Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister to her new role, and I very much look forward to working with her. I further welcome the clarification that this Bill brings to the law on spiking and the new offence of taking non-consensual intimate images. I very much look forward to supporting my noble friend Lady Sugg on her amendments on honour-based abuse and my noble friend Lady Bertin on her amendments on online pornography. I want to take this opportunity to congratulate my noble friend Lady Bertin on her brilliant review and thank her for her tireless efforts pushing for comprehensive law on online pornography.

I turn now to the new taking offence. I greatly welcome the implementation of the Law Commission recommendation to update the pre-existing voyeurism and upskirting offences and implement a single taking offence. I am very pleased to see that it is vitally a consent-based offence, removing the unnecessary burden of having to prove the motivation of the perpetrator, which has featured in previous iterations of image-based abuse offences. However, it is vital that we further strengthen this offence, by increasing the time limits prosecutors have to bring forward charges, so that victims are not inadvertently timed out by the six-month time limit of a summary offence.

In February, the Government gave me an undertaking to extend the time limits for the non-consensual creation offence in the data Bill after it was highlighted by the campaign group #NotYourPorn. The extension of the time limit here means that, for the creation offence, victims have three years from when the offence is committed or alternatively from when the CPS has enough evidence to prosecute. Given that we have already achieved a legal precedent for extending the time limits on image-based sexual abuse, I would be grateful if the Minister, in his summing up, could commit to extending the time limits available in both the new taking offence and the pre-existing sharing offence, to ensure that all image-based abuse offences have parity within the law.

I was pleased to see the updating of the Sentencing Code to reflect the new taking offence and to clarify that photograph or film to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded as used for the purpose of committing the offence. However, I am keen that we look into further ways to ensure that this content is not kept by perpetrators and remains offline in perpetuity. Further, I will continue my work with survivors of this abuse and charities to explore ways in which this content can be removed from the internet as rapidly as possible.

Additionally, I was concerned that there does not seem to be a sufficient definition of what it is to “take” an image or video in the offence, and I would therefore also be grateful if the Minister could confirm that the definition of taking will include screenshotting. In the 2022 Law Commission report on intimate-image abuse, the example was given where a person may consent to being in an intimate state on a video call but not consent to the person screenshotting them. The Law Commission concluded that taking a screenshot of a video call should fall under the definition of taking, because this conduct creates a still image that does not otherwise exist.

I turn now to the issue of spiking, which my colleague in the other place, Joe Robertson MP, has highlighted, alongside the campaigners Colin and Mandy Mackie, whose son Greg tragically died after a spiking incident at university. While the clarification of spiking in this new offence is very welcome, I echo the point made by my noble friend Lady Coffey that there is concern that the intention element might be too narrow and that it might not allow for cases where a person has been spiked that do not fall into the categories of injure, aggrieve or annoy. This Bill is a positive step, and I look forward to working with the Government and noble Lords to strengthen it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Boycott (CB)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, and in particular I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her endless work in this capacity. This is the first time I have spoken on any of these groups of amendments. I find everything the noble Lord, Lord Nash, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others have said truly shocking. Some 55 years ago, I started a magazine called Spare Rib. If I had ever dreamed, in my wildest and worst nightmares, that I would find myself listening to what everyone has been talking about, I suppose we would not have gone on. In so many ways, this is a worse situation that women find themselves in, and certainly young girls. I carried on riding a pony till I was 15—that was my childhood—and then I found boys. This is so terrible, and I congratulate every noble Lord, and particularly the noble Baronesses, on the work that they have done.

I will be very brief, as I just want to speak in support of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Nash, and Amendment 266, which simply says that AI is already being used to harm children. Unless we act decisively, this harm will just escalate. The systems that everyone has been discussing today are extraordinary technological achievements—and they are very dangerous. The Internet Watch Foundation has reported an explosion in AI-generated child sexual abuse material. Offenders can now share instructions on how to manipulate the models, how to train them on illegal material and how to evade all the filters. The tools are becoming so accessible and so frictionless that a determined offender can produce in minutes material that once would have involved an entire criminal enterprise. Against that backdrop, it is quite staggering that we do not already require AI providers to assess whether their systems can be used to generate illegal child abuse. Amendment 266 would plug this gap. Quite frankly, I cannot for the life of me see why any responsible company would resist such a requirement.

Amendment 479 addresses a confusion that has gone on for too long. We cannot have a situation where some companies argue that generative AI is a search service and therefore completely in scope of the Online Safety Act, while others argue the opposite. If a model can retrieve, repackage or generate harmful content in response to a query, the public deserve clarity about precisely where that law applies.

On Amendment 480, this really is an issue that keeps me awake at night. These chatbots can be astonishingly persuasive. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says, they are also addictive: they are friendly, soothing and intimate, and are a perfect confidant for a lonely child. They also generate illegal material, encourage harmful behaviour and groom children. We have already seen chatbots modelled on sex offenders and heard reports of chatbots sending sexualised messages to children, including the appalling case of a young boy who took his life after weeks of interaction with AI. We will no doubt hear of more such cases. The idea that such systems might fall through the cracks is unthinkable.

What these amendments do is simple. They say that if a system can generate illegal or harmful content for a child, it should not be allowed to do so. Quite frankly, anything that man or woman can make, man or woman can unmake—that is still just true. We have often said in this Chamber that children deserve no less protection online than they do offline. With AI, however, we should demand more, because these systems are capable of things no human predator could ever manage. They work 24/7, they target thousands simultaneously and they adapt perfectly to the vulnerabilities of every child they encounter. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is right to insist that we act now, not in two years—think how different it was two years ago. We have to act now. I say to the Government that this is a real chance to close some urgent gaps, and I very much hope that they will take it.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I will speak to Amendments 479 and 480 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I declare my interest as a guest of Google at their Future Forum, an AI policy conference.

These amendments are vital to ascertain the Government’s position on AI chatbots and where they stand in relation to the Online Safety Act, but I have to question how we can have been in a state of ambiguity for so long. We are very close to ChatGPT rolling out erotica on its platform for verified adults. Six months ago, the Wall Street Journal highlighted the deeply disturbing issue of digital companion bots engaging in sexual chat with users, which told them they were underage. Further, they willingly played out scenarios such as “submissive schoolgirl”. Another bot purporting to be a 12 year-old boy promised that it would not tell its parents about dating a user identifying himself as an adult man. Professor Clare McGlynn KC has already raised concerns about what she has coined chatbot-driven VAWG, the tech itself being designed to be sexually suggestive and to engage in grooming and coercive behaviours. Internet Matters found that 64 % of children use chatbots. The number of companion apps has rapidly developed and researchers at Bournemouth University are already warning about the addictive potential of these services.

The Government and the regulator cannot afford to be slow in clarifying the position of these services. It begs a wider question of how we can be much more agile in our response and continually horizon-scan, as legislation will always struggle to keep pace with the evolution of technology. This is the harm we are talking about now, but how will it evolve tomorrow? Where will we be next month or next year? It is vital that both the Government and the regulator become more agile and respond at pace. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the noble Baroness’s amendments.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak very briefly. Earlier—I suppose it was this morning—we talked about child criminal exploitation at some length, thanks particularly to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and Professor Jay. Essentially, what we are talking about in this group of amendments is child commercial exploitation. All these engines, all these technologies, are there for a commercial purpose. They have investors who are expecting a return and, to maximise the return, these technologies are designed to drive traffic, to drive addiction, and they do it very successfully. We are way behind the curve—we really are.

I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, said about the body of knowledge within Parliament, in both Houses, that was very involved in the passage of the Online Safety Act. There is a very high level of concern, in both Houses, that we were perhaps too ambitious in assuming that a regulator that had not previously had any responsibilities in this area would be able to live up to the expectations held, and indeed some of the promises made, by the Government during the passage of that Act. I think we need to face up to that: we need to accept that we have not got it off to as good a start as we wanted and hoped, and that what is happening now is that the technologies we have been hearing about are racing ahead so quickly that we are finding it hard to catch up. Indeed, looking at the body language and the physiognomies of your Lordships in the Chamber, looking at the expressions on our faces as some of what we were talking about is being described, if it is having that effect on us, imagine what effect it is having on the children who in many cases are the subjects of these technologies.

I plead with the Minister to work very closely with his new ministerial colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Lloyd, and DSIT. We really need to get our act together and focus; otherwise, we will have repeats of these sorts of discussions where we raise issues that are happening at an increasing pace, not just here but all around the world. I fear that we are going to be holding our hands up, saying “We’re doing our best and we’re trying to catch up”, but that is not good enough. It is not good enough for my granddaughter and not good enough for the extended families of everybody here in this Chamber. We really have to get our act together and work together to try to catch up.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Nash (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group. It is shameful that we have not yet legislated for parity between the regulation of online and offline pornography and that we are so very late in playing catch-up. What people can view online at a couple of clicks—including children often diverted to this sort of stuff without asking for it—is horrifying. As the report of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, stated, over half of 11 to 13 year-olds have seen pornography, often accidentally, and many have seen appalling images of choking, strangulation or sex where one partner is asleep, which is of course a non-consensual act—rape.

Therapists and front-line practitioners often describe a growing number of clients stating that porn consumption led them to child sexual abuse material. In the late 1980s, the Home Office commissioned a study that showed that fewer than 10,000 child sexual abuse images were available online. Today, it is conservatively estimated that, worldwide, the number of child sexual abuse images is 70 million to 80 million.

The internet has become a place where you can search for and find absolutely anything. If you cannot find it, you can create it yourself using AI and LLMs that are on the market, with no guard-rails. For example, generative AI can be and has been used to create pictures of someone’s older self abusing their younger self, including, in one series of images, that self as an eight year-old abusing themself as a two year-old. This is not a problem of the dark web; this is available easily, at a few clicks, on popular social media sites. One social media site alone hosts and facilitates by far the greatest number of cases of sextortion and, in a number of cases, this has led to young people taking their own lives.

Bad actors are also exploiting generative AI to sexually extort. Com groups are driving abuse and exploitation behaviours that are unimaginable, including cutting competitions where the winner is the person who cuts the deepest. Other com groups are used by adults—bad actors—to groom the most vulnerable children and control them to engage in the most horrifying acts, including suicide. One survivor described watching multiple suicides in one group.

Children are using social media to create their own payment models for live sex shows, like the one the recent TV series “Wild Cherry” showed, but much worse. More than half of the 107,000 child sexual abuse and exploitation cases recorded in 2022—a figure that has quadrupled in the last 10 years—were committed by children. Pornography has to play a large part in this. The amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, have the support of the NSPCC, the Children’s Commissioner and many other organisations. We must listen to them. It would be completely morally irresponsible for us, as guardians of children, not to enact now.

In the last Committee session, the Minister promised me a meeting with the appropriate person and officials to talk about my amendment to allow new technology that is now available to block out child sexual abuse material. He indicated that officials were unsure whether this technology works. Since then, I have met with the providers of this technology again and they have assured me that it does work, certainly for young children, and that they are in active dialogue at a senior level with the head of the technical solutions team at the Home Office, DSIT, the Internet Watch Foundation, the NCA and GCHQ. I very much look forward to that meeting.

I should say that, although I do not think this will happen—I am fully aware of the rules—I have committed to a radio interview, so it is just possible that I may not be here to the end. I think I will be, but I apologise if I am not.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Bertin for her hard work and her review. I fully support all her amendments, but will focus my remarks on a couple of them. I declare my interest as a guest of Google at its Future Forum, an AI policy conference, and my interest as receiving pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on my work on intimate image abuse.

On Amendment 292, it is vital that we always remember that consent is a live process, and our law should protect those who have featured in pornographic content and wish to withdraw their consent, no matter how long after publication. One content creator said, “A lot of the videos, I have no rights under; otherwise, I would probably have deleted them all by now”, and went on to describe it as a stigma that will follow her for the rest of her life. Given the huge scale of the porn industry, it is vital that our law protects those who feature and offers them recourse to remove their content should they wish to.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge]

295BA: After Clause 84, insert the following new Clause—
“Content removal reporting and enforcement(1) No later than 12 months from the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—(a) the way in which offences under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film) can be reported, and(b) the mechanism by which content created as a result of offences under that section can be removed.(2) The mechanism must include—(a) a mandatory removal period for content that the reporting party reasonably believes to be in breach of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of 48 hours,(b) guidance on what constitutes clear and accessible reporting,(c) sanctions for malicious reporting,(d) sanctions for the failure to remove duplicates of offending material,(e) a review period after the initial 48 hours for assessing suspected offending content, and(f) guidance on which online platforms are within scope of this section.”

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 295BA and the other amendments in this group in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron, Lady Coffey and Lady Gohir. I am grateful for the wise legal counsel of Professor Clare McGlynn KC and the support of the Revenge Porn Helpline, My Image, My Choice, Not Your Porn and Jodie Campaigns.

Amendment 295BA is based on the precedent set in the Take It Down Act in the USA. It compels the Secretary of State to implement a 48-hour time limit for online platforms to remove non-consensually shared intimate content. It is important to note that there is also a clause that allows for sanctions for malicious actors. In this way, we seek to protect those who may consensually share content from being targeted by people who may wish to silence them.

Sophie Mortimer from the Revenge Porn Helpline said that while we have an excellent track record on removal, the reality in most cases is that it takes hours, days, or months. There are a number of clients who have been reporting content for over five years. Sophie has emphasised that the handful of responsible and responsive platforms should not be the yardstick for all, when the majority are painfully slow to respond or entirely non-compliant.

One Cornell University study found that violations of copyright are acted upon quicker than the reporting of NCII content. The amendment would ensure, vitally, that online services remove duplicates of the content. It is designed to complement the Online Safety Act, under which tech companies have to proactively ensure that this priority illegal content is removed from their sites. At present, however, there is no system in place for individuals to report directly to Ofcom. This amendment would ensure a reporting and removal mechanism for victims or any other person who believes a breach of Section 66(b) of the Sexual Offences Act has been committed, and it would provide a maximum time frame.

Amendment 295BB would strengthen the law on deletion orders. While I am pleased to see the Government’s clarification in the Bill that intimate images used to commit an offence, and anything containing them, should be seen as being used to commit an offence under Section 153 of the 2020 Sentencing Act, I believe we must go further.

Research by journalist Shanti Das published in February this year found that, of the 98 intimate image abuse cases prosecuted in magistrates’ courts in England and Wales in the preceding six months, only three resulted in deprivation orders. No one should have to live in the knowledge that their convicted abuser is allowed to retain content used to commit the crime. This amendment would direct the prosecutor to lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days, verifying the destruction of the content and ordering the defendant to hand over the passwords and authenticators needed to access the material. There is still too much ambiguity in the law around this, and the victims of intimate image abuse are paying the price.

Amendments 295BC and 295BD would compel the Secretary of State to implement a hash registry for non-consensual intimate content, which providers must use to prevent the re-upload or distribution of NCII material. The amendment implements a hash-sharing system that offers survivors the peace of mind that their non-consensual content will remain offline. A hash is a unique value assigned to an image. Importantly, duplicates have the same hash value. Hashing preserves the victim’s privacy, as only the hash and not the content itself would be stored in the register.

This system means that victims can use two options to ensure that their content stays offline: prosecuting and going through a criminal court or privately hashing the content without prosecuting. Some survivors may use both options, but hashing is an important option for those who feel unable to face criminal proceedings. We already have a precedent for how this would work, as CSAM content is hashed in the same way. These amendments are a vital step to assure victims that their content will no longer trend online.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am extremely sorry to hear about that experience. As ever, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, for whom the entire Committee has great respect.

As I was about to say, the Government are fortified in our belief that the concept of intention would be proved by the fact that there is case law that establishes that, where ecstasy was administered to another to “loosen them up”, that amounted to an intent to injure—intention being separate from the motive. The fact is that defendants say all sorts of things about what they did or did not mean; it will be for the tribunal of fact, looking at what happened, to see whether it can be sure that the intention was as specified in the statute.

We are confident that the types of behaviour that should be criminalised are already captured. Once again, I go back to the important point I set out at the beginning of this group: this new spiking offence aims to simplify the legal framework and to make enforcement straightforward. We do not want to do anything that risks undermining that by overcomplicating the offence.

Amendment 356B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, proposes to expand the scope of prohibited conduct under domestic abuse protection orders. Although I appreciate the motive underpinning this amendment, these orders already allow courts to impose any conditions that they consider both necessary and proportionate to protect victims from domestic abuse. Put simply, setting out a prescriptive list risks narrowing the flexibility and discouraging conditions that are tailored to the conditions of the offender. The police statutory guidance already includes examples, such as prohibiting direct or indirect contact and restricting online harassment, but we are happy to update this guidance to include the additional behaviours mentioned.

This has been a long speech, and I hope your Lordships will forgive me. My intention has been to explain to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and all other noble Lords, for whom I have great regard, why the Government cannot support these amendments today. For the reasons I have set out, I invite them not to press their amendments, but I hope they will join me in supporting government Amendments 300 to 307, which I commend to the Committee.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, can I just check something? On Amendment 299B, she knows that my intention is not to create something that is too broad but to tackle the very real and rapidly proliferating problem of semen images. It would be helpful to get clarification that the Government understand this to be an issue and are willing to work with me so that we can bring back an amendment on Report. Further, on Amendment 295BB, the Minister spoke about physical devices, but I am keen to know how the Government will tackle images shared on the cloud, because this is the real problem. Finally, on Amendment 295BA, the Minister said that more detail would be given. I just want to know whether that will be on Report or between now and Report, so that we can bring back something about the 48-hour takedown on Report. America has already won the battle on this.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

As far as the revolting practice of semen images is concerned—and I do not think anybody in your Lordships’ House would think it was anything other than that—if an offence can be drafted that is sufficiently specific, then of course we will consider it. Our concern is that the drafting of the proposed amended offence is so wide that it would capture a lot of behaviour that should not be criminalised. As for the other two matters raised by the noble Baroness, please may we discuss them?

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

I am sorry, I realise that people want to get to the dinner break, but will the noble Baroness commit to meeting me, the noble Viscount and the Revenge Porn Helpline on Amendments 295BC and 295BD? She spoke about duplication. These amendments are suggested by the Revenge Porn Helpline; therefore, I do not believe that it believes it duplicates its work. It would be very helpful for us to meet and clarify that.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The answer to that is a short one: of course.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her responses. I am grateful for the engagement so far with her and Minister Davies-Jones, and I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. I am going to take these points away for further considerations, and I look forward to the meetings that we are going to have, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 295BA withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an honour to be opening today’s debate on intimate image abuse. It gives me great pleasure to be able to say that, over the course of the passage of this Bill in your Lordships’ House, I have had a number of extremely helpful conversations on the subjects of pornography, child sexual abuse images, misogyny and a lot of other subjects which, while often distasteful, are important in the fight against violence against women and girls. We will cover some of those issues in this group and others in subsequent groups. I want to say, in relation to all of them, how grateful I am to those Members of your Lordships’ House who have taken the time to speak to me and work with me.

In the context of this group, I pay tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Owen, Lady Kidron, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Clement-Jones. A substantial part of my career as a lawyer has been spent in the fight against violence against women and children—not only girls—and I thought that I was pretty knowledgeable about it in the context of the criminal law, but I am more than happy to acknowledge that I have learned a great deal from those to whom I have spoken in the context of this Bill, and I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. On a number of occasions, I have changed my mind after speaking to them and I have no doubt that this is a better Bill as a result, and so I thank them.

As a result of what has been said in the debates and other conversations, the Government have tabled a collection of amendments that, taken together, create a package of further changes that strengthen the overall intimate image abuse regime already contained in the Bill. I hope that your Lordships will agree that they show that the Government are listening and acting.

I have already mentioned the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, but I also thank Professor Clare McGlynn; they have both worked hard to keep these issues at the top of the agenda. These amendments are also a tribute to the vital work of organisations such the Revenge Porn Helpline and Refuge and, of course, the victims and survivors themselves, who have taken the courageous and important step of reporting online abuse and raising awareness.

I have already said that I am proud of these amendments, but I am aware that, for some, they do not go far enough. I ask those who will speak to their amendments today to accept two things: that we are all on the same side about the harm that we are trying to prevent and that I am truly committed to trying to get this right. When I say that I cannot accede to something, there is a good reason for it, and I am not refusing to accept amendments for partisan reasons or simply out of stubbornness.

This landscape changes fast and usually not for the better, but there is a reason that we sometimes urge caution before creating new criminal offences and penalties. There can be real dangers in making piecemeal changes as soon as we are confronted by some new horrifying behaviour causing harm to so many victims. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that we do not legislate in haste and then come to regret it. If, in relation to some of these proposals, I ask that the Government are given time to gather more evidence and then consider the best way of going about preventing such behaviour, I ask your Lordships to accept that this comes from a good place—namely, wanting to make sure that any laws we pass capture the crimes we have in mind but do not have unanticipated consequences.

I turn to semen-defaced images. This is not a pleasant thing to discuss in polite society, but I need to make it clear what is meant by this, what the harm is and what we are doing in relation to it. What is meant by semen-defaced images are images of semen deposited on to another image, often a photograph and usually a photograph of a woman. It is disgraceful behaviour. It is designed to degrade and humiliate the woman in the picture, and we cannot tolerate this misogynistic behaviour in a civilised society. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, persuaded me that we should make this a criminal offence and so we have done so. That is why the Government are bringing forward Amendments 271, 278, 279, 290 and 292 today. Together, they introduce a new offence of sharing a semen-defaced image of another person without consent.

This is the first step in stamping out this type of behaviour for good, but it is not the end. We are determined to tackle violence against women and girls in all its forms, and we want to ensure that the criminal law gets ahead of emerging harms. That is why we have announced in the VAWG strategy that we are launching a call for evidence better to understand online misogynistic, image-based abuse and the extent to which there are new harms and behaviour that may not be fully captured by existing criminal offences.

The issue of screenshotting was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, at Second Reading and in Committee. Intimate images are personal and private. Consenting adults are of course free to share them and may do so in ways that are permanent or temporary. A person’s right to share their image temporarily in private must be respected, and if there is a violation of that right, it must be addressed. Government Amendments 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 293, 294 and 295, taken together, make it a criminal offence non-consensually to take a screenshot of, or copy in any way, an intimate image that the victim has shared only temporarily. This offence sits alongside, and mirrors wherever relevant, the other intimate image offences, and it sends a clear message to those who engage in this non-consensual behaviour that it is unacceptable and will be punished.

I briefly turn to the subject of takedown. I know that Amendment 275, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, will be debated later today in a separate group, but I will take a moment to mention the announcement made by the Prime Minister on 19 February. We will bring forward government Amendments at Third Reading in response to Amendment 275 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to ensure that tech companies are legally required to have measures to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours to ensure that victims get rapid protection. It is important to refer to this now to demonstrate the Government’s action in this space as a whole. Where we have been able to, we have moved. I hope that your Lordships will bear that in mind as we progress through this debate.

I am also pleased to say that Amendments 296 and 456 designate new offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to criminalise creating and requesting purported deepfake, non-consensual intimate images as priority offences under the Online Safety Act. As many of your Lordships will know, this means that platforms will face the stronger duties that apply to the most serious illegal content. They will be required to assess specifically the risks of the service being used to facilitate this offence; to mitigate and manage the risk of the service being used to commit the offence; to take proactive steps to prevent users encountering such content; and to minimise the time that such content is present on their platform. There has been understandable public concern over the creation and dissemination of non-consensual sexual deepfakes on X, and the Government have been clear that no woman or child should live in fear of having their image sexually manipulated. These amendments help put that principle into practice.

Finally, Amendment 455 makes a small minor and technical change in respect of the taking and installing offences in the Bill, and I can provide further details if any of your Lordships would like them. I beg to move.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 273, 274, 275, 276, 284 and 296A in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. In doing so, I declare an interest as I have received pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on image-based sexual abuse. I will also speak to government Amendments 278, 281 and 296. I want to place on record my support for Amendment 277 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

I thank the Minister for her determination to make progress on this issue. We have made huge strides since Committee, and I am very grateful. I also thank the survivors and campaigners who have fought for so long for these changes.

Amendment 273 seeks to ensure that in relation to abusers who are convicted of an intimate image abuse offence the court must,

“order the destruction of any content used to commit the offence on any device or data store containing”

it, and that prosecutors,

“lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days”.

While I acknowledge that the Government have updated the law to clarify that this content should be seen as being used to commit the offence under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020, this does not offer victims any guarantee of the total destruction of the content used to commit the crime.

One survivor, Daria, whose convicted abuser was allowed to keep the content of her, said, “The weapons with which he caused life-shattering harm remain in his arsenal. Despite the severity of the crimes, as reflected in the sentences handed down by the Crown Court, I remain at his mercy with regard to whether he chooses to violate me again in the same way”. Daria is not alone in her experience. Shanti Das, a journalist who undertook research on this and published in February 2025, found that of the 98 image-based abuse offences prosecuted in magistrates’ courts in England and Wales in the preceding six months, only three resulted in deprivation orders. It is quite simply appalling. Survivors of this abuse deserve better. On this amendment, I will test the opinion of the House.

Amendments 274 and 276 mandate the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to create a centralised statutory hash registry and mandate hash sharing. The Revenge Porn Helpline currently runs the voluntary register called StopNCII.org and has confirmed that it would be willing to run the centralised registry. The Revenge Porn Helpline does incredible work supporting victims of intimate image abuse and has a 90% success rate on the removal of content. However, 10% of the content is on non-compliant sites.

The amendment seeks to tackle non-compliance by allowing the Revenge Porn Helpline to co-ordinate with internet service providers to mandate the blocking of verified NCII content in cases of non-compliance, thus avoiding the long and bureaucratic process of obtaining business disruption measures under Ofcom that are of little comfort to victims whose image remains online. One victim, Jane, stated that,

“the platform’s slow and inconsistent enforcement left me feeling trapped in a relentless cycle, where the harm snowballed with every hour the abusive content stayed up. Constantly monitoring the internet, reporting the same material, and watching it reappear has taken a huge mental toll”.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will say two things in response to the noble Lord. The first is that the criminal courts tend not to be very keen on provisions that they regard as complex when they come at the end of a sentencing hearing. They tend to react by saying, “We’re going to leave this to be dealt with through some other mechanism because it’s too complicated. We can’t work out how to verify it”—the sorts of objections that occasionally are made in relation to, for example, very complicated compensation orders or confiscation orders. The second point is that there is, as I have already said, a real risk in piecemeal legislation that you bring in provisions for one court that then do not work in the read-across from the civil courts. On the civil courts, we cannot do that today.

We need to do this quickly, and we absolutely recognise this. After all, there is no point in saying that we take this stuff seriously and then saying that we are not going to do anything about getting rid of the images. It is illogical, apart from anything else, as well as perhaps not being very moral either. I ask the noble Baroness to accept the sincerity of what we say. That is as far as I can go today.

I turn now to Amendment 274, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I understand and agree with what she is trying to achieve. The only issue between us is whether this is the right way to do it. Ofcom has already consulted on additional safety measures for its illegal content codes of practice. These proposed measures explicitly include the use of perceptual hash-matching technology to detect and remove non-consensual intimate imagery, including deepfakes.

To be deemed compliant with their Online Safety Act duties by following the codes, services would need to deploy this technology automatically to identify and remove such content, providing victims with reassurance that their images are being removed swiftly. Given the urgent need to strengthen protection in this area, Ofcom announced on 19 February that it is accelerating timelines and will publish its final decision on these proposals on the use of hash matching in May, with measures expected to come into effect by the summer.

We consider that the work of Ofcom meets the aims of the noble Baroness’s amendment. The protection that she seeks will be delivered promptly and robustly through Ofcom’s forthcoming codes of practice. It is an area where unnecessarily imposing duties in statute, especially where work is already in progress, could have the adverse effect of restricting the flexibility of this work should it need to respond and change to the ever-changing online landscape in the future.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

The Prime Minister launched his strategy for tackling non-compliance by saying that it would be a “one and done” system. Does the Minister acknowledge that the Ofcom system is not a “one and done” system? It is dependent on a series of factors, including whether all service providers choose to adopt third-party hashing. If they choose to operate their own hash database where they do not share the hashes, it is not a “one and done” system. I would really like to tidy up the confusion here between whether the Prime Minister is right or what is being said here is correct.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The Prime Minister is right. The difference between us is what we understand by the system. The Government’s position is that the Ofcom system will achieve what the Prime Minister said he wanted to achieve. That is the difference between the noble Baroness and me. I am not sure that I can go any further than that this evening.

I turn now to Amendment 276, once again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on the NCII register. The Government recognise the vital work undertaken by the Revenge Porn Helpline, including operating a database of existing hashes of non-consensual intimate images that are shared with participating companies to detect and remove the images online. We recognise the benefits that a register of verified NCII content would provide, including the important role that it could play in supporting victims in the removal of the content.

This is one of those instances where the issue between us is whether it is necessary or desirable to put it on a statutory footing. The Government’s position is that it is not a necessity for its success and needs very careful consideration, especially to ensure that an NCII register aligns with the process taken by the Internet Watch Foundation’s register for child sexual abuse imagery, which operates successfully and has never been on a statutory footing, and to avoid any unintended consequences. For this reason, I confirm that the Government are committing to undertake a preliminary evaluation to determine the operational needs and impact of establishing a successful central register for non-consensual intimate image abuse.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

I think it is important to clarify for the sake of the House that, with regard to the Internet Watch Foundation’s CSAM register, CSAM is illegal in and of itself. NCII—non-consensual intimate image—material is not illegal in and of itself. Therefore, a voluntary system will not work. It needs to be on a statutory footing.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not think anyone is suggesting that it should be voluntary. It is simply whether it should be established through primary legislation or regulation. I used the expression earlier about the unwieldiness of primary legislation. After all, one of the problems with legislating through primary legislation is that, if you get it wrong, you have to try to amend it or repeal it, whereas if you have regulations, particularly backed up by enforcement powers, it is a much nimbler way of going about things. That is the issue between us.

The evaluation will also assess critical considerations that are still outstanding, including the effect that such a registry has on intermediary liability and what is needed to establish robust verification procedures. The findings will be used to guide next steps to ensure that any options are sustainable and effective and work alongside existing regulation for platforms.

Turning again to semen-defaced images and Amendments 284 and 296A, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, as I said when opening this group, the Government agree with her that semen imagery is disgusting behaviour. That is exactly why we have brought forward our own amendments to criminalise the sharing of a semen-defaced image without consent. The inclusion of

“semen … on any part of their body”,

as in the noble Baroness’s amendment, is unnecessary, because such images would already fall within the scope of the intimate image offences. To answer her question directly, I can confirm that the example she gave will, and should, already be covered by the existing legislation. The noble Baroness asked whether we can, in effect, require the CPS to amend its guidance to make it clearer. The CPS is, of course, an independent organisation—constitutionally, importantly so—but we can certainly look at asking the CPS whether it would be prepared to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not think I can quite express how unpopular I would be if I suddenly, on the hoof, came out with a time. All I can say is that we are committed to doing this quickly.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I emphasise that we have talked about drafting issues on Amendment 273. Obviously, I do not want to delay proceedings, but I remind the House that I first brought up forced deletion in September 2024, so the issue has been before the House now for about 17 months. It was in the Data (Use and Access) Bill in December 2024, when the Minister said, “There’s no problem here because it should be seen under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020”. This is not working, and the only answer really is to deal with the matter tonight.

Amendment 271 agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge]

273: After Clause 89, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to make deprivation and deletion orders (non-consensual intimate images)Where a person is convicted of an offence involving sharing or threatening to share intimate images without consent, as described by sections 66A and 66H of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (intimate images), the court must—(a) order the destruction of any content used to commit the offence on any device or data store containing such images;(b) order the defendant to disclose any password, key or authenticator necessary to access accounts or devices containing such images;(c) order verified deletion of such images from all locations, including cloud services;(d) direct the prosecutor to lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days.”

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, we cannot allow victims to continue to suffer long after their abusers walk free. It is time we resolve this issue. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge]

274: After Clause 89, insert the following new Clause—
“Hashing(1) No later than 12 months from the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument provide for the generation and lawful sharing of hashes of intimate images shared without consent in contravention of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2023 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film), for the purpose of preventing re-upload , subject to safeguards.(2) The Secretary of State must make the regulations in cooperation with industry standard initiatives (such as StopNCII).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment works in conjunction with others in the name of Baroness Owen regarding a mandatory removal period or de-indexing period of 48 hours for non-consensual intimate images and the establishment of a statutory Non-Consensual Intimate Image Register. This allows the Revenge Porn Helpline (who would be the preferred register holders) to share the verified hashes to internet infrastructure providers to ensure content is removed and blocked in cases where removal is not possible.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, every day this content remains online is another day women have to live in fear of it been viewed, downloaded or reshared. This is a vote to tackle non-compliant websites and allow victims to reclaim their lives. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge]

275: After Clause 89, insert the following new Clause—
“Content removal reporting and enforcement(1) Within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument make provision for—(a) the way in which offences under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film) can be reported to the relevant internet service as defined in section 228 of the Online Safety Act 2023 (internet service), and (b) the mechanism by which content created as a result of offences under that section must be removed by the relevant internet service.(2) The regulations must include—(a) a mandatory removal period or de-indexing period, as the case may be, for content that the reporting party reasonably believes to be in breach of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of 48 hours,(b) a requirement that the reporting process must be clear and accessible, and guidance on what constitutes clear and accessible reporting,(c) sanctions for malicious reporting,(d) sanctions for internet services for the failure to remove duplicates of offending material,(e) a review period after the initial 48 hours for assessing suspected offending content, and(f) a statement of which internet services are within scope of this section, produced after consultation with the Revenge Porn Helpline and other relevant stakeholders.”

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 275 is in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I apologise to the House for the last-minute degrouping of this amendment. It is a vital amendment and I wanted to ensure that it could be brought back at Third Reading.

The amendment mandates the Secretary of State to create a mechanism whereby sites have to have clear and accessible reporting systems for content that a person believes breaches Section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act on the sharing of non-consensual intimate images. Vitally, it mandates internet services to remove or de-index this content within 48 hours. Critically, it includes sanctions for internet services to remove duplicates.

Last year I was contacted by Christina Trevanion, host of “Bargain Hunt”. Christina spoke to me about the ongoing trauma she faced trying to remove non-consensual, sexually explicit deepfakes of herself from the internet. She is one of many brave survivors of intimate image abuse who spoke out and inspired my 48-hour take-down amendment. She said, “It’s too late for me, but I do not want my daughters to grow up in a world where posting a photograph of themselves online puts them at risk”.

The amendment was based on the precedent set in the USA with the TAKE IT DOWN Act, itself inspired by the incredible advocacy of a young woman called Elliston and her mum, Anna. Anna described to me the unending trauma her daughter suffered knowing that, for the rest of her life, those pictures could be there. Anna’s biggest priority was getting those images taken down from the internet. For victims such as Christina and Elliston, every day that goes by is another day when they live in constant fear that their content will be viewed, downloaded or reshared in an ongoing cycle of revictimisation. I am delighted that the Government have agreed to work with me on this amendment. I think the Minister knows how passionate I am about this.

I am very pleased that the Government have committed to bring back their own amendment at Third Reading; we will get the exact details in a second. I am very keen to secure an undertaking that we can return to this issue at Third Reading. If for any reason the Government do not follow through and bring an amendment back in time for Third Reading, I reserve the right to bring back my Amendment 275, covering all the elements I have raised on this important issue. I am very grateful to the Minister for her collaboration and determination to work together on this. I know she is committed to getting it right. I ask her to confirm that the Government will provide an undertaking to bring back amendments at Third Reading to address the 48-hour take-down requirement for intimate images. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her amendment, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State, within 12 months of the Act being passed, to make provisions for the way in which offences of sharing intimate images are reported and the mechanisms by which content is removed by the relevant internet service. I understand that the Government have given my noble friend an undertaking for Third Reading, and I am pleased that they have done so.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to put on record that this Government completely accept and agree with the intention that underlies this amendment. That is why, as I said earlier, the Government will introduce a legal duty for tech platforms to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours, to ensure that victims get rapid protection. This change, which will be brought forward at Third Reading, will create a strong, enforceable foundation for getting harmful material removed from online circulation, so that victims are no longer left chasing platforms for action. To support swift and effective action to remove this material by internet infrastructure providers, we will also explore any barriers to blocking and how this can be addressed. This will help ensure that rogue sites operating outside the scope of the Online Safety Act will be targeted. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s eagerness to see this change brought about quickly, but as the Government intend to bring forward amendments to this effect at Third Reading, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

Can the Minister confirm to the House that not only will the Government be bringing forward amendments but if I am not satisfied with them, I may bring back my own?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Yes.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

May I just check that that is an undertaking? We have a nod. Thank you. I am very pleased that we will return to this issue at Third Reading, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 275 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge]

276: After Clause 89, insert the following new Clause—
“Register of intimate images shared without consent(1) No later than 12 months from the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument establish a statutory Non-Consensual Intimate Image Register for the purpose of preventing access to and dissemination of material shared online in contravention of section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film) (“NCII material”).(2) The Register must contain hashes of verified NCII material.(3) The Secretary of State must appoint a regulator for the Register to be responsible for oversight, enforcement, and coordination with internet service providers and online platforms.(4) Providers designated by the appointed regulator must use the Register to prevent the re-upload or distribution of NCII material.(5) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on governance, accuracy, proportionality, and privacy safeguards.(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
For the purposes of this amendment, the Revenge Porn Helpline is the preferred body to manage the register. The service currently runs a voluntary hashing register and has indicated that they would be able to operate it. The register would be the authoritative source for platforms, search engines, and ISPs to block, delist and prevent access to NCII content.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

The current consultation is so poorly conceived that it does not even deal with enforcement, which is the central problem of the current regime. Let us not allow better to be the enemy of best. None of us in this House wants to be standing here in the weeks and months ahead mourning the death of a child from an act of violence, knowing that we could have acted but did not when we had the chance. I beg to move.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 422D and 433 to 437. I fully support the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. Her arguments have been entirely backed up by the release only today of the report entitled Invisible No More: How AI Chatbots Are Reshaping Violence Against Women and Girls by Durham University and Swansea University. The research identifies the range of design choices and failures in safety mechanisms that enable, encourage, simulate and normalise violence against women and girls. The report found that fantasies of incest and rape were normalised, and one chatbot, Chub AI, suggested violent rape and domestic abuse as categories.

I reiterate the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, about the long and bureaucratic path to business disruption measures, meaning that harm continues to perpetuate as our system is not agile enough to tackle these rapidly evolving issues. I wish to pay tribute to Professor Clare McGlynn KC for her work co-authoring this ground-breaking report and emphasise the warning she made in today’s Times newspaper. She said:

“Chatbot violence against women represents a rapidly escalating threat. Without early intervention, these harms risk becoming entrenched and scaling quickly, mirroring what happened with deepfake and nudify apps, where early warnings were largely ignored. We must not make the same mistakes again”.


Professor McGlynn and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, once again demonstrate their ability to warn against these emerging harms, and I sincerely hope that noble Lords will back the noble Baroness should she wish to divide the House today.

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 422D and the consequential Amendments 434 to 437, to which I have added my name. In Amendment 429B the Government have gone far to respond to concerns over AI-generated harms, but this amendment, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said, gives enormous powers to the Secretary of State to decide the shape of how AI-generated services are controlled in this country. The Minister knows there is concern across the House about exposing this central part of the new tech economy to what are effectively unfettered ministerial powers. Very few noble Lords want to support a skeleton amendment like this.

Government Amendment 429B gives the Secretary of State the right to amend, which is defined later as including the right to

“repeal and apply (with or without modifications)”.

This applies to all of Part 3 of the Online Safety Act illegal content duties in relation to AI services. Parliament will not even have an option to amend regulations on this issue. Proposed new subsection (1) in this amendment seems like a big deal to me, and the noble Lord should be very concerned. The intention seems to be that the basis of the existing regime in Part 3 will be used, but we do not know how the Secretary of State will decide to adapt that regime to fit the particularities of AI services that generate illegal content. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, pointed out, that goes a long way beyond AI services designed to mimic humans and human conversations, which is what chatbots are. If a subsequently elected Government are in thrall of the tech companies, how might they abuse this power?

During the passage of the Online Safety Act, noble Lords spent time and energy defining both a “search service” and a “user-to-user service”, and their responsibility for both designing out and mitigating illegal harms. It seems extraordinary not to have the details of the new services on the face of the legislation. The definition of “AI” in new subsection (17) is oddly uninformative. It simply says:

“‘AI’ is short for artificial intelligence”.

I think we all know that. That does not give us much of a clue about which technology it covers. By contrast, I draw your Lordships’ attention to Article 3(1) of the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act, which sets out a carefully thought through definition of an AI system:

“‘AI system’ means a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that … infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions … or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments”.


The unclear nature of the AI definition in the amendment is compounded by new subsection (10), which allows for the definition of the provision to be changed and expanded. Once again, Parliament will not be able to amend any regulations derived from this power.

The biggest concern about the amendment is that, although it covers illegal content, it does not cover content that is harmful to children. As a result, I completely support my noble friend Lady Kidron’s Amendment 422D, and its consequential amendments, which would assuage many of my concerns about the scope and power given to Ministers at the expense of Parliament. I also urge noble Lords to vote against government Amendment 429B when it comes up later in the evening.

I also say to the Minister that regulating the wide definition of “AI” covered in Amendment 429B is important. It needs to be brought back as part of wider artificial intelligence legislation. I hope that he can reassure noble Lords that we will hear more about this in the King’s Speech.