Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateMonday 6th March 2023
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRetained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 View all Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 89-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee - (6 Mar 2023)
Lord Callanan
That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.
Amendment to the Motion
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, I too am extremely grateful to the Minister for his letter; I actually got it on Friday. I certainly welcome it. One of the sentences in the letter that struck me—it hit me in the face, as it were—was in the paragraph at the bottom of the second page:
“The Government is intent on bringing clarity to the statute book, and for citizens and businesses so that they are clear as to the rights that they rely on”.
That is the fundamental issue here; it is certainly the one that I want to concentrate on in our debate on this group. By the way, I am not going to repeat the points about the potential impact as we have had lots of discussion about that.
We are dealing here with known unknowns, if you like. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, just said, it is about the idea that we do not know quite what impact the case law and common law that has developed over 50 years has had. Of course we had a very detailed discussion on Clause 1, but Clause 3 is potentially even more serious because it deals not with specific regulations that might be identified on the dashboard—it is now approaching 4,000 pieces of legislation—but with areas where we are not sure whether the legislation is EU-derived, are not sure about the impact of EU law on them, and where decisions will undoubtedly have a huge impact.
These amendments are trying to assist the Government in how to ensure a proper process for identifying these things before anything falls off a cliff edge ahead of this date, and how to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny. It is a reasonable question in relation to process. This is not about trying to frustrate the Government, as noble Lords have already commented. It is about how we assist the Government in avoiding chaos.
Certainly, this clause requires more than simply cataloguing instruments. It requires us to look into how courts have interpreted decisions and what impacts that will have. Whether it is the Law Commission or another body, the Government must ensure that proper time is allocated to research this so that, coming back to the letter, we have certainty, because businesses require certainty. We have had that debate. Workers require certainty as to their rights. Consumers require certainty. All those things have been impacted by decisions through common law.
Nobody disputes that there may be EU rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures that we could do better without. There is no doubt about that, but let us have a proper procedure for determining it. It cannot be right that we simply have a cliff edge with a dashboard that the Minister repeatedly refers to that does not even quantify them. I think there are 28 in the dashboard that you can consider impacted by Clause 3 out of the 4,000. There are clearly lots more examples.
I am attracted to Amendment 69A signed by my noble friend Lady Chapman, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox. It provides a clear structure and timetable for us to work through that will ensure a transparent way of dealing with people’s rights. That is the most important element of these groups of amendments. Let us not frustrate what the Government want, but let us do this in a proper way that does not lead to the confusion and chaos which undoubtedly Clause 3 would.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Callanan) (Con)
I thank all Peers who have contributed to the debate. I was getting a bit concerned about the subject of my famous correspondence with the House, but I took on board the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, at the end of the last day in Committee, about wanting to see the letter in advance. I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, got his on Friday afternoon; I approved it in draft on Friday afternoon. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, did not get his until noon today. I received it on my parliamentary email at 10 am, so perhaps his email is a bit slow. I did attempt to get it out as early as possible because I suspected that it might come up and I knew that noble Lords would want to read it before the debate. I am sorry that the noble Lord thinks that it is gobbledegook, but that is lawyers for you.
The amendments in this group are Amendment 68 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, Amendment 69 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and Amendment 69A tabled by all three noble Lords. These would set unnecessary conditions on the commencement of Clauses 3, 4 and 5. Let me start by drawing noble Lords’ attention to why we are making the changes in these clauses. Each of the clauses is vital to the Government’s programme of reforming retained EU law.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Before he sits down, I refer him to the second paragraph on page 2 of his letter—for which I was grateful, joking apart:
“From the end of 2023 our domestic courts should no longer apply the retained EU principles of interpretation … Instead, we expect them to apply domestic principles of interpretation”.
What are these domestic principles?
Lord Callanan (Con)
They are the domestic principles of interpretation that have been used by the courts since time immemorial: the normal procedures they use to apply their scrutiny of UK law. That is the point we are making. It is important that the general principles of EU law, which were introduced into UK law with our accession and which have applied to retained—[Interruption.] Will the noble Lord let me finish making my point before he intervenes again?
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
In time immemorial, we were not members of the European Union. Is the Minister saying that we all should go back to pre-1972, and that anything that happened when Denning salt water was coming up the estuaries—anything that happened in the last 50 years—is to be ignored by the courts?
Lord Callanan (Con)
No, I am not saying that at all. Case law is not abolished: courts will still be able to take case law into account. We will use the power of restatement where necessary. Departments will look at whether the general principle of EU law, which we are abolishing with this legislation, affects the particular statutes that they are retaining, and they will adjust them accordingly so that the same policy effect is maintained. Of course I am not suggesting that we go back on what was agreed. The principles of case law will remain.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
We are talking about the courts and cases. Surely the courts will have to look at the domestic principles of interpretation which they are going to apply. Will they be given any guidance?
Lord Callanan (Con)
The courts will use the same principles they have used for the interpretation of UK statute for many hundreds of years.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
Workers will want to know precisely which of their rights will be impacted by this clause. Of the current numbers, can the Minister identify how many regulations in the dashboard will be impacted by Clauses 3 to 5?
Lord Callanan (Con)
We will keep the dashboard updated as work progresses. As the noble Lord knows, we had this debate in the first grouping on workers’ rights. We are proud of our record and have given a commitment that the UK will not go back on our excellent principle of workers’ rights, which are far in excess of that guaranteed by European law. I see that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, is smiling.
We have had this debate on the issue of the dashboard, which noble Lords have raised on many occasions, but let me restate the Government’s position. We are happy that departments know what legislation they are responsible for. Their lawyers are still going through it to determine which is or is not retained EU law, but we have introduced technical amendments to make it clear that, by default, if they are not sure, they should retain that law. No detriment or challenge could be made if they did that.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
I have just realised that my noble friend referred a moment ago to this Parliament’s lack of involvement in EU matters or legislation. He and others here are always putting forward that Ministers of this Government are accountable to Parliament—although, we sometimes argue, not sufficiently. Of course, they make up the Council of Ministers, which they attend in order to approve all European legislation. He surely therefore recognises that Parliament is almost directly linked to European legislation, but he says that there is no UK parliamentary input. I just wanted to correct that point.
Lord Callanan (Con)
It is slightly off the point, but I hope the noble Lord is not trying to argue that the UK Parliament is President in the Council of Ministers.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, the point that I want to probe a bit more is the known unknowns. We do not really know what will be impacted. I will read from the noble Lord’s letter:
“A comprehensive review of all retained EU law on the UK statute book began in September 2021, and work is well underway by departments to assess line by line, the desired policy intent and effects of retained EU law on the statute book and to ensure that REUL that needs to be preserved, is preserved”.
What and who decides the policy intent? The Bill does not tell us anything. That is the biggest concern and why these amendments try to assist the Government by providing a process where we can have greater transparency. The noble Lord is unable to give an answer at this stage of the game, and we are not far away from the cliff edge that we have all been talking about. He cannot tell me what the dashboard numbers are. Can he tell us the policy intent identified in his letter?
Lord Callanan (Con)
The reference in that is to the policy intent of the particular piece of retained EU law. The point we are making is that if the abolition of the principles of EU law, the supremacy and interpretive effects, changes the policy intent of that particular piece that is worth retaining then of course it will be changed using the powers in the Bill—the powers of restatement, which we will debate later—to preserve the original policy intent, as would have been approved by Parliament, if Parliament had any role in approving that in the first place.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
This takes us back to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, which specifically made the point that there is not,
“an indication of which legal or policy areas the Government think should be retained, amended or revoked”.
It says absolutely specifically:
“The Government need to explain how they propose to use the powers in the Bill. They also need to explain what is behind the headlong rush and the impending and arbitrary end-of-year deadline”.
With the greatest of respect to the noble Lord, the letter does not say that. I think noble Lords would agree that we have not had that explanation over the last three days in Committee either.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am sorry if the noble Baroness believes that. We have debated the principle of the sunset. I accept that she presumably has a different position from mine, but I have stated the Government’s position on numerous occasions. The dashboard will continue to be updated as departments come to decisions on what they want to do with their stock of retained EU law.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, while it is in my mind, I am not sure the Minister answered my noble friend Lady Brinton’s question, which was, in citing the Delegated Powers Committee report, to ask what was the policy intention and to point out that the Bill is a blank sheet of paper as far as that is concerned. That is what is completely worrying us, because of its effect on the real world and the lack of any parliamentary grip on this process.
For him to say that Amendment 69A would involve the Law Commission in Government policy misrepresents the amendment—no doubt inadvertently—which talks about asking the Law Commission to report on,
“the effect of sections 3, 4 and 5 … on legal certainty, and the clarity and predictability of the law.”
That is surely within the purview of the Law Commission. That would not involve the Law Commission in policy. I fear that the Minister misrepresented Amendment 69A, perhaps in his enthusiasm.
Lord Callanan
“Retained EU law governing the CAP direct payment schemes Retained direct EU CAP legislation | Assimilated law governing the CAP direct payment schemes Assimilated direct CAP legislation” |
This amendment renames bodies of law relating to direct payments to farmers as regards times after the end of 2023.
Lord Callanan
““retained EU law governing the CAP direct payment schemes” and “retained direct EU CAP legislation” have the meaning given by section 2 of the Direct Payments to Farmers (Legislative Continuity) Act 2020 (as it has effect on the day on which this Act is passed).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the Minister’s amendment to Clause 6, page 4, line 15 .
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group. I will start with some general comments and observations on Clause 7 and thereby deal also with Amendment 99A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, which would remove Clause 7 altogether.
In short, Clause 7 gives higher UK courts greater flexibility to depart from retained EU case law than is currently the case. I emphasise first that we are talking about appeal decisions. First-instance courts continue to be bound and that is an important part of any answer to the points raised about legal certainty. Currently, the Supreme Court or the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, and other higher courts, must apply the same tests that they would apply if departing from their own previous case law.
Clause 7 lowers the bar somewhat. It provides that, in deciding whether to depart, the court must have regard to, among other things, the principle that decisions of a foreign court are not, generally speaking, binding in UK courts; any change of circumstances relevant; and the extent to which retained EU case law restricts the proper development of domestic law. I will come to the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and to the questions of change of circumstances and the word “proper”, in a moment.
That is a lower bar than is currently the case. It does not necessarily imply a cliff edge or any floodgates; it is looking ahead. We do not know what circumstances will arise as the next 20 or 30 years pass, how things will change and whether existing retained EU case law should be followed. The clause essentially says that it is for the higher UK courts to determine how that case law should develop and that it is not the case that previous EU case law can be changed only if the ECJ says yes. Without such a mechanism it is difficult to credibly say that one has withdrawn from the EU, so, in the Government’s view, some such mechanism is needed.
That is the first and general point. The second is that much, but not all, retained EU law is highly influenced by a context that is no longer relevant to the UK: for example, the need to promote among the 27—previously 28—member states the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and to protect the single market. All of that is reflected in the case law. There is also the common agricultural policy; the quite different institutional structures of the EU, notably the role of the Commission; the, if I may say so, laconic nature of much EU legislation; and the inevitable challenge of finding a common denominator among so many different legal traditions, languages and national backgrounds while, internally, working entirely in French.
One can pay the highest tribute to the way that the CJEU has navigated these difficulties over the years, and I readily do. But it does not follow that case law developed in those circumstances is necessarily suitable for the UK in the future, particularly in a fast-changing world with such things as the digital economy, artificial intelligence, climate change, genetic science, data protection and so forth. These present novel challenges all the time. In the Government’s view, the UK’s higher courts should be fully equipped to deal with them without being constrained by EU jurisprudence if they feel that they should depart therefrom.
Thirdly, if your Lordships will forgive me saying so, we have in this country a pearl beyond price: the common law. It has nurtured and protected us for centuries and has successfully taken root all over the world. By some measures, it is the world’s most widely used legal system. I was asked whether I would refer to the Warner Music case, which is referred to in the Explanatory Notes. The only reference I will make to that case is that made by the Master of the Rolls, the right honourable Sir Geoffrey Vos, who observed that the CJEU is “very far” from being a common law court. In other words, it is a quite different animal from the courts that we traditionally have in this country. We could spend much time philosophising but, in my humble experience, the continental legal tradition places emphasis on identifying abstract legal principles from which a solution may be deduced, while the common law starts from the other end, as it were, with the facts of a particular case and how those facts relate to other decided cases and the legislation in question. The art of distinguishing cases and building a legal system via a mosaic of interrelated cases has been perfected over the centuries by the judges of this country and other common law jurisdictions.
A very experienced solicitor working in a deprived part of north London said to me, when he heard that I had some previous association with the EU, “Don’t let them weaken the common law.” The common law is a people’s law. It comes up from the bottom; it does not come down from the top. In the Government’s view, it is very important that we never underestimate, underplay or weaken the great common law tradition that we have in this country.
That forms an essential part of the background to this clause, which is essentially to enable our judges to use the best of the common law traditions to take us forward. The Government are not saying that any one approach is better than another, only that the common law is in our DNA. Clause 7 will reinforce the common law tradition and allow it to flourish.
That being the essential rationale, I turn to the various amendments suggested to modify the new tests as set out in the Bill. I will first comment on the theme of legal certainty. The common law, as it has developed, has always been fully aware of the need to preserve legal certainty, but that has not inhibited the proper development of the law as the needs arise—I will come to that in a moment. It is always a question of balance. If one bakes in or gives priority to legal certainty one would never change anything. Legal certainty will of course remain an important circumstance, as it was in the Warner Music case—no doubt judges will have regard to it; it will be up to them—but we cannot say that legal certainty means that we have to slavishly follow old EU jurisprudence until the cows come home just because of legal certainty. We have to find a balance. That is one factor among others, but not necessarily a dominant factor.
I turn to the specific amendments. Amendment 81 was moved by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. I am not completely sure that we have in this group all the amendments to which she originally referred in her speech, but we will sort that out through the usual channels, if we may. Amendment 81 would reduce the “must” have regard to “may” have regard. In the Government’s view, this would again tend to bake in the existing situation and enable the courts to ignore changes of circumstances, and to not allow or to continue in a state of undue deference to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
I say “undue”, by which I mean that some deference is clearly highly necessary. In particular, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said, parts of our law where the statute is essentially an EU creation may well be different situations from other parts of the law. I agree, although I am bound to say, on the legal certainty and accessibility of case law to the general public points, that I very much doubt whether any member of the public, having fought through the 25 often conflicting decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the question of communication to the public, which is the subject matter of the Warner Music case, would be much the wiser when it came to working out what the law was. However, that is another matter.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
It also clearly extends to statute-based law. Is that not a case for bringing the courts into expressing a view as to what is essentially the function of Parliament?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, the courts are always astute. They sort of intuitively know where they have to stop and where Parliament has to take over. That is a process that has been honed and refined for the past 100 years at least, but it does not prevent the courts moulding, refining and developing the common law. There comes a point where you cannot go further, but quite often in a court you can, especially when you have existing jurisprudence. It is quite early on in the development of a new technology. In the Warner case, we were talking about hyperlinks, graphic interfaces and all sorts of high-technology things with which I am sure your Lordships are extremely familiar, but it is a new area of law, and the courts, generally speaking, work with that until they find that they have gone as far as they can as a court and then Parliament takes over. With respect, I would not completely accept the observation of my noble friend Lord Hailsham that this is usurping Parliament.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I think I understand the Minister’s argument about “proper” in new paragraph (c) in Clause 7(3), but is the wording of this not prejudicial because it assumes that retained EU law restricts the proper development of domestic law? It does not say that the court should consider whether and to what extent retained EU law restricts the proper development of domestic law. It says that it should consider the extent to which it does, assuming that it does. Would it not be better to go for non-prejudicial language, as well as, I hope, including the balancing language in Amendments 83, 85 and 88?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
As far as I know, this is not intended to be prejudicial, but it presupposes a case where there is a tenable argument and it is put to the court that a retained EU law has that effect. Then the court will decide whether it does and what would be the proper development going forward. Taking that intervention on the hoof as it were, I am not sure at first sight that one is convinced that it would be better to change the wording. Let me reflect further.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I am looking at the same clause as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. He asked about new subsection (5) (c). I shall ask the Minister about new subsection (5ZA)(a), in which the courts are being asked to consider
“the extent to which the retained domestic case law is determined or influenced by retained EU case law from which the court has departed or would depart.”
If we are not encouraging courts to depart, why would we be asking them to consider the extent? That seems to raise a question, given what the Minister has just said.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
If I may say so to the noble Baroness, I think this is just a drafting point. The extent may well be nil. There is no particular reason to suppose that the retained EU case law in a particular case is restricting the proper development of domestic law. That was the situation, as it turned out, in the Warner music case, although at least one learned justice in that case very pointedly left open the possibility of further developments in a fast-moving technology.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I was not referring to the proper development of domestic law on this occasion. At the top of page 6, we seem to be asking courts to consider the extent to which EU case law “determined or influenced” in and of itself rather than about the “proper development” which is in new subjection (5)(c). I wonder whether that is, to use the language used by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, prejudicial or leading the court.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I think I can take it not much further than the answer that I have just given—that the extent may well turn out to be nil.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
But why are we asking courts to ask themselves that question?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The answer is that the courts will not raise these questions of their own motion. These points will be raised by a party to the proceedings. Then the party to the proceedings will argue that this retained domestic law is influenced by EU case law and is now having—or may have in five or 10 years’ time—a restrictive effect that is holding up the common law. Those are the kinds of circumstances that it envisages, I think.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
I think the Minister was about to sit down, but he kindly invited me to respond so I will. I think that is the problem. He must surely understand that we anticipate this leading to an enormous amount of uncertainty—if that alone is something a party in the court is able to point judges towards and say that, because the case law came from the EU, in and of itself that is a reason to ask for a decision to be made in a different way.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
Respectfully, as I said a moment ago, I do not accept that this will lead to a great deal of uncertainty. It is binding on the courts of first instance. No one is going to take this to appeal unless there is a real point to be argued. If there is a real point to be argued, it is right that that our courts of appeal and higher courts should consider that point.
Perhaps we have had sufficient exchanges on this topic and I ought to move on as best I can. Finding my place in the notes, I think I have not answered the concerns raised about what we mean by “changes of circumstances” and how we manage that. Again, this is a matter that the common-law courts are very well equipped to deal with and they can decide for themselves whether there has been any relevant change of circumstances or, in particular, whether the change of circumstance is relevant.
I would not have thought that a change of government or a change in the political wind is a relevant change of circumstance. What you need is some circumstance that makes it either difficult to operate, or less than ideal to be bound by, a particular judgment of the European Court of Justice that may have been made many years ago. It may now be completely out of date or may have failed to take account of various factors that the court feels should be taken account of. Very often in a common-law system, when you look at a case and at previous decisions, you see that the particular point had not in fact been decided and you are therefore free to decide it yourself. That is much more difficult to do in a European system, which purports to lay down perfectly general principles.
If I may trespass on your Lordships’ kindness for a moment, it is often quite interesting to look at the summary of a European Court judgment, which in English terms would be referred to as the “headnote” of the case. It extracts principles from the judgment. The equivalent headnote in an English case says: these are the facts, and this is what the decision was on these facts. That encapsulates a difference of approach, thought and philosophy as to how you develop the legal system.
As I said a moment ago, I am not saying that it is better or worse; it is just different. Historically, we in this country belong to a huge family across the world that uses this technique, whether in the United States, Canada, Australia, India—very prominently—or otherwise. The Government are simply saying that we should not forget that we have a great legal tradition and we do not have to, as it were, slavishly follow the latest emanation from those very hard-working, very able, but not necessarily relevant to us, judgments and judges in Luxembourg.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I have listened very carefully, and there is a fundamental flaw in my noble friend’s argument as it relates to Scotland. Scotland has a mixed legal system. I am a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates. I chose to go and practise EU law because every reference was either passed down to London or you could practise EU law in Brussels; there were very few opportunities to practise at the Scottish Bar. But my noble friend must accept that the Scottish system—which, I would hazard a guess, has many advantages over the English system—is based on Roman law. It is based on a system of codified law, and what distinguishes it fundamentally from what he has just described about the common-law system is that it is a mixed legal system. I wonder whether he would like to address this in his remarks, given the comments that I made in relation to the amendments that I spoke to—Amendments 81, 82, 84 and 94—and mindful of the fact that I am approaching this from a mixed civil and common-law system.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh for that intervention, and I stand corrected. She is completely right that Scotland is a mixed system, although I venture to suggest much influenced—if I may use that controversial word for a moment—by the common law. As I said a moment ago, Scottish judges have been, frankly, the best common lawyers anyone has ever known. They happen all to be called Reid but that is a coincidence.
Of course, I accept the comment, although I beg to differ as to whether any different conclusion follows. Essentially, the “may”, “must” and other amendments that the noble Baroness has proposed are independent of the exact legal approach one is talking about. It may well be that, in a Scottish situation, there would be a greater willingness not to disturb retained case law than in an English situation. I do not know; maybe these things will come up to the Supreme Court and someone will say “That is what we are going to do”. Maybe the Scottish tradition will prevail; that is perfectly likely. With respect, the Government do not feel that that changes the general thrust of Clause 7.
That was changes of circumstances. The next question is on this word “influence”—whether it has been influenced or determined by European law. I think “influenced” is included simply to give a sufficient degree of flexibility and to avoid deciding what might be quite a difficult point: whether European law was in fact determinative of a particular point or just part of the general context. Very often, it is part of the general context and the influence of the European element on the final outcome.
On that point—I am not sure we picked it up entirely; I may be speaking out of turn—I shall, if I may, at least attempt a reply to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on the question of principles of interpretation. I think it is relevant to the influence point. It arises in the context of legislation. Many here will know better than me, but the essential difference, as I understand it, is that traditional common law, including the Scottish approach, is a highly textual interpretation: what the meaning of the words is. The European Court’s general approach is a teleological interpretation of the general idea of where the statute is going. Very often, because of the laconic and sometimes completely deficient nature of European legislation, that court is much more prepared to fill in the gaps in the legislation than an English court would be. It is along those general lines; I am sure we can elaborate further as necessary later in these proceedings. So that is the influence point.
I think I have dealt with adding in the factors of settled understanding, legal certainty and so forth. The Government do not support that approach because it would simply bake in the status quo; that is the Government’s essential position. Legal certainty is inevitably something the courts will consider. They considered it in the Warner Music case because they were dealing with an international treaty and there was a desire not to disturb the law—albeit that the law was a right old muddle, as far as one can see, if I may put it colloquially just for a moment. In that case, it was not actually very seriously argued that we should depart from EU law; it was a perfunctory argument that took place in a few minutes at the end of the day, so it was a bit of a non-event.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I apologise if I am interrupting the Minister before he has finished; I think he is replying to Amendments 85 and 88, although he did not specifically refer to them. He dismisses the need for the factors introduced in those amendments because he says the courts can have regard to them anyway. Why have the Government prescribed several elements themselves if the courts can have regard to them? Our whole argument is that the courts can have regard to factors they want to have regard to. The impetus behind Amendments 85 and 88 was that the Government were being partial and pushing in a certain direction for the three elements they will allow the courts to consider—the argument for adding the extra elements, the consequences of disturbing the settled understanding of the law and the importance of legal certainty, clarity and predictability—and to try to re-establish the balance that the authors of the amendments felt was lacking.
If I may say so, I find the Minister’s reply so far extremely puzzling. He has, correctly, given a paean of praise to our courts and the common law, saying that they have perfected the art of creating this mosaic—
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Yes, I am getting to it. I want an explanation. I said the Minister’s reply was “puzzling” but, if I may say so, I want to say “contradictory” and “does not add up”. I want to press the Minister to clarify what he has said. I find it really quite irritating that Ministers keep interrupting us when we are trying to say something. The fact is that the Minister has praised our common-law courts and said they have not been inhibited in the proper development of the law and so on, but now he wants—
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True)
My Lords, at the previous stage I reminded the House, I thought courteously, of chapter 4.29 of the Companion, where it is made perfectly clear that lengthy and frequent interventions are not desirable, whether or not the Minister accepts them. This is Committee. The noble Baroness can return with a reasoned response to what the Minister has said, but I think it is to the advantage of the House generally in our debates to hear the Minister’s arguments and then respond in a proper Committee manner. If I may, the noble Baroness’s intervention seemed to me to be getting into the category of “lengthy”.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
Before the Leader of the House sits down, perhaps he could just clarify that point. I have always understood that Committee stage in this House is about having a conversation so that the House as a whole can understand the nature of the arguments. With all due respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, with whom I often disagree, I think she is trying to get some elucidation, and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Bellamy, will answer fully in a moment.
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True)
I say to the noble Lord that the answer is precisely so; it is a conversation, but that conversation is conducted politely one to another. It is perfectly correct and reasonable for the House to ask a question for elucidation in the course of a Minister’s remarks, but a lengthier intervention criticising the Minister’s argument follows naturally in the Committee conversation afterwards.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
If I may be permitted to finish, I have now had three interventions from the Government Front Bench, which of course have lengthened this intervention. I ask the Minister please to explain how his paean of praise to our courts and their ability to develop the common law without inhibition accords with the constraints and straitjackets the Bill is putting on the courts he is praising.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, the Government’s position is that this is not a straitjacket. The courts are required to look at three things: the fact that the retained EU case law is made by a different court, whether there has been a relevant change of circumstances, and how the proper development of the common law should continue in future.
As to why we have not included other considerations—notably, legal certainty—the Government’s position, which noble Lords may or may not agree with but this is the explanation, is that once you write down the importance of legal certainty, that is potentially a recipe for passively doing nothing and continuing to be a rule taker for 20 years to come. That is not the consequence of withdrawing from the EU. The courts can continue to look at it, but that is the reason why the Government have drafted Clause 7 as it is.
I hope I have dealt with most of the issues raised about Clause 7 one way or another. There is the reference procedure, and noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, have made the point that higher courts always have the discretion whether to take a case, and they should be able to decline it. I completely understand that point. The Government had thought that the ability of those superior courts—the higher courts or the Supreme Court—to decide whether what they were being asked to do was relevant and whether the point raised was of general public importance was sufficient protection and would enable them to decline to hear the case if that were so. I must say that the circumstances in which a lower court actually gets as far as making a reference and identifying a point of public importance that a superior court feels it should not hear seem to me, if I may say so, somewhat remote, but we can have another look at the drafting if there is a need for further reassurance. I cannot commit to changing it, but I can commit to looking at it and discussing it with the relevant persons.
Lord Etherton (CB)
My Lords, will the Minister please reply to the point I made? The situation may be such, as we know from bitter experience, that you can identify an important point of law in a case but, unless it is dispositive of the whole of it, it will lead to further expense and time. That may apply equally to this point of law as to any other. There is no special feature regarding points of law relating to retained law, as opposed to points of law in any case.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
That might raise the question of whether indeed it was relevant. You could say, “That’s not relevant here because it’s not dispositive”, or “It’s only one point among several”. However, I say to the noble and learned Lord that the Government will have another look at this. There is no point in having provisions that are not satisfactory in this regard.
That takes me to the law officer reference and intervention powers. On the essential points made by my noble friend Lady McIntosh about the position of the Lord Advocate, I hope she will bear with me. My understanding of the exact position of the Lord Advocate is probably not as good as hers and that of other noble Lords in the Committee. Essentially, the law officer reference power provides another mechanism for resolving these various points, and it gives the UK law officers and the relevant officers of the devolved Governments a statutory right to be considered and so forth. It does not extend the Lord Advocate’s powers to anything outside the devolved competence of the Scottish Government, any more than it does for the Counsel General for Wales or the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland. The Government’s view on this point is that the other law officers in the devolved Governments should be involved in matters that affect the devolved Governments and not matters that are retained UK law. That is the Government’s position.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
The Minister does not have to be sorry. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, was only coughing.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I am sorry. I am rather nervous when noble Lords come at me from all directions, especially the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
That is quite all right.
This is the logic of the approach. It is a cross-UK approach and not a Scotland-specific approach. It does not seem appropriate that the previous functions of the Lord Advocate, so far as they have been retained, should change.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I am sorry. I was saying that this is a structure that gives the UK law officers power in relation to UK competence and the devolved Governments power in relation to their competence. That is the structure of it all.
Amendment 101, on the question of incompatibility orders, is described as a probing amendment. Again, this has precedence in other parts of the statute book. The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 has a similar power. If there is a point of incompatibility, the courts are given a power to manage that; it would probably mean deferring making an order for six months until the Government could fix it, as did the Court of Appeal in the Open Rights Group v The Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport: we have found a problem, and we are going to give you time to come up with solution, whether it is legislative or otherwise. In that particular case, the power was said by the Court of Appeal to derive from EU powers, but this is giving the court power under domestic legislation. I hope it is a sensible process for making the compatibility mechanisms work properly if incompatibility is found, which is likely to be a fairly rare event. I hope I have covered most points, if not all.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
I am very grateful to the Minister for the skill with which he is trying to explain to a layman like me abstruse points of law. Could he give us a worked example, please? I was struck by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said about the potential cost to the country of a loss of clarity. Take his example of the copyright law of the United Kingdom, which, he said, was virtually exclusively based on EU law. What changes of circumstances do the Government envisage that the courts should be considering when they consider cases that are tried under the present British copyright law? The only change of circumstances I can think of is if the Government were to pass new legislation on copyright. I do not think that is the plan, but if they do not, what are the courts supposed to do? What change of circumstances would they have to consider?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, fortunately, I think I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, for only one example, and so I will just give one because it is getting quite late. The example is changes in technology, which are moving very quickly. The Warner case, which has now been mentioned several times, was a case in which a radio station in the US put some music in a hyperlink on its website. Consumers in the UK could click on the link on that website, and the question was whether the UK copyright holders could get a royalty on that even though the UK user was accessing it in the United States—it does not matter if it is the United States, Taiwan or anywhere else. In that kind of area, the technology is moving very quickly. The existing EU decisions are not entirely consistent, and it can be easily envisaged that in some future situation, where some technology that we do not yet understand or know of has come into being, a UK court might take a different view and distinguish previous EU jurisprudence. That sort of situation is more than likely to happen at some stage.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, it has been a lengthy and thorough debate, and I fear it has not gone quite as smoothly as my noble and learned friend the Minister would have wished. I am pleased he has conceded that Scots rule approaches this from a different angle. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has not been able to be present today, and I do not think my noble and learned friend has entirely answered the concerns of either the Royal Society of Scotland or the noble and learned Lord. In particular, my noble and learned friend has not addressed the question of why there is no corresponding restraint on the powers of any other UK law officer—for example, the England or Wales law officer—but only on the Scotland law officer. I would like to understand, perhaps at a meeting before Report, why that is the case. It is quite serious.
My noble and learned friend spoke at length about why retained EU law is historic now, but we are in a situation where court cases may arise. For example, the chemical industry here is going to be covered by the fledgling UK REACH programme, but the industry would also hope to export to the EU and so will have to meet the terms of the EU REACH programme. Does my noble and learned friend not accept that there will be cases that relate to this?
I fear that Clause 7 is an exam question seeking to show that, on appeal, there will be no reliance on retained EU law going forward. I think that was the wrong question to put, as has been adequately set out to such an extent that a distinguished former President of the Family Division, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said it is offensive to treat judges in this way, as did my noble friend Lord Hailsham, in slightly less graphic language.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for speaking to the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I believe that work is not complete on this chapter but, with the promise of a meeting before Report, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Baroness Neville-Rolfe) (Con)
My Lords, we have ensured that the Bill contains robust scrutiny mechanisms that will enable the appropriate scrutiny of any amendments or repeals of retained EU law made by the powers included in the Bill. The debate touched on two different things: we need to differentiate between the effects of Clause 10 and the application of pre-existing delegated powers contained in other Acts of Parliament, and the delegated powers included in the Bill.
Because of the points that have been made, I want just to touch on the scrutiny mechanisms. These include a sifting procedure that will apply to regulations proposed to be made under the power to restate and the powers to revoke or replace. This will afford additional scrutiny to the use of the power while retaining the flexibility of using the negative procedure where there are good reasons for doing so. We recognise the significant role Parliament has played in scrutinising instruments subject to sifting procedures previously and are committed to ensuring the appropriate scrutiny under the delegated powers in the Bill. Indeed, the Leader of the House of Commons has written to the chair of the European Statutory Instruments Committee proposing that the committee take on the role of sifting committee in the House of Commons to determine where the negative procedure may apply.
I wanted to give that background because there are these two different aspects to the debate, but I turn first to the clause stand part motion introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. Clause 10 must stand part of the Bill because it provides the answers to two fundamental questions. First, is it right that technical regulations should be treated as equivalent to an Act of Parliament? Secondly, are this Government happy with the risk of these regulations sitting stagnant on the statute book? The answer to both, as we have argued all along, is no. Clause 10 modifies powers in other statutes to allow them to be used to amend or retain direct EU legislation and directly effective rights. Over 50% of retained EU law currently identified on the REUL dashboard—I agree with the noble Baroness on that figure—is retained direct EU legislation. It is comprised mainly of EU regulations in which the UK Parliament had no real say. This legislation often does not reflect the UK’s priorities or objectives—to drive growth, for example. We are currently forced to treat some retained direct EU legislation as equivalent to an Act of Parliament when amending it. This is not appropriate; it does not fit with this Government’s vision of REUL reform following the Brexit process, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred.
I understand the concerns of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, but we do need to think of the opportunity that Brexit affords, while maintaining necessary protections. In doing so, we must ensure that parliamentary time is used appropriately. Furthermore, relying purely on primary legislation to amend these technical regulations to meet the UK’s needs would take decades. It is of critical importance that we ensure that these mostly technical regulations do not remain static and can be updated, amended and reformed in response to events and new knowledge, using appropriate delegated powers. Without the measures in Clause 10, thousands of regulations will become stagnant and will be unable to stay up to date, react to new information or implement new international agreements without requiring an Act of Parliament.
I will now move on to a set of amendments relating to the delegated powers, starting with amendments—
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
Before the Minister leaves the question of allowing Clause 10 to stand part, I am surprised at her disagreement with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—a dangerously radical body containing wild revolutionaries such as the noble Lords, Lord Janvrin and Lord Goodlad, and the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay. Their view was clearly set out in their report: that Clause 10
“effects a significant transfer of power to Ministers”,
contrary to what was set out in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The Act said it would be for Parliament to decide changes in primary legislation, rather than for Ministers to do so in secondary legislation.
I understand the argument the Minister is making, but it is not one likely to find much support across the House. We think we have a role in deciding what should be on the statute book; it is not simply for the Executive. I can see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton—yet another dangerous radical—that it will take time so there will be, in a sense, continuing uncertainty. This is why I support an extension of the sunset deadlines—although that is not a sufficient cure, I think it is a necessary one for the Bill. But the noble Lord has to recognise that there is huge uncertainty now for economic operators across the country: they do not know which laws are to be amended, which are to be retained and which are to be extinguished. Once we know, perhaps it would be sensible to discuss how long it will take to make the necessary changes.
Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)
Surely the thing that concerns businesses is how legislation is going to be amended, not whether it is or not.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the noble Lords for their interventions. I did say that I understood the concerns of the Committee. I was trying to explain that, in this particular case, we need to go forward with the arrangements we have because of the situation the EU law of 2018 has left us in and the need to tidy up the statute book, which, otherwise, would take decades to do.
Amendments 115 and 116 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering would insert a requirement to consult any interested persons or relevant devolved Governments before any secondary retained EU law could be revoked or replaced. Amendment 115 would require that no regulations may be made under Clause 15(2) unless Ministers comply with a set of conditions, including a requirement to consult any interested persons in relevant devolved Governments before any REUL can be revoked or replaced. Amendment 116 would insert the same consultation requirements regarding regulations made under Clause 15(3). These amendments would hinder the efficient removal of outdated and unnecessary burdens and regulations and their replacement with regulations that are more fit for purpose.
Furthermore, we have sought, as I have explained, to ensure that the Bill contains robust scrutiny mechanisms, including for the powers to revoke or replace. In particular, the sifting procedure will apply to those regulations proposed to be made under the negative procedure. The sifting procedure largely corresponds with the procedure under the EUWA and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. In both cases, sifting has been effectively used to ensure proportionate parliamentary scrutiny of legislation regarding EU exit. We are scheduled to debate the sifting procedure in more detail on Wednesday, and obviously I look forward to that debate. In addition, it is our expectation that the departments concerned will follow standard procedures regarding consultation and engagement with the devolved Governments during policy development, so I do not consider adding a requirement to consult on the face of the Bill to be appropriate or necessary.
Amendment 128, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, would create a new clause introducing additional restrictions on the use of powers under Clauses 15 and 16. Among the proposed extensive conditions is a requirement that Ministers provide a report outlining an assessment of the potential impact of proposed new regulations. This would include the difference between current and proposed new regulations for protections for consumers, workers, businesses, the environment, animal welfare, any changes to the regulatory burden, and whether the UK’s international commitments to the trade and co-operation agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol continue to be met. Such conditions are unnecessary. The Bill has been drafted to ensure that legislation made under these powers is subject to scrutiny procedures that are proportionate to the scope of the powers. It is our expectation that departments will follow the standard procedures for consultation and impact assessment where it is undertaken. Adding these conditions would significantly delay the process of REUL reform, impact departments’ delivery plans and could prevent departments maximising the use of the powers in Clauses 15 and 16.
Before coming to the sunsets, I turn to Amendment 129, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, which seeks to add a clause to the Bill introducing additional restrictions for food standards legislation. It is only right to have powers in the Bill which will help put the UK statute book on a sustainable footing. The powers will facilitate the much-needed review and reform of outdated retained EU law that not is fit for the UK, and they will ensure that we can capitalise on the benefits of Brexit. As I have said, the powers to amend are not intended to undermine the UK’s already high food standards. I say again that this Government are committed to promoting robust food standards nationally and internationally, so that we can continue to protect consumer interests, facilitate trade and ensure that consumers can have confidence in the food they buy. I also value the work of the food standards agencies, for all the reasons the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, has outlined, but that is not a reason to amend this general Bill.
To respond to the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, the Hansard that he referred to reflects the position that retained EU law that needs to be kept will be preserved. The FSA is saying publicly that retained EU law on food standards should be preserved. It is for the relevant department—the Department of Health—and the devolved nations to decide whether retained EU law in their area should be preserved. Therefore, I humbly suggest that the two statements are not in conflict.
Lord Krebs (CB)
To wind back a few sentences, the Minister quite rightly said that the Department of Health would be responsible ultimately for changes in the law that affect food safety and standards. However, my amendment was not questioning that issue; it was questioning where the Department of Health is going to get its expert advice from. I did not hear the Minister say that the Department of Health would not propose any changes unless the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland had agreed that they would not compromise consumer protections in relation to food, whether it is to do with safety information or health. Could she therefore confirm whether that is the Government’s intention?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I am sure the Ministers responsible at the Department of Health and in the devolved nations will consult the Food Standards Agency. In the work I do with the Department of Health which involves food, the Food Standards Agency is an incredibly important part of the decision-making process.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
The noble Baroness should not therefore have a problem in saying that they will consult it. Can we not have a commitment from the Government that they will do so? That is all.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
As I said, I am sure that the Health Ministers will consult the Food Standards Agency. The food standards agencies have been set up for this purpose. If you are making changes to legislation, of course there will be consultation. I am not the Health Minister, so I cannot make a declaration of that kind, but I have already said that I will pass on to the Health Minister the discussions we are having on food safety.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
I think the question my noble friend was asking was what the Government’s position is—that is the answer we need.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I have given my answer. I have been very clear about the importance we attach to food safety from both a government point of view and my own historic point of view, which I hope adds some credibility. I do not think I have a lot further to say, apart from the fact that officials are working with the Food Standards Agency day and night on these areas.
Amendment 132, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington, proposes that a Minister of the Crown should publish a report 30 days before the powers can be exercised. The report would have to include a list of criteria which relevant national authorities would need to take into account when exercising the powers under Clauses 12 to 17 of the Bill. The delegated powers within the Bill will enable Ministers to make active decisions regarding their respective retained EU law. It is only right to have such powers; they will help to put the UK statute book on a sustainable footing within a reasonable timeframe and facilitate the much-needed review and reform of retained EU law to ensure that we can capitalise on the benefits of UK autonomy. Furthermore, the Bill has been drafted to ensure that legislation made under the delegated powers is subject to scrutiny procedures proportionate to the scope of the powers. I therefore do not consider that publishing a report setting out criteria which Ministers must take into account when using the powers within the Bill is necessary given the scrutiny already provided for.
I turn now to Amendment 141 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead; I am sorry he is not here today. The amendment would impose a requirement to seek consent from a Scottish or Welsh Minister where a Minister of the Crown intends to exercise a power in the Bill separately on legislation which is in an area of Scottish or Welsh devolved competence. First, I assure your Lordships that the Government are committed to respecting the devolution settlements and the Sewel convention. Indeed, none of the provisions within the Bill, including the powers, affects the devolution settlements, nor is the Bill intended to restrict the competence of either the devolved legislatures or the devolved Governments.
I recognise that the extension power is not conferred on the devolved Governments. However, we are keen to ensure that the provisions within the Bill, including the powers, work for all parts of the UK. That is why the majority of the powers will be conferred concurrently on the devolved Governments: to enable them to make active decisions regarding their retained EU law. As such, introducing a requirement for a Minister of the Crown to seek legislative consent when using the powers on legislation within areas of devolved legislative competence is not necessary.
Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)
We keep being told that there is not going to be consultation or legislative consent, and that the Food Standards Agency would of course be mindful of what the Government have to say. We are being asked to take all these things on trust, but it is not as though the Government have an impeccable record on these things. Can the noble Baroness not appreciate that what the Committee is trying to get at is to understand how these determinations will come about? We are looking for some sort of signal from the Government that there will be openness and a willingness to involve, and an attempt to do more than what is absolutely strictly necessary within the letter of the Bill that she is referring to. Were she to endeavour to give us that reassurance or explain how that would be done, she might find a little—not a lot—more sympathy for the position she is taking.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I understand. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for trying to help to move things forward; we are certainly keen to do that. Clearly, this enabling Bill is going through Parliament ahead of the some of the work that has been going on around the dashboard and the individual governmental plans, which is perhaps a pity. I think my noble friend the Minister said that he would try to make more information available as that became possible. Indeed, we have given an extra couple of days for debates in Committee. Progress is being made all the time in departments on their plans. We have these two processes—
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, said, the Minister has turned down every single amendment in this group, whether it is for more consultation or for the Food Standards Agency to have a proper say. Every time, she has simply said, “That would take decades”. I am not sure whether an impact assessment has been done to work out what lies behind that phrase; I suspect it is just a throwaway phrase which is meant to cast dust in our eyes. However, it is not terribly convincing, because not a single amendment on the Marshalled List suggests putting the cut-off date beyond 2028, as the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, suggest. Nobody is suggesting a period of decades. What those of us who support these amendments are suggesting is that the Government should follow the normal procedure, which we have always had in this country before, of consultation and legislation. Could we please not dismiss everything by saying that it would take decades?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I think I said “decades” once. This is of course a bit different from the normal laws that we debate and put through this Parliament, because it is dealing with retained EU law, and we think that there is a need for special arrangements. Equally, there is also a need for your Lordships to understand what our plans are. This is Committee; it is quite conventional at this stage to explain the problems with amendments, which I have obviously been doing.
Picking up on what has just been said, perhaps I should move on to the final issue in this group, which is timing. Amendment 104, in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, relates to Clause 12 and seeks to change the date on which the power to restate under Clause 12 is capable of acting on retained EU law from the sunset date—the end of 2023—extending it to 2028. The existing power to restate under Clause 13, which is exercisable up to 2026, provides an adequate opportunity for the reform of retained EU law and assimilated law while providing a deadline to ensure that retained EU law does not languish on our statute book indefinitely.
I turn to Amendment 108A in the name of my noble friend Lady Lawlor. Although she did not speak to it on this occasion, I am glad that one of her early interventions as a Member of this House has been on this important Bill. Her amendment seeks to bring forward the date on which the power to restate assimilated law expires to the end of 2024. This power already puts a protection in place after the sunset by allowing departments to reproduce the effects of retained case law and EU-derived principles of interpretation in relation to specific provisions of restated assimilated law, which sunset at the end of 2023 up to 23 June 2026.
Although I understand where my noble friend is coming from, I believe that it is necessary to make the power to restate assimilated law available for a sufficient window of time following the sunset date to ensure that the Government can mitigate any unintended consequences associated with the sunset in 2023. While we expect the power to be used only in exceptional cases, it would be irresponsible for the Government not to have a protection in place. Bringing forward the expiration date of the power to restate assimilated law to the end of 2024 would provide a limited time window for departments to use this power and could result in provisions not being restated that are necessary to maintain the desired policy effect.
Amendments 122 and 122A are also on timing. Amendment 122 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering would change the date on which the powers to revoke or replace are capable of acting on REUL and post-sunset secondary assimilated law, extending it to 2028. Exercising the powers to revoke or replace will allow the Government to seize our new regulatory autonomy and ensure that REUL can be tailored to meet the UK’s needs in a timely manner. We need to complete that important process.
The powers to revoke or replace are important, cross-cutting enablers. They will allow the Government to overhaul EU laws in secondary legislation across the many different sectors of the economy where, if left, many pieces of REUL risk becoming fixed features of the statute book that are ill suited to the UK. As my noble friend Lord Hamilton said, extending the date to 2028 would also add to uncertainty. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, was right to remind us that some of the public think that the process of EU reform is sluggish, but I think that 2026 gives us ample time.
Lastly, I turn to Amendments 124 and 125 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering. In broad terms, they would change the dates that enable the power to act upon assimilated law. I will not go through the detail of why these amendments do not work because I have already explained it quite clearly. The powers to revoke or replace are already capable of acting on assimilated law for an additional two and a half years after the sunset, which is adequate time to complete REUL reform and provide greater legal certainty UK-wide.
I am sorry to have spoken at length but there were a lot of amendments in this group. I hope this has provided noble Lords with some reassurance on the powers in the Bill, their timeframes and the way in which scrutiny will work, as I tried to set out at the beginning of my speech. With this in mind, I ask noble Lords to withdraw or not press their amendments.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
The Question is that Clause 10 stand part of the Bill.