Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Tuesday 20th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, which will see the establishment of a women’s justice policy unit to review the treatment women received when they enter the criminal justice system. The unit would develop a government strategy for dealing with women offenders and the problems surrounding reoffending. Both these functions would be welcome.

In Committee, I supported an amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, which called for courts to have regard for the effect of sentencing on dependants when sentencing women. I referred to the admirable work that the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, and her influential 2007 report have done to raise awareness of the particular problems facing women in the penal system. Women tend to fall into crime for specific reasons and, it is often claimed, are penalised more harshly than men.

The effect that prison has on women is more taxing. As the report by the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, points out, prisons were designed for men and thus the conditions are particularly unforgiving for women. For example, recent figures suggest that 37 per cent of women prisoners have attempted suicide, 51 per cent have severe mental illness, 47 per cent have a major depressive disorder, and 50 per cent have been subject to domestic violence and 33 per cent to sexual abuse. Developing a specific strategy to ensure that women in the penal system receive more appropriate services is fundamental if these appalling statistics are to be improved.

That the unit would tackle the problems which often give rise to women offending is welcome. It is a venture which would limit the number of women who end up in contact with the justice system in the first place. This is particularly important when we consider that, according to the Government’s figures, 54 per cent of women who are imprisoned are reconvicted within 12 months, rising to 64 per cent if the sentence was shorter than a year. To tackle offending and to limit reoffending, it is vital to eliminate the problems which cause women to fall victim to this vicious cycle of crime.

I am pleased to see that the unit would review the delivery of services relating to children and families. In Committee, we discussed the effect that sentencing can have on dependants. Some 66 per cent of female prisoners have children compared with 59 per cent of men. The Howard League for Penal Reform estimates that only 5 per cent of female prisoners’ children remain with the family when their mother is incarcerated compared with 90 per cent of male prisoners’ children. Clearly sentencing has an undeniable and often disastrous impact on women’s families. For that reason, more than most, the implementation of a unit to oversee and review strategies for women in the justice system would be a positive improvement, not just for these women, but for society at large.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I want to make a very brief point in support of my noble friend Lady Corston. She talked about how we cannot leave the issue of women in the criminal justice system to the Ministry of Justice alone. My noble friend Lord Judd made the case for an interdisciplinary approach. Many women get caught up in the criminal justice system because their crimes are crimes of poverty. Women are more vulnerable to poverty than men, and many women in this country are experiencing poverty. They have to manage poverty while looking after their children. As well as a criminal justice system better attuned to the needs of women, we need an anti-poverty policy better attuned to the needs of women. A unit such as this could link the two.

[Baroness Stern]

My Lords, this amendment does not ask for much. It is indeed modesty itself. It asks for a focus, a group of people in the Ministry of Justice whose job should be to carry forward the excellent policies that the Minister told the House about in Committee. It makes it clear that the Ministry of Justice cannot do this on its own and calls for the Ministry of Health, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Home Office to be involved—a point that has just been ably made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. It makes it clear that they should report to a ministerial group and that there should be an annual report.

This amendment is not a criticism of the Government’s work so far, nor of that of the previous Government. It is recognition that this is a particularly intractable problem. Efforts are made by many people, and the situation gets a little better, but then it reverts. The Minister will know, because he has just kindly answered a Written Question that I asked, that the Chief Inspector of Prisons said of the Keller unit at Styal prison that it constitutes,

“a wholly unsuitable place to safely hold and manage very seriously damaged and mentally ill women”.

The conditions in which such women are held in Styal prison have been criticised on and off for many years. On 15 February, in Committee, the Minister said that,

“one does not need to visit many women’s prisons to see that far too many prisoners should not be there”.—[Official Report, 15/2/12; col. 876.]

Ministers have said that before. This is not politically contentious. There is wide agreement about what should happen but sadly it does not change or it changes at the margins—one aspect improves while another deteriorates.

That is why there is wide support among those who are concerned with this issue for a statutory framework, a strategy, a focal point and an annual report that will allow Parliament to see if at last we are moving forwards and seeing improvements that last. I very much hope that the Minister will support this modest proposal.

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[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I turn to a group of government amendments that concern three areas. I will deal first with the substantive amendments. The first concerns the duties on courts to explain a sentence. The second deals with powers to withdraw distress warrants. I will then deal with the grouped technical amendments that relate to the powers of magistrates to impose fines.

First, government amendment 152ZA relates to the revised provisions in Clause 61, which deal with the duties on courts to give reasons for, and explain the effect of, a sentence. These duties already exist under Section 174 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 but Clause 61 provides for a revised and simplified version of the requirements.

We had an excellent debate on this in Committee. My noble friend Lord McNally was very grateful for the opportunity to discuss the concerns that several Peers had in relation to this duty and the needs of offenders who have learning difficulties or other problems understanding the sentence imposed on them. I pay particular tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Rix, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Wigley, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Quin and Lady Gould, who have provided enormous insight into the problems that these offenders may face.

As my noble friend said in Committee, the Government were concerned to ensure that we got the balance right between removing unduly prescriptive provisions on sentencers while retaining the important duties to explain a sentence in court. The Government also wanted to ensure that the law remained practical, taking account of the million-plus sentencing decisions made by the courts each year.

The Government have looked again at these provisions, in light of the helpful discussions that we had in Committee. We believe that the basic statutory duties to give reasons for a sentence and explain the effect of a sentence, in open court and in ordinary language, remain appropriate for the vast majority of cases, but we also accept the point made by noble Lords that further guidance on this may be required.

With that in mind, we have looked at subsection (4) of the revised Section 174, which gives a power to the Lord Chancellor to prescribe cases where the duty to explain can be less onerous or not required at all. This power has existed since the 2003 Act came into force but has never been exercised by the Lord Chancellor. On reflection, we think that such a power would be better exercised by the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, an independent body that provides rules that govern the way the criminal courts operate. The Criminal Procedure Rules already touch on the sentencing process so it seems more appropriate that the committee should have a specific power in this regard.

The first part of this amendment transfers the Lord Chancellor’s order-making power to a rules-making power for the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. Secondly, the amendment clarifies the scope of the power in relation to the duties on sentencers. The amendment retains the power for the rules to prescribe when the duties to give reasons for the sentence or explain the sentence to the offender do not apply; for example, where the sentence is obvious because there is a fixed penalty or where the case is entirely dealt with on the papers without the offender being present, as happens with many low-level road traffic offences.

I draw particular attention to the fact that the amendment also allows the rules to make provision about how an explanation of the effect of a sentence is to be given to the offender. This allows the rules to cover, if required, any particular circumstances the courts should consider when meeting the statutory duty to explain the effect of a sentence to an offender.

I have no doubt that the committee, in considering this new power, will take account of the debate that your Lordships had in Committee and the helpful representations that have been made from organisations such as Mencap and the Prison Reform Trust. I will ensure that these are flagged to the committee. We believe that the consideration of the detail of requirements is better dealt with via rules than primary legislation. One of the Criminal Procedure Rules already requires the court to,

“explain the sentence, the reasons for it, and its effect, in terms the defendant can understand (with help, if necessary)”.

I thank noble Lords for sharing the benefit of their wisdom and hope that this amendment achieves our goal of allowing for practical measures to be taken to ensure that the duties to explain a sentence are met in every case.

Government Amendment 152BYH relates to a very specific area of the law that deals with distress warrants. Distress warrants are issued following the non-payment of a fine, to recover the value of the fine imposed by the courts. They can be issued by a court or by a fines officer. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, tabled an amendment that sought, among other things, to clarify the law on distress warrants, and in particular whether it was possible to withdraw a distress warrant once it had been issued. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford also highlighted the problem of the inability to withdraw distress warrants.

I indicated in response to noble Lords that the Government were willing to look at the issue and, if a change in the law was necessary, to return to it on Report. That is what we have done. I very much welcomed the opportunity we had to discuss this issue with the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, as well as drawing on the expertise of the Z2K Trust and the CAB.

We accept that the current law is flawed. This amendment makes a number of changes, mainly to Schedule 5 to the Courts Act 2003. The new clause introduced by the amendment does four things. First, it provides magistrates’ court fines officers with the power to withdraw distress warrants they have issued, in the circumstances specified in new paragraph (40A), which is introduced by subsection (8) of the new clause. This means that a fines officer can withdraw the warrant if there is any part of the sum left to pay and if the fines officer is satisfied that the warrant was issued by mistake. This can include a mistake made as a result of non-disclosure or a misrepresentation of a material fact in the case.

Secondly, the amendment makes it clear in new paragraph (40B) that a magistrates’ court has a similar power to discharge a distress warrant issued by a fines officer as it does to discharge such a warrant issued by the court itself. Thirdly, the amendment enables fines officers to take further steps to enforce a penalty where a distress warrant has been withdrawn, but this time taking into account information that was not available when the distress warrant was issued; this includes the power to issue a further distress warrant. Finally, the amendment enables magistrates’ courts to exercise any of their powers in respect of a fines defaulter where a distress warrant has been withdrawn, including issuing a further distress warrant.

Noble Lords will have noticed that while I have explained the amendment in terms of “distress warrants”, the amendment itself refers to “warrants of control”. That reflects the new terminology that will apply when the relevant provisions of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which are presently the subject of consultation, are commenced. However, transitional provision will be made under the powers in Part 4 of this Bill to the effect that, until those 2007 Act provisions come into force, these provisions are to have effect as if the references to warrants of control were to warrants of distress.

These changes put the question of whether a distress warrant can be withdrawn beyond doubt and provide clear but practical powers for the courts and fines officers to deal with mistakes in the issuing of warrants. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, and to the tireless work of Reverend Paul Nicolson of the Z2K Trust, for identifying these problems and encouraging us to address them.

Finally, government Amendments 152BA to 152BYG deal with the changes to magistrates’ fines powers in Clauses 80 to 82. These amendments are largely technical and ensure that Clauses 80 to 82 operate as intended. The policy intention here is unchanged: the clauses remove the upper limit on the level of fines available in the magistrates’ courts on summary conviction. They also allow for the uprating of other fines, in particular by providing a power to increase the maximum fine amounts for levels 1 to 4 on the standard scale of fines for summary offences.

I draw your Lordships’ attention to the set of amendments that applies the provisions to fines imposed for common law offences which can be dealt with by magistrates. These offences—“causing a public nuisance” and “outraging public decency”—were not caught by the previous version of the clauses. It is important that magistrates should have the freedom to impose larger fines for these offences in the same way as they will be able to do when sentencing offenders committing statutory offences.

Overall, these amendments now deliver more effectively the Government’s objectives. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, as the Minister has explained, Amendment 152BYH is in response to an amendment I tabled in Committee with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The purpose was to remove legal confusion about the power of bailiffs to return a fine to magistrates for consideration. That confusion has resulted in hardship for many vulnerable people.

I am grateful to the Minister and to the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for meeting me and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, as well as representatives of Zacchaeus 2000 and Citizens Advice to discuss this and related matters. I am even more grateful that the Government agree that the current law is flawed and that this Bill provides the ideal vehicle for removing the confusion. I assume therefore that they do not expect that there will be a further suitable Bill coming along in the foreseeable future and thus they brought forward their own amendment.

I had hoped that I would be able to sit down at this point and that all would be sweetness and light, but as the noble Baroness knows I am worried that the amendment refers simply to the power to withdraw the warrant where there has been a mistake, albeit one made in consequence of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact. Rectifying mistakes will not prevent all of the kinds of problems that Zacchaeus 2000 and Citizens Advice have identified. I am particularly concerned about cases where there has been a change of circumstances since the fine was set. For instance, if the debtor’s or defaulter’s material circumstances have changed because of illness, unemployment or relationship breakdown, that could have just the same effect on the ability to pay the fine as if there had been a mistake at the time of the original determination.

I have been in touch by e-mail with the Ministry of Justice about this. Its response was that while the amendment does not cover a simple change of circumstances, it is clear that a debtor can argue that the change of circumstances, if it had been known to the court, would have affected the decision to issue the warrant, so the decision was based on a mistake as to the debtor’s circumstances and that, in other words, the provision in the amendment goes further than the simple slip rule would do.

Will the Minister clarify this statement for your Lordships’ House? I do not really understand what it means. Does it mean that if a debtor’s circumstances change for the worse after the fine has been set and the bailiff is made aware of it, the bailiff can withdraw the warrant and return the fine to the magistrates’ courts on the grounds that the fine would not have been set on that basis had those circumstances pertained when it was set? If it means that, I urge the Minister to withdraw the amendment and make that clear at Third Reading. Otherwise I fear that we face a new source of legal confusion. If it does not mean that, I fear that the amendment will not go nearly far enough to resolve the kind of problems that Z2K and Citizens Advice have brought to our attention. Will the Minister withdraw the amendment and think again before Third Reading? Can the Minister confirm that a mistake will cover cases where the defaulter was not in court when the fine was imposed so that the mistake was made because the full circumstances were not known?

In Committee, the Minister prayed in aid the revision of the National Standards for Enforcement Agents, and in particular the standards they set for dealing with vulnerable and socially excluded people. The revised standards for such situations, now published on the MoJ website, are virtually identical to those previously in operation. It is clear from the experience of Z2K and Citizens Advice that they have not provided an adequate safeguard. That is why we had hoped that the amendment would ensure that bailiffs have discretion within the application of the Wednesbury principles—in other words, a test of reasonableness—to return a fine to the magistrates’ court when they discover that the debtor is in a vulnerable situation as set out in the National Standards for Enforcement Agents.

I am disappointed but realise that the Minister signalled this in Committee. Can I ask that the MoJ monitors this? If it is clear that the National Standards for Enforcement Agents are not on their own providing an adequate safeguard, will the Government consider returning to this issue at the next legislative opportunity?

In conclusion, I thank the Government for having moved on this issue. However, I am seeking assurances about the situation with regard to a change of circumstances, to be made clear in an amendment at Third Reading, if necessary, and about monitoring the effectiveness of the National Standards for Enforcement Agents, which state that,

“the agent has a duty to contact the creditor and report the circumstances in situations where there is evidence of a potential cause for concern”,

to ensure that that happens. Otherwise I fear that vulnerable people will continue to suffer and that legal confusion will continue to reign.

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[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, this has been another useful debate. I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for the Government’s changes to the duty to explain. I encourage him to feed in his concerns to the committee. I have no doubt whatever that noble Lords will scrutinise how the duty is being implemented. The fact that this may not be part of legislation will not stop people reporting, debating and asking whether this is working as it should. The Government clearly cannot dictate to the committee what it should make its rules on and what it should say, but I have no doubt that when and if noble Lords find that this is not being implemented as they feel it should be, that will have its effect.

On distress warrants, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for her guarded welcome of the Government’s amendment. She questioned whether the amendment goes far enough and was kind enough to send an e-mail with a number of questions. She has referred to our response, which gives me an opportunity to expand on or clarify a number of those points. She was concerned, among other things, about whether it allowed for the withdrawal of a distress warrant where there had been a change in the offender’s circumstances or where the offender was deemed to be vulnerable. I will do my best to reassure her on a few points.

It is clear that the government amendment allows for the withdrawal of a warrant where there is a mistake in the decision to issue the warrant in the first place. The amendment covers the case where an offender is not in court when the warrant is issued, which results in the court not having the full information before it. This, in effect, amounts to a mistake. I hope that that also helps to reassure my noble friend Lord Thomas. If there has been a change of circumstances that, had it been known to the court, would have had an impact on the decision to issue a warrant, it is open to the debtor to argue that the warrant had been issued by mistake.

The noble Baroness also raised the question of bailiffs dealing with debtors who find themselves in hardship or appear to be vulnerable. It is important that we strike the right balance between protecting the vulnerable—she is right about that—and ensuring that fines, where appropriate, are paid. Noble Lords will have seen recent criticisms of fine payment rates. The fine is by far the most used sentence of the criminal courts.

In practice, however, when bailiffs come across hardship as defined in the guidance they should not execute the warrant and return it to the court. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I must say that we would welcome any further information on this matter and on the effectiveness, which she has queried, of the guidance. It is very important that that is monitored. The Government do not think that it would be appropriate for a bailiff simply to withdraw a warrant in regard to a fine issued by a court. This could undermine the decision made by the court, which is why such a power is not included in the amendment, although I realise that that will disappoint the noble Baroness. If, however, the fine was imposed because the full facts were not made clear to the court, or they had changed, the provision in the Bill could apply.

In the case of changed circumstances since the fine was imposed, the debtor can contact the court at any time to speak to a fines officer to have the matter reviewed. The Government would encourage any debtor to contact the fines officer or court about a change of circumstance, which is clearly a better approach than waiting until a bailiff seeks to execute a warrant, but it is important that we separate the two parts in that respect.

As I said in Committee, the Government think it is important that bailiffs are dealt with via effective guidance, national standards and contractual obligations. As the noble Baroness knows, the Government are consulting on the operation of bailiffs, and we will carefully consider responses to that consultation. I hope that the noble Baroness and the organisations with which she is associated will feed into that consultation.

I hope that the noble Baroness can be reassured that the government amendment addresses the key legal issue with distress warrants and places the decision on them properly with the courts. How bailiffs operate is a matter for consultation in order to make sure that they operate properly and as we would wish. I hope therefore that the noble Baroness is reassured and content with what the Government have brought forward.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I got the impression that the Minister was saying that outside organisations should do the monitoring. I would argue that the Government have a responsibility to monitor this. I realise that some of this will be covered by the current consultation, but if there is to be a reliance on the national standards and the requirements and standards are not written in the Bill, it is incumbent on the Government to monitor and to make sure, as she said, that these national standards are effective.

[Baroness Northover]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. I was trying to indicate that a number of organisations are closely involved in such cases. Their information is extremely useful to the Government because they are often closer. However, the Government have picked up on the concerns, which has led them to decide that they need a consultation on the operation of the bailiffs system. I hope that she will be reassured by that government involvement in trying to take that matter forward.

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[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

My Lords, I am sure that the House will find it convenient if we discuss all the amendments relating to Clause 136 in one group and, therefore, I intend to regroup them. I am sure that your Lordships will not need reminding that this matter was not discussed at all in Committee in the Commons and was discussed very late at night in your Lordships’ House, although it was not at a quarter to midnight.

Even given your Lordships’ stamina, I do not think that this is any way in which to deal with a major point of principle. It is no accident that squatting in an empty property has never before been criminalised in the UK. In its historic context, it has been seen as a humane response to the homeless seeking shelter. Any big change deserves more scrutiny than it has so far had in its entire passage through Parliament. Even though the hour is late, I hope that we will discuss the principle and, should Parliament decide on the principle that the Government are asking for, some of the practical measures that need to be further considered. That is what my amendments seek to address.

This is a cross-departmental matter. It will involve the Home Office because the police will have to spend a lot more time and resources. It will involve the Department for Communities and Local Government because local authorities will be involved in rehousing tens of thousands of people who will be made homeless. The MoJ will be involved because of all the people who will end up being criminalised. In addition, there is the entire housing issue, and I am sure that your Lordships will join me in wishing that this had come as part of a housing Bill.

We need to talk about a lot of issues, but I will turn directly to the practicality of my amendments. Amendment 157A was suggested by the charity for the homeless, Crisis. This is an issue about homelessness. If a building has been empty for more than 12 months, someone squatting in it should not be criminalised. I spoke to that issue at greater length in Committee, so I will leave it at that for now.

Amendments 157B and 157C deal with “residential”. The Bill defines “residential” very loosely. If a garage had a bed in it, even someone wandering into it and lying on that bed could criminalise themselves by that action. The drafting of the definition of residential is far too wide, and we should think about it.

Amendment 157D deals with the even more worrying issue of retrospectivity. No one knows exactly—I have asked Written Questions on this and the Government have admitted that they do not know—but there could be up to 50,000 or 60,000 people squatting at the moment. If they are all criminalised overnight, what will they do? Will they present themselves as homeless to local authorities? That is what retrospectivity means here. They will not have a choice: they will either have to stay where they are and risk becoming criminalised or they will have to present themselves as homeless, and that has tremendous implications.

I am grateful to the Minister and his colleague, Crispin Blunt, who talked through transition measures with me, but there is an awful lot more we need to discuss with regard to this. I cannot think of a single local authority which would be in a position at the moment to deal with anything like 200 homeless people presenting themselves on its doorstep, let alone thousands. This is a big issue which needs further discussion. As I have said, it obviously has cross-departmental implications.

In fact, it is practicality which worries me most. The Government could choose to bring this measure in over a considerably longer period because we cannot solve the problem extremely quickly. I am sure that in their hearts the Government do not want to criminalise a section of the population who, very often through no fault of their own, are homeless. The clause is about squatters, but if you described them as “vulnerable homeless”, most people’s reaction would be different. I know the debate in the press and in political circles has been coloured by perhaps a dozen cases that the press have quoted, but I remind your Lordships that they were of squatters who went into someone’s home and that people’s homes are already protected in legislation. There are thousands of people out there who are in empty properties because they are homeless and seeking shelter. The Government need to give further thought to how they are going to deal with so many people presenting themselves as homeless. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I am pleased to have added my name in support of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer. I pay tribute to her for her tenacity in making sure that this damaging clause is not completely overlooked. Both in Committee and today she has made a powerful case. I am only sorry that I was not able to be present in Committee.

I ask noble Lords to stop and think who we identify with because that will colour our attitudes to the clause and the amendments. In the Guardian last week a Ministry of Justice spokesman was quoted as it being,

“determined to stamp out this distressing practice which causes property owners untold misery and costs them thousands of pounds in eviction, repair and clean-up costs”.

I ask the Minister for his evidence of this. My point is that most of us are probably property owners—that is, we own our own homes—and the thought someone of breaking in and squatting in our homes while we are not there is, indeed, painful. In contrast, it is highly unlikely that any noble Lords have, either from choice or necessity because of homelessness, squatted. It is therefore not surprising that I detect a degree of unease about opposing this clause. However, a Government committed to evidence-based policy-making should not rely on misleading stereotypes.

This clause is not there to protect the homes of people like us. As we have heard, the law already does that. There was a letter in the Guardian last year from more than 160 leading housing lawyers, both academics and practitioners, who made clear that this clause is completely unnecessary. I understand that a similar position is taken by the Magistrates’ Association and the Metropolitan Police. If there is a problem, it is a problem of enforcement: the existing law needs to be enforced better. It is interesting that earlier today, in response to Amendment 145A, the Minister said that we do not need new legislation; we just need to enforce the existing legislation better.

On the question of stereotypes, the great majority of squatters are not doing it by choice. Research for Crisis by Sheffield Hallam University concludes:

“The evidence consistently points to squatting as a manifestation of housing need, and of inadequate support and provision for single homeless people”.

The Sheffield Hallam University Crisis report goes on to say that squatting,

“is a homelessness and welfare issue, not a criminal justice issue”.

I do not know about other noble Lords, but I find it quite distressing that I am finding more and more rough sleepers on the streets of London. It is reminding me of the 1980s. This is a welfare and homelessness issue that is growing.

In Committee, the Minister said that the Government wanted to send a clear message to existing and would-be squatters. To my mind, there is too much legislation about sending messages, especially when it is a message which involves criminalising a vulnerable group of people. I fear, however, that this is not about sending a message to squatters; this is about sending a message to the right-wing press, which has conducted a misleading and pernicious campaign on this matter, demonising homeless people in the process.

I would like us to send a message tonight—a message that we are willing to put ourselves in the shoes of homeless people for whom squatting and empty property offer a meagre lifeline and that we oppose this nasty little clause. Therefore, despite the lateness of the hour, if the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, chooses to test the opinion of the House on one of her amendments, I very much hope that noble Lords would be willing to support it.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, in some circumstances I might have hesitated to support the amendments that have been tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer. However, in the circumstances in which we find ourselves—circumstances in which the Government have made drastic cuts to new provision of social housing and have introduced reforms to housing benefit which will cause significant numbers of people to lose their homes—I can only support the noble Baroness’s amendments. I do not think it is right to criminalise vulnerable homeless people, as she describes them, who seek to find a roof over their heads in empty properties in these circumstances.