(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Motion J1 in my name. First, I am grateful to the Minister for his invitation to discuss this matter last week and for acknowledging the particular vulnerabilities of children who arrive in this country alone. But, having carefully read the Government’s Amendments 36A and 36B in lieu, I think it is clear that the Bill would contain no absolute time limit or safeguards on the powers to detain unaccompanied children. Permitting a tribunal to grant bail to only some detained unaccompanied children, after eight days, is not the same as an actual time limit on detentions for all unaccompanied children. They would still be a great many unaccompanied children who could be detained without any time limit and to whom the First-tier Tribunal could not grant bail for 28 days. Therefore, I would like to provide the other place with an opportunity to reconsider this matter.
If an unaccompanied child is detained under any of the new powers in the Bill, under the amendments I now propose, that child cannot be detained for more than 72 hours. If in regulations the Home Secretary wishes to specify a time limit for detaining unaccompanied children for less than 72 hours, then of course she has that prerogative. However, a matter as fundamental as the ultimate period for which an unaccompanied child can be held in detention should not be left to mere regulations or verbal assurance. It must be stated in the Bill. Overturning the legal safeguards and time limits introduced—and I say once again, under a Conservative Prime Minister and Conservative Home Secretary—and detaining children without any stated time limit serves neither British nor Conservative values. Therefore, I will divide the House on this, so that we may provide the Commons with the opportunity to think again carefully about the powers created by this Bill. I ask the House to approve Motion J1.
My Lords, with reference to Motion L, I welcome the government amendments, which have the same effect as our original amendments of restoring the status quo ante with regard to pregnant women.
Before my round of thanks, I have one query from the lawyer who has kindly been advising us. He says that his only concern is that they are a separate provision for the new powers in paragraph 16(2C) and proposed new subsection (2A) of Section 62 rather than reapplying the protection of Section 60. The reason that this matters is that for the purposes of the time limit, the period of detention under the old detention powers would not be aggregated with the period of detention under the new detention powers. However, now, in theory, a pregnant woman could be detained for up to seven days under the old detention powers and then for another seven days under the new detention powers. Could the Minister confirm that this is not the intention and that the powers would not be used in this way?
I turn to my thanks. First, I pay tribute to Women for Refugee Women, in particular Gemma Lousley, for all their invaluable work in pressing this amendment, and also to David Neale of Garden Court Chambers for his pro bono legal advice. I thank all noble Lords around the House who have supported the amendments by adding their names, speaking in support, voting in support or deliberately abstaining. I am particularly grateful to those Members—largely women, I think—on the Government Benches who could not bring themselves to support the Government on this. That there was so much support for the amendments on the Government Benches is largely down to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, who I think of as a noble friend. She has been tireless, both behind the scenes and on the Floor of the House, as was recognised by the Immigration Minister yesterday.
The preservation of the time limits on the detention of pregnant women in recognition of the likely health impact of the original proposal to remove them represents one small beacon of light in what otherwise continues to be the gloom of a punitive Bill that will do untold harm. The government Motion was described on both sides of the Commons yesterday as a no-brainer. Nevertheless, it would be churlish not to recognise that the Government have listened on this issue at least, and I thank them for doing so.
Leave out from “36” to end and insert “, do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 36A and 36B in lieu, and do propose Amendments 36C and 36D in lieu of Amendments 31, 35 and 36—
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 51 in my name seeks to retain existing statutory time limits for the detention of unaccompanied children put in place by a Conservative Government. I am grateful for the significant support from these Benches and across the House during last Wednesday’s debate. Although we have received some verbal reassurances throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government have yet to put in place the necessary safeguards in time limits to protect children from the harms of detention under the Bill. Therefore, I have no alternative but to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.
My Lords, if Amendment 51 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 52 to 54 because of pre-emption.
My Lords, I have thought long and hard about calling another Division from these Benches, this time on retaining our current statutory time limits on detention of accompanied children or children who are with their families. These children are likely to be much younger. The psychological harms of detention on young children are significant and likely to impact them for the rest of their lives. For that very reason, I ask that we retain the statutory time limits put in place by a Conservative Government. I wish to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there are two sets of amendments in this group. I am speaking to Amendments 49, 53, 56 and 61, which all concern standards in places of detention. The other amendments have been tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik. From these Benches, we support all the amendments in her name and would be pleased to have been able to add our name to them.
We discussed this matter of standards very briefly in Committee, but the rules on where people can be held for detention are being altered by the Bill. Rather than following the Immigration Act 1971, which lays out clearly where people could be detained, this says that people can be detained anywhere the Minister feels appropriate. I have been thinking about a number of questions which arise from that, but clearly the issue that I am particularly concerned about is the boundary-line between where people are going to be detained—because, of course, that is part of the Bill—and where they might be placed when that detention ends and what offering they might get.
I regret to say that today we heard about the government costs for the barge in Portland: a contract has been let, without tendering, for £1.6 billion for the first two years of that contract. I have in front of me a copy of the floor-plan of that barge, and it is quite clear that the only way that the numbers the Government say will be accommodated will be achieved is by putting in bunk beds in each of the single bedrooms on the “Bibby Stockholm”. We are also led to understand, apart from the huge cost involved, that there will be curfews and that people will only be allowed on to the dockside in a compound—that is the only space they will occupy. To me, that seems to be detention. The only thing that I need to understand is whether the standards of a place of detention are going to be the same as where people are accommodated when they are not in detention. It seems that what the Government are proposing in this £1.6 billion contract is very clearly a place of security and secure boundaries. If there is a curfew when people are not allowed to leave, clearly that means that there are very strict rules that people will have to follow.
Consequently, if the Minister would ensure that the standards of the Detention Centre Rules, which have been in place since 2001, and the Short-term Holding Facility Rules, which were put in place in 2018, are going to be followed, we can expect to have at least some boundary-lines about what sort of accommodation it will be like. However, I fear that the worst aspect is that we are going to see a dehumanisation of people by being put into places which will not suit the current legislation and certainly will not suit what most people would think of as somewhere decent for people to be detained or to live.
I ask these questions to seek some clarity. Are there any rules at all which the Government are going to follow in relation to the detention of the people they now propose to detain, with everybody being put in detention when they arrive?
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 51, 57, 59 and 63 in my name, which retain existing time limits for the detention of children, both unaccompanied and those with families.
Under a Conservative-led Government over a decade ago, Parliament rectified what David Cameron called the scandal of routinely detaining innocent children, so it is regrettable that we are conducting this debate again. The evidence is unequivocal, the debate long since settled: detention does immense and long-lasting harm to children.
I made my points at Second Reading and in Committee, so I shall not repeat the arguments other than to remind my noble friend the Minister of warnings of leading medical organisations in a letter to the Home Secretary outlining the serious harm and risks that refugee children will face if the detention powers in the Bill become law.
There is no policy rationale for why the Government should detain vulnerable young people. The argument is that not detaining children would lead to adults pretending to be children or smugglers exploiting loopholes. But preventing presumed future actions of an unknown number of adults is not a justification.
My noble friend the Minister has recognised the particular vulnerability of unaccompanied children, and for that I thank him. He told us in Committee that, for the most part, unaccompanied children will not be detained. Yet any such exceptionality of a lone child’s detention is nowhere in the Bill. Indeed, the proposed legislation expressly does away with the existing statutory provisions that limit an unaccompanied child’s detention.
In fact, the new powers to detain them are unrestricted. Under the Bill, unaccompanied children may be detained under the new powers only in circumstances prescribed in regulations. We do not know what will be in these regulations or when we will see them. While I thank my noble friend the Minister for the positive step in making the unaccompanied children regulations subject to the affirmative procedure, there is still no knowing what circumstances will be specified in them.
The law governing something as extreme as the power of the state to detain an individual without charge or trial must be much more firmly established. In Committee, my noble friend the Minister said that
“the Bill will also allow the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying time limits to be placed on the detention of unaccompanied children for the purpose of removal, if required”.—[Official Report, 7/6/23; col. 1491.]
I remind noble Lords that the Bill does away with precise time limits, as established by a Conservative Government, that keep unaccompanied children’s detention to no more than 24 hours and only in short-term holding facilities. The Bill will replace existing limits with a power, if required, to make regulations with any as yet unknown time limits on detention and of unaccompanied children only. To my mind, this is wholly insufficient.
I turn from the Government’s possible future time limits in regulations for unaccompanied children to the promised government timescale for child detention. This, we are led to believe, is a timescale for detention of all children—those who are unaccompanied and alone as well as those with their families. The timescale was to be set out during the passage of the Bill through this House, but as yet we do not have it. However, following a very positive engagement with the Immigration Minister earlier today, I am hopeful that we will have clarity and that my amendments will receive consideration on return to the Commons. For that reason, I am minded to test the opinion of the House on Monday.
In October 2020, a Kurdish-Iranian family from Sardasht near the Iraqi border died after the boat they were travelling in capsized in the channel. They were Rasoul Iran-Nejad, 35, Shiva Mohammad Panahi, 35, Anita, nine, Armin, six, and Artin, 15 months, whose tiny body washed up on the coast of Norway months later. I am sure that noble Lords will join me in continuing to mourn the loss of these lives. If these three children, Anita, Armin and Artin, had survived, under the Bill they would be detained indefinitely upon arrival in the UK. Surely that cannot be right. I urge the Government to think again about undoing the progress made when we ended the cruel practice of detaining babies, toddlers and children.
We can and must do better by these vulnerable young people whom the world has already put through so much. Trafficked and refugee children need recovery and protection in line with their rights under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, trafficking conventions and the refugee convention. Let us not take away the existing time limits for the detention of migrant children as laid out by a previous Conservative Government. The ending of lengthy child detention was a humanitarian response to what had been an unacceptable practice with grave impacts. This is a proud legacy that we must protect.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to accept the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord German, as another lawyer, to address the Hardial Singh principles and habeas corpus, but since, on my reading of the Bill, they arise under Clauses 11 and 12 respectively, I think it might be best to reserve that treat for another day. I do have a question about Clause 10, which I candidly admit I do not find the easiest to understand. The Bar Council, in its briefing prepared by immigration practitioners far more expert than me, states that the powers already exist to detain any individual who is suspected to be subject to the Clause 2 removal duty, that Clause 10 does not provide for any additional persons to be detained, and that the purpose of the clause is simply to remove existing protections for unaccompanied minors, families and pregnant women. Is there any more to it than that?
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 59, 63, 64 and 67 standing in my name. I am immensely grateful to my noble friends Lady Helic and Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham for adding their names to these amendments. I am also extremely grateful to the many children’s organisations that sent invaluable briefings and gave clarity on the subject. I refer noble Lords to the relevant interests in my name in the register.
The words “detention” and “children” have no place in the same sentence. In the case of this Bill, it can also mean the possibility of indefinite detention, as proposed by the Government. In 2010, the organisation Medical Justice coined the term “state-sponsored cruelty” in relation to children in immigration detention. Its reports highlighted the great calamity being inflicted on thousands of innocent children, with lasting and detrimental consequences, including leaving them traumatised and suicidal. This led to a deep conviction across the political spectrum that such practices were inherently wrong and that a better, more humanitarian approach had to be taken. A pledge was given in 2010 by someone seeking the office of Prime Minister—David Cameron. He pledged that, if elected as Prime Minister, child detention would end. He was true to his word, and it became part of the coalition’s programme for Government in 2010, with policy changed as soon as 2011. With the Immigration Act 2014, the routine detention of children came to an end. That was progress. It was, as one would expect, a humanitarian response to an unacceptable and cruel practice. It is therefore with some dismay and disbelief that we are seeing attempts to reverse the progress made. Almost a decade on, we are discussing the reintroduction of those measures in an even more draconian form.
This Bill creates powers to detain en masse those who arrive in the UK without permission, on or after 7 March 2023, because they are not coming directly from a country where their life and liberty are threatened. Fleeing war-torn Syria but crossing through, for example, Belgium disqualifies them. As mentioned many times, there are no legal routes to the UK for most of those seeking asylum here. Of those coming, thousands of children could face detention. This is not a random statement but one based on the Refugee Council’s careful analysis in its impact assessment of the Bill. The exact figures are available in its report, but over a three-year period it equates to around 13,000 to 15,000 children in detention per annum. We are talking about babies, toddlers, children who are victims of child trafficking, unaccompanied children and children with families—defenceless little people, many of whom have not yet learned to speak and others who may be of speaking age but have no English language. They are detained, and with no legally defined time limit to their detention. They are detained anywhere,
“in any place that the Secretary of State considers appropriate”,
and without the possibility of bail for 28 days. Needless to say, children’s and refugee organisations are aghast at what is being proposed. They are not alone. Many of us across all Benches in this House and the other place feel the same.
Let us stop and think for a moment that perhaps it is not the intention of the Home Secretary to lock up thousands of children. Perhaps we can put this down to the lack of an economic impact assessment or child’s rights impact assessment conducted by the Home Office itself. If that is the case, now is the opportunity, in Committee in this House, for my noble friend the Minister to reconsider what is being proposed. Of course it is understood that there will inevitably be very specific and limited occasions when children are detained, but the existing legislation already gives parameters for this. That is why I propose amendments to Clause 10, to retain the existing time limits of 24 hours in detention and with safeguards for unaccompanied children. Amendments on those who are with families seek to retain existing time limits so that they can be detained only for up to 72 hours, or not more than seven days where detention is personally authorised by a Minister. Importantly, this should be in short-term holding facilities or pre-departure accommodation.
Existing legislation on the detention of children, as under the Immigration Act 2014, is already in place. I ask only that the status quo be maintained. The Home Secretary may argue that by not detaining children we are creating another pull factor, but the evidence shows that there was no significant increase in the number of children seeking asylum once routine detention ended in 2011.
The question then is what the intention of the Government is if, as Prime Minister Sunak says:
“The intention of this part of the policy objective is not to detain children”.
We were given reassurances by the Minister during the Commons Report stage on 26 April that,
“we do not want to detain children. We will do so only in the most exceptional circumstances”.
There was also assurance from the Minister that the time limits
“will be as short as practically possible”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23; col. 837.]
However, these tests of “most exceptional circumstances” and
“as short as practically possible”
cannot be found in the Bill. All that can be found following the Government’s amendment is a delegated power for the Home Secretary to make regulations under the negative procedure that specify circumstances for the detention of unaccompanied children. There is also a discretionary power for the Home Secretary to make regulations that specify time limits. There is no clarification in the Bill as to the length of the time limits for detention or to which unaccompanied children they might apply, or how discretion might be exercised. Moreover, the regulations may or may not specify time limits for unaccompanied children. We have no assurance in the Bill that they will. Either way, they will do nothing for children and families.
I understood from my noble friend the Minister that later in the Bill’s passage the Government propose to
“set out the new timescale under which children may be detained for the purposes of removal without judicial oversight”.—[Official Report, 10/5/23; col. 1783.]
I must ask for clarification from my noble friend. If the Government truly wish to detain children for as short as practically possible, why are they disapplying the 2014 safeguards to children affected by this Bill? These safeguards were put in place by a Conservative Prime Minister and a Conservative Home Secretary.
Given this late stage in the Bill’s passage, when do the Government propose to set out these new timescales in the Bill, and what will they be? What are the circumstances in which unaccompanied children would be detained and why can these “most exceptional circumstances” not be stated on the face of the Bill and be open to full scrutiny during its passage? Will those timescales in regulations be an absolute time limit for the detention of children, or merely a timescale for judicial oversight of that detention? As a country in which the rule of law is a pillar of our constitution, can we detain children without judicial oversight? I presume detention is for the purposes of removal but would like clarification on whether the Government are proposing child detention for other purposes. If so, can the legal basis for such detention be explained?
Verbal reassurance is completely inadequate. I am no expert but I understand that this is not the way that laws are made. Laws must be much more firmly established. They cannot just fluctuate depending on which Home Secretary is in the driving seat; that is surely a dangerous precedent. Amendments 59, 63, 64 and 67 seek to place our current safeguards for the detention of children in the Bill, so that children impacted by it need not rely on mere verbal assurance. I understand that the issue of illegal migration is complex and requires a deterrent factor so that those who genuinely qualify can be identified, and that it requires a genuine solution, but I think most here would agree that the solution being proposed is not the right one on so many levels.
We are speaking about defenceless children. I say to noble Lords that it may be difficult for us to think back to our six year-old selves, so let us think about our children or grandchildren, who have neither the physical strength to defend themselves nor the verbal sophistication. We have a moral obligation to ensure that we protect the rights of these most vulnerable human beings.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak in support of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to leave Clause 9 out of the Bill. I find it difficult to comprehend that we are even debating something so out of step with our rules of justice and fairness. Depriving someone of their citizenship without even informing them, as would be the case if Clause 9 were to be enacted into law, is in effect an addition to the already punitive measures that have existed since 1918.
As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, stated, Clause 9 effectively removes the right of appeal, which has evolved over the decades to become ever more powerful. If the Home Office deems it to be in the public interest or, as is worded,
“conducive to the public good”,
then the long-standing position under the British Nationality Act 1981 that an individual must be notified if they are to be deprived of their nationality is being amended, so that they do not even have to be informed. Currently, citizenship deprivation letters can be delivered to the individual’s last known address, so why are we changing that? Essentially, over this past decade, the Government have failed to provide notice on many occasions, and it appears they are now seeking to declare all unlawful deprivation orders as lawful by making Clause 9 retroactive.
Clause 9(5) purports to make lawful deprivation orders which courts have found unlawful because of failure to give notice. That is making lawful a breach of requirements as laid down by Parliament, after the fact. This completely undermines the rule of law as we understand it. While I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which would provide some safeguards on the use of Clause 9, the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to remove the retroactive application of Clause 9 in its subsections (5)(6) and (7), should be considered seriously.
Former Prime Minister Sir John Major has warned that we should search our souls before taking this step. Others such as the Institute of Race Relations, the House of Lords Constitution Committee, the think tank Policy Exchange and the former Attorney-General Dominic Grieve, as well as five separate UN bodies, have stated that such deprivation orders made under Clause 9 are likely to be discriminatory and unlawful. I hope that we would give attention to such notable organisations and individuals.
I add that I support in principle the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, to omit subsections (2) and (4) of Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, but understand that it is probably outwith the scope of the Bill. However, we have to address this, because we are in danger of creating a two-tier system of citizenship.
The fact is that Clause 9 has a disproportionate impact on people from ethnic-minority backgrounds. As a person cannot be made stateless according to international conventions, by default it is more likely to affect those who have a connection to the Commonwealth or a country where they are entitled to dual nationality. But it is not even as obvious as that, for some Commonwealth countries allow dual nationality or will accept people if they have a connection through their parents or grandparents, while others do not. Take south Asia, for example: while Bangladesh and Pakistan offer dual nationality to British citizens who have a direct link, India does not, so citizenship deprivation would not impact British citizens of Indian heritage. As I said in Committee, if Clause 9 is enacted into law, we are heading towards a society made up of degrees of citizenship, where some are full citizens while others are half-citizens and others somewhere in between.
Growing up between two distinct cultures, one is acutely aware of certain idiosyncrasies and traits which define each. The core values are, of course, the same, but there are always certain endearing features: the British sense of humour, with its self- deprecation and the ability to laugh with others at one’s own expense is one. The other is this sense of fairness. How often do we hear the phrase “That’s not fair”? Then there are all the variations: “Let’s be fair”, “Fair enough” and “Fair is fair”. Do noble Lords think it fair to have a two-tier system of citizenship? Do we think it is fair to deny someone their citizenship without informing them?
I understand that our intention is to root out ruthless individuals and deny them entry to our country, which is absolutely right. Not one of us would disagree that we must do everything to protect our people, but it begs the question: will it protect our citizens to have ill-intentioned people free to continue to conspire against us elsewhere, rather than having them locked away safely, following the rigours of our excellent courts? It also begs the question: what if there is a mistake, as has already happened in the case pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, of the British Bangladeshi man referred to as E3? He spent five years in Bangladesh trying to get back, having had his citizenship revoked without him even being informed. He eventually got back, as there was no evidence that he had committed any crime or had any intention of doing so—a completely innocent man, wrongfully accused. Was that fair or unfair?
Britain has a proud tradition of justice, equality and fairness. Let us keep it that way.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, reference has understandably been made to one of the Acts which came to fruition when I was Home Secretary, and I do not resile from that. I speak this afternoon because this is a critically important debate, and the contributions so far have been both informative and enlightening.
Amendment 28 from the noble Lord, Anderson, has a great deal of merit. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for whom I have the most enormous respect and good will from working together on a whole range of other issues, that simply going back to day zero is not necessarily the best answer for the solution we are seeking. If we could find a way forward on Report that takes away the genuine fear from millions of people who believe—erroneously, but they believe it—that Clause 9 as drafted and the implementation of further measures will put them and their families at risk, then we will have done a good job in clarifying the situation.
To put things in perspective, the reason that there was a change from the early 20th century onwards has a great deal to do with the nature of dual citizenship, the way in which global movements have changed quite dramatically and the consequences of global franchise terrorism, which did not exist before. Our main threat, as we all know, up to the beginning of this century, was seen to be from the conflict in Ireland.
To be fair to the Minister, an effort to try to bring the present situation up to date is understandable, but the way it is being done is not. I do not think that the 2002 legislation, implemented in 2003, actually went too far. It was done on the back of the attack on the World Trade Center and beyond, and it was necessary to take into account the dangers that were foreseen and the people who were known to be a danger to our country. I thought that the measures taken at the time seemed to be proportionate. We can debate whether they were or were not, but it is absolutely clear that simply going further and further without justification is not appropriate in our democracy. A step back and a reflection on what it is we are trying to achieve, and why, would be beneficial.
By the way, I do not consider that the measures I was involved in were about punishing anybody. They were about protecting people from those embedded in the community who were no longer committed to our democratic society; in other words, those who had forfeited this part of their dual citizenship—citizenship of our country—because of the actions they took or were prepared to take. These were the actions of individuals, not actions imposed by government.
Let us try, if we can, to get this right on Report. If we can do that, we will take away that fear, which I think is the main reason why we should remove Clause 9.
My Lords, first, I apologise for being unable to speak at Second Reading. I have put my name to Amendment 27 in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan, who laid it out so well.
Clause 9 has shone a spotlight on legislation concerning the deprivation of citizenship—legislation that has essentially been in existence since 1918, as has been pointed out. However, the degree of power that this legislation wields has evolved over decades, most notably in 2002, 2006 and 2015. The current attempt to deprive a British person of their citizenship without even informing them in advance takes these powers to a wholly unacceptable and sinister level; powers that we would not expect in a modern democracy and, as has been said, more akin to archaic banishment laws.
As my noble friend Lord Moylan stated, this amendment would allow us to row back from the damaging legislation of recent years to the British Nationality Act 1981. It is by no means perfect, as it has certain aspects that one could question, but it is perhaps the most pragmatic and acceptable legislation that we have currently. At the very least, this amendment would go a long way to providing some degree of security to the many people who feel that they are vulnerable under the current legislation, and certainly the proposed legislation. Such legislation has crept in, often as a knee-jerk response to a single event or individual.
The Minister may argue that what I say is an over- reaction and that these powers would be used only in exceptional circumstances. But if Clause 9 is enacted into law, there is a very real danger of its misuse. The open- ended term
“conducive to the public good”
flashes red. If citizenship is revoked without notice—perhaps while someone is abroad, with the Home Secretary considering them unreachable—it is highly unlikely that that person would have any recourse to appeal by the time they found out their predicament. On a more basic level, you cannot appeal a decision of which you are unaware.
As a person cannot be made stateless according to international conventions, by default this clause has a disproportionate impact on people from ethnic- minority backgrounds who have a connection to the Commonwealth or a country where they are entitled to dual nationality. It also has an impact on people from Europe, and it impacts Jewish communities who are entitled to citizenship in Israel.
There are already examples of wrongful revocation of someone’s citizenship, in effect destroying years of their life, as in the case of the British man known as E3. He was stripped of his citizenship while in Bangladesh and stranded there for five years. He only recently had his citizenship reinstated, with no explanation by the Home Office as to its actions, no shred of evidence against him and eventually no charge. There needs to be greater transparency as to how this power is used, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out. Surely we cannot have a society made up of degrees of citizenship, where some are full citizens while others are half-citizens and some are perhaps a bit more than half-citizens.
Being British should not mean that people are expected to deny their ethnicity or renounce their religion, their culture, the country of their birth or that which gives them their identity. We should all be able to celebrate every aspect of who we are and still be a citizen of the state able to vote, work, contribute, raise our families and live in freedom and free from prejudice. I understand that this is not what is being disputed, but there are many people in our country right now—good, law-abiding, loyal citizens—who feel threatened, let down and even scared because they feel that they are the target of this legislation due to their ethnic heritage. There is real disquiet among minority-ethnic communities about the impact of this proposed legislation. Certainly, it does not give confidence or engender loyalty and a sense of belonging, which is what I hope the Home Office would wish to see from all those who live here.
Today, expulsion is for extreme crimes. Tomorrow, it may be for wrongfully accused postmasters or for those exercising the right to peaceful protest on some issue. After all, expulsion may be deemed to be
“conducive to the public good”.
On a personal level, I feel utterly disappointed. If your Lordships will permit me to digress, I do so by way of illustrating how others like me feel. I came to this country as a child of six in the 1960s and was subsequently naturalised—yes, I am associated with that dubious term. My late father served in what was then the British Indian Army during the Second World War. He came from Pakistan. His loyalty to the UK throughout his life was without question and his contribution notable, both in wealth creation and in public service. He was a first-generation immigrant familiar with the language and culture of his country of birth.
We now have a significant population of second, third and even fourth-generation people from the Commonwealth who know no other country than the UK. They have local accents, and they are relaxed with local cultural norms. They feel themselves to be 100% British. They are, nevertheless, in a category of those who have links to another country: that of their parents’ or grandparents’ birth. Therefore, they are potentially vulnerable to having their citizenship revoked and—if Clause 9 is enacted into law—perhaps without even the courtesy of being informed beforehand.
I believe that there is a wider debate to be had over whether citizenship deprivation as a whole is in the interests of our country. I support Amendment 32 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in this regard.
I understand that the broad objective of this legislation is aimed at only a handful of extremists and criminals, but legislation has to be more wind-tight and watertight. What is essentially at stake here is the principle of the rights of all citizens. Are we really going to let a handful of criminals dictate our very values of fairness, justice and equality? I hope that we would trust in our justice system, one that is the envy of the world, and not perhaps a whim and a flick of an administrator’s pen.
As a six year-old newcomer, unfamiliar with the language or customs of this country, I was acutely conscious of any prejudice or discrimination, however subtle. Human beings are good at detecting such subtleties. Unlike my carefree school friends, I grew up very mindful of immigration legislation whenever it was being debated. I was also conscious of the attempts by our various Governments to address inequalities and to establish good race relations. Having recently served in the European Parliament, I can say that I am proud that the UK has done more in the area of equality, inclusion and diversity than any other country in Europe.
We have so much to be proud of as a nation, so let us not bring into law such a blatantly illiberal and divisive piece of legislation. It is not in accordance with our values and will not serve us well. I agree with the conclusion of the Constitution Committee that Clause 9 must be removed from the Bill.