Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her kind words about the new offence with respect to child sexual abuse image generators and I take the opportunity to recognise the work of the specialist police unit that has worked alongside me on these and other issues. Working at the front line of child sexual abuse detection and enforcement is to come up against some of the most sordid and horrendous scenarios that can make you lose faith in humanity, so I want to put on record our huge debt to those in the unit for their courage and commitment.

I was also pleased to hear the Minister’s commitment to criminalise pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation. This is one of a number of concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, will speak to shortly, and I shall be supporting her on all her amendments. During the Recess, I chaired a meeting of extremely senior health professionals and the prevalence of young people presenting in clinical settings suffering from violence and abuse during sex was simply horrific, with outcomes ranging from fear and trauma to death itself. There is an epidemic of sexual violence, normalised and driven by pornography, and I very much hope that the noble Baroness will have the support of the whole House on this matter.

I have four further areas of concern and I am going to touch on each very briefly. First, this House successfully introduced amendments to the Data (Use and Access) Act to empower coroners to require technology companies to preserve data when a child has died. At the time, we proposed that preservation notices should be automatic and that statutory guidance should be developed, but this was refused. We now have the law, but bereaved families are still unable to benefit from its provisions, because preservation notices are not being used quickly enough, and nor are the powers fully understood. It is simply heartbreaking to see a parent who has just lost a child become a victim of a system that does not understand or use its own powers. I will be tabling amendments to make the new law work as was promised and as Parliament intended.

Secondly, we have all seen media reports of chatbots suggesting illegal content or activity to children. I remain unclear about the Government’s appetite to strengthen Ofcom’s codes or to resolve the differences of opinion between Parliament and the regulator about the scope of the Online Safety Act. Nevertheless, I will be seeking to ensure that AI chatbots that suggest or facilitate illegal activity are addressed in the Crime and Policing Bill.

Thirdly, as I have indicated, I welcome the CSAM generator offence in the Bill, but a gap remains and I will be tabling amendments to place clear, legally binding duties on developers of generative AI systems to conduct risk assessments, identifying whether and how their systems could be misused for this narrow but devastating purpose.

Finally, I am curious about youth diversion orders. I am by no means against them, but I would like to understand whether they are to be backed up by other support, such as autism screening and therapeutic support. Many at the front line of this issue say that there is a serious lack of resource, and I would be interested to hear from Ministers how young people are to be supported once diverted, and whether the Government have plans to look further at the responsibility of tech companies that deliberately design for constant engagement, even if extreme content is being used simply as bait. It is no longer possible to consider the online world as separate from any other environment and, if we do not impose the legal order we require elsewhere, we will continue to create a place of lawlessness and abuse.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

266: Clause 63, page 81, line 34, at end insert—
“46D Child sexual abuse image-generation risk assessment(1) A provider of an online service, including but not limited to a generative AI large language model, must risk assess the likelihood of their service being used to create or facilitate the creation of a CSA image or images as defined by section 46A.(2) If a risk is identified in a CSA risk assessment—(a) where the provider is regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must report the risk and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM;(b) where the provider is not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks of their online service being used to create or facilitate the creation of CSA images with the National Crime Agency.(3) Where a provider regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM (see subsection (2)(a)), they can be subjected to OFCOM’s enforcement powers set out in Part 7, Chapter 6 (enforcement powers) of that Act.(4) Where a provider not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with the National Crime Agency (see subsection (2)(b)), they commit an offence.(5) A provider that commits an offence under this section is liable to be issued with a penalty notice by the National Crime Agency.(6) In this section a “penalty notice” means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding whichever is the greater of—(a) £18 million, or(b) 10% of a provider’s qualifying worldwide revenue for the most recent complete accounting period.(7) A penalty notice may be reissued where a provider continues to commit an offence under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that services that do not fall into scope of Clause 63 as currently drafted still assess and mitigate the risk of their services being used as an AI child sexual abuse generator.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 266, I will speak also to Amendments 479 and 480, all of which are in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Russell, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for their support.

All three amendments concern illegal or harmful online activity. Amendment 266 places a legal duty on online services, including generative AI services, to conduct risk assessments evaluating the likelihood that their systems could be used to create or facilitate child sexual abuse material. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause establishes that duty. Subsection (2) requires providers to report the results to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency, depending on whether or not they are regulated under the Online Safety Act. Subsections (3) to (7) set out the enforcement mechanisms, drawing on Ofcom’s existing enforcement powers under the OSA or equivalent powers for the NCA.

Amendment 266 complements Clause 63, which creates the new offence relating to the supply of CSA image generators to which the Minister has just spoken, but it is in addition to those powers. In June 2023, the BBC reported that the open-source AI model Stable Diffusion was being used to generate child sexual abuse material. Researchers at Stanford University subsequently found that Stable Diffusion had been trained on datasets containing child sexual abuse material. This issue is not confined to a single model. The Internet Watch Foundation and the chair of the AI Security Institute have warned of the potential for open-source AI models to be used for the creation of CSAM.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very happy to arrange a meeting with an appropriate Minister. I would be very happy to sit in on it. Other Ministers may wish to take the lead on this, because there are technology issues as well. I have Home Office responsibilities across the board, but I have never refused a meeting with a Member of this House in my 16 months here and I am not going to start now, so the answer to that question is yes. The basic presumption at the moment is that we are not convinced that the technology is yet at the stage that the noble Lord believes it to be, but that is a matter for future operation. I again give him the assurance that, in the event that the technology proves to be successful, the Government will wish to examine it in some detail.

I have absolutely no doubt that we will revisit these matters but, for the moment, I hope that the noble Baroness can withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Nash, for his amendment and his fierce following of this issue, and for bringing it to our attention. I recognise that this is a Home Office Bill and that some of these things cross to DSIT, but we are also witnessing crime. The Home Office must understand that not everything can be pushed to DSIT.

Your Lordships have just met the tech Lords. These are incredibly informed people from all over the Chamber who share a view that we want a technological world that puts kids front and centre. We are united in that and, as the Minister has suggested, we will be back.

I have three very quick points. First, legal challenges, operational difficulties and the capacity of the NCA and Ofcom were the exact same reasons why Clause 63 was not in the Online Safety Bill or the Data (Use and Access) Bill. It is unacceptable for officials to always answer with those general things. Many noble Lords said, “It’s so difficult”, and, “This is new”, with the Online Safety Bill. It is not new: we raised these issues before. If we had acted three or four years ago, we would not be in this situation. I urge this Government to get on the front foot, because we know what is coming.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

In conclusion, how many more times will we debate these issues? These amendments are not radical; they are reasonable, evidence-based and urgently needed. We cannot allow the increase in harmful online content to continue. This must stop. I urge the Government to support these amendments, which are the foundation of a safer digital world. If we fail to act, we risk legitimising a culture in which abuse is normalised and young people grow up with a distorted understanding of healthy relationships. As I always say, childhood lasts a lifetime, so let us act now to ensure that every childhood is free from abuse and victimisation. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin. I share much of her frustration about us being here discussing this again and hearing that litany of powerful images—that I would rather unhear—from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I do not propose to add to them, except to say that what the noble Baroness has said on the record, in Hansard, is not an exaggeration or cherry-picking; it is normal, and the House must consider whether that is the “normal” we would like to live in.

I have been proud to add my name to the noble Baroness’s amendments. I commend her on her work on the pornography review, which I know was an enormous effort and, as I understand it, quite a catastrophic personal experience. I also want to take the opportunity to commend the Government on recognising the issue of strangulation. I know we will come to it, but I wanted to mention it in this group, because it is this relationship between what happens online and how that then impacts offline that we have to concentrate on. A few weeks ago, I was with a group of very senior medical professionals, and one consultant radiologist talked about how post-mortem guidance is being changed to check for strangulation as a cause of death among young women. That is chilling. The entire room was chilled. It is an indictment of how prevalent and serious the consequences of violent pornography are. We must not hide behind thinking this is happening in another space; this is the space in which people are now living.

On the same theme, some time ago I was contacted by a lawyer who told me that she dreaded freshers’ week. Each year, an increasingly long line of barely adult young men would come through her door facing charges of acts of sexual violence which mimicked behaviour they had seen online. A wealth of talented young women are now traumatised at a crucial point in their life, and a litany of young men, probably equally talented, are now sex offenders. These lives are being ruined.

The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness are sensible—I believe that was the word the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, used. I do not know whether they are radical; I hope they are, and I hope they solve the problem, but they are sensible solutions. They seek to close the gaps, and have taken learnings from other jurisdictions, which is crucial. The whole world is tackling this, and we must learn from what other people understand. We do not need to make it all up ourselves. “Not made here” is about the worst thing that we keep on seeing in politics, particularly in the online sphere.

I support all the amendments in this group, and I wanted briefly to mention just two of them. First, Amendment 298 would prohibit ownership of software which we often call “nudification” apps. A Teacher Tapp survey last week found that one in 10 teachers were aware of pupils creating “deepfake, sexually explicit videos”, and the safeguarding lead who was quoted warned that deepfakes and nudifiers

“feel like the next train coming down the track”.

I know a lot of safeguarding staff, and this is what they are saying. Can we, as a Parliament and as a House, be ahead of the train coming down the track rather than waiting for it to come and ruin our schools?

The Children’s Commissioner points out in her briefing, which supports these amendments wholeheartedly, that nudification technology is harming girls. Even if they have not been directly targeted by the tools, girls report withdrawing from the online world—for example, not posting pictures of their full faces to reduce the chances of their being transplanted on to a naked body. Can we not, as a House, stand up for women in the public sphere? This is not okay. It is so regressive to look at a technology that silences young girls’ participation in this new world.

Rightly, this amendment does not create an offence for under-18s, so I have another request of the Government: that they accept the amendment but also commit to adopting a broader strategy to tackle the deepfake crisis in schools before it is too late.

Last week, we had a debate in which the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, said that this issue sits with DSIT and not the Home Office. My understanding is that the issue I am addressing could sit with DSIT and the DfE. However, the Government as a whole have a commitment to children, and as a whole they have committed to halving violence against women and girls. I will do a shout-out here and say that men do experience violence, but it is primarily experienced by women and girls. So, unless the Government start to act more swiftly on our concerns about technology-facilitated sexual abuse, they will be failing in both their responsibility to children and their commitment to women and girls.

Amendment 314 seeks to create parity between laws that regulate pornography online and offline. It is a perennial cause of harm that the tech sector lacks accountability. This lack of accountability, the lack of parity, seen through the lens of pornography, is the very definition of tech exceptionalism. The laws that apply to the rest of our lives in society do not apply in the technological sphere, protected by tens of millions of lobbying dollars. This is at the heart of the problem that we are discussing. Pornography has been a major engine of the tech sector. It is worth billions of dollars, responsible for millions of downloads and a significant driver of online traffic.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it would not be right to begin the Government’s response to this group of amendments without first thanking unequivocally the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. The whole Chamber will join me in saying that we have a great deal to thank her for. She has worked tirelessly on the independent pornography review and has long campaigned to raise awareness of the ways pornography shapes sexual behaviour. This Government share her determination to ensure that the online world is a safer place for everyone, and we are immensely grateful to her for her insights.

The motivation for these amendments is important and I make it absolutely clear that I take them seriously. I have not disagreed with a single word that has been said in the impassioned and sometimes angry contributions in this Chamber—I share that anger and outrage. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is aware, following our meeting last week, of the reasons why the Government will resist her amendments at this stage. However, I look forward to continuing our discussions in greater detail over the coming weeks, including in meetings between my department, the Home Office and DSIT. I hope we will all work closely together to achieve our shared objectives.

I also take this opportunity to announce that the Government will accept, in part, one of the noble Baroness’s recommendations from her pornography review—namely, recommendation 24. The Government will review the criminal law relating to pornography, which will give us a chance to look at the law holistically and consider whether it is fit for purpose in an ever-developing online world. Importantly, the review I am announcing today will look into the effectiveness of the existing law in relation to criminalising, among other things, harmful depictions of incest and any forms of pornography that encourage child sexual abuse.

I know the noble Baroness is anxious that any review should not be used as a delaying tactic to avoid making any decisions. I hope she will take it from me that it is my wish to make sure that this takes place quickly. In addition, as I mentioned to her when we met, the Government are not completely opposed to considering swifter action where this is critically important, and I know we will discuss this further at our next meeting.

Given what I have just said, I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I address Amendments 290 to 292 briefly, in the light of the fact we are proposing a review. I am very grateful for the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Benjamin, Lady Kidron, Lady Sugg and Lady Owen, my noble friends Lady Kennedy and Lady Berger, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Cameron of Lochiel—I hope I have mentioned everybody.

I appreciate the motivation behind these amendments, and I reassure my noble friend Lady Kennedy that the Government and I are very much in listening mode. Of course images of actual child incest or actual child sexual abuse are extremely harmful. The same is also true for intimate photos or videos shared without consent, and I note the concerns about how effectively this law is being enforced and regulated. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, that I am committed to working with her on the issues raised by these amendments and I very much look forward to meeting again to discuss them in greater detail to see where we can go with them.

Amendment 298 would criminalise the possession of nudification tools by users. Once again, I accept the intention behind this amendment and recognise the harm caused; it is horrifying. My noble friend Lady Berger spoke movingly about its impact on young women, and other noble Lords spoke strongly about this as well.

Our concern is that this amendment would not target those who provide these unpleasant tools to users in the UK. Additionally, as drafted, it would criminalise the possession of legitimate tools which are designed to create intimate images, such as those used in a medical context. I reiterate that we have significant sympathy for the amendment’s underlying objective, so we are actively considering what action is needed to ensure that any intervention in this area is effective. I assure the noble Baroness that we will reflect carefully on what she and other noble Lords—including the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron, Lady Boycott and Lady Owen, my noble friend Lady Berger, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, among others—have said in this debate. I also assure her that we aim to provide an update on this matter ahead of Report.

Finally, Amendment 314 seeks to bring regulatory parity between offline and online pornography. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for her continued advocacy on this topic over the years. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—for whom huge respect is due, in this House and elsewhere—the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Haslemere and Lord Nash, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, among others, all spoke powerfully about this.

I stress once again that I do not disagree with the motivation that underlies this amendment. No one could disagree with the general principle as a matter of common sense, but extensive further work with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is needed to consider and define with sufficient certainty what currently legal online pornography should not be permitted. It is also important that we make a thorough exploration of the existing legislation and regulation to ensure any new offence is enforceable, protects users to the highest standard and works as intended.

Under the Video Recordings Act, the distribution of pornography on physical media formats is regulated by the BBFC, as we have heard. Obviously, the BBFC will not classify any content which breaches criminal law. Amendment 314 as drafted would create a criminal offence which would require a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content which has not been subject to the classification process. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, expressed concerns about the drafting of this amendment while supporting its underlying motivation. As I hope your Lordships will agree, creating this style of criminal offence requires a clearer and more certain definition of this pornographic content, as any individual would need to be able clearly to understand what they need to do to regulate their conduct, so as not to inadvertently commit a criminal offence.

I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, will appreciate the reasons I have set out for the Government not supporting these amendments today. That said, I hope the announcement of the review into the criminal law and the Government’s commitment to work with the noble Baroness over the coming weeks will leave her sufficiently reassured not to press her amendments at this stage.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I want to ask the Minister about the timing. Her tone is exceptionally welcome— I will leave the substance of her response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin—but I am watching facial recognition, edtech and AI being rolled out by the Government with impunity. Even earlier today, at Questions, the tool was put at a higher order than the safety. What is the timeframe for the reviews and in which we can expect these very urgent questions to be addressed? There is a Bill in front of us, but when will the next Bill come?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Can the noble Baroness imagine just how unpopular I would be if I committed to an absolute timeframe? What I can say is that I hope she will take it from me that I regard this as important. The meetings with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, have started. This matters but we need to get it right.

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I enthusiastically join my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti in praising the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I was in the House—it was on a Friday—when she first moved her Private Member’s Bill. The Minister then was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and he promised that the Government would review and come to the assistance of the noble Baroness. What she is doing now is quite amazing, with a number of very detailed amendments. I will hold myself here to await what my noble friend the Minister will say in reply, but I do hope she will be very positive.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to add my voice to the praise for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen—me too—and to put on record my support. I believe the noble Baroness did such a detailed, forensic laying out of her amendments. I would just like to make a couple of points.

During the passage of the Online Safety Act, we had a lot of discussion about an ombudsman. It was very much resisted. At the same time—in the same time- frame as that Bill took place—I was an adviser to the Irish Government, who put in an ombudsman. I think we are missing something. It was a very big part of the previous discussion about chatbots and so on in an earlier group. I very firmly agree with what the noble Baroness said as she laid out her amendments: we really need a way of alerting the regulator to what is going on, and it is not adequate for the regulator to have only an emerging harms unit that is waiting for us to fill in a form, which is the current state of play. I leave that with the Minister as a problem that needs solving.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

438ED: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“Police protocols when investigating the death of a child(1) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 27 (common law rules as to criminal investigations), insert—“Inclusion of guidance on collecting digital data when investigating the death of a child(1) Within six months the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, the code of practice under section 23 must include protocols that a person of a prescribed authority must adhere to when investigating the death of a child.(2) These protocols must include the treatment of potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry.(3) In order to treat a potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry, a person of a prescribed authority, must—(a) seize and forensically examine digital devices as soon as is reasonably possible;(b) take all reasonable steps to capture early digital evidence and account data, taking into account that online services delete user data after a short period of inactivity;(c) document a child’s activity on all known online services, including recommended content, interactions with other users, content viewed, content uploaded, and any relevant metadata.(4) Where an investigation gives evidence that a service regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 may have breached that Act, Ofcom must be notified and supplied with the evidence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would update statutory guidance issued to police to include guidance on effective evidence-collecting during an investigation into the death of a child.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barran and Lady Morgan, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their support.

It is heartbreaking to be here again. I first raised this issue over four years ago after witnessing Senior Coroner Walker’s difficulties in obtaining data from US tech firms during his investigation into the death of Molly Russell. Senior Coroner Walker, Ian Russell—Molly’s father—and the family’s lawyers fought for years to secure data that revealed the role played by Pinterest and Meta, and this evidence was central to the coroner’s finding that both services,

“contributed to her death in a more than minimal way”.

Data is crucial. The original amendments were also recommended in the pre-legislative Joint Committee report on the draft Online Safety Bill. We debated them at length during the Bill’s proceedings. We got agreement to put them into the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which fell when the election was called. We tried to push them through in the wash-up and finally, after years of campaigning by bereaved families, they were included in the Data (Use and Access) Act last year.

I say all this because I want the Minister, when she replies, to weigh up her words carefully, knowing that the bereaved families, who have worked so hard to pass these provisions for so many years—some of whom are in the Gallery today—are still waiting. Yesterday, I met several bereaved families, including Mia Janin’s father, Mariano, who held a photograph of his daughter as he described a recent meeting with the Secretary of State, Liz Kendall. He said, “I thought it was a good meeting until I realised it was the same meeting we had with Peter Kyle a year ago—except this year we needed a bigger room because there are more bereaved parents, more dead children”.

I also heard yesterday of a newly bereaved parent who tried to get the police to access her daughter’s data, only to be told by Gloucestershire Constabulary’s occupational health department to talk to Ellen Roome: “She knows more about the law than the entire Gloucestershire police force”. I spoke to Ellen, who is with us in the Gallery, and she told me that the police downloaded her son Jools’s data in 2022 but are only now beginning to examine it.

We have a law, but it is not working, and I want to set out three reasons why. First, although coroners can ask Ofcom to issue a data preservation notice that requires online services to retain data in advance of issuing a Schedule 5 notice, they are not routinely doing so. Although Section 101 enables Ofcom to use its information-gathering powers when it receives a Schedule 5 notice from a coroner, it is not routinely doing that either.

I have eight separate letters from the Government saying who has been written to and outlining what guidance has been sent to whom, but still bereaved parents come to my door. For some, the loss of their child is still raw and they are blindly trying to work out the system; others are heartbroken that the opportunity to preserve data is long gone because they found out about the law too late. Sometimes, the coroner does not know that the measure exists or does not understand that data disappears and wants to wait for the police investigation before even considering such a request. All these different reasons undermine the fundamental purpose of the law.

To be absolutely clear, I have no criticism of the coroners. They are not experts in digital systems and cannot reasonably be expected to know that even a brief engagement, such as hovering over a link or pausing on a piece of content, can influence how an algorithm responds. Nor are they expected to know that platforms routinely infer and group children into behavioural cohorts relating, for example, to low mood, late-night use, social isolation or identity exploration. Nor are they supposed to know that seemingly fleeting online interactions can leave persistent data traces. The measure was specifically designed for Ofcom to take that burden from the coroners, but that has not happened.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I can start again; I am very grateful to my noble friend for taking over. I say now that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as she and I discussed when we met briefly the other day. The Government do have concerns that being too prescriptive in legislation may create more problems than it solves because the legislation would need to be amended every time there were changes in technology or in operational practices. Your Lordships will be well aware, given our many late nights spent scrutinising primary legislation, of which tonight may be another, how clunky, cumbersome and time-consuming it can be to keep amending primary legislation.

For this reason, it is the Government’s view that our shared objective can be achieved using non-statutory guidance. Police forces are well used to applying and following guidance in a range of areas, from missing people to information sharing. Having said that, I make the point that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to see whether we can find a way through this by working together to do so.

I turn to Amendments 474 and 475. Again, this is an issue that the Government take very seriously. I reassure your Lordships that we are carefully considering the issues that these amendments raise and are grateful for the continued engagement of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the bereaved families. Taken together, these amendments would require coroners to notify Ofcom within five days of a child’s death, triggering a standard form to request data preservation.

Once again, we can see the appeal of such a requirement. The problem is that it would apply to all cases of deaths in the over-fives, regardless of whether social media may be relevant to their death. So, for example, where a child died as a result of a road traffic collision or of cancer, it is unlikely in most cases that social media retention would be of use to the police or the coroner. Therefore, while the Government are sympathetic to the aims of these amendments, it is our view that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

On that point, does the Minister have the number of children over five who die in other ways, just so the Committee can understand how much of a burden that might be?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I cannot give the noble Baroness the answer now, but I can write to her with that data.

Our view is that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences; the need not to place a disproportionate burden on those investigating; and how such a provision might be drafted so as not to capture deaths which are outwith the scope of the amendment.

To conclude, we are not saying no. What I am saying is that I understand the noble Baroness’s concern that the existing statutory provision for the preservation of a deceased child’s social media data should operate as effectively as possible and we will consider carefully what further steps could be taken. As I have just mentioned, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and I spoke briefly and agreed to meet, and I am happy to extend that to include Ministers from both the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.

I look forward to updating the House on Report on this important topic. I cannot update the Committee in relation to the issues with the United States now, but I will write to the noble Baroness in relation to that. In the meantime, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I start by accepting all the various offers to meet the Minister and thank her for her tone in her response and for expanding it to the other departments as necessary. Before I withdraw the amendment, however, I want to make a couple of things very clear.

First, this sits in the broader issue of failure to have the Online Safety Act implemented properly. It sits in the broader issue of why children are dying at all. Moreover—I think I have to say this both on my own behalf and on behalf of the bereaved parents—I am very grateful for everybody’s gratitude, but we do not want gratitude; we want action. I am sorry, but on the actual points—six months, the same letter about the guidance that never comes—I do not accept that there cannot be a way of exempting sick children, and I would like to know how many children died in car crashes because someone was on the phone.

I do not think it is an excuse, and I really feel at this point that officials and Ministers are way too comfortable with unintended consequences. How about the House starts with dealing with the intended consequences of its legislation that are not being properly implemented? With that, and the promise to come back on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 438ED withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

209: Clause 65, page 84, line 42, at end insert—
“46D Child sexual abuse image-generation risk assessment(1) A provider of an online service, including but not limited to a generative AI large language model, must risk assess the likelihood of their service being used to create or facilitate the creation of a CSA image or images as defined by section 46A. (2) If a risk is identified in a CSA image-generation risk assessment—(a) where the provider is regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must report the risk within two working days to OFCOM, and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks within 14 days;(b) where the provider is not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must notify the National Crime Agency within two working days and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks of the online service being used to create or facilitate the creation of CSA images within 14 days.(3) Where a provider regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM (see subsection (2)(a)), they can be subjected to OFCOM’s enforcement powers as set out in Part 7, Chapter 6 (enforcement powers) of that Act.(4) Where a provider not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with the National Crime Agency (see subsection (2)(b)), they commit an offence.(5) A provider that commits an offence under this section is liable to be issued with a penalty notice by the National Crime Agency.(6) In this section a “penalty notice” means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding whichever is the greater of—(a) £18 million, or(b) 10% of a provider’s qualifying worldwide revenue for the most recent complete accounting period.(7) A penalty notice may be reissued where a provider continues to commit an offence under this section.(8) In carrying out its duties set out in this section, the National Crime Agency may consult with OFCOM.”Member’s explanatory statement
The Bill includes amendments which prohibit the creation of Gen-AI models specifically designed to create CSA images, but it is still possible for general-purpose models to be used to create CSA images. The Government has committed to allow providers of other Gen-AI services to risk assess how their services could be used for this purpose. This amendment makes that a requirement.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Clement-Jones, for adding their names. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for trying to add her name. Such was the enthusiasm that there was no space.

As already discussed, the Government have brought in new Clauses 92 and 93 to allow companies and responsible third parties to risk-assess the creation of CSA by gen AI models. That is an important detail. If the company is red teaming, or the regulator needs to test, it must not be guilty of an offence for doing so. But this new measure is permission, not obligation—and permission is not enough.

Amendment 209 seeks to do three things: to make risk assessment mandatory; to require mitigation within 14 days; and to hold companies not covered by the Online Safety Act to the same standard via the National Crime Agency.

A report from UNICEF last month referenced an Interpol study across 11 countries which found that at least 1.2 million children have disclosed having their images manipulated into sexually explicit images in the past year. In some countries that is equivalent to one child in every classroom being subjected to this new form of child sexual abuse. The report recommended the introduction of guardrails for AI developers at the design stage. In a meeting earlier in your Lordships’ House, we were told repeatedly and reminded graphically that AI CSAM creates appetite in offenders and that what happens online does not stay online.

We have consulted, and Ofcom has consulted—Parliament has debated this for years—and now we are consulting again. I argue that there are three reasons for accepting the amendment right now.

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I am happy to confirm to noble Lords that this will allow us to impose duties on these services that correspond to, or are similar to, the Act’s duties on tackling child sexual exploitation and abuse content. Chatbot providers will have a legal duty to protect all users from illegal content, including non-consensual sexual deepfakes, and where chatbots continue to generate such content, the providers should expect to face the consequences of breaking the law that we hope that this House will pass.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

If I was in the same meeting as the Minister, officials were unable to say that LLMs and generative models would be covered by that amendment. Indeed, they said that the policy of the Government was chatbots only. Chatbots are the subject of another amendment that I have tabled, which we will come to later. We have to be clear that the amendment in front of us remains only because I was told this afternoon that the new government amendment would not cover the same territory.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The government amendment has been tabled. I am asking the noble Baroness—whether she does this is self-evidently a matter for her—to withdraw her amendment and look at the amendment that we have tabled today on a cross-party basis and on behalf of DSIT and the Home Office, the department that I represent. That amendment will be debated around 18 March, and she can make comments on it at that stage. I am trying to meet the needs of the House and the Government to respond to what are complex and difficult challenges. All I will say is that, by bringing more AI services into the scope of the Online Safety Act, we will ensure that there is a clear and consistent regulatory framework that will allow us to hold companies to account.

In Clause 93, we have introduced the technology testing defence that will enable persons authorised by the Secretary of State to test technology for these harms. The defence will give providers reassurance to test the robustness of their models’ safeguards, identify weaknesses and design out harmful inputs. This, in turn, will reduce the risk of their models being criminally misused, particularly to abuse women and children. This further supports all AI companies in scope of the Online Safety Act with their risk-assessment obligations.

Given those measures—the noble Baroness will have to make a judgment on this—but the Government consider that Amendment 209 is therefore unnecessary as it cuts across the approach that I have outlined to date both in the Bill, in Clause 93 and the clauses I outlined earlier, and the proposed amendment that I shared with her as best I could prior to this debate. The House has a chance to look at that now that it is published. This cuts across that duty and imposes a broad statutory duty on online services, duplicating regulatory mechanisms, and it could create legal uncertainty. The noble Lord, Clement-Jones, challenged me on that, but that is the view of Ministers, officials and our legal departments. We are worried about the similar enforcement routes outside the Online Safety Act framework.

We take this seriously. The points that the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, made are extremely important. I was not able to attend the briefing earlier, but I know how much that has impacted Members who have spoken today. The National Crime Agency and police will play a key role in protecting children from UK child abuse. It is warned that the scale and complexity of online child sexual abuse are resulting in tens of millions of annual referrals of suspected online sexual abuse. Policing resources are best spent on protecting children and arresting offenders, so it is appropriate that Ofcom continues to play a critical regulatory role in preventing and tackling the AI generation of child sexual abuse material.

I have tried to persuade the noble Baroness but, if I have not succeeded, there will have to be a Division. I do not want there to be one because I think this House should speak with one voice on tackling this issue. The laudable objectives of the amendment are, we believe, better addressed through both the existing legislative framework and the targeted government amendment we have tabled today to expand the scope of the Online Safety Act to bring illegal content duties in line for chatbots. This will mean that providers need to mitigate potential risks to prevent children facing such abuse.

I hope I have convinced the noble Baroness. Again, I apologise to the House for the lateness of the tabling of the amendment. We are trying to work across government on this, and that amendment will be debated on 18 March. In light of that, I hope the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, as a point of information, I feel it would be useful to say that Clauses 64 and 65, to which the Minister refers, are in fact a narrowing of an original amendment, laid by me and other noble Lords, that the Government deliberately narrowed so that it deals only with electronic files that have been deliberately and exclusively created to create child sexual abuse. I very much welcome those clauses. However, if the Government had not narrowed that amendment, I would not be standing here today with this amendment.

I am grateful for the Minister’s time, and I am happy with the chatbot amendment as far as it goes—and inasmuch as I have seen it an hour before everyone else—but it does not deal with this issue. I rang the Minister this morning and asked for a meeting to say, “If you can tell me that this is covered by the chatbot amendment or that it’s already covered in another way, I will back down”. But I am afraid that nobody could tell me that, because it is not. That is just how it is.

I say to the noble Lord speaking for the Official Opposition, no, no, no. It is not okay to say, “We must work out how to do this”. This is an opportunity to work out how. We always do it this way. We pass an amendment; we get a power; and Ofcom and the Government do the guidance. I say to the whole House, and particularly to my friends on the Labour Benches who may be considering voting against this, have any of you seen child sexual abuse made out of your image? I have. It is not funny; it is serious and it is easily done. I think it is unacceptable to vote against an amendment that says only, “Risk assess”. It is not okay to put a product out in the world if you do not have any responsibility for the harm it causes. So, I do not expect to win, because the Government are whipping against and the Opposition are sitting on their hands, but I think it is important to say to the people who are in a vortex of this kind of abuse that at least some of us in this House have their backs.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

When the noble Baroness says that some of us in this House are concerned about this issue, I want to say to her that all of us in this House are concerned about this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and myself have many differences in this House, but we are at one in trying to improve the position of the regulations to tackle this issue. The amendment that I have tabled is a very important step forward on behalf of the Government, on a DSIT and Home Office basis, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord. I do not want to have a Division in this House. The Government and the Opposition may well win that vote, but I do not want that Division to happen; I want us to go forward in a constructive way, to look at the amendments that are tabled and to make a change that really benefits people.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I say to the noble Lord that there is only one way to prevent a Division on this issue, which is either to stand at the Dispatch Box and say that it is covered, or that we will keep it alive until Third Reading so that we can make sure that it is covered. If I have insulted anyone by suggesting that only some of us are willing to walk through the Lobby to protect children from child sexual abuse, forgive me, but unless the Minister has something to say, then as a matter of principle I shall divide the House.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this group covers a range of human conduct, from the objectionable to the disgusting. I thank the Minister for tabling a series of amendments which will benefit women and society at large. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for all the work that she has done, which has led us to this position, and for the amendments that she has tabled. I am sure that the whole House is very grateful to her.

I will speak specifically to Amendment 273, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to which I have added my name. I understand that the noble Baroness may, if the Minister does not accept the amendment, wish to test the opinion of the House. This amendment simply seeks to impose a duty on a court to make a deprivation and deletion order where a person is convicted of an offence involving sharing or threatening to share intimate images without the consent of the victim.

The argument in favour of this amendment is very simple. It is necessary to give comfort to the victim who knows that the perpetrator has created or distributed the intimate images without consent. Unless there is a duty to destroy this content, the victim is inevitably going to remain extremely concerned that the content will remain in circulation and in existence.

That is the first argument. The second argument is that I can think of no justification whatever why the culprit should retain such intimate images when they have been convicted of being a wrongdoer in this respect. Those two points make this amendment unanswerable, and I strongly support it.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group—the government amendments, those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, and the other amendment that was tabled. It was such an excellent speech, with such detail, that I do not want to go over the specifics, except to say that the noble Baroness is our leader and we will follow her through the Lobby.

I want to make one point, regarding the fantastic list of what is in the gap between what Ofcom can do and what Parliament can do. We should hesitate on that thought. Having looked a little this afternoon at the Government’s consultation, I see that there is almost nothing about what Ofcom cannot do, almost nothing about enforcement and, as I explained earlier, almost nothing about risk assessment. What happens beforehand, to prevent all this? What happens after it has all happened and we start to get enforcement? We cannot keep playing around in the middle. We have to go upstream, to the beginning, and we have to come to the end and get these things categorically dealt with in a way that interferes with business and makes it unacceptable to do it. With that, I will be supporting the noble Baroness.

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I urge the Government to support these amendments. They are the foundation of a safer online world. If we fail to act, we risk legitimising a culture where abuse is normalised, and we cannot allow the increase of harmful online content to continue. It must be stopped because it causes harm and poisons minds, especially those of children and very young people and distorts the concept of a healthy, loving relationship. I will say it again and again and again: childhood lasts a lifetime, so let us act now to ensure that every childhood is free from abuse, victimisation and exploitation. Let us act now, sooner rather than later, to help those victims who are being victimised right at this very moment. Let us focus our minds on those young people and those children.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, briefly, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. It has been a very grim afternoon, I have to say, repeatedly hearing some of the most horrendous things that can happen to women and children. I say to the Minister, for whom I have a great deal of respect and who spoke passionately—a word normally associated with me—that this is still too little, too late and too long across a number of these issues. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, is relatively new in the House, but we have been debating these things for eight years and I remember having this exact discussion during the Online Safety Bill. We have to just move on. We cannot keep on saying that it moves quickly and then allowing ourselves to move this slowly.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, made a really strong case that online porn affects real life. It is real-life violence and there is this unbelievably vast overlap with child sexual abuse. It is that mess that we have to see as one and, in that sense, the noble Baroness made the case for all of her amendments. I want to quickly mention government Amendment 272, which establishes an offence if a person makes or adapts, or

“supplies or offers to supply a thing, for use as a generator of … intimate images”.

What has happened to that amendment is exactly the same as what happened to the child sexual abuse amendment that has the same form. It deals with intentionality and says: “If you absolutely intend to do this, it will be illegal. But if it happens in general, on any old piece of software that somebody hasn’t bothered to train properly or put protections in, then you’re not caught”. I believe that is what the noble Baroness has in her broader amendment about software.

I really want to make the point that there seems to be a reluctance to catch general- purpose technology in these issues of child abuse, violence against women, intimate image abuse and pornography, and I hope that the Government are listening. We cannot avoid general-purpose technology if that is what is spreading, creating and making this situation available across communities. It is in that space that so many children first see porn. It is in that space that so many women are abused and that so much child sexual abuse is present.

I urge the Minister to think about the breadth and not just the intentionality, because in my view it does not really matter whether it is accidental on the part of the company. I finish by saying that I had the privilege of meeting Yoshua Bengio last week, who is absolutely central to the development of AI and neural networks, and so on. He said, and I paraphrase: show me the incentive and I will show you the design.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly, partly as a male of the species, since we are largely responsible for the situation we are describing. We are behind these business models, we are the sex that is making all the money out of it, and, in most cases, we are the abusers. It behoves us to acknowledge that and speak up about it.

I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. As a mother of young children, she has, on our behalf, subsumed herself for over two years in a world that most of us can barely imagine. That must have been an extraordinarily unpleasant and difficult experience. I pay tribute to her for doing it, because I am not sure many of us would have taken that on or lasted the course.

With that in mind, given the time and thought that she has given to this, the number of experts she has spoken to, the number of international parameters and comparators she has taken into account in looking at this, and the detailed way in which she has analysed the business models that underline this highly profitable business, it behoves all of us, and particularly the Government, to listen very carefully. The amendments that she has brought forth are not something that she dreamed up overnight; they are based on her detailed and painful knowledge of exactly how this business operates. She is identifying some gaps in the laudable approach the Government are taking to try to do something about this.

With my business experience hat on, I say that a major fault that businesses make is overpromising and underdelivering. His Majesty’s Government are in grave danger of doing exactly that in many of these areas to do with violence against women and girls. It is wonderful to have the headlines and to say, “We are taking this seriously and we are doing something about it”, but the devil is in the detail, and the detail is effective implementation. To effectively implement, you have to understand the business model, and, as people have said previously, you have to be prepared to disrupt it.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

These are exactly the conversations that we wish to carry on having, on how to best go about this to make sure that we achieve the aim that we are all trying to get to: getting rid of these horrible things. I would like to continue the conversation with the noble Baroness in due course.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, stressed that there was undue emphasis on intention and states of mind. Again, this is the problem with criminal offences: we do not create criminal offences where people who have done something accidentally end up being criminalised. That is why, on occasions, we say that regulation may be a better tool. The noble Baroness is looking outraged.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

No, I dare not tackle the noble Baroness on legal matters—what we do and do not do in the law—but, if you accidentally poison children’s food, you do not get a free pass. There are all sorts of places and spaces that have to—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

We will continue this, but with the greatest of respect to the noble Baroness, the fact is that all criminal offences, pretty much, apart from those that are strict liability offences, which are pretty unpopular in the criminal law—[Interruption.] We will discuss this later, but take it from me that it is very rare to criminalise something that is done accidentally.

I turn now to incest. As I said earlier today, the Government have tabled a cluster of amendments that seek to go further than Amendment 299 by criminalising the possession and publication of pornography that depicts sexual activity between both adult and child family members. The reason for doing that is that it makes it more straightforward for law enforcement and regulators to tackle the harmful content, as pornography that portrays a family relationship will be criminalised and the prosecutor does not need to have to prove that the person concerned is under 18 or is a child. It can be very difficult to prove that the person is actually a child. We therefore consider government Amendment 297 to more robustly address the harm that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, seeks to address.

I turn to the noble Baroness’s Amendments 297AA, 297B, 297C and 297D. Although I understand why she wishes to extend the Government’s amendment to a wider range of relationships, it is important that your Lordships understand that such an extension would criminalise sexual relationships that are lawful between adults in real life. With her Amendment 298, the noble Baroness has specifically sought to include that. It would go further than offline regulation, where some portrayals of step-relative relationships are classified, provided they are not in any way abusive in nature.

In addition, this change proposed by the noble Baroness’s amendment would significantly increase the complexity of the offence. For example, if the pornographic image depicted sex between step-siblings, operational partners would then also have to consider whether the persons live or have lived together, or whether one person is or has been regularly involved in caring for the other. It would be challenging for the police and the CPS to determine and ultimately prosecute. The intention behind the Government’s amendments is to make it as straightforward as possible to enforce and prosecute. That said, although I appreciate what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, I urge her not to press her amendment.

Turning now to parity, I put on record that the Government accept the principle at the heart of Amendment 298 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. There is a clear and urgent need for greater parity between the treatment of harmful pornography online and offline. This Government, who have prioritised tackling all forms of violence against women and girls, will show the leadership necessary to deliver it. We have, with thanks to the noble Baroness, already taken steps in the Bill to criminalise some of the most egregious forms of content that are currently mainstream online. The strangulation pornography offence added in Committee and the further changes we are bringing forward today on incest pornography have been added because of the noble Baroness. These matters are now prohibited under offline regulation.

Acknowledging that the changing online world brings new challenges that must be tackled to address emerging harms, we will also be reviewing the criminal law relating to pornography to assess its effectiveness. We will ensure that our online regulatory framework keeps pace with these changes to the criminal law. Delivery of parity in regulatory treatment has already started. Once enforced, these offences will become priority offences under the Online Safety Act, requiring platforms to have proportionate systems and processes in place to prevent UK users encountering this content. This should stop this abhorrent content circulating unchecked on online platforms, where right now it is being recommended to unwitting users.

While these measures mark a significant step forward in protecting individuals online, we acknowledge that they do not address the totality of the complex question on parity. The current offline regime relies on checks on individual pieces of content, which can consider wider context and nuance in a way that does not easily translate to the scale and speed of online content. For this reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s amendment, but because we completely agree with the need for greater parity, the Government are committing our joint pornography team, which was announced as part of the VAWG strategy, to produce a delivery plan within six months of Royal Assent.

Crucially, the delivery plan will set out how, not whether, the Government can most effectively close the gap. This will include consideration of how a new approach can address other potentially harmful content, such as pornography portraying step-incest relationships or adults role-playing as children. The delivery plan will thoroughly test which approach will be most effective by testing audit and reporting functions and considering how this can be done at scale to achieve the desired impact. The plan will also consider how and which regulatory frameworks can best address the issue, noting the interactions with the BBFC’s existing remit and that of Ofcom under the Online Safety Act, and how to ensure that there is effective enforcement in any future system. It will examine the case for tools, including fines and business disruption measures. We will keep up the pace. I can commit to including clear timelines for implementation in the plan, and we will keep them as short as possible, factoring in the possible need for legislation, subject to parliamentary timing. I know that my fellow Ministers will welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, joining us as we conduct this work.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

404: After Clause 182, insert the following new Clause—
“Police protocols when investigating the death of a child(1) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 27 (common law rules as to criminal investigations), insert—“27A Inclusion of guidance on collecting digital data when investigating the death of a child(1) Within six months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, the code of practice under section 23 must include protocols that a person must adhere to when investigating the death of a child.(2) These protocols must include the treatment of potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry.(3) In order to treat a potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry, an investigating person must—(a) seize and forensically examine digital devices as soon as is reasonably possible;(b) take all reasonable steps to capture early digital evidence and account data, taking into account that online services delete user data after a short period of inactivity;(c) document a child’s activity on all known online services, including recommended content, interactions with other users, content viewed, content uploaded, and any relevant metadata.(4) Where an investigation gives evidence that a service regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 may have breached the terms of that Act, OFCOM must be notified and supplied with the evidence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to update statutory guidance issued to police to include guidance on effective evidence-collecting related to potential digital harm during an investigation into the death of a child. Currently, there is no statutory guidance for police to follow regarding investigating digital harm.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 404, 405, 431 and 432. In the light of the hour and the spirit of my conversations with the Minister, I will not go through my amendments in detail, nor the very long journey it has been to get here. In short, they concern earlier agreements that, in cases where a child has died, the coroner and the police should be equipped and informed to preserve data from online services.

I thank the Minister, and officials from both the Ministry of Justice and DSIT, for their engagement. Before I put on record some of my concerns, I acknowledge that, for the past few weeks at least, we have been trying to get to the same place on this. I am disappointed that we have not quite found a way to do so, and I hope that the Minister will find a way to reassure me and—possibly more importantly—the bereaved parents who have fought hard for these amendments.

Both my Amendment 404 and government Amendment 429A seek to make it automatic that, on being notified of the death of a child, a coroner issues a data preservation notice which means that a regulated service under the Online Safety Act would have to preserve the data of a child within five days. The Government have agreed to this in principle but wanted to exclude children who die in circumstances such as a road accident or in hospital as a result of illness, to which I have agreed. But, in their effort to exclude those children, they have, in proposed new subsection (1)(b) in their Amendment 429A, allowed the coroner to decide

“that no purpose would be served by OFCOM giving a notice”

under the Act

“because such information is of no relevance to a child’s death”.

That is too broad. Giving permission for a coroner to decide what constitutes “no purpose” is a bit like snakes and ladders: we are back to the problem that has plagued bereaved parents, where coroners underestimate the speed necessary to preserve data, or the scope and importance of information that might be preserved in this way. This is not a criticism of coroners. It is far beyond the experience of professionals, across all domains, to understand the range of online material available or its ethereal nature.

My second issue with the government amendment is that they have chosen to reduce the length of time that data is preserved—the preservation notice—from a year to six months. I discussed this with officials earlier today, and I understand that it is extendable, but both I and Ellen Roome, bereaved mother of Jools, feel that it is not long enough. Some 45% of inquests take longer than six months; 18% take more than a year. Reducing the time is deliberately creating a weakness in the system at a time when parents need support and must not be made anxious by watching the clock running down and worrying whether someone, somewhere in the system, will fail to extend the preservation order.

There is also an ongoing issue with conflicts between our laws and those in the US. I received a letter from Minister Narayan this week updating me about the conflict between Section 101 of the Online Safety Act and the US Stored Communications Act. The letter said:

“Interpretation of the SCA is not settled”,


there may be some variety between different US states, and

“discussions between DSIT, Ofcom and service providers are taking a place to find a path forward”.

This regime depends entirely on resolving this issue. We were promised from the Dispatch Box that this was a priority for DSIT nearly two years ago, when the previous Government were in power. It was not done then and it is still not resolved. The letter did not mention anything about discussions between Government Ministers and their counterparts in the US, upon which this finally depends. I hope that the Minister is not surprised at the level of frustration felt by bereaved parents at the lack of speed with which this issue has been pursued.

The Government have put out a press release and made assurances to bereaved parents, and now we are here at a time of night when no vote can reasonably take place. So I would like the Minister to offer to bring pack tighter wording at Third Reading. I believe it is necessary and what parents are expecting. Even if she is not able to make that commitment tonight, it is what should happen and I ask her to try to make it happen. It has been promised and I believe it must be delivered.

I do not intend to pursue my Amendment 405, but I simply ask the Minister to put on the record how the police will be better informed of this regime. I finish by paying tribute all the bereaved families who have campaigned for this change—Jools’ law—and the amendments that preceded it. We in this House are witness to your pain and your generosity in campaigning so that others do not suffer as you have.

I wish to remind the Government of what one father said the day before Committee: “I was happy with the meeting with Liz Kendall until I realised it was the exact same meeting I had with Peter Kyle the year before. Nothing had changed except the size of the room to accommodate the increased number of bereaved parents”. There is a crisis unfolding that the Government are not grasping. Sorting out this amendment is not enough, but it must be done. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on this vital group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, concerning the investigation of child deaths, to which I have been very pleased to add my name. We all absolutely acknowledge that the noble Baroness has been tireless in her campaign and her support for the bereaved parents, and she is no less eloquent or persuasive even at this time of night.

The chink of light provided by the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, in Committee and the movement represented by government Amendments 429A and 454A are very welcome. However, on these Benches, like the noble Baroness we question whether they are as comprehensive as the solutions proposed in her amendments. The government amendments are substantive concessions regarding the principle of automatic data preservation, but they fall short of the immediate statutory certainty and the proactive coronial and police duties sought by the noble Baroness to ensure a comprehensive investigation into digital harms. So, while I welcome in principle the Government’s agreement to make DPNs automatic, their current drafting often leans on secondary legislation and future consultations. These amendments place the duty firmly in the Bill, providing the immediate legal certainty that bereaved families deserve in 2026.

Perhaps the most critical missing piece in the Government’s current approach is addressed by Amendment 404, which requires the police to investigate digital harm as a primary line of inquiry as a matter of routine. We cannot treat the digital environment as secondary to the physical. If a child is found harmed in a public park, the police do not wait for a consultation to decide whether to check the CCTV, yet when a child dies in circumstances which may involve social media, digital forensics are often treated as an afterthought or a secondary consideration. So the noble Baroness’s additional amendments should not be controversial. They should be accepted, fast-tracked and robustly enforced, and I urge the Minister to take them on board today.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government remain grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to the bereaved families who have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the existing framework for the preservation of online material that may be relevant to understanding a child’s death. I reiterate what I said in Committee: the loss of any child is a profound tragedy, and the Government are clear that we must take every possible step to safeguard children online.

I pay tribute to all the campaigners on this issue. Of course, I would be delighted to see Ellen Roome. I had the opportunity to meet her briefly; she was introduced to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, outside the Chamber. It would be good to organise something formally and to include the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Barran. I will do what I can to find out what is happening with the inquest. Obviously, I cannot commit my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General to anything, but I will do what I can to find out what is happening.

I promised in Committee that the Government would consider how that framework could be amended to ensure that data preservation is applied consistently and as quickly as possible. We have done that: we listened and we have acted. I am delighted today to bring forward government Amendments 429A, 454A and 467AB, which require speedy data preservation in every case involving the death of a child aged five or above. The only exceptions to that will be where the child’s online activity is clearly irrelevant to their death or an investigation is plainly not necessary.

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her constructive engagement on the development of this provision. Our most recent meeting was this afternoon, where we did our best to move things forward; I will return to that in a moment. As I have emphasised to her, the Government’s firm intention is that a DPN request becomes the default and should be made in every case, unless the coroner is very clear from the outset that online data is not relevant to a child’s death. We will ensure that this expectation is clearly set out in the Explanatory Notes to the new provision. I will write to the Chief Coroner, asking her to consider issuing guidance for coroners on the application of the mandatory requirement and, crucially, the circumstances in which an exception may be appropriate.

The Government thought we had done enough and that we had done what was wanted of us, because we all agreed with the objectives. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has reservations, and I understand them. I hope that we can continue to discuss this, so that we can reach a position where everybody is happy that we are doing what we have set out to do.

On the time limit, this now mandatory policy will entail the preservation of a much greater volume of data, including that of third parties, than at present. As it preserves the data relating to the dead child, it will also sweep up those on the other end of the interaction—the third parties are the issue here. To ensure that it is proportionate, we are therefore reducing the initial retention period—not the overall retention period—to six months, which, in the majority of cases, should provide sufficient time for the coroner to decide whether the online evidence is relevant. It is not related to when the inquest takes place, because the coroners all start working on this long before the inquest actually opens. It is simply putting it in place so that they have time to make the decision. There is a provision to extend it. The coroner does not have to apply to extend it; it is much simpler than that—they simply have to decide to extend it. Therefore, more time can be secured by the coroner if it is not yet clear.

We will work with the Chief Coroner and operational partners to ensure that coroners are clear that a positive decision is needed at the six-month point on whether or not to extend a DPN. If there is any doubt, the default position should be to extend the DPN to ensure that the data is preserved until the inquest.

These amendments will make a minor change to the existing regulation-making power in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act, so that regulations setting out the kinds of services that will automatically receive a DPN can refer to ongoing research. That means they will remain current and will capture any new and emerging services that become popular with children.

Amendments 431 and 432, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would, as we are all aware, basically give effect to the same issue as the government amendments, but they include preserving data where online activity is not relevant to a child’s death. The reason for the difference is that the government amendments carve this out to reduce delay and diverting resources away from relevant cases. For that reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s Amendments 431 and 432, as they would require a disproportionate retention of third-party data, which would risk breaching Article 8.

Finally, on Amendment 404 and the consequential Amendment 405, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we agree that it is essential that the police both understand the powers available to them and can use those powers consistently to access all relevant information when investigating these cases, including digital material or content held on social media platforms. As the noble Baroness knows, the National Police Chiefs’ Council is developing guidance to improve awareness and to promote uniform use of these powers, and the Home Office is committed to working with the police on this issue.

I know how concerned your Lordships’ House is about the pace of change in some of these newer technologies. That is exactly why, for guidance to remain practical and effective, it must be able to evolve alongside the fast-changing technological developments and legal frameworks. That is why it is preferable not to set this guidance or its detail in primary legislation but instead to continue working with the police to ensure that this guidance is delivered soon and to a high standard.

For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments. I thank her again and thank all other noble Lords who have spoken for their collaboration and engagement on this important issue.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I thank all noble Lords who have supported this, not just tonight but on previous occasions, and I thank the Minister. Earlier this afternoon, we were looking for the perfect words. When she stood up, she said “clearly irrelevant” to the death of a child, and that would have been the perfect phrase to have in the Bill. I say it on the record. Maybe she can come back with a surprise at Third Reading.

I very much appreciate the work of the department and where the Government have met us, and I accept the point about the police. I say for one final time that, unfortunately, we have been round this three times. If this does not work, we will be back again with fury. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 404 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

422D: After Clause 207, insert the following new Clause—
“AI chatbots: content promoting terrorist and national security offences(1) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which produces content specified in subsection (2).(2) Content is covered by this section if it is content which--(a) produces language promoting, or tactics or target selection for, terrorist offences or real world violence,(b) threatens national security, or(c) encourages activity which threatens public safety.(3) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which has not been risk assessed for the possibility of producing content specified in subsection (2).(4) Where a provider of a chatbot identifies a risk of the chatbot producing content of the kind set out in subsection (2), it is an offence for a provider of a chatbot not to take steps to mitigate or manage those risks before making the chatbot publicly available.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) For the purposes of this Act an “AI chatbot” is a generative AI system, including a deep or large language model, able to generate text, images and other content based on the data on which it was trained, and which has been designed to respond to user commands in a way that mimics a human, or engage in conversations with a user that mimic human conversations.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, drawing on conclusions in reports by the Centre for Countering Digital Hate, seeks to make it an offence to supply a chatbot which creates content or provides tactics that would result in terrorist offences or threats to national security, or supply a chatbot which has not properly been risk assessed. It is part of a set of amendments related to AI chatbot offences in Baroness Kidron’s name.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan.

I will first speak briefly to government Amendment 429B, which will give a power to the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations that could, in the future and at the discretion of the Secretary of State, ensure that chatbots are covered by the Online Safety Act. However, that very broad power is not matched by substance. The amendment does not define a chatbot or deal with the critical fact that, when a child is entrapped by a chatbot, there is nowhere to turn. Currently, the regulator has no duty to deal with individual complaints and the police do not recognise a chatbot as a person, meaning that there is no perpetrator to pursue.

The amendment also fails to address harms to children. In fact, it explicitly deals only with “illegal” harms. It does not deal with the coercive elements of control or the willingness of chatbots to plan many crimes, in addition to the crimes themselves. The government amendment also has nothing to say about enforcement. Taken together, it simply adds new duties to a system that is already understood to be lacking in speed and effective enforcement.

This lack of substance is compounded by a lack of clarity about scope. The amendment’s wording refers to an

“internet service that is capable (or part of which is capable) of generating AI-generated content”.

This is so broad that both Amendment 209, of two weeks ago, and Amendment 441A in this group would be entirely unnecessary. Yet, during our meetings on this issue, officials have been absolutely clear that although the scope is currently drafted as wide as possible, the intention is to get to a narrower definition as part of the process of creating secondary legislation. They could not guarantee that gen AI or search would be covered in any final measures. In short, it creates powers but offers no promise of protection.

I would rather have worked with the Government on this issue to make watertight provisions. Indeed, I have made that offer directly to the Secretary of State. We are in the foothills of a crisis. The government amendment offers too little clarity or certainty, so we are left with an amendment that is limitless in wording but uncertain in application and with a timeline that simply does not meet this moment.

On Thursday 5 March, Megan Garcia and her husband came to Parliament to talk about the loss of their son, Sewell. Members from both Houses were moved by the story of a much-loved and high-achieving child who was captured by a chatbot, coerced, bullied and, finally, encouraged to commit suicide. His death resulted in the chatbot, character.ai, becoming age-gated to users over 18, but there are many more chatbots to take its place that are not restricted in the same way. As this issue is getting more public notice, is in the newspapers daily and is talked about in the online world, sadly, my inbox is filling with cases that involve similar coercion, sexual content, dangerous medical advice and chatbots that support illegal activity.

On Friday last week, the Centre for Countering Digital Hate published a report that showed that eight out of 10 chatbots it tested were willing to help rehearse, offer tactical advice and identify potential sites for US shooters. Scenarios included a school shooting and a synagogue. Whether in the UK or elsewhere, the capability is the same and the risk is real. A chatbot that organises an attack, while wishing its user, “happy (and safe) shooting!”, is no less likely to help place a bomb, organise a knife attack or any other such violent act. This is not a description of a dystopian future; these chatbots are already on the market, widely used by both adults and children—ChatGPT, Gemini and Replika, among others.

Only on Monday, just two days ago, I was contacted by someone about Alexa+, which is widely anticipated to be launched very soon in the UK and is already available in the US. In the tranche of messages, there were messages about emotional dependence in very young children and stories of inappropriate content. One exchange on Reddit, from which I have redacted the name of the child, said:

“I plugged our Alexa in to ask it to help me with cooking a sweet potato”.


Then, her daughter asked it

“to tell her a silly story so it did”.

Then, her daughter

“asked it if she could tell it a story. It said yes … and then mid story interrupted her and asked her what she was wearing and if it could see her pants”.

I could not find a reliable statistic for how many households in the UK have Alexa, nor is it clear whether Alexa+ will be a choice for consumers or simply rolled out as an upgrade, but the statistics I found revealed that between a third and two-thirds of UK households have Alexa. In the material I was sent, it repeatedly alluded to the fact that the new service was active in their house or child’s bedroom without their knowledge or consent.

We have chatbots that coerce children into suicide, plan violent acts, build abusive relationships and have the capacity to be active in tens of millions of households. Taking a power, having another consultation and bringing forward regulation over which Parliament has no oversight is not action; it is kicking the problem down the road.

--- Later in debate ---

I accept and understand that there is a clear choice here for the House and that there may be a Division. I think this House has a unified approach to wanting to stop the illegal chatbots that are causing the damage that Members have mentioned. It is unacceptable. The Prime Minister, the DSIT Secretary, the Home Secretary and I, on behalf of the Government, are saying that our amendments are a mechanism to make sure we get that right with regulation through consultation and that we bring forward proposals, which I remind the House it can reject. I suggest that the noble Baroness gives us that breathing space to ensure that we do that in a proper and effective way, and I urge the House to support the Government’s amendments. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw hers.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his words and his roll-call of that incredible list of speakers who supported the amendments. That was a wonderful list of people from all sides of the House, who did indeed have slightly varying reasons to support the amendment, but they were all positive. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his Benches for their unequivocal support. I believe that the Opposition Benches are allowing a free vote this evening, and I really hope that they will use their free vote freely.

I will address a couple of details, just for the record. First, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it is a binary, I am afraid, because either we have the Government’s amendment, which has no proper scope—it will be subject to all sorts of changes on the way—no oversight, no time limit and no scrutiny, or we have something that I have made very clear that I am willing to work with both sides of the House to perfect in the next few weeks.

Secondly, I say to the Minister that the Online Safety Act and the enforcement process we currently have has, so far, by civil penalty, put forward one fine of £55,000. That is where we are, and there is nothing in this government amendment or the consultation about online safety that deals with the problem of enforcement.

Finally, on the points that were made, we are talking about one person in one department having absolute power to change absolutely everything that eight years of debate in this House, two years of consultation, et cetera, have put forward. I am sorry but that is just inappropriate.

We have a new technology—it addicts, grooms, abuses and sometimes even kills. This is not in the future; it is right now. These amendments have the support of 45 expert organisations, which I believe have written to all noble Lords. I ask noble Lords, irrespective of their party affiliation, to support children, families, the vulnerable, women and, indeed, all of us, by sending a message to the Government to say, “If you can’t accept this, come back with something, for now, that is better described, narrow and to the point, that we can enforce”. On that basis, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

3rd reading
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, at Third Reading it is extraordinarily rare to find issues still in contest, and to be presented, as we have been today, with a choice on which we will have to vote. Normally, by this stage, the issues have been clearly discussed and the parties concerned—the Government on the one side and those proposing amendments on the other—have had enough meetings to be able to get to a point where they can agree on what is going forward.

Having said that, I am sure that the whole House is very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for bringing forward what he has brought forward. These are substantial changes to the Online Safety Act and they are extraordinarily welcome. They cover the ground very well, but, as has been pointed out, they perhaps do not go quite as far as they could do. We are at Third Reading, so it is therefore very difficult to find the time and space to be able to resolve what I think are relatively quite small differences between the two sides.

I point out simply to my noble friend the Minister that this places those of us who support the noble Baroness in her amendments in a difficult position about his amendments, which we want to support; but the only way to get them to resolution is probably to vote with the noble Baroness. I hope he will appreciate that, and I suggest to him that, when he comes to respond, he makes it very clear that the Government are still willing to talk about these issues and still willing to meet those who have concerns and views about what the Government have done. I hope he might be able to promise that action could be taken in the Commons to resolve this.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. As ever, she has spoken fantastically convincingly to her amendments, which sit in a broader set of aims that we have heard in Committee and on Report—at many stages. While recognising that the Government have moved considerably, I believe that we are debating this again in the context of a flood of women coming forward as survivors of non-consensual image abuse. As the harms are ever increasing, I am putting my faith in the noble Baroness’s interpretation of what is still necessary. Her amendments do something really important. I have spoken about this before and will do so on a later Bill this afternoon, but we need to tackle the issue of enforcement.

We cannot keep on adding duties to the Online Safety Act and expecting something to be different at the other end. In fact, we are adding a burden for people without giving them the tools by which that burden could be alleviated. The noble Baroness’s amendments have sought to create a more streamlined and agile system by allowing for fines every 24 hours in which an image is not removed. We have to find an incentive for tech to come to terms with the regulator, and the noble Baroness is doing just that. Unless we put a ticking clock on online services for failing to respond to harms to children and women, we cannot hope that women and children will be safe.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I add my support to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, puts her finger on it: enforcement is key here, and it is key because we all know that without serious enforcement, these companies, which will be acting in breach of the law, will simply not comply. What will make them comply are substantial fines to hit them in the pocketbook. That is the only thing that will make them comply, and that is why I support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen.