Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Tuesday 20th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, as a signatory to the amendment, I am pleased to say that the Opposition is more than happy to support it and should the noble Baroness not receive a satisfactory answer from the Minister—we live in hope—and wish to press the amendment, we will certainly endorse it. I was particularly impressed by the remarks of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who speaks from direct and daily experience of these matters in a busy court in the capital. We are already 25 minutes into this debate and there is much more to come, so I am content to rest the Opposition’s case at this point.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, this amendment returns to issues raised by my noble friend Lady Linklater in Committee. I very much welcome the contribution that she has made on this issue during the passage of the Bill. My noble friend has considerable experience, to which other noble Lords have referred, in bringing magistrates and probation together and building trust in alternatives to custodial sentences. She is very much to be applauded for that. Like her, I pay tribute to the work that magistrates and probation trusts do.

We agree with the noble Baroness that it is important that probation trusts provide information to sentencers about the services they provide in delivering community sentences. We encourage that sharing of information. We agree that such liaison is beneficial both to magistrates and probation. We also agree that it is important that magistrates see for themselves the work of probation trusts. We agree with the intention behind the amendment, but we would point out that the current provisions in legislation already allow for this kind of liaison between probation and magistrates to take place. The noble Baroness is seeking to get two sets of people to talk to each other and that can already happen. There is no statutory barrier to it, but I hear what she says about trying to ensure that this happens, and we are certainly in favour of promoting best practice. We will look to see if there is more that we can do to ensure that best practice is brought to the attention of probation trusts. We are also ready to work with the Magistrates’ Association and others to ensure that we have practical arrangements in hand to encourage magistrates to take part in meetings so that information can be exchanged. We can, however, do this without changing primary legislation. I also note that the amendment does not ensure that magistrates attend these meetings—which would, of course, not be appropriate—it instead places the duty on probation trusts to provide information. As my noble friend Lord McNally said in Committee, we are not aware of a problem in the provision of information but would welcome further information on it if one exists.

I understand what the amendment is trying to achieve. It provides two illustrative examples of what regulations might cover. They include guidelines for liaison and a scheme for magistrates’ expenses. I would like to point out to my noble friend that both of these are, in fact, already covered by existing arrangements. Guidelines for liaison meetings are set out in a protocol issued not by the Government, but by the senior presiding judge. We think it is right that the protocol should set out the process so that there is no suggestion that magistrates should be unduly influenced in sentencing by consideration of a local probation trust’s priorities, rather than what they see as the appropriate sentence in an individual case. That is why the senior presiding judge issues guidance, not the Government. We agree that there should be guidance on these meetings, but we think that the current system is more appropriate and that the guidance—especially since it applies to the judiciary—should come from the senior judiciary, not the Government.

The second example which the noble Baroness gives relates to the payment of expenses. It is true that Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service does not routinely pay expenses for meetings between magistrates and probation. That does not, however, mean that magistrates can not claim expenses. They can, in fact, claim expenses from the probation trusts in attending these meetings. This is an area where the Government might assist by doing more to publicise the process if magistrates are unaware of it. We will certainly consider, as a practical approach, encouraging better liaison by publicising this.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to a statutory committee. The amendment would not create a statutory committee; it would merely provide a regulation-making power to promote such arrangements if that was what was decided. On the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, about ordering the probation service out, we are not aware of the detail of that situation. We would welcome further details, and I will then write to the noble Lord with our reaction to what sounds like a very concerning incident.

I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured that we are committed to best practice regarding liaison and that we will look at practical solutions. We welcome her input on guidance and expenses under the current legislation. I hope that, on that basis, she will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Linklater of Butterstone]

I am sorry, my Lords—you must be getting very bored with the sound of my voice. I move on briefly to the second, connected clause, which is about the presumption against short sentences.

The presumption against short sentences carries with it the expectation that low-level offending will receive an effective community sentence which is designed to address the causes of offending behaviour and to emphasise that it is in this category that reoffending is the highest of all. This is the greatest area of sentencing failure in this country today, contrary to the central goal of government policy which is to reduce reoffending. There may, of course, be times when a short prison sentence has a place. An example might be when an offender is constantly breaching a non-custodial order and the magistrates feel that they are left with no option. Or it may give the victim of an offender a brief break from the hell of a violent partner and the chance to make changes to her life in the breathing space. These are legitimate but there should be a presumption against these short sentences which is not the case at the moment, as witnessed by the 38,000 sentences of three months or less in the year up to March 2011. That is an astonishing figure; these cases should be the exception and not the rule.

I suggest that we should follow the example of Scotland, where Section 17 in Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 is entitled, “Presumption against short periods of imprisonment”. Subsection (3A) states that a court,

“must not pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 3 months or less on a person unless the court considers that no other method of dealing with the person is appropriate”.

This is a proper model to follow.

Many of these sentences are for women, as noble Lords mentioned in our debate on the previous amendment. They are just enough to do disproportionate damage to children, families, jobs and housing, and to the ability of chaotic, vulnerable people who commit minor offences to keep their lives together at all.

Imprisonment results in even greater chaos to the community, which then has to manage that chaos and to deal with the inevitable reoffending, whereas preventive, effective work through community disposals is far more likely to effect change and make people face up to the causes and effects on others of their law-breaking behaviour. Short prison sentences do absolutely nothing to address offending behaviour. No provision exists during or after imprisonment—hence the reoffending results, at great and disproportionate cost to the community.

It is also worth re-emphasising that where communities want and need to demonstrate toughness in punishment, community sentences are the tough option—and are seen as such by offenders. It is much tougher to be made to face up to what you have done, and why, than to sleep away your sentence in a prison cell; and to learn about the consequences of your behaviour and be made to put something back into the community, for example by doing unpaid work.

An inquiry chaired by Peter Oborne and commissioned by an organisation called Make Justice Work, which is doing a lot of effective work in this field, highlighted how effective community sentences were seen to be by offenders, as well as how much more successful they were at tackling reoffending. This ties in with my earlier remarks about magistrates knowing what community sentences are like. If properly informed, they will be at the front line of awareness of the quality of the programmes, and of what works and is being well done, which will ensure that standards are high. I greatly welcome the Government’s plans to start a consultation on the effectiveness of community sentences, and I look for reassurance from the Minister that a presumption against short sentences will form part of the framework of their thinking.

The second reason that I return to this subject is the need for sentences to come with an explanation in court of the exact reasons for a disposal—and in particular, where the threshold for custody comes in a case, and precisely why and how the threshold has been passed so that a community penalty has become inappropriate. Perhaps the Minister will confirm, following a letter of 15 March from the noble Lord, Lord McNally, whether under new Section 174, to be imported under Clause 61 of the Bill, the sentencing judge or magistrate must explain to a person sentenced to less than six months in prison that,

“no other method of dealing with him is appropriate, and give reasons, including how the custody threshold has been reached, for that conclusion, whether to him if he is present or under rules made in accordance with government amendment 152ZA”.

I am quoting from the letter. If this is the case, that amendment will be welcome, since previous legislation did not require the degree of clarity and explanation that I sought. I look forward to the Minister’s reply and beg to move.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, Amendment 151B, moved by my noble friend Lady Linklater, relates to the imposition of short custodial sentences. It would place a duty on a court to consider all alternatives before imposing a short custodial term. The amendment would also require the court, when imposing a short custodial sentence, to explain why alternative sentences were not considered appropriate.

As my noble friend Lord McNally said when the amendment was debated in Committee, we completely understand the argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater. We agree that short custodial sentences can be less effective than community sentences in tackling reoffending. The Government looked closely at community sentences and intend to consult very soon on ways to build greater confidence in their use. Our payment by results pilots are also looking to support offenders who are released from short custodial sentences.

As the Minister also said, a duty already exists in current law. I urge my noble friend to look at Section 152 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which was passed by the previous Government and places restrictions on courts imposing discretionary custodial sentences. It states:

“The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence”.

That provision applies to all courts that are considering a custodial sentence of any length—not just a sentence of less than six months, to which the amendment is limited. The issue of short custodial sentences has been discussed in Scotland. My noble friend made reference to Scottish legislation. The new Scottish provisions are less onerous on judges than the existing law in England and Wales that I have just explained.

The current requirement on courts considering a custodial sentence is more wide-ranging and onerous than that contained in the amendment. I understand the intention behind it, but I hope that I can reassure my noble friend on this point. I hope that she will feed into the consultation on how to make sure that what is already in law is used as widely as possible. The law is as she wishes it; we need to ensure that it is fully understood and delivered. On this basis, I hope that she will withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, what alternatives to imprisonment are being considered to punish the persistent non-payment of fines, which is a very common reason why people are sent to prison for short periods? Is there no other way of recovering the amount of the fine that could be considered by the courts, and is the matter being looked at by the Government?

[Baroness Northover]

I thank my noble friend for those points, and will write to him with details on them. He may wish to feed in to the consultation on the matter.

[Baroness Linklater of Butterstone]

I thank my noble friend for answering my short remarks. I will go away to think a little more. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Northover]

152ZA: Clause 61, page 44, leave out lines 20 to 24 and insert—
“( ) Criminal Procedure Rules may—
(a) prescribe cases in which either duty does not apply, and(b) make provision about how an explanation under subsection (3) is to be given.”

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I turn to a group of government amendments that concern three areas. I will deal first with the substantive amendments. The first concerns the duties on courts to explain a sentence. The second deals with powers to withdraw distress warrants. I will then deal with the grouped technical amendments that relate to the powers of magistrates to impose fines.

First, government amendment 152ZA relates to the revised provisions in Clause 61, which deal with the duties on courts to give reasons for, and explain the effect of, a sentence. These duties already exist under Section 174 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 but Clause 61 provides for a revised and simplified version of the requirements.

We had an excellent debate on this in Committee. My noble friend Lord McNally was very grateful for the opportunity to discuss the concerns that several Peers had in relation to this duty and the needs of offenders who have learning difficulties or other problems understanding the sentence imposed on them. I pay particular tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Rix, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Wigley, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Quin and Lady Gould, who have provided enormous insight into the problems that these offenders may face.

As my noble friend said in Committee, the Government were concerned to ensure that we got the balance right between removing unduly prescriptive provisions on sentencers while retaining the important duties to explain a sentence in court. The Government also wanted to ensure that the law remained practical, taking account of the million-plus sentencing decisions made by the courts each year.

The Government have looked again at these provisions, in light of the helpful discussions that we had in Committee. We believe that the basic statutory duties to give reasons for a sentence and explain the effect of a sentence, in open court and in ordinary language, remain appropriate for the vast majority of cases, but we also accept the point made by noble Lords that further guidance on this may be required.

With that in mind, we have looked at subsection (4) of the revised Section 174, which gives a power to the Lord Chancellor to prescribe cases where the duty to explain can be less onerous or not required at all. This power has existed since the 2003 Act came into force but has never been exercised by the Lord Chancellor. On reflection, we think that such a power would be better exercised by the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, an independent body that provides rules that govern the way the criminal courts operate. The Criminal Procedure Rules already touch on the sentencing process so it seems more appropriate that the committee should have a specific power in this regard.

The first part of this amendment transfers the Lord Chancellor’s order-making power to a rules-making power for the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. Secondly, the amendment clarifies the scope of the power in relation to the duties on sentencers. The amendment retains the power for the rules to prescribe when the duties to give reasons for the sentence or explain the sentence to the offender do not apply; for example, where the sentence is obvious because there is a fixed penalty or where the case is entirely dealt with on the papers without the offender being present, as happens with many low-level road traffic offences.

I draw particular attention to the fact that the amendment also allows the rules to make provision about how an explanation of the effect of a sentence is to be given to the offender. This allows the rules to cover, if required, any particular circumstances the courts should consider when meeting the statutory duty to explain the effect of a sentence to an offender.

I have no doubt that the committee, in considering this new power, will take account of the debate that your Lordships had in Committee and the helpful representations that have been made from organisations such as Mencap and the Prison Reform Trust. I will ensure that these are flagged to the committee. We believe that the consideration of the detail of requirements is better dealt with via rules than primary legislation. One of the Criminal Procedure Rules already requires the court to,

“explain the sentence, the reasons for it, and its effect, in terms the defendant can understand (with help, if necessary)”.

I thank noble Lords for sharing the benefit of their wisdom and hope that this amendment achieves our goal of allowing for practical measures to be taken to ensure that the duties to explain a sentence are met in every case.

Government Amendment 152BYH relates to a very specific area of the law that deals with distress warrants. Distress warrants are issued following the non-payment of a fine, to recover the value of the fine imposed by the courts. They can be issued by a court or by a fines officer. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, tabled an amendment that sought, among other things, to clarify the law on distress warrants, and in particular whether it was possible to withdraw a distress warrant once it had been issued. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford also highlighted the problem of the inability to withdraw distress warrants.

I indicated in response to noble Lords that the Government were willing to look at the issue and, if a change in the law was necessary, to return to it on Report. That is what we have done. I very much welcomed the opportunity we had to discuss this issue with the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, as well as drawing on the expertise of the Z2K Trust and the CAB.

We accept that the current law is flawed. This amendment makes a number of changes, mainly to Schedule 5 to the Courts Act 2003. The new clause introduced by the amendment does four things. First, it provides magistrates’ court fines officers with the power to withdraw distress warrants they have issued, in the circumstances specified in new paragraph (40A), which is introduced by subsection (8) of the new clause. This means that a fines officer can withdraw the warrant if there is any part of the sum left to pay and if the fines officer is satisfied that the warrant was issued by mistake. This can include a mistake made as a result of non-disclosure or a misrepresentation of a material fact in the case.

Secondly, the amendment makes it clear in new paragraph (40B) that a magistrates’ court has a similar power to discharge a distress warrant issued by a fines officer as it does to discharge such a warrant issued by the court itself. Thirdly, the amendment enables fines officers to take further steps to enforce a penalty where a distress warrant has been withdrawn, but this time taking into account information that was not available when the distress warrant was issued; this includes the power to issue a further distress warrant. Finally, the amendment enables magistrates’ courts to exercise any of their powers in respect of a fines defaulter where a distress warrant has been withdrawn, including issuing a further distress warrant.

Noble Lords will have noticed that while I have explained the amendment in terms of “distress warrants”, the amendment itself refers to “warrants of control”. That reflects the new terminology that will apply when the relevant provisions of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which are presently the subject of consultation, are commenced. However, transitional provision will be made under the powers in Part 4 of this Bill to the effect that, until those 2007 Act provisions come into force, these provisions are to have effect as if the references to warrants of control were to warrants of distress.

These changes put the question of whether a distress warrant can be withdrawn beyond doubt and provide clear but practical powers for the courts and fines officers to deal with mistakes in the issuing of warrants. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, and to the tireless work of Reverend Paul Nicolson of the Z2K Trust, for identifying these problems and encouraging us to address them.

Finally, government Amendments 152BA to 152BYG deal with the changes to magistrates’ fines powers in Clauses 80 to 82. These amendments are largely technical and ensure that Clauses 80 to 82 operate as intended. The policy intention here is unchanged: the clauses remove the upper limit on the level of fines available in the magistrates’ courts on summary conviction. They also allow for the uprating of other fines, in particular by providing a power to increase the maximum fine amounts for levels 1 to 4 on the standard scale of fines for summary offences.

I draw your Lordships’ attention to the set of amendments that applies the provisions to fines imposed for common law offences which can be dealt with by magistrates. These offences—“causing a public nuisance” and “outraging public decency”—were not caught by the previous version of the clauses. It is important that magistrates should have the freedom to impose larger fines for these offences in the same way as they will be able to do when sentencing offenders committing statutory offences.

Overall, these amendments now deliver more effectively the Government’s objectives. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, as the Minister has explained, Amendment 152BYH is in response to an amendment I tabled in Committee with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The purpose was to remove legal confusion about the power of bailiffs to return a fine to magistrates for consideration. That confusion has resulted in hardship for many vulnerable people.

I am grateful to the Minister and to the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for meeting me and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, as well as representatives of Zacchaeus 2000 and Citizens Advice to discuss this and related matters. I am even more grateful that the Government agree that the current law is flawed and that this Bill provides the ideal vehicle for removing the confusion. I assume therefore that they do not expect that there will be a further suitable Bill coming along in the foreseeable future and thus they brought forward their own amendment.

I had hoped that I would be able to sit down at this point and that all would be sweetness and light, but as the noble Baroness knows I am worried that the amendment refers simply to the power to withdraw the warrant where there has been a mistake, albeit one made in consequence of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact. Rectifying mistakes will not prevent all of the kinds of problems that Zacchaeus 2000 and Citizens Advice have identified. I am particularly concerned about cases where there has been a change of circumstances since the fine was set. For instance, if the debtor’s or defaulter’s material circumstances have changed because of illness, unemployment or relationship breakdown, that could have just the same effect on the ability to pay the fine as if there had been a mistake at the time of the original determination.

I have been in touch by e-mail with the Ministry of Justice about this. Its response was that while the amendment does not cover a simple change of circumstances, it is clear that a debtor can argue that the change of circumstances, if it had been known to the court, would have affected the decision to issue the warrant, so the decision was based on a mistake as to the debtor’s circumstances and that, in other words, the provision in the amendment goes further than the simple slip rule would do.

Will the Minister clarify this statement for your Lordships’ House? I do not really understand what it means. Does it mean that if a debtor’s circumstances change for the worse after the fine has been set and the bailiff is made aware of it, the bailiff can withdraw the warrant and return the fine to the magistrates’ courts on the grounds that the fine would not have been set on that basis had those circumstances pertained when it was set? If it means that, I urge the Minister to withdraw the amendment and make that clear at Third Reading. Otherwise I fear that we face a new source of legal confusion. If it does not mean that, I fear that the amendment will not go nearly far enough to resolve the kind of problems that Z2K and Citizens Advice have brought to our attention. Will the Minister withdraw the amendment and think again before Third Reading? Can the Minister confirm that a mistake will cover cases where the defaulter was not in court when the fine was imposed so that the mistake was made because the full circumstances were not known?

In Committee, the Minister prayed in aid the revision of the National Standards for Enforcement Agents, and in particular the standards they set for dealing with vulnerable and socially excluded people. The revised standards for such situations, now published on the MoJ website, are virtually identical to those previously in operation. It is clear from the experience of Z2K and Citizens Advice that they have not provided an adequate safeguard. That is why we had hoped that the amendment would ensure that bailiffs have discretion within the application of the Wednesbury principles—in other words, a test of reasonableness—to return a fine to the magistrates’ court when they discover that the debtor is in a vulnerable situation as set out in the National Standards for Enforcement Agents.

I am disappointed but realise that the Minister signalled this in Committee. Can I ask that the MoJ monitors this? If it is clear that the National Standards for Enforcement Agents are not on their own providing an adequate safeguard, will the Government consider returning to this issue at the next legislative opportunity?

In conclusion, I thank the Government for having moved on this issue. However, I am seeking assurances about the situation with regard to a change of circumstances, to be made clear in an amendment at Third Reading, if necessary, and about monitoring the effectiveness of the National Standards for Enforcement Agents, which state that,

“the agent has a duty to contact the creditor and report the circumstances in situations where there is evidence of a potential cause for concern”,

to ensure that that happens. Otherwise I fear that vulnerable people will continue to suffer and that legal confusion will continue to reign.

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[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I speak in support of government Amendment 152ZA and also speak on behalf of my noble friend Lord Rix who unfortunately is unable to be present because of his wife’s ill health. I thank the Minister for the extremely productive meeting that we had, which has been mentioned. The points that my noble friend has asked me to raise arise out of the amendment which came after that discussion in support of what was said.

The context of this is the duty of the court to explain sentences in ordinary language, which we raised in Committee. The Minister admitted that the phrase would ensure only that most people could understand an explanation. While we welcome the amendment and believe that it has the ability to extend comprehension of the effect of a sentence on all parties concerned, which is an important development, we are still not certain that it covers the point about ordinary language. On that, we would like some clarification. We believe that the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee could offer a similar safeguard, but we are not sure about where that safeguard extends and how wide it is. Will the Minister clarify how confident she is that the committee will make rules regarding the need to go beyond ordinary language in certain circumstances? Will it actually make these rules? To what extent are the rules made by that committee binding on the court? The concern is that if the rules are merely guidance, they might not be put into practice, despite the best intentions of the Government and the committee.

Will the Minister tell us about the time scales? When will the committee be empowered to make such rules and when might they be enforced? Are we looking at something imminent? Will it depend on when the Bill is passed? Finally, what opportunities will there be for Members of both Houses to scrutinise the implementation of these measures in the future? If they are rules of the committee rather than something in the Bill, it is more difficult for us to monitor them. They have an enormous effect on the people whom we mentioned in Committee and their ability to understand the process of law.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, this has been another useful debate. I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for the Government’s changes to the duty to explain. I encourage him to feed in his concerns to the committee. I have no doubt whatever that noble Lords will scrutinise how the duty is being implemented. The fact that this may not be part of legislation will not stop people reporting, debating and asking whether this is working as it should. The Government clearly cannot dictate to the committee what it should make its rules on and what it should say, but I have no doubt that when and if noble Lords find that this is not being implemented as they feel it should be, that will have its effect.

On distress warrants, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for her guarded welcome of the Government’s amendment. She questioned whether the amendment goes far enough and was kind enough to send an e-mail with a number of questions. She has referred to our response, which gives me an opportunity to expand on or clarify a number of those points. She was concerned, among other things, about whether it allowed for the withdrawal of a distress warrant where there had been a change in the offender’s circumstances or where the offender was deemed to be vulnerable. I will do my best to reassure her on a few points.

It is clear that the government amendment allows for the withdrawal of a warrant where there is a mistake in the decision to issue the warrant in the first place. The amendment covers the case where an offender is not in court when the warrant is issued, which results in the court not having the full information before it. This, in effect, amounts to a mistake. I hope that that also helps to reassure my noble friend Lord Thomas. If there has been a change of circumstances that, had it been known to the court, would have had an impact on the decision to issue a warrant, it is open to the debtor to argue that the warrant had been issued by mistake.

The noble Baroness also raised the question of bailiffs dealing with debtors who find themselves in hardship or appear to be vulnerable. It is important that we strike the right balance between protecting the vulnerable—she is right about that—and ensuring that fines, where appropriate, are paid. Noble Lords will have seen recent criticisms of fine payment rates. The fine is by far the most used sentence of the criminal courts.

In practice, however, when bailiffs come across hardship as defined in the guidance they should not execute the warrant and return it to the court. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I must say that we would welcome any further information on this matter and on the effectiveness, which she has queried, of the guidance. It is very important that that is monitored. The Government do not think that it would be appropriate for a bailiff simply to withdraw a warrant in regard to a fine issued by a court. This could undermine the decision made by the court, which is why such a power is not included in the amendment, although I realise that that will disappoint the noble Baroness. If, however, the fine was imposed because the full facts were not made clear to the court, or they had changed, the provision in the Bill could apply.

In the case of changed circumstances since the fine was imposed, the debtor can contact the court at any time to speak to a fines officer to have the matter reviewed. The Government would encourage any debtor to contact the fines officer or court about a change of circumstance, which is clearly a better approach than waiting until a bailiff seeks to execute a warrant, but it is important that we separate the two parts in that respect.

As I said in Committee, the Government think it is important that bailiffs are dealt with via effective guidance, national standards and contractual obligations. As the noble Baroness knows, the Government are consulting on the operation of bailiffs, and we will carefully consider responses to that consultation. I hope that the noble Baroness and the organisations with which she is associated will feed into that consultation.

I hope that the noble Baroness can be reassured that the government amendment addresses the key legal issue with distress warrants and places the decision on them properly with the courts. How bailiffs operate is a matter for consultation in order to make sure that they operate properly and as we would wish. I hope therefore that the noble Baroness is reassured and content with what the Government have brought forward.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I got the impression that the Minister was saying that outside organisations should do the monitoring. I would argue that the Government have a responsibility to monitor this. I realise that some of this will be covered by the current consultation, but if there is to be a reliance on the national standards and the requirements and standards are not written in the Bill, it is incumbent on the Government to monitor and to make sure, as she said, that these national standards are effective.

[Baroness Northover]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. I was trying to indicate that a number of organisations are closely involved in such cases. Their information is extremely useful to the Government because they are often closer. However, the Government have picked up on the concerns, which has led them to decide that they need a consultation on the operation of the bailiffs system. I hope that she will be reassured by that government involvement in trying to take that matter forward.

Amendment 152ZA agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Northover]

152ZC: Clause 71, page 53, line 12, at end insert—
“(3) In section 223(3) of that Act (power to amend specified periods of time), omit paragraph (c).”

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, this is a very important social issue. I do not think that anyone in the House disputes the fact that alcohol-related crime is a scourge blighting too many of our city and town centres and one we must address. I pay tribute to many noble Lords, especially the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Jenkin, and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for ensuring that we have reached this point. Through their amendments in Committee for an alcohol-monitoring requirement, this issue was flagged up in the way that it was last year in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill.

In that regard, I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who brought her knowledge, experience and wisdom to this area, including when dealing with the previous incarnation of this issue during the debates on the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, has given an insight into the terrible harm that alcohol-fuelled violence can cause to victims and their families. I applaud the work that she has undertaken to help the Government establish a more effective approach to building active and safer communities, and in particular the work that she is leading to develop community-led, partnership-based approaches to tackling alcohol-fuelled crime and anti-social behaviour.

As noble Lords have demonstrated through their persuasive and informed words, it is vital that we look at new innovative ways of tackling the causes of alcohol-fuelled crime. That is why the Government have committed, as I set out in Committee, to undertake pilots to trial sobriety requirements as part of conditional cautions and community orders. Since then, we have considered the noble Baroness’s amendments. I was also fortunate to listen to the presentation from the United States based around experience in both South Dakota and Hawaii.

We have attempted to capture the essential elements of the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, in order to provide a practical power for the court to impose sober behaviour on offenders who commit alcohol-related crime. Through these means we will send a clear message that if you abuse your right to drink and damage those around you, that right can be taken away from you. That is why the Government are bringing forward their own amendment which provides courts with a new power to impose an alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement as part of a community order or suspended sentence order on an offender who has committed an alcohol-related offence.

The amendment forms an important part of our wider response to these problems, introducing a new and innovative way of tackling the causes of alcohol-fuelled crime through enforced sobriety schemes. I pay tribute at this stage to the work of the London mayor, Boris Johnson, and the deputy mayor, Kit Malthouse, and to their commitment in this area. Their work on the alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirements is a testament to their determination to make a stand against alcohol-fuelled crime in the capital and we will continue to work with them in the development of this initiative.

The requirement as part of community orders and suspended sentence orders will therefore focus on serious offences, in particular violent offences, where alcohol is often a contributing factor, such as common assault, actual bodily harm, affray and violent disorder. Under the Government’s proposed alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirements, offenders will be required by the court to abstain from drinking for a period specified by the court up to 120 days. They will be required either to attend a police station or test centre to be monitored by breathalyser equipment or to wear an alcohol tag around their ankle. This innovative new electronic monitoring technology will test sobriety at half-hourly intervals during the day.

Before imposing a requirement, the court will have to establish a link between alcohol consumption and the offending behaviour. In a case where the offender does not comply with the conditions of the requirement, existing breach proceedings will ensue and the courts will have robust powers to penalise the non-compliance.

I wish to make clear that this requirement does not amount to treatment. That is not to say that supporting programmes such as alcohol awareness and education courses do not have a use here, alongside the abstinence requirement, to help ensure that offenders seek to change their alcohol-fuelled offending behaviour. However, it is distinct from the alcohol treatment requirement and the alcohol specified activity requirement, which seek to treat dependent drinkers and provide advice and support to offenders with other alcohol-related needs. For alcohol-dependent offenders and others needing treatment these options will continue to be the best avenue for addressing these issues.

These new provisions enable the Government to carry out initial trials which will test the processes and practicalities of enforced sobriety schemes and help build the confidence of the probation officials and sentencers who will operate them. We will make use of the lessons learnt to inform further work in this area. We are carrying out an additional pilot to test sobriety schemes as part of conditional cautions. The conditional caution is an out-of-court disposal which aims to tackle low-level crime. The pilot scheme will therefore be targeted at offences such as drunk and disorderly, criminal damage and public disorder, which account for a considerable volume of alcohol-related offences overall. The condition requires an offender to abstain from drinking on the days they are most likely to offend as a result of alcohol and to attend a police station to be tested, using a breathalyser, on those days—for example, Friday, Saturday or Sunday.

We have already had interest from a number of police areas in piloting the conditional caution scheme, particularly from cities where alcohol-fuelled crime is a severe problem. We heard quite a lot about that in Committee. We will announce the pilot areas in the forthcoming government alcohol strategy. The first conditional cautions enforcing sobriety should be administered from April/May. We believe that this is a considered and effective amendment to test out the important concept of reducing alcohol-fuelled crime.

Amendments 152ZC and 152ZD seek to remove provisions under Section 223 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to amend the minimum period of time specified for a drug rehabilitation requirement or alcohol treatment requirement under Sections 209 and 212 of the same Act. The Government are taking forward provisions in the Bill to remove the statutory minimum period for drug rehabilitation requirements and alcohol treatment requirements in order to increase the use and effectiveness of these requirements, allowing for greater flexibility in tailoring and delivering treatment and recovery options to individual needs. Provisions under Section 223 for these requirements are therefore no longer necessary.

The alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement, introduced by our amendments, is to be available to the courts in England and Wales but not, of course, to the courts of Scotland or Northern Ireland. It is our intention that the requirement should not be capable of being imposed by a court in England and Wales on a person who is resident in Scotland or Northern Ireland. We undertake to bring forward and table amendments at Third Reading to make that clear. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I have some amendments in this group, but of course I am absolutely delighted that the Government have decided to bring forward their own amendments. If the House approves those amendments, I will withdraw the amendments in my name. I would like to add my thanks to all Peers from all sides of the House who have worked tirelessly to try to ensure that this localism response for local communities to deal with alcohol-fuelled offences can actually proceed and that this new sentencing ability will be available to the courts. I would also like to single out the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Northover, both of whom have gone to great lengths to listen to all sides of the argument and to take those representations away. I know that they really have worked very hard behind the scenes to get to the point that we have reached today.

The government amendments do not include the “offender pay” content set out in my amendments. I understand that this is a complex issue and, depending on the outcome of the pilots, could be revisited at a later stage, but it has wider implications. The advantage of now being able to proceed with breathalyser pilots as well as tags is that, for those who have to present daily or twice daily for breathalysing, they will encounter staff who will be able to see how they are coping and offer them support to cope with all the other aspects of their lives that they have not been managing well and that have been contributing to their alcohol abuse. There is that support element and I know from the United States that the failure rate with tags is about nine times that with breathalysers. That is partly because the offenders tend to think that the electronics will fail and do not believe in the efficacy of the tags. They sometimes try to tamper with them and so on. It will be very important to see how it works here and compare the different systems.

This week there was a motion to seek international endorsement for these types of programmes from the 180-signatory nations to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. These kinds of schemes are being debated there as well. I have had meetings with police officers from different parts of the UK and a consistent story that comes through is that after 10 pm at night alcohol-related problems are between 80 and 100 per cent of their workload, depending in part on the night of the week. Evidence of decreased reoffending has come from the USA and in the pilots we will be able to see whether that is replicated here. There, they are reporting a more than 50 per cent drop in reoffending at three years; a more than 50 per cent drop in drink-driving offences; and a more than 10 per cent drop in domestic violence. There has also been a fall in incarceration rates. Alcohol use appears to be interrupted before the person who has been abusing the alcohol can actually kill somebody, so they have decreased the very serious end of crime as well. We know that in London the Metropolitan Police recorded 18,500 offences flagged for alcohol. Offences involving violence against the person accounted for 64 per cent of those.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am not sure what the correct collective noun is for a group of persuasive Baronesses, but whatever it is, we—the House, and indeed society—are greatly indebted to this particular group of persuasive Baronesses, supported as they have been by the occasional male Member of this House.

I would like to join other noble Lords in congratulating the Government on responding so positively and readily to the proposals to carry forward the pilot scheme and to come forward with a legislative framework to adopt the proposals. These have been pushed very hard by the Mayor of London and, indeed, by London Councils as an organisation. There has been complete unanimity politically in London, and in this House too, about the merits of this scheme.

Coming as I do from a city where, unfortunately, alcohol consumption is particularly high—leading generally to low-level crime and a low level of violence which is nevertheless a disturbing social phenomenon—I am very glad that we are beginning to see an approach here that we hope will make a difference. As has been pointed out, however, an alcohol strategy is still awaited. This is perhaps only a first instalment in what may need to be a major review of how we deal with these problems.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—who has been so much the moving spirit, if I can be forgiven the use of that term, in these matters—mentioned one particular matter: domestic violence. There has been consultation about this, as the noble Baroness rightly said. At a meeting held in May 2011, all the violence-against-women agencies present expressed,

“high levels of concern about this scheme operating in relation to domestic violence”.

They gave as reasons that tackling alcohol in itself,

“does not tackle domestic violence … implies that domestic violence behaviour is driven by alcohol, which is not the case … domestic violence can occur when men are sober”—

or when women are sober, as it is not always one-sided—and,

“implies that physical assault (which is linked with alcohol) is the main/only form of domestic violence”,

as that is not correct either. There was,

“general consensus that the additional elements which would need to be considered for DV”—

domestic violence—

“cases, including risk assessment and support”,

would make the matter very complex.

That is not in any way to derogate from the proposals being made, but it does emphasise the need to look carefully, in the context of the pilot, at what will be run as part of the experiment, and to look very sensitively at the concerns of the organisations that work most closely with women as the principal victims of domestic violence, to see whether this is necessarily the most appropriate way of dealing with those problems.

I certainly have an open mind about that, and I assume that the Government would as well. I am therefore just uttering a word of caution. It should not necessarily be assumed that domestic violence is an appropriate topic for inclusion in a scheme of this kind. It is a matter that needs to be tested. The American experience might be helpful in that respect, of course, but the culture is not necessarily the same here as it is in South Dakota or other parts of the United States. I think that we have to be a little careful about jumping to conclusions.

With that single reservation—it is only a note of caution—I very much endorse the principle and the Government’s amendments. I would also like to endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has said about costs. I assume that the Government would cover the cost of pilots as they take place in localities. In local government parlance, this would be a new burden, and the convention is that such new burdens are funded by government. As it is a pilot, it should not be too expensive to run—and ultimately, we hope, the public purse will benefit significantly from any savings that accrue, not least in the health service, where such savings would be extremely desirable. I mean savings not only in financial resources but in the time and skills of staff.

The Opposition strongly support this principle. With that note of caution, we congratulate the Government and look forward to taking matters further. Perhaps I may also ask whether the Minister or her colleagues would be prepared to meet before the pilots are instituted with representatives of the organisations concerned with violence against women to explore their concerns and to see whether, perhaps together, a joint approach might be worked out to test the scheme in practice or to see how it might be modified to reflect the real concerns they have expressed. We certainly support the Government and these amendments.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and my noble friend Lady Browning for their incredibly kind words to me. However, it is they who have been the doughty fighters who have brought us to this position. I should also like to thank my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, Ken Clarke, for his help in taking forward this innovative idea.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, mentioned domestic violence, and as both noble Lords emphasised, these are complex issues which require multifaceted approaches. We will need to see how, in tackling the abuse of alcohol, there might be a beneficial effect in this area as well. The provision is not targeted at domestic violence, as noble Lords will appreciate, but we will need to see what we can learn from its possible effects. I would be extremely happy on behalf of the Government to meet the organisations to which the noble Lord referred. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, expressed an interest as well. I really appreciate that and look forward to taking that further forward. It is extremely important that we discuss what is suggested here with such groups.

We agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, that alcohol treatment is extremely important; as a spokesperson for health, I hope that I can reassure noble Lords that we fully recognise that. I want to reassure the noble Baroness that we believe that the pilots are there so that we can learn from them. We need to learn what works elsewhere and see how it might need to be adapted within our own legal, social and economic situation. However, we are optimistic that these are interesting proposals to take forward.

My noble friend Lord Avebury asked about the funding for the pilots and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also flagged that up. Existing resources will be drawn on for some of the work with breathalysers, but the Government are indeed providing funding for the pilots and this will be announced shortly. My noble friend Lord Avebury asked about the areas for conditional caution pilots. I hope he will be pleased to hear that this will be announced in the alcohol strategy next week.

Above all, I thank noble Lords for their support for the government amendments, and especially for the work of the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Browning, and others in bringing us to this point. I look forward to our learning from these pilots.

Amendment 152ZC agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Northover]

152ZD: Clause 72, page 53, line 16, at end insert—
“(2) In section 223(3) of that Act (power to amend specified periods of time), omit paragraph (d).”

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. We are entirely in agreement that restorative justice represents a significant way forward. It is calculated, as the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, said, to save public funds, reduce reoffending rates and prove acceptable to the wider community, which is not as hard-line in these matters of penal policy as sometimes people imagine. Restorative justice has been shown to be welcomed by 80 per cent of the victims who participate in it. That in itself is a testimony to its effectiveness. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will feel able to accept the amendment but, if she is not, I hope that she will undertake to meet the noble and learned Lord and other colleagues before Third Reading to allow a further and final opportunity to discuss the way forward to improving this part of the Bill, recognising that it will contribute to the intentions of the Government.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, these amendments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and my noble friend Lord Dholakia return to the question of restorative justice. The noble Lords have been outstanding exponents of the importance of restorative justice and we appreciate the contribution that they have made in the House, nationally and internationally in this matter. The Government support the principle of restorative justice as part of an effective response to crime. It offers a crucial opportunity, not only to assist in the rehabilitation of offenders by making them face the consequences of their actions and seek to make amends for the damaged inflicted on others, but to give victims a greater stake in the resolution of offences and in the criminal justice system as a whole. Indeed, victim satisfaction rates have been extremely positive. Additional work in this area will enable us to realise the benefits of restorative justice further. We already have encouraging evidence around its impact on reoffending rates and anecdotal evidence that it encourages offenders to seek further necessary interventions, such as drug and alcohol treatment.

As I mentioned in Committee, we are committed to delivering greater use of restorative practices across the criminal justice system and we are putting a great deal of time and effort into building up the capacity of youth offending teams, probation trusts and prisons to provide restorative justice services, investing over £1 million in order to do so. We just heard reference from the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, to the Thames Valley restorative justice partnership. It is developing training materials and guidance for using restorative justice in the adult system as part of our response to more serious offences. Its experience is invaluable.

These amendments take a three-pronged approach to adding restorative justice to the current legislation. The first would make restorative justice a statutory purpose of sentencing alongside the existing purposes of punishment, reduction of crime, rehabilitation, protection of the public and making reparation to offenders, as set out in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The second would create a new restorative justice requirement for a community order or suspended sentence order, while the third would add the words “restorative justice” to the existing activity requirement.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am sorry that I was unable to take part in the debate in Committee.

The noble Baroness has spoken powerfully about a very serious subject. I share the views of those who responded to the consultation with some doubts about whether it was appropriate or necessary to change the law. These included key stakeholders such as Women’s Aid, Refuge, Liberty and the Local Government Association. I share their concerns about whether introducing a new law is realistic.

I do not know anyone who has gone into a relationship with the mindset that suggests checking up on the new partner through this sort of scheme. Most importantly, it could well be a distraction from the important work that still needs to be done in this area, but I will not spend more time on that. The thrust of the noble Baroness’s speech was about the pilots. If legislation was not needed for the pilots, legislation is not needed for their assessment. I would not lose faith in any Government if, having committed themselves to pilots, they would seek to avoid an evaluation and assessment. We have too much on the statute book. Let us see the evaluation of a pilot put in place on the basis of the law that we have now before Amendments 155 and 156 or anything like them. I will take my cue from my noble friend and put asking questions about it in my diary. I dare say that the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, will do the same. She has a great record for raising these issues, so she is not going to let this rest. Parliament is going to hear about it.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, when we debated these amendments in Committee my noble friend Lord McNally was able to tell the Committee how sympathetic the Government were to the thinking behind them, borne out of the circumstances of the tragic murder of Clare Wood by Clare’s ex-boyfriend who had previous convictions for violent offences. I pay tribute to Clare’s family and to the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, and others on this issue.

As the noble Baroness has flagged, the Home Secretary has announced the Government’s intention to pilot a domestic violence disclosure scheme for one year in the four police force areas of Greater Manchester, Gwent, Nottinghamshire and Wiltshire. The pilot will start this summer, and I hope that noble Lords will welcome it. The pilot, which is similar in spirit to that envisaged by the noble Lady’s amendment, will be established under existing police powers and test two types of process.

The first will be triggered by a request by a member of the public, in other words, a “right to ask”. The second will be triggered by the police, where they make a proactive decision to disclose the information in order to protect a potential victim, which we are calling a “right to know”. The Government believe that a disclosure scheme, which establishes a framework with recognised and consistent procedures for disclosing information, will enable new partners of previously violent individuals to make informed choices about how and whether they take that relationship forward. I note what my noble friend Lady Hamwee said on this, and it may be that she would prefer the second pilot.

The Home Secretary’s announcement follows a consultation held by the Government. A clear majority of respondents favoured the introduction of a national disclosure scheme. However, the consultation raised important issues about the scope and proportionality of the information that should be disclosed to potential victims, the safeguards that will be needed against malicious applications and the paramount need for the safety of victims to be taken into account. These are serious matters, and the Home Secretary has concluded that it is therefore right that these issues are addressed and tested in a pilot to ensure that the disclosure scheme is compatible with all relevant law and accounts for the safety and needs of potential victims. The Home Office is undertaking further scoping work to decide how the disclosure scheme will work.

Amendment 156ZA would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review of the pilot and to publish its findings. I can confirm, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee indicated, that we will conduct an assessment of the domestic violence disclosure scheme as part of the pilot process and make our conclusions public. I hope that that reassures the noble Baroness, Lady Gale. The assessment will be used to inform decisions about whether the scheme should be expanded further after piloting.

The House may be assured that the Government’s aim is to end all forms of violence against women and girls. Soon after coming to office, we set out a new strategy to end violence against women and girls, and on 8 March we published an updated action plan in this area. The domestic violence disclosure scheme pilot announced by the Home Secretary is part of that updated action plan. The fact that approximately two people are killed by their current or former partner each week underlines the need for action. The Government believe that the domestic violence disclosure scheme will be an important additional tool that enhances the protection available to victims. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, for her work in this area, and I hope that with these reassurances she will be willing to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Gale]

I thank the Minister for her reply and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her contribution to this debate. I agree that in the early stages of a new romance a woman is not likely to check on her new partner but, as time progresses, she may have queries and worries. We know the success of Sarah’s law. I am sure that the pilot and the assessment could provide a lot of evidence which would make it useful for rolling out throughout the country.

I am glad that the assessments about which the Minister spoke will be made public. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, suggested, we will be putting this in our diaries, checking up and asking questions. Certainly, at the end of the first year everyone will want to know the results of the assessment. I am glad that the Minister once again made the Government’s commitment to end violence against women. Both the previous Labour Government and the coalition Government have been committed to this and we have a lot in common. I do not think that there is much between us at all. I thank the Minister for her response. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for continuing to bring this issue forward. It is a vital area and we should work to ensure that when people leave custody, they will have swift access to the benefits to which they are entitled.

As I mentioned in an earlier debate, we think of coming out of prison as something positive. However, it can be traumatic for people who rely on benefits in a system which they see as complicated, slow and sometimes unhelpful. One report has made the point that people who leave prison with no financial contingency and are highly reliant on the benefit system might, if not helped, return to crime, which has been a proven source of income for them in the past. We know that there have been delays and problems with pre-custodial claims which need to be resolved before a new claim can be made. There can be delays because a person has no fixed abode, and there are sometimes queries over the dates of prison admission and release dates. We know that eight in 10 prisoners are reliant on benefits and that one-third do not have access to a bank account, which makes any down payment for a new home particularly difficult.

Prisoners released over the next few years will come out to a whole new welfare system. The Welfare Reform Act will have changed things enormously, and even those claiming benefits before they went in will have to negotiate a whole new system of rules. There will also be the benefit cap, the bedroom tax and different units to which the payments are made. As the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said, although we welcome the advice given on the jobs programme, released prisoners will also need help with benefits if they are to survive when they come out.

This amendment, which I trust the Government will accept, will be good for prisoners. It will also be good for society and the state if it reduces the chances of reoffending and helps ex-prisoners to re-establish themselves in society.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for continuing to examine the practical difficulties that some ex-prisoners face. We appreciate the difficulties that they may face when trying to resettle in the community and we have taken a number of steps to address these problems.

When the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, withdrew his amendment in Committee, he expressed the hope that the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Work and Pensions would communicate more effectively on this issue. My noble friend Lord McNally wrote to my noble friend Lord Freud and I can give the noble Lord an absolute reassurance that our departments are working very closely to address the gap between release and receipt of benefits.

Prisoners’ needs are already often assessed on reception as part of the sentence plan. New prisoners are specifically asked about benefits by staff at induction and are referred to one of the 140 Jobcentre Plus employment and benefit advisers currently working in prisons. In addition, all prison leavers have their rehabilitation needs reviewed as part of the discharge process only weeks before release. It is this period close to release that is key to meeting resettlement needs, and that is where the Government have invested resources.

The Government are doing a great deal to overcome resettlement barriers and are currently implementing a strong package of measures. The key strategy to take this forward is the data-linking project which is being undertaken by the Ministry of Justice and the DWP. The project shows that more than half of offenders sentenced to custody are claiming benefits immediately prior to their incarceration, and two years after release from prison almost half are claiming out-of-work benefits. This is the scale of the task we face as we seek to make improvements to the process.

However, improvements are there. From 1 March, offenders leaving custody have their jobseeker’s allowance claims processed before they leave. We expect to reach some 30,000 prisoners a year. Jobcentre Plus advisers are rightly in the lead on providing advice and administering benefit claims, but they are working closely with prison staff to facilitate this process, including advice on financial support available prior to release. We believe that this is the right point at which to make assessments for eligibility.

We are also aiming to address the finance gap through our plans for universal credit payments. Under our proposals, an applicant, on leaving prison with a valid claim, can be paid his claim immediately through payment on account in the same way as any other benefit claimant. All of this is intended to help prison leavers get their benefits quickly and help increase their chances of finding work, which is also a key part of the Government’s agenda on reducing reoffending.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 156A would have prisons potentially duplicating the work of Jobcentre Plus. In addition, the process proposed by the amendment would require the Prison Service to conduct sometimes wasted work. A mandatory assessment of all offenders on entering into custody would either be premature—as the work done on entering prison is highly likely to need updating as the sentence continues—or not needed at all, if the personal circumstances of that person do not justify it.

The Government are fully committed to ensuring that ex-prisoners have the support they need to make a successful and productive return to society. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is quite right in his aim in this respect. Our proposals on ex-prisoners’ access to welfare benefits are part of that commitment. I hope that what I have said today reassures the noble Lord and that he will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. Just to correct her, I had no intention of duplicating any work; I was hoping that the Jobcentre Plus representative in prison would do the work while in prison so that it did not have to be done in the jobcentre outside prison. So it was early work by the jobcentre—nothing more by the Prison Service. I am very glad to hear that this has happened, and it is useful that, at last, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Ministry of Justice have come together, because this is a piece of joint working that could have been done years ago and would have saved a great deal of misery among released prisoners. Rather like the previous amendment, this is something on which the Government can expect to be questioned at fairly regular intervals in the future. Again, in that spirit, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Northover]

156B: Before Schedule 22, insert the following new Schedule—
“Dangerous offenders subject to service law etcPart 1Sentences for dangerous offenders subject to service law etcArmed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)1 The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.
2 After section 218 and the italic heading “Required or discretionary sentences for particular offences” insert—
“218A Life sentence for second listed offence
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person aged 18 or over is convicted by the Court Martial of an offence under section 42 (criminal conduct);(b) the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence listed in Part 1 of Schedule 15B to the 2003 Act;(c) the offence was committed after this section comes into force; and(d) the sentence condition and the previous offence condition are met.(2) Section 224A(2) of the 2003 Act applies in relation to the offender.
(3) In section 224A(2)(a) of that Act as applied by subsection (2)—
(a) the reference to “the offence” is to be read as a reference to the offence under section 42; and(b) the reference to “the previous offence referred to in subsection (4)” is to be read as a reference to the previous offence referred to in subsection (5) of this section.(4) The sentence condition is that, but for this section, the Court Martial would, in compliance with sections 260(2) and 261(2), impose a sentence of imprisonment for 10 years or more, disregarding any extension period imposed under section 226A of the 2003 Act as applied by section 219A of this Act.
(5) The previous offence condition is that—
(a) at the time the offence under section 42 was committed, the offender had been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 15B to the 2003 Act (“the previous offence”); and(b) a relevant life sentence or a relevant sentence of imprisonment or detention for a determinate period was imposed on the offender for the previous offence.(6) A sentence is relevant for the purposes of subsection (5)(b) if it would be relevant for the purposes of section 224A(4)(b) of the 2003 Act (see subsections (5) to (10) of that section).
(7) A sentence required to be imposed by section 224A(2) of that Act as a result of this section is not to be regarded as a sentence fixed by law.”
3 (1) Section 219 (dangerous offenders aged 18 or over) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) Section 225(2) of the 2003 Act applies in relation to the offender.”
(3) In subsection (3) omit “and (3A)”.
4 In the heading of that section for “Dangerous” substitute “Life sentence for certain dangerous”.
5 After that section insert—
“219A Extended sentence for certain violent or sexual offenders aged 18 or over
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person aged 18 or over is convicted by the Court Martial of an offence under section 42 (criminal conduct) (whether the offence was committed before or after the commencement of this section);(b) the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified offence;(c) the court is of the required opinion (defined by section 223); (d) the court is not required to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life by section 224A(2) of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 218A of this Act) or section 225(2) of that Act (as applied by section 219 of this Act); and(e) condition A or B is met.(2) Condition A is that, at the time the offence under section 42 was committed, the offender had been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 15B to the 2003 Act.
(3) Condition B is that, if the court were to impose an extended sentence of imprisonment under section 226A of the 2003 Act as a result of this section, the term that it would specify as the appropriate custodial term would be at least 4 years.
(4) Subsections (4) to (9) of section 226A of the 2003 Act apply in relation to the offender.
(5) In section 226A(4) to (9) of the 2003 Act as applied by this section—
(a) the reference in subsection (6) to section 153(2) of the 2003 Act is to be read as a reference to section 261(2) of this Act;(b) the reference in subsection (7) to further specified offences includes a reference to further acts or omissions that would be specified offences if committed in England and Wales;(c) the reference in subsection (8)(a) to a specified violent offence is to be read as a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified violent offence; and(d) the reference in subsection (8)(b) to a specified sexual offence is to be read as a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified sexual offence.(6) In this section “specified offence”, “specified sexual offence” and “specified violent offence” have the meanings given by section 224 of the 2003 Act.”
6 Omit section 220 (certain violent or sexual offenders aged 18 or over).
7 In section 221 (dangerous offenders aged under 18) for subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) Section 226(2) of the 2003 Act applies in relation to the offender.”
8 In the heading of that section for “Dangerous” substitute “Life sentence for certain dangerous”.
9 After that section insert—
“221A Extended sentence for certain violent or sexual offenders aged under 18
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person aged under 18 is convicted by the Court Martial of an offence under section 42 (criminal conduct) (whether the offence was committed before or after the commencement of this section);(b) the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified offence;(c) the court is of the required opinion (defined by section 223); (d) the court is not required by section 226(2) of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 221 of this Act) to impose a sentence of detention for life under section 209 of this Act; and(e) if the court were to impose an extended sentence of detention under section 226B of the 2003 Act as a result of this section, the term that it would specify as the appropriate custodial term would be at least 4 years.(2) Subsections (2) to (7) of section 226B of the 2003 Act apply in relation to the offender.
(3) In section 226B(2) to (7) of the 2003 Act as applied by this section—
(a) the reference in subsection (4) to section 153(2) of the 2003 Act is to be read as a reference to section 261(2) of this Act;(b) the reference in subsection (5) to further specified offences includes a reference to further acts or omissions that would be specified offences if committed in England and Wales;(c) the reference in subsection (6)(a) to a specified violent offence is to be read as a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified violent offence; and(d) the reference in subsection (6)(b) to a specified sexual offence is to be read as a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified sexual offence.(4) In this section “specified offence”, “specified sexual offence” and “specified violent offence” have the meanings given by section 224 of the 2003 Act.”
10 Omit section 222 (offenders aged under 18: certain violent or sexual offences).
Part 2Consequential provisionJuries Act 1974 (c. 23)11 In Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Juries Act 1974 (persons disqualified from jury service) in paragraph 6(d) after “2003” insert “(including such a sentence imposed as a result of section 219A, 220, 221A or 222 of the Armed Forces Act 2006)”.
Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27))12 In article 6(1) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (sentences excluded from rehabilitation under the Order) in sub-paragraph (g)(iii) after “section” insert “226A, 226B,”.
Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)13 In section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (early release of prisoners) in subsection (1A)—
(a) before “227” insert “226A or”, and(b) after “219” insert “, 219A”.Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6)14 The Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is amended as follows.
15 In section 99 (conversion of sentence of detention to sentence of imprisonment) in subsection (6)—
(a) after “226” insert “, 226B”, and(b) after “221” insert “, 221A”.16 In section 106A(1) (interaction with sentence of detention) in the definition of “sentence of detention”—
(a) before “228”, in the second place it appears, insert “226B or”, and(b) before “222” insert “221A or”.Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c. 43)17 The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows.
18 In section 62 (release on licence etc: conditions as to monitoring) in subsection (5)(f) after “221” insert “, 221A”.
19 In section 64 (release on licence etc: drug testing requirements) in subsection (5)(f) after “221” insert “, 221A”.
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)20 In section 131 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (young offenders: application) in paragraph (l) before “222” insert “221A or”.
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)21 In section 237 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (meaning of fixed term prisoner etc) in subsection (1B) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(ba) references to a sentence under section 226A of this Act include a sentence under that section passed as a result of section 219A of the Armed Forces Act 2006;(bb) references to a sentence under section 226B of this Act include a sentence under that section passed as a result of section 221A of the Armed Forces Act 2006;”.Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)22 The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.
23 (1) Section 188 (consecutive custodial sentences) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2) in paragraph (c)—
(a) for “228” substitute “226B”, and(b) for “222” substitute “221A”.(3) In subsection (4) in paragraph (c)—
(a) before “228” insert “226B or”, and(b) before “222” insert “221A or”.24 In section 209 (offenders aged under 18 convicted of certain serious offences: power to detain for specified period) in subsection (7)—
(a) for “section 226(2)” substitute “sections 224A and 226(2)”, and(b) for “section 221(2)” substitute “sections 218A and 221(2)”.25 In section 211 (offenders aged under 18: detention and training orders) in subsection (4)—
(a) after “218,” insert “218A,”, and(b) for “222” substitute “221A”.26 In section 221(3) (dangerous offenders aged under 18) after “as applied” insert “by”.
27 In section 223 (the “required opinion” for the purposes of sections 219 to 222) in subsection (1)—
(a) for “220(1)” substitute “219A(1)”, and(b) for “222(1)” substitute “221A(1)”.28 In the heading of that section for “222” substitute “221A”.
29 For section 224 (place of detention under certain sentences) substitute—
“224 Place of detention under certain sentences
Section 235 of the 2003 Act (detention under sections 226, 226B and 228) applies to a person sentenced to be detained under section 226(3), 226B or 228 of that Act as applied by section 221, 221A or 222 of this Act.”
30 (1) Section 228 (appeals where previous convictions set aside) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (1) substitute—
“(1A) Subsection (3) applies in the cases described in subsections (1B) to (2).
(1B) The first case is where—
(a) a sentence has been imposed on any person under section 224A of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 218A of this Act);(b) a previous conviction of that person has been subsequently set aside on appeal; and(c) without that conviction, the previous offence condition mentioned in section 218A(1)(d) would not have been met. (1C) The second case is where—
(a) a sentence has been imposed on any person under section 225(3) of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 219(2) of this Act);(b) the condition in section 225(3A) of the 2003 Act was met but the condition in section 225(3B) of that Act was not; and(c) any previous conviction of the person without which the condition in section 225(3A) would not have been met is subsequently set aside on appeal.(1D) The third case is where—
(a) a sentence has been imposed on any person under section 226A of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 219A of this Act);(b) the condition in section 219A(2) was met, but the condition in section 219A(3) was not; and (c) any previous conviction of the person without which the condition in section 219A(2) would not have been met is subsequently set aside on appeal.(1E) The fourth case is where—
(a) a sentence has been imposed on any person under section 227(2) of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 220(2) of this Act);(b) the condition in section 227(2A) of the 2003 Act was met but the condition in section 227(2B) of that Act was not; and(c) any previous conviction of the person without which the condition in section 227(2A) would not have been met is subsequently set aside on appeal.”(3) In subsection (2)—
(a) for “Subsection (3) also applies” substitute “The fifth case is”; and(b) in paragraph (a) after “226” insert “of this Act”.(4) After subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) Subsection (3B) applies where—
(a) a sentence has been imposed on a person under section 224A of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 218A of this Act);(b) a previous sentence imposed on that person has been subsequently modified on appeal; and(c) taking account of that modification, the previous offence condition mentioned in section 218A(1)(d) would not have been met.(3B) An application for leave to appeal against the sentence mentioned in subsection (3A)(a) may be lodged at any time within 29 days beginning with the day on which the previous sentence was modified.”
(5) In subsection (4) for “Subsection (3) has” substitute “Subsections (3) and (3B) have”.
31 In section 237 (duty to have regard to the purposes of sentencing etc) in subsection (3)(b)—
(a) after “sections” insert “218A,”, and(b) before “225(2)” insert “224A,”.32 In section 246 (crediting of time in service custody: terms of imprisonment and detention) in subsection (6)(b)—
(a) before “228” insert “226B or”, and(b) before “222” insert “221A or”.33 (1) Section 256 (pre-sentence reports) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(c)—
(a) for “220(1)” substitute “219A(1)”, and(b) for “222(1)” substitute “221A(1)”.(3) After subsection (9) insert—
“(10) The reference in subsection (1)(a) to a court forming any such opinion as is mentioned in section 260(2) or 261(2) includes a court forming such an opinion for the purposes of section 218A(4).”
34 (1) Section 260 (discretionary custodial sentences: general restrictions) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(b)—
(a) before “225(2)” insert “224A,”, and(b) before “219(2)” insert “218A,”.(3) After subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) The reference in subsection (4) to a court forming any such opinion as is mentioned in subsection (2) or section 261(2) includes a court forming such an opinion for the purposes of section 218A(4).
(4B) The reference in subsection (4) to a court forming any such opinion as is mentioned in section 261(2) also includes a court forming such an opinion for the purposes of section 226A(6) or 226B(4) of the 2003 Act (as applied by section 219A or 221A of this Act).”
35 (1) Section 261 (length of discretionary custodial sentences: general provision) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) before “225” insert “224A,”, and(b) before “219(2)” insert “218A,”.(3) In subsection (3) for “220, 222” substitute “219A, 221A”.
36 In section 273 (review of unduly lenient sentence by Court Martial Appeal Court) in subsection (6)(b)—
(a) before “225(2)” insert “224A,”, and(b) before “219(2)” insert “218A,”.37 In section 374 (definitions applying for purposes of the whole Act) in the definition of “custodial sentence” after paragraph (e) (but before the “or” at the end of that paragraph) insert—
“(ea) a sentence of detention under section 226B of that Act passed as a result of section 221A of this Act;”.Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28)38 In Schedule 6 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (notification requirements: application to service offences) in paragraph 5(1)(a) after sub-paragraph (vi) (but before the “or” at the end of that sub-paragraph) insert—
“(via) detention under section 226B of that Act (extended sentence of detention for certain dangerous offenders aged under 18);”.Part 3Transitory provision39 (1) In relation to any time before the repeal of section 30 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (protection of children: supplemental) by Schedule 10 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, that section has effect with the modification in sub-paragraph (2).
(2) In subsection (1), in paragraph (dd) of the definition of “qualifying sentence”, after “2003” insert “(including such a sentence imposed as a result of section 221, 221A or 222 of the Armed Forces Act 2006)”.”

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[Lord Bach]

My Lords, from the opposition Front Bench I thank the noble Lord for the impressive way in which he moved the amendment, and an impressive amendment it is too. He could not have put the case better. We look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in reply, and we would be very surprised if it is not sympathetic.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I, too, thank my noble friend Lord Sharkey for putting his case, and indeed I have deep sympathy for it. The amendment appears to extend the provisions contained in the Protection of Freedoms Bill so that they are also available to those who are no longer alive. The provisions in that Bill allow a person to apply to have his historic convictions for consensual gay sex with over-16 year-olds deleted from official records, the effect of which is that those convictions will no longer affect that person’s life or career. This was a commitment made in our programme for government. However, the objective is not to rewrite history. The provision in the Protection of Freedoms Bill does not state that the person was wrongfully convicted, nor does it pardon them. It is just that they can now be treated for all purposes in law as someone who was not convicted of those offences.

The position in relation to those who have been convicted of this type of offence and have since died is different. I understand the strength of feeling about such convictions, and the cruelty of the laws under which they were imposed, and I know that this is particularly true in relation to the conviction of Dr Alan Turing. As Gordon Brown said in 2009, while we cannot put the clock back, we recognise that his treatment was utterly unfair and we are all deeply sorry for what happened to him. He deserved so much better. That said, I do not believe that the provisions for disregarding convictions, which are concerned with the practical consequences of conviction, are an appropriate means of putting right the wrongs done to people who are no longer alive to suffer those consequences. As my noble friend himself points out, the numbers involved are potentially very large. I understand his aim, but I am afraid that we cannot agree to his amendment. I realise that he will be disappointed, but I am afraid that I must invite him to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord McNally has explained in previous debates why Clause 136 is important to the Government. If somebody stole a car, a handbag or a phone, most people would expect there to be criminal consequences if the offender were caught. Yet, where squatters deprive a person of their residential property, some do not regard this as a crime. We do not accept that logic. The occupation of other people’s homes causes misery, and squatting in residential property should be a criminal offence.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness so early in her comments, but it is a crime. The Criminal Law Act 1977 makes it a crime. Why does she insist that it is not?

[Baroness Northover]

I will come to that in a minute. As I say, occupation of other people’s homes causes misery, and squatting in residential property should be a criminal offence just as the theft of a car would be.

Nor do we agree that squatting is a reasonable answer to homelessness, which is the key point here. In fact it is often dangerous and bad for health, and ideally people should be in mainstream services. We share my noble friend’s concern about homelessness, but squatting is not the answer.

We are therefore proposing a balanced approach: clamping down on the squatting in residential buildings on the one hand, while ensuring that genuinely vulnerable people who might be at risk of squatting or rough sleeping are given the support that they need to find alternative forms of accommodation. We are investing £400 million in homelessness prevention over the next four years, with the homelessness grant being maintained at 2010-11 levels. We also announced in December the first ever £20 million fund to prevent single homelessness. That will help to ensure that single homeless people get the help and advice that they need, and do not have to resort to sleeping on the streets or in squats.

We have also brought together eight government departments through the Ministerial Working Group on Homelessness to tackle the complex causes of homelessness. The group published its first report, Vision to End Rough Sleeping, in July 2011, which sets out joint commitments to tackle homelessness. The working group will publish its second report on preventing homelessness later this spring.

We are also tackling the number of empty homes that often attract anti-social behaviour, vandalism and squatting. We recently announced £70 million of funding to bring more than 5,600 homes back into use as affordable housing. We will announce a further £30 million shortly, including funding for community and voluntary groups.

My noble friend’s Amendment 157A would exempt squatters who occupied buildings that had been empty for a year or more. We believe that that is wrong in principle. We would not accept that after a year of non-use it would be defensible to deprive owners of their other assets such as cars or phones. Moreover, there are many legitimate reasons why a residential building might be left empty for a year or more—for example, when a property is inherited following a death and probate takes some time to be sorted out.

The amendment would also make the offence more difficult to enforce as it would enable squatters facing a charge to argue that the property had been empty for years even if they had no idea whether that was true. Instead of legal arguments turning on the true issue at stake—the criminal occupation of somebody else’s residence—this would muddy the water and put the focus back on the police or the home owner to show how long it had been empty for.

Amendment 157B would remove the definition of “building”, leaving it unclear what “building” in the offence covers and leading to legal arguments on this matter. Amendment 157C would delete the definition of “residential” in Clause 136 and replace it with a new definition. The only residential buildings which would be covered by the offence as a result of the new definition would be those which are used for the purposes set out in class categories C3 and C4 of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987.

The amendments would introduce confusion and complexity. The advantage of the existing clause is that any structure—permanent or temporary, moveable or immoveable—is covered by the offence if it has been designed or adapted for use as a place to live.

My noble friend’s Amendment 157D would further weaken the offence by exempting squatters who entered a building prior to commencement of the offence. This would clearly not be in the interests of home owners. It would not make sense if an offender who entered a property the day before commencement, for example, could not be convicted if they continued to live in the premises against the wishes of the property owner after the offence commenced.

Amendment 160B suggests that the Secretary of State should report to Parliament prior to commencement on likely costs of the new offence to the criminal justice system and local authorities. We published an impact assessment which included costs to the criminal justice system. The impact assessment also recognised that there might be an impact on local authorities if squatters approached them for support. Requiring the Secretary of State to report further on these issues prior to commencement is therefore not necessary.

I know that when my noble friend met the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Crispin Blunt, one of her main fears was that there would be a surge in applications for social housing in the days following commencement. We have taken my noble friend’s point on board. I can assure her that through the Ministerial Working Group on Homelessness, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office will work together to ensure that any local enforcement against squatting is carried out in partnership with local homelessness services to mitigate against an associated increase in rough sleeping.

We will also liaise with local authorities in advance of commencement to ensure that they are aware of the new offence if squatters approach them for help and to remind them of their duties towards homeless people. We will encourage authorities to make use of the good practice advice letter and an additional £20 million of funding to prevent single homelessness, both of which have been developed recently with input from Crisis.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked about the current law and why this was not sustained by what was already there. Why the need for a new offence? The current law can be improved so that it does more to deter squatters from entering and occupying a residential building without permission in the first place. We believe that there should be a specific criminal offence that protects people from those who squat in their residential buildings and that this offence should not be limited to cases where a squatter refuses to leave when required to do so. In addition, the offence under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 does not protect residential property owners who are not displaced occupiers or protected intending occupiers. Currently, they may need to seek repossession of their properties in the civil courts, which can be time-consuming and expensive. That is why we feel that the law needs to be changed.

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[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have not only stayed but spoken so passionately that it makes up in quality for what we did not have in numbers. Several other noble Lords who were not able to stay have expressed their sadness about that. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spoke extremely powerfully. In one way I am glad she was not able to speak in Committee because it gave us the chance to hear some of the arguments lying at the very basis of this issue. It is important to remember, as she outlined, that this is about homeless people. I was disappointed by the Minister’s reply when she kept emphasising the occupation of someone else’s residence or home. These are not residences or homes, by and large; they are simply empty properties. This is the basis of the misunderstanding and it is what I have tried to get to the bottom of.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, for his support and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee who, as always, asked some very incisive questions, some of which I do not feel were fully answered tonight. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, is quite right when he says that I took his advice on extending the six months suggested by Crisis to 12 months, because that puts it beyond doubt that the property is empty. In fact, there are definitions, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, of an empty property, and my amendment is more modest than those.

I have not heard anything new from the Minister tonight about the transition measures. She mentioned that local authorities would be approached by those being criminalised, but I wonder whether she is aware—

[Baroness Northover]

I had a long list of other measures that have been taken, but I thought that the best thing might be to write to the noble Baroness with that rather than detain people too long tonight.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I am grateful to the Minister for that suggestion. Is she saying that the issue is still live and can therefore come back on Third Reading?

[Baroness Northover]

As I said to the noble Baroness, I am very happy to arrange a meeting to take this forward. Then we will have to see where we are at that point.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

Can she give me an assurance that it will be possible to come back on this at Third Reading on the basis of that? Can the Minister clarify what she is saying? She says that she has a list of other measures, but we will not know what they are this evening because she is not reading them out. We will need to know what they are before we decide what to do. She will need to go through the list.

[Baroness Northover]

My understanding is that having left it open it is still open.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying the fact that it is still open. Therefore, it is free for me to bring the matter back before your Lordships at Third Reading.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I would be pleased to ask her again, because it is very important before I make a decision on what to do with this amendment.

[Baroness Northover]

My noble friend says that we have discussed the possibility of meeting and considering this further. I gave her the assurance that this was still open because that was what I was informed, and I reiterate that assurance.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I am grateful to my noble friend. I suspect that that is as far as we can go this evening. I have to say on the record that if I find that the agreement does not hold, I shall have to consider my position very carefully.

I still want to put on record the point that I was about to make because it is very pertinent. The Government should not be under any illusion that local authorities will be in a position to help those who present themselves to them as homeless. I quote from the Crisis report:

“Most are also recognised as homeless by the LA (78 per cent) but few are entitled to accommodation under the terms of the homelessness legislation, typically because they are not considered ‘priority need’, or are deemed ‘intentionally homeless’”.

That leaves thousands of young and middle-aged people in this country potentially being criminalised. We have not heard what measures the Government will put in place tonight to mitigate that. I am in some doubt as to whether we will be able to return to this issue, but I am sure that when the House reads this debate it will be the will of the House that we return to it. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.