing to us are saying, “No, this will not do. This Bill does not work. It is dangerous and difficult”. It needs clarification, and these amendments highlight the areas that need it. We are going to move on to other areas that need clarification and which will certainly need amendment. This is an important and legitimate question to ask about the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords—I keep saying “noble Lords” but it has really been noble Baronesses, so I will switch my language—who have both tabled amendments in this group and spoken to them.

Before I come to the substance of the amendments, I shall say two things. First, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that there is an urgency. To use the words of the Local Government Association, “the current system is unable to ensure there is adequate protection for human rights”. That is the reality of the situation that we find ourselves in at the moment.

Secondly, views about the perfection or otherwise of the Bill will vary across the House, but I hope that in the two days of Committee prior to this one I was able to demonstrate that the department and Ministers are absolutely committed to improving the Bill in any way that we can during its passage through Parliament, especially in this House where there are so many experts. I really think we have made some progress. I realise that that will not be enough to satisfy everyone and there is clearly much more to come—care home managers are clearly a big area of work that we need to focus on—but we have made some progress. I encourage noble Lords to continue in that mindset because I think we can reach a good outcome that deals with the fact that, as Age UK says, the system leaves,

“many highly vulnerable older people languishing without any legal protection at all”,

something none of us can accept. We stand ready to undertake that work, as noble Lords know, and I know they do so too.

I turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 55, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, outlines the circumstances in which an authorisation ceases to have effect, particularly noting that authorisations should end if they conflict with a valid decision of a court-appointed deputy or a donee of a lasting power of attorney. The amendment also states that an authorisation would not cease to have an effect if a person’s capacity fluctuated, and would create regulation-making powers to define what constitutes fluctuating capacity.

Section 6(6) of the Mental Capacity Act already provides that action cannot be taken that conflicts with a lasting power of attorney or a deputy’s valid decision, and I can confirm that the Bill does not change that. This means that an authorisation can only be given if it is in accordance with a valid decision, so I hope I have provided reassurance on that front.

I can also confirm that if it emerges that an authorisation conflicts with a decision of a donee of a lasting power of attorney or by a court-appointed deputy, a review should be arranged under paragraph 31 of the Schedule. In particular, it will need to be considered if the attorney or deputy has valid and applicable powers to make this decision, and if the deprivation of liberty authorisation continues to be necessary. That means that in the event of such a conflict, the authorisation ceases to have effect. I hope that provides reassurance to the noble Baronesses on that point.

The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, focused particularly on fluctuating capacity. I agree that an authorisation should not necessarily cease to have effect if a person’s capacity fluctuates and there are short periods of lucidity. That is currently the case under the DoLS system and I can confirm that it will continue under the liberty protections safeguards. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, brought to life, it is very difficult to define either “fluctuating” or “short”, particularly in legislation. For that reason, we do not think regulation-making powers are appropriate; we believe this would be better dealt with through a code of practice, which would allow for more detail and more regular updating but would also allow the use of case studies to bring examples to life. We plan to give much more detailed guidance in the new code of practice, and I reassure noble Lords that we will be working with the sector in order to produce it.

Amendments 56 and 58 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, relate to the thorny issue of the interaction between mental health and mental capacity legislation. They would mean that an authorisation had effect in relation to arrangements that were not in accordance with mental health requirements. As noble Lords know, mental health requirements are conditions placed on Mental Health Act patients living in the community. Currently, DoLS authorisations no longer have effect if a person is subject to arrangements or conditions under the Mental Health Act and that authorisation would be in conflict. This means that the terms of a DoLS authorisation cannot conflict with those of, for example, Section 17 leave of absences. The Bill has been drafted to reflect the interaction that currently exists between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act.

The review of the Mental Health Act has been mentioned in this debate. The review, chaired by Sir Simon Wessely, has been considering, among other things, the interaction between these two pieces of legislation. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has sincere concerns about the nature of that interaction and about why we are bringing forward this legislation now. My short answer is that urgent reform is needed for the reasons that we have set out, including the quotes that I have given. The contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, was helpful, and I have put in my notes that I need to speak to Sir Simon Wessely myself to understand his perspective. However, if I have understood correctly, regardless of the timing of his report, the process of implementing his proposals will take some time to do properly. In our view, it is not right to wait until that has been perfected before we try to deal with many of the issues under consideration in the Bill in the light of the current inefficiencies of the DoLS system. It is for that reason that we want to push ahead. As I have said, I will take it upon myself to speak to Sir Simon Wessely and get a real understanding of his expectations on timing, and to try to understand from his point of view the scale of the interaction between these two pieces of legislation so that we really know what is at stake.

I think the noble Baroness herself said that the amendments are essentially probing. She will know that the effect of them would be that two authorisations could be live at the same time. I am confident that that is not what she is proposing, not least because it would have the perverse effect of requiring people to be in two places at once, so I know she was using this as an opportunity to discuss this question. As I said, it is important that we move ahead for the reasons that we have discussed, notwithstanding that the Government will of course consider incredibly carefully the findings in Sir Simon Wessely’s report and what action is required to implement his recommendations.

On a couple of occasions the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, referred to the consideration of harm to others. I am told that harm to others can be considered under the current DoLS system, so what is proposed is not a change from the current system. However, I will pick that point up with her offline so that we can really get to the bottom of it and ensure complete clarity to a degree that satisfies her. I hope that on that basis, the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw the amendment, and I look forward to discussing more of these issues throughout the evening.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Thornton]

58A: Schedule 1, page 15, line 12, leave out from “of” to end of line 14 and insert “12 months or less.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Thornton]

The amendment would reduce the maximum time for which an individual can be held in detention without renewal from three years back to 12 months. The Bill would allow responsible bodies to renew an authorisation of deprivation of liberty in some cases for up to three years, while simultaneously reducing the safeguards that a renewal process would require. The amendment would shorten that three-year period to a maximum of 12 months.

Why is that important? Tripling the potential length of an authorisation period to three years creates a stark difference between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, apart from anything else, and moves away from best practice in other countries. Paired with the new LPS renewal process, which weakens safeguards designed to prevent lengthy detentions, a three-year authorisation will be likely to face legal challenge.

At its core, the new LPS system is intended to safeguard vulnerable people who have been deprived of their liberty on mental capacity grounds. The possibility of a three-year period of detention with limited safeguards gets the balance wrong between safeguarding vulnerable individuals and the desire to reduce the bureaucracy of the system.

Strasbourg case law confirms that a lawful deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR must include both “limits in terms of time” and “continuing clinical assessment of the persistence of a disorder warranting detention”. Therefore, in order to comply with Article 5, any system must contain, first, a provision for the termination of the authorisation after the maximum time has expired and, secondly, an ability to terminate an authorisation before the time limit has expired if the deprivation of liberty is no longer necessary.

A three-year renewal limit is likely to pose problems for responsible bodies, especially in cases concerning conditions such as learning disabilities, acquired brain injuries and other non-degenerative mental impairments. The courts are likely to intervene to interpret those paragraphs concerning renewals—paragraphs 27(a)(ii), 28(b)(ii) and 29(1)(b)—as narrowly as possible. Capacity assessments are time specific, and a three year-old capacity assessment cannot be relied on as accurate evidence for detention. Therefore, we propose to reduce the three years to 12 months.

It is notable that a 2017 paper comparing mental health legislation in five different jurisdictions—Canada, Australia, Scotland, the Republic of Ireland and England and Wales—states that renewal orders vary in different jurisdictions,

“with the time periods for subsequent orders being longer in duration up to a maximum of 12 months, except in Ontario (3 months) and Victoria (6 months)”.

The Law Commission states that a three-year period should be considered only in the context of robust safeguards and constant review. Given the weakening of the safeguards throughout the rest of the Bill, it would be inappropriate to triple the length of time for which an authorisation can last.

In his opening remarks on the Bill, the Minister stated:

“It is essential that the system afford the necessary protections for the most vulnerable people”.—[Official Report, 16/7/18; col. 1061.]

The Bill as currently drafted would in this respect not deliver that protection. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I have three amendments in the group designed to remove any ambiguity about authorisations, in that an authorisation would fall if it partly fell—in other words, if the person’s condition had either improved or changed to such an extent that the plan in place was no longer applicable, even in part, that would warrant a complete review. I accept that it would have to be a light-touch revision, because some things might not have changed, but I am not comfortable with simply allowing it to be reviewed and people to say that these parts of the condition no longer apply.

Amendment 58C is to stress the need for evidence to be supplied to support statements. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide me with some assurance. That evidence might come from photographs, video recordings of behaviour or whatever. That may be quite different to the written word. I worry that one person’s observed written word may not adequately portray a picture, particularly where the cared-for person has become withdrawn. Someone might interpret that as their being compliant, when actually they may be deeply unhappy. A broader direct recording of the person could be helpful.

I tabled Amendment 62A because I was concerned that the care home manager might be in the process of arranging for adaptations to be made to meet the cared-for person’s needs in line with that person’s wishes and feelings, and that the Bill’s wording does not provide enough flexibility to consider the arrangements to meet the individual’s needs.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I thank the noble Baronesses for tabling their amendments about renewals. I deal first with Amendment 58A, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, which, as she said, would have the effect of meaning that authorisations cannot be renewed for longer than 12 months. As she pointed out, this would go against the Law Commission’s recommendation, which was that there could be circumstances under which renewals took place for up to three years, particularly following an initial review after up to 12 months and if it was unlikely that there would be a change in the person’s condition.

These three-year renewals are in place so that those who are in a stable condition and unlikely to recover are not subjected to annual assessments. The Bill does provide the safeguard—referred to by the noble Baroness—which ensures that an authorisation would need to be reviewed if there is a change. We would also want to make sure that there are appropriate reviews of arrangements when annual reviews under the Care Act take place. It would be up to the responsible body to set review periods. In care home settings, the care home manager must report to the responsible body on any reviews that have been carried out. As the Bill stands, there are significant safeguards to prevent abuse or lack of care of the vulnerable person.

All that being said, I know how strongly noble Lords and stakeholders feel about this issue. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, made a valid point about aligning the review process with the terms set out under the Care Act. I would like to give further thought to this, particularly in the context of the discussions which will be taking place about the proper role of the care home manager. There is clear concern about a proper system of oversight and regular review where responsibility has been devolved to the care home manager. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will follow that up after this debate.

Amendment 58B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, considers an authorisation ceasing to be renewed if it has lapsed wholly or in part. We will want to give further consideration to that. As discussed earlier in Committee, there are circumstances under which one might be happy for an authorisation to continue after a very minor change. That might be the proper process to align this to, and I want to give further thought to this.

Amendment 58C asks that, when deciding whether to renew authorisations in care home cases, responsible bodies should consider other relevant information, as well as that provided by the care home manager. I can confirm that the Bill does allow responsible bodies to consider information other than that provided by the care home manager. That would, inevitably, be in other formats too. We will set out more detail on that in the code of practice.

Amendment 62A would add the word “arranging” to the scenarios in which the care home manager was required to notify the responsible body that an IMCA should be appointed. The amendment intends to make sure that that happens at the earliest stage, including when the assessments are being arranged. That is what the word “proposing” in the Bill achieves. We are satisfied that the language currently in the Bill means that care home managers would be looking at this issue when they are beginning to propose an authorisation, which is the earliest point at which planning for, arranging or bringing together the assessments would take place. I would be happy to demonstrate what underpins our belief that this is the case. I do understand what the noble Baroness is driving at; it is something which we are trying to achieve.

On that basis, I hope that the noble Baronesses are willing to withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the Minister for his answer. I am encouraged that we are going to continue the discussion on this issue. Apart from anything else, I will need quite a lot of convincing that the Bill provides the right kind of protections to allow a period of three years, as currently stated.

On the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I was reminded when reading the letters the Minister has written to noble Lords, and the record of the previous two days in Committee, that we need to clarify the meaning of “care home manager”. Or is it “care manager”, an expression which he has also used? I do not want an answer to that now, but I put it on the table as one issue which we need to clarify in our discussions and in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 58A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to follow up the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, by referring to the recent CQC annual report, which had a section on the implementation and practice in relation to DoLS. The report laid out a number of key concerns about care home and hospital providers that are actually using DoLS at the moment in relation to the Act itself. There is a huge variation in practice and this variation is commonly linked with a basic lack of understanding of the law, which is complex and difficult to understand. The report says that the result is that there are unnecessarily restrictive practices that can result in the loss of freedom and, in some cases, the loss of people’s human rights. The problems are reinforced by limited staffing levels, a lack of time to complete applications and inadequate staff training.

I am aware, of course, that the intention of this Bill is to streamline some of those procedures, although I think that, because the safeguards have been drastically reduced, we might be landing ourselves in future problems once the courts begin to hear some of the cases that will arise. The point is that it is quite clear that, at the moment, effective training is not taking place among many of the organisations involved in the operation of DoLS. The risk is that the same will happen in relation to the new legislation. We need some guarantees that there are going to be resources and a concerted training programme to ensure that we mitigate that impact.

[Baroness Thornton]

I will add to the questions that have already been asked of the Minister: who is going to pay for this? Training is very expensive and I was waiting for the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, to ask that question but she did not, so I am asking it. As I recall from the impact assessment, I am not sure that there is a large sum of money in there for the amount of training that might be necessary to ensure that this Bill is properly enacted.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for tabling these amendments and precipitating this discussion. I will move straight on to the substance of the amendments. Amendment 61 provides that local authorities must make arrangements for a named person to be in charge of training and revalidation of approved mental capacity professionals and that local authorities must make arrangements for contracts with neighbouring local authorities and health bodies as required.

On the issue of approvals and training, the Bill is clear that local authorities must approve individuals to become AMCPs, and regulations under paragraph 33 will make provision around training, qualifications and other eligibility criteria. The question of what kind of training there should be and who pays is something that we discussed at some length on the last Committee day. That was more in relation to care home managers, which was primarily the focus of the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The same read-across applies to AMCPs as well. On that occasion, I committed to bringing forward more details of what the training would look like. I also confirmed that, in England, Health Education England and ADASS would be responsible for working with Skills for Care, and Social Work England. Those are the bodies that would be responsible for overseeing and designing the training. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked about the rights of individuals. Of course, that would be the centrepiece of any training programme to make sure that those rights are properly respected.

On the specific question about local authorities naming an individual, I say that the Bill does not prevent them doing so. It is something that they are able to do and, in our view, it does not need to be set out in primary legislation. There is no such requirement for best-interests assessors or approved mental health professionals, I understand, and that has not caused any difficulties in practice. To that extent, we can mimic the arrangements in place there.

Making arrangements with other local authorities is again not precluded by the Bill. Clearly, that is something that local authorities will want to do, depending on the arrangements they have commissioned in care across different authorities. I can confirm that we will provide guidance on this in the code of practice.

Amendment 61A adds to the criteria that must be met for a person to become an AMCP. They must be,

“a registered professional, with a minimum of three years clinical experience”.

A list sets out whom that could include; that list has been added to by one tonight, which in some senses exemplifies the nature of the problem. I completely agree with the noble Baroness: we need to set out not only the kind of professionals but the kind of qualifications and experience. There has to be a balance and a mix between all of those. That will be set out in regulations. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked about the proper place to set out the rigidity or robustness, and we believe that the appropriate place would be in regulations, which provide a degree of flexibility that would not apply if we enshrined this in primary legislation. That is why we are proposing the approach of defining the groups that should be acting as AMCPs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, this is again a rather fundamental indicator of some of the things that are badly wrong with the Bill. The words “best interests” appear in it three times, and twice they are used in relation to a care home manager being able to restrict access to advocacy. As the Bill stands, referral to advocacy is controlled by a relevant person, either the responsible body or the care home manager, and an advocate must be appointed if a person has capacity and requests an advocate—that is quite rare, and I have to say that under the Bill it would be something of a miracle, because they do not have the right to information about not only their current circumstances but about other less restrictive options. The Minister’s statements on information last week, when he referred to GDPR, were so strange that it has taken me a considerable time to work out that he had completely misunderstood that under the current system people have a right to information. They have the right not to request information but to be provided with information, which this amending Bill severely restricts.

However, the second condition is by far the most worrying. Somebody can request an advocate if the person lacks capacity and the relevant person is,

“satisfied that being represented and supported by an IMCA would be in the … person’s best interests”.

I invite noble Lords to think what would have happened if those words had been in law during Winterbourne View. That is why I am quite happy to use the word “shocking” about the Bill, as this is unacceptable. My amendments would try to get rid of the abuse of the term “best interests” to limit vulnerable people’s access to support. The Minister knows that under the DoLS system, by and large, if somebody requests an advocate, it is up to the relevant body to try to do their best to find one, or that they find an appropriate person. I refer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that under case law at the moment, local authorities have the right to override if an appropriate person is not doing their job properly on behalf of the person. That too will be undermined by the Bill.

The Minister will also know that if somebody has no relatives and nobody else in the world—they are “undefended”, to use that rather archaic but useful and clear term—they have an automatic right to advocacy. I know that much will be made of advocacy being expensive, advocates being a resource that is not readily available, and that people who do not need advocacy will be unnecessarily interviewed. I am quite happy to talk at length to the Government about ways in which advocates or advocacy resources could be better used and better targeted—but absolutely not by drawing it like this, putting this sort of hurdle not even in a code of practice but in a Bill.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, we on these Benches very much agree with the purport of these amendments, which again bring to light some of the ambiguities in the Bill and some of the rights that are not properly respected by it. Over the next period the Minister will not only need to give us a theoretical answer but have to answer things such as the question about Winterbourne View, and look at the hard examples of real experience which some of us have been receiving in our postbags over the last month. We will need to return to this over the next few weeks, and possibly even at the next stage.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to all the noble Baronesses for their amendments and for speaking in the debate on this group. Let me begin with a statement of principle. I accept the challenge from the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that we need to move from principles to practicalities, or in our case to the appropriate legislation. There is genuinely no attempt in the Bill to restrict people’s access to independent advocacy. As has been clearly voiced, not only in this Chamber but elsewhere, there is a concern that that will be the effect of what is proposed, and that is something that we need to deal with. But let me say at the beginning that that is not the intention. It must be the case that anybody who needs support to navigate these difficult and complex situations must be able to find the right support for them. I will explain why the Bill is as it is in a moment, but let me at least give that statement of principle at the beginning.

I will deal now with the specific amendments in this group. Amendments 63 and 64 aim to ensure that the Bill is robust on the appointment of the IMCA. I completely agree that it is vital that the care home manager notifies the responsible body that an IMCA should be appointed. That is required by the Bill. However, I know that there is great concern about the impartiality of this person and a requirement for strengthening in this regard. It is also our position that a responsible body will be able to appoint an IMCA if there is a request by, for example, a family member or the person themselves, or if there is a disagreement with the notification given by a care home manager. I am considering how we can make the Bill clearer in that regard. As we home in on the issue of the incentives for the care home manager to follow best practice, as we would want, I am aware that we need to do more work on this to get it right.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Thornton]

My goodness, we are back in the Bill, out of the appendix. I am formally moving that Clause 2 do not stand part. However, I will address my remarks to the two amendments in my name in this group. They concern advance consent. This amendment comes from Clause 6 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill, and inserts two new sections into the Mental Capacity Act: advance consent to certain arrangements, and the effects of advance consent. These sections provide for a person to consent in advance to specific arrangements to enable care and treatment that would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty.

To give advance consent, the person must have the capacity to consent to specified arrangements being put in place at a later time that otherwise would be considered deprivation of liberty. They must also clearly articulate the arrangement to which they are consenting. Provisions in this amendment relating to advance consent are similar to those relating to advance decisions to refuse treatment which appear in Sections 24 to 26 of the Mental Capacity Act.

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and my noble friends Lord Touhig and Lord Hunt for supporting this amendment, and I think it is important that we probe this particular issue. On previous Committee days and in discussions with stakeholders, one of the recurring sentiments was that the well-being of the cared-for person should be at the front of this legislation, and it seems that advance consent is definitely a crucial issue in putting the cared-for person at the heart.

Amendment 85 concerns unlawful deprivation of liberty. Again, this amendment comes from Clause 7 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill and would insert two new sections into the Mental Capacity Act on unlawful deprivation of liberty and on proceedings and remedies. These sections would provide a route for an individual deprived of their liberty in a private care home or hospital to seek redress where proper authorisation under this Bill and the Mental Health Act, or an order of court, has not been obtained. This amendment seeks to define the private care provider. Again, we have been concerned about how the Bill will be applied to those in a private care setting or hospital. It seeks to probe how they should be affected by the Bill.

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, Amendment 84, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is possibly one of the most important amendments we have tabled to the Bill. It has become so much more important over the last 20 or 30 years to try to encourage people to make decisions in advance about what should happen to them and to encourage them to think about what will happen in the event of things going wrong—to think about things such as lasting powers of attorney and advance decisions on mental health services. I understand that Sir Simon Wessely will recommend some changes that are very similar to this to go into the new mental health legislation. It would be good, bearing in mind our previous discussions, if we could feel confident that the same sort of approach was being taken in this Bill.

Advance decision-making in legislation has proved quite difficult to implement, because you have to have a widespread campaign of understanding how people can make these decisions. It also has to have the individual making the decision accept that things will happen to them that they are not expecting, which is sometimes very difficult. That is why it so difficult to get people to sign up to insurance against long-term care; they simply do not believe that it will ever happen to them. It is very difficult to get these bits of legislation implemented and widespread, but we have to start somewhere. This is such an important piece to try to get into a Bill, to start people thinking about their future and what is acceptable. This would be a very important thing for the Bill.

I would also like to see Amendment 85 implemented. It is something that the Law Commission had in originally. I am not quite sure why it came out. It sort of just disappeared in the transcription somewhere. It is an important safeguard. We tend to forget all those Victorian cases a couple of hundred years ago when people were quite regularly held in circumstances against their wishes and unlawfully deprived of their liberty. It is as well to be reminded that it can, and probably does, still happen quite frequently. To have something on the statute book would be helpful, so I support the two amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for introducing this clause stand part debate. We had a chat earlier, so I shall not formally respond to her but instead deal with the amendments as laid, if that is all right with everybody. Clearly, these are very important issues that need to be dealt with properly.

Amendment 84 would allow individuals to provide advance consent to arrangements enabling care or treatment that would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty. As noble Baronesses have commented, the Law Commission recommended that provision should be made in the Bill to allow this. This would mean saying that cared-for people entering certain settings, such as hospitals and end-of-life care, where the arrangements are predictable and time limited, would not be required to undergo additional assessments if they needed to be deprived of their liberty. In the Government’s response to the Law Commission, we agreed that people should have choice and control over future decisions being made on their behalf, but we said that we needed to look at the detail of this specific proposal. I understand that there is enthusiasm among some noble Lords for such a recommendation, particularly, as has been said, as a way of alleviating unnecessary assessments for those in palliative and end-of-life care.

On palliative care, before I get on to more general concerns, I think it is important to note that the Government have issued some guidance about consent in the context of palliative care in the last few weeks of life. I realise that this talks only about one part of the time period that we might be talking about. The guidance says that if an individual has capacity to consent to arrangements for their care at the time of their admission, or at a time before losing capacity, and does consent, this consent would cover the period until their death, hence there is no deprivation of liberty. However, the guidance is also clear that this consent would no longer be valid if significant extra restrictions were put in place, after this point, to which the person had not consented. So there is a situation that pertains to people right at the end of life and provides some opportunity for challenge if restrictions change.

If we extend that time period out, not just to weeks but to months and years, it has been brought to light in this debate that, while there is a desire to make sure that a person’s advance consent is taken seriously and given legal force, concerns have also been raised, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about extending the application in such a way that it could actually deprive people of their protections and human rights. These are clearly concerns that we need to take seriously.

Concerns have also been expressed to the department, in engagement with stakeholders, that the inclusion in statute law of advance consent to being deprived of liberty might imply that there is an expectation that people should have an advance statement of wishes in place, and that people may be pressured into making an advance statement. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that in some ways planning for the future may be a good thing but, equally, we do not want to force people to plan for the future when their desire is not to. We protect the right of people to make bad decisions; that is an important part of a person having a sense of agency and autonomy. Concerns have been expressed that that would be put in danger and people would feel pressured to do something that they might not wish to do.

Clearly, the Law Commission made this recommendation with highly laudable aims. However, we have concerns and are not yet convinced of the merits of the amendment. We have tried to deal with some of the issues around integrating planning through the creation of a system based on the production of a care plan. We have talked about the inclusion of a statement of wishes. I would like to know more about the proposal of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about advance statements of wishes. I would like to follow that up and understand it a bit better. The process we are envisaging would allow the inclusion of advance decisions to refuse treatment as part of future care planning. That is not affected by what we are discussing here but that would be allowed. We are not convinced of the merits of the amendment—indeed, we have some concerns about the implications of it—but I would be keen to understand a bit more about previous discussions of this topic and whether there are other ways to provide that sense of agency for the person who will be cared for without producing undue pressure on them or legal force in a way that would go against their interests and, in legal terms, their human rights.

Amendment 85 would create a new civil court remedy against some private care providers, including non-NHS hospitals and private care homes, if they have deprived someone of their liberty unlawfully. Again, this provision was proposed by the Law Commission. However, we do not believe that a new legal remedy is required. There is already an ability to seek damages under the Human Rights Act on the basis of a breach of Article 5 and usually Article 8. This is available in private cases, where a private care provider is depriving a self-funder of their liberty unlawfully. A remedy could be sought against the public authority responsible for the deprivation. Obviously, we need to hold private care providers to the same standards that we hold public care providers to. There are already a number of mechanisms that allow for this, and the law provides for them. There is the criminal offence of false imprisonment, as well as the existing law of false imprisonment for civil claims. So people can already bring legal action against private care providers.

On top of this, the Care Quality Commission in England and the Care Inspectorate Wales would also ensure compliance with the liberty protection safeguards. Clearly, they have a range of enforcement actions available to them that apply to the public and private sector alike. Furthermore, as commissioners, local authorities will—and do—have a role in ensuring that private care providers fulfil their legal duties. The Government believe that sufficient levers are already in place and that the creation of an additional civil route could increase care providers’ insurance costs at a time when, as we all know, we are working hard to make sure that there is funding in the system to provide adequate and good-quality social care to everybody who needs it.

I understand and agree with the desire to hold private providers to the same standards that we hold public providers to, but we believe there are existing remedies within the system and there is no need to require or implement new ones. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness will not move her amendments.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the Minister for that detailed response and the noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy and Lady Barker, for their support. I did not intend to alarm the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I thought we might be veering into discussions the House has had on many occasions about advance consent for various things. I do not think we want to go there, but I was beginning to get the feeling of “Doctor knows best” when we were having that discussion.

I am not certain that the care plan works. The Law Commission had very good reasons for putting what are now Amendments 84 and 85 into the draft Bill that it brought forward, which were to do with the fact not that its people are lawyers but that it had consulted very widely with stakeholders and people involved in the care system. These are the conclusions that it came to, so I will read carefully what the Minister has said about this. Maybe we can include these amendments in our discussions and decide whether we need to pursue them further at the next stage of the Bill.

Clause 2 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Thornton]

83: After Clause 2, insert the following new Clause—
“Restriction on power of attorneys and deputies
After section 29 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 insert—“29A Deprivation of libertyNothing in this Act authorises a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a deputy to consent on behalf of a person to arrangements which give rise to a deprivation of that person’s liberty.””

[Baroness Thornton]

Amendment 83 concerns the power of attorney and restrictions on it. This amendment comes from Clause 3 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill. I said right from the outset that in Committee we would test the Bill against those issues that the Law Commission had decided to put into the draft Bill and ask why they had been dropped. Many of them are absolutely at the heart of the safeguards that are necessary for vulnerable and cared-for people. The amendment would insert a new section into the Mental Capacity Act, which expressly prevents,

“a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a deputy”,

appointed by the Court of Protection from consenting on a person’s behalf,

“to arrangements which give rise to a deprivation of … liberty”.

This is the position in the current law but this statement makes it explicit. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I have three amendments in this group, which are there simply because the topic is lasting power of attorney. I do not have an argument with Amendment 83 at all. It is absolutely right that the person’s best interests must be considered and that someone cannot just give consent on their behalf.

The amendments that I have tabled are designed to solve three current problems that we have with lasting powers of attorney. The first, Amendment 83ZA, relates to the identity documentation that somebody must produce to show that they are the donee of a lasting power of attorney. These are bulky papers which have to be registered and stamped by the Office of the Public Guardian, and then produced. For many people who are donees, those papers may be at their home; that may be a long way away from wherever the cared-for person—the donor—is. When that donor has lost capacity, the donee can either carry the sheaf of papers around with them all the time or just hope to be going via their home filing cabinet to pick them up before they go to see the person.

I hope that we might move toward something a bit more modern in electronic identification—something like the driving licence, which is a small card on which you can have a registration number. You could also have a picture of the donor as well as one of the donee, which would allow a second layer of recognition. That would also, I hope, focus the mind on the fact that the donor must be at the centre of all the decision-making. Its validity could easily be checked against a number, so that if it had been updated—and for some reason the previous form had not been returned—a simple check with the Office of the Public Guardian might verify its status.

Amendment 87G is designed to solve another problem that has been arising: that a person may appoint several people to hold their lasting power of attorney in the event that they lose capacity. However, as time goes on it has happened that they lose confidence in one of those people, for whatever reason. Maybe there is a dispute in the family or they feel that the person is no longer able to take a decision in their best interest, for whatever reason, and they want to revoke having that person as a donee. The problem is that it is quite a complicated process and they have to go back to square one. This amendment is designed to make it much easier for them to state that they no longer want one person listed but they want the others to remain. I have discussed this with the Public Guardian, who sees it as a problem at the moment that the revocation of a donee is difficult.

Amendment 87E arises out of a problem which is also beginning to occur. I should declare an interest here because it is a problem that is close to my heart: a member of my family has severely impaired capacity and her spouse, who is the only person who can act on her behalf, is becoming older. There is concern about what happens if he cannot act on her behalf and take decisions. At the moment, it is only when the donee loses capacity that others can go to the Court of Protection for a court-appointed deputy. The aim of this amendment is to allow the donee to make some provision so that, in the event of their losing capacity—either temporarily if they have a fall with a fracture, a head injury or have pneumonia, or permanently so they become frail and possibly demented—they can make provision ahead of time in the cold light of day. The alternative is the family, with one family member who lacks capacity and the person who was taking care of their affairs now acutely ill and in crisis, having to go to the Court of Protection to get a court-appointed deputy, which can take some time.

I have discussed this with the Court of Protection, which wants to be helpful in moving things forward, and with Alan Eccles, the Public Guardian, who is extremely sympathetic to the problem and can see that people who took out a lasting power of attorney, or prior to that an enduring power of attorney, and never expected to live as long as they have could now find that the donee is at greater risk of becoming frail than they anticipated. Donors are outliving their prognosis not just by months, but by years and possibly decades.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to the noble Baronesses and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for tabling amendments in this group. I am very aware of the complexity of this issue. For a lay person such as me, some of the terminology can be confusing. I will do my level best to be as clear as humanly possible, but if I fail in that endeavour I will write to noble Lords and explain better what I am attempting to explain now.

The effect of Amendment 83, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, would be to confirm in law that a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a deputy appointed by the Court of Protection was unable to consent on a person’s behalf to a deprivation of liberty. If they could provide such consent, the person would not be considered to be deprived of their liberty and no safeguards would need to be provided.

The Law Commission report stated that it was already the position in law that a donee or deputy could not consent to a deprivation of liberty. We confirmed in our response to the Law Commission’s report that the Government agreed with its view on the current legal position, and the Bill does not change the current situation. While the Bill creates a duty to consult with any donee of the lasting power of attorney or a deputy, it does not enable a donee or deputy to consent to the deprivation of liberty on behalf of the cared-for person. In other words, under this Bill the cared-for person would still be deprived of their liberty in those circumstances and would still need to be provided with safeguards to satisfy Article 5, which is of course the whole purpose of DoLS and liberty protection safeguards. In that sense the amendment, with which we agree, would serve only to duplicate existing legislation and is not necessary. I hope I have provided an adequate explanation to noble Lords, but obviously I am willing to set out in more detail exactly why we believe the current situation is not changed by the Bill as it stands.

I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Amendment 83ZA would require the Office of the Public Guardian to provide documentation, which may be in electronic form, to identify the donor and donee or donees of a lasting power of attorney and to recall the documentation if the donee’s power is revoked. As the noble Baroness pointed out, this is designed to make it easier for attorneys to provide proof of the existence of a registered LPA. It is right that there ought to be a robust system of proving that there is a valid power. My understanding is that the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Public Guardian are actively considering how to offer a digital means of providing evidence of a valid LPA, and we expect to bring forward proposals in due course. I am happy to pursue that further with colleagues in that department and that office to understand greater details of their plans and to share those with noble Lords if they are forthcoming, which I hope that they will be.

Amendment 87E, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would allow the donee of a lasting power of attorney to nominate someone to replace them if they were no longer able to fulfil their duties—I think that means if the lasting power of attorney was no longer able to fulfil their duties—while Amendment 87G would allow a replacement attorney to be nominated by the donor at the time of registering the LPA to take over the power if the donor decides to remove the power from the donee.

I do not need to reiterate to noble Lords just how critical it is to get the law and the rules in this area right; as the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, pointed out, the rules around this would not apply only to this Bill. It is worth pointing out that there is provision in the original Mental Capacity Act to allow a person making a lasting power of attorney to nominate a replacement in the event that their attorney is unable to continue, but I think the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting at is that there is a slight chicken and egg situation here: at the point where they no longer have capacity but the person whom they have previously appointed is no longer able to fulfil their role or the cared-for person no longer wants them to do so, they cannot go back in a time machine and appoint someone else—in other words, they cannot know what they do not know. I have just made things really clear by getting all Donald Rumsfeld about it all.

Having said all that, I want to consider if there is a way of unlocking that paradox, but clearly the implications of that would go well beyond the remit of what we are discussing here. I do not want to make any promises that it is not in my power to keep. I would appreciate the opportunity to explore this further so that we can consider how to give the donor more opportunities to have a sense of choice and agency as they think ahead to the future. I would have thought that we must be able to provide for that without creating extra complications. I look forward to taking that up with the noble Baroness and other noble Lords who are interested in the topic. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the Minister for that detailed answer. As usual, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has raised some interesting challenges. In my family, someone who had enduring power of attorney died at the point they were needed. We were in a ridiculous and complex situation—resolved by good will, but the law did not help us. This is therefore a serious matter.

I understood what the Minister said about the power of attorney, and I will read his response. It sounded to me as though it was probably reasonable, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 83 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Thornton]

83B: Clause 3, page 3, line 33, at end insert—
“21ZB Presumption of P giving evidence(1) This section applies where an authorisation under Schedule AA1—(a) has effect, or(b) is to have effect from a date specified under paragraph 22 of that Schedule.(2) P shall be presumed to give evidence in Court of Protection proceedings.(3) This presumption may be rebutted, having regard to P’s rights, including by evidence that P—(a) is not competent to give sworn evidence; or(b) does not wish to provide evidence (in whichever form) to the court.(4) Evidence from P shall be secured in any form that the court and the parties consider appropriate having regard to P’s circumstances and may include the following—(a) sworn evidence given orally in court;(b) unsworn evidence given orally in court;(c) unsworn evidence given outside of the court;(d) a written statement;(e) pre-recorded evidence.(5) The appropriate authority may make regulations outlining the measures that will be available to support P to give evidence in proceedings.”

[Baroness Thornton]

The Minister will be familiar with this amendment because it stems from Inclusion London, which drafted it. I know that it has written to him about it. It is run and controlled by disabled people, is very concerned about the Bill and wants this issue discussed.

The amendment concerns ensuring the effective participation of P in the Court of Protection proceedings. It gives P the presumed right to give evidence and sets out a number of ways in which that might happen. The organisation has copied me in to a letter to the Minister. It writes that one of the key challenges to date has been securing P’s meaningful participation in Court of Protection proceedings, something acknowledged in the 2018 Joint Committee on Human Rights report, The Right to Freedom and Safety: Reform of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards. Participation is an important issue for a number of reasons, including that it is more likely to place the person at the centre of the decision-making process and may change the outcome of the case. Research suggests that P rarely participates in or gives evidence in proceedings. In the light of the Government’s emphasis on providing protection for people who may lack capacity, it is asking us to consider the amendment.

This seems a reasonable point, and I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response. I beg to move.

[Baroness Meacher]

I will speak to Amendment 87C and apologise to the Committee for being unable to remain in the Chamber earlier—I had two commitments that I had to fulfil. I emphasise that it is a probing amendment; it will certainly need rewriting at Report if we bring something back. I thank Godfred Boahen of BASW, whose briefing was an enormous help in preparing my remarks.

Our aim is to stimulate a debate about the processes to deal with deprivation of liberty issues which arise in domestic settings. There is a case for enhancing the assessment processes in those situations. As it stands, the Bill makes no mention of people in domestic settings where deprivation of liberty is at issue. It is not clear—to me, anyway—what the Government have in mind and I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify the position. The Bill leaves vulnerable individuals in domestic settings where there is an issue of deprivation of liberty with no judicial protection, except through an appeal to the Court of Protection, a process which is onerous, costly, stressful and slow. That also leaves this group of people without access to a mental capacity professional in the event of an objection to the proposed care plan. The amendment assumes that, where a deprivation of liberty arises in a domestic setting, this would be considered, as now, under either the care planning or the safeguarding provisions of the Care Act 2014, but with two important reforms, which I will come to. Thus domestic settings would not come under the processes set out in the Bill.

Before referring to the proposed reforms, I need to clarify the two key processes involved under the Care Act, or the reforms would not make a lot of sense to anybody. First is the prospective model, as proposed by the Law Commission, when a deprivation of liberty is considered during care assessments and planning. The care planning processes apply here. During a Care Act assessment of needs, professionals will ascertain the likely impact of a care plan on the liberty of an individual, whom I will call P. The idea is that, in some cases, the state has prior knowledge that a deprivation of liberty will occur and has therefore taken the necessary steps to authorise it alongside establishing conditions to safeguard P’s human rights. This could be achieved through an amendment to the Care Act guidance, not a legislative change.

The great attraction of this approach, as the Law Commission recognised, is that the safeguards are implemented in a way that minimises intrusion into private and family life. The Law Commission argues that:

“In most cases arrangements could be authorised in an unobtrusive and straightforward manner through a care plan and without a perception of State intrusion into family matters”.


In domestic situations and with the involvement of professional local authority employees in organising and undertaking the care planning, only where the care plan is contrary to the wishes of P would the involvement of the mental capacity professional be warranted. At present, the Bill does not make it clear that the MCP would be brought into domestic settings in any circumstances. This is one of the two areas in the Bill that need clarification. I am impressed that the Law Commission thinks that this approach strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of the person to be protected, and the rights to private and family life under Article 8.

The second model for the deprivation of liberty in domestic settings is the retrospective model, where the safeguarding procedures under the Care Act 2014 come into play. Under Section 42(1) of that Act the safeguarding procedures apply to an adult who satisfies three conditions, which I do not need to go into. The safeguarding process involves P from the very beginning. There are certain crucial points about these processes: their desired outcomes should be considered; professionals have to balance P’s capacity against their best interests and the public interest; and the safeguarding provisions draw significantly on the best-interests principle of the Mental Capacity Act. If deprivation of liberty is an issue, then the Care Act safeguarding provisions and the Mental Capacity Act best-interests principle can be applied to generate a care plan which safeguards P’s interests while providing care and protection.

Within the safeguarding provisions an independent advocate is appointed when appropriate. What is currently lacking is access to a mental capacity professional in the event that P has concerns about or objections to the care plan. An amendment bringing the MCP into safeguarding in domestic settings is needed to align people in such settings with those in others.

My last point relates to the requirement under the European Convention on Human Rights that if P is deprived of their liberty, they must have access to a court. I have already referred to the current arrangement for access to the Court of Protection as the only court route. I urge the Minister to consider seriously the possibility that mental health tribunals could be adapted to become mental health and capacity tribunals to include those in domestic settings where P is objecting to the care plan.

Mental health tribunals already consider whether and how their judgments and the conditions they impose on patients might amount to a deprivation of liberty. Additionally, they have experience of the issues involved in deprivation of liberty considerations in domestic settings. This would not be something outside their competence, and that is very important. It would be too radical to introduce something entirely different. Such tribunals are local and would be speedier, less costly and more accessible for families who are themselves often vulnerable. They are less imposing and therefore less stressful for those involved.

Consider the case brought to my attention recently of an 85 year-old woman looking after her 89 year-old husband, who had severe dementia. She felt she could only cope by keeping her husband in one room. The idea of taking that case to the Court of Protection just feels unreasonable. It certainly needs sorting out in some way, but not that way. In line with the estimated number of appeals to the tribunals, clearly, the number of tribunal members would need to increase. However, as well as having advantages for those involved, this reform would surely be less costly than the current Court of Protection process. I hope we can have a short but constructive debate today and that the Minister will meet us to discuss the best way forward. It might not be exactly what I have suggested, but we really need to think this through carefully. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Meacher]

I thank the Minister very genuinely for an encouraging and positive response. I recognise that this matter of deprivation of liberty in domestic settings needs to be addressed and that we need to have a conversation about exactly how it should be done. I also thank my noble friends Lady Murphy and Lady Watkins and the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for putting their names to my amendment, albeit that it still needs a lot of work. I am grateful for their helpful comments, along with those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Barker. I look forward to discussions with the Minister and others.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the Minister for that helpful answer. The grouping is slightly odd, but I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, has joined in; I notice that she has been sitting in her place for the whole of our proceedings. We have had a useful discussion and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 83B withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Thornton]

89: After Clause 4, insert the following new Clause—
“Compatibility with European Convention on Human Rights
So far as it is possible to do so, all provisions under this Act must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Article 5 (Right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights.”

[Baroness Thornton]

This is the last amendment, and I will be very brief. It is quite appropriate that the last amendment we consider is about Article 5 of the ECHR, which is about the core of the Bill: people’s liberty and the deprivation of it. I have four things to say. The reason this amendment is so important is because it addresses the things that we have found lacking in the Bill which we feel need to be addressed. They are: the availability of information; advocacy and the fact that people need to have access to champions; representation; and the conflict of interest that arises when a detainer is required to assess a detainee. Particularly where a financial interest is in play, it is obvious that it has to be addressed if the proposals in the Bill are to be Article 5 compliant, which they need to be. That is the test that we need to apply to the Bill all the way through. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Baroness has given us this opportunity to discuss a really important matter, albeit that it is late at night. I noted what the Minister said at various times throughout the debate about reliance on the code of practice. He will know that, as we have been trying to make clear all the way through the debate on the Bill, if some rights are not statutory rights in the Bill, then compliance is inn question. I rather suspect that the Bill that was presented to us was not compliant. I do not see how a Bill which, on the face of it, would enable somebody to be detained without being met and assessed by a professional person could be compliant.

There are a number of key matters which the Government are, at the moment, talking about putting into the code of practice—perhaps, possibly on a good day, into regulations—but which need to go back into the Bill. If they do not, the responsible body will not have the statutory responsibility to see that they are carried out. They are: the basis for the detention and the necessary and proportionate test and when that test applies; the role of IMCAs and access to appropriate persons; professional qualifications and training for people undertaking those pre-authorisation reviews; where an AMCP referral should be made; and the obligation to provide information to the person and their family about authorisation. All those things are important.

I say from these Benches that if we do not have considerable movement towards putting those things into the Bill, however briefly, the Bill will still be in trouble when we come to Report.

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[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

My Lords, this is a good way to finish our Committee proceedings. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for tabling the amendment, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for speaking to it.

Clearly, not only ought it to be the case that the Bill is compliant with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but it is also important to make it clear, as I did at the point of the introduction of the Bill, that its provisions are compatible with Article 5. As noble Lords will know, and as becomes painfully clear when you become a Minister and you see your name on printed Bills giving these kinds of reassurances, that is a process that we need to go through before introducing legislation. Clearly, there are still concerns about whether the Bill can be improved in giving force, as the noble Lord pointed out, to the rights under Article 5. Nevertheless, it is my view that the Bill is compatible with the ECHR.

Furthermore, because of Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1988, primary and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect to in a way that is compatible with convention rights. It is already the case that the Bill must be read and given effect to in a way that is compatible with Article 5. My concern with the approach here is therefore not so much one of repetition but one of partiality because it only talks about Article 5. There is therefore a risk that if we implied that this legislation had only to comply, or had a special duty to comply, with Article 5 of the convention rather than the whole convention, that would not reflect our responsibilities under the Human Rights Act. Indeed, it could downplay critical protections that exist in the ECHR, such as the Article 8 rights to family and private life. So while I understand the motivation behind tabling the amendment and using it as an opportunity to rehearse some of the desire to improve the actions that will safeguard the liberty and security of the person, I do not think it is right to put such a clause in the Bill precisely because the Government have a broad responsibility to ensure not only that the Bill is compliant but that it is read and given effect to in a way that is compatible with all convention rights.

I hope that has provided reassurance to noble Lords that our intention, and indeed our obligation, is to provide not only for those Article 5 rights but for all other rights that apply under the ECHR. I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the Minister for that answer, and for his recognition that the reason for tabling the amendment at this point in the Bill was to allow us to say that these were the issues we needed to address, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and my noble friend Lord Touhig outlined. I am pleased that the Minister has acknowledged that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 89 withdrawn.

Children: Gender Dysphoria

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Wednesday 17th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

Yes, I am happy to confirm to the noble Baroness that no surgery should be offered to under-18 year-olds; no cross-sex hormones, which change biological gender, should be available to under-16 year-olds and even the use of hormone blockers is highly unusual for those under the age of 15. That is set out in the guidance and adhered to by the Tavistock and Portman trust, which delivers the service for children.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, gender dysphoria is described by the NHS as the discomfort or distress caused by a mismatch between a person’s gender identity and their biological sex assignment at birth. This is not a new condition, but we must be grateful that it is recognised today as a real issue and a real cause of harm to those children and young people affected. I declare an interest as a health commissioner in the area of the Tavistock Institute.

Does the Minister agree that we need not only more research on the medical, psychological and emotional solutions for this cohort of children and young people, but also resources to be made available? The Tavistock, with its excellent work, is currently the only institute in the UK providing this support.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I agree with the noble Baroness that this is a very real condition; it is rare, particularly in children, but nevertheless it is real. Therefore it is appropriate that those who have it should get the right support. As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, pointed out, that support may be psychological or endocrinological —whatever is required, multidisciplinary teams will provide it. There has been an increase in the number of resources available as well as a cultural change towards greater acceptance. Ultimately, what this comes down to, and what people worry about, is that children are pressured into being one thing or another when they should be allowed to be themselves.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I was not planning on speaking to this amendment at all. I am certainly not an expert on the Mental Capacity Act, but it was suggested to me by BASW that the Bill will cover people in domestic situations. It questions whether those people could be taken out of the Bill. I very much follow the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that it might be a good thing to do something really well for people in institutions while maybe avoiding duplication for people in domestic situations. There is the safeguarding procedure, which, as has been suggested by my medic daughters, is already incredibly bureaucratic, but I will leave that to one side for the moment. If at least the people in domestic settings were left to be assessed by the safeguarding system, that would achieve something and reduce the number of people covered by the Bill. This is particularly true because, as we go along, more and more people will be looked after in domestic settings rather than in care homes.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is our job to look at how things will and will not work and what the alternatives are. The noble Baroness takes a perfectly legitimate position that says, “If this won’t work, what will?” In a way, that underlines a lot of the discussions we have been having in this House: we need some time to discuss this Bill and we have not been able to have that.

My name is to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt. We are questioning the ability of the care home manager to be able to do this at all. The words that have been used to us by the stakeholders—we have now talked to dozens of stakeholders in the last month or so—are “capability” and “capacity” of care home managers. Professionals question the capability and local government and other institutions question the capacity. Those words are being used constantly while we discuss this issue.

It is also worth mentioning the voice of the care home managers themselves, which is starting to emerge. We recently had a briefing from a large group of care home managers who feel that they are not qualified to take on this role or to carry out assessments and that the administrative burden they could carry could mean that they will not have the capacity to take on the extra work to carry out liberty protection safeguard assessments.

There is some confusion here with what the Minister said during the first day in Committee and in the letter he wrote to us all following Second Reading. I admit that I am confused as to whether we are talking about initiating and carrying out assessments and what the powers of the care home managers are. It seems that the Bill team and the Minister have given us several different descriptions of what those roles might be. That has not helped our consideration of our concerns.

Mencap has stated that it believes that the views of the cared-for person have to be at the heart of this part of the Bill and that it should be refocused accordingly. The comments made by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, suggest that that has not yet been achieved, and that the role of the care home manager makes it less rather than more likely. That has been said to us not just by Mencap but by many stakeholders. They are concerned that the cared-for person is not at the heart of the Bill. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the Government have got this aspect of the Bill right and whether they need to find a different way of delivering it.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I wanted to respond in part to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. The original legislation was brought in on the basis of agreement across all parties in the House; so, too, was the report which reviewed the workings of the Mental Capacity Act. There was a unanimous view that DoLS need to be revised; they are not working.

It is interesting that many of the criticisms that have come to light in recent months have been from people who do not defend the current system but who have grave concerns not just about capacity but about some basic assumptions being made—not just about the role of care managers but about how the arrangements will work in practice. There is a quite legitimate view that the legislation will not solve the problem nor necessarily deal with a backlog; it will just shove it somewhere else. We need to think our way carefully through that because, as I will go on to say in debates on later amendments, there is no doubt that there is a watering down in the legal protections proposed by the Government. The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, are therefore right that we should examine in some detail exactly what the Government are proposing, because up until this point it has been quite difficult to understand it.

I thank the Minister for sending his letter of 4 October —he did so in the characteristically open and respectful way in which he treats this House. However, I want to ask a question which is germane to what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is trying to achieve in her amendment. The letter states:

“Care home managers will be responsible for arranging the assessments that are needed for the authorisation. In most cases, they will use assessments that have been completed by a social worker or a medical professional or others as part of the care planning process. This means we will reduce the duplication that exists in the current DoLS system and ensure that people access the safeguards they need”.


Exactly what assessments is the Minister talking about? DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. It would be very helpful if he could say that, because it is one of the fundamental assumptions that we are all working to and which may turn out to be incorrect.

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[Baroness Thornton]

I am very pleased to hear what the Minister is saying, but he and the Bill team need to talk to the stakeholders because they do not feel heard. In particular, they do not feel heard on this issue. I am counselling the Minister that it is not good that the stakeholders are coming to all of us and do not feel heard.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am sorry to hear that that is the perception. I know that the team is engaging with stakeholders and, clearly, we will do better. I take the noble Baroness’s advice very seriously. As I said, we will make sure that the Bill reflects the need to consult the cared-for person. We have also taken on board the comments about the phrase “of sound mind”, which is used in one of the amendments later on. That is one reason why we might want to reconsider it. I know that there is a great concern that the language is inappropriate and that creating a new definition might create a gap, but, having looked at this further, we think we would be able to change this language and carry out various other work to reduce the gap to a minimum. That is something that we intend to bring forward, so I hope that that will be welcomed by many people.

I only give those examples to demonstrate that we are making progress as we go along. Perhaps noble Lords will say that we should have done this beforehand, but we are where we are, and we are trying to fix a creaking system and are using our best endeavours to do that. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, the latest data suggests that the situation is getting worse, not better. There were a total of 227,400 DoLS applications received in 2017-18 and 125,000 people in the backlog, 48,000 of whom have been waiting for more than a year already. In 2013-14, when the House found the DoLS system in need of reform, there were just 12,400 applications. We know the reason for that leap, but it suggests that this problem is not sorting itself out and it is urgent that we address it. Clearly, that is what we are all endeavouring to achieve in this process.

It is for that reason that I come to the role of the care home manager. That is obviously a critical role to avoid duplication and to ensure that cases that are relatively straightforward can be dealt with at a level that is close to the person being cared-for can be integrated into care planning without involving referrals upwards-even though there will continue to be reviews by responsible bodies and the opportunity for the AMCP to intervene where there is any cause for concern. To make sure that this is a manageable process, it is integrated into care planning. I still believe that that is the right model. We need to determine how this model can be developed and delivered in a way that overcomes the very many concerns, many of which I have sympathy with, that have been expressed in this debate and will I am sure be expressed this afternoon in other debates. The onus is on the Government to lead that process and put as many of those concerns to bed as possible while, as I have said, protecting the model because it gives us a way out of the duplication and backlog that we have now.

I want to address some specific issues raised in regard to care managers. For example, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and others raised the point about care home managers being responsible for arranging assessments but not generally for conducting them. In response to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that will be the case for all assessments—DoLS assessments and assessments regarding care planning—and it will include determining whether arrangements are necessary and proportionate. However, although those managers have a responsibility to arrange the assessments, the Bill allows for them to be conducted by others involved in the person’s care, who must have a medical qualification or be suitably trained, as will be explained in the code of practice. So while there is that responsibility to arrange the assessments, those assessments will be carried out by somebody other than the care home manager, except in nursing homes, for example, which might be run by a nurse with a suitable qualification. It would be somebody with the appropriate training to ensure that whatever kind of assessment it is, it can be carried out properly.

I understand that that still leaves a small set of assessments which a care home manager could both arrange and carry out, because they had suitable training. If noble Lords are still concerned about the appropriateness of that kind of activity, I would be absolutely willing to discuss how we can minimise any concerns about conflicts of interest. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, pointed out, such conflicts of interest happen all the time and we rely on regulation—

[Baroness Thornton]

The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, is quite right that people such as her good self have to manage conflicts of interest all the time and they do it superbly, but such a conflict of interest is actually to do with profit and earning money. It is to do with keeping capacity in the care home, which creates a profit for that company. It is quite different from a conflict of interest involving what kind of medicine a doctor might prescribe, for example. It is directly due to the fact that a care home manager’s job is to keep their care home as full as possible, so that it continues to make money. Some of them are in not-for-profits and some are in for-profits, but it is an absolutely different kind of conflict of interest.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

As the noble Baroness says, there are conflicts of interest of various kinds; the important point is that there are protections against any conflict of interest. Typically, those will be through the regulatory authorities, whether the professional bodies or the CQC, which of course inspects all care homes and has found that 80% of them provide good or outstanding care. I believe that there are systems within the current regulatory framework that will provide for that oversight and prevent conflicts of interest. There is also the fact that the responsible body will carry out the reviews and that there is an opportunity to refer to an AMCP.

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[Baroness Thornton]

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done the Committee a great favour. The previous group of amendments was about whether care managers should do this at all. This group is about how they do it, which is a fair question to ask. I have three points to make, and they run like a stream through the Bill. The first is, if care managers have powers and responsibility, how will that work? Will they be qualified and, if so, how? As my noble friend Lord Hunt stated on the first day of Committee, many care homes do not even have registered managers. They are very small and are not capable of doing this. Secondly, who decides and who pays? I appreciate that the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, are exploring how care home managers would manage, but some amendments in this group actually water down even further the rights and responsibilities relating to deprivation of liberty.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

I have a fair degree of sympathy with the sentiment behind this group of amendments. It is right that the Committee looks at what an appropriate role for the care manager might be. We have not got it right yet and it is clear from the debate so far, and the representations received from the sector and from people who deal with this day to day, that there must continue to be some sort of more independent element in the assessment. It cannot simply all come down to the care manager. However, I equally have some sympathy with the idea which was partly behind the Bill. We need better integration between care planning and the difficult decisions that have to be made about deprivation of liberty.

That is why we must explore further what an appropriate role might be. I am not quite sure what it is. Is it simply making referrals or some sort of co-ordination? I share the concerns of other noble Lords about dilution of safeguards, conflicts of interests and all that, but equally we must make sure that the care manager has an appropriate role and is not left out of the picture. We are talking about a very important sentiment.

I welcome what the Minister said in response to the previous group of amendments about the position he has now come to on including 16 and 17 year-olds and putting the cared-for person at centre stage to ensure that they are part of the consultation. I particularly welcome what he had to say about changing the language of unsound mind.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I thank noble Lords for a concise but incisive debate on this group of amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, this is really about the role of those organising assessments for the deprivation of liberty and about who is responsible for pre-authorisation reviews. As has been mentioned by the noble Lords who tabled them, many of these amendments specify that pre-authorisation reviews must be completed by someone who is not employed by an organisation involved in the day-to-day care of the cared-for person or in providing any treatment to that person.

Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the schedule outline that, in all cases, arrangements must be authorised by the responsible body, which is either a local authority, hospital manager, CCG or local health board. It is our intention that only the responsible body, or an individual working on their behalf, will conduct the pre-authorisation review. Currently, senior social workers will often review DoLS applications when they are received. Similarly, we expect that, under the liberty protection safeguards, those for care home cases will be completed by a senior social worker. There are circumstances in which the responsible body is also the organisation that delivers the day-to-day care of treatment—and that is one of the concerns raised about conflicts of interest. This will usually be the case when NHS organisations are the responsible body, but it will also be the case for authorisations in local authority-run care homes.

Unfortunately—although I understand the motivation behind them—the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Thornton, Lady Murphy, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, would make it harder to satisfy the pre-authorisation review requirement where the responsible body also delivers the day-to-day care and treatment; this would be especially so for smaller NHS bodies such as some trusts and CCGs. It would mean such bodies having to hire people from outside organisations specifically for the role, which could introduce complexity and lead to delays.

[Baroness Thornton]

I hate to interrupt the Minister, but I think he might be answering the next group of amendments. I am not sure—perhaps he is answering both groups together—but it feels as though he is answering a speech I have not yet made.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I would like to intervene for a moment as I think this has been a valuable debate, even though short. I shall pick up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, on conditions, which are incredibly important. She cited one example, and I return to the musician to whom I referred earlier. Most professional musicians will feel that their instrument is an integral part of their own personality. If they lose speech, they will communicate through their instrument, especially their mood—their feelings, responses and so on—so it is a terrible deprivation of liberty to separate a musician from their instrument.

If the musician plays a trumpet or another loud instrument and they are in a care home, it will be important to find somewhere they can go to play their instrument without disturbing everybody else. It sounds humorous but it is incredibly important to people. I was struck when I visited a care home some time ago and saw a man playing a piano. I thought he was a volunteer brought in to play—beautifully—to people. When he finished playing, I started to engage in conversation with him and it became clear that, while his recall for the symphony he had been playing from memory was superb, he could recall or discuss remarkably little else from which I could gain a modicum of sense. As a result, we had a bizarre conversation, other than about the symphony.

Conditions are absolutely essential. My hope would be that, in the code of practice, we require conditions to be put into the care plan that must be enacted on a daily basis. This should not be just a set of recommendations that could be ignored. My concern is that we link care planning to the delivery of care; that is extremely important.

I was grateful also for the support—albeit somewhat tentative—from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I draw a distinction between the care manager and the care home manager. The care manager should be the person overseeing the direction of care planning; they could be the district nurse for somebody at home, or whoever runs the supported living environment on a day-to-day basis and looks at alterations in the care plan.

In a large care home, the care home manager often manages the building and the staff. They make sure that regulations are maintained and that the lifts work, dealing with all the things that happen on a day-to-day basis, but can have remarkably little contact with individuals. I do not want to sound disrespectful to care home managers when I say that I would envisage their co-ordinating role as much more like that of an administrative secretary, rather than as somebody who gets information directly from the person or the family. However, I would want them to make sure that the family had been consulted, that all the people who cared about the person had been spoken to and that that information was properly documented, with a package being put together for the local authority to inspect. I believe that the local authority will know which care homes on their patch are working well and which need an eye to be kept on them. I think I have half given my response to the Minister’s response.

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[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. In view of my previous comments, people may be surprised that I did because it seems to be making life more complicated. In fact, I saw the more professional pre-authorisation process for the smaller group who will eventually be subject to this Act, I hope, as introducing something for the high-risk people who will be assessed by professionals. I like the role of the new AMCP, which sort of takes over from the best interests assessor, because I think it will be a well-qualified group. It would add some solid support if the care home manager’s role is to continue. I saw this, when I first read it, as a good way of providing some pre-authorisation backstop, if you like—a solid foundation on which we would have more confidence that the care manager role could work. I am still anxious about the care management work for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, mentioned, but this was one way that I saw of adding some professional expertise that would give confidence to the mental capacity community that we were taking this seriously.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and to my noble friend Lord Hunt’s amendment. Pre-authorisation review is essential. We support these amendments because they propose that everyone should have access to an approved mental capacity professional. As drafted, my understanding is that the Bill gives that access only to those who object to the proposed arrangements. If everybody had access to an AMCP it would lessen concerns about the significance of the independence of the reviews.

Age UK has said:

“In respect of self-funders in private homes, there is an existing principle in mental health law that where an assessor has a financial interest in the decision to deprive someone of liberty there must also be an independent external assessor. A preauthorised review by an Approved Mental Capacity Practitioner … will bring this section of the Bill into line with this principle, which is currently reflected in the Conflicts of Interest Regulations to the Mental Health Act. Without such a requirement a significant conflict of interest for the care home manager is likely to arise”.


I will not say more because I think that we have explored that issue.

There also seems to be an assumption that care homes will already have existing written capacity assessments and that staff will have the knowledge to carry out such an assessment. As we have already discussed, that is clearly not the case.

This is a significant group of amendments. The Minister needs to take heed that we are, in a way, returning to some of the fundamentals that underpin the legislation. We on these Benches have listened carefully to stakeholders and are fairly sure that the Government have not got it quite right. As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, in this House we have always proceeded on mental capacity issues on a consensus basis. We would much prefer that that was the case because we have come up with solutions to these very difficult, knotty, complex problems that cut across health, justice and liberty, and take account of things such as the United Nations and the European Union’s rights of the individual. This House is famous for doing that—I wanted to say that at some point this afternoon. This group of amendments lends itself to that because if we get the pre-assessment regime right then a lot of other things will flow from it that will lead to the right decisions and minimise the risk of local authorities, health authorities and CCGs ending up in court because the right procedures have not been taken and the rights of the individual have not been managed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, mentioned the qualifications needed to be an assessor. We have had several briefings from BASW, for which I am very grateful, that explain how well qualified the people involved in this process are. That of itself creates a problem for care home managers to undertake these issues.

I will paint a scenario for the Minister. If the local authority is the responsible body and therefore will end up in court if this does not work out—it will be expensive and time-consuming and behind it will be an individual who has not been treated properly—it seems quite likely that the local authority will be very risk-averse to the tick-box system that the Bill suggests to assess whether the right procedure was gone through in the assessment process.

Does the Minister agree that we might actually increase the bureaucracy and delays in the system, simply because we did not get the pre-assessment right? That could create one of two things: either a local authority will keep referring back the assessments for reprocessing or it will let through assessments which do not do the trick and therefore bear the risk of ending up in court because somebody’s individual rights have not been properly taken into account. Not only is this an issue of doing right by the individual but there is possibly a compelling case for why it is important to get the pre-assessment right. If we do not, the Bill fall shorts on Article 5 of the ECHR. Had the Government followed the Law Commission’s draft Bill, which contained these safeguards, I think that we would not be having this debate in this form.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker]

Following on from the observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, one of the most common restrictions of liberty is medication and medication reviews. We often think of it as being physical but it is not. New medicines often come online and create change. I take her point and hope we will be able to work towards a definition.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I will not add much more because the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done us all a favour by putting forward great questions exploring the Cheshire West ruling. The Joint Committee on Human Rights agrees that a definition needs to be found, otherwise—the noble Baroness is right—we will be back in a situation where things have not gone right and we end up in court again. We all need to put our minds to this. We should be able to find a definition and I look forward to the Minister leading that particular discursive discussion across the Committee.

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[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to lend my support to Amendment 21 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Barker and to speak to Amendment 22, which is tabled in my name. Amendment 22 is essentially about who should be able to determine whether an individual is, as it currently states in the Bill, “of unsound mind”. That is the terminology being used, but I would prefer to see terms like a “disorder” or a “disability” of the mind. That is one of the three key authorisation conditions. Perhaps I may say again how very pleased I am that the Minister has indicated his willingness to look at some new language so that we do not use the term “unsound mind”, which in my view is stigmatising and has no place in today’s society.

I return to Amendment 22. Currently, the authorisation arrangements in this part of the Bill state that a medical assessment has to be made but do not state who has to make it. It is likely that most people would assume—indeed, it may well be that the Government are assuming it and no doubt the Minister can reassure us on the point in his response—that a medical assessment needs to be carried out by a registered medical practitioner. However, it would be helpful and reassuring to have that made clear in the Bill. The report published earlier this year by the Joint Committee on Human Rights is clear that, in order to comply with human rights law, any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 requires,

“objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement, which persists throughout the period of detention”.

Given the requirement for “objective medical evidence”, my contention is that there needs to be a guarantee in the Bill that only a registered medical practitioner with appropriate training has the power to determine whether someone has an unsound mind or mental disorder, depending on which language is going to be used.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I will speak to two amendments in my name in this group, although I may also come back on what has been said.

Amendment 23 concerns supported decision-making and is based on Clause 12 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill. The amendment would require a clear determination,

“made on an assessment that steps to establish supported decision making are not practicable”.

It states:

“Steps to establish supported decision making are practical if, in relation to decisions about their personal welfare or property and affairs (or both), a cared-for person— … is aged 16 or over, and … has capacity to appoint a person to assist them in making those decisions”.


Amendment 24 concerns the restriction of defence and is based on Clause 9 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill. It states:

“The assessment must include … a description of the steps which have been taken to establish whether the cared-for person lacks capacity”.


NICE recently released guidelines on what it thinks the Bill should say regarding supporting a cared-for person:

“Support people to communicate so that they can take part in decision-making. Use strategies to support the person's understanding and ability to express themselves in accordance with paragraphs 3.10 and 3.11 of the Mental Capacity Act”.


NICE also recommended:

“Practitioners should make a written record of the decision-making process, which is proportionate to the decision being made. Share the record with the person and, with their consent, other appropriate people. Include: … what the person is being asked to decide; … how the person wishes to be supported to make the decision … steps taken to help the person make the decision … other people involved in supporting the decision … information given to the person … whether on the balance of probabilities a person lacks capacity to make a decision … key considerations for the person in making the decision … the person’s expressed preference and the decision reached … needs identified as a result of the decision … any further actions arising from the decision … any actions not applied and the reasons why not”.


These basic and important matters were included in the Law Commission’s draft Bill but not adequately included in this Bill. I am pleased to be part of this group and able to raise these issues. I will let my noble friend Lord Hunt talk about Amendment 50ZA.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for that invitation. Amendment 50ZA refers to circumstances in which the pre-authorisation review is not undertaken by an approved mental capacity professional. Paragraph 18(2) of Schedule 1 sets out the circumstances where that applies, stating that the AMCP will be brought into play where,

“the arrangements provide for the cared-for person to reside in a particular place, and it is reasonable to believe that the cared-for person does not wish to reside in that place, or … the arrangements provide for the cared-for person to receive care or treatment at a particular place, and it is reasonable to believe that the cared-for person does not wish to receive care or treatment at that place”.

Paragraph 20 of Schedule 1 sets out what the person carrying out the review needs to do,

“if the review is not by an Approved Mental Capacity Professional”,

but it does not say who should do it. I want to raise this issue with the Minister. Clearly, there is concern that it may not come to the attention of the responsible body that the cared-for person does not wish to be treated in a particular place or receive a particular form of care or treatment. We could go back to the architecture of the Bill. We think that it puts too much authority in the hands of the care home manager who, in many cases, has to unlock the door to allow these concerns to be raised. Given that some people should be assessed with their review undertaken by an AMCP, but this will not happen, it is important to know the circumstances under which the review would then take place.

Essentially, my amendment is a probing one. The pre-authorisation review referred to in paragraph 20 of Schedule 1 does not have to be done by an AMCP, but Amendment 50ZA says that the person who undertakes it should at the very least,

“be qualified as a medical practitioner, nurse, social worker, speech therapist, occupational therapist or other profession as may be specified in regulations”.

That covers the point made earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that those professions are regulated. It is important for us to be clear. Some people may fall through the net and not be seen to qualify under paragraph 18(2) of Schedule 1. Therefore, the people doing the reviews who are not AMCPs must have enough professional standing to identify problems that might arise. I hope that the Minister, who is in a concessionary mood today, will agree to look at that.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, three amendments in this very important group are in my name. I fully support the stress being placed on the need to see whether, with additional help and support, the cared-for person could make their own decision. It is always better if they can take their own decision over any aspects of their care that need to be in place. For example, providing support to young people with learning difficulties or people with an expressive disorder may require special skills, time and patience to support them to make their own decision. However, the Mental Capacity Act is clear that every effort must be made to support people.

It is also right that the way in which support is provided, as well as the evidence for why such support may have failed, should be recorded—as in Amendment 23, which I strongly support. Decisions should be based on evidence as much as possible, not on the personal opinion of the assessor, although there will always be a degree of interpretation of evidence. For people in community and supported living settings, this will be important to stress as they may agree with and consent to certain aspects of the care plan but not understand others—so it is not an all-or-nothing. However, even if the person does not appear to understand, everything must be explained as fully and clearly as possible. It will be important for any such evidence submitted to support the deprivation of liberty to come from the professional responsible for the care plan, whoever that is.

We have already debated the role of the care home manager. For consistency, I have removed the care home manager from this part of the Bill. I should apologise to care home managers for my use of “secretary” in relation to their role, which could be misinterpreted. I did not mean to cause offence; I just wanted to make sure that we recognise that the care manager and the care home manager are often different people.

In response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, I would advise caution. In some situations, a specialist clinical psychologist may be better than a medical practitioner at undertaking the assessment. I would hate for us to end up with the view that the doctor would always be the best person to do the assessment because I do not think that they always would be; there may well be others.

I welcome the addition of speech and language therapists. They have a great deal to offer to people with expressive disorders and can often establish communication when other people think that the cared-for person lacks capacity but in fact they simply cannot express themselves.

[Baroness Thornton]

Yesterday or on Friday—whenever it was—we received a very helpful briefing from the Royal College of Psychiatrists. I found what it had to say on Amendment 22 very useful:

“The Royal College of Psychiatrists believes that only a ‘Registered Medical Practitioner’ should be able to determine whether an individual has a ‘disorder or disability of the mind’ … Currently the authorisation arrangements in Part 2 of the Bill say that a capacity and medical assessment has to be made, but does not say who has to make it. It is likely that the Government is assuming that this would be carried out by a ‘Registered Medical Practitioner’ but it would be helpful to have it on the face of the Bill.


The JCHR report was clear that in order to comply with human rights law, any deprivation of liberty under Article 5(l)(e) requires ‘objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement, which persists throughout the period of detention’.


Given this requirement for ‘objective medical evidence’, there needs to be a guarantee in the Bill that only a Registered Medical Practitioner with appropriate training has the power to determine whether someone has an ‘unsound mind’ or ‘mental disorder’”.

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords for tabling amendments on this very important topic of making sure that when these decisions are made and the assessments of them carried out that they are done on the best possible evidence. That informs all the amendments in this group.

We have talked already about the role of the care home manager in arranging assessments and providing a statement to the local authority while the assessment is conducted by a suitably qualified professional. Clearly we will explore that further following the debate tonight. It is also clear that in many cases care home managers will be using assessments that have already been conducted, wherever possible, ensuring that we reduce duplication. There is clearly a balance between making sure that we have access to the best possible information and not creating extra burdens on the system to duplicate work where a previous assessment would be useful, up to date and valid.

I will deal with the amendments in turn and try to think about how we can get that balance. Amendment 21 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, would remove the ability of care home managers to rely on previous medical and capacity assessments. It would mean that assessments could be relied on only if responsible bodies judged it appropriate. Our belief is that where valid assessments are already in place and have been completed by a suitably qualified professional—such as those completed as part of a care plan—they should be used. We are concerned about the implications of the amendments in this group because of the duplication that could arise, particularly perhaps if there is a difference between assessments and each person who carried out the work is still of the view that their judgment was the correct one. We need to be concerned about that as we are trying to simplify the system.

We also do not believe it would be proportionate to expect care home managers to seek permission from a responsible body on every case where there is a previous or equivalent assessment, especially when it is clear for example that somebody has a lifelong diagnosis such as a learning disability and a previous assessment can be reasonably expected to provide valid and reliable evidence of this.

I understand the intention of the noble Baronesses in wanting to avoid care home managers relying on previous assessments when it is not appropriate to do so, which I think is what has informed these amendments. That is where the responsible body reviewing is incredibly important. Generally speaking it will be a senior social worker who will be able to examine the case and if there is an overreliance on past—particularly quite long-dated—assessments in that statement, it will be a flag for escalation to the AMCP.

I understand why there is concern about giving too much leeway to the care home manager, but I also think the amendment would deliver a disproportionate system. It would not provide the degree of flexibility we want and therefore we intend to outline the appropriate use of previous assessments in the code of practice. I think that that is the appropriate vehicle.

Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, seeks to ensure that medical assessments are completed by a registered medical practitioner. Clearly our intention is that that should be the case, and that the person who conducts the medical assessment must be suitably competent. I use that word rather than “qualified” and we will set out further detail in the code of practice. As was stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and others, human rights case law already requires that a deprivation of liberty must be based on objective medical expertise. That can be done on a competence basis rather than on qualifications. Qualifications change whereas competencies, by and large, remain the same. That is why we will focus on a competence-based approach rather than listing professions in a code of practice. A code of practice gives us the ability to exemplify the kind of competencies we mean without being restricted, which would be the case if it were in the Bill, to only certain categories of worker, which might change over time.

Amendment 23 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, creates a duty under liberty protection safeguards to assess whether steps to establish supported decision-making are practical. As I am sure noble Lords know, supported decision-making is already part of the law, and indeed it is the second principle of the Mental Capacity Act. Perhaps one of the reasons that this amendment has come forward is that this is an amendment Bill and therefore there can be a dislocation sometimes between what we are considering and the wider context.

It is already the case that steps should be taken to support people to make their own decisions. We have not brought forward the Law Commission’s recommendation to set up a formal supported decision-making scheme because that legal entitlement already exists. Wherever possible, of course, people should make decisions for themselves and be supported to do so. However, as I say, the second principle of the Mental Capacity Act provides that legal force and in the code of practice we will set out the guidance about how that should work in principle.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, introduced Amendment 24, which describes the process of how someone should be deprived of their liberty. It was helpful for her to refer to the NICE guidance on this. We have already talked tonight about a written record—I think that goes some way—and the basis on which it is shared, which is also important. I will provide more detail on that. The concern about the way that this has been framed is that it is too specific to be in the Bill and the process and the terms may change over time. Although I am sympathetic to the idea that there needs to be clarity about what the appropriate process is, that is best done in the code of practice rather than in the Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, introduced Amendments 24A, 24B and 24C. I need to reflect further on the implication of these amendments because the way she described them was perhaps not how we had previously interpreted them. My only concern is that one of the effects might be that only responsible bodies could decide to rely on previous assessments, because she has taken care home managers out.

Amendment 25 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, would require the care home manager or responsible body to have regard to any change in a person’s circumstances when seeking to rely on a previous or equivalent capacity or medical assessment. I agree with the intention of the amendment, which is to ensure that before relying on a previous or equivalent medical or capacity assessment proper consideration is given to whether it is reasonable to rely on it. The Bill allows for this already. Such an assessment can be used only if it appears to be reasonable to rely on it. As we have said, responsible bodies when reviewing such statements are obviously legally liable for making sure that the reasonableness test is carried out. Again, we will provide more detail in the code of practice about where it is reasonable to rely on an assessment.

The noble Baroness talked about the difference between condition and circumstances, or the complementary nature of the two. If circumstances change and this affects a person’s capacity or diagnosis, it would also need to be considered before relying on previous or equivalent assessments. We are reflecting at the moment on whether the Bill as drafted achieves our aim here. So this is a topic for a further conversation to make sure that we can get the appropriate balance in this area without introducing too many additional terms that might in themselves provide greater unclarity—which of course is something we are trying to avoid.

Amendment 30 deals with less restrictive arrangements. This is a principle of the Mental Capacity Act and the Bill makes no change to it. Again, we will provide more detail in the code of practice as to how the new model will work in the wider health and care system, including the Mental Capacity Act and the Care Act.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, unless training becomes mandatory on some level, the problem is that we will always train those who are willing to be trained while not reaching those who perhaps need to be trained more. If we could make training a little bit like fire training or manual handling, with very short bursts of realistic training, it might be much more effective. Over the years I have seen very costly, ineffective training and very low-cost extremely effective training. Often the most effective training includes a realistic assessment because assessment drives learning. I strongly support the comments made by my noble friend Lady Hollins because case-based training involving the people themselves has a huge emotional impact and therefore embeds change in the behaviours and attitudes to the person on the receiving end. On a slightly optimistic note, I am rather hoping that within Wales, we might manage to get an agreement that all doctors at every grade need at least a minimum awareness of the Mental Capacity Act and that we might then be able to build on that. I keep my fingers crossed.

The other point that we have to be careful of when we talk about training is that this is not about broadcasting information that might sound quite legalistic and frightening. One of the most important skills is listening, and listening skills have often failed in these cases, such as the ones referred to already in which the relatives were not listened to early on. They were not believed early on, the cared-for people were not adequately listened to and things spiralled down. Some of that lack of listening is just a result of poor communication skills training. I am not sure that we have to be overspecialised, but we need to raise the skills of everybody across the board. It needs to be embedded in revalidation—you might train somebody now, but in five years’ time there will be drift. The training, therefore—particularly if people are being trained to take on specific responsibilities—needs to be refreshed over time to ensure that it remains authentic.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, this has been a very useful and essential discussion about training. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, is quite right that there needs to be a strategy. I am concerned that there does not seem to be a strategy, so can the Minister tell us what consultation there has been about how this training—even the minimal familiarisation—would be achieved? Even the Minister accepts that that is clearly not going to be acceptable.

In terms of the stakeholders, the MHA—a charity providing care, accommodation and support for older people throughout the UK—heard from a care home manager in Hereford, who said, “As home managers without a mental health nursing background, it would be impossible to expect a home manager to undertake these assessments, as with the continuing health assessments, which we are deemed unable to complete as we are not healthcare professionals”. Well, quite.

Age UK says that at present there are no fewer than six assessments for a DoLS application. In order for care home managers to be able to conduct these assessments—or indeed be party to them, if only to act as secretaries, as outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—they are going to need the requisite training.

The LGA point out that the Government should recognise the problems caused by these additional responsibilities and the financial pressures—as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hunt—put on care homes by the provisions in the Bill, especially when the sector is already facing significant challenges in terms of both resources and workforce recruitment and retention.

Voiceability expressed its concerns about the new requirements on care home managers. It is concerned that this transfer of responsibility sets up potential conflicts of interest, which we have already discussed. Mencap says that there has to be significant consultation with the care sector about the implications of the new requirements on care home managers.

I am just wondering how we have got to this point in the Bill without that consultation having already taken place. We need to play catch-up because this is such an important area: not only are there funding implications, but we should not be expecting people who do not have appropriate skills to be carrying these responsibilities.