Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 15th May 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

2: At end, insert—
“(1B) Subsection (1) will only take effect if—(a) the legislation listed in Schedule (Sunset of subordinate legislation and retained direct EU legislation) has been referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses, and(b) a period of at least 30 days has elapsed after that referral, not including any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or either House is adjourned for more than four days.(1C) If the Joint Committee, after considering any legislation included in this Schedule, finds that the revocation of any item of legislation represents a substantial change to current UK law, a Minister of the Crown must arrange for the revocation of such legislation to be debated on the floor of each House and voted on before the date in subsection (1).(1D) If the revocation of any legislation is not approved by both Houses before the date in subsection (1), it is retained.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment to the amendment in the name of Lord Callanan provides for the Schedule of retained EU law which is to be revoked to be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses for sifting so that, in the case of those which represent a significant change from the preceding retained EU law, Parliament will be enabled to differ from the Executive and express its own view as to their contents.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I think it will start our debate if I speak to Amendment 2 at this stage. That amendment, of course, is in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton of Epsom and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.

I do not need to take up time by speaking to Amendments 10, 11 and 12 in this group—which are also in my name, and to which the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Randerson and Lady Humphreys, have added their names. The issues raised in Amendments 10 and 12 are no longer live in view of the removal of the sunset provision from Clause 1 and the Government’s proposal that Clause 3 should be deleted. This is also the case regarding the need to postpone the sunset date in the case of legislation relevant to common frameworks, which Amendment 11 seeks to do—although others of your Lordships may have something to say about this. Amendment 4 relates to a provision which the Government are proposing to remove from the Bill, so I do not need to say anything about that either. That leaves me with Amendment 2, to which I do wish to speak.

I am sure that I am not alone in welcoming government Amendments 1, 5, 12 and 68. This really is a victory for common sense. It was obvious to many of us in this House, especially those in touch with the devolved Administrations, that the scheme laid down in the Bill was never going to work within the time given to it. I reject the suggestion that the reason this is now being acknowledged is because of a failure of effort by civil servants. The fact is that however hard to civil servants tried, there was a real problem about getting the job done across all parts of the United Kingdom. There was always going to be a risk that work under the pressure of time would give rise to errors. Any error in this field, such as the removal of regulations that require or authorise the spending of money, could have grave consequences that could be hard to reverse. Care is needed, and that takes time. The devolved Administrations are in a particular difficulty. Their post-devolution regulations are not and cannot be listed on the dashboard; their legislative timetables are not equipped for the task within the timescale. That is the reality.

The Secretary of State deserves to be commended for the steps she has taken, but there remains a very significant gap which my amendments in this group—and in groups 3 and 6—are designed to address. This is that there is no provision for parliamentary scrutiny in the proper sense of those words. It is the greatest of ironies that taking back control over our laws—which is what Brexit was all about—has resulted in handing back this control to Ministers and civil servants, and not to Parliament. The parliamentary scrutiny over what they are doing is not there, other than in the most superficial way, as our power over delegated legislation is so limited. This has been described as an unprecedented transfer from Parliament to the Executive.

I think that all of us who were present at Second Reading can recall how strongly my noble and learned friend Lord Judge—whose absence I regret—felt about this subject. I am sure he would not object to my reminding your Lordships of what he said. It was short and to the point; it directed attention to what he thought was really happening. With his tongue firmly in his cheek, he said that he had received a letter by special messenger called “Restoring Parliamentary control”. It went over the key provisions of this Bill, one by one, and ended with this assertion:

“By agreeing to all these separate surrenders, Parliament will have taken back control. We trust you agree”.—[Official Report, 6/2/23; col. 1001.]


My Amendment 2 is based on amendments that were put down for Committee by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Lisvane, who I am glad to see in his place. They provide for the referral of the list in the schedule to a Joint Committee of both Houses. In the event that the committee finds that the revocation of any item of legislation represents a substantial change of the law, it provides for that revocation to be debated on the Floor of each House and voted on.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The trigger point in the amendment is quite a narrow one: “substantial change”. Has the noble and learned Lord contemplated enlarging the power of the committee to require it to be put to the House if there was other substantial reason?

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, “substantial change” probably accommodates what the noble Lord was thinking about. I am following a formula which the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, thought was appropriate, bearing in mind that there are limits to the extent to which this House can lay down procedures for the other place.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there are references—for example, in Clause 16—to a sunsetting date, so there are parts of the Bill that retain sunsetting and it has not entirely been departed from. I see the value of sunsetting and I am in favour of reforming our rules book, but it would be a mistake to think that we were taking the brake off completely; that is not the way the Bill is constructed.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, I think the main substance of sunsetting has been removed by the amendments put forward by my noble friend because we do not reach a cliff edge at the end of this year, or such a later date as might have been put in place, for the whole of retained EU law to disappear if it had not been dealt with. That is the issue that I was referring to.

Perhaps I could just complete what I was saying. I hope that between now and our next day on Report we can have some constructive dialogue with my noble friend the Minister about how we can have some kind of process, information sources, or whatever, to ensure that what we have lost with these amendments—which is ensuring that we deal with the whole of retained EU law—can be salvaged.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The directives she seeks an explanation on are not listed on the revocation schedule. Therefore, they continue to be in operation. They will be subject to a reform programme, but that is a question she will need to direct towards the Secretary of State at Defra.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have listened very carefully to what the Minister said. I have not seen the additional information which has apparently been circulated to some Members of this House, and I think many Members have no idea what it contains. That makes my point for me: proper parliamentary scrutiny is essential. That is what my amendment is all about and, with great respect to the Minister, I do not think he has really answered that point of principle. Having moved Amendment 2, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

15: Leave out Clause 4 and insert the following new Clause—
“Revocation of retained EU rights, powers, liabilities etc(1) Any rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures retained by section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 are revoked at the end of 2023 in accordance with subsections (2) to (4).(2) A responsible Minister of a relevant national authority may make a statement before the end of October 2023 to, as the case may be, each House of Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru or the Northern Ireland Assembly, identifying any rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies or procedures that the relevant national authority has decided not to restate, reproduce or replace before the end of 2023 and that it wishes to be revoked at the end of 2023.(3) If both Houses of Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru or the Northern Ireland Assembly, as the case may be, resolve that a right, power, liability, obligation, restriction, remedy or procedure identified in the statement referred to in subsection (2) be retained, it is not to be revoked under subsection (4) at the end of 2023.(4) If, and to the extent that, no such resolution referred to in subsection (3) has been made before the end of 2023, the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures identified in the statement referred to in subsection (2) are revoked with effect from the end of 2023.(5) Any right, power, liability, obligation, restriction, remedy or procedure that is revoked by virtue of this section is not recognised or available in domestic law at or after the end of 2023 (and, accordingly, is not to be enforced, allowed or followed).”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment, which is modelled on the amendment to Clause 1 in the name of Lord Hope of Craighead, is to enable Parliament and the devolved legislatures, not the Executive, to have the final decision as to whether or not rights, powers, liabilities &c. retained by section 4 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 should be revoked at the end of 2023.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to two amendments in this group: Amendment 15, which I am moving, and Amendment 76, which comes later in the Marshalled List; I shall explain what that is about. One or two ancillary amendments—Amendments 69, 73 and 74—are related to Amendment 76.

This group seeks to develop further the application to this Bill of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Amendment 15 is in the name of the noble Lord, Anderson of Ipswich. I added my name to it, as did the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton and Lord McLoughlin. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is not here today, so I am moving Amendment 15 on his behalf.

Amendment 15 is directed to Clause 4, which is headed “Sunset of retained EU rights, powers, liabilities etc”. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that this is an example of a sunset that is still in the Bill and which we are not disputing should remain in the Bill. It provides, first, that

“Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 … is repealed at the end of 2023”.

It then provides that

“anything which, immediately before the end of 2023, is retained EU law by virtue of that section is not recognised or available in domestic law at or after that time (and, accordingly, is not to be enforced, allowed or followed)”.

The purpose of Amendment 15 is to provide a mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny of subsection (2). There could be a great deal of law hidden behind the clause which we cannot understand or see. Therefore, it should be fully investigated by the relevant committee. The mechanism that we propose in Amendment 15 is that the law that would be affected by Clause 4(2) must be identified by the making of a Statement to Parliament before the end of October, which would then provide a basis for the matter to be debated in both Houses. The purpose of the amendment is simply to close a gap that might otherwise remain in the need for effective scrutiny.

I shall not take up time by reading out the whole of Amendment 15 as your Lordships can see what is there, but the explanatory statement says that it is modelled on the amendment to Clause 1, in my name, which has just been agreed by your Lordships,

“to enable Parliament and the devolved legislatures, not the Executive, to have the final decision as to whether or not rights, powers, liabilities … should be revoked at the end of 2023”.

I think that is all I need to say about Amendment 15. I do not want to take up further time by adding more to what I have said.

Amendment 76 in my name, along with—as I have said—those of the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton, Lord McLoughlin, and Lord Anderson, is very important because it is directed to the very heart of the Bill; this lies beyond the schedule that we will be looking at and beyond Clause 4, to which I have just been referring. It is directed to Clauses 13, 14 and 16.

I remind your Lordships that Clause 13 is headed “Power to restate retained EU law”. Clause 14 is headed “Power to restate assimilated law or reproduce sunsetted retained EU rights, powers, liabilities etc”, and Clause 16 is described as “Powers to revoke or replace”. These are extremely important powers that, as the Bill stands, are to be exercised by statutory instrument, not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, which is what we are seeking to do.

I do not wish to go over the arguments that we have debated so fully today, beyond emphasising that these are very far-reaching powers that will result in a complete rewriting of much of the law that we have kept on our departure from the EU. We do not dispute the need to do that—there has been a good deal of reference already today to the importance and indeed necessity of carrying out these exercises—but our point is that that cannot be left entirely to Ministers and civil servants without proper parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 76 is once again based on an amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, in Committee. It would provide for any instruments made under these three clauses to be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses for scrutiny. Again, if that committee found that the regulations represented a substantial change to the preceding EU law or that sufficient public consultation had not been carried out, a Minister of the Crown would have to arrange for the instrument to be debated on the Floor of each House. It is contemplated that the Houses may agree to amendments, whether or not proposed by the Joint Committee.

Of course, the Minister may come up with a better scheme for subjecting those regulations to effective public scrutiny, but this is the best that, with the assistance of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, we have been able to devise. We have tried to keep the procedure as quick and simple as possible without disturbing the sunsetting provisions in the clauses and we are reasonably sure, on the advice of the noble Lord, that our proposal will meet these requirements.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Could the noble and learned Lord deal more fully with the amendment provision? It is a most interesting provision because hitherto my understanding has always been that statutory instruments cannot be amended. What is proposed in new paragraph 8A(3) in Amendment 76 is a power to amend a statutory instrument. I would like to know—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I am so sorry. Being rather deaf, I have to listen to what the noble and learned Lord is saying by turning towards him. I apologise. I would like to know—[Laughter] I am doing it again. I would like to know what the procedure is. Is it precedented, or is it a new concept that the House is being asked to contemplate—namely, the power to amend statutory instruments?

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, the amendment, which I invite the noble Viscount to look at more closely, is carefully worded. All we say is that if any amendments to the regulations are agreed to—we have to be extremely careful in our proposal because we cannot direct what a Joint Committee of both Houses is going to do, which is a matter for it—we suggest that the committee may feel it appropriate to recommend that amendments should be laid. That is a matter for the Joint Committee. We are not giving a power ourselves but handing it over to the Joint Committee, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, will confirm.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I am sorry to press the noble and learned Lord—while looking straight at your Lordships’ House—but is the concept that there will then be on the Order Paper proposed amendments to the statutory instrument, or will there be an informal recommendation by the Select Committee? Those are not the same things. I would be very pleased if they were a power to amend statutory instruments, and I would really like to know what procedure is contemplated.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. I think the noble Viscount will appreciate that we have to deal with this very carefully. On the other hand, I think he will agree that, given the nature of the task being carried out, it would be extremely unfortunate if a flaw were spotted and nothing could be done about it. We are trying to suggest a mechanism by which something that is agreed by the Joint Committee, and indeed by both Houses as necessary, should be capable of being done. I hope I may leave it at that. This is a carefully drafted amendment that is doing its best to address an extremely important and, in some respects, quite delicate task.

When the time comes, if necessary, I shall seek the opinion of the House on Amendment 76. For the time being, because we have before us Amendment 15, that will be my position too, if necessary, when Amendment 15 is called.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, we have had two significant amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord. I have Amendments 73 and 74 in this group, which are small and technical but significant in the way in which they try to enhance the scrutiny provisions that underlie the noble and learned Lord’s two amendments, which I entirely support. I will not repeat my reasons because I would be largely rehearsing the arguments that I made an hour and a half ago.

It is generally anticipated, though not certain, that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee will be one of the bodies appointed to carry out some scrutiny of the regulations, as and when this particular part of the Bill comes into force. The Bill as drafted envisages a period of 10 working days for a report to be produced by the SLSC that would then come before the House, and the House would make its mind up about its view of that report on the instrument. The Government use the example—the dreaded precedent—of the 10-day period provided under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. In the SLSC report that I referred to earlier, we proposed that the period should be extended from 10 days to 15. We said in paragraph 58:

“We know from our own experience in scrutinising proposed negatives under the 2018 Act that, depending on the day of the week on which a proposed negative has been laid, meeting that 10-day deadline could be challenging”.


Under the Bill, the regulations to be scrutinised are of an entirely different level of policy implication, importance and significance. This view and the proposal for a five-day extension—by no means a huge length of time—have been endorsed by the Hansard Society, which Members of the House will be aware is an academic expert in matters of parliamentary procedure.

In Committee on this Bill on 8 March, at col. 876, my noble friend, having heard the debate on these amendments, was kind enough to offer to go away and reflect. I have no doubt that he did his level best, but I fear that he was rebuffed because the Government said in their response to the SLSC report of 10 May:

“Having considered this carefully and in particular how the existing 10 day sifting practice works, the Government remains of the view that a 10 day sifting period is sufficient for SIs laid using the powers in the Retained EU Law Bill … The retained EU Law programme is a similar challenge”—


to 2018—

“but it is no more complex or demanding”.

I have just two points on that. First, to describe this Bill as no more complex and demanding, compared to that of 2018, is, I am afraid, plain wrong. It is a much more significant piece of legislation than the 2018 Act. Secondly, the members of the SLSC do not come to this view ex cathedra. We think about it, but we also talk and take into account the views of the highly experienced and dedicated staff, who produce excellent reports which come before your Lordships’ House every week.

To conclude, I suppose I could just about have got my mind around my noble friend’s view that it should be 10 days after all when we were under the cosh of the 31 December drop-dead end date. We do not have that now, so the time pressure that was otherwise going to be imposed has now been released and reviewed. I urge my noble friend to go back to the chateau behind the lines and ask the general commanding to think again. If the Government do not think again, it will be yet another example of how they appear intent on marginalising Parliament at every single opportunity.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 15 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, effectively seeks to delay a vital part of the Government’s retained EU law reform programme whereby EU rights, obligations and remedies saved by Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 will cease to apply in the UK after 31 December 2023. The matters saved by Section 4 consist largely of rights, obligations and remedies developed in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Many of these overlap with rights already well established by domestic law in this country, and those overlaps can cause confusion.

Where the UK and devolved Governments consider that there is a need to codify any specific rights that may otherwise cease to apply, this can be done under the Bill’s powers. These codified rights will be placed on a sustainable UK footing, providing certainty and therefore safeguarding and enhancing them in domestic statute. The Bill is ending the current situation whereby citizens must rely in some cases on an unclear category of law and complex legal glosses to enforce their rights. Sadly, the proposed amendment seeks to perpetuate this situation, which the Government consider unacceptable. I hope the noble and learned Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Amendments 69, 76, 73 and 74 relate to Schedule 4 and parliamentary scrutiny. Amendments 73 and 74, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, relate to the sifting procedure and seek to extend the period during which committees of this House and the House of Commons can make a recommendation about the relevant scrutiny procedure for regulations made under Clauses 13, 14 and 16. Specifically, these amendments seek to change the time limit under which both Houses can make recommendations on the appropriate procedure to be used when an instrument is laid and subject to the sifting procedure.

As the provision is drafted, relevant committees of this House and the Commons have a period of 10 sitting days to make recommendations on the appropriate scrutiny procedures. This starts on the first day on which both Houses are sitting after the instrument has been laid. If the period of 10 sitting days does not cover the same dates for both Houses, the end date of the relevant period will be the later of the two dates. Amendment 73 extends the number of sitting days in the period from 10 to 15 for the House of Commons, while Amendment 74 does the same for this House.

As I have been reminded by a number of noble Lords, particularly my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Hunt, I committed in Committee to review the 10-day scrutiny period for sifting. I engaged in extensive discussions not just in the department but with the business managers about whether a 10-day sifting period was sufficient. As my noble friend Lord Hodgson intimated, I was not successful in persuading them. The Government’s position remains that a 10-day sifting procedure is sufficient for SIs laid under the powers in the Bill.

It is also worth pointing out that we had that debate under the old provisions of the Bill. Under the new schedule approach, the total volume of statutory instruments to be delivered via the reform programme has been significantly reduced. My noble friend’s concern that there was not enough time to consider them properly will have been to some extent allayed, given the previously very large volume of SIs.

From previous experience, the 10-day period worked quite well during the programme of SIs for EU exit and is in line with the sifting procedures and legislation introduced under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. I have some confidence that it will continue to work well in this scenario. Therefore, I am afraid the Government do not consider it necessary to extend the time limit within which an instrument is scrutinised as part of the sifting procedure.

I turn now to Amendments 69 and 76 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. These amendments put a somewhat novel scrutiny procedure in place for the powers under Clauses 13, 14 and 16. Specifically, Amendment 69 removes the requirement for certain regulations made under those clauses to be subject to the affirmative procedure. In consequence of this, Ministers would be left with a choice between the negative or affirmative procedures, with the former subject to the sifting procedure.

Amendment 76 imposes this novel and untested scrutiny requirement on regulations made. This takes the form of an enhanced sifting procedure—not dissimilar to the super-affirmative procedure—under which Parliament may make amendments to a proposed instrument. The Government believe that the purpose of this Bill is to ensure that we have the right regulations in place which are right for the whole of the UK. The House can be assured that the Government will ensure that any significant retained EU law reforms will receive the appropriate level of scrutiny by the relevant legislatures and will be subject to all of the usual processes for consultation and impact assessment. However, we also believe that we have to ensure that the limited amount of parliamentary time that is available is used most appropriately and most effectively. Requiring that the powers be subject to additional scrutiny is neither appropriate nor necessary in this case.

The sifting procedure that we suggested was purposely drafted as a safeguarding measure for these powers. The sifting procedure will give the UK Parliament the opportunity to take an active role in the development of this legislation. It is a tried and tested method of parliamentary scrutiny which delivers—in my view—good results for everyone and does draw on the expertise of our various parliamentary committees. Requiring that legislation to be subject to novel, untried, untested and onerous scrutiny, such as this enhanced sifting mechanism would—in my view—not be an effective use of parliamentary time. It would result in delaying departments delivering their REUL reform programmes and would delay the Bill in delivering its objective of bringing about much-needed REUL reform. For all those reasons, the Government cannot support Amendments 69, 76, 73 and 74.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the course of this debate. I do not want to go over the arguments again. On the criticisms the Minister has made about my two amendments, I have only two points to make.

First, I think he said that the purpose of Amendment 15 was to delay the process that Clause 4 is talking about. That is simply not true. We have kept within the timetable that Clause 4 itself lays down. As I made clear, the aim throughout our amendments is to try to achieve what is required as quickly as possible. The sunset date in Clause 4 remains, according to our amendment. So, to say that we are delaying anything is, with great respect, not the case.

Secondly, to describe Amendment 76 as novel and untested is not a criticism that meets the situation. We are dealing with an entirely new situation where we are having to redesign an enormous quantity of EU law which we have inherited. Of course, the system we have devised is new because we are dealing with something we have never encountered before. That itself is no answer to the point that we were making throughout: parliamentary scrutiny is essential. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, drew attention to provisions in Clause 16 which absolutely emphasise the essential nature of that. So I move Amendment 15 and, if it is not agreed to, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

17: Clause 7, page 5, line 25, at end insert—
“(6A) The Scottish Ministers may by regulations make provision amending an enactment that is within devolved competence in consequence of the name of a thing being changed by subsection (1).(6B) The Welsh Ministers may by regulations make provision amending an enactment that is within devolved competence in consequence of the name of a thing being changed by subsection (1).(6C) A Northern Ireland department may by regulations make provision amending an enactment that is within devolved competence in consequence of the name of a thing being changed by subsection (1).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment gives the Scottish and Welsh Ministers and a Northern Ireland Department a power, equivalent to the power of Ministers of the Crown in Clause 7(6), to amend legislation in consequence of the change in terminology from ‘retained EU law’ to ‘assimilated law’ made by Clause 7.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am sorry; it falls to me to introduce this group—again.

This is about devolution. One of the concerns about the Bill as drafted is that it does not pay proper attention to the devolution settlements as regards Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and to the key principle of respect and co-operation that underpins those settlements. I have several amendments in this group to which I wish to speak, as briefly as possible: Amendments 17, 35, 37, 39, 72A and 75.

Amendment 17 seeks to extend the regulation-making power under Clause 20 that is referred to in Clause 7 to Ministers in each of the three devolved Administrations. I seek clarification from the Minister as to whether this point is already met by government Amendments 57 to 60, which, among other things, extend the power in Clause 20 to make regulations to the devolved Authorities. If that is the case, I am very grateful and may not press this amendment.

Amendments 35, 37 and 39 seek to ensure that the consent of the relevant devolved legislatures is sought before a Minister of the Crown can make regulations under Clauses 13, 14 and 16 where the provisions fall within devolved competence. The principle that lies behind these amendments is very simple: respect and co-operation is key to the effective operation of the devolution settlements, and that is what these amendments seek to give effect to.

Amendment 75, to which Amendment 72A is related, seeks to apply the same principle to the powers given to a Minister of the Crown acting alone under Part 3 of Schedule 4. These powers should be exercised in devolved areas, only with the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers or a Northern Ireland department, as the case may be. These amendments are not intended to delay matters; they simply seek to obtain the proper respect for the devolved Administrations which is the essence of the devolved settlements.

I am open to correction; it may be that the government amendments meet what I am seeking. However, if they do not go far enough, I invite the Minister to give further thought to my amendments. I beg to move.

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[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Baroness Neville-Rolfe) (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, and other noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, to all the extensive and useful debates we had in Committee, and—this is important—for the useful engagement that has taken place on the devolutionary aspects of the Bill.

The Government have listened carefully to the concerns raised both in the debates in Parliament and by the devolved Governments and have tabled the government amendments in this group in response. Amendments 52 and 53 extend the power to make consequential provision under Clause 20 for the devolved authorities. Amendment 58 extends the power to make transitional, transitory and savings provisions under Clause 23 to the devolved authorities. These amendments will make the consequential power and the power to make transitional, transitory and savings provisions concurrent powers. This will enable UK Ministers and the devolved Governments—or both acting jointly—to exercise the powers in devolved areas.

The remaining government amendments, Amendments 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72 and 77, are consequential. They will remove the requirement for the devolved Governments to request the UK Government to make such changes on their behalf. Furthermore, these amendments will align these powers with the other powers in the Bill, which are also conferred concurrently on the devolved Governments.

I hope that noble Lords will agree that this is a meaningful change to the Bill that demonstrates the UK Government’s commitment to working collaboratively with the devolved Governments—which we talked about in Committee—and ensuring that the Bill works for all parts of the UK. Amendment 71 is a further technical amendment that I think everybody is happy with.

Amendment 17, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, is to Clause 7. As we have now extended the power to make consequential provision under Clause 20 on devolved authorities, he is right that it is no longer necessary.

I turn to Amendments 35, 37, 39 and 75, which relate to powers under Clauses 13, 14 and 16 and Schedule 4. Amendment 35 requires that the power to restate REUL cannot be used to restate it in areas of devolved competence unless the relevant parliament has provided legislative consent for the retained EU law to be restated. Amendments 37 and 39 place similar requirements on the power to restate under Clause 14, and on the powers to revoke or replace under Clause 16.

In essence, these amendments would carve out regulation within areas of devolved competence in the absence of legislative consent. As has been said, Amendment 75 similarly seeks to impose a requirement for a Minister of the Crown to seek legislative consent when using the powers on legislation within areas of devolved legislative competence. These amendments are unnecessary. The UK Government are committed to ensuring that the provisions in the Bill, including its powers, are consistent with the devolution settlements and work for all parts of the UK. Indeed, the majority of the powers in the Bill are conferred concurrently on the devolved Governments, which will enable them to make active decisions regarding their retained EU law.

It is not necessary to limit the use of the powers within areas of devolved legislative competence by requiring UK Ministers to obtain legislative consent. Rest assured, the concurrent nature of the powers is not intended to affect the devolution settlements, nor to influence decision-making in devolved Governments. Rather, it is intended to reduce additional resource pressure on the devolved Governments by enabling the UK Government to legislate on behalf of a devolved Government where they do not intend to take a different position.

Let me move on and address Amendments 41 and 46, eloquently spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. Her amendments would restrict the exercise of the powers to revoke or replace and the power to update. They require that any replacement instruments could not effect substantial policy change relating to human rights, equality or environmental protection that has effect in Northern Ireland. The Government intend to maintain the UK’s leading role in the promotion and protection of human rights, equality, the rule of law and environmental protections. We are proud of our long and diverse history of freedoms. The Government do not intend to undermine our hard-won human rights, equality and environmental legislation through the exercise of these powers. I should perhaps add that we are committed to ensuring the UK’s compliance with our international obligations, such as our human rights obligations. I therefore do not judge that the proposed restrictions to this clause are necessary.

Amendment 61 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, is no longer necessary in the light of the amendments that the Government have tabled in relation to Clause 23.

Finally, I turn to the noble and learned Lord’s latest amendment, Amendment 72A. It relates to Amendment 76, which we discussed in the previous grouping and which seeks to insert a new paragraph in Schedule 4 to the Bill. As Amendment 76 has fallen away, this amendment is now redundant.

Let me say that we have come a long way on this part of the Bill, as has been acknowledged on all sides. For all the reasons I have outlined, I ask that these amendments be withdrawn or not pressed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this debate; I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, for her very kind words.

I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I am grateful for her assurance that Amendment 17 is not required; that was my impression, so it is nice to have confirmation of that from her.

As far as the other amendments are concerned, I take the point that increasing pressure on resources is something that we should try to avoid. I see the value of joint working, which is really what the Minister described to us in her reply. I recognise that the Government have gone a long way in their amendments in this group, for which I am extremely grateful; I am sure that all others who care about devolution would say the same.

I will not press the amendments, but I hope that the message is still powerfully in the mind of the Government that continued co-operation and easing of the pressures round about to achieve a consensus across the board is the way to proceed if we possibly can. I think that the signs behind the scenes are that that can be achieved. I am grateful for that. For that reason, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 17 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

18: Clause 8, page 6, leave out lines 27 and 28
Member's explanatory statement
Inserted paragraph (b), which this amendment seeks to remove, could undermine legal certainty and risk bringing the judiciary into the political arena.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, this is an entirely different group. Amendment 18 deals with the provisions relating to the role of the courts in reforming our law in the light of our withdrawal from the European Union.

This group contains various amendments in my name, which fall into two parts. Both relate to the provisions of Clause 8, which is designed to deal with the subject matter that I just mentioned. The first part—Amendments 18 to 29—is concerned with the role that the courts will play in reforming our domestic case law as we depart from retained EU case law. The second part—Amendments 30 to 34—is concerned with the role of the Lord Advocate in the making of references to the courts on points of law regarding retained case law. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has kindly added his name to my amendments in the first group but, for reasons that I can well understand, he has not gone that far in relation to my amendments about the Lord Advocate.

I can be very brief about the first group because the Minister has now added his name to two of my amendments in it, for which I am grateful; these are Amendments 24 and 27. He has also added two consequential amendments of his own.

My amendments were designed to do two things. The first was to simplify the work of the courts in this potentially difficult area and preserve legal certainty. The second was to give the courts a discretion to decline to accept a reference by a lower court or tribunal on retained case law in place of the obligation to do so, which is what the Bill currently provides. The obligation was an obstacle to efficiency in the running of the courts. It never made sense for the senior courts to be so encumbered by worthless or unnecessary references as to be unable to conduct their business in the way they would wish to do.

I am very pleased that the Government have now accepted that the senior courts should have that discretion and that, in the Bill as currently drafted, “must” should be changed to “may”. It means that good sense has prevailed and that the courts will not have to accept a reference on points that have already been decided or would be better dealt with under another reference that is already pending or one that has no reasonable prospect of success. That is extremely helpful; I know that, for his part, the President of the UK Supreme Court is also grateful to Ministers for making that concession.

The Minister has not gone as far as I would have liked on my other amendments, but I am not going to look a gift horse in the mouth, if I can put it that way, so I will not press those amendments.

As for the second group, relating to the role of the Lord Advocate, the Lord Advocate has written to the Secretary of State more than once to explain her concerns, which I have tried to capture in my amendments. She is seeking parity with the UK law officers in the exercise of the functions to which this clause refers. Her point is that her role is not thought to be a political one in furtherance of Scottish government policy; nor should it be thought that she exercises her role collectively with the Scottish Ministers. She values her independence, which is crucial to the position that she occupies as the senior law officer in Scotland.

I do not think that it would assist the House if I were to develop these arguments further now, but I would be grateful if the Minister would undertake to ask the Secretary of State to look at this issue once again, one more time, so that a proper balance can be achieved. I beg to move.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I lend the support of these Benches to the important amendments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. They might seem perhaps a little specialised, but they are extremely important. There might not be any intention to press any of these amendments to a vote, but I do hope that the Government will see their way to taking on board more than they have already in the two amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan.

These amendments are about trying to remove threats to legal certainty and therefore to increase legal certainty, respecting the courts and their ability to run their business efficiently and removing the peril of the court being asked to venture into political and policy matters. We know about the flak to which the courts have been exposed—including, it has to be said, not being defended by the person in government who should have defended them.

It therefore seems perverse that the Bill, as drafted, would increase the likelihood of the courts being exposed to being hanged, drawn and quartered, as we have seen on the front pages of certain newspapers at various times. So there is a desire to get more predictability and certainty into the law, and more discretion for the courts to run themselves as they see fit and not have to do things that would get them into shark-infested waters. So, even though it seems that these important amendments will not be determined by the House today, I hope that the Government will reflect before Third Reading and see the wisdom behind them.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his careful reply. On the point that we are agreed upon, the change of the word “must” to “may” may seem a very minor change, but words matter a great deal and it is a very significant change indeed. That is why I express gratitude to the Minister and, on his behalf, the gratitude of the president of the court for accepting that change, because it makes a great deal of difference to the court and the way in which it can organise its business. It can be relied upon, I think, to exercise its functions under the Bill to the fullest degree in seeking to achieve the aim, which is, as speedily as possible, a return to our own system of law from what we have inherited from the European Union.

As for the retained functions of the Lord Advocate, the word “retained” is really referring to pre-devolution functions. The Minister is quite right that the principal function of the Lord Advocate before devolution, which is retained, is the right to continue the whole responsibility of conducting criminal prosecutions in Scotland. There is something that he has missed out: it is perhaps not very significant, but investigation of deaths is also a function of the Lord Advocate which is retained.

I think all I can say is that I appreciate the thought that has been given to the Lord Advocate’s request. Of course, she is disappointed that the view has been taken that everything she is asking for cannot be given to her and we will just have to see how the system works out. Of course, it is all a matter of making references to the court. No doubt, in the course of argument, things may be presented which the court can consider if they are on the fringes of what is described in the Bill, or the Act as it becomes.

Words matter: again, the court will look at the reference and see whether it is something that it can accommodate within the wording of the legislation. So, I am grateful to the Minister for his careful reply and the thought that has been given to it and I will not press those amendments. For the reasons I have given, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 18.

Amendment 18 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

24: Clause 8, page 7, line 39, leave out “must” and insert “may”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to preserve the court’s discretion to refuse to accept a reference, which is a necessary safeguard against abuse.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

27: Clause 8, page 8, line 3, leave out “must” and insert “may”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to preserve the court’s discretion to refuse to accept a reference, which is a necessary safeguard against abuse.