Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

68: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Conditions for bringing section 3, 4 or 5 into force(1) None of sections 3, 4 or 5 may be brought into force unless all the following conditions have been satisfied.(2) The first condition is that a Minister of the Crown has, after consulting organisations and persons representative of interests substantially affected by, or with expertise in the likely legal effect of, that section on a draft of a report, laid that report before Parliament setting out, with reasons, the Minister’s view as to the likely advantages and disadvantages of bringing that section into force, setting out in particular the effect of that section on –(a) the rights of and protections for consumers, workers and businesses, and protections of the environment and animal welfare, (b) legal certainty, and the clarity and predictability of the law,(c) the operation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU, and UK exports of goods and services to the European Economic Area, and(d) the operation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the EU withdrawal agreement.(3) In relation to section 4, the report must take into account any regulation made or likely to be made by a relevant national authority under section 8(1).(4) The second condition is that a period of 60 days has passed since the report was laid before Parliament, with no account taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.(5) The third condition is that, after the end of that period, both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section come into force.(6) If both Houses of Parliament have approved a resolution that that section should not come into force unless it is amended in a way set out in that resolution, then the Minister may by regulations amend that section accordingly, and that section may not be brought into force until that amendment has been made.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause requires Ministers to analyse, and to explain their analysis of, the effect of the removal of retained EU law rights, the principle of supremacy of EU law, and of the general principles. It also includes opportunity for Parliamentary approval and timeframes for laying reports before both Houses.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 68 I will speak to Amendments 69 and 69A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. I will take a little while; I know we want to make progress today, but these amendments are on legally very significant issues in relation to Clauses 3 to 5. Last Thursday, we discussed the fact that, unlike the sunset under Clause 1, there is no saving provision for Clauses 3 to 5, such as appears in Clauses 1(2). We moved an amendment to try to change that, and perhaps the Government will accept it.

I heard a Conservative MP on “Any Questions?” this weekend assert that Brexit meant bringing democracy back. I think that noble Lords across the Committee who have taken part in the four days of proceedings so far on the Bill would agree that it does not bring democracy back. Instead, it reinforces the executive diktat that, unfortunately, we have become rather used to.

The effect of these amendments, beginning with Amendment 68, would be to require

“Ministers to analyse, and to explain their analysis of, the effect of the removal of retained EU law rights, the principle of supremacy of EU law, and of the general principles”

of EU law. I presume that the Government have conducted such an analysis before bringing into force such wide-ranging changes. In the words of the Bar Council,

“it would be extraordinarily irresponsible were that not done”.

We would like to see a sharing of that analysis; it needs to

“be consulted on, made public, and put before Parliament. The new clause … gives Parliament the chance, in the light of such an analysis, to prevent the bringing into force of those sections or to propose amendments”.

The fact is that the effect and scope of Clauses 3 to 5 are extremely unclear.

On legal certainty, the principles of the interpretation of EU law are ones with which UK lawyers and courts are, by now, very familiar; they are well settled as principles of the interpretation of UK statues as well. Removing those principles is likely to generate uncertainty and unintended consequences, in particular because quite a lot of those topics will have been the subject of considerable EU case law and removing them will create instability. The Government have not explained what the consequences of the removal of those principles will be on the various rules and protections concerned. I am very grateful to the Bar Council for its briefing, and, again, in its words:

“It is not a good idea to legislate when you have no idea what the consequence of that legislation will be.”


However, I am afraid that that is where we seem to be.

Under these clauses, there will be a retrospective effect to alter the position of domestic legislation, which could not have been foreseen by the domestic legislator at the time. That appears to be a very dubious thing to do. The rationale for retaining, for instance, the principle of the supremacy of EU law—a much misunderstood term; lawyers describe it better as a hierarchical rule—is legal certainty, because individuals and businesses will have taken decisions, sometimes far-reaching and involving significant investment, based on the law as it was. Removing that principle to give priority to any subsequent domestic legislation would mean that it would be impossible to say whether the consequence of removing the principle in any particular case would reduce the clarity of the law or change its effect. Even if it does not do those things, it will at least reduce certainty and lead to unpredicted—and perhaps undesirable or unjust—consequences.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am sorry if the noble Baroness believes that. We have debated the principle of the sunset. I accept that she presumably has a different position from mine, but I have stated the Government’s position on numerous occasions. The dashboard will continue to be updated as departments come to decisions on what they want to do with their stock of retained EU law.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, while it is in my mind, I am not sure the Minister answered my noble friend Lady Brinton’s question, which was, in citing the Delegated Powers Committee report, to ask what was the policy intention and to point out that the Bill is a blank sheet of paper as far as that is concerned. That is what is completely worrying us, because of its effect on the real world and the lack of any parliamentary grip on this process.

For him to say that Amendment 69A would involve the Law Commission in Government policy misrepresents the amendment—no doubt inadvertently—which talks about asking the Law Commission to report on,

“the effect of sections 3, 4 and 5 … on legal certainty, and the clarity and predictability of the law.”

That is surely within the purview of the Law Commission. That would not involve the Law Commission in policy. I fear that the Minister misrepresented Amendment 69A, perhaps in his enthusiasm.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

The Committee will be aware that I am not a fan of this Bill because it marginalises Parliament. Therefore, I was pleased to be able to put my name to and speak to the group of amendments beginning with Amendment 32, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane.

I have to say, as I said the other evening, that I sometimes find that we seem to be facing in all directions. I mentioned before about how one group of people were concerned to get clarity as soon as possible and therefore wanted to foreshorten the sunset clause. There were others who wanted to have time for consultation to bring people along and therefore lengthen the sunset clause. I never quite heard a serious reconciliation of those points of view.

I have to say that on this group of amendments, I have the same concern. I recognise that I am putting my head into not one legal lion’s mouth but several simultaneously, and I do so with due care, not being a lawyer. First, I note the emphasis on the importance attributed to certainty, clarity and predictability. That comes up in Amendment 85, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. It is referred to again in Amendments 86, 88 and 89. I get that: even I, as a non-lawyer, can see that certainty, clarity and predictability are quite important.

Then I look at some of the other amendments—Amendments 81, 90 and 92—and I see that we are changing “must” to “may”. As a non-lawyer, I feel that “must” to “may” does not increase predictability and clarity. Then, in Amendment 91, we have

“ought to be considered at that time”.

That seems to me, from the point of view of clarity and predictability, to run in completely the opposite direction. Where we had, in paragraph 4, on page 7, “a court must”, it is now “a court may”, and to the end of that is added

“and ought to be considered at that time”.

I am happy to be corrected because I am not a lawyer, but as a non-lawyer this seems to me to be running in both directions, and not to have the sort of clarity, predictability and certainty that I can quite understand. It seems to muddy waters that a previous series of amendments had sought to clarify.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 85 and 88, as a co-signatory of both those amendments, led by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who unfortunately cannot be here today. He has been kind enough to share his thinking with me.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

And his notes, by the look of it.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

And his notes, indeed, although any use I make of them is entirely down to me.

I want to start by reflecting that in the last group, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who is no longer in his place, rather airily dismissed a question from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who was seeking to find out what “domestic principles of interpretation” means. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, “Oh, it is quite clear: the courts know what ‘domestic principles of interpretation’ means”. Fine, we rely on the courts, as we do. I think it is an answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson: the courts know what they are doing, so if we use the word “may”, that is predictability, because the courts generally follow precedent and know what they are doing. If we tell them they “must” do something, that actually constrains them in a rather awkward and unpredictable way. That is my understanding, anyway. I found the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, masterful.

The Minister told us in discussing the last group that the courts know what they are doing, but in Clause 7 they are told what to do by the Government. As I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said, the drafting appeared to lack any litigation or judicial experience. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out—I cannot remember her exact words, but I interpret what she said—that she found it rather impertinent of the Government. I may be over-reading what I heard, but the courts know what they are doing and the Government come along and are prescriptive about what they are allowed to do. Arguably, Clause 7 is unnecessary, but the amendments seek at least to improve it. By the way, I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for pointing out that the amendments to Clause 7 are pretty complicated and convoluted, and it might have been better just to provide an alternative text to substitute a new Section 6 of the EU withdrawal Act, rather than making pages of amendments.

The fact is that the higher appeal courts are already not bound by retained EU case law and can depart from it if it is right to do so. This test is well established, having been set out in the House of Lords Practice Statement in 1966. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said, the Court of Appeal comprehensively considered the power to depart from retained EU case law in the case of TuneIn Inc v Warner Music UK. It considered various factors but decided not to depart from retained EU case law. You would get another impression from government explanations and commentary.

The courts in this case, and in other scenarios, have made comprehensive analyses and have given balanced reasons why and when the courts should or should not overturn settled case law. One of the things cited in that Court of Appeal case was the need to balance the need not to

“unduly restrict the proper development of the law”

with

“too rigid adherence to precedent.”

They are conducting that balancing exercise, but they drew particular attention to the special need for certainty in the law. Therefore, they gave legal certainty a particular value which must not be overlooked.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

I am listening carefully to what the noble Baroness is saying, but it has nothing to do with “predictable”. Everything she is saying about the way the law works is unpredictable because it depends on how the courts interpret it at the time. The idea that we are putting the emphasis on predictability in these amendments seems to me to be inaccurate.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I trust the courts; clearly, the noble Lord does not. I believe that the courts do know what they are doing, and that we have an extremely experienced and valuable judiciary. That is why, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, pointed out, lots of people come here to use the UK courts, particularly in London. The Government do not seem to have given any consideration to the fact that they are undermining the extremely valuable legal services that London sells to the world. They did not give consideration to service industries during Brexit generally, but this one brings in a lot of money for the UK economy and is being totally undermined, not least by this Bill.

Legal certainty was given a particular value by the Court of Appeal, but the Bill overlooks it, as many noble Lords have said, and detracts from the courts’ ability to do their job. In the notes from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out, I do have—he points out that Amendments 85 and 88 in his name are very moderate. Amendment 85 leaves intact the power of the courts to depart from retained EU case law, and Amendment 88 would retain domestic case law. They even leave intact the three factors the Government wish them to have regard to. The noble Lord says that he is persuaded, having seen Amendments 83, 84 and 87, that those factors—if they are to be kept—really need to be amended, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord Judge and Lord Thomas. The factors specified in the clause at present each militate in favour of departing from existing law. It seems to have been concluded that the judges require a powerful shove in the direction of the unknown. That is another seam of this Bill: we are jumping off a cliff edge and into a void.

All this is the antithesis, as has been said several times—the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who was interrupted at one point by the Government Front Bench, said how un-Conservative this Bill is. It requires leaps into voids and unknowns and off cliffs—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The noble Baroness is entirely right about the leap into the unknown. Does this not emphasise the point that members of the public cannot understand what the law is? That prejudices compliance and the ability of advisers to give good advice.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The noble Viscount is absolutely right, and I agreed with every word of his earlier contribution.

What the amendments do, instead having of a one-way impetus to the judges, is to introduce some balance to the exercise. Both these amendments would introduce two factors—they are repeated for the two scenarios—which might incline the judge in favour of caution:

“the consequences of disturbing a settled understanding of the law”

and

“the importance of legal certainty, clarity and predictability”.

The amendments give the judges more space for their judgment, which is—I am quoting the notes of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—“after all what judges are for”. What is the point of having judges if all they have to do is read the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill? Good luck with that.

Then the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, says of the quotation and reference in the Explanatory Notes to the Court of Appeal case of TuneIn Inc v Warner Music Ltd that “this, I am afraid, is disingenuous and I do hope the Minister will not repeat it from the Dispatch Box”. I am looking at the Minister—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy—and hoping that he does not do that, because TuneIn was a case in which the Court of Appeal decided not to depart from the jurisprudence of the CJEU for a number of reasons which were carefully enumerated. One decisive factor was that to

“return to the drawing board and start all over again … would create considerable legal uncertainty”.

So, the judges are stressing continuity, predictability, being able to weigh up factors and not being constrained. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, with respect, that he has got this wrong: if you say that the judges must do something and allow them to take into account only certain factors, it does not allow them to exercise their training and judgment. That is what we pay them for: to continue the law to provide the predictability that we need.

I finish by conveying that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, wanted to register his strong support for Amendments 90 to 93 in the names of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord Judge and Lord Thomas. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said: “They know a thing or two about the pressures of business in the highest courts, and this Bill is going to create a tsunami of business for lawyers. A sturdy floodgate is needed if those courts are not to be swamped, and these amendments provide one.” I respectfully recommend these amendments to the Committee.

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, your Lordships may have noticed that there is a rather cruder amendment in my name towards the end of this group: Amendment 99A. I am not a lawyer, but much of my life in politics and trade unionism and as a consumer champion has been defined by decisions of the British courts—some of the most important of which have been influenced by European law or by the judgments of the European courts. The advances we have made on equalities, employment rights, a number of consumer items and the environment, and indeed on issues such as intellectual property and digital protection and so forth, have been in large part—not entirely; I will not overstate the case—affected by European law, now called retained EU law, or the European courts’ own judgments which have been followed by the British courts.

In the exchange between the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—he is not here at the moment; I welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy—and the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said that the courts will go on interpreting cases as they have done from time immemorial. However, from time immemorial, the courts have interpreted the law on the basis of what is on the statute book at that time. They continue to do so until that law is changed by this Parliament. The implications of parts of Clause 7 are that that will no longer be the case; that the courts will need to have less regard to the types of cases that arose because they were influenced, at least in part, by European law; and that European decisions will not need to be held in the same regard in future. That is the purpose of Clause 7, which is why my amendment would delete it.

I largely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that it could be rewritten—we do need some guidance on case law—but this is taking it in entirely the wrong direction and destabilising what has, from time immemorial, been the basic role of the British courts in interpreting legislation. If the Government and Parliament change the law, that changes it; some of those cases no longer have the same effect as they do at the moment. However, if we take Clause 7 as it stands, we are undermining a number of improvements in the conditions of our people and, at the same time, undermining the credibility, consistency and historical role of our courts. I therefore suggest to the Government that they should remove this clause. If the Bill proceeds—noble Lords know that I am not in favour of it—the Government could come back with a rather more sensible Clause 7. However, as it presently stands, it is one that we ought to oppose root and branch.

The role of our legal system is being undermined by a political doctrine that has yet to find its way into the legislation and the statutory law of our land. That is a dangerous road that we should not go down; I therefore suggest that we remove Clause 7 and think again.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh for that intervention, and I stand corrected. She is completely right that Scotland is a mixed system, although I venture to suggest much influenced—if I may use that controversial word for a moment—by the common law. As I said a moment ago, Scottish judges have been, frankly, the best common lawyers anyone has ever known. They happen all to be called Reid but that is a coincidence.

Of course, I accept the comment, although I beg to differ as to whether any different conclusion follows. Essentially, the “may”, “must” and other amendments that the noble Baroness has proposed are independent of the exact legal approach one is talking about. It may well be that, in a Scottish situation, there would be a greater willingness not to disturb retained case law than in an English situation. I do not know; maybe these things will come up to the Supreme Court and someone will say “That is what we are going to do”. Maybe the Scottish tradition will prevail; that is perfectly likely. With respect, the Government do not feel that that changes the general thrust of Clause 7.

That was changes of circumstances. The next question is on this word “influence”—whether it has been influenced or determined by European law. I think “influenced” is included simply to give a sufficient degree of flexibility and to avoid deciding what might be quite a difficult point: whether European law was in fact determinative of a particular point or just part of the general context. Very often, it is part of the general context and the influence of the European element on the final outcome.

On that point—I am not sure we picked it up entirely; I may be speaking out of turn—I shall, if I may, at least attempt a reply to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on the question of principles of interpretation. I think it is relevant to the influence point. It arises in the context of legislation. Many here will know better than me, but the essential difference, as I understand it, is that traditional common law, including the Scottish approach, is a highly textual interpretation: what the meaning of the words is. The European Court’s general approach is a teleological interpretation of the general idea of where the statute is going. Very often, because of the laconic and sometimes completely deficient nature of European legislation, that court is much more prepared to fill in the gaps in the legislation than an English court would be. It is along those general lines; I am sure we can elaborate further as necessary later in these proceedings. So that is the influence point.

I think I have dealt with adding in the factors of settled understanding, legal certainty and so forth. The Government do not support that approach because it would simply bake in the status quo; that is the Government’s essential position. Legal certainty is inevitably something the courts will consider. They considered it in the Warner Music case because they were dealing with an international treaty and there was a desire not to disturb the law—albeit that the law was a right old muddle, as far as one can see, if I may put it colloquially just for a moment. In that case, it was not actually very seriously argued that we should depart from EU law; it was a perfunctory argument that took place in a few minutes at the end of the day, so it was a bit of a non-event.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise if I am interrupting the Minister before he has finished; I think he is replying to Amendments 85 and 88, although he did not specifically refer to them. He dismisses the need for the factors introduced in those amendments because he says the courts can have regard to them anyway. Why have the Government prescribed several elements themselves if the courts can have regard to them? Our whole argument is that the courts can have regard to factors they want to have regard to. The impetus behind Amendments 85 and 88 was that the Government were being partial and pushing in a certain direction for the three elements they will allow the courts to consider—the argument for adding the extra elements, the consequences of disturbing the settled understanding of the law and the importance of legal certainty, clarity and predictability—and to try to re-establish the balance that the authors of the amendments felt was lacking.

If I may say so, I find the Minister’s reply so far extremely puzzling. He has, correctly, given a paean of praise to our courts and the common law, saying that they have perfected the art of creating this mosaic—

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

I ask the noble Baroness to put her question to the Minister.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

We are getting to it.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Yes, I am getting to it. I want an explanation. I said the Minister’s reply was “puzzling” but, if I may say so, I want to say “contradictory” and “does not add up”. I want to press the Minister to clarify what he has said. I find it really quite irritating that Ministers keep interrupting us when we are trying to say something. The fact is that the Minister has praised our common-law courts and said they have not been inhibited in the proper development of the law and so on, but now he wants—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

May I finish?

[The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True)]

My Lords, at the previous stage I reminded the House, I thought courteously, of chapter 4.29 of the Companion, where it is made perfectly clear that lengthy and frequent interventions are not desirable, whether or not the Minister accepts them. This is Committee. The noble Baroness can return with a reasoned response to what the Minister has said, but I think it is to the advantage of the House generally in our debates to hear the Minister’s arguments and then respond in a proper Committee manner. If I may, the noble Baroness’s intervention seemed to me to be getting into the category of “lengthy”.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

If I may be permitted to finish, I have now had three interventions from the Government Front Bench, which of course have lengthened this intervention. I ask the Minister please to explain how his paean of praise to our courts and their ability to develop the common law without inhibition accords with the constraints and straitjackets the Bill is putting on the courts he is praising.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government’s position is that this is not a straitjacket. The courts are required to look at three things: the fact that the retained EU case law is made by a different court, whether there has been a relevant change of circumstances, and how the proper development of the common law should continue in future.

As to why we have not included other considerations—notably, legal certainty—the Government’s position, which noble Lords may or may not agree with but this is the explanation, is that once you write down the importance of legal certainty, that is potentially a recipe for passively doing nothing and continuing to be a rule taker for 20 years to come. That is not the consequence of withdrawing from the EU. The courts can continue to look at it, but that is the reason why the Government have drafted Clause 7 as it is.

I hope I have dealt with most of the issues raised about Clause 7 one way or another. There is the reference procedure, and noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, have made the point that higher courts always have the discretion whether to take a case, and they should be able to decline it. I completely understand that point. The Government had thought that the ability of those superior courts—the higher courts or the Supreme Court—to decide whether what they were being asked to do was relevant and whether the point raised was of general public importance was sufficient protection and would enable them to decline to hear the case if that were so. I must say that the circumstances in which a lower court actually gets as far as making a reference and identifying a point of public importance that a superior court feels it should not hear seem to me, if I may say so, somewhat remote, but we can have another look at the drafting if there is a need for further reassurance. I cannot commit to changing it, but I can commit to looking at it and discussing it with the relevant persons.

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This is based on a recommendation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report on the Bill.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will move the Motion, in the name of my noble friend Lord Fox, that Clause 10 do not stand part of the Bill. I am relying on the persuasive report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which points out that the powers in Clause 10 to amend retained direct EU legislation affect over 50% of retained EU law, because 50% is retained direct EU legislation. At present, much of this can be amended only by primary legislation or Henry VIII powers. So Clause 10 in fact downgrades the status of retained direct EU legislation.

The DPRRC quotes the delegated powers memorandum from the Government, which says that they are doing this so that such law

“can be amended by ordinary powers to amend secondary legislation”

to “save parliamentary time”. As the committee remarks, perhaps somewhat caustically,

“the argument based on saving parliamentary time is unpersuasive. It should be for Parliament to say what is the best use of its time.”

So it seems a little forward of the Government to make that assertion on behalf of Parliament.

However, as the committee points out, retained direct EU legislation

“has a special status because much of it is of considerable significance in policy terms”.

Therefore, it is necessary for Parliament to keep control of which elements of the law to keep, amend or repeal. The committee says:

“Clause 10 … is an unacceptable interference with the position in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that substantial policy changes should be for Parliament to decide in primary legislation rather than for Ministers to decide in secondary legislation.”


We have made that point repeatedly during the proceedings on the Bill. The Government broke a pledge. When the EU withdrawal Act went through, we were repeatedly assured that it would be for Parliament to make decisions about what retained EU law to amend and how to do so. But then the Bill comes along, and they do not even admit that this is a complete switch of approach and a grabbing back of powers for the Executive—but that is what it is.

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Whereas I want to hold the Government to account for the problems with the Bill, my nervousness is that it feels mired in politics. So I cannot get away from the feeling that any delays or tactics that say, “Can we not just wait a bit longer?”, let the Government off the hook. The Government should have got on with this a lot longer ago rather than having to rush it through now. But I think any delays are likely to cause real cynicism outside this place. But the Government do need to reassure me—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I just wanted to say to the noble Baroness—and I probably will not go into lawmaking in the EU, as the noble Baroness was an MEP herself—that to say that lawmaking in Brussels is not democratic is, to my mind, ridiculous.

I particularly want to address her assertion that objections to this Bill are mired in politics. Had she been here, as I have, through the entire four days—now nearly four and a half—on this Bill, she would know that across the House the objections have been because it is an Executive power grab. Almost no reference has been made to the Brexit referendum or the policy of Brexit. It is about the way that the Bill is constructed and the power that the Government are concentrating in themselves. It is a question of the rights of Parliament and the type of governance we are objecting to. It is not political in that sense. The objections to this Bill are constitutional.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I appreciate that I have not been in the Chamber for all of that time, although I have been here a fair few hours, one way and another, and I have read everything that was said in previous discussions. I do not feel as though I am just wandering in to make this point.

I have also talked to people outside this House about their understanding of this discussion and I am trying to draw attention to that—

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)]

The Question is that Clause 10 stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I believe I have a right to reply; I have been corrected so many times today that I do not know what my rights are nowadays.

The Minister seems to believe that robust parliamentary scrutiny is enshrined in a sifting, negative procedure power. I do not agree, I am afraid. Parliament is being sidelined in this Bill. Indeed, I wonder when this radical, revolutionary, un-Conservative Government will seek to abolish Parliament.

On the assertion that the UK Parliament had no real say in EU law, that is the nature of the organisation. Law is made at the level at which it is considered, obviously. However—I made this point at Second Reading—some Parliaments in the EU, notably the Danish one, kept their Ministers on a tight leash. Ministers went to the Council of Ministers from the UK Parliament; if they did not represent the views of the UK Parliament, we have to look at them and their record. The UK Parliament could have done the kind of scrutiny and accountability exercises that the Danish Parliament notably did; if it did not do so, that is the fault not of the EU but of the UK Parliament.