Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not want to disappoint anybody, but I am not my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint; it would not be a very convincing impersonation, not least because he is sitting next to me. Noble Lords will all have the pleasure of hearing from him later on.

This Bill reflects not only our manifesto commitments but demonstrates the careful stocktake we have made of the important parts of our criminal justice system and our determination to improve the law where needed. It aims to keep citizens safer and more confident in the daily lives of all of us and I am proud of our proposals. They are fair, proportionate and add to the law where needed.

As part of the Bill’s driving force, which is to make people and communities safer, it will build on what we have done already in the past year to rebuild neighbourhood policing. We are restoring public trust in the criminal justice system through the delivery of our safer streets mission and aim to halve—yes, halve—knife crime and violence against women and girls in a decade.

For too long, neighbourhood policing has been neglected and downgraded. That has ended. We are already delivering on our commitments, with 13,000 additional neighbourhood policing personnel by the end of the Parliament, backed by £200 million in new funding this year. Alongside this investment, the Bill brings in new respect orders to tackle persistent offenders who engage in the anti-social behaviour that blights our town centres. There are also enhanced powers to tackle the anti-social use of cars and off-road bikes. The police will now be able to seize these without first having to give a warning.

Everyone should feel safe when they are at work. This Bill delivers stronger action to protect shop workers. Assaulting a shop worker will be a bespoke criminal offence with a presumption that the courts will, on conviction, impose a criminal behaviour order on offenders. We are also repealing the provision that treats low-value shop theft as a minor offence. Shoplifting is not minor, and we are sending a clear message that all shop theft should be taken seriously. I know both these measures will be particularly welcomed by the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.

Part 2 of the Bill brings in Ronan’s law. We are clamping down on dangerous knives and weapons on our streets by introducing a duty on retailers to report bulk sales of knives and offensive weapons, increasing the maximum penalty for offences relating to the sale of knives to children and strengthening the age-verification requirements for the online sale and delivery of bladed products and crossbows. We are also delivering on our manifesto commitment to hold senior managers of online platforms personally liable for failure to take action to remove illegal content relating to knives and offensive weapons.

I turn now to violence against women and children. The prevalence of violence and abuse against women and children defiles our society. We need more effective enforcement action against perpetrators and better protection for victims. To this end, the Bill strengthens stalking protection orders and the management of registered sex offenders, including preventing them changing their names on official identity documents where they pose a risk of sexual harm.

The Bill also creates a new offence of administering a harmful substance, including by spiking, to make it absolutely clear that such behaviour is illegal and encourage victims to report such incidents.

Recognising how dangerous online material is in perpetuating the growing epidemic of violence against women and girls, we will bring forward amendments in your Lordships’ House to criminalise pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her tireless work culminating in the pornography review which recommended that action be taken in this area.

Child sexual abuse and exploitation are among the most despicable crimes imaginable. It is estimated that half a million children every year experience some form of child sexual abuse. Alongside the new national inquiry recommended by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, we are pleased to be pressing ahead with the implementation of some of the key recommendations of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.

As a result, the Bill creates a new duty to report child sexual abuse, backed up by strong criminal sanctions for those who seek to cover up such abuse by preventing or deterring a person from carrying out the duty. It makes grooming a statutory aggravating factor when sentencing and removes the three-year time limit for civil personal injury claims brought by victims and survivors of child sexual abuse.

Part 5 of the Bill also helps to tackle the rising levels of online child sexual abuse. In particular, the Bill provides for new criminal offences to stop—and we mean stop—AI-facilitated child sexual abuse and hold accountable those who commit or enable these vile crimes. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her earlier advocacy of the new child sexual abuse image-generator offence.

The Bill also provides enhanced protections for children and vulnerable adults against their exploitation for criminal purposes. First, it provides for a new offence of child criminal exploitation, where an adult intentionally uses a child to commit criminal activity. To complement this new offence, the Bill also provides for child criminal exploitation prevention orders to help prevent the criminal exploitation of children occurring. Secondly, the Bill introduces a new offence to tackle the practice of cuckooing, where criminals take over the home of a vulnerable person for the purpose of illegal activity, such as drug dealing. Thirdly, the Bill creates a new offence to combat coerced internal concealment, or plugging, where children or vulnerable adults are coerced into concealing drugs or other items in their body for criminal purposes, typically as part of a county lines operation.

We also recognise how dangerous online material is in perpetuating the growing epidemic of violence against women and girls. We committed in the other place to criminalising pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation in this Bill, and we will shortly bring forward an amendment to that effect.

I turn now to children who are victims of child sexual abuse. As noble Lords will be aware, 10 years ago the Street Offences Act 1959 was amended so that the offences of persistent loitering or soliciting in a public place for the purposes of prostitution no longer applied to children. Parliament was right to do that because it recognised that children, because they are children, involved in such conduct are not criminals but the victims of sexual exploitation. I am pleased to say that we will bring forward amendments in this House to introduce a new disregards and pardons scheme for anyone convicted or cautioned as a child for these offences.

I now turn to policing. We will address the need to rebuild trust in policing. In some serious and worrying cases, public confidence has been undermined by atrocious criminality and misconduct by a very small minority of officers. Deterrence and punishment of such misconduct is a priority for this Government, as it is for the police. A key strand of the Government’s safer streets mission is to increase public confidence in policing and the wider criminal justice system.

Since 2017, the College of Policing has operated a police barred list—an advisory list which ensure that those officers who are dismissed by a police force in England and Wales are prevented from just joining another force. Such individuals have no place in policing. The Bill extends this approach, ensuring that officers dismissed at disciplinary proceedings from the National Crime Agency and other specialist police forces cannot be re-employed by another force.

It is vital that the system of police accountability commands the confidence of both the public and the police. As a society we rely on the professionalism and bravery of firearms officers who put their own lives at risk to keep us all safe. Thankfully, the occasions where the police have to use lethal force in this country are few and far between. When they do so, it is entirely right that officers are accountable for their actions. But those accountability arrangements must be proportionate, timely and fair to all concerned. Regrettably, this is not currently the case. Measures proposed in the Bill will improve the timeliness and appropriateness of investigations by the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the rights of victims. That said, if firearms officers are charged with offences relating to and committed during their duties, the Bill will protect them from violent reprisals by establishing a presumption of anonymity in criminal proceedings up to the point of sentence.

The public rightly want to see crimes solved and offenders brought to justice. To do this, the police must have the necessary tools to do their job. If someone has their mobile phone stolen and the victim can trace its whereabouts, the Bill ensures that the police have the powers to enter premises quickly and, if necessary, without a warrant, to recover electronically tracked stolen goods.

It is also vital that police powers keep in step with the march of technology in other respects. Evidence of criminality is no longer routinely stored on a computer hard drive; it is instead held remotely in the cloud. The Bill clarifies the circumstances in which law enforcement agencies can access such information, subject to strong safeguards, as they investigate offences ranging from child sexual abuse to fraud and terrorism, thereby protecting the public and our borders.

The Bill also ensures that law enforcement agencies have the necessary powers to combat other forms of technology-enabled crime. We are banning the possession and supply of SIM farms, save where there are legitimate uses such as in broadcasting. We are giving the police and others the power to suspend IP addresses and domain names used to commit fraud or other serious crimes, such as the so-called pimping websites involved in commercial sexual exploitation.

I turn to protests. The right to peaceful protest is fundamental to our vibrant democracy, but in facilitating peaceful protest, the police also have a duty to uphold the rights of others not to be harassed or intimidated and to go about their daily lives without serious disruption. The Bill ensures that the police have the powers they need to protect places of worship from intimidatory protests and protects specified war and other memorials, including the Cenotaph and the statue of Winston Churchill in Parliament Square, that have been the target of protest action. A new targeted offence of concealing identity at designated protests will strengthen police powers to require the removal of face coverings at protests where violence or other criminality either has occurred or is likely to occur.

The precious right to engage in peaceful protest and the equally precious entitlement to freedom of speech do not extend to threatening or abusing others, all the more so where those threatened or abused are emergency workers. The law already recognises that racially or religiously motivated threats and abuse should attract tougher penalties, but these currently do not apply where the behaviour takes place in a person’s private home. When the police, firefighters and ambulance staff attend someone’s home— for example, in response to a 999 call—they have no choice but to remain and to act. The Bill closes the loophole in the law so that anyone who threatens or abuses an emergency worker because of their race or religion within a private dwelling will be liable for the higher maximum penalties such hate crimes would attract where the conduct took place in a public place.

I now turn to counterterrorism. We must also make sure that counterterrorism powers reflect evolving threats, ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to keep the public safe. Part 14 of the Bill delivers on several recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. He has identified the need for a new diversion order in response to the increasing number of young people who are the subject of counterterrorism investigations. The youth diversion order provided for in Part 14 will be a new civil order that will enable the police to intervene earlier to prevent young people engaging in terrorism and divert them from the criminal justice system.

Finally, in addition to the three new measures that the Government will seek to add to the Bill to which I have already referred, we will table amendments to apply various further provisions in the Bill to Scotland and/or Northern Ireland. These amendments are being brought forward at the request of the Scottish Government and the relevant Northern Ireland departments.

This Government were elected to deliver change: change that will reverse the decline in neighbourhood policing; change that will tackle the epidemic of violence against women and girls and the epidemic of knife crime. The Bill will help deliver that change by cracking down on anti-social behaviour, making our town centres safer, building trust in the police, clearing our streets of knives, protecting our children from sexual abuse, criminal exploitation and online harms, and safeguarding women and girls from stalkers and sexual predators. These are the purposes behind this Bill. I beg to move.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 17th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, everyone is concerned about gang activity. The dark web means it has never been easier for people to source and buy drugs independently, contributing to the emergence of more loosely organised micro-gangs, as once an individual has a large supply of illicit drugs, they need to recruit others to help distribute them. I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the tabled amendments.

On Amendment 51 on graffiti, I entirely agree with some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that this usually relates to gangs marking territory or expressing group affiliation. It can result in public spaces feeling unsafe, and the fear is that it could fuel turf wars between rival gangs. To many it is also an unsightly nuisance, with the clean-up cost high for home owners, businesses and local authorities. However, we remain unconvinced that this amendment is the way forward.

Graffiti without the property owner’s permission is already a criminal offence, classified as vandalism or criminal damage, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. I am also concerned that measures such as this risk embedding racial bias in law enforcement and disproportionately affecting minority and marginalised communities. The courts have already found that using graffiti as a marker of gang identity can result in the unjust targeting of marginalised groups, especially people of colour.

In 2022 a legal ruling forced the Metropolitan Police to admit that the operation of its gangs matrix was unlawful, breached human rights and had a disproportionate impact on black people. The matrix used factors, including graffiti, to label people as gang members, leading to life-changing consequences for those who had been wrongly included. Over 1,000 individuals assessed as low risk subsequently had to be removed from the database. This demonstrates the danger of conflating graffiti, gangs and criminality. While I understand the intention behind this amendment, the risk of unintended consequences is clear.

The definition of a gang in Amendment 52 feels worryingly broad, so we cannot support it. As drafted, it raises significant concerns that outweigh its intended benefits. Prosecutors are already cautioned not to use the term “gang” without clear evidence because, used inappropriately, it can unfairly broaden liability for an individual’s offending while disproportionately affecting ethnic minorities.

This proposal also feels overly prescriptive. It is important that the courts retain discretion and the law allows for nuanced sentencing; for example, when someone was plainly being coerced, groomed or manipulated into gang activity.

On these Benches, we believe that sentencing must account for individual circumstances and be based on specific individual criminal behaviour. Simply being in with the wrong people is not the same thing.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, for tabling Amendments 51 and 52. These amendments are proposed and supported by three Members of your Lordships’ House who, between them, have considerable experience in what might loosely be called the law and order space. They are, in rugby terms, a formidable front row and, as such, I have considered what they proposed with care.

I reassure the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Blencathra, and indeed your Lordships’ House, that this Government are definitely against gangs and absolutely against graffiti. That said, we do not believe that these proposals are needed, primarily because the activities criminalised in these measures are already covered by existing legislation.

The intended effect of Amendment 51 is to criminalise the kind of graffiti which gangs use to mark what they feel is their territory and/or to threaten rival groups with violence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, this criminal behaviour is already covered by the existing offence contained within Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Section 1 is broad enough to cover graffiti because case law establishes that the damage does not have to be permanent, and it catches behaviour such as using water-soluble paint on a pavement or smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. In addition, Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act has a higher maximum penalty than the proposed new offence, being punishable in the Crown Court by a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.

Not only is the proposed offence not needed, there are very real problems with the structure of what is proposed; I will mention three, but there are others. First, this amendment creates an offence of strict liability. That means that the prosecution is not required to prove intention, recklessness or even knowledge. The result is a criminal offence which could be committed by accident. The criminal law does not like strict liability offences, and they are very rare in our jurisprudence. The reason is simple: we do not usually criminalise people who are not even aware that they were doing anything wrong.

Secondly, whatever the intention behind the drafting of this proposed criminal offence, in the way it is drafted, the definition of “gang” is so broad that it would capture both the Brownies and the Church of England, as well as football teams, drama societies and many other groups not normally regarded as criminal. I do not think that the noble Lords intend that a Christian cross chalked on a fence could potentially be prosecuted as a criminal offence.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I apologise for standing up a bit late but I want to go back to an earlier comment that graffiti could happen by accident. How on earth can graffiti artists spray a wall with gang tags by accident?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The difficulty is that if somebody were to put something on a fence, for example, and they were not aware that this was associated with a gang, they would potentially be criminalised by it.

Thirdly, the requirements of the proposed new offence mean that expert evidence would need to be adduced in order that the jury or magistrates could decide whether the prosecution had proved to the criminal standard—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—whether the graffiti is gang-related within the meaning of the section. Most judges, magistrates and juries are unlikely to understand the significance of particular names, symbols or tags—this is not just the Sharks and the Jets that we are talking about, but rather most abstruse versions. Then the requirement that a trial be fair would require that the defence would also have to be able to instruct an expert, usually at public expense. Your Lordships’ House is well aware of the difficulties the criminal courts already have with delay. The idea that these existing challenges should be added to by numerous “battle of the expert” trials about graffiti is as unpalatable as it is unnecessary, given that the conduct is already captured by the Criminal Damage Act.

Amendment 52 seeks to make gang involvement a statutory aggravating factor in the sentencing for any criminal offence; thus, it is very wide indeed. The definition of “gang” is once again so broad that it would capture a number of wholly innocuous groups, and this is not a mere drafting issue. It encapsulates the fundamental problem with this provision, which is the difficulty of defining the conduct which it seeks to condemn with sufficient precision to make it workable. Again, evidence might be needed at the sentencing stage.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled this notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill, to correct what has become serious misinformation. By way of background, Clause 39 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That section was inserted into the 1980 Act by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 provides that where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence where the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will only be heard before magistrates’ courts and will not go before the Crown Court. This alteration has become the subject of significant misinformation, largely perpetuated by the party in government. In the 2024 election manifesto, it claimed that this had created

“effective immunity for some shoplifting”

and the Government’s policy paper in the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”. This, of course, is absolutely false. There is no immunity in any form for any shoplifting offences. Allowing an offence to be tried only in a magistrates’ court does not give anyone immunity.

The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for sentencing a person guilty of theft from a shop state that the starting point for low-value shoplifting, with little additional harm to the victim, is a “high-level community order”, with the maximum being a 12-week custodial sentence. For low-value shoplifting, with significant additional harm to the victim, the starting point is 12 weeks’ custody and the maximum is 26 weeks’ custody. It is clear, then, that magistrates’ courts can impose community orders and terms of imprisonment on offenders found guilty of low-value shoplifting. If the Government believe that is immunity, they clearly need to have a serious rethink. I therefore ask the Minister why the Government are making this change, since there is absolutely not immunity for low-value shoplifting. What can they possibly hope that this will achieve?

The reality is that Clause 39 is purely performative. Worse than that, it is performative politics with negative ramifications. Where an offence is triable either way, it is up to the magistrates’ court and the defendant to decide which court finally hears the case. If the magistrates’ court deems itself to have sufficient powers to try the case, a defendant is able to elect the court that their case will be heard by. Are we seriously saying that we will be permitting a person charged with stealing £50-worth of chocolate to be hauled in front of a Crown Court judge and jury? In such a scenario, the most likely sentence would be a community order for a few months’ imprisonment: that sentence would likely be the same whether the case was tried in a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.

Why enable the possibility for a person charged with low-value shoplifting to elect to go to a Crown Court, simply for them to be handed the same sentence they could have been given in the magistrates’ court? There are around 73,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard by the Crown Courts. Many people are waiting years for their case to be heard. The last thing we need now is for more minor offences to be sent to the Crown Courts, adding to their already sizable backlog. This is not a solution to shoplifting. It is simply another way for a defendant to string out their proceedings. Permitting low-value shoplifting to be tried only summarily does not give shoplifters immunity but will serve only to clog up our already stretched Crown Courts.

What does create an effective immunity for shoplifting is the Government’s Sentencing Bill. Noble Lords will know that the Bill creates the presumption that a custodial sentence of less than 12 months be suspended. Even if a person is given a custodial sentence for low-value shoplifting, they will not serve any time in prison. If that does not give would-be shoplifters more incentive to steal, I do not know what does. Clause 39 is pointless and performative, and would be damaging to the swift passage of justice.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the intention of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but we firmly believe that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. There is one thing that we can all agree on: shop theft has risen at any alarming rate in recent years. It is a blight on our society; it causes loss and distress to retailers and it undermines the safety of retail spaces.

This Government are committed to restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, and to protecting businesses from escalating losses. The latest figures from the Office for National Statistics are stark. Shoplifting almost doubled over the past five years, increasing to 530,643 cases in 2025. While multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences, and some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised.

The noble Lord is right that Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act converted theft of goods worth £200 or less from shops to being tried summarily. I completely understand that the argument of the previous Government was that this would increase efficiency by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft and keeping the cases in the magistrates’ court, but it has not worked. Instead, it is not that there is immunity, but there is a perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. My noble friend Lord Hannett referred to this in relation to the previous group of amendments.

Clause 39 will rectify this, and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so; they think it is a waste of time, because they believe that the police will not do anything. The underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable.

We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge, and Clause 39 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously. By removing the financial threshold for so-called low-value shop theft, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime is not going to be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are also making it clear to the retailers that we take this crime seriously, and they should feel encouraged to report it.

I acknowledge the concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that by making shop theft triable either way there is scope for some cases to end up in the Crown Court. However, there are two reasons why the noble Lord does not need to worry about this. The first is that Sir Brian Leveson highlighted in his independent review that the risk is mitigated by the existing sentencing guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate. This means that, in practice, the vast majority of such cases fall well within magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be committed to the Crown Court, for either trial or sentence. We anticipate that the effect on the backlog will be negligible. Secondly, as far as defendants electing trial in the Crown Court is concerned, they already have the ability to do this in relation to the so-called summary only offence. In practice, elections occur only in marginal numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that Clause 39 will change this.

I urge the noble Lord to join us in sending this very clear message—we entirely accept it was always the intention of the previous Government not to decriminalise this—to make it clear to everybody what a serious offence this is. I hope that he is willing to withdraw his opposition to Clause 39 standing part.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am, however, very disappointed by her continued defence of Clause 39. It is absolutely clear that the changes made by the previous Government do not create effective immunity for low-value shoplifting. All shoplifting offences are able to be tried in a magistrates’ court, where the court can impose a custodial sentence if necessary. Drink-driving offences are tried summarily only. I do not see the Government proposing to make that offence triable either way.

The fundamental point is that this change will not help anyone. It will not deter shoplifters. I hardly think a potential shoplifter will suddenly decide to stop because he might be tried in a Crown Court as opposed to a magistrates’ court. It will simply increase the Crown Court backlog without any benefit. This is a matter that I am sure we will return to on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on the noble Lord’s Amendment 215, I have great sympathy for its suggestions. Electronic monitoring can certainly play a useful role, although there is mixed evidence of its ability to reduce reoffending. However, there are multiple challenges in implementation, including inconsistent use by probation services, delays in procuring new GPS tags and gaps in responding promptly to breaches. However, my main problem is that, from a policing perspective, I worry there is no slack available in police time to monitor curfews, exclusion orders or electronic tagging. I fear it may be counterproductive to give the police yet more work when they are having great difficulty coping with what they already have.

I have a similar reservation about Amendment 216, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. In principle, I would support a code of practice to improve enforcement. However, in the absence of more police resources, the danger is that this would only exacerbate the current situation, where chief constables are faced with having to rob Peter to pay Paul in other areas of policing, and victims of other crimes would likely suffer as a consequence.

I would stress prevention over cure. I draw the Committee’s and the Minister’s attention to a West Midlands Police programme that diverts repeat low-level shoplifters into services like drug rehabilitation. Since its pilot in 2018, it has been credited with saving local businesses an estimated £2.3 million through reduced shoplifting. Surely this is something we ought at least to investigate.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendments 215 and 216 respectively. I have great respect for both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. The noble Baroness’s background means that she knows more than most about the corrosive experience of shoplifting and the effect it can have on those working in the retail industry. The noble Lord’s distinguished career as a police officer gives him great authority to speak about the challenges to police forces and their obligations to society that they should be fulfilling. I reassure both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that we are all on the same side on this. This is one of these situations where I am very keen to work with Members from all sides of your Lordships’ Committee to ensure that we deal with this social and economic menace efficiently and effectively.

On Amendment 215, I will repeat what I said a few moments ago: this Government take repeat and prolific offending extremely seriously. However, sentencing in individual cases must be a matter for our independent judiciary, and it must take into account all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the statutory purposes of sentencing. Your Lordships will, of course, be aware that the courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders.

As some of your Lordships may be aware, until relatively recently I was a judge in the Crown Court, and I sentenced my fair share of shoplifters. There was a complete spectrum of those offenders, from the destitute, homeless young mother stealing nappies for her baby at one end to the shameless, organised shoplifting gangs who terrify and terrorise shop workers. As the sentencing judge, there was a toolbox of disposals of increasing seriousness available to me, so that I could match the appropriate sentence to the offender on a case-by-case basis. These included discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences with requirements and custodial sentences where appropriate.

Previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor, with the sentencing guidelines making it clear that, when determining the sentence, sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions and the time elapsed since the previous conviction. But that repeats what is, in fact, common sense and what every sentencer knows. From my own experience, I can tell the Committee that the more frequently a defendant appears before the court, having gone out and done exactly the same thing that he or she had just been sentenced for, the more exasperated the judge becomes, who then starts imposing tougher and tougher sentences.

Despite the popular caricatures, judges do live in the real world. While sentencing a shoplifter to prison as a standard proposition will seem harsh, it can and does happen if the court concludes that there is no other way of stopping them. Importantly, this Government will introduce a whole range of options that will ramp up the community and suspended sentence powers for judges. In other words, the toolbox is getting fancier and more extensive.

As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, sentencers are already able to impose a robust range of electronic monitoring requirements on anyone serving their sentence in the community. Where the court imposes curfews, exclusion zones and/or an alcohol ban, offenders must be electronically monitored, subject to individual suitability. I note the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the effect on police resources. However, quite a lot of the monitoring is done by the Probation Service. As the noble Baroness is probably aware, the Government are putting a lot of additional resources back into the Probation Service to enable it to do this.

Soon judges will be able to add driving bans and bans on offenders attending pubs, bars, clubs and desirable social activities like sports and concerts, as well as some tough new geographical restriction zones, to the existing tools.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I love that the Minister said that judges will be able to do that. Will she use the new powers, which I think the Attorney-General is taking, to overrule the Sentencing Council if it tries to dilute those powers?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

This is probably not the moment for me to embark on that one. This, of course, is simply about agreeing with the Sentencing Council’s guidelines in individual cases, not overriding them. I am confident that agreement will be reached, but, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, perhaps that is one I will deal with another day.

We are also about to expand the intensive supervision courts to deal with the root causes of these crimes by making repeat offenders come back in front of the same judge on regular occasions to see how they are doing. That is what is going to be available to judges.

Let us look at the other side of the coin for a moment. Many shoplifters have complicated backgrounds and complex needs, and sometimes electronic monitoring may not be an appropriate requirement to add to an offender’s sentence, even if this is their third or more offence. Many prolific offenders are homeless and lead chaotic lives. Even getting them to turn up to court on time can be a significant challenge. Imposing an electronic monitoring requirement in some of these cases would be setting the defendant up to fail instead of helping to improve the outcome for the perpetrators and victims of crime and the public at large. It is all entirely case specific, and the judge is the right person to make that decision.

I am proud of our judiciary, which is working hard under very difficult circumstances at the moment, and I am asking noble Lords to trust our magnificent judges, because they do understand the problems that repeat shoplifting can cause and they understand the powers available to them to sentence individual offenders appropriately. This measure would put unnecessary constraints on them and make an already difficult job harder. I can also assure noble Lords that we are continuing to work with cross-government partners and police forces to consider new ways of targeting and tackling persistent and prolific offenders.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her courtesy and the depth of her reply, but I am not quite sure how we solve the £200 problem. The points she made about enforcement are very good ones, but the difficulty is this belief that if you steal something worth less than £200, nothing will happen to you; thus my parallel with San Francisco. What are we going to do about that?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The first thing we want to do is Clause 39, which, of course, was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But in addition, this is about making it clear to everybody that it really does matter, and driving it through to the police that there should be no immunities—that there are no levels below to which this should not apply.

For all these reasons, I do believe these amendments are not required, but I would be very happy to discuss the matters further with both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and I encourage them to speak with me if they feel there are matters that I have not fully taken into account. But, for now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her kind offer.

The amendment of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe focuses on enforcement. If the police do not investigate theft, if they do not take measures to deter and prevent shoplifting, no amount of legislation will change that. Creating a code of practice for low-value shoplifting could be a step in the right direction. Together with my Amendment 215—and I am grateful, I think, for the implied support of the Liberal Democrats—these measures target enforcement and punishment. This is in stark contrast to what the Government are proposing in Clause 39. The effective immunity for shoplifters comes from the inability of the police to catch those who shoplift. It is an issue of enforcement and investigation, which in turn all comes back to police funding and officer numbers—a point made by the noble Baroness Lady Doocey. Better enforcement is what will drive down shoplifting offence rates, not putting those cases before Crown Court judges. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I add my voice to what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The fundamental principle is set out in new Section 11ZB(2): if the defendant cannot have a fair trial, the hearing cannot proceed. The gravity of the allegations and the public interest demand that there be no hearing, notwithstanding the damage that this causes to the unfortunate alleged victim. I entirely agree that new Section 11ZB(3) confuses the position; it introduces uncertain concepts and will inevitably lead to unhelpful litigation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 289, I thank my noble friend Lady Royall, who is not in her place today because she is ill, and Mr Stephen Bernard, both of whom met me recently. We discussed both the impact of the limitation period on victims and survivors of child sexual abuse and their concern over the test of substantial prejudice within this clause. I was moved by what Mr Bernard told me and I thank him for his courage in telling me about what happened to him.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for moving Amendment 289. I hope both my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Lord will be reassured that I fully understand the sentiment behind the amendment. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, for welcoming the general spirit of the clause and for their constructive comments. I make it clear that we absolutely do not want to add additional or unnecessary barriers to stop victims of child sexual abuse from proceeding with their civil claims. So I have asked my officials to look closely at the issues this amendment raises for further consideration, and I aim to provide a further update to your Lordships on Report.

Turning to the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to Clause 82 standing part of the Bill, I think he is well known for being very expert in this area and I pay tribute to that. But Clause 82 implements important recommendations made by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. The noble Lord raised concerns during Second Reading and again during this debate that the reform is unnecessary and would lead to greater uncertainty and litigation, but, with respect, I disagree. The inquiry looked at this in great detail. It found that the limitation period for civil claims itself acted as a deterrent to victims and survivors—just the very fact that it existed. The inquiry also found that it acted as a deterrent irrespective of the existence of the discretion in Section 33, and the inquiry therefore found that Section 33 did not provide sufficient protection for victims and survivors.

The inquiry found that the regime acted as a barrier to claimants at three stages: first, solicitors’ willingness to take on claims, because it can make it really hard for them to find a lawyer to represent them; secondly, the settlement and valuation of claims, because it can lead to victims accepting lower settlements because of uncertainty about the limitation issue; and, thirdly, the hearings themselves in relation to the limitation period, the effect of which on the claimants was described as “intrusive and traumatic”.

I think the noble Lord will find that it was not this Government who said they were not in favour of these recommendations; it was actually the previous Government. This Government accepted the recommendation in February of this year and are satisfied that Clause 82 is necessary and proportionate. The courts are perfectly capable, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, of deciding when a claim is inappropriate or unfair and should not succeed. This Government and my department put victims at the heart of everything we do. This is why we believe that this reform is necessary and important for victims and survivors. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment and I hope the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 82.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

The noble Baroness is quite right that the response to IICSA came from the previous Government. It was written by the Ministry of Justice and signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. While not in any way undermining his contribution to whatever was produced, I suspect that it was the work of government lawyers, approved by him. It was a careful study of the law by reference to, for example, the operation of Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. IICSA was not a Law Commission or law reform body, and it covered a huge area of inquisition. It had to cover so many areas that many people doubted whether it had any utility. I am not suggesting that, but it was not primarily concerned with civil claims as such. What I would like to ask the noble Baroness is this: Section 33 has been in operation since 1980. I can tell her, and I am sure she will accept from me, that it is used a great deal by many claimants represented by firms of solicitors. Very often, limitation is not even considered, because as she quite rightly says, very often somebody will delay a considerable time before bringing a claim, and quite rightly so. But why, I ask, is she satisfied, given the wideness of the discretion, that Section 33 does not work as it is?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is no answer to say that another Government considered it carefully: different Governments have different priorities. I am not sure that that is going to come as a great surprise to the noble Lord. As for Section 33, this Government are satisfied that it does not provide sufficient protection.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief in my response. As I say, this was a probing amendment, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. I thank the Minister for her clarification. I am content with the Government’s assurances, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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In conclusion, these amendments do not target free expression; they target exploitation. They would not restrict lawful adult behaviour; they would restrict the depiction and monetisation of criminal acts. They would not create new moral codes; they would simply insist that our existing laws protecting children and families apply with equal force online as they do offline. For those reasons, I support all the amendments in this group from my noble friend Lady Bertin. Having heard the support from across the House this evening, I hope the Minister will too.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it would not be right to begin the Government’s response to this group of amendments without first thanking unequivocally the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. The whole Chamber will join me in saying that we have a great deal to thank her for. She has worked tirelessly on the independent pornography review and has long campaigned to raise awareness of the ways pornography shapes sexual behaviour. This Government share her determination to ensure that the online world is a safer place for everyone, and we are immensely grateful to her for her insights.

The motivation for these amendments is important and I make it absolutely clear that I take them seriously. I have not disagreed with a single word that has been said in the impassioned and sometimes angry contributions in this Chamber—I share that anger and outrage. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is aware, following our meeting last week, of the reasons why the Government will resist her amendments at this stage. However, I look forward to continuing our discussions in greater detail over the coming weeks, including in meetings between my department, the Home Office and DSIT. I hope we will all work closely together to achieve our shared objectives.

I also take this opportunity to announce that the Government will accept, in part, one of the noble Baroness’s recommendations from her pornography review—namely, recommendation 24. The Government will review the criminal law relating to pornography, which will give us a chance to look at the law holistically and consider whether it is fit for purpose in an ever-developing online world. Importantly, the review I am announcing today will look into the effectiveness of the existing law in relation to criminalising, among other things, harmful depictions of incest and any forms of pornography that encourage child sexual abuse.

I know the noble Baroness is anxious that any review should not be used as a delaying tactic to avoid making any decisions. I hope she will take it from me that it is my wish to make sure that this takes place quickly. In addition, as I mentioned to her when we met, the Government are not completely opposed to considering swifter action where this is critically important, and I know we will discuss this further at our next meeting.

Given what I have just said, I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I address Amendments 290 to 292 briefly, in the light of the fact we are proposing a review. I am very grateful for the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Benjamin, Lady Kidron, Lady Sugg and Lady Owen, my noble friends Lady Kennedy and Lady Berger, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Cameron of Lochiel—I hope I have mentioned everybody.

I appreciate the motivation behind these amendments, and I reassure my noble friend Lady Kennedy that the Government and I are very much in listening mode. Of course images of actual child incest or actual child sexual abuse are extremely harmful. The same is also true for intimate photos or videos shared without consent, and I note the concerns about how effectively this law is being enforced and regulated. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that I am committed to working with her on the issues raised by these amendments and I very much look forward to meeting again to discuss them in greater detail to see where we can go with them.

Amendment 298 would criminalise the possession of nudification tools by users. Once again, I accept the intention behind this amendment and recognise the harm caused; it is horrifying. My noble friend Lady Berger spoke movingly about its impact on young women, and other noble Lords spoke strongly about this as well.

Our concern is that this amendment would not target those who provide these unpleasant tools to users in the UK. Additionally, as drafted, it would criminalise the possession of legitimate tools which are designed to create intimate images, such as those used in a medical context. I reiterate that we have significant sympathy for the amendment’s underlying objective, so we are actively considering what action is needed to ensure that any intervention in this area is effective. I assure the noble Baroness that we will reflect carefully on what she and other noble Lords—including the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron, Lady Boycott and Lady Owen, my noble friend Lady Berger, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, among others—have said in this debate. I also assure her that we aim to provide an update on this matter ahead of Report.

Finally, Amendment 314 seeks to bring regulatory parity between offline and online pornography. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for her continued advocacy on this topic over the years. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—for whom huge respect is due, in this House and elsewhere—the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Haslemere and Lord Nash, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, among others, all spoke powerfully about this.

I stress once again that I do not disagree with the motivation that underlies this amendment. No one could disagree with the general principle as a matter of common sense, but extensive further work with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is needed to consider and define with sufficient certainty what currently legal online pornography should not be permitted. It is also important that we make a thorough exploration of the existing legislation and regulation to ensure any new offence is enforceable, protects users to the highest standard and works as intended.

Under the Video Recordings Act, the distribution of pornography on physical media formats is regulated by the BBFC, as we have heard. Obviously, the BBFC will not classify any content which breaches criminal law. Amendment 314 as drafted would create a criminal offence which would require a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content which has not been subject to the classification process. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, expressed concerns about the drafting of this amendment while supporting its underlying motivation. As I hope your Lordships will agree, creating this style of criminal offence requires a clearer and more certain definition of this pornographic content, as any individual would need to be able clearly to understand what they need to do to regulate their conduct, so as not to inadvertently commit a criminal offence.

I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, will appreciate the reasons I have set out for the Government not supporting these amendments today. That said, I hope the announcement of the review into the criminal law and the Government’s commitment to work with the noble Baroness over the coming weeks will leave her sufficiently reassured not to press her amendments at this stage.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I want to ask the Minister about the timing. Her tone is exceptionally welcome— I will leave the substance of her response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin—but I am watching facial recognition, edtech and AI being rolled out by the Government with impunity. Even earlier today, at Questions, the tool was put at a higher order than the safety. What is the timeframe for the reviews and in which we can expect these very urgent questions to be addressed? There is a Bill in front of us, but when will the next Bill come?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Can the noble Baroness imagine just how unpopular I would be if I committed to an absolute timeframe? What I can say is that I hope she will take it from me that I regard this as important. The meetings with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, have started. This matters but we need to get it right.

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

Will this review—yet another review—take place before Report? The Bill is before us, so once Report has passed, it will be too late to have the review. This is not something that we can leave until it is too late. Can we at least have an assurance that Report will be timed in a way that enables the Minister to come back and say, “This review has happened, and this is what we’re going to do”?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I entirely understand the sentiments. I cannot commit to that today, but I will take the point away.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

I will give the Minister a little bit of context, because she has not been in this House very long, for which she is probably very grateful. Many of us speaking today were very involved in the genesis and ultimate passage of the Online Safety Act. That took six years to happen. When we passed that Act, we thought we were being crystal clear, in both Houses of Parliament, on what we intended to happen and what we intended the regulator to do. One of reasons why her ministerial colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, got a pretty hard time from this Committee on 27 November was that we felt there was a certain unwillingness to recognise the degree of frustration many of us feel about how the Online Safety Act is being enacted.

In particular, on 27 November, the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, told us that the Molly Rose Foundation has, in effect, given up on hoping that Ofcom will actually do its job, because Ofcom has told the foundation that its attitude and strategy in enacting the Online Safety Act, when dealing with the large platforms, is what it calls “tactical ambiguity”. If I were a lawyer for one of the large platforms, I would think that having a regulator that was applying tactical ambiguity was absolutely wonderful; it would be exactly what I would hope for. What we are looking for is action from His Majesty’s Government, and when it happens, we are not looking for any kind of ambiguity.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I have already said that I have heard, and indeed share, the anger and frustration in Committee. I may not have been in your Lordships’ House for that long, but I have not been living underneath a stone. Given my previous existence, I am acutely aware of these debates. What is obvious to us all is that, however well-intentioned past attempts have been, these things are still happening. If we want them to stop, we have to do something about them. I do not believe I can go further than I have at the moment; all I can say is that the will is there.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

During Robert Runcie’s time in the Church of England, he was exasperated that when matters became very difficult, the General Synod was called to set up a committee. He saw the setting up of committees as a postponing of a decision that ought to be taken. These inquiries keep going on and on. Given the Government’s machinery and lawyers, I do not understand why this could not be looked at before Report.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I have already answered that, I am afraid. With the greatest of respect to the noble and right reverend Lord, I cannot give that commitment today, but he has heard what I have said.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, this has been humbling for me, and it is very hard to know how to respond. There are big shoes to fill after so many amazing speeches. That is what we call teamwork and showing this Chamber at its very best. I assure noble Lords that I still have plenty of petrol left in the tank on this issue. I am very grateful for the acknowledgement that it has been a gruelling piece of work, but what would damage me more is if we did not get this right. I am not prepared to look back and think that we could have done more, and I believe that many others in this Committee would agree with that.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward this amendment today. As I have said when responding to the other amendments, I stress that I entirely understand the motivation underlying it. Victims and survivors of child sexual abuse have every right to see justice for the horrendous crimes they endured. I know perfectly well through my experience in other parts of public service, if you like, of how long it can take for victims to be able to come forward. To that extent, there is nothing between the noble Baroness and me, and indeed others who have spoken: the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. That said, I am afraid I am going to have to disappoint the noble Baroness when I say that the Government cannot accept her amendment, and I hope she will appreciate the reason for it when in a moment I explain why.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Just because this is so important, and no doubt for our understanding, can I ask two questions? First, on there being no time limit, is that because there is some exception in the Magistrates’ Courts Act to the normal six-month time limit on summary conviction? Section 9(3)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act allows summary conviction, so this removal of the time bar must be somewhere either in the Sexual Offences Act or in the Magistrates’ Courts Act. My second question relates to Article 7. Of course, the prohibition on retroactive criminalisation does not apply when the crime in question would be thought of as criminal according to the laws of civilised nations. Of course, that was upheld as a principle when marital rape was finally criminalised in all these jurisdictions by the courts rather than by statute.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will deal with my noble friend’s second point first. There are decisions of the domestic courts here that support the fact that you cannot bring prosecutions for what was the unlawful sexual intercourse offence under Section 6, nor can you even bring a prosecution for sexual assault based on the same facts, because that would transgress the prohibition in Article 7. As regards the time limit, Section 9 of the 2003 Act has no time limitations in it, which is the usual principle of criminal offences in this country, but for this tiny cohort of behaviour—it really is very small—you could not prosecute under Section 9 because of Article 7. Section 6 no longer exists, and you cannot get round it by using Section 9, but it really is a very small number of cases.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I suggest to the noble Baroness that, in addition, these offences are so serious that they would not be prosecuted in the magistrates’ court; they would be indictable offences, would they not?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord is quite correct: this has nothing to do with magistrates’ court time limits. There was a statutory time limit contained within Section 6 of the 1956 Act that said that all prosecutions for offences under Section 6 must be brought within 12 months in any court. It is nothing to do with the time limits in the Magistrates’ Courts Act.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so sorry to labour the point, but I think it is so important that we understand, and if it cannot be dealt with now, perhaps the Minister could write to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Committee. I am looking at Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act, on “Sexual activity with a child”, which I understand to be the section that the noble Baroness is seeking to amend in her amendment. Section 9(3)(a) allows summary conviction for that offence, and the maximum penalty is

“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months”,

or the statutory maximum fine.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am of course more than happy to write to my noble friend, and it must be my fault I am not explaining this properly. There is no time limit for prosecutions brought under Section 9 generally, unless it refers to particular behaviour—so that would be an offence committed against a girl aged between 13 and 15—that took place before the repeal of the 1956 Act and the bringing into force of the 2003 Act. You could not prosecute that under Section 9 because the time limit has expired for bringing it under Section 6, in the same way that you cannot prosecute for sexual assault for the same behaviour because you cannot bring a prosecution under Section 6. I had better write, because I can see from the puzzled look on my noble friend’s face that I have not explained it very well.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Perhaps the noble Baroness could also include in that letter reference to what is either a decision of the Appellate Committee or the Supreme Court—I think it is the former—which addresses this and explains precisely why those who are alleged to have committed offences before the relevant dates are protected by the 1956 Act and continue to be so.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord has explained it rather better than I did.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to everyone who has spoken. I am probably the only non-lawyer in this debate, and as it is my amendment I feel something of a duffer.

I am very grateful for the advice. I came to this amendment after reading the recommendations of IICSA, and what concerned me particularly was picking up that people who had come forward years afterwards were told that things were timed out—that might have been a decision by the CPS to say that it felt that it would not be effective going to trial. However, I very much appreciate the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, because I have experience of the issue of which court deals with issues through my interests in stalking and other domestic abuse cases, where often that is the place that things happen. All the description that has been given for “no time limits” has not been for the magistrates’ court, excepting the detail that the noble Baroness provided, which is way beyond my knowledge.

There is the difficulty that Professor Jay reported. In two cases where I was heavily involved with the victims, decisions were made initially by the CPS and the victims were told that they had timed out. That may not have been the case, but that is what they were told. In another case, when there were three pupils from the same school all giving evidence, none of them knowing each other, the first victim was told by the judge, “Yours is over 20 years ago; you can’t possibly remember what happened and therefore it’s timed out”. That is what is happening in the practice of the courts. Professor Jay’s report spoke to the experience of the victims. We have gone into extraordinary technical detail that many victims would be completely oblivious to. I would be very grateful for a letter. If there is an easy solution, it may just be that it needs to be clarified with the police and the CPS. There are a lot of unhappy victims out there. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

294: After Clause 84, insert the following new Clause—
“Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation: England and Wales and Northern Ireland(1) After section 67 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 insert—“67A Possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation(1) It is an offence for a person to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person strangling or suffocating another person, and(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real.(2) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(3) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.(5) In this section“image” has the same meaning as in section 63.(6) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted—(a) in England and Wales, except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions;(b) in Northern Ireland, except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.67B Defences to offences under section 67A(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67A(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67A(1);(c) that the person— (i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that the person directly participated in the act portrayed and the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person.(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67A(2), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67A(1);(c) that the person directly participated in the act portrayed, the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and the person only published the image to other persons who directly participated.(5) In this section“non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66.67C Penalties for offences under section 67A(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67A(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine (or both);(c) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67A(2) is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine (or both);(c) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).67D Possession of extreme pornographic images: alternative verdict in magistrates’ courtIf on the trial of a person charged with an offence under section 63 a magistrates’ court finds the person not guilty of the offence charged, the magistrates’ court may find the person guilty of an offence under section 67A(1).”.(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services) for “section 63” substitute “sections 63 and 67A”.(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services)—(a) in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “63” insert “or 67A”;(b) in paragraph 5(2)—(i) after “possession” insert “or publication”;(ii) for “an offence under section 63” substitute “the offence in question”. (4) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13 insert—“13ZA An offence under section 67A of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation) in relation to an image showing a person under 18.”(5) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29—(a) for “section 63” substitute “any of the following provisions”;(b) for the words in brackets substitute—“(a) section 63 (possession of extreme pornographic images);(b) section 67A (possession or publication of pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in England and Wales and Northern Ireland to possess or publish a pornographic image that portrays strangulation (often referred to as “choking porn”) or suffocation.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, again it would not be right to speak to this group of amendments without first thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. In her independent pornography review, the noble Baroness recommended that non-fatal strangulation pornography—commonly known as choking porn—should be illegal to possess, distribute and publish. The noble Baroness has identified, and many have already mentioned in your Lordships’ Committee as part of the debate on another group of amendments, that the prevalence of strangulation pornography is leading to this behaviour becoming more commonplace in real life. The noble Baroness is absolutely right. Evidence suggests that it is influencing what people, particularly young people, think is expected of them during sex. It is also right to point out that they are not necessarily aware of the serious harm it can cause.

In June this year, we committed to giving full effect to the noble Baroness’s recommendation. Today I am pleased to do just that. We have tabled Amendments 294, 295, 488, 494, 512, 515, 526, 548 and 555, which will criminalise the possession and publication of pornographic images that portray strangulation or suffocation—otherwise known as choking porn. These changes will extend UK-wide. The terms “strangulation” and “suffocation” are widely understood and carry their ordinary meaning. Strangulation requires the application of pressure to the neck and suffocation requires a person to be deprived of air, affecting their ability to breathe. For this offence, the strangulation or suffocation portrayed must be explicit and realistic, but it does not have to be real. For example, it can be acted or posed, or the image may be AI-generated—provided that the people in the image look real to a reasonable person.

The maximum penalty for the possession offence is imprisonment for two years. This mirrors penalties under Section 3 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The penalty reflects that while the content is harmful, much of it will not depict an unlawful act actually taking place, depending on the circumstances. For publication of such images, the maximum penalty will be imprisonment for five years, commensurate with penalties for publication under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. This reflects the underlying aims of this amendment to restrict the availability of this type of pornography.

In addition, we are amending the Online Safety Act 2023 to ensure that the offences are listed as priority offences. This will oblige platforms to take the necessary steps to stop this harmful material appearing online. This change is a vital step towards our mission to halve violence against women and girls, and as I move these amendments today it is right that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is credited for this change. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, I rightly praise the Government and the Prime Minister for making this change. It shows real leadership. I speak for so many in saying thank you for taking that recommendation on board.

This amendment to ban depictions of strangulation in pornography has raised awareness more widely of how out of control online pornography has become and how it is affecting real life behaviour. I am not easily shocked these days, but I was very shocked by the example given by my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, of how those carrying out post-mortems are now having to be trained to look for signs of strangulation. That says it all.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

I thank the Minister for tabling this group of amendments, and I am happy to offer the support of these Benches. The criminalisation of strangulation in pornography is part of a wider initiative that has been championed across the House and discussed today, particularly on this side by my noble friend Lady Bertin, but by many others as well.

The prevalence of strangulation in pornography and the harm it causes are very clear. Distributing such material is already illegal offline; the fact that its online equivalent is not is a gap in the law, and these amendments correct that. They close that gap and prohibit the distribution of a practice that is both dangerous and extreme. I know that there are reports from some GPs of an exponential rise in incidents of non-fatal strangulation and suffocation among younger generations, which they largely attribute to pornography; the least we can do is to provide restrictions on dangerous content that should not be normalised. As has been said, distributing non-fatal strangulation images is unlawful offline; it makes little sense that that is not replicated in our online legislation. This group aims to correct that, and I willingly offer the support of these Benches.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for their support for these amendments, particularly the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin, Lady Gohir and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. I also note the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, about enforcement and regulation. As I said in the debate on the second group, I am very keen to continue working with the noble Baroness on other matters related to online pornography— there is much more to be done.

I hope that, in the meantime, your Lordships will join me in supporting the important steps the Government are taking in relation to strangulation pornography. I beg to move.

Amendment 294 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

295: After Clause 84, insert the following new Clause—
“Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation: Scotland(1) After section 51C of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 insert— “51D Pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation(1) It is an offence for a person to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 51A,(b) the image depicts, in an explicit and realistic way, a person strangling or suffocating another person, and(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real.(2) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(3) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 51B.(5) In this section“image” is to be construed in accordance with section 51A.51E Defences to offences under section 51D(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 51D(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 51D(1);(c) that the person—(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that the person directly participated in the act depicted and the act did not actually involve strangulation or suffocation of any person.(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 51D(2), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 51D(1);(c) that the person directly participated in the act depicted, the act did not actually involve strangulation or suffocation of any person, and the person only published the image to other persons who directly participated.51F Penalties for offences under section 51D(1) A person who commits an offence under section 51D(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 51D(2) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).51G Possession of extreme pornographic images: alternative verdictIf on the trial of a person charged with an offence under section 51A a court finds the person not guilty of the offence charged, the court may find the person guilty of an offence under section 51D(1).”.(2) In the Extreme Pornography (Electronic Commerce Directive) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (S.S.I. 2011/137)—(a) in regulation 2(1), in the definition of “relevant offence”—(i) after “51A” insert “(extreme pornography) or 51D (pornographic images of strangulation or suffocation)”;(ii) after “Act” omit “(extreme pornography)”;(b) in regulation 3(1) and (3) for “a relevant offence” substitute “an offence under section 51A of the 1982 Act”;(c) in regulation 6(2)—(i) after “possession” insert “or publication”;(ii) for “a relevant offence” substitute “the relevant offence in question”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in Scotland to possess or publish a pornographic image that depicts strangulation (often referred to as “choking porn”) or suffocation.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Owen of Alderley Edge for bringing these important matters to your Lordships’ Committee and for speaking so passionately and clearly about the subject matter of her amendments. There is very little that I can add. My noble friend has an impressive track record in this area, her Private Member’s Bill being a striking example of that, and these amendments are very much in the same vein. As she made clear, we must all remember what is truly important here, and that is the victims of these events. They must be at the centre of all our debates, and today they have been.

I am very pleased that my noble friend has retabled Amendments 333 and 334, which were brought forward in the other place by my honourable friend Joe Robertson MP. The omission of recklessness as part of the offence of spiking is, as many noble Lords have said, a severe oversight by this Government; we believe that it should be rectified. My noble friend Lady Owen has our full support for this amendment and our broad support for the rest of her amendments.

Finally, I draw the Minister’s attention to my Amendment 295C, which is a probing amendment. By way of background, Schedule 9 inserts new Sections 66AA and 66AB into the Sexual Offences Act 2003. New Section 66AB contains exceptions to the new offences of taking or recording intimate photographs or films, and its subsection (3) contains an exemption for healthcare professionals who are taking intimate photos of a person who is under 16 and lacks the capacity to consent. My probing amendment would remove the provision that the person has to be under 16 for the exemption to apply. It seeks to probe the Government about a situation where, for example, a doctor has a 30 year-old patient with severe learning disabilities or an 80 year-old patient with dementia. Neither has the capacity to consent, but the doctor has to take a photo of the patient in an intimate state to show the patient’s condition to their consultant, for example. That doctor would not be included in the exemption and therefore would be liable to prosecution.

This is simply to try to understand the Government’s reasoning because, if the exemption is to apply—and it should—there should be no distinction based on age. The doctor is performing the same professional duty to a person who is 15 and cannot consent and a person who is 18 and cannot consent. I will be grateful if the noble Baroness can clarify that particular point.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I join with all other Members of your Lordships’ Committee in expressing gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for bringing forward this large group of amendments, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for bringing forward Amendment 295C. I am also pleased to commend government Amendments 300 to 307 in my name, which make two changes to the existing intimate image abuse provisions in Clause 84 and Schedule 9.

This is an eclectic, disparate and rather large group of amendments. I will endeavour to address them in as concise a manner as I can, but it is going to take a bit of time, so I hope your Lordships will forgive me. I start by stressing that the Government are committed to tackling the complete violation that is non-consensual intimate image abuse. However, before I turn to the noble Baroness’s amendments, I want to make a few general comments that apply to many of the amendments in this group, and to some of the others that are being considered by your Lordships’ Committee today.

I start with a comment with which I am sure we can all agree: it is essential that the law is clear and easy to interpret. In that context, I make the following observation, not so much as a Minister, but drawing on my past experience as a senior prosecutor and judge. It is very tempting to add new offences to the statute book. Some of these are intended to spell out the conduct of which society disapproves, even when it is already caught by more general offences—or, some would say, to make something that is already criminal, more criminal.

It is tempting to say that, if such an additional offence makes no substantive change, then why not—the Government should simply accept it. However, such changes are not always without consequence. In my experience, it can sometimes make it harder to prosecute, and thus secure convictions, when there are a number of different offences on the statute book, all of which cover the same behaviour but often with slightly different elements or maximum penalties. I know that that is absolutely not the intended effect of many of these amendments, but I would gently suggest to your Lordships that it is worth bearing in mind that legislating for large numbers of new offences may not be without adverse consequences.

That said, I have the utmost respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. She and I share the determination to deal with some pretty repellent behaviour that has the ability to ruin victims’ lives; the question is how best to achieve it. As I said before, I want to make it absolutely clear that the Government and I are very much in listening mode. I was very pleased to meet the noble Baroness recently, and I thank her for that. I wanted to understand better the intentions underlying some of her amendments, and I look forward to working with her closely over the coming months.

I am thankful for the contributions of my noble friends Lord Hacking, Lady Curran and Lady Chakrabarti. I am afraid that I am going to have to disappoint my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti on the implementation date for the deepfake legislation, as she will probably not be surprised to hear. It will depend on a number of factors, and I cannot give her a date today. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin, Lady Maclean, Lady Sugg and Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who was kind enough to leave the question of the ombudsman with me. I am also thankful for the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Banner and Lord Cameron, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville.

I turn now to this group of amendments. Amendment 295BA seeks to create a reporting mechanism for non-consensual intimate images to be removed within 48 hours. The Government recognise the calls to go further than the existing protections afforded by the Online Safety Act. We share the concern that some non-consensual intimate images remain online even after requests for removal have been made by the Revenge Porn Helpline. Worse still, some remain online following a successful conviction for non-consensual intimate image offences. We absolutely acknowledge this problem. I reassure the noble Baroness that we are considering how best to tackle this issue, and I hope to be able to provide more detail on the work in this area on Report.

I turn to Amendment 295BB. As I have just said, the Government recognise the harm caused by the continued circulation of intimate images and thus share the intention underlying this amendment. There are existing mechanisms that allow the courts to deprive offenders of images once they have been convicted of intimate image abuse offences. We are already amending deprivation orders so that they can be applied to seizing intimate images and any devices containing those images, regardless of whether the device was used in the offence itself. An example would be an external hard drive: even if it was not used to perpetrate the offence, it can be seized if it has the images on it. This will significantly limit the defendant’s ability to retain or access intimate image abuse material.

That said, we recognise that these existing powers were not originally designed with intimate images in mind, and that, as a result, they currently do not extend to devices that contain images but were not directly used to commit the offence. I reassure the noble Baroness that we are taking steps to strengthen the framework.

I turn to Amendments 295BC and 295BD, which were also spoken to by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I must say that the noble Viscount slightly lost me with some of the more technical details of what he was describing.

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

Will the Minister meet with me?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am always delighted to meet with the noble Viscount.

Through these amendments, the noble Baroness wishes to create a statutory register of non-consensual intimate images and hashes. Once again, I commend the intention behind the amendments, but I believe that they will lead to duplication of work that I can confirm is already taking place. Organisations such as the Revenge Porn Helpline play a vital role in detecting and removing non-consensual intimate image abuse. That organisation has in place a database of existing hashes of non-consensual images that are shared with participating companies to detect and remove the images from circulation online.

Furthermore, in March this year, Ofcom published its first codes of practice for the Online Safety Act regulatory regime, which set out a range of measures that platforms should implement to tackle non-consensual intimate image abuse. Ofcom is currently reviewing consultation responses on new measures for the codes, which include measures for platforms to use scanning technology to detect intimate images by matching them against appropriate databases of digital fingerprints or hashes of such images. I reassure the noble Baroness that finalised measures will be published in due course.

Amendments 295BE to 295BG, 295BJ, 298A, 299A and 300B all share the purpose of expanding all intimate image offences to include real and purported audio recording of those in an intimate state. The noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, spoke powerfully about the need for this. However, the Government cannot accept these amendments for two reasons. The first is the difficulties in proving such offences, and the second is that we consider that the harm in question is covered in the main by existing offences.

As far as proof is concerned, it is a general truth that being able to identify voices is a great deal more problematic than identifying images. Awkward and possibly embarrassing though this is to be considering in your Lordships’ Committee in the middle of the working day, a few moments’ thought about the kinds of sounds recorded, given the context, will illustrate some of the difficulties. First, it would be difficult for tribunals of fact, whether magistrates, judges or juries, to determine whether the recorded audio is or purports to be that of a particular person. Secondly, the proposed definition of an intimate audio recording as one “which a reasonable person considers sexual in nature” might be hard to determine from the audio alone. In short, there are concerns about how this could be proved to the criminal standard.

In this context, I refer back to the point I made earlier: the law must be clear and enact only offences that are capable of enforcement. The Government have looked at this closely and seriously, and we have tried to identify cases where intimate audio abuse is alleged. It is our view that there does not appear to be a large number of cases where this happens in isolation. Instead, the reason for the audio abuse is usually to blackmail or harass someone. Both are criminal offences already, with blackmail carrying a significant maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. If we are wrong about this, I know that the noble Baroness has said that she will share further evidence with me, and I am sure that this will also apply to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir. I am happy to discuss this issue further with both of them.

Amendment 295BH seeks to define “taking” for the purposes of the new intimate image-taking offences. In our recent meeting, following the question the noble Baroness raised at Second Reading, I confirmed to her that the proposed “taking” offences as currently defined would not include screenshots, but I understand the harm that the noble Baroness seeks to prevent, and I have asked officials to look at this issue closely. I hope to provide a further update on Report.

Amendment 295C, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to amend the base offence set out in Schedule 9. This applies where an image of a person under 16 in an intimate state is taken or recorded for the purposes of medical care or treatment. The noble Lord’s amendment recognises the need for the medical exemption, but it would remove the age restriction to prevent the criminalisation of those taking or recording intimate images of a person of any age. Section 5 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 already provides for specific medical exemptions in cases where an intimate image is taken of someone over 16. I hope the noble Lord will agree that it is therefore unnecessary to extend the provision in this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I was spiked at the age of 16 at a dance by a cousin of the hosts where I was staying. He said afterwards, “I don’t know why I did it. I didn’t intend to hurt anyone”. So there are such situations—having listened to what the Minister said, I note that no one could prove that he had been anything other than rather silly. He was in his 20s and was probably drunk. He filled an orange juice jug with gin, and I spent two days in bed.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am extremely sorry to hear about that experience. As ever, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, for whom the entire Committee has great respect.

As I was about to say, the Government are fortified in our belief that the concept of intention would be proved by the fact that there is case law that establishes that, where ecstasy was administered to another to “loosen them up”, that amounted to an intent to injure—intention being separate from the motive. The fact is that defendants say all sorts of things about what they did or did not mean; it will be for the tribunal of fact, looking at what happened, to see whether it can be sure that the intention was as specified in the statute.

We are confident that the types of behaviour that should be criminalised are already captured. Once again, I go back to the important point I set out at the beginning of this group: this new spiking offence aims to simplify the legal framework and to make enforcement straightforward. We do not want to do anything that risks undermining that by overcomplicating the offence.

Amendment 356B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, proposes to expand the scope of prohibited conduct under domestic abuse protection orders. Although I appreciate the motive underpinning this amendment, these orders already allow courts to impose any conditions that they consider both necessary and proportionate to protect victims from domestic abuse. Put simply, setting out a prescriptive list risks narrowing the flexibility and discouraging conditions that are tailored to the conditions of the offender. The police statutory guidance already includes examples, such as prohibiting direct or indirect contact and restricting online harassment, but we are happy to update this guidance to include the additional behaviours mentioned.

This has been a long speech, and I hope your Lordships will forgive me. My intention has been to explain to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and all other noble Lords, for whom I have great regard, why the Government cannot support these amendments today. For the reasons I have set out, I invite them not to press their amendments, but I hope they will join me in supporting government Amendments 300 to 307, which I commend to the Committee.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, can I just check something? On Amendment 299B, she knows that my intention is not to create something that is too broad but to tackle the very real and rapidly proliferating problem of semen images. It would be helpful to get clarification that the Government understand this to be an issue and are willing to work with me so that we can bring back an amendment on Report. Further, on Amendment 295BB, the Minister spoke about physical devices, but I am keen to know how the Government will tackle images shared on the cloud, because this is the real problem. Finally, on Amendment 295BA, the Minister said that more detail would be given. I just want to know whether that will be on Report or between now and Report, so that we can bring back something about the 48-hour takedown on Report. America has already won the battle on this.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

As far as the revolting practice of semen images is concerned—and I do not think anybody in your Lordships’ House would think it was anything other than that—if an offence can be drafted that is sufficiently specific, then of course we will consider it. Our concern is that the drafting of the proposed amended offence is so wide that it would capture a lot of behaviour that should not be criminalised. As for the other two matters raised by the noble Baroness, please may we discuss them?

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

I am sorry, I realise that people want to get to the dinner break, but will the noble Baroness commit to meeting me, the noble Viscount and the Revenge Porn Helpline on Amendments 295BC and 295BD? She spoke about duplication. These amendments are suggested by the Revenge Porn Helpline; therefore, I do not believe that it believes it duplicates its work. It would be very helpful for us to meet and clarify that.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The answer to that is a short one: of course.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her responses. I am grateful for the engagement so far with her and Minister Davies-Jones, and I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. I am going to take these points away for further considerations, and I look forward to the meetings that we are going to have, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

300: Schedule 9, page 275, line 38, at end insert—
“6A In section 66H (time limits for prosecuting summary offences)—(a) in subsection (1), for “under section 66E or 66F” substitute “to which this section applies”;(b) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) This section applies to offences under—(a) section 66AA(1);(b) section 66AC(1);(c) section 66B(1);(d) section 66E;(e) section 66F.”;(c) for the heading substitute “Intimate images: time limit for prosecution of summary offences”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends the time limit for prosecuting the summary only offences in existing section 66B(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and new sections 66AA(1) and 66AC(1) (added by Schedule 9 to the Bill).

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

301: Schedule 9, page 278, line 24, leave out sub-paragraph (2)
Member’s explanatory statement
My amendments to Schedule 9 paragraph 18 amend section 177DA of the Armed Forces Act to add the provision the Bill currently inserts as section 177DZA. They also provide for images of breastfeeding recorded in circumstances which constitute an offence under section 67A(2B) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to be subject to deprivation orders.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

To conclude, we are all in agreement on the need for more measures to reduce the suffering of animals. I hope that the Minister will reflect on all the speeches in this debate. It is an argument that holds up both morally and practically and is driven by an extensive amount of research and data. I look forward to hearing what she has to say.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not think anyone could disagree that this is a deeply troubling and uncomfortable issue. I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Black, for moving his amendment, and the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Cameron, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their contributions. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Black, for sharing a copy of his speech with me yesterday—it was helpful and informative.

The Government are committed to protecting animals and holding to account those who abuse animals. I listened with care to the concerns raised by the noble Lord. These are horrible offences. That said, we believe that the criminal law as a whole already provides sufficient powers to tackle the sexual abuse of animals as well as the robust offences to tackle child sexual abuse and domestic abuse.

I pause here to say that while this is not a laughing matter in any way at all, I shall long remember the striking description of the Kama Sutra of sexual offences against animals given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I will have to write to him about the sentences imposed for animal abuse, although I am rather minded to agree with those noble Lords who spoke about the fact that there are pathetic individuals but there are also some really wicked ones out there as well.

As the noble Lord, Lord Black, has said, sexual abuse of animals causes them suffering. It is therefore possible to prosecute sexual acts involving animals under broader animal cruelty offences, which bring with them additional powers for the courts to impose orders on offenders.

As the noble Lord said, this is in addition to Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The latter two offences are listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, meaning that if convicted, individuals are automatically subject to the notification requirements, which is colloquially known as being on the sex offenders register.

We acknowledge that the law in this area is set out across a number of different offences. However, we believe that, taken together, these offences ensure that there is sufficient coverage of the sexual abuse of animals in criminal law. We are not persuaded at present that these amendments would substantially increase protection for animals or for people who are victims of sexual abuse. There is plainly coexistence of the two groups of offences. We are less sure that there is evidence for a causative link between the two.

Having said that, I welcome the evidence that the noble Lord shared in his speech. To that end, I would welcome a discussion with him in the coming weeks to look at the issues he has raised; first, in relation to the need for specific further offences and, secondly, the evidence in relation to the possible causative links between the two groups of offending.

My notes say that I will now turn to Amendments 316ZA to 316ZE, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but I shall not turn to those, as the noble Lord does not intend to press them. I am grateful to him for his temperate and constructive comments on this issue.

I was going to say that I would be happy to meet with either or both of the noble Lords to discuss any evidence suggesting that there are gaps in the law. That offer still holds good. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. Does she not agree, however, that it is arbitrary in the extreme that Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 addresses sex with animals, but that it covers only specific, very limited forms of sexual activity? If you are going to have a specific offence, surely it should cover a wider range of sexual activity with animals, not just the limited categories that we have discussed.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The Government are satisfied that, when looked at as a whole, all the possible offences here cover the conduct complained of. However, I am conscious that there are ways of committing sexual offences that have not necessarily occurred to the draftsmen of earlier legislation. The best that I can offer the noble Lord is that I will reflect on the matter. I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his amendment.

Amendment 316ZA (to Amendment 316) withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.

Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).

I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.

I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.

I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.

On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.

I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.

I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.

The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.

In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.

I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister, who has carefully taken us through three limbs, as far as I tell: first, there will be CPS guidance in terms of the specific offence, in the way that it decides whether or not to prosecute; secondly, the way that the offence itself has been drafted; and, thirdly, the public interest test. However, will she engage with the organisations that are concerned about the offences? I think I understand what she is saying about intent, grievous bodily harm and the other limbs that mean we will not see the kinds of prosecutions that people are concerned about, but will the MoJ engage with the organisations that have concerns?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As far as the first of the three protections is concerned, obviously I cannot bind the Crown Prosecution Service—the whole point about it is that it is independent of government. However, based on my own experiences, where there are areas of the law that plainly need clarification as to when the Crown Prosecution Service would prosecute and when it would not, it usually issues guidance. As regards engaging with the organisations, of course, it is sometimes not easy to explain the law and the thinking behind it. It is in everyone’s interests that the organisations which are concerned for vulnerable people understand that the Government have those interests very much at heart. I would welcome the opportunity to explain to them.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group concerning the important issue of child abduction. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions this evening. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward Amendments 335A and 335B, which raise important questions about the interaction between Clause 104 and the lived reality of victims of domestic abuse. The amendments probe how the new offence will operate where a parent has acted out of fear for their own safety or that of their child, and they touch on the wider issue of how the criminal law recognises coercive, controlling and violent relationships.

We very much support the principle behind the noble Baroness’s amendments and the safeguarding concerns that they highlight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about how the Government intend to ensure that the operation of Clause 104 does not inadvertently criminalise vulnerable parents acting in desperation to protect themselves or their children.

Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, create and support a parallel offence in Northern Ireland relating to the detention of a child overseas without consent. I recognise the importance of maintaining consistency across jurisdictions and ensuring that children in Northern Ireland benefit from equivalent protections. I would be grateful if the Minister can set out how the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland intends to exercise the new regulation-making and commencement powers. What discussions have taken place with relevant agencies to ensure that the offence can operate effectively in practice? I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendments 335A and 335B. Her amendments have been grouped with the modest collection of government amendments—336, 496, 521 and 549—tabled in my name, which extend the provisions contained in Clause 104 to Northern Ireland.

I note the concern raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that Clause 104 will criminalise parents who are fleeing domestic abuse where the detention of the child is primarily motivated by the intention of keeping themselves and/or the child safe. I reassure your Lordships that this absolutely is not the intention of the existing Clause 104. Indeed, in developing the provisions, very careful consideration was given to the implications of potentially criminalising a parent who has detained their child abroad.

Before I turn to the reasons why the Government will not be supporting these amendments today, I want to explain a little more about the purpose of Clause 104’s inclusion in the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her clear and even-handed explanation of her understanding of the reason why the Government included it in the first place. The clause seeks to implement the Law Commission’s 2014 recommendation that the Government should close a small gap in the law by making it a criminal offence for a parent, or person with similar responsibility to a parent, to detain a child abroad without appropriate consent, once the original consent has expired.

I am sure that I do not need to explain to anyone that the abduction of a child by a parent is an extremely distressing experience for everyone involved. For any Government, the aim is to safeguard children from abduction by preventing the unlawful removal of a child, ensuring their swift and safe return when they have been taken and upholding custody rights through international co-operation and legal enforcement. The new measure is intended to be consistent with the existing criminal framework, to stand as a deterrent and a backstop where we know that a gap in the law is being exploited, even if by very few people. Some of those who have not returned a child are themselves abusers; they are abusive parents seeking to evade the law. We cannot leave that gap unclosed.

However, I have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by your Lordships this evening, and to some sent to me by organisations with an interest in this area. I remain satisfied that there is no risk of vulnerable parents who have been victims of domestic abuse being criminalised. I hope I shall be forgiven for setting out my reasons in a little more detail; I alluded to them earlier in relation to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but that was in a slightly different context, and I think I need to give more detail.

Many of your Lordships will be aware that there is a two-stage test for the Crown Prosecution Service to apply when deciding whether a prosecution should be brought. The first is an “evidential sufficiency” test but, even if that stage is passed and it is felt that there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, that is not the end of the matter. The second stage is the “public interest” test, which asks whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be brought. It is this stage of the test that is often applied in, for example, assisted dying cases. This is important, including in a domestic abuse context, because it means that prosecutors must consider the background, including whether the alleged offender was acting from benign motives or was themselves a victim of domestic abuse, before deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. Additionally, and importantly, a third test applies for the new offence in Clause 104 which adds an additional safeguard: that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required for a case to proceed.

Prosecutorial discretion remains a key safeguard, and evidence of domestic abuse would be a highly relevant factor in any decision to prosecute, or in whether the Director of Public Prosecutions would give his consent in addition. Factors that are relevant to the public interest do not require proof to the criminal standard. It is a much more “in the round” assessment than would be required if bringing some kind of criminal proceedings.

To be clear, in answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the Government continue to believe that the civil courts remain best placed to deal with child abduction cases. That is why we support international co-operation and recourse to the 1980 Hague convention as a civil mechanism for facilitating the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other state parties and the Hague Conference, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, to ensure that the convention operates effectively. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in effect agreed, that this prosecution should be the act of last resort. We agree. We are conscious, however, that criminal proceedings may be needed in some cases. It has been suggested that some parents see detaining a child abroad following any earlier consent as an easier route to keeping their child permanently outside the UK with no criminal charges or police involvement. That clearly circumvents the law. This change to the criminal law is intended to sit alongside and supplement existing civil remedies, rather than filling the courts with people who have retained their child abroad.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asks whether the Government would be prepared to add a domestic abuse defence, in effect. The law on defences, including those relevant to domestic abuse, is highly complex. It requires definitions and decisions about where the burden of proof lies and what the standard of proof will be. It is precisely because of this complexity that the Law Commission is currently reviewing defences in domestic abuse cases as part of its wider project on homicide and sentencing. While the primary focus of its review is on homicide, the findings are likely to have broader implications for how defences operate in domestic abuse contexts and could be relevant across a broader range of offences. A bespoke defence of domestic abuse in the offence created by Clause 104 could have implications far beyond the child abduction framework.

I hope that the noble Baroness will accept from me that the Law Commission’s findings will be carefully reviewed before any changes to the law are considered, in order to ensure that any legislative changes are informed by evidence. In the meantime, we are exploring ways to strengthen our understanding of how defences operate in non-homicide cases by gathering more robust data. For these reasons, it would be premature to legislate before the Law Commission has completed its work, but I take the point about the equality impact assessment and the gendered nature of some of these offences. I will, if I may, write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and, obviously, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well.

I turn very briefly to government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549. Until now, the provisions in Clause 104 extended to England and Wales only. However, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive, these provisions will now also apply to Northern Ireland. I note the concerns raised by the two amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment at this stage. I hope your Lordships will join me in supporting the government amendments in this group.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to all those who have spoken. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hacking and Lord Davies, for their implied support. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for their detailed responses to the amendment and the debate we are having. They rightly confirmed that criminal proceedings must be a last resort, and that we should always aim for these cases to be settled via the family court and through the Hague process.

I am particularly grateful to the Minister for her detailed response on the two-stage test, especially the public interest test. If that is where domestic abuse issues can be assessed, that is good. I am also grateful that she has repeated that the consent of the DPP must be obtained, and that this is not up to the criminal standard. That is very reassuring.

It is always difficult when the Law Commission is working on something, because one cannot say “When is it going to be done?” I hope that it will not be too long. If issues remain after the Law Commission reports, I hope that the Government, or a future Government, will be prepared to discuss this at that point. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

336: After Clause 104, insert the following new Clause—
“Child abduction: Northern Ireland(1) The Child Abduction (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (S.I. 1985/1638 (N.I. 17)) is amended as set out in subsections (2) and (3).(2) In Article 3 (offence of abduction of child by parent etc)—(a) after paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) Subject to paragraphs (2A) to (3A) and (7), a person connected with a child under the age of 16 commits an offence if—(a) the child is taken or sent out of the United Kingdom with the appropriate consent, and(b) at any time after the child is taken or sent, the person detains the child outside the United Kingdom without the appropriate consent.”;(b) in paragraph (2A)—(i) in the words before sub-paragraph (a), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or by detaining a child outside the United Kingdom,”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (b) (before its substitution by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(iii) in each of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) (as substituted by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(c) in paragraph (2B), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(d) in paragraph (3A), in paragraph (b) after “out of the United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”. (3) In the Schedule (modifications of Article 3 for children in certain cases), in each of the following provisions after “paragraph (1)” insert “or (1A)”—(a) paragraph 1(2)(a);(b) paragraph 3(2)(a) (before its substitution by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(c) paragraph 3(2)(a) (as substituted by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(d) paragraph 4(2)(a).(4) The amendments made by this section apply only in cases where the taking or sending of the child out of the United Kingdom takes place on or after the date on which this section comes into force.(5) In this section “the 2022 Act” means the Adoption and Children Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 18 (N.I.)).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in Northern Ireland for a parent etc to detain a child under 16 outside the UK without appropriate consent.