Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, might understand that there are lots of things that the Liberal Democrat Benches might want to achieve, but, unfortunately, we cannot do things on our own and we need rather considerable support from other Benches.

We have heard some very eloquent and forceful criticisms of the Bill. I commend all those speeches, not only but especially from my own Benches. I am sorry that I lack time to react to most of the speeches I appreciated, though that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has to be a witty exception. I will nick the terms used by the noble Lords, Lord McLoughlin, Lord Hannay and Lord Cormack, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, respectively: “all powers, no policy”, “scrappage scheme”, “constitutional monstrosity” and “the gift that keeps on taking”.

I warmly congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway—we come from the same borough—on her maiden speech. She adequately and expertly refuted the assertion, made by the Minister a couple of times in this Chamber in the past fortnight, that UK employment law owes nothing to EU law. She is a very valuable addition to this House. I also welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Bray of Coln. I hope that she did not learn the wrong things from Ken Livingstone.

The contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, reminded us how un-Conservative, and certainly un-Thatcherite, the Bill is, with its revolutionary approach to eradicating at a stroke EU laws crucial to business, as well as to unions and many other aspects of life. He rightly warned that any potential investor would be deterred by “a giant question mark”.

Only a few voices—was it 10? I did not count quite that many—were raised in fervent support of the Government. Otherwise, we heard from across the House, as we are hearing from commentators and interested parties outside, that the Bill is extremely unwise, ill considered and reckless. I do not know of anyone outside a rarefied circle of cheerleaders—that is, anyone sensible and reasonable, even for a Conservative—who thinks the Bill is a good idea. Can the Minister cite anyone?

Stephen Kon, competition lawyer at law firm Macfarlanes, said that it is hard to think of a piece of legislation that has been so broadly and deeply criticised. The Hansard Society says that the Bill’s approach to REUL is “fundamentally and irresponsibly flawed”. Journalist Peter Foster—from that woke, left-wing rag, the Financial Times—has said that this Bill

“is a reminder that the outwardly sensible Sunak government still comes with some pretty crazy baggage”.

The distinguished legal commentator, Joshua Rozenberg, has called the Bill “dangerous”. The experienced George Peretz KC says:

“Fiddling around with the law when you don’t know what the consequences of the fiddle are is not obviously a good idea”


and suggests that

“if you don’t know what the effect is of what you are doing, don’t do it”.

Sir Jonathan Jones KC, former head of the Government Legal Service, says

“it’s a very bad way to legislate”.

The Bar Council, as others have quoted, says that the Bill

“will damage the UK’s reputation for regulatory stability, predictability, and competence on which growth-promoting investment in critical sectors of our economy depends”.

As has been much quoted, the independent Regulatory Policy Committee of experts red-rated the impact assessment for the Bill as “not fit for purpose”. The chief executive of Wildlife and Countryside Link said that scrapping environmental laws would be “legislative vandalism”.

Noble Lords get the picture. But after director-general of the CBI, Tony Danker, said the Bill risked uncertainty and chaos, the Minister last week breezily brushed aside the fears of the boss of UK’s top business organisation as wrong. We are well beyond the era when the Tory party even claims to be the party of business. It has just gone rogue. This Bill is not some arcane or obscure exercise. It will affect substantive law and thus businesses and all kinds of organisations in the many fields already cited in this debate.

I will say a word to those complaining that this Parliament had no ability to block or amend legislation once it was agreed in Brussels. It was a supranational organisation, as has been said. Please remember that democratically elected MEPs and the UK Government made the decisions on the legislation, not in fact the European Commission, apart from some regulations about sheep meat prices or something. Of course, many of us in this Chamber are former MEPs.

The UK was rarely outvoted in the Council, and if there was a gap in UK parliamentary scrutiny, that was a failing of Westminster, since other national Parliaments, such as the Danish one, insisted on full accountability from their Governments on what they were agreeing to in Brussels. Indeed, they had a veto on what their Government did. I am sorry: do not blame Brussels, blame Westminster.

These are just some of the objections to the Bill. The huge legal uncertainty created will be very damaging. Businesses, workers, consumers and citizens are in the dark. Even lawyers, who might be expected to relish all the work coming their way, are quaking in their boots. The Government have no idea of how many instruments the Bill will affect; there is indeed no guarantee that all retained law subject to its provisions will be identified.

There will be very considerable legal confusion. For instance, no one knows what removing the supremacy, direct effect or general principles of EU law will mean. The meaning not only of regulations but of primary legislation, such as of the Equality Act 2010—already the subject of huge controversy—will not be the same next year as this. As our Delegated Powers Committee says, the Government

“need to explain what is behind the headlong rush and the impending and arbitrary end-of-year deadline”.

Can the Minister give the committee, me and others who have quoted this a coherent reply?

Where regulations are restated, previous judgments relating to these instruments would no longer be binding; workers and employers would be back at square one, and issues will have to go through the judicial system again, with all the length and expense of that process. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, confirmed this in his opening speech, though he seemed to think it was a good idea. If lower courts are able to reject ECJ decisions, this may precipitate more—even opportunistic —litigation by some less reputable companies.

What happens if there are errors, either because the hard-pressed Civil Service, with its high turnover of staff, has perhaps lost its institutional memory and misses something, or if a regulation is accidentally switched off at the end of 2023? Is the Civil Service adequately resourced for this exercise? BEIS has said it needs 400 extra staff: what a waste when Whitehall faces so many other pressing issues.

The Government’s proposed wholesale deregulation—a slash and burn exercise—gives stakeholders no chance to say what should be kept. This is sweeping away the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 settlement which took a long-term approach, allowing departure from EU law over time and after consultation. The Government made a political commitment during the passage of that Act that, aside from technical tidying-up, primary legislation would be needed to make significant policy changes. This Bill breaks that pledge. It is simply anti-democratic and authoritarian in conferring massive powers instead on the Government. The Delegated Powers Committee called it

“a blank cheque placed in the hands of Ministers”,

as others have quoted.

The unexpected consequences of kicking out the EU undergirding of UK law could be very perverse and damaging, with what is left lacking legal coherence. In the field of construction, the Building Safety Act 2022 is premised on definitions in a set of 2015 regulations—the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations —implementing an EU directive and creating a framework for health and safety in construction. Unless these regulations are kept switched on, the 2022 Act of Parliament will have its underpinning yanked away. What then exists?

In employment rights, despite what the Minister has recently claimed, there are many topics for which EU law is the bedrock, even if added to—or gold-plated—in UK law, since, after all, EU law always only provided for minimum, not maximum, standards. Parental leave had no basis in UK law before the EU legislated, and it could be entirely removed or drastically altered by the Bill.

Many of the regulations affected are in areas of devolved competence. My noble friend Lady Randerson and others eloquently explained the harmful effect of this Bill on the devolved Administrations. Others have talked about the consequences for Northern Ireland and for the level playing field provisions in the trade and co-operation agreement—which, if we break it, could lead to trade retaliation. Will the Minister tell us about that?

To conclude, if, as the Government claim, there are real regulatory gains from altering retained EU law which could be agreed with or not, there are much better ways of doing that that have already been identified by this very Government, as others have said. The Financial Services and Markets Bill, which was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, makes provision for an extensive new regime which has already been subject to considerable consultation. The Procurement Bill brings in new rules on that topic, and then there is the review led by Professor Sir Patrick Vallance to examine EU regulation in high-growth sectors. However, primary legislation and expert reviews require real, careful work, not a simplistic, arbitrary and ideological presumption that EU law must be slashed. They need Bills to be brought forward asking Parliament to legislate with democratic input from MPs, but also input from affected stakeholders of all kinds.

In short, this is a very bad Bill that does not deserve a place on the statute book—certainly not in the form in which it is now before us. The Minister referred in his opening speech to good governance. I think we would like to see some.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I hope the Minister will forgive me but before she moves on, I want to add to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. The Financial Services and Markets Bill is not only primary legislation but there has been consultation, proper scrutiny and so on, and listed in the schedule to the Bill are all the measures that are being removed. That is essentially what is being asked for by critics of this Bill. Please will the Minister tell us what the Government are doing with individual measures—the 4,000 or whatever?

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I almost dare not go down that line because it has been suggested that what I have been saying is not applicable to these amendments. I think it is applicable, and we have to talk about this principle if we are to discuss the Bill properly. On what the noble Lord rightly put forward, all this throws everything into doubt, and it is very un-Conservative. I have never known a Conservative proposal to throw aside all the interpretation that has grown up over the years, because that is exactly what life is about: learning through the years. Citing the fact that it happens to be interpretation of European Union laws is to ignore the history. We have been a member of the European Union, and we are no longer; I am sorry about that, but I am one of those who wants to draw a line underneath that and behave sensibly from now on. I do not want this appallingly reactionary approach, which says, “Because it’s got ‘EU’ on it, there’s something wrong with it”. Let us consider it properly and separately.

So if we are not going to get rid of the first point about motor vehicles and seat belts for children, let us therefore have a different way of doing it. Let us decide that we will have a reform of the laws in general and that we will bring before this House proposals for what those changes will be in a timetable which is sensible and which the House can deal with. Therefore, we would not do the last non-Conservative thing, which is so outrageous as to be almost inconceivable: taking the power over law from Parliament and giving it to Ministers. I can think of nothing less Conservative than that.

Let me put it like this: we are not even giving it to these Ministers; we are going to give it to whichever Ministers are there—and they may not be the same lot. All I want to say is that no Conservative in my knowledge of history has ever proposed that the decision on something as important as, for example, children wearing seat belts shall not be our job in this House and in the elected House, but the job of Ministers alone.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and I support every word that he said. I too will react to the letter we got minutes before we started this Committee debate—if I am allowed to do so without an intervention from the Government Front Bench. My noble friend Lord Fox referred to how the letter says that the dashboard

“presents an authoritative catalogue of retained EU law, not a comprehensive list of retained EU law”.

So I hope that the Minister, in her response, can give us a precise explanation of the difference between “authoritative catalogue” and “comprehensive list”, because, for my part, I cannot really understand how it can be authoritative if it is not comprehensive.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I suggest to the noble Baroness that this is about the Government allowing themselves wriggle room.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I could not possibly comment on any wriggle room that the Government are giving themselves. However, because there is some justice in what the noble Viscount has said, I still want an explanation on the record from the Minister of how it can be authoritative if it is not comprehensive. Indeed, it cannot be authoritative at the moment because we know that it is still in the process of being added to.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

When is a catalogue not a list?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Yes, indeed, when is a catalogue not a list? It would be really helpful if the Government could explain that.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, referred to how this is not a Conservative Bill because it is revolutionary. Yesterday, I found myself using the adjective “anarchic”, because the Bill is revolutionary and anarchic; we have an anarchist revolution from a Conservative Government, which is quite an interesting development. Another way of putting it is that it is a complete mess.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

Chaos.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

It is a chaotic mess. They are making it up as they go along. We understand that officials are not only still dabbling around desperately trying to find EU law but thinking about what to do with each instrument once they have found it—whether it should be junked, preserved or altered. That is an odd way of putting the cart before the horse. Why was the Bill ever submitted if there was no idea of what was going to happen to EU law? I will add to my adjectives: the Bill is higgledy-piggledy and all over the place.

Finally, I wanted to raise another point for the Minister to answer. I am grateful to George Peretz KC for raising this point. We will come back to Clause 1 in future groups, but it is entirely relevant here to raise it. The definition of EU-derived subordinate legislation that is to be sunsetted in Clause 1(4) is

“any domestic subordinate legislation so far as … it was made under section 2(2)”

or another provision of the

“European Communities Act 1972, or … it was made”

otherwise, in

“implementation of EU obligations”.

But one problem is that sometimes an SI was made partly under Section 2(2) of the ECA and partly on another legal basis. Are those all going to be, whether this list is authoritative or comprehensive, or when it is finally arrived at—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Absolutely. George Peretz refers to the bits of an SI that were not made to implement an EU obligation. Do they remain as what he calls “bleeding chunks”, because of the “so far as” caveat? He calls them Frankenstein SIs, which may or may not make any sense as law. If an SI has been partially made to implement an EU obligation, will it be on the catalogue or list or whatever?

In a meeting yesterday I mentioned one problem, and I shall mention it here now. I had a Liberal Democrat colleague in the European Parliament, Chris Davies, who consistently raised the question of what were called in the jargon “correlation tables”. What that meant was traceability—being able to see how EU law was being implemented in all the member states. That had various advantages, and one advantage that it would have now is that we would not have hundreds of civil servants scurrying around Whitehall who should be doing more important work than trying desperately to find out what is retained EU law, because the EU measure being implemented is not cited in the SI or even in primary legislation.

That is one problem that we have now—and I will repeat an example that I have given before, which is something that I know something about. The Extradition Act 2003 implemented the European arrest warrant. You will not find the term “European arrest warrant” in the Act, which just referred to Part 1 and Part 2 countries for extradition. Part 1 was broadly about European arrest warrant countries, but an ordinary person opening up the Extradition Act would not have had a clue that it was implementing the European arrest warrant. So I am afraid that successive Governments have made a rod for the back of the present Government, and all those poor civil servants, and the National Archives and everybody else who is being dragged into this absurd exercise.

There has been a failure for a variety of reasons, one of which is the gold plating. There would be some dusty project in a Whitehall drawer somewhere, and then an EU measure would come along that was a wonderful vehicle for it. They could never justify to Ministers putting it through in a Bill, so they thought, “Aha, nobody will notice. When we implement it through Section 2(2), we’ll blame the EU or we’ll kind of hide it among all this stuff”. So I am afraid that chickens are coming home to roost with regard to the 4,000 or however many thousand measures. We do not know what is in the scope of this Bill. More importantly, all the people out there in the real economy—the businesses, the trade unions, consumer organisations and travel firms—do not know what EU law they are going to be continuing to operate, and that frankly is a disgrace.

[Lord Krebs (CB)]

My Lords, I return to the by now infamous letter, which I too opened a few minutes ago. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said, when we talked about regulatory burden we asked for some worked examples, because it is only when you have the worked example with the actual numbers—maths homework—that you can actually see how it is going to operate. When I opened the letter, I thought for a moment it was a spoof, because it says:

“There is no definition of regulatory burden in the Bill, as … such a definition could unnecessarily constrain departments”.


It also says—this is helpful—that decisions about the regulatory burden

“will take place on a case by case basis and it will be an ‘in the round’ consideration that encompasses the vector of considerations in clause 15(10).”

If that is the worked example then, my God, we need a bit of help. I hope that when we get the real letter, rather than a spoof letter, it will actually tell us how this trade-off between a bit more regulation there and a bit less regulation over here is going to work.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

Again, we come back to individual decisions, although we have an amendment on the devolved Administrations later on; I hope we will reach it today. To respond to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, assimilation will be discussed fully in our debates on later groups.

On the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about whether the dashboard is authoritative, I can confirm that it is. This is because it has gone on an extensive, cross-Whitehall process and has been agreed at ministerial level. It is not comprehensive because, as noble Lords will know, the process is still ongoing. We have made a promise to update the dashboard accordingly as we go along; the next update is planned for spring 2023.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I still do not really understand the difference. How can it be authoritative if it is not comprehensive? That mystery will have to live with me for the rest of the day, I suppose. Can the Minister tell us when the list will be comprehensive? When will the Government say, “The list is now, in our terminology, comprehensive”?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

We can confirm that it is authoritative. The version that will come out in the spring—the next version—will be authoritative. The comprehensiveness of it will come when the archives have finished their process and so on. A lot has been made of this point, frankly. The key regulations are on the dashboard; for me, the key thing that matters is what departments do with them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister—I know that everyone wants to get to the dinner break—but what kind of regulations is he talking about? For instance, the general data protection regulation took two years of negotiation. I can think only of tertiary legislation by the Commission, such as on the price of sheepmeat or something that changes daily. On what regulations did we have no say? I was an MEP, and we had co-decision on practically everything of any importance.

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I am very happy for the noble Baroness. As a parliamentarian in the UK Parliament, I had no say. However, many of the regulations were very good and we want to retain them.

I am grateful for the words of so many noble Lords. My noble friend Lord Cormack embarrassed and moved me with his nice words, but when such words are said in this House, I know that there is an enormous “but”. I will try to address it.

I count myself an environmentalist. I have been on the boards of different NGOs, I am a member of many and I have campaigned and worked on the environment all my life. I see my role as a Minister as just a small part of that. I would absolutely not be standing here if I thought that we were indulging in some means of trashing the kind of protections that we want to continue and improve in this country. There are opportunities; as my noble friend Lord Caithness said, we have had these regulations but biodiversity continues to decline, as it has done for decades. We now have a commitment to reverse that decline, stop it by 2030 and see it increase as against 2020 data by 2042. No Government will be able to escape that, so the idea that we could get rid of regulations that would make that happen is wrong.

I find at the moment that all roads in Defra lead towards our land use framework. I applaud those Members of this House who wrote a really good report on it, as my noble friend Lord Caithness mentioned. I agree with him that if we are going to get this right and achieve anything on environmental regulation, incentives to farmers through ELMS, our water policy, anything to do with air quality, the health of people and the benefits of nature, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, then we need really to understand how, in a finite piece of territory, we will manage all those requirements and our international commitments, some of which I have already mentioned.

As my noble friend said, the powers in the Bill will empower departments to unleash innovation and propel growth across every area of our economy. The Bill is simply an enabling Act. It is up to departments and the devolved Administrations what they will do on specific pieces of policy.

In Amendment 10, the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, has raised the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations. I reassure her that the Government remain committed to the ambitious plans set out in the Environment Act, which sets out legally binding targets to halt nature’s decline by 2030. The noble Baroness, Lady Young, said that the habitats directive was the jewel in the crown; she is absolutely right that it has been a huge driver in environmental policy, although not an exclusive one. She raised a point about interpretive effects. Interpretive effects are the general principle of EU supremacy as set out in Section 4 rights and do not relate to case law. However, I absolutely assure her of our commitment to 30 by 30. Our commitment to protect 30% of our land and oceans remains fundamental. We will continue to do that—we would not be able to if we damaged our environment in the ways that some noble Lords have suggested.

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[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

My Lords, as I expected, the Minister is giving a very satisfactory list of assurances that he has not the slightest intention of lowering any standards. I am quite sure that he is sincere and that the Government actually believe that they are not going to lower any of those standards. I cannot understand what the argument is against ending this whole ridiculous debate by just putting a statement in the Bill which lists key directives—such as the habitats directive and the bathing water directive—and emphasises that they are going to remain totally unchanged, so that if any future Government decided to start deregulating in this area, it would need a proper parliamentary process before they had any chance of doing so. What is the positive argument against putting these undertakings, which are wholly reassuring, in the Bill? The last hour and a half would have been quite unnecessary if that had been done.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Before the Minister stands up, he will know that one of the continuing problems in this country is not lack of law but the lack of enforcement. That is very obvious in the sewage discharges, and, at the moment, the only reason that the urban wastewater directive is being enforced in London is that the European Commission took infringement proceedings, subsequent to a petition that I took to the European Parliament. That is why we are getting the Thames super sewer. I am sorry for rivers everywhere else, including the Thames in its higher reaches, but we are getting the very expensive Thames super sewer because the European Commission took enforcement proceedings which ended in a judgment in the European Court of Justice. Elsewhere, UK enforcement has been dire.

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness and my noble friend for those remarks. We will be providing a clear list of regulations in due course, but we are working through them, and I make no apology: we want to get it right and we have a lot of work to do on that front.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

26: Clause 1, page 1, line 4, at beginning insert “Subject to section (Consultation and reporting),”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is connected to Lord Fox’s amendment after Clause 1 “Consultation and reporting”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 is a paving amendment, so I will speak mainly to the substantive Amendment 48. Much reference was made in the previous two groups to the need for consultation and consideration of various factors and elements before there can be sunsetting. This theme will be taken up; it links to later groups, particularly the fifth group.

Many of us think that this Bill is pretty hopeless. It has been described as revolutionary and, in my case, anarchic, but we are trying to bring some rationalisation and order to the Bill, which is at the moment completely disordered. I referred earlier to it as putting the cart before the horse, in that we have had this Bill in Parliament for several months but no one can say when we are going to get the famous comprehensive list. We understand that officials are still trying to trawl through the regulations so far and decide, with Ministers presumably, into what bucket they should go. You would have thought that all that work on bucket filling would have gone on before the Bill was ever introduced, because surely that is the right way round: you have the policy before you seek the legislative powers to do anything about it. Unfortunately—we all know it is a piece of ideological gesture politics—we have not had that sensible approach. Some of us hope that we will get a sensible approach once the Northern Ireland deal is successfully approved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I and everybody else wants me to be brief. I was astonished to hear the Minister describe a considered process of consultation and reporting as complex and unnecessary. I would be interested to hear the response of the CBI to such a characterisation of what is surely a part of good governance: consulting people who are going to be affected and then reporting to Parliament, which should be in the driving seat of this process. Indeed, it was promised that Parliament would be in the driving seat of this process; that is why we were taking back control, we were told. I welcome and agree with the intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett.

The Minister also said that such consultation would “hamper attainment of our ambitions”. I am afraid the Minister’s slip is showing because that displays the intention of slash and burn. He does not want a considered process of consultation; he just wants to chuck it all out. That is precisely what businesses and other stakeholders fear: that this is window-dressing—a gesture politics Bill which has an ideological motive, rather than one to get good, proper, appropriate regulation.

The Minister mentioned the financial services Bill, and we keep mentioning it because, if we want to change EU law, there are issues around that to do with divergence and so on—but it is “if”. The Prime Minister lauds Northern Ireland being in the single market. Perhaps he would like to give the single market back to us in Great Britain. The advantage for Northern Ireland is being close to EU regulation. Whether or not one wants to diverge, the way to do it is through primary legislation, where you list all the measures you are going to keep and not keep. Businesses, trade unions, charities, campaign groups and so on fear very much that the Government are being cavalier about what they are doing in the Bill and about the substance of regulation which they have grown used to.

I find Amendment 45 quite impossible to understand. The Minister says that it consolidates things elsewhere in the Bill. I suppose it has the advantage of bringing to our attention how peculiar these provisions are:

“any specified instrument or provision of an instrument or anything having effect under the specified instrument or provision … any specified description of minor instruments”.

I really find this quite difficult to understand and I would be grateful if the Minister could write to me, and put a copy of the letter in the Library, to give us some examples of what is being covered here.

I am afraid that the Minister has not really convinced me of why the Government are not prepared to properly consult, properly explain and properly reason what they want to do. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 29 in the names of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope and others.

A couple of weeks ago your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee, on which I have the honour to serve, went to Cardiff and Edinburgh to take evidence in the context of our current inquiry into the future of UK-EU relations. During those visits, on which we talked to Members of the Senedd and the Parliament in Edinburgh, the points about this Bill, and above all the points covered by my noble and learned friend’s amendment, were raised forcefully with us by representatives of all parties, including the party that supports the Government, in both Cardiff and Edinburgh. They told us they were completely in the dark about the application of this Bill if it became an Act, and in particular about how it would impact on the areas that my noble and learned friend has drawn attention to, which are devolved and are the responsibility of the Scottish and Welsh Governments. They said they were really worried that this would lead to many unforeseen negative consequences.

They said there had been no contact or discussion at the political level between either the Welsh or Scottish Government and Whitehall about these measures. There had been contact at official level, of course, and in previous parts of the debate on the Bill here, Ministers have said, “Oh, well, there are some jolly good contacts going on at official level and civil servants are talking to each other”. That will not do; it is not enough. There must be a dialogue with the Welsh and Scottish Governments about this issue; it deeply concerns them.

I hope that the Minister, when he comes to reply to the debate on this amendment, will give certain undertakings in that respect. Above all, I hope he will commit and say categorically that if this amendment is not put to a decision today—it is of course axiomatic that it will not be—these contacts at political level with the Welsh and Scottish Governments will take place between today and Report and he will report back to this House what has passed in those contacts. Without that, we are just heading towards greater and completely unnecessary discord. I hope this point can be taken on board. I do not think it a great deal to ask the Minister to commit himself to. Frankly, it is astonishing that it has not happened already.

One of the things that was quite clear from our contacts in both Cardiff and Edinburgh was that this absence of certainty about what is covered by the sunset clause is itself extremely damaging. Nobody has been able to tell them the list of measures that would be affected by the sunset clause. So I hope the Minister can respond positively when he comes to reply to this debate.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to give a few words of support to the amendments in this group, particularly those led by my noble friends Lady Humphreys and Lady Randerson. To pick up the phrase just used by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, it is astonishing that the Government are proposing to create such discord with this Bill and by their failure to respect the devolved Administrations and include them in the processes of consideration.

As an Englishwoman, though with roots throughout these islands, I am no expert either on the devolution settlement or on common frameworks—very far from it—but our party is a unionist one, which surely means fostering, respecting and supporting the operation of the union.

In paragraph 60 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, there is a very clear statement:

“The Government also remains committed to respecting the devolution settlements and the Sewel Convention, and has ensured that the Bill will not alter the devolution settlements”—


that does not appear to be the case—

“and will not intrinsically create greater intra-UK divergence”.

Quite a lot of weight is put on “intrinsically” in that sentence, because it has great potential to create intra-UK divergence and thus seems very contrary to government policy. On Monday we heard the Prime Minister deliver a passionate statement of support for unionism. He passionately said, “I am a unionist”—he also said, “I am a Brexiter”, but I was not so keen on that bit. The Bill does not illustrate that passionate unionism from the Government.

Coming specifically to the effect on Northern Ireland, I fully agreed with the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie. We on these Benches are also extremely concerned about the Bill’s impact on the Northern Ireland protocol, and in particular on Article 2 on the upholding of rights under EU law, including human rights. We hear with great concern the view of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, which argues that the Bill risks the basis of the Good Friday agreement. That cannot be at all overlooked.

I have a few questions in reference to the Windsor Framework that I hope the Minister can answer. First, will the Stormont brake apply to any laws affected by the REUL Bill or only to new legislation? Has the Prime Minister agreed with the EU to retain all EU law affected by this Bill in Northern Ireland as part of the Windsor Framework? If not, will that not undermine the Windsor Framework? Have the Government agreed to amend this Bill as part of the deal done on Monday in the Windsor Framework on the Northern Ireland protocol?

Practically speaking—given that, sadly, there is no sign yet that the Northern Ireland Executive will be up and running soon—who will be making decisions on which EU law is protected from the sunset? The situation in Northern Ireland is of course very delicate. Given that either removing retained EU law or pulling the Stormont brake could trigger a breakdown in trade between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, will the Minister commit that that will happen only when there is cross-community support for doing so? That question is perhaps more on the framework.

With regard to the Bill, there are major concerns about the devolution settlements, the common frameworks and, not least arising from the Windsor Framework, the effect specifically on Northern Ireland. I hope that the Minister can cover all those concerns in his response.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have not signed any amendments in this group—I was not asked, and I was not quick enough to get my name down. All of the issues have been covered absolutely amazingly by other noble Lords, so I will restrict myself to talking about the politics. The politics of this particular Bill are extremely interesting. I support all the amendments in the first group, simply because they are sensible and practical, and I like practical outcomes. But, at the same time, we ought to throw the whole clause out, and I do not see any option to do that. We want a democracy when we have finished voting on the Bill and, if it goes through as it is, we will not have one.

I will ask two political questions. First, why do we have the Bill at all? Quite honestly, it is terrible piece of legislation that is absolutely outrageous. In the 10 years I have been here, I have almost never had a glimmer of sympathy for the Government. But, having seen the Bill, I do: it is like the last gasp of a dying creature, and that dying creature is the popular Tory party of 2019, when it actually had some credibility and popularity, as I said. That has seeped and ebbed away, to the point that it is now in the most extraordinary position and putting forward legislation like this. It is an ideological monstrosity that caters to the worst parts of the right wing of the Tory party, and it will not have support.

I think the Conservative Party expects to run out into the streets and say, “We did it—we got rid of all EU law. Brexit has finally happened”. But, of course, that is simply not true: a lot of this is not EU law but British law. I am sure that the Minister himself had a hand in producing some of it, as a Member of the European Parliament. For anyone who has been in the European Parliament to say that this is pure EU law is complete nonsense. I do not want to accuse the Minister of telling lies, but it is nonsense. So why is it here? Is it here because the Conservative Party wants to get some sort of popularity or something? Why is it here? It is not a worthwhile Bill; it is a ludicrous Bill to bring here. There has been so much learned opposition, but still the Government insist on pushing it through.

My second political question is: what happens afterwards? Of course, it is all very well to put this through, but what happens when Labour is in government? Will the Conservative Party really be happy that Labour has these powers and can just whip out a piece of legislation and give Ministers all these powers? It is not a democracy when you give so much power to Ministers. That is not what Brexit was about—and I say that as somebody who voted for Brexit. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that he is perhaps a rejoiner now, not a remoaner—sorry, I mean remainer. It is perhaps time we understood that the damage has been done and this just creates more damage. It is time to drop the Bill. We will not have a democracy if it goes through.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased that everybody who has spoken in this debate is pulling in the same direction, which is an effort to rescue the Government from themselves. It is not only former diplomats and civil servants, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, who applaud the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom; I am afraid to say to the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, that it is also Liberal Democrats as well, which might be even more upsetting to him. But we are all, at least partially, on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, and I do hope that we will be able to rally round a single powerful amendment for Report, based on elements of all of the laudable amendments in this group.

What has been brought out in the debate are the contradictions and hypocrisy of criticising the EU legislative process—which I happen to believe was democratic, but I will leave that there. But, even if you do not, introducing rule by executive diktat does not seem a very intelligent response to your criticism of EU lawmaking.

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who cited the report of the Constitution Committee; I think we are all grateful not only to that committee but to the Delegated Powers and secondary legislation committees—we have with us the former chair of the SLSC, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who supervised the work for that committee’s report on this Bill before he stepped down. The DPRRC not only described the Bill, as we have frequently said, as “hyper-skeletal” but noted that approach taken by the Government

“contradicts pledges by the Government since 2018 that Parliament would be the agent of substantive policy change in these areas”.

Instead, they have made the Bill

“a blank cheque placed in the hands of Ministers”.

That is our objection. The Government would be wise to go back and think about what they are doing in this Bill. We are trying to put some order and reasonableness into the way it is being done. We are having to do a lot of the work that should have been done before the Bill was introduced. All the amendments, whether the one led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and supported by my noble friend Lord Beith, or those led by my noble friend Lord Fox, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, in one way or another seek to avoid the deletion of unidentified law unintentionally and to allow Parliament rather than Ministers control in a considered, explained, transparent and accountable way. Seriously, what is not to like about those two objectives?

We heard some nice phrases in the debate. It was said that we wanted to avoid the “unannounced repeal” of legislation, which was translated perhaps in a rather more blunt, northern way, if I may say so to my noble friend Lord Beith, as “washing stuff down the plughole”. We heard about a “circular economy” of the law from the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I might recycle that—oh, dear—at some point. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, described the processes in the Bill as “bizarre” and “constitutionally improper”. Several amendments, including Amendment 42, led by my noble friend Lord Fox, seek to avoid the default loss of laws that our citizens will not even know they have lost—various speakers, including the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned the effect of that.

So we are trying to establish default retention and to build in specification of objectives for any revocation. A lot of the amendments are sister amendments to those debated on Tuesday in an earlier group—we had Amendment 48 on consultation and reporting. All of them aim to introduce a reasonable, considered, parliamentary way of doing things which will not surprise all the businesses, unions, consumers, employees and so on, who will not know what on earth is going on.

I realise that Amendment 50, which proposes a super-affirmative process for revocation, may offend the reservations of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and my noble friend Lord Beith about amendable SIs, but I am sure that, with the skill of both those very experienced parliamentarians, we will be able to think of a better way of drafting everything. But I think that all the aims that we have debated in this group are worth pursuing.

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

I interject to make a point that perhaps I did not get over clearly enough earlier. In moving Amendment 42, we would be doing nothing but trying to help the Government and help good governance.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord.

[Baroness Crawley (Lab)]

My Lords, very briefly, I support this group of important amendments. In particular, I support Amendment 43 in the names of my noble friend Lady Chapman of Darlington and the noble Lord, Lord Fox. Through it, only legislation identified and approved by Parliament could be revoked, and that is the responsible, democratic and considered way to proceed.

Amendment 43 would put responsibility for a timetable of revocation back with Parliament, so that the Government cannot claim that it is an open-ended approach. It also begins to answer the very important questions around the complete lack of executive accountability raised by our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. So many sectors and people are affected by the Bill and do not want Parliament to be taken for granted, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, put it.

I will concentrate for half a minute on consumer protection. As the vice-president of the Chartered Trading Standards Institute, I will reflect some of the fears raised with me over the past weeks and months.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

I apologise for my enthusiasm causing a truncation of the Minister’s response. Does he at least understand, if he does not accept, that as long as the Government resist suggestions such as come through in these amendments, whereby a list of the laws that are covered by the Bill is laid before Parliament and officially and definitively made available—not a catalogue, as we have been promised but a definitive and complete list, of the sort of laws that not only the noble Baroness but all of us feel passionately about—we are bound to be fuelled by distrust?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Before the Minister replies, I add that what the Minister is saying now directly contradicts the letter we had the other day from the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, which we discussed. The distinction is made by the Government between an authoritative catalogue and a comprehensive list. The Government admit that the dashboard is not comprehensive, so how can each department possibly know all the EU law it is responsible for? As anyone can, I can give examples—and I am grateful to the organisation Justice, of which I should declare I am a vice-president, for giving two examples of direct effect treaty articles and directive clauses which are not on the dashboard, which cites only 28 in that category. That is Article 157 of the treaty and a clause of the habitats directive. They are not on the dashboard, so how are we meant to believe that departments know exactly what law they are dealing with?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I just explained that point in my earlier answer. The noble Baroness can look at Hansard and come back to me if she is not satisfied with that explanation.

To go back to the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, let us accept for the purposes of making his point that, as he said, huge swathes of vital REUL will somehow accidentally disappear. The Government do not accept that; we think it is extremely unlikely. However, I understand the point he makes. I refer him to the answer that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe gave to a similar question yesterday. We understand the point that noble Lords are making, we will reflect on that issue and, if necessary, come back to it. Without making any promises, we will reflect on whether that is possible. Obviously, being a member of the Government, I trust them, but I accept that other noble Lords may not have the same faith in what we are doing. It is essentially intended to be a constructive process.

Moving on, Amendment 44A seeks to omit the sunset from the Bill and allow the repeal, revocation or amendment of retained EU law to be carried out only via primary legislation. Currently we are unable to keep retained direct EU legislation up to date with new advances, precisely because of that problem—because some of it is regarded as primary legislation. For those who still wish us to reflect EU law, we cannot even update it in line with any EU changes or new advances because, if we decided to do so, we would need to do it through primary legislation, and parliamentary time does not allow for that. This is creating more legal and business uncertainty, as regulations become more and more out of date and burdensome. The Bill is therefore designed to rectify this issue. This amendment, however, would instead maintain the status quo, which we do not believe is either helpful or beneficial to anyone. Again, I understand that, if people wanted to undermine the fundamental purpose of the Bill, they would support that amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendment led by and spoken to by my noble friend Lady Humphreys. I also support the amendment to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, just spoke. As I said on an earlier group, these Benches fully support respect for a union which is built on trust, which is what we feel is lacking here. I also want to speak to Amendment 136, in the name of my noble friend Lord Fox, who had to be absent for the moment.

[Noble Lords]

He is behind you.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Oh, has he come back? I am not doing too well. I am getting tired; I expect we all are.

Amendment 136 would give Parliament some power over the use of the delay to sunset powers in Clause 2(1), where powers are conferred to delay the sunsetting under Clause 1. Clause 2(1) allows Ministers by regulations to postpone the date when any retained EU law, unless expressly saved, is automatically revoked. However, as our Delegated Powers Committee has said:

“Use of this power is apt to be highly significant but is subject only to the negative procedure.”


As is well known, Parliament hardly ever overturns government proposals in a negative procedure—I believe that the last time it happened in the House of Commons was in 1979; I am subject to correction there, but it is not exactly every day. The power for Ministers in Clause 2(1) is not constrained by any requirement for consultation, any criteria to be met or any preconditions to be satisfied. We do not even know from the Bill, because no indication is given, whether the postponement would be exceptional or the general rule—we have no idea what the Government’s intentions are for delaying sunsetting. The DPRRC reminds us that the delegated powers memorandum states that

“the power is not intended for wide usage”,

but how do we know? How can we know? The memorandum also says

“Ministers have confirmed that they do not intend on allowing the usage of this power without collective agreement”.

We might think, “Oh, whose agreement does that mean? Does it mean consultation with businesses, unions, et cetera? Does it mean some kind of consensus?” No, says the DPRCC,

“this is merely a statement of the doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility rather than an effective constraint on the power contained in clause 2(1)”.

We might get excited by that phrase, but “collective agreement” just means collective ministerial responsibility.

The power in Clause 2(1), combined with the scale of the task of determining which pieces of retained EU law are to be retained, revoked or amended, gives rise, in the words of the DPRRC, to

“significant uncertainty as to what the sunset date will be”.

It concludes:

“Given the importance of the power, we consider that its use merits affirmative procedure scrutiny.”


In the light of our debates today, the way that Parliament is just being cut out of this whole exercise is totally at odds with the claims made during the referendum that it would be put back in control and in the driving seat. Two years later, the EU withdrawal Act was accompanied by lots of promises about how Parliament would be the one to decide when to revoke, retain or amend retained EU law.

The point of Amendment 136 is its continuity with, in particular, the amendments we debated in the last group and on Tuesday, which set out that Parliament cannot be ignored in this process—which it will be, in effect, if there is only a negative procedure. I hope that the Government will agree that Parliament should be in the driving seat on the question of whether to delay the sunset.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope, therefore, that the Government will be prepared to put people’s minds at rest that they are not going to simply let regulations or laws in those areas fall as of 31 December. That will at least ensure more detailed consideration beyond that date, if necessary. I hope the Minister can take at least that aspect into account. I also say to him that regulations in those areas are, by and large, popular; they are popular with business as well as with the people whom they directly affect. The Government would be alienating everybody if they allowed them to fall at the end of this year.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendment 62, on which I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I will also mention Amendment 67, which is about Ministers being able to extend the sunset for the matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5, which at the moment is lacking. There are such powers for Clause 1, but there are not similar powers for the very important matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5. Amendment 137 is a consequential amendment and introduces our familiar theme of the affirmative procedure.

I want to concentrate on Amendment 62, because it is about removing

“the automatic deletion by the sunset clause of the rights, powers, liabilities etc currently recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 4 of the”

European Union (Withdrawal) Act. The amendment calls for no abolition until these rights, powers and liabilities et cetera have been identified, and subjected to consultation and to a report laid before the relevant legislature—Parliament or the devolved ones—detailing the consequences of abolition. We do not have a huge amount of time, so I will not laboriously go through the text of the amendment, which is before noble Lords, but they will recognise the structure of it. On these Benches, there is a pattern to the amendments that we have tabled—Amendments 48, 42 and others which escape my memory at the moment—which are all about this considered way of making decisions.

The point about Amendment 62 is that it reflects one of our consistent objections. When I say “our”, I think I can say that right across the House, at Second Reading and in three days of Committee, there is a concern that it would be almost impossible to know what domestic law would actually look like after the end of this year. This offends key principles of the rule of law, including the requirement of legal certainty, human rights protection and other matters. The risk that this amendment is designed to address is that retained EU law will be revoked unknowingly; it is particularly prevalent for Clause 3 as the dashboard is far from comprehensive on this non-legislative form of law.

These rights encompassed by Clause 3 were originally recognised domestically by Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act and were retained by Section 4 of the EUWA. However, the potential effect of Clause 3 is arguably more serious than that of Clause 1. This is because identifying retained EU law to be deleted by Clause 3 is even more difficult than for Clause 1. We have been extensively through the difficulties of identifying retained legislation. Clause 3 is not a cataloguing of legal instruments. It requires legal research, often into case law of UK courts and the ECJ, to identify which EU treaty or directive articles have been found to contain directly enforceable EU rights and obligations. There may be further rights which are so obviously directly effective that they have never been litigated, and that provides a further challenge to identifying them before the deadline.

The Government have hardly started. Of the 3,800 pieces of REUL identified so far on the dashboard, only 28 rights, powers et cetera caught by the Clause 3 sunset have been identified, and there is no power to extend the Clause 3 deadline if Ministers run out of time. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has amendments to that effect, as we do in Amendment 67. To delete all those which are not saved by Ministers by the end of this year is reckless and unnecessary, so I am sorry but I am going to take a little bit of time. Unfortunately this group comes at the end of the day, and we are all tired and we all want to get home, but these are really important matters.

I have two examples which have not yet been identified on the famous dashboard so have not been subject to any consultations with affected individuals, organisations or businesses and could have a very severe impact if they are deleted by Clause 3. The first example is Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the TFEU. This goes much further than the right to equal pay under the Equality Act 2010 because it is less restrictive with regard to comparators. For example, under Article 157, a woman teacher can compare herself to a man employed by a different education authority. They do not need to have the same employer. That type of comparison is not possible under the Equality Act. It requires comparison with a man employed by the same employer—it is usually a man; it could be the other way round but, let us face it, it is a normally a woman claiming equal pay with a man—so it has had a pretty revolutionary impact on the ability of women to get equal pay. However, Article 157 is not on the REUL dashboard as a directly effective right, so it would be repealed as a directly enforceable right by Clause 3 at the end of the year and women’s equal pay protections will be severely weakened as a result. Frankly, every woman in this country should be bombarding the Government with that fact. The Government have told us recently everything they say they are doing for women. I welcome anything that they are doing, but this drives a coach and horses through those claims.

The second example is Article 6 of the habitats directive. We have heard quite a bit about that directive, which is about the conservation of natural habitats and fauna and flora. One of the obligations in that directive has been found to be directly enforceable. It is the obligation of the competent authority, in our case the Environment Agency, in special areas of conservation and sites of international importance to habitats and species to

“take appropriate steps to avoid … the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species”

et cetera.

This is a proactive and preventive obligation. It is not enough to react to deterioration once it has happened; it requires anticipatory protections to prevent deterioration and disturbance of habitats and species. That obligation has not been fully transposed into our domestic legislation. There remains in domestic law only a weaker duty on the Environment Agency to have regard to the habitats directive, which has been found not to impose a direction obligation, as article 6 of the EU directive does. So neither the habitats directive nor the case law on it appear on the REUL dashboard.

I hope that in his reply the Minister can address those two specific examples, which are not airy-fairy but very practical and significant. As things stand, this obligation will fall off the radar at the end of the year and the requirements on competent authorities to protect special areas of conservation proactively will be weakened. I must confess that I would like to have the noble Lord, Lord Benyon, here and to hear what he thinks of that.

Lastly, I recall that among the matters that Amendment 62 would require consideration of is the effect on our obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement and the protocol on Northern Ireland. That is a consistent point that we need to make from these Benches.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have signed Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I take this opportunity to say a few words about Clauses 3 to 5 more generally.

I spoke at Second Reading and, although I have not so far burdened your Lordships by speaking in Committee, I have watched much of the first two days’ proceedings with what I can describe only as horrified fascination. Reference has been made today to the recklessness of the Bill. I hope to explain as briefly as I can that this recklessness is not confined to Clauses 1 and 2 but reflected just as strongly in Clause 3, as the noble Baroness just said, and indeed in Clauses 4 and 5.

The Prime Minister does not strike me as a reckless man. We do not know his view of the Bill but perhaps we can take something from the fact that when he was Chancellor, he was careful to ensure that the rules for which he was responsible were excluded from its ambit.

A constant theme of the committee debates on EU-derived legislation was what I think of as the warning lights on the dashboard: a catalogue of retained EU law that is not comprehensive, a hole of uncertain size where devolved legislation should be and, however much Ministers may wish to reverse the presumption of revocation, its application by default to any provisions that have fallen down what has been referred to as the back of the national sofa.

Clause 3 has attracted only a small fraction of the public attention devoted to Clauses 1 and 2 but is, if anything, even more productive of uncertainty. So far as I can work out, that uncertainty comes in three varieties.

The first uncertainty derives from the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, no definitive list exists of the rights, powers and liabilities referred to in Clause 3 or, in all probability, is even capable of being prepared. The rights, powers and liabilities referred to include all those provisions of EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to confer rights directly on individuals, together with directly effective rights from EU agreements with third countries and directly effective rights in EU directives, subject to qualifications. All those rights had been preserved by Section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act in the interests of legal continuity. All are now to be removed in a single big bang moment at the end of the year, with no provision equivalent to Clause 2 for extending that sunset to a later date, as highlighted in the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. These measures do not bear the brand “direct effect” on their foreheads; no one has ever made a full list of them. It is quite certain that the 28 directly effective rights listed in the dashboard, one of them repealed, can be only a tiny proportion of the total. No one has counted them, consulted on them or assessed the impact of their imminent removal.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I will talk to the lawyers and attempt to get the noble Lord an answer to his concerns.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned the habitats directive. I am slightly loath to go back there, after the long discussion with my noble friend Lord Benyon on Tuesday, but let me restate again for the benefit of the record that the Government have been clear about the importance of environmental protection across the UK, not least through the Environment Act, which includes a legally binding target to halt the decline of nature by 2030. As I emphasised earlier in the debate, we are committed to meeting this target and we will of course not undermine our obligations to the environment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise to the Minister, but that is not the point I was asking about. I am no expert on the habitats directive, but a specific clause has been interpreted in case law as imposing a preventive, proactive duty—in our case, on the Environment Agency. Will that be retained?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Case law is being retained. Case law is not being abolished, it will still exist, and courts will still be able to take account of it. Removing the complex and opaque legal gloss associated with Section 4 of the 2018 Act will improve the clarity of our domestic law. It would be, in our view, inappropriate, to leave these provisions on our statute book, and we wish to end them as soon as reasonably practicable. We consequently also oppose Amendment 137, which specifies that any regulation made under the power conferred by Amendment 62 would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I do not think he said that; he said that there has to be an end to EU supremacy in UK law. While we are all swapping letters, perhaps the Labour Party might want to write us a letter to clarify what he meant. I am not being serious, of course; it is not the Labour Party’s job to do that.

Amendment 142 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, seeks to clarify that this Bill does not disturb Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. That section makes the rights and obligations in the withdrawal agreement available in domestic law. It also provides that domestic legislation must be read and given effect subject to those rights and obligations. I can reassure the noble Baroness that this Bill will not disturb Section 7A of the 2018 Act. I can also assure her that the Bill provides powers to restate rights and obligations required for Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol as needed. The Government will ensure that all necessary legislation is in place by the Bill’s sunset date to uphold all the commitments made under Article 2.

Amendment 100, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh, would remove the sunset date for the compatibility power in Clause 8. It is not necessary to have a power to specify legislative hierarchies beyond 23 June 2026, by which time the Government will have exercised the power as needed.

I move on to Clause 5. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has given notice of his intention to oppose the question that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill. General principles of EU law were developed in CJEU case law, with which EU institutions and member states must comply. I submit that it is clearly no longer suitable for our status as an independent nation outside the EU—however much the Liberal Democrats wish that not to be the case—for these specific principles to continue forming part of UK law. The powers in the Bill allow the Government to codify clearly any necessary effects to bring clarity to our domestic statute book.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but that remark was gratuitous. The point is about legal certainty. It is not about whether we as a party, or anybody else, would have wanted to remain in the EU—it is clear that we would. It is about whether the law will be clear, and whether the judges will be able to operate it, and whether businesses, unions and whoever will know what they are supposed to be doing. That is the point that we have been trying to make over four days on this Bill. Brexit is irrelevant to this discussion, and I do not believe I have used the word once in these proceedings. What is important is whether the law will be able to be operated with certainty, clarity and predictability.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

That is fair enough; it was a slightly gratuitous point. I actually agree with the noble Baroness—we want the law to be as clear and accessible as possible. That is why we do not believe that the general principles of EU law, which of course were developed by the CJEU for use primarily by EU institutions and member states, should be relevant to the UK now that we are an independent nation, whatever our differences of opinion might have been on that.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

68: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Conditions for bringing section 3, 4 or 5 into force(1) None of sections 3, 4 or 5 may be brought into force unless all the following conditions have been satisfied.(2) The first condition is that a Minister of the Crown has, after consulting organisations and persons representative of interests substantially affected by, or with expertise in the likely legal effect of, that section on a draft of a report, laid that report before Parliament setting out, with reasons, the Minister’s view as to the likely advantages and disadvantages of bringing that section into force, setting out in particular the effect of that section on –(a) the rights of and protections for consumers, workers and businesses, and protections of the environment and animal welfare, (b) legal certainty, and the clarity and predictability of the law,(c) the operation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU, and UK exports of goods and services to the European Economic Area, and(d) the operation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the EU withdrawal agreement.(3) In relation to section 4, the report must take into account any regulation made or likely to be made by a relevant national authority under section 8(1).(4) The second condition is that a period of 60 days has passed since the report was laid before Parliament, with no account taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.(5) The third condition is that, after the end of that period, both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section come into force.(6) If both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section should not come into force unless it is amended in a way set out in that resolution, then the Minister may by regulations amend that section accordingly, and that section may not be brought into force until that amendment has been made.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause requires Ministers to analyse, and to explain their analysis of, the effect of the removal of retained EU law rights, the principle of supremacy of EU law, and of the general principles. It also includes opportunity for Parliamentary approval and timeframes for laying reports before both Houses.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 68 I will speak to Amendments 69 and 69A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. I will take a little while; I know we want to make progress today, but these amendments are on legally very significant issues in relation to Clauses 3 to 5. Last Thursday, we discussed the fact that, unlike the sunset under Clause 1, there is no saving provision for Clauses 3 to 5, such as appears in Clauses 1(2). We moved an amendment to try to change that, and perhaps the Government will accept it.

I heard a Conservative MP on “Any Questions?” this weekend assert that Brexit meant bringing democracy back. I think that noble Lords across the Committee who have taken part in the four days of proceedings so far on the Bill would agree that it does not bring democracy back. Instead, it reinforces the executive diktat that, unfortunately, we have become rather used to.

The effect of these amendments, beginning with Amendment 68, would be to require

“Ministers to analyse, and to explain their analysis of, the effect of the removal of retained EU law rights, the principle of supremacy of EU law, and of the general principles”

of EU law. I presume that the Government have conducted such an analysis before bringing into force such wide-ranging changes. In the words of the Bar Council,

“it would be extraordinarily irresponsible were that not done”.

We would like to see a sharing of that analysis; it needs to

“be consulted on, made public, and put before Parliament. The new clause … gives Parliament the chance, in the light of such an analysis, to prevent the bringing into force of those sections or to propose amendments”.

The fact is that the effect and scope of Clauses 3 to 5 are extremely unclear.

On legal certainty, the principles of the interpretation of EU law are ones with which UK lawyers and courts are, by now, very familiar; they are well settled as principles of the interpretation of UK statues as well. Removing those principles is likely to generate uncertainty and unintended consequences, in particular because quite a lot of those topics will have been the subject of considerable EU case law and removing them will create instability. The Government have not explained what the consequences of the removal of those principles will be on the various rules and protections concerned. I am very grateful to the Bar Council for its briefing, and, again, in its words:

“It is not a good idea to legislate when you have no idea what the consequence of that legislation will be.”


However, I am afraid that that is where we seem to be.

Under these clauses, there will be a retrospective effect to alter the position of domestic legislation, which could not have been foreseen by the domestic legislator at the time. That appears to be a very dubious thing to do. The rationale for retaining, for instance, the principle of the supremacy of EU law—a much misunderstood term; lawyers describe it better as a hierarchical rule—is legal certainty, because individuals and businesses will have taken decisions, sometimes far-reaching and involving significant investment, based on the law as it was. Removing that principle to give priority to any subsequent domestic legislation would mean that it would be impossible to say whether the consequence of removing the principle in any particular case would reduce the clarity of the law or change its effect. Even if it does not do those things, it will at least reduce certainty and lead to unpredicted—and perhaps undesirable or unjust—consequences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am sorry if the noble Baroness believes that. We have debated the principle of the sunset. I accept that she presumably has a different position from mine, but I have stated the Government’s position on numerous occasions. The dashboard will continue to be updated as departments come to decisions on what they want to do with their stock of retained EU law.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, while it is in my mind, I am not sure the Minister answered my noble friend Lady Brinton’s question, which was, in citing the Delegated Powers Committee report, to ask what was the policy intention and to point out that the Bill is a blank sheet of paper as far as that is concerned. That is what is completely worrying us, because of its effect on the real world and the lack of any parliamentary grip on this process.

For him to say that Amendment 69A would involve the Law Commission in Government policy misrepresents the amendment—no doubt inadvertently—which talks about asking the Law Commission to report on,

“the effect of sections 3, 4 and 5 … on legal certainty, and the clarity and predictability of the law.”

That is surely within the purview of the Law Commission. That would not involve the Law Commission in policy. I fear that the Minister misrepresented Amendment 69A, perhaps in his enthusiasm.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

The Committee will be aware that I am not a fan of this Bill because it marginalises Parliament. Therefore, I was pleased to be able to put my name to and speak to the group of amendments beginning with Amendment 32, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane.

I have to say, as I said the other evening, that I sometimes find that we seem to be facing in all directions. I mentioned before about how one group of people were concerned to get clarity as soon as possible and therefore wanted to foreshorten the sunset clause. There were others who wanted to have time for consultation to bring people along and therefore lengthen the sunset clause. I never quite heard a serious reconciliation of those points of view.

I have to say that on this group of amendments, I have the same concern. I recognise that I am putting my head into not one legal lion’s mouth but several simultaneously, and I do so with due care, not being a lawyer. First, I note the emphasis on the importance attributed to certainty, clarity and predictability. That comes up in Amendment 85, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. It is referred to again in Amendments 86, 88 and 89. I get that: even I, as a non-lawyer, can see that certainty, clarity and predictability are quite important.

Then I look at some of the other amendments—Amendments 81, 90 and 92—and I see that we are changing “must” to “may”. As a non-lawyer, I feel that “must” to “may” does not increase predictability and clarity. Then, in Amendment 91, we have

“ought to be considered at that time”.

That seems to me, from the point of view of clarity and predictability, to run in completely the opposite direction. Where we had, in paragraph 4, on page 7, “a court must”, it is now “a court may”, and to the end of that is added

“and ought to be considered at that time”.

I am happy to be corrected because I am not a lawyer, but as a non-lawyer this seems to me to be running in both directions, and not to have the sort of clarity, predictability and certainty that I can quite understand. It seems to muddy waters that a previous series of amendments had sought to clarify.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 85 and 88, as a co-signatory of both those amendments, led by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who unfortunately cannot be here today. He has been kind enough to share his thinking with me.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

And his notes, by the look of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

And his notes, indeed, although any use I make of them is entirely down to me.

I want to start by reflecting that in the last group, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who is no longer in his place, rather airily dismissed a question from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who was seeking to find out what “domestic principles of interpretation” means. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, “Oh, it is quite clear: the courts know what ‘domestic principles of interpretation’ means”. Fine, we rely on the courts, as we do. I think it is an answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson: the courts know what they are doing, so if we use the word “may”, that is predictability, because the courts generally follow precedent and know what they are doing. If we tell them they “must” do something, that actually constrains them in a rather awkward and unpredictable way. That is my understanding, anyway. I found the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, masterful.

The Minister told us in discussing the last group that the courts know what they are doing, but in Clause 7 they are told what to do by the Government. As I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said, the drafting appeared to lack any litigation or judicial experience. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out—I cannot remember her exact words, but I interpret what she said—that she found it rather impertinent of the Government. I may be over-reading what I heard, but the courts know what they are doing and the Government come along and are prescriptive about what they are allowed to do. Arguably, Clause 7 is unnecessary, but the amendments seek at least to improve it. By the way, I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for pointing out that the amendments to Clause 7 are pretty complicated and convoluted, and it might have been better just to provide an alternative text to substitute a new Section 6 of the EU withdrawal Act, rather than making pages of amendments.

The fact is that the higher appeal courts are already not bound by retained EU case law and can depart from it if it is right to do so. This test is well established, having been set out in the House of Lords Practice Statement in 1966. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said, the Court of Appeal comprehensively considered the power to depart from retained EU case law in the case of TuneIn Inc v Warner Music UK. It considered various factors but decided not to depart from retained EU case law. You would get another impression from government explanations and commentary.

The courts in this case, and in other scenarios, have made comprehensive analyses and have given balanced reasons why and when the courts should or should not overturn settled case law. One of the things cited in that Court of Appeal case was the need to balance the need not to

“unduly restrict the proper development of the law”

with

“too rigid adherence to precedent.”

They are conducting that balancing exercise, but they drew particular attention to the special need for certainty in the law. Therefore, they gave legal certainty a particular value which must not be overlooked.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

I am listening carefully to what the noble Baroness is saying, but it has nothing to do with “predictable”. Everything she is saying about the way the law works is unpredictable because it depends on how the courts interpret it at the time. The idea that we are putting the emphasis on predictability in these amendments seems to me to be inaccurate.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I trust the courts; clearly, the noble Lord does not. I believe that the courts do know what they are doing, and that we have an extremely experienced and valuable judiciary. That is why, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, pointed out, lots of people come here to use the UK courts, particularly in London. The Government do not seem to have given any consideration to the fact that they are undermining the extremely valuable legal services that London sells to the world. They did not give consideration to service industries during Brexit generally, but this one brings in a lot of money for the UK economy and is being totally undermined, not least by this Bill.

Legal certainty was given a particular value by the Court of Appeal, but the Bill overlooks it, as many noble Lords have said, and detracts from the courts’ ability to do their job. In the notes from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out, I do have—he points out that Amendments 85 and 88 in his name are very moderate. Amendment 85 leaves intact the power of the courts to depart from retained EU case law, and Amendment 88 would retain domestic case law. They even leave intact the three factors the Government wish them to have regard to. The noble Lord says that he is persuaded, having seen Amendments 83, 84 and 87, that those factors—if they are to be kept—really need to be amended, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord Judge and Lord Thomas. The factors specified in the clause at present each militate in favour of departing from existing law. It seems to have been concluded that the judges require a powerful shove in the direction of the unknown. That is another seam of this Bill: we are jumping off a cliff edge and into a void.

All this is the antithesis, as has been said several times—the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who was interrupted at one point by the Government Front Bench, said how un-Conservative this Bill is. It requires leaps into voids and unknowns and off cliffs—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The noble Baroness is entirely right about the leap into the unknown. Does this not emphasise the point that members of the public cannot understand what the law is? That prejudices compliance and the ability of advisers to give good advice.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The noble Viscount is absolutely right, and I agreed with every word of his earlier contribution.

What the amendments do, instead having of a one-way impetus to the judges, is to introduce some balance to the exercise. Both these amendments would introduce two factors—they are repeated for the two scenarios—which might incline the judge in favour of caution:

“the consequences of disturbing a settled understanding of the law”

and

“the importance of legal certainty, clarity and predictability”.

The amendments give the judges more space for their judgment, which is—I am quoting the notes of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—“after all what judges are for”. What is the point of having judges if all they have to do is read the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill? Good luck with that.

Then the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, says of the quotation and reference in the Explanatory Notes to the Court of Appeal case of TuneIn Inc v Warner Music Ltd that “this, I am afraid, is disingenuous and I do hope the Minister will not repeat it from the Dispatch Box”. I am looking at the Minister—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy—and hoping that he does not do that, because TuneIn was a case in which the Court of Appeal decided not to depart from the jurisprudence of the CJEU for a number of reasons which were carefully enumerated. One decisive factor was that to

“return to the drawing board and start all over again … would create considerable legal uncertainty”.

So, the judges are stressing continuity, predictability, being able to weigh up factors and not being constrained. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, with respect, that he has got this wrong: if you say that the judges must do something and allow them to take into account only certain factors, it does not allow them to exercise their training and judgment. That is what we pay them for: to continue the law to provide the predictability that we need.

I finish by conveying that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, wanted to register his strong support for Amendments 90 to 93 in the names of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord Judge and Lord Thomas. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said: “They know a thing or two about the pressures of business in the highest courts, and this Bill is going to create a tsunami of business for lawyers. A sturdy floodgate is needed if those courts are not to be swamped, and these amendments provide one.” I respectfully recommend these amendments to the Committee.

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, your Lordships may have noticed that there is a rather cruder amendment in my name towards the end of this group: Amendment 99A. I am not a lawyer, but much of my life in politics and trade unionism and as a consumer champion has been defined by decisions of the British courts—some of the most important of which have been influenced by European law or by the judgments of the European courts. The advances we have made on equalities, employment rights, a number of consumer items and the environment, and indeed on issues such as intellectual property and digital protection and so forth, have been in large part—not entirely; I will not overstate the case—affected by European law, now called retained EU law, or the European courts’ own judgments which have been followed by the British courts.

In the exchange between the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—he is not here at the moment; I welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy—and the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said that the courts will go on interpreting cases as they have done from time immemorial. However, from time immemorial, the courts have interpreted the law on the basis of what is on the statute book at that time. They continue to do so until that law is changed by this Parliament. The implications of parts of Clause 7 are that that will no longer be the case; that the courts will need to have less regard to the types of cases that arose because they were influenced, at least in part, by European law; and that European decisions will not need to be held in the same regard in future. That is the purpose of Clause 7, which is why my amendment would delete it.

I largely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that it could be rewritten—we do need some guidance on case law—but this is taking it in entirely the wrong direction and destabilising what has, from time immemorial, been the basic role of the British courts in interpreting legislation. If the Government and Parliament change the law, that changes it; some of those cases no longer have the same effect as they do at the moment. However, if we take Clause 7 as it stands, we are undermining a number of improvements in the conditions of our people and, at the same time, undermining the credibility, consistency and historical role of our courts. I therefore suggest to the Government that they should remove this clause. If the Bill proceeds—noble Lords know that I am not in favour of it—the Government could come back with a rather more sensible Clause 7. However, as it presently stands, it is one that we ought to oppose root and branch.

The role of our legal system is being undermined by a political doctrine that has yet to find its way into the legislation and the statutory law of our land. That is a dangerous road that we should not go down; I therefore suggest that we remove Clause 7 and think again.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh for that intervention, and I stand corrected. She is completely right that Scotland is a mixed system, although I venture to suggest much influenced—if I may use that controversial word for a moment—by the common law. As I said a moment ago, Scottish judges have been, frankly, the best common lawyers anyone has ever known. They happen all to be called Reid but that is a coincidence.

Of course, I accept the comment, although I beg to differ as to whether any different conclusion follows. Essentially, the “may”, “must” and other amendments that the noble Baroness has proposed are independent of the exact legal approach one is talking about. It may well be that, in a Scottish situation, there would be a greater willingness not to disturb retained case law than in an English situation. I do not know; maybe these things will come up to the Supreme Court and someone will say “That is what we are going to do”. Maybe the Scottish tradition will prevail; that is perfectly likely. With respect, the Government do not feel that that changes the general thrust of Clause 7.

That was changes of circumstances. The next question is on this word “influence”—whether it has been influenced or determined by European law. I think “influenced” is included simply to give a sufficient degree of flexibility and to avoid deciding what might be quite a difficult point: whether European law was in fact determinative of a particular point or just part of the general context. Very often, it is part of the general context and the influence of the European element on the final outcome.

On that point—I am not sure we picked it up entirely; I may be speaking out of turn—I shall, if I may, at least attempt a reply to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on the question of principles of interpretation. I think it is relevant to the influence point. It arises in the context of legislation. Many here will know better than me, but the essential difference, as I understand it, is that traditional common law, including the Scottish approach, is a highly textual interpretation: what the meaning of the words is. The European Court’s general approach is a teleological interpretation of the general idea of where the statute is going. Very often, because of the laconic and sometimes completely deficient nature of European legislation, that court is much more prepared to fill in the gaps in the legislation than an English court would be. It is along those general lines; I am sure we can elaborate further as necessary later in these proceedings. So that is the influence point.

I think I have dealt with adding in the factors of settled understanding, legal certainty and so forth. The Government do not support that approach because it would simply bake in the status quo; that is the Government’s essential position. Legal certainty is inevitably something the courts will consider. They considered it in the Warner Music case because they were dealing with an international treaty and there was a desire not to disturb the law—albeit that the law was a right old muddle, as far as one can see, if I may put it colloquially just for a moment. In that case, it was not actually very seriously argued that we should depart from EU law; it was a perfunctory argument that took place in a few minutes at the end of the day, so it was a bit of a non-event.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise if I am interrupting the Minister before he has finished; I think he is replying to Amendments 85 and 88, although he did not specifically refer to them. He dismisses the need for the factors introduced in those amendments because he says the courts can have regard to them anyway. Why have the Government prescribed several elements themselves if the courts can have regard to them? Our whole argument is that the courts can have regard to factors they want to have regard to. The impetus behind Amendments 85 and 88 was that the Government were being partial and pushing in a certain direction for the three elements they will allow the courts to consider—the argument for adding the extra elements, the consequences of disturbing the settled understanding of the law and the importance of legal certainty, clarity and predictability—and to try to re-establish the balance that the authors of the amendments felt was lacking.

If I may say so, I find the Minister’s reply so far extremely puzzling. He has, correctly, given a paean of praise to our courts and the common law, saying that they have perfected the art of creating this mosaic—

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

I ask the noble Baroness to put her question to the Minister.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

We are getting to it.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Yes, I am getting to it. I want an explanation. I said the Minister’s reply was “puzzling” but, if I may say so, I want to say “contradictory” and “does not add up”. I want to press the Minister to clarify what he has said. I find it really quite irritating that Ministers keep interrupting us when we are trying to say something. The fact is that the Minister has praised our common-law courts and said they have not been inhibited in the proper development of the law and so on, but now he wants—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

May I finish?

[The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True)]

My Lords, at the previous stage I reminded the House, I thought courteously, of chapter 4.29 of the Companion, where it is made perfectly clear that lengthy and frequent interventions are not desirable, whether or not the Minister accepts them. This is Committee. The noble Baroness can return with a reasoned response to what the Minister has said, but I think it is to the advantage of the House generally in our debates to hear the Minister’s arguments and then respond in a proper Committee manner. If I may, the noble Baroness’s intervention seemed to me to be getting into the category of “lengthy”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

If I may be permitted to finish, I have now had three interventions from the Government Front Bench, which of course have lengthened this intervention. I ask the Minister please to explain how his paean of praise to our courts and their ability to develop the common law without inhibition accords with the constraints and straitjackets the Bill is putting on the courts he is praising.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government’s position is that this is not a straitjacket. The courts are required to look at three things: the fact that the retained EU case law is made by a different court, whether there has been a relevant change of circumstances, and how the proper development of the common law should continue in future.

As to why we have not included other considerations—notably, legal certainty—the Government’s position, which noble Lords may or may not agree with but this is the explanation, is that once you write down the importance of legal certainty, that is potentially a recipe for passively doing nothing and continuing to be a rule taker for 20 years to come. That is not the consequence of withdrawing from the EU. The courts can continue to look at it, but that is the reason why the Government have drafted Clause 7 as it is.

I hope I have dealt with most of the issues raised about Clause 7 one way or another. There is the reference procedure, and noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, have made the point that higher courts always have the discretion whether to take a case, and they should be able to decline it. I completely understand that point. The Government had thought that the ability of those superior courts—the higher courts or the Supreme Court—to decide whether what they were being asked to do was relevant and whether the point raised was of general public importance was sufficient protection and would enable them to decline to hear the case if that were so. I must say that the circumstances in which a lower court actually gets as far as making a reference and identifying a point of public importance that a superior court feels it should not hear seem to me, if I may say so, somewhat remote, but we can have another look at the drafting if there is a need for further reassurance. I cannot commit to changing it, but I can commit to looking at it and discussing it with the relevant persons.

--- Later in debate ---

This is based on a recommendation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report on the Bill.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will move the Motion, in the name of my noble friend Lord Fox, that Clause 10 do not stand part of the Bill. I am relying on the persuasive report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which points out that the powers in Clause 10 to amend retained direct EU legislation affect over 50% of retained EU law, because 50% is retained direct EU legislation. At present, much of this can be amended only by primary legislation or Henry VIII powers. So Clause 10 in fact downgrades the status of retained direct EU legislation.

The DPRRC quotes the delegated powers memorandum from the Government, which says that they are doing this so that such law

“can be amended by ordinary powers to amend secondary legislation”

to “save parliamentary time”. As the committee remarks, perhaps somewhat caustically,

“the argument based on saving parliamentary time is unpersuasive. It should be for Parliament to say what is the best use of its time.”

So it seems a little forward of the Government to make that assertion on behalf of Parliament.

However, as the committee points out, retained direct EU legislation

“has a special status because much of it is of considerable significance in policy terms”.

Therefore, it is necessary for Parliament to keep control of which elements of the law to keep, amend or repeal. The committee says:

“Clause 10 … is an unacceptable interference with the position in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that substantial policy changes should be for Parliament to decide in primary legislation rather than for Ministers to decide in secondary legislation.”


We have made that point repeatedly during the proceedings on the Bill. The Government broke a pledge. When the EU withdrawal Act went through, we were repeatedly assured that it would be for Parliament to make decisions about what retained EU law to amend and how to do so. But then the Bill comes along, and they do not even admit that this is a complete switch of approach and a grabbing back of powers for the Executive—but that is what it is.

--- Later in debate ---

Whereas I want to hold the Government to account for the problems with the Bill, my nervousness is that it feels mired in politics. So I cannot get away from the feeling that any delays or tactics that say, “Can we not just wait a bit longer?”, let the Government off the hook. The Government should have got on with this a lot longer ago rather than having to rush it through now. But I think any delays are likely to cause real cynicism outside this place. But the Government do need to reassure me—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I just wanted to say to the noble Baroness—and I probably will not go into lawmaking in the EU, as the noble Baroness was an MEP herself—that to say that lawmaking in Brussels is not democratic is, to my mind, ridiculous.

I particularly want to address her assertion that objections to this Bill are mired in politics. Had she been here, as I have, through the entire four days—now nearly four and a half—on this Bill, she would know that across the House the objections have been because it is an Executive power grab. Almost no reference has been made to the Brexit referendum or the policy of Brexit. It is about the way that the Bill is constructed and the power that the Government are concentrating in themselves. It is a question of the rights of Parliament and the type of governance we are objecting to. It is not political in that sense. The objections to this Bill are constitutional.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I appreciate that I have not been in the Chamber for all of that time, although I have been here a fair few hours, one way and another, and I have read everything that was said in previous discussions. I do not feel as though I am just wandering in to make this point.

I have also talked to people outside this House about their understanding of this discussion and I am trying to draw attention to that—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)]

The Question is that Clause 10 stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I believe I have a right to reply; I have been corrected so many times today that I do not know what my rights are nowadays.

The Minister seems to believe that robust parliamentary scrutiny is enshrined in a sifting, negative procedure power. I do not agree, I am afraid. Parliament is being sidelined in this Bill. Indeed, I wonder when this radical, revolutionary, un-Conservative Government will seek to abolish Parliament.

On the assertion that the UK Parliament had no real say in EU law, that is the nature of the organisation. Law is made at the level at which it is considered, obviously. However—I made this point at Second Reading—some Parliaments in the EU, notably the Danish one, kept their Ministers on a tight leash. Ministers went to the Council of Ministers from the UK Parliament; if they did not represent the views of the UK Parliament, we have to look at them and their record. The UK Parliament could have done the kind of scrutiny and accountability exercises that the Danish Parliament notably did; if it did not do so, that is the fault not of the EU but of the UK Parliament.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

Debate on Amendment 102 resumed.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to the proposal that Clause 12 should not stand part, which is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Fox and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. I will also speak to the proposal that Clause 13 should not stand part, and to Amendment 111, which would require consultation, reasoning, et cetera for proposed restatement regulations.

My noble friend Lady Humphreys quoted the powerful view of the Delegated Powers Committee that Clauses 12 and 13 should be removed from the Bill because they inappropriately delegate legislative powers and appropriate powers that ought to belong to Parliament and be achieved subject to specific primary legislation. That committee brought to our attention, or reminded us of, the delegated powers memorandum, which says:

“This power cannot substantively change the policy effect of legislation.”


The DPRRC says:

“We doubt whether this is correct. Where there is ambiguity—


allowing Ministers to make changes to resolve ambiguities is one of three factors that a restatement is supposedly able to address—

“as to whether policy A or policy B is intended and the legislative restatement emphatically resolves in favour of policy A, the restatement has … made a firm policy choice”.

That view of our committee makes sense. It invited us to ask the Government to explain why none of the law that can be restated under the powers in Clause 12 would instead merit being restated in primary legislation. I hope the Minister will do so in his response.

The committee also draws attention to the powers that Ministers have, I think in Clause 14(6), to reproduce the effects of the supremacy of EU law, the retained general principles of EU law and retained EU case law, to ensure that the restatement has the same practical outcome that existed previously. These three elements are the ones that are otherwise abolished by the Bill; we debated that today in relation to Clauses 3 to 5. So the Government want to bring back, under Clause 14(6), the power for Ministers to reproduce the effects of the things they are abolishing, to ensure that the restatement has the same practical outcome that existed previously.

The DPRRC comments:

“This power may give rise to significant policy questions”,


but they are given to Ministers to answer rather than Parliament. I add to that a suggestion that it will also create legal confusion, because, on the one hand, you have abolished these three elements—supremacy, general principles and retained rights—yet, on the other, Ministers can bring them back. I have not quite worked out how that is supposed to work.

My noble friend Lady Humphreys quoted the fact that the powers in Clause 12 are completely “open-ended”, with

“no requirement for consultation … criteria … or … pre-conditions”.

That explains our Amendment 111, which again seeks to repeat the elements we constantly introduce.

The other thing that Clauses 12 and 13 give to Ministers, in restating REUL in secondary legislation, is the power to use different words or concepts from the original instrument and to make any change considered appropriate. That is rather worrying, and requires the Minister to explain what is meant by “restatement” if the restated law will be different in concept from the original law. To what extent can different words be used before the restatement changes into a new and distinct law? It is no longer a restatement; because different words and concepts have been used, it becomes, in effect, a new and distinct law. When does it morph into a new law, having started off as a restatement? There is quite some confusion on that.

Finally, if I have understood correctly the email from, and blog of, the distinguished legal commentator Joshua Rozenberg, it appears that he has been highlighting the fact that the pensions of some 11,000 serving or former part-time judges were going to be abolished because they relied on EU law. But apparently the Deputy Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Justice, announced that he was going to save these pensions and that there was no intention to grab them back from affected judges.

I presume that this is the first announcement we have had of what is to be preserved under the Bill. Perhaps the Minister could confirm that. Obviously, I think it is a good thing. I do not think that judges’ pensions, any more than former MEPs’ pensions, should be whipped away. I suspect the Minister might agree on that point. That is a good thing, but we are still fighting for confirmation on things such as water safety, air quality, product safety, employment rights and everything else. When are we going to hear about what is going to be preserved from those other areas of deep concern? I am very pleased for judges, and indeed gratified, but it seems quite odd that we have had an announcement about that but we do not know whether anything else is going to be preserved. Perhaps the Minister could enlighten us in his reply.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Clauses 12 and 13 no longer standing part of the Bill. Opposition to those clauses has been led by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. I support them on the very simple premise that the Government are attempting to sweep all legislation, including primary legislation which creeps up on secondary legislation; in other words, the secondary legislation has been adopted as primary legislation.

Before I go further—and I think I have attempted to do this already—I would like to put right the misconception that the EU law coming into our country was all under the carpet, that it was not considered and endorsed by Parliament. I suppose the Government have not put it quite so colourfully, but they could well say, on that basis, “What’s all the fuss about? The EU legislation arrived under the parliamentary carpet, why are you making all this fuss now?”

I want to correct that misconception. I sat for a number of years on the EC Committee and then the EU Committee in the 1980s and 1990s. I must have had about 10 to 12 years sitting on those committees—it was the same committee but it was renamed when the EC renamed itself the European Union. When I was on that committee, we had very alert clerks and very good relations with Brussels. The result was that when a regulation that caused concern was being considered by the Commission, with great co-operation from the Commission we were shown the draft of that regulation, really in its final form, before it was introduced as a regulation. We would examine it. It happened on a number of occasions; I cannot count the number. Your Lordships’ European Committee considered in detail the regulation, took evidence, wrote a report and sent that report back to Brussels.

I do not want to fancy ourselves too much, but the House of Lords European Committee had a great reputation in Brussels. Of all the parliaments in the union, we were the most constructive. I suppose I have to include whatever the other place was doing. With our good relationship with the Commission, when the Commission read our report it was influenced and changed the drafting of that particular regulation.

Of course, of the many regulations that were brought through when we were in the European Union, I am referring to only a few, but it is an example of how we were involved in the creation of regulations in an influential way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I would also like to speak in support of the amendments on the definition of regulatory burden, because the truth is that throughout our history, one person’s burden has also possibly been somebody else’s vital protection. This is particularly true in respect of employment rights.

It was good to hear the Minister talking positively about the living wage, which started life as the national minimum wage. As somebody who campaigned for it, I vividly remember huge opposition and resistance to the introduction of a national minimum wage, precisely on the grounds that it would be a burden on employers, cost too much and so on. Of course, today, it is now seen as one of the most successful policy innovations this country has ever delivered. I might add that it has been delivered on the advice of one of our few remaining tripartite bodies to make recommendations to government—the Low Pay Commission.

I am also particularly concerned about this clause’s impact on equality. Equal rights for part-time workers, which we also campaigned for, meant that, for the first time, millions of women in particular had access to occupational pension schemes. Without doubt, some might describe that as an administrative burden and an added cost for employers. I would argue that driving up labour standards is good for productivity, protects the decent employer against the bad and is ultimately good for our country. We want a country where people can work and retire with dignity. This clause is really unhelpful: the definition of “burdens” is unhelpful and does not appear to consider the impact on ordinary working people at all. It would be wise to drop it.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, we have heard some excellent contributions in this debate, not least the latest one from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, and those of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones made an extremely powerful case on product safety in online marketplaces. In the course of his contribution, he, like others, tested or tried to probe what “subject area” means—the Bill says, “a particular subject area”. I am afraid we are rather used to this, but the letter that we received from the Minister simply repeated that and did not explain it. It said:

“it will be possible for a single instrument made under … clause 15 to increase the regulatory burden, so long as this increase is offset by a decrease of regulation in the same subject area.”

But it did not enlighten us about the scope of a subject area, because that is a very subjective definition.

The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said that if civil servants were considering one new measure they would have to look at all of the past measures. I suggest that they would have to look at all of the anticipated future measures as well and be Mystic Meg, because they need to know what is coming down the track to take any kind of view of what a single instrument might do to the weighting of the scales in the balance and amount of regulation. It is a bit of a lottery whether any single measure will fall foul of the overall regulatory burden test.

I note that the Minister’s letter admitted that

“There is no definition of regulatory burden in the Bill, as the Government considered that such a definition could unnecessarily constrain departments given the considerable variety in what is covered in regulations across Government.”


This is not the first time that we have been told that we must not unnecessarily constrain departments—which means unnecessarily constrain Ministers. So consultation, analysis, publication of the results of consultation and the role of Parliament all have to fall by the wayside because we must not unnecessarily—that is a loaded word—constrain departments: that is, constrain Ministers. The Government are acting in a very arrogant and high-handed way. They are getting too big for their boots by saying that nothing should be allowed to constrain ministerial powers. I am quite fed up with it.

So we are not getting any satisfactory explanation of how Clause 15 will be applied, and we cannot have any confidence, given the factors in Clause 15(5), that it will not lead to a de facto lowering of standards. That is the whole thrust of what has been talked about, and the whole rhetoric around the Bill, which started as the Brexit freedoms Bill, so it is very difficult to trust the assurances we have had that Ministers do not intend to lower standards.

During an evidence session with the House of Lords Environment and Climate Change Committee, the Secretary of State for Defra referred to the goal of the Environment Agency

“to change quite a lot of the water framework directive”.

That immediately makes one somewhat worried. It may well be that we need a sensible approach to looking at the water framework—and even my favourite one, the urban waste water treatment directive—but it is well known, and a source of great public concern given the state of our rivers and seas because of the discharge of raw sewage, that tackling the dire state of our waters will not be possible without substantial investment, which would trigger both a financial cost and the profitability limbs of Clause 15(5). So how will Clause 15 be a route through which the Government deliver improved environmental outcomes? There is a simple contradiction at the heart of all this.

The noble Lord, Lord Benyon, has told the Committee several times that the Government are committed to maintaining high environmental standards and that they want to see standards improve in future, but the whole thrust of Clause 15, particularly subsection (5), pulls in the opposite direction. You can just see water companies coming along and saying, if we require them to improve our pipes—which are bursting all the time, not least in my neck of the woods in Islington—and to stop raw sewage discharges by having better treatment facilities, that it will reduce their profits, which are of course being creamed off, with no benefit to consumers and citizens. So it is clear that the thrust of all this is towards a lowering of standards, and it is really impossible to believe the opposite of the case.

Finally, I will speak to the weakness of the “same or similar objectives” test. The reason for us wanting to replace “objectives” with “effects” is because you could have a law which might have the same or similar objectives of protecting consumers, but which will achieve the objectives in ways which are controversially different. I will leave noble Lords with the example of parental leave. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, talked about various employment areas, and one of those rights is to parental leave. If Ministers wanted to have replacement regulations under Clause 15, they could argue that they could decide to give employers the right to refuse leave rather than just postponing it, as they are able to do in narrow circumstances where the operation of the business would be unduly disrupted. The Government could say, “Oh, well, we would be pursuing a similar objective of creating provision for parental leave while protecting businesses from being disrupted”. But if you gave employers the right to refuse leave—pursuing the similar objective because it is about parental leave—you would be driving a coach and horses through the parental leave rights.

Clause 15 is riddled with weaknesses and dangers; it is a “Here be dragons” clause, and it should be removed. It cannot be improved, and it should be taken out of the Bill.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Inglewood (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have been listening to this debate with interest. Obviously, it relates to environmental standards, but is also about the way in which the legislation that deals with environmental standards is cast. I am sure we are all agreed that some of the things that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, described could be substantially mitigated, to the benefit of everybody.

Having said that, what we see with the two amendments we are considering is the introduction of legal certainty into the legislation. That, it seems to me, is actually quite important because, as has been described on previous days in Committee, the underlying rationale behind the kind of approach being adopted by the Government is what I might describe as the operation of a compensatory principle. This, it seems to me, is a very attractive notion. But how is it going to work? In particular, as has been debated previously, what is the currency you use to determine whether or not something is compensation? It has to be equivalent, it seems to me. That is the basic meaning of the word in the English language.

Then there has been discussion about “Well, it’ll be done on the whim of a civil servant or a Minister”. But I do not think this is going to be the end of the story—this is what my concern is—because any change that comes about will produce winners and losers. Wherever there are winners and losers, not least in this area of policy, the law gets dragged in. I can see that the whole scheme on which this particular approach has been adopted is going to lead to an absolute abundance of applications for judicial review, because any change that is made on the basis of this compensatory principle is going to have a winner and a loser, and is going to be the hinge on which the legislation depends. I would be very interested to know the views of the Front Bench on this, because I can see that what sounds superficially like a siren song of easy administration may well end up providing an absolute bonanza for lawyers. I suppose that, as one myself, I should declare an interest.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I want to say a few brief words before the Minister replies; this is prompted by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, in summing up on the last group, and the letter we received today from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. My noble friends, in moving and speaking to the amendments in their names, and other noble Lords from other Benches, have highlighted the objective of the amendments, which is to get pledges to uphold environmental protections, including those in international instruments.

In the last group, the Minister gave as an example a pledge to uphold human rights. We are shortly to have a Statement on the well-named Illegal Migration Bill, in which the Home Secretary has said that this is 50% likely to breach the European Convention on Human Rights. If that is the standard by which we judge the Government’s intentions in upholding international law, I do not think it is terribly encouraging.

We debated on Monday the definition of a subject area in the light of the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield. I think we have done so again today. Does it mean water quality? Is it the whole of environmental law? Is it the whole of what Defra does? None of us has the foggiest idea. The same puzzle arises over the term “objectives”. The letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, tells us that

“the individual limbs of the power”

in Clause 15

“are also restricted. Subsection (2) is limited such that any replacement legislation must be appropriate and must fulfil same or similar objectives as the retained EU law or assimilated law that it is replacing.”

That is, of course, the wording in the Bill. She goes on:

“This limits the functionality of this limb of the power to essentially adjusting policy to better fit the UK context”.


Apparently, this is

“rather than radically departing or introducing legislation in ways that are controversially different from the existing legislation.”

So now we have “appropriate”, we have the “same or similar objectives”, we have “subject area”, and now we have a pledge to essentially adjust policy to better fit the UK context. I am afraid that this does not assuage concerns because I, for one, do not have the foggiest idea what restraints or constraints there will be on the Government in their adjustment of policy. They are proposing to adjust policy on refugees, with a 50% likelihood of breaching the European Convention on Human Rightsm as well as, in the opinion of these Benches, totally breaching the refugee convention. I am afraid that the Minister has his work cut out to convince us—certainly these Benches—of the Government's good intentions in the environmental area.

[The Minister of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Lord Benyon) (Con)]

My Lords, I seek two things this evening: first, to get through this group without having to write any more billets-doux to noble Lords, because I think they have had quite enough. I will be able to explain, I hope, what we are trying to do to satisfy noble Lords. The other is to leave them, if I did not in the previous group that I responded to, with the absolute certainty that we want to see our environment enhanced, and that existing protections continue to function in a way that works at a time when we are tackling the biggest crisis mankind has faced. My noble friend Lord Lilley raised points about the bureaucracy of trying to do the right thing—that if we want to create a wind farm, the delays in doing that are prohibitive. We need to do things quickly, because there is an urgency about what we are trying to do. There is an urgency in trying to reverse the decline of species, which is more than just a crisis. As Dasgupta said, it is more than just an environmental crisis; it is an economic one as well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, mentioned my noble friend Lord Randall, who is in hospital. I sent him a message earlier and he replied; he is on the mend and we wish him well.

Amendments 126 and 130 seek to add conditions on and restrictions to the use of the powers contained in the Bill. Amendment 126 would place conditions on UK Ministers or devolved authorities when using the powers under Clause 15 to revoke or replace retained environmental EU law. In particular, this amendment would prevent any provision being made before all the conditions specified in the amendment had been fulfilled. This would add significant delay and negatively impact how we review and reform retained environmental law.

The Government have been clear that we will uphold our environmental protections and our commitments, both domestic and international. The UK is a world leader in environmental protection. In reviewing our retained EU law, we want to ensure that environmental law is fit for purpose and able to drive improved environmental outcomes. We remain committed to our ambitious plans, set out in the net zero strategy, the Environment Act and the Environmental Improvement Plan 2023, which detailed comprehensive action this Government will take to reverse the decline in species abundance by 2030, achieve our net zero goals, and deliver cleaner air and water. This includes creating and restoring at least 500,000 hectares of new wildlife habitats, delivering a clean and plentiful supply of water for people and nature into the future, keeping councils accountable to improve air quality faster, incentivising farmers to adopt nature-friendly practices, and boosting green growth and creating new jobs. This Bill will not alter that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

In his reply, the Minister has several times implied that it was the fault of EU law, but surely it was a problem of UK implementation and enforcement. I know I am a broken record in this respect but I have, at various times, referred to the Thames super sewer. Left to their own devices, the UK Government were not going to stop the discharge, in even minimal rainfall, of raw sewage through 36 combined sewage overflows into the River Thames as it goes through London. It was only infringement proceedings by the European Commission that led to this result. The standards that we have are not the EU’s fault; it is the UK Government and the agencies that have not done their job.

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I never said that. I was the Minister who made the sewer that is being put in place happen. I know all about the urban waste water treatment directive, and it is a very good directive indeed. It is cleaning up a lot of rivers and will ensure that we have more investment such as we are seeing in the Thames. There may be cases where there has been poor implementation, and there may be cases where there has been very good European regulation which we want to see retained. There may be areas where we can see an improvement which reflects a local dynamic in our environment.

We cannot talk about this in a binary sense. There is some very good EU law which we want to see continue, there are some areas in which it is no longer necessary, and there are some areas in which with a few tweaks it can be improved. Among the proposed conditions in the amendment is a requirement to publish a statement setting out how such environmental standards have been met. Such conditions are already being met under the Environment Act 2021. The Act has established a robust legal framework to deliver environmental benefits and hold Governments, both now and in the future, to account in delivering them. Crucially, the Act also established the Office for Environmental Protection, an independent body to scrutinise government delivery and progress on environmental ambitions. In addition, we have a statutory duty, through the Environment Act, to report annually to Parliament on progress against the environment improvement plan and to undertake a significant improvement test every five years.

To reiterate the point on REACH, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, raised, we recognise there may be concerns about the future of REACH regulation. That is why we have deliberately built protections into the provisions of the Environment Act. The Secretary of State must publish a statement to explain how any proposal is consistent with the basic aim and scope of REACH. There must be consultation before we can make any changes. We have also excluded more than 20 provisions to protect the fundamental principles of REACH, including the no dating, no market principle, using animal testing only as a last resort, and the public transparency of the system.

Finally, I want to clarify a response made to the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, the last time I addressed the Committee on the Bill’s removal of interpretive effects. The removal of interpretive effects by the Bill refers to measures in Clauses 3 to 5 which repeal rights, powers and liabilities saved by Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. They abolish the principle of the supremacy of EU law and general principles of EU law as aids to interpretation of the UK statute book. Retained case law is not being sunsetted.

Further detail on interpretive effects was set out by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his letter circulated before the Committee on 6 March. We will shortly publish a list for noble Lords, so they will have plenty of time and opportunity to review the regulations we intend to allow to expire at the end of the year and those we wish to retain.

The Government are committed to upholding the environmental protections. I hope I have reassured noble Lords, and I therefore ask them not to press these amendments.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 15th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend is making a statement. He is not asking a question, and we should let others get on with their one speech.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, these are rather strange goings-on.

From these Benches, we support all the amendments in this group and I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for introducing them. If he chooses to test the opinion of this House, we will support him on Amendment 15 and, later, on Amendment 76.

Rather like group 5, which we will come to later and is about the powers of courts, this group is about trying to introduce some legal stability and certainty into what has been a bumpy process for this Bill. One could say that the Bill is no way to run a whelk-stall. As my noble friend Lord Fox said, we did get some explanations for the measures to be revoked in the schedule, but it was only just before—or just after—we started to debate Clause 1, and we only got the amendments to the Bill four days ago. It has been a bit of a rollercoaster, and any effort to introduce some certainty and predictability is to be welcomed.

I will speak exclusively to Amendment 15, which is very important. The Government may be retaining a lot more EU law, but they have insisted—indeed, the Minister keeps repeating that they are proud of this—on playing fast and loose with the way that retained EU law will be interpreted, such as ending the much misrepresented supremacy of EU law and the general principles which guide it, as well as EU rights, which this amendment is particularly about. It is quite a mystery as to how the retained law is to be interpreted.

No one, least of all the Government, knows what the impact of this abolition will have on legal certainty and continuity. Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg’s flippant response that “life is uncertain” was typically unhelpful. Can the Minister tell us what assessment the Government have made of the loss of any interpretive effects in the measures to be revoked? What effect will abolishing any interpretive effects in the revoked list have on laws which are retained and assimilated? Are the Government going to put interpretative effects back into SIs on amended, restated, retained and assimilated law, and how will that work? I hesitate to say that it could come back by the backdoor because, quite honestly, any retention could well be helpful to lawyers, the courts and so on. At the moment, we just do not know and are in considerable uncertainty about what the Government’s regulatory intentions are.

We know from Clause 16, which we will come to later, that the Government do not want to increase regulatory burdens. Some of us are a little wary of their definition of burden. According to the smarter regulation document of last week and the consultation on employment law, which I think came out on Friday, it includes the burden of recording working hours, which is odd, and calculating holiday pay. All of that could have a considerable impact on quite a lot of people.

The Government also want regulators to have a growth duty, to

“prioritise growth alongside … their core functions, such as protecting consumers or our natural environment”.

Indeed, they have cited Ofwat, Ofgem and Ofcom in this context. Some of us are a bit concerned that, particularly in the water industry, regulators have already given too much leeway to water companies’ growth, particularly in dividends and bosses’ pay—though perhaps not so much in sewage treatment capacity. There is quite a lot of concern about how all these regulatory intentions, which we are finding in statements and consultation documents, fit the professed commitment to maintain higher standards—I think the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, mentioned this earlier. But if higher standards are kept, particularly those which derive from EU law, how are they going to be interpreted? Some clarity from the Government would be very desirable this afternoon.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendments 15 and 76. Amendment 76 is in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. This, of course, is what puts meat on the bones of the whole business of restoring parliamentary sovereignty. It is very important that we get back the sovereignty of Parliament, and this is a great opportunity to do it.

There has been a steady erosion, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson has commented, in which statutory instruments are being used to a greater extent. This merely moves power from Parliament to the bureaucracy of this country. This is not a situation that any of us should welcome. If we want to restore our democracy, we should have a Joint Committee of both Houses to look at this legislation. It is very important that we concentrate on the future of this country and of our Parliament and start to restore some of its influence in the world today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, this is an entirely different group. Amendment 18 deals with the provisions relating to the role of the courts in reforming our law in the light of our withdrawal from the European Union.

This group contains various amendments in my name, which fall into two parts. Both relate to the provisions of Clause 8, which is designed to deal with the subject matter that I just mentioned. The first part—Amendments 18 to 29—is concerned with the role that the courts will play in reforming our domestic case law as we depart from retained EU case law. The second part—Amendments 30 to 34—is concerned with the role of the Lord Advocate in the making of references to the courts on points of law regarding retained case law. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has kindly added his name to my amendments in the first group but, for reasons that I can well understand, he has not gone that far in relation to my amendments about the Lord Advocate.

I can be very brief about the first group because the Minister has now added his name to two of my amendments in it, for which I am grateful; these are Amendments 24 and 27. He has also added two consequential amendments of his own.

My amendments were designed to do two things. The first was to simplify the work of the courts in this potentially difficult area and preserve legal certainty. The second was to give the courts a discretion to decline to accept a reference by a lower court or tribunal on retained case law in place of the obligation to do so, which is what the Bill currently provides. The obligation was an obstacle to efficiency in the running of the courts. It never made sense for the senior courts to be so encumbered by worthless or unnecessary references as to be unable to conduct their business in the way they would wish to do.

I am very pleased that the Government have now accepted that the senior courts should have that discretion and that, in the Bill as currently drafted, “must” should be changed to “may”. It means that good sense has prevailed and that the courts will not have to accept a reference on points that have already been decided or would be better dealt with under another reference that is already pending or one that has no reasonable prospect of success. That is extremely helpful; I know that, for his part, the President of the UK Supreme Court is also grateful to Ministers for making that concession.

The Minister has not gone as far as I would have liked on my other amendments, but I am not going to look a gift horse in the mouth, if I can put it that way, so I will not press those amendments.

As for the second group, relating to the role of the Lord Advocate, the Lord Advocate has written to the Secretary of State more than once to explain her concerns, which I have tried to capture in my amendments. She is seeking parity with the UK law officers in the exercise of the functions to which this clause refers. Her point is that her role is not thought to be a political one in furtherance of Scottish government policy; nor should it be thought that she exercises her role collectively with the Scottish Ministers. She values her independence, which is crucial to the position that she occupies as the senior law officer in Scotland.

I do not think that it would assist the House if I were to develop these arguments further now, but I would be grateful if the Minister would undertake to ask the Secretary of State to look at this issue once again, one more time, so that a proper balance can be achieved. I beg to move.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I lend the support of these Benches to the important amendments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. They might seem perhaps a little specialised, but they are extremely important. There might not be any intention to press any of these amendments to a vote, but I do hope that the Government will see their way to taking on board more than they have already in the two amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan.

These amendments are about trying to remove threats to legal certainty and therefore to increase legal certainty, respecting the courts and their ability to run their business efficiently and removing the peril of the court being asked to venture into political and policy matters. We know about the flak to which the courts have been exposed—including, it has to be said, not being defended by the person in government who should have defended them.

It therefore seems perverse that the Bill, as drafted, would increase the likelihood of the courts being exposed to being hanged, drawn and quartered, as we have seen on the front pages of certain newspapers at various times. So there is a desire to get more predictability and certainty into the law, and more discretion for the courts to run themselves as they see fit and not have to do things that would get them into shark-infested waters. So, even though it seems that these important amendments will not be determined by the House today, I hope that the Government will reflect before Third Reading and see the wisdom behind them.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am sorry to speak out of turn, but I entirely support all the amendments in this group. In particular, I endorse the plea of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on the status of the Lord Advocate. Could the Minister clarify, either at this opportunity or at a later stage of the Bill, the points that the noble and learned Lord made, because it would not be acceptable for the Lord Advocate to be treated differently from any other law officer in the land?

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I too strongly support what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said. I cannot resist telling the House that I am chairman of the Ecclesiastical Committee, and some years ago the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury was discussing a measure that was coming through our hands before going to Parliament, which had a clause that would allow the General Synod to make almost any changes to any law in England. We pointed out gently that it would not get through Parliament. Dear, oh dear, what are we talking about today? I would not have been quite as gung-ho about what could not happen in Parliament if I had come across this Bill and, I have to say, the Illegal Migration Bill.

The point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was making about delegated powers—I remember that speech very well—is one that I am delighted the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has taken up. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was saying that there will come a point when we will actually vote against secondary legislation—and maybe the time is just beginning to come. If we end up with having no power in Parliament, in either House, to decide whether laws that are different from those we have can be argued in either Chamber, what is the point of us being here? Consequently, I do feel that the House should support the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the work he has done on Motion B1 with the listing of powers, rights and liabilities. I note that he will not press his amendment because he has got it to the point of getting a pledge from the Government.

Perhaps I might ask the Minister what the timescale is for putting these on the dashboard, because they are not currently on the dashboard. The last time they were searchable on the dashboard, only 28 rights, powers and liabilities were listed. They did not include, for instance, Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which, as all noble Lords know, concerns the right to equal pay for equal work; it goes further than the Equality Act 2010 and is an absolutely crucial instrument for equal pay. They also did not include Article 6.2 of the habitats directive, which imposes an obligation to take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of habitats. Those are two examples of key rights and powers that need to be on the dashboard, and there must be many more. Can the Minister tell us how many he thinks will be listed and by when?

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I am delighted to support Motion E1 in the name of my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich. At a time when there is increasing concern about the balance between Parliament and the Executive, I was rather surprised that the elected House rejected the idea of a Joint Committee to sift proposals, which might well be of disadvantage to their constituents. I was also surprised—perhaps “saddened” might be the better word—that the Government saw fit to take that view of the amendment in the Commons. This Motion, as my noble friend outlined, returns to the charge, but provides a Commons-only Select Committee—a sifting committee—rather than a Joint Committee.

There has been much talk about amendable SIs. It may be part of the Government’s case, or be seen by the Government as strengthening their case, to portray them as a whole new category of legislative procedure, where SIs become like mini-Bills, with all the complications that would ensue.

Much as I appreciate the noble Viscount’s wish that these would be broad, sunlit uplands, I do not think that this is the case in this instance. As far as I am aware, there are only two examples of statute providing for amendable SIs, via Section 1(2) of the Census Act 1920 and Section 27(3) of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. SIs under either of those Acts are truly amendable because, if an amendment is approved, it becomes immediately effective.

What this Motion proposes is a little different; it is much closer to the super-affirmative procedure applied to legislative reform and regulatory reform orders, which does not seem to have frightened the horses in either House. There is a difference, yes, because in that super-affirmative procedure it is a matter of discretion as to whether the Minister accepts the advice of the sifting committee as to amendments that might be made. Commons Standing Orders 141 and 142 provide for that difference of opinion between the Minister and the sifting committee. The Motion before your Lordships would remove that ministerial discretion—but I find it hard to see how allowing the two Houses to take the decision would be such a dreadful thing, unless of course the Government see it as infringing upon the prerogative of the Executive, which would confirm the worst fears of many.

Whatever one’s views on the issue, it is very important to keep a sense of proportion. I cannot imagine the heavy weaponry that is implied by some in this Motion being deployed at all often. The Government, if they had any sense, would want to reach agreement with a sifting committee rather than seeking the adversarial outcome of a vote on the Floor of the House. In any event, what would be so wrong about accepting the view of an all-party committee which had identified in a government proposal hazards for business, the environment, civil liberties or any of the other fields in which Parliament is supposed to be the guardian of our citizens’ interests?

The Minister criticised the proposal on the basis that it was novel and untested. If one is going to improve the effectiveness of Parliament, there will from time to time be procedures that are novel. If it were not the case, we would be living the rest of our lives encased in a sort of parliamentary aspic. He also said that it was untested. In a parliamentary environment, you cannot have a novel procedure unless it is untested so, with great respect to the Minister, I would dismiss that criticism.

I conclude with a short look ahead, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, invited your Lordships to do, to the further stages that might ensue. There is an urban myth to the effect that two exchanges is the limit. I had some involvement with the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill in 2007, and on that occasion there were seven exchanges between the two Houses. Other Bills have demonstrated more than two exchanges on a number of occasions. On something that raises an issue of constitutional principle—and I borrow the description of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in speaking to his Motion—it would be right if the Commons were invited on several occasions to consider whether it had got this right after all.