National Security (State Threats) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friends have said, we on these Benches strongly support the Bill, but with some caveats about process, scope and drafting. We felt bafflement and frustration as this Government—and indeed the last one—failed to act on the very obvious threat from the IRGC. The Conservative Government promised to in 2023 but did not deliver in office. But we then accepted that the tool of proscription had to be replaced by a new formula of designation for state bodies, although I note what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said about Hezbollah, which was interesting. Jonathan Hall KC’s report was delivered over a year ago, and now, having dragged their feet, the Government want to rush the Bill through at unseemly speed, and at the possible expense of precision. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, suggested, understandably, that a draft Bill might have been preferable.

As the Minister said in his introduction, state threats are “both evolving and enduring”. The Bill needs to be scrutinised and stress-tested sufficiently in Committee that it produces lasting but nimble legislation, which is capable of future adaptation. We know that we are experiencing the equivalent of terrorist acts emanating from states such as Iran and Russia, in sabotage, physical attacks, arson, firebombing and propaganda—with Jewish communities often targeted, shamefully—as well as from China in spying, harassment and death threats to Hong Kong pro-democracy activists. Often proxies are used for these nefarious activities, in parallel with espionage and cyber threats from state intelligence agencies.

The Bill must be fit for designation of foreign power entities backed by any state. However, the IRGC is the clearest and most obvious one. These Benches therefore envisage seeking to amend the Bill so as to ensure, on its face, that IRGC designation is properly pursued within one month. This is an urgent priority. If not the IRGC, and not in this Bill, then who and when? The Minister made encouraging noises about designation for the IRGC, but no commitment. A commitment is needed—not the wiggle room that one suspects some bits of Government still seem to want.

We also wish to extend the offence of material assistance to a designated body to include the setting up and use of companies or trusts to hide the true ownership of assets belonging to that body, and we will explore that in Committee. My noble friend Lady Doocey also sought clarity that organisations could not escape the Bill’s net by operating from abroad in this digital world. She also suggested that foreign state threats in the Bill should be capable of including superintelligent AI tools.

Many noble Lords referred to humanitarian activities, conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. Some of this activity requires, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it,

“intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult … for western Governments to speak”.

I think we all accept that.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained the Opposition’s objection to the prohibited purpose offence having the limitation of being

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

One problem with removing this limitation is that it might expose the activities of humanitarian and peace- building organisations to criminalisation. Indeed, the fact that this limitation of the offence, or defence to it, does not appear in proposed new Sections 17B or 17C on assisting or material benefits, but only in proposed new Section 17A on supporting a foreign power entity, illustrates perhaps the worries raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, my noble friends Lady Tyler and Lady Northover, and others.

Other organisations besides the IRGC are in our minds. The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office has been mentioned in the debate, and it was debated yesterday. No doubt it was once an office that did what it said on the tin, but it now seems to be an extension of the transnational repression perpetrated by China.

The noble Lord, Lord Pickles, also raised the issue of organisations which might pose a threat but do not fit the definition of state-sponsored threats, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. One could, no doubt, think of others.

All noble Lords who have spoken have welcomed the Bill as an important step forward but will seek to ensure that it is watertight but adaptable, durable but not inflexible. We have a task before us in Committee. The Government would do well to benefit from all the expertise which has been on display in the Chamber today—and to listen and to incorporate changes where justified. As well as legal, diplomatic and other expertise, we are fortunate to have heard from not one, but two, former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, in the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, as well as the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Let us draw on all the skills and talents to perfect the Bill. The Government would be making a mistake if they were just to rush through without listening to all the very well-intended suggestions for amendments that have been made.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the amendments in their names. It is timely to have a debate and to keep raising—as I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, does regularly—the threat we face from China. The ISC in its China report outlined the very detailed structure which the Chinese state, which has the largest security services in the world, uses not just at home for repression but abroad for undermining other nations’ ability to act, and in persecuting individuals who oppose the Chinese communist regime.

The issue around the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office is an obvious one which has raised concerns. The Bill is needed because whenever we have made the operating environment more difficult for states to use diplomatic cover, they have gone to other lengths. The success in identifying individuals who are using diplomatic cover for other activities shows that our security services are conscious of this. The response to the Salisbury attacks—in this country and across Europe among our allies, where a number of individuals were expelled from Russian embassies because of their links to intelligence services and activities which were not in keeping with their designation under the Vienna convention—certainly proved that point.

The problem I have with Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is in defining strategy. That would be very difficult in terms of the united front. We all know what our adversaries get up to and what the aims are. The Bill is important because, as the operating environment has become more difficult, they are subcontracting this to individuals. So it is not necessarily about not understanding what the Chinese state is up to—we have a very clear understanding of this, and it is very complex and broad. The other thing the ISC report highlighted is that it is not just the scale but the lengths it goes to, both to intimidate individuals here and across the globe and to suck up information—which many of us might think is pretty irrelevant—for economic purposes and for building up a picture, a matrix, of what is happening in various political systems around the world.

It is good that these issues have been raised, because it throws a spotlight on what is happening not just in terms of China but what both Iran and Russia are doing. As I said at Second Reading, it is important to have that public debate to keep highlighting the dangers this country faces, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on his tenacity in continuing to do this. These dangers are on multiple fronts, whether it is universities being targeted, and individual diaspora members being targeted there, or IP thefts from both companies and universities. This is something that needs constant vigilance.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I was pleased to co-sign the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. All the amendments in this group—Amendments 1, 3 and 4 in particular—are expressing frustration with the limited scope of the Bill. Perhaps the Minister might be able to give an idea as to whether the national security Bill that was heralded in the King’s Speech will be able to pick up some of these themes, if we are not successful in persuading the Government today to make amendments to this state threats Bill.

There is a feeling of concern that some threats that have been experienced, or that are pretty obvious, are not being sufficiently dealt with by the Government. This is particularly in relation to China, where we have been urged to wake up and not be naive about the underwater crocodile. Whether the Government are being naive or shaped by other considerations towards China, there is a feeling that there appears to be so much going on—demonstrated in the recent trial concerning the staff of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and otherwise instanced by the transnational repression towards residents of this country from Hong Kong who are being persecuted by the Chinese state, while they are supposedly under the protection of this country and this Government, which is intolerable—that we need to wake up and smell the coffee in relation to China.

I would like to hear some reassurances from the Minister that if he cannot take up some of these points in this Bill, the Government will take them up in the forthcoming national security Bill, which is intended to:

“Consolidate the Government’s approach to countering state threats to align more closely with the approach to countering terrorism”.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I strongly agree with the points that the noble Baroness has just been making. She has referenced the plight of people living in the United Kingdom who now have bounties on their heads. Will she take the opportunity to highlight specifically the case of Chloe Cheung, who was 14 when she took part in pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and now has a 1 million Hong Kong dollar bounty on her head and is fearful of being dragged in—as some were, and attempts were made to drag others, to the Chinese consulate in Manchester in order to intimidate them? These are not illusions. There are many frightened Hong Kongers in the UK worried about the direct attacks that are being made upon them. I thank the noble Baroness for raising the general point.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Not at all. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for all the work that he has done on this topic, both individually and as chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I had the pleasure of meeting Chloe Cheung and some of her colleagues, and became even more aware of the threats they are under. It is intolerable that people to whom we have rightly given protection and residence are facing these kinds of huge, life-threatening threats from a foreign state. So far, we are not feeling reassured that this Bill is going to cover these threats.

There is a feeling among many of us that we want to hear robust pledges from the Government, even if, for whatever reason, they now want to get the Bill through incredibly quickly, having—to the bemusement of some of us—taken over a year to get to the point. They now want to rush it all through, but so be it. There is unfinished business in the Bill. If it is not dealt with today, it needs to be dealt with as soon as possible in the forthcoming national security Bill: the transnational repression, the proxy networks, the issues with the capacity of our police forces to cope with these threats, the foreign language capacity, the resources, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, called it, the “China capability”. We risk being looked at as a laughing stock if our state and its law enforcement institutions are not able to cope with the threat being directed towards our state and the people living here. So I hope that, even if the Minister does not accept some of these amendments, he will tell us that no stone will be left unturned in the coverage of the national security Bill that we are expecting.

My noble friend Lady Doocey gave a very powerful justification of her own amendment on superintelligent AI. She certainly frightened me, in as far as I understood much of it. I am a bit behind the curve on AI, it has to be said, so she will have to give me a tutorial. But, to be serious, she rightly stressed all the threats and the Bill covers only a bit of this territory. We need to hear from the Government much stronger and more comprehensive responses to all the threats that are being sponsored by foreign countries towards us and the people who live here.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I do not want to delay the House for very long. I will just add my voice to Amendment 1, which I added my name to. The Government are very clearly warning about hostile state activity. Therefore, the probing amendment gives the Government and the Minister the opportunity to say that espionage is included in the state threat. The amendment seeks to add it and to give clarity to the clause. However, I hope that the Minister can be very clear that the foreign power threat activity includes espionage. If he is able to say that, it will be very helpful. It is very clear, after the recent case involving the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office—which, as far as I am concerned, should no longer have any status here in London and should be disbanded, but that is for another day—that the British state was penetrated, dissidents have been targeted and, indeed, our colleagues in Parliament have been under surveillance. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be able to say that in his closing remarks.