Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Wednesday 25th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, at Third Reading it is extraordinarily rare to find issues still in contest, and to be presented, as we have been today, with a choice on which we will have to vote. Normally, by this stage, the issues have been clearly discussed and the parties concerned—the Government on the one side and those proposing amendments on the other—have had enough meetings to be able to get to a point where they can agree on what is going forward.

Having said that, I am sure that the whole House is very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for bringing forward what he has brought forward. These are substantial changes to the Online Safety Act and they are extraordinarily welcome. They cover the ground very well, but, as has been pointed out, they perhaps do not go quite as far as they could do. We are at Third Reading, so it is therefore very difficult to find the time and space to be able to resolve what I think are relatively quite small differences between the two sides.

I point out simply to my noble friend the Minister that this places those of us who support the noble Baroness in her amendments in a difficult position about his amendments, which we want to support; but the only way to get them to resolution is probably to vote with the noble Baroness. I hope he will appreciate that, and I suggest to him that, when he comes to respond, he makes it very clear that the Government are still willing to talk about these issues and still willing to meet those who have concerns and views about what the Government have done. I hope he might be able to promise that action could be taken in the Commons to resolve this.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. As ever, she has spoken fantastically convincingly to her amendments, which sit in a broader set of aims that we have heard in Committee and on Report—at many stages. While recognising that the Government have moved considerably, I believe that we are debating this again in the context of a flood of women coming forward as survivors of non-consensual image abuse. As the harms are ever increasing, I am putting my faith in the noble Baroness’s interpretation of what is still necessary. Her amendments do something really important. I have spoken about this before and will do so on a later Bill this afternoon, but we need to tackle the issue of enforcement.

We cannot keep on adding duties to the Online Safety Act and expecting something to be different at the other end. In fact, we are adding a burden for people without giving them the tools by which that burden could be alleviated. The noble Baroness’s amendments have sought to create a more streamlined and agile system by allowing for fines every 24 hours in which an image is not removed. We have to find an incentive for tech to come to terms with the regulator, and the noble Baroness is doing just that. Unless we put a ticking clock on online services for failing to respond to harms to children and women, we cannot hope that women and children will be safe.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I add my support to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, puts her finger on it: enforcement is key here, and it is key because we all know that without serious enforcement, these companies, which will be acting in breach of the law, will simply not comply. What will make them comply are substantial fines to hit them in the pocketbook. That is the only thing that will make them comply, and that is why I support the noble Baroness, Lady Owen.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

422D: After Clause 207, insert the following new Clause—
“AI chatbots: content promoting terrorist and national security offences(1) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which produces content specified in subsection (2).(2) Content is covered by this section if it is content which--(a) produces language promoting, or tactics or target selection for, terrorist offences or real world violence,(b) threatens national security, or(c) encourages activity which threatens public safety.(3) It is an offence to create, supply, or otherwise make available an AI chatbot which has not been risk assessed for the possibility of producing content specified in subsection (2).(4) Where a provider of a chatbot identifies a risk of the chatbot producing content of the kind set out in subsection (2), it is an offence for a provider of a chatbot not to take steps to mitigate or manage those risks before making the chatbot publicly available.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) For the purposes of this Act an “AI chatbot” is a generative AI system, including a deep or large language model, able to generate text, images and other content based on the data on which it was trained, and which has been designed to respond to user commands in a way that mimics a human, or engage in conversations with a user that mimic human conversations.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, drawing on conclusions in reports by the Centre for Countering Digital Hate, seeks to make it an offence to supply a chatbot which creates content or provides tactics that would result in terrorist offences or threats to national security, or supply a chatbot which has not properly been risk assessed. It is part of a set of amendments related to AI chatbot offences in Baroness Kidron’s name.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan.

I will first speak briefly to government Amendment 429B, which will give a power to the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations that could, in the future and at the discretion of the Secretary of State, ensure that chatbots are covered by the Online Safety Act. However, that very broad power is not matched by substance. The amendment does not define a chatbot or deal with the critical fact that, when a child is entrapped by a chatbot, there is nowhere to turn. Currently, the regulator has no duty to deal with individual complaints and the police do not recognise a chatbot as a person, meaning that there is no perpetrator to pursue.

The amendment also fails to address harms to children. In fact, it explicitly deals only with “illegal” harms. It does not deal with the coercive elements of control or the willingness of chatbots to plan many crimes, in addition to the crimes themselves. The government amendment also has nothing to say about enforcement. Taken together, it simply adds new duties to a system that is already understood to be lacking in speed and effective enforcement.

This lack of substance is compounded by a lack of clarity about scope. The amendment’s wording refers to an

“internet service that is capable (or part of which is capable) of generating AI-generated content”.

This is so broad that both Amendment 209, of two weeks ago, and Amendment 441A in this group would be entirely unnecessary. Yet, during our meetings on this issue, officials have been absolutely clear that although the scope is currently drafted as wide as possible, the intention is to get to a narrower definition as part of the process of creating secondary legislation. They could not guarantee that gen AI or search would be covered in any final measures. In short, it creates powers but offers no promise of protection.

I would rather have worked with the Government on this issue to make watertight provisions. Indeed, I have made that offer directly to the Secretary of State. We are in the foothills of a crisis. The government amendment offers too little clarity or certainty, so we are left with an amendment that is limitless in wording but uncertain in application and with a timeline that simply does not meet this moment.

On Thursday 5 March, Megan Garcia and her husband came to Parliament to talk about the loss of their son, Sewell. Members from both Houses were moved by the story of a much-loved and high-achieving child who was captured by a chatbot, coerced, bullied and, finally, encouraged to commit suicide. His death resulted in the chatbot, character.ai, becoming age-gated to users over 18, but there are many more chatbots to take its place that are not restricted in the same way. As this issue is getting more public notice, is in the newspapers daily and is talked about in the online world, sadly, my inbox is filling with cases that involve similar coercion, sexual content, dangerous medical advice and chatbots that support illegal activity.

On Friday last week, the Centre for Countering Digital Hate published a report that showed that eight out of 10 chatbots it tested were willing to help rehearse, offer tactical advice and identify potential sites for US shooters. Scenarios included a school shooting and a synagogue. Whether in the UK or elsewhere, the capability is the same and the risk is real. A chatbot that organises an attack, while wishing its user, “happy (and safe) shooting!”, is no less likely to help place a bomb, organise a knife attack or any other such violent act. This is not a description of a dystopian future; these chatbots are already on the market, widely used by both adults and children—ChatGPT, Gemini and Replika, among others.

Only on Monday, just two days ago, I was contacted by someone about Alexa+, which is widely anticipated to be launched very soon in the UK and is already available in the US. In the tranche of messages, there were messages about emotional dependence in very young children and stories of inappropriate content. One exchange on Reddit, from which I have redacted the name of the child, said:

“I plugged our Alexa in to ask it to help me with cooking a sweet potato”.


Then, her daughter asked it

“to tell her a silly story so it did”.

Then, her daughter

“asked it if she could tell it a story. It said yes … and then mid story interrupted her and asked her what she was wearing and if it could see her pants”.

I could not find a reliable statistic for how many households in the UK have Alexa, nor is it clear whether Alexa+ will be a choice for consumers or simply rolled out as an upgrade, but the statistics I found revealed that between a third and two-thirds of UK households have Alexa. In the material I was sent, it repeatedly alluded to the fact that the new service was active in their house or child’s bedroom without their knowledge or consent.

We have chatbots that coerce children into suicide, plan violent acts, build abusive relationships and have the capacity to be active in tens of millions of households. Taking a power, having another consultation and bringing forward regulation over which Parliament has no oversight is not action; it is kicking the problem down the road.

--- Later in debate ---

I accept and understand that there is a clear choice here for the House and that there may be a Division. I think this House has a unified approach to wanting to stop the illegal chatbots that are causing the damage that Members have mentioned. It is unacceptable. The Prime Minister, the DSIT Secretary, the Home Secretary and I, on behalf of the Government, are saying that our amendments are a mechanism to make sure we get that right with regulation through consultation and that we bring forward proposals, which I remind the House it can reject. I suggest that the noble Baroness gives us that breathing space to ensure that we do that in a proper and effective way, and I urge the House to support the Government’s amendments. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw hers.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his words and his roll-call of that incredible list of speakers who supported the amendments. That was a wonderful list of people from all sides of the House, who did indeed have slightly varying reasons to support the amendment, but they were all positive. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his Benches for their unequivocal support. I believe that the Opposition Benches are allowing a free vote this evening, and I really hope that they will use their free vote freely.

I will address a couple of details, just for the record. First, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it is a binary, I am afraid, because either we have the Government’s amendment, which has no proper scope—it will be subject to all sorts of changes on the way—no oversight, no time limit and no scrutiny, or we have something that I have made very clear that I am willing to work with both sides of the House to perfect in the next few weeks.

Secondly, I say to the Minister that the Online Safety Act and the enforcement process we currently have has, so far, by civil penalty, put forward one fine of £55,000. That is where we are, and there is nothing in this government amendment or the consultation about online safety that deals with the problem of enforcement.

Finally, on the points that were made, we are talking about one person in one department having absolute power to change absolutely everything that eight years of debate in this House, two years of consultation, et cetera, have put forward. I am sorry but that is just inappropriate.

We have a new technology—it addicts, grooms, abuses and sometimes even kills. This is not in the future; it is right now. These amendments have the support of 45 expert organisations, which I believe have written to all noble Lords. I ask noble Lords, irrespective of their party affiliation, to support children, families, the vulnerable, women and, indeed, all of us, by sending a message to the Government to say, “If you can’t accept this, come back with something, for now, that is better described, narrow and to the point, that we can enforce”. On that basis, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

404: After Clause 182, insert the following new Clause—
“Police protocols when investigating the death of a child(1) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 27 (common law rules as to criminal investigations), insert—“27A Inclusion of guidance on collecting digital data when investigating the death of a child(1) Within six months of the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, the code of practice under section 23 must include protocols that a person must adhere to when investigating the death of a child.(2) These protocols must include the treatment of potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry.(3) In order to treat a potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry, an investigating person must—(a) seize and forensically examine digital devices as soon as is reasonably possible;(b) take all reasonable steps to capture early digital evidence and account data, taking into account that online services delete user data after a short period of inactivity;(c) document a child’s activity on all known online services, including recommended content, interactions with other users, content viewed, content uploaded, and any relevant metadata.(4) Where an investigation gives evidence that a service regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 may have breached the terms of that Act, OFCOM must be notified and supplied with the evidence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to update statutory guidance issued to police to include guidance on effective evidence-collecting related to potential digital harm during an investigation into the death of a child. Currently, there is no statutory guidance for police to follow regarding investigating digital harm.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 404, 405, 431 and 432. In the light of the hour and the spirit of my conversations with the Minister, I will not go through my amendments in detail, nor the very long journey it has been to get here. In short, they concern earlier agreements that, in cases where a child has died, the coroner and the police should be equipped and informed to preserve data from online services.

I thank the Minister, and officials from both the Ministry of Justice and DSIT, for their engagement. Before I put on record some of my concerns, I acknowledge that, for the past few weeks at least, we have been trying to get to the same place on this. I am disappointed that we have not quite found a way to do so, and I hope that the Minister will find a way to reassure me and—possibly more importantly—the bereaved parents who have fought hard for these amendments.

Both my Amendment 404 and government Amendment 429A seek to make it automatic that, on being notified of the death of a child, a coroner issues a data preservation notice which means that a regulated service under the Online Safety Act would have to preserve the data of a child within five days. The Government have agreed to this in principle but wanted to exclude children who die in circumstances such as a road accident or in hospital as a result of illness, to which I have agreed. But, in their effort to exclude those children, they have, in proposed new subsection (1)(b) in their Amendment 429A, allowed the coroner to decide

“that no purpose would be served by OFCOM giving a notice”

under the Act

“because such information is of no relevance to a child’s death”.

That is too broad. Giving permission for a coroner to decide what constitutes “no purpose” is a bit like snakes and ladders: we are back to the problem that has plagued bereaved parents, where coroners underestimate the speed necessary to preserve data, or the scope and importance of information that might be preserved in this way. This is not a criticism of coroners. It is far beyond the experience of professionals, across all domains, to understand the range of online material available or its ethereal nature.

My second issue with the government amendment is that they have chosen to reduce the length of time that data is preserved—the preservation notice—from a year to six months. I discussed this with officials earlier today, and I understand that it is extendable, but both I and Ellen Roome, bereaved mother of Jools, feel that it is not long enough. Some 45% of inquests take longer than six months; 18% take more than a year. Reducing the time is deliberately creating a weakness in the system at a time when parents need support and must not be made anxious by watching the clock running down and worrying whether someone, somewhere in the system, will fail to extend the preservation order.

There is also an ongoing issue with conflicts between our laws and those in the US. I received a letter from Minister Narayan this week updating me about the conflict between Section 101 of the Online Safety Act and the US Stored Communications Act. The letter said:

“Interpretation of the SCA is not settled”,


there may be some variety between different US states, and

“discussions between DSIT, Ofcom and service providers are taking a place to find a path forward”.

This regime depends entirely on resolving this issue. We were promised from the Dispatch Box that this was a priority for DSIT nearly two years ago, when the previous Government were in power. It was not done then and it is still not resolved. The letter did not mention anything about discussions between Government Ministers and their counterparts in the US, upon which this finally depends. I hope that the Minister is not surprised at the level of frustration felt by bereaved parents at the lack of speed with which this issue has been pursued.

The Government have put out a press release and made assurances to bereaved parents, and now we are here at a time of night when no vote can reasonably take place. So I would like the Minister to offer to bring pack tighter wording at Third Reading. I believe it is necessary and what parents are expecting. Even if she is not able to make that commitment tonight, it is what should happen and I ask her to try to make it happen. It has been promised and I believe it must be delivered.

I do not intend to pursue my Amendment 405, but I simply ask the Minister to put on the record how the police will be better informed of this regime. I finish by paying tribute all the bereaved families who have campaigned for this change—Jools’ law—and the amendments that preceded it. We in this House are witness to your pain and your generosity in campaigning so that others do not suffer as you have.

I wish to remind the Government of what one father said the day before Committee: “I was happy with the meeting with Liz Kendall until I realised it was the exact same meeting I had with Peter Kyle the year before. Nothing had changed except the size of the room to accommodate the increased number of bereaved parents”. There is a crisis unfolding that the Government are not grasping. Sorting out this amendment is not enough, but it must be done. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on this vital group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, concerning the investigation of child deaths, to which I have been very pleased to add my name. We all absolutely acknowledge that the noble Baroness has been tireless in her campaign and her support for the bereaved parents, and she is no less eloquent or persuasive even at this time of night.

The chink of light provided by the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, in Committee and the movement represented by government Amendments 429A and 454A are very welcome. However, on these Benches, like the noble Baroness we question whether they are as comprehensive as the solutions proposed in her amendments. The government amendments are substantive concessions regarding the principle of automatic data preservation, but they fall short of the immediate statutory certainty and the proactive coronial and police duties sought by the noble Baroness to ensure a comprehensive investigation into digital harms. So, while I welcome in principle the Government’s agreement to make DPNs automatic, their current drafting often leans on secondary legislation and future consultations. These amendments place the duty firmly in the Bill, providing the immediate legal certainty that bereaved families deserve in 2026.

Perhaps the most critical missing piece in the Government’s current approach is addressed by Amendment 404, which requires the police to investigate digital harm as a primary line of inquiry as a matter of routine. We cannot treat the digital environment as secondary to the physical. If a child is found harmed in a public park, the police do not wait for a consultation to decide whether to check the CCTV, yet when a child dies in circumstances which may involve social media, digital forensics are often treated as an afterthought or a secondary consideration. So the noble Baroness’s additional amendments should not be controversial. They should be accepted, fast-tracked and robustly enforced, and I urge the Minister to take them on board today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government remain grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to the bereaved families who have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the existing framework for the preservation of online material that may be relevant to understanding a child’s death. I reiterate what I said in Committee: the loss of any child is a profound tragedy, and the Government are clear that we must take every possible step to safeguard children online.

I pay tribute to all the campaigners on this issue. Of course, I would be delighted to see Ellen Roome. I had the opportunity to meet her briefly; she was introduced to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, outside the Chamber. It would be good to organise something formally and to include the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Barran. I will do what I can to find out what is happening with the inquest. Obviously, I cannot commit my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General to anything, but I will do what I can to find out what is happening.

I promised in Committee that the Government would consider how that framework could be amended to ensure that data preservation is applied consistently and as quickly as possible. We have done that: we listened and we have acted. I am delighted today to bring forward government Amendments 429A, 454A and 467AB, which require speedy data preservation in every case involving the death of a child aged five or above. The only exceptions to that will be where the child’s online activity is clearly irrelevant to their death or an investigation is plainly not necessary.

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her constructive engagement on the development of this provision. Our most recent meeting was this afternoon, where we did our best to move things forward; I will return to that in a moment. As I have emphasised to her, the Government’s firm intention is that a DPN request becomes the default and should be made in every case, unless the coroner is very clear from the outset that online data is not relevant to a child’s death. We will ensure that this expectation is clearly set out in the Explanatory Notes to the new provision. I will write to the Chief Coroner, asking her to consider issuing guidance for coroners on the application of the mandatory requirement and, crucially, the circumstances in which an exception may be appropriate.

The Government thought we had done enough and that we had done what was wanted of us, because we all agreed with the objectives. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has reservations, and I understand them. I hope that we can continue to discuss this, so that we can reach a position where everybody is happy that we are doing what we have set out to do.

On the time limit, this now mandatory policy will entail the preservation of a much greater volume of data, including that of third parties, than at present. As it preserves the data relating to the dead child, it will also sweep up those on the other end of the interaction—the third parties are the issue here. To ensure that it is proportionate, we are therefore reducing the initial retention period—not the overall retention period—to six months, which, in the majority of cases, should provide sufficient time for the coroner to decide whether the online evidence is relevant. It is not related to when the inquest takes place, because the coroners all start working on this long before the inquest actually opens. It is simply putting it in place so that they have time to make the decision. There is a provision to extend it. The coroner does not have to apply to extend it; it is much simpler than that—they simply have to decide to extend it. Therefore, more time can be secured by the coroner if it is not yet clear.

We will work with the Chief Coroner and operational partners to ensure that coroners are clear that a positive decision is needed at the six-month point on whether or not to extend a DPN. If there is any doubt, the default position should be to extend the DPN to ensure that the data is preserved until the inquest.

These amendments will make a minor change to the existing regulation-making power in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act, so that regulations setting out the kinds of services that will automatically receive a DPN can refer to ongoing research. That means they will remain current and will capture any new and emerging services that become popular with children.

Amendments 431 and 432, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would, as we are all aware, basically give effect to the same issue as the government amendments, but they include preserving data where online activity is not relevant to a child’s death. The reason for the difference is that the government amendments carve this out to reduce delay and diverting resources away from relevant cases. For that reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s Amendments 431 and 432, as they would require a disproportionate retention of third-party data, which would risk breaching Article 8.

Finally, on Amendment 404 and the consequential Amendment 405, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we agree that it is essential that the police both understand the powers available to them and can use those powers consistently to access all relevant information when investigating these cases, including digital material or content held on social media platforms. As the noble Baroness knows, the National Police Chiefs’ Council is developing guidance to improve awareness and to promote uniform use of these powers, and the Home Office is committed to working with the police on this issue.

I know how concerned your Lordships’ House is about the pace of change in some of these newer technologies. That is exactly why, for guidance to remain practical and effective, it must be able to evolve alongside the fast-changing technological developments and legal frameworks. That is why it is preferable not to set this guidance or its detail in primary legislation but instead to continue working with the police to ensure that this guidance is delivered soon and to a high standard.

For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments. I thank her again and thank all other noble Lords who have spoken for their collaboration and engagement on this important issue.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I thank all noble Lords who have supported this, not just tonight but on previous occasions, and I thank the Minister. Earlier this afternoon, we were looking for the perfect words. When she stood up, she said “clearly irrelevant” to the death of a child, and that would have been the perfect phrase to have in the Bill. I say it on the record. Maybe she can come back with a surprise at Third Reading.

I very much appreciate the work of the department and where the Government have met us, and I accept the point about the police. I say for one final time that, unfortunately, we have been round this three times. If this does not work, we will be back again with fury. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 404 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

438ED: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“Police protocols when investigating the death of a child(1) The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.(2) After section 27 (common law rules as to criminal investigations), insert—“Inclusion of guidance on collecting digital data when investigating the death of a child(1) Within six months the day on which the Crime and Policing Act 2026 is passed, the code of practice under section 23 must include protocols that a person of a prescribed authority must adhere to when investigating the death of a child.(2) These protocols must include the treatment of potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry.(3) In order to treat a potential online harm as a primary line of enquiry, a person of a prescribed authority, must—(a) seize and forensically examine digital devices as soon as is reasonably possible;(b) take all reasonable steps to capture early digital evidence and account data, taking into account that online services delete user data after a short period of inactivity;(c) document a child’s activity on all known online services, including recommended content, interactions with other users, content viewed, content uploaded, and any relevant metadata.(4) Where an investigation gives evidence that a service regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 may have breached that Act, Ofcom must be notified and supplied with the evidence.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would update statutory guidance issued to police to include guidance on effective evidence-collecting during an investigation into the death of a child.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barran and Lady Morgan, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their support.

It is heartbreaking to be here again. I first raised this issue over four years ago after witnessing Senior Coroner Walker’s difficulties in obtaining data from US tech firms during his investigation into the death of Molly Russell. Senior Coroner Walker, Ian Russell—Molly’s father—and the family’s lawyers fought for years to secure data that revealed the role played by Pinterest and Meta, and this evidence was central to the coroner’s finding that both services,

“contributed to her death in a more than minimal way”.

Data is crucial. The original amendments were also recommended in the pre-legislative Joint Committee report on the draft Online Safety Bill. We debated them at length during the Bill’s proceedings. We got agreement to put them into the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which fell when the election was called. We tried to push them through in the wash-up and finally, after years of campaigning by bereaved families, they were included in the Data (Use and Access) Act last year.

I say all this because I want the Minister, when she replies, to weigh up her words carefully, knowing that the bereaved families, who have worked so hard to pass these provisions for so many years—some of whom are in the Gallery today—are still waiting. Yesterday, I met several bereaved families, including Mia Janin’s father, Mariano, who held a photograph of his daughter as he described a recent meeting with the Secretary of State, Liz Kendall. He said, “I thought it was a good meeting until I realised it was the same meeting we had with Peter Kyle a year ago—except this year we needed a bigger room because there are more bereaved parents, more dead children”.

I also heard yesterday of a newly bereaved parent who tried to get the police to access her daughter’s data, only to be told by Gloucestershire Constabulary’s occupational health department to talk to Ellen Roome: “She knows more about the law than the entire Gloucestershire police force”. I spoke to Ellen, who is with us in the Gallery, and she told me that the police downloaded her son Jools’s data in 2022 but are only now beginning to examine it.

We have a law, but it is not working, and I want to set out three reasons why. First, although coroners can ask Ofcom to issue a data preservation notice that requires online services to retain data in advance of issuing a Schedule 5 notice, they are not routinely doing so. Although Section 101 enables Ofcom to use its information-gathering powers when it receives a Schedule 5 notice from a coroner, it is not routinely doing that either.

I have eight separate letters from the Government saying who has been written to and outlining what guidance has been sent to whom, but still bereaved parents come to my door. For some, the loss of their child is still raw and they are blindly trying to work out the system; others are heartbroken that the opportunity to preserve data is long gone because they found out about the law too late. Sometimes, the coroner does not know that the measure exists or does not understand that data disappears and wants to wait for the police investigation before even considering such a request. All these different reasons undermine the fundamental purpose of the law.

To be absolutely clear, I have no criticism of the coroners. They are not experts in digital systems and cannot reasonably be expected to know that even a brief engagement, such as hovering over a link or pausing on a piece of content, can influence how an algorithm responds. Nor are they expected to know that platforms routinely infer and group children into behavioural cohorts relating, for example, to low mood, late-night use, social isolation or identity exploration. Nor are they supposed to know that seemingly fleeting online interactions can leave persistent data traces. The measure was specifically designed for Ofcom to take that burden from the coroners, but that has not happened.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I can start again; I am very grateful to my noble friend for taking over. I say now that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as she and I discussed when we met briefly the other day. The Government do have concerns that being too prescriptive in legislation may create more problems than it solves because the legislation would need to be amended every time there were changes in technology or in operational practices. Your Lordships will be well aware, given our many late nights spent scrutinising primary legislation, of which tonight may be another, how clunky, cumbersome and time-consuming it can be to keep amending primary legislation.

For this reason, it is the Government’s view that our shared objective can be achieved using non-statutory guidance. Police forces are well used to applying and following guidance in a range of areas, from missing people to information sharing. Having said that, I make the point that I would welcome a conversation with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to see whether we can find a way through this by working together to do so.

I turn to Amendments 474 and 475. Again, this is an issue that the Government take very seriously. I reassure your Lordships that we are carefully considering the issues that these amendments raise and are grateful for the continued engagement of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the bereaved families. Taken together, these amendments would require coroners to notify Ofcom within five days of a child’s death, triggering a standard form to request data preservation.

Once again, we can see the appeal of such a requirement. The problem is that it would apply to all cases of deaths in the over-fives, regardless of whether social media may be relevant to their death. So, for example, where a child died as a result of a road traffic collision or of cancer, it is unlikely in most cases that social media retention would be of use to the police or the coroner. Therefore, while the Government are sympathetic to the aims of these amendments, it is our view that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

On that point, does the Minister have the number of children over five who die in other ways, just so the Committee can understand how much of a burden that might be?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I cannot give the noble Baroness the answer now, but I can write to her with that data.

Our view is that we need carefully to consider any possible unintended consequences; the need not to place a disproportionate burden on those investigating; and how such a provision might be drafted so as not to capture deaths which are outwith the scope of the amendment.

To conclude, we are not saying no. What I am saying is that I understand the noble Baroness’s concern that the existing statutory provision for the preservation of a deceased child’s social media data should operate as effectively as possible and we will consider carefully what further steps could be taken. As I have just mentioned, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and I spoke briefly and agreed to meet, and I am happy to extend that to include Ministers from both the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.

I look forward to updating the House on Report on this important topic. I cannot update the Committee in relation to the issues with the United States now, but I will write to the noble Baroness in relation to that. In the meantime, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I start by accepting all the various offers to meet the Minister and thank her for her tone in her response and for expanding it to the other departments as necessary. Before I withdraw the amendment, however, I want to make a couple of things very clear.

First, this sits in the broader issue of failure to have the Online Safety Act implemented properly. It sits in the broader issue of why children are dying at all. Moreover—I think I have to say this both on my own behalf and on behalf of the bereaved parents—I am very grateful for everybody’s gratitude, but we do not want gratitude; we want action. I am sorry, but on the actual points—six months, the same letter about the guidance that never comes—I do not accept that there cannot be a way of exempting sick children, and I would like to know how many children died in car crashes because someone was on the phone.

I do not think it is an excuse, and I really feel at this point that officials and Ministers are way too comfortable with unintended consequences. How about the House starts with dealing with the intended consequences of its legislation that are not being properly implemented? With that, and the promise to come back on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 438ED withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

266: Clause 63, page 81, line 34, at end insert—
“46D Child sexual abuse image-generation risk assessment(1) A provider of an online service, including but not limited to a generative AI large language model, must risk assess the likelihood of their service being used to create or facilitate the creation of a CSA image or images as defined by section 46A.(2) If a risk is identified in a CSA risk assessment—(a) where the provider is regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must report the risk and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM;(b) where the provider is not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks of their online service being used to create or facilitate the creation of CSA images with the National Crime Agency.(3) Where a provider regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM (see subsection (2)(a)), they can be subjected to OFCOM’s enforcement powers set out in Part 7, Chapter 6 (enforcement powers) of that Act.(4) Where a provider not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with the National Crime Agency (see subsection (2)(b)), they commit an offence.(5) A provider that commits an offence under this section is liable to be issued with a penalty notice by the National Crime Agency.(6) In this section a “penalty notice” means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding whichever is the greater of—(a) £18 million, or(b) 10% of a provider’s qualifying worldwide revenue for the most recent complete accounting period.(7) A penalty notice may be reissued where a provider continues to commit an offence under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that services that do not fall into scope of Clause 63 as currently drafted still assess and mitigate the risk of their services being used as an AI child sexual abuse generator.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 266, I will speak also to Amendments 479 and 480, all of which are in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Russell, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for their support.

All three amendments concern illegal or harmful online activity. Amendment 266 places a legal duty on online services, including generative AI services, to conduct risk assessments evaluating the likelihood that their systems could be used to create or facilitate child sexual abuse material. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause establishes that duty. Subsection (2) requires providers to report the results to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency, depending on whether or not they are regulated under the Online Safety Act. Subsections (3) to (7) set out the enforcement mechanisms, drawing on Ofcom’s existing enforcement powers under the OSA or equivalent powers for the NCA.

Amendment 266 complements Clause 63, which creates the new offence relating to the supply of CSA image generators to which the Minister has just spoken, but it is in addition to those powers. In June 2023, the BBC reported that the open-source AI model Stable Diffusion was being used to generate child sexual abuse material. Researchers at Stanford University subsequently found that Stable Diffusion had been trained on datasets containing child sexual abuse material. This issue is not confined to a single model. The Internet Watch Foundation and the chair of the AI Security Institute have warned of the potential for open-source AI models to be used for the creation of CSAM.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very happy to arrange a meeting with an appropriate Minister. I would be very happy to sit in on it. Other Ministers may wish to take the lead on this, because there are technology issues as well. I have Home Office responsibilities across the board, but I have never refused a meeting with a Member of this House in my 16 months here and I am not going to start now, so the answer to that question is yes. The basic presumption at the moment is that we are not convinced that the technology is yet at the stage that the noble Lord believes it to be, but that is a matter for future operation. I again give him the assurance that, in the event that the technology proves to be successful, the Government will wish to examine it in some detail.

I have absolutely no doubt that we will revisit these matters but, for the moment, I hope that the noble Baroness can withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Nash, for his amendment and his fierce following of this issue, and for bringing it to our attention. I recognise that this is a Home Office Bill and that some of these things cross to DSIT, but we are also witnessing crime. The Home Office must understand that not everything can be pushed to DSIT.

Your Lordships have just met the tech Lords. These are incredibly informed people from all over the Chamber who share a view that we want a technological world that puts kids front and centre. We are united in that and, as the Minister has suggested, we will be back.

I have three very quick points. First, legal challenges, operational difficulties and the capacity of the NCA and Ofcom were the exact same reasons why Clause 63 was not in the Online Safety Bill or the Data (Use and Access) Bill. It is unacceptable for officials to always answer with those general things. Many noble Lords said, “It’s so difficult”, and, “This is new”, with the Online Safety Bill. It is not new: we raised these issues before. If we had acted three or four years ago, we would not be in this situation. I urge this Government to get on the front foot, because we know what is coming.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her kind words about the new offence with respect to child sexual abuse image generators and I take the opportunity to recognise the work of the specialist police unit that has worked alongside me on these and other issues. Working at the front line of child sexual abuse detection and enforcement is to come up against some of the most sordid and horrendous scenarios that can make you lose faith in humanity, so I want to put on record our huge debt to those in the unit for their courage and commitment.

I was also pleased to hear the Minister’s commitment to criminalise pornography that depicts acts of strangulation and suffocation. This is one of a number of concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, will speak to shortly, and I shall be supporting her on all her amendments. During the Recess, I chaired a meeting of extremely senior health professionals and the prevalence of young people presenting in clinical settings suffering from violence and abuse during sex was simply horrific, with outcomes ranging from fear and trauma to death itself. There is an epidemic of sexual violence, normalised and driven by pornography, and I very much hope that the noble Baroness will have the support of the whole House on this matter.

I have four further areas of concern and I am going to touch on each very briefly. First, this House successfully introduced amendments to the Data (Use and Access) Act to empower coroners to require technology companies to preserve data when a child has died. At the time, we proposed that preservation notices should be automatic and that statutory guidance should be developed, but this was refused. We now have the law, but bereaved families are still unable to benefit from its provisions, because preservation notices are not being used quickly enough, and nor are the powers fully understood. It is simply heartbreaking to see a parent who has just lost a child become a victim of a system that does not understand or use its own powers. I will be tabling amendments to make the new law work as was promised and as Parliament intended.

Secondly, we have all seen media reports of chatbots suggesting illegal content or activity to children. I remain unclear about the Government’s appetite to strengthen Ofcom’s codes or to resolve the differences of opinion between Parliament and the regulator about the scope of the Online Safety Act. Nevertheless, I will be seeking to ensure that AI chatbots that suggest or facilitate illegal activity are addressed in the Crime and Policing Bill.

Thirdly, as I have indicated, I welcome the CSAM generator offence in the Bill, but a gap remains and I will be tabling amendments to place clear, legally binding duties on developers of generative AI systems to conduct risk assessments, identifying whether and how their systems could be misused for this narrow but devastating purpose.

Finally, I am curious about youth diversion orders. I am by no means against them, but I would like to understand whether they are to be backed up by other support, such as autism screening and therapeutic support. Many at the front line of this issue say that there is a serious lack of resource, and I would be interested to hear from Ministers how young people are to be supported once diverted, and whether the Government have plans to look further at the responsibility of tech companies that deliberately design for constant engagement, even if extreme content is being used simply as bait. It is no longer possible to consider the online world as separate from any other environment and, if we do not impose the legal order we require elsewhere, we will continue to create a place of lawlessness and abuse.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

I intend to move Motion E1 at the appropriate point to test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness Kidron (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Motion D, the government amendment in lieu of Lords Amendment 4. I, too, thank the Minister for her time and the care that she showed when we met. I wish also to recognise Stella Creasy MP, who has done so much to advance this issue.

I warmly welcome the enhanced protections, most particularly on the definition of exceptional circumstances. Experts have made clear to me that if that is applied rigorously, coupled with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, it will indeed make a real difference on the ground. Asking children to undertake illegal activities on behalf of the authorities is a place that none of us wants to be in, but as the Bill does precisely that, by formalising and giving permission to instruct child operatives to commit crime, it must be to the highest order of protection. It is the question of what a child is that I wish to raise once more.

A child of 16 or 17 is still a child, as defined by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and in our laws, and treated in our communities and families as a child—by right, by law and by practice—and yet the Bill does not afford 16 and 17 year-olds the protections due to children. While under-16s have the absolute right to have an appropriate adult with them when they meet a relevant person, in the case of 16 and 17 year-olds, a relevant person can decide that there are

“circumstances which justify the absence of an appropriate adult”,

even when that is a meeting that will lead to the child undertaking illegal activity on behalf of the authorities. This introduces an extraordinary conflict of interest that structurally undermines the Bill’s other requirement to act in the best interest of the child because it denies a 16 or 17 year-old child the automatic right to the presence of an adult who has the child’s interests as their unfettered concern.

Moreover, while I know the Minister’s assurance that more than one person must be involved, those circumstances can happen at the beginning of a child’s use as a CHIS, during their term as a CHIS and again under proposed new article 10 concerning the renewal of each four-month term, thereby making it possible for a child to be introduced, managed and repeatedly renewed as a CHIS, with no appropriate adult present at any time.

When we last debated this matter, a number of colleagues robustly criticised the amendment in my name, arguing that we should ban child CHIS altogether. However, while my heart is entirely with them, I had accepted the Government’s argument that if gang leaders knew beyond doubt that a child could not be a CHIS, it would drive further recruitment and exploitation of children by gangs. My, albeit reluctant, view was that the best way in which to protect children from being exploited by gangs was to allow the possibility of a child CHIS but to shroud the process in robust protections. We have failed to do that for 16 and 17 year-olds.

This is a failure of which the Front Bench of the Official Opposition in the other place should be ashamed, given that they have not fought for it. I am further disappointed that the Government have used their majority to walk through the Lobby rather than to protect the citizens they are elected to serve—in this case, vulnerable children being made more vulnerable at the behest of the state. All that is being asked here is that every child has an appropriate adult whose role is to make sure that what the child is being asked to do meets the bar of exceptional circumstances, and is understood, agreed to without pressure and in their best interests.

I do not doubt the principled behaviour of many in the enforcement community. I will work alongside officers in the UK and internationally whose commitment to exploited children online is nothing short of humbling. However, history is littered with examples of people in authority who have abused their position. In creating this glaring loophole, not only are we clearly exposing these children to the possibility of abuse by those in authority, we are also exposing those in authority to suspicion, and the Home Office itself to reputational and legal risk from even one bad apple.

Therefore, while the Bill is all but done, I still have some practical questions on both safeguarding and arrangements for meeting, as set out in proposed new Clause 29C(3)(b)(ii) and proposed new subsection (3)(c), where the word “believes” is the bar. In spite of the Minister’s assurance, that still appears to allow a relevant person to say that he or she thought that there was no harm in asking the child to do something illegal. Can she confirm that the guidance will include an objective test for both issues? Similarly, does the IPCO have to work out whether the officer “believed” that the illegal activity was in the child’s best interests or will they be looking to establish whether the action was “compatible” with the child’s best interests? In the event that the IPCO does not like the explanation, how quickly and by what process would it be challenged, bearing in mind that all the while a child is acting as a CHIS with no support? If the final port of call is reporting to Parliament, as we have heard, what level of detail is the IPCO to provide to Parliament? If, God forbid, something went wrong, is there an expectation that the police would reveal that a child was acting as an informant to serious case review, and would that automatically trigger an investigation?

The guidance, the code of conduct or, as the Minister rightly suggested, secondary legislation may be the last port of call for these children. Perhaps she can say when it will be ready, what form it will take and whether she would consider sharing it in advance so that parliamentarians with an interest in this matter can comment and input. Will the guidance be subject to a child rights impact assessment? I understand that it is frustrating to have to deal with so many questions at this late stage but almost every child CHIS has been or will be 16 or 17 years old. If the Bill fails this age group, it will have failed children overall.

In these extraordinary times, we have byzantine rules that make it difficult for colleagues to participate, so I want to put on the record that while the form of expression is mine, the view I am expressing is shared by scores of noble Lords on the Government Benches, the Opposition Benches and my own Benches, and a veritable flock of Bishops, who regret the lack of opportunity to make their views known.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Young, has spoken passionately and eloquently about protecting children, as he did in Committee. He made an excellent start to this debate.

I shall speak to Amendment 14, which prohibits the authorisation of criminal conduct by children without specific prior judicial approval. I thank the Minister for arranging for my noble friend Lord Dubs and me to meet officials in the Home Office to discuss this amendment. This was useful and informative but my concerns remain about the use of children in criminal circumstances.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, reported on the Bill last November. The government response to the report was published on Monday and makes substantial reference to criminal conduct by children, for which I am grateful. I shall refer to those reports.

I come to the Bill as someone who has worked with children—anyone under the age of 18, as defined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—for many years. I am not sentimental about children, but I believe that they have rights as set out in the UNCRC— not just legal rights, although they are important, but moral and ethical rights such as protection, safety, family life and the right to be heard. Societies that nurture, cherish and attend to the total welfare of children are civilised societies. No society should endanger children. They need protection but also empowerment to take responsibility for themselves and others, and to learn to express opinions constructively. I like to think that the UK aspires to these principles of the UNCRC which it has ratified. We are fortunate in this country in having an articulate, dedicated voluntary sector for children that keeps us vigilant to their needs.

I cannot see how a child could be used to commit a criminal offence without there being a risk of danger, physical or psychological. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, said, I would prefer children not to be working as CHIS at all, but if they do we must make the situation as watertight as possible. I and other noble Lords know of cases where children have been let down and exploited by systems, and fallen through the net to physical and psychological harm, sometimes death. That must be prevented at all costs. It is why my amendment seeks high-level judicial approval before a child can take part in criminal conduct. The organisations Justice, Just for Kids Law and the Children’s Rights Alliance for England call that “meaningful safeguards”.

Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and other noble Lords is very worthy. The noble Lord, Lord Young, referred to it as a useful advancement. I recognise also that she and her co-signatories are people who also care deeply about children’s welfare. That amendment extends additional protection not only to children but to vulnerable adults. That is important but, and this is a big “but”, it does not provide for independent judicial scrutiny of a CCA being made in respect of a child or other vulnerable person. It imposes a requirement that there should be exceptional circumstances before an authorisation is granted and makes it clear that other interests cannot be more primary than the child’s, and that it must have been determined that the child will not be in any danger of foreseeable physical or psychological harm. That amendment also makes compulsory the presence of an appropriate adult for all under-18s when meeting with the investigating authority. It requires any use of a CCA in respect of a child to be reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within 18 days.

Amendment 24 meets most of the concerns of the Joint Committee on Human Rights about the welfare of children under CCAS. However, a major concern is that there is no independent decision-maker—only independent review after the event by the IPC. This system can pick up an abuse of power only when it has happened. Tough, independent assessment of whether a child should be used as a CHIS should be made before the child moves into a dangerous situation. I am sure the people working with these children are caring and professional, but this is such a serious issue for children that a judicial commissioner should look at each case and make the final decision.

I know that the Minister, speaking on different amendments on Monday, said that she could not agree with prior authorisation. I am not sure why. It may be that she can tell me more. There are not that many children in such a position—between 12 and 17 between 2015 and 2018. Undue delay would therefore be unlikely and the children’s cases would have double scrutiny, which is what they deserve, due to the seriousness of what they are being asked to do. If Amendment 24 is accepted by the House, I shall not put my amendment to the test but will suggest further action. The government amendment does not add much to what we have already heard, and we need to go further. That amendment, however, recognises that there are concerns about authorising children as CHIS and makes efforts at reconciliation, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, said.

This issue is not new. The Joint Committee on Human Rights raised concerns in 2018 and 2019 with the Minister for State for Security and Economic Crime and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. In 2019, the High Court assessed whether the scheme in place to regulate the use of children as CHIS provided sufficient safeguards to comply with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court concluded that the scheme was compliant. However, it was accepted that the use of a child as a CHIS was

“liable to interfere with the child’s ‘private life’, which covers the physical and moral integrity of the person. The dangers to the child of acting as a CHIS in the context of serious crimes are self-evident.”

The Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the Bill must be amended to exclude children or to make clear that children may be authorised to commit criminal offences in only the most exceptional circumstances. I suggest that those exceptional circumstances should have independent consideration at the highest level.

The Government’s response to the JCHR report gave considerable space to discussion of these issues in relation to chapter 6 of the report. But they came up with, to me, a rather tenuous argument, stating that

“young people may have unique access to information that is important in preventing and prosecuting gang violence and terrorism. This helps remove from the cycle of crime not only the young person … but other young and vulnerable individuals caught in criminality. We should also acknowledge that by universally prohibiting the authorisation of young people to undertake criminality we are increasing the risks to them and placing them in an even more vulnerable position. If criminal gangs … know that a young person will never be authorised by the state to undertake criminality, such groups will be more likely to force young people to engage in criminality, confident in the knowledge that they could never be a CHIS”.—[Official Report, 3/12/20; cols. 937-8.]

I can see absolutely no logic in that statement.

Indeed, a former undercover police officer, with experience of being a CHIS, has said that

“Children recruited as informants are also highly likely to end up getting drawn back into criminality and feeling trapped in their situation.”


I am aware that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, knows something about those situations.

A leading and highly respected child psychiatrist has said that

“the deployment of children as a CHIS could incur significant … emotional damage to the child and could in fact engender the creation of new criminals by placing them in criminogenic environments.”

This is not child protection; it is not respecting children’s rights. It is dangerous and potentially destructive. Every care must be taken, and we have a duty to see that that happens.

I have the greatest respect for the Minister and admire her common sense, sensitivity and practicality. Might I suggest that this whole operation needs to be taken away and looked at again very carefully, with an independent review? This should cover: the types of involvement by children; how children are assessed as suitable for such work; how the views of children, parents if appropriate and those accompanying children are taken into account; what psychological support is offered; and how children are assessed and supported after their involvement as CHIS, and for any long-term effects.

This may result in a recommendation not to use children in this fashion—I would welcome that—or in more stringent methods of prior independent authorisation being employed, as suggested by my amendment. The current situation in which children are used as CHIS cannot remain the same. I hope that the Minister will consider this suggestion. This issue is not going to go away; indeed, it is likely to intensify. I look forward to her comments and thank noble Lords for their time.

[Baroness Kidron (CB) [V]]

I speak to Amendment 24 in my name and that of the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This sets out the safeguards and protections that should exist if we ask a child to commit a crime as a covert human intelligence source. I pay tribute to the work that many have done on this issue, including the noble Lords who support this amendment; the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, who raised these concerns so admirably in Committee; the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who has left us with no doubt where right lies; and my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool, who has taken time to go through the interlocking amendments and considerations with me.

I also acknowledge the tireless efforts of Stella Creasy MP, in bringing this issue forward in the other place, and the children’s rights advocates Just for Kids Law, which brought the court case on this matter last year. I have taken up the baton for this work at their request. As many of your Lordships know, my time, both in the House and beyond its walls, is spent as an advocate for children’s rights online and offline. I have great sympathy for the other amendments in this group, but I speak to Amendment 24 only and will make some points about government Amendment 26. I note and take to heart the words of both the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham; while I have their support for what I propose, it is the absolute minimum that children require and is not ideal, in their view. I declare my interests set out on the register.

Children do not all have the same circumstances. It is simply a fact that some children will not be as well-loved as others, some not as well-cared-for and some not as well-behaved. None the less, whether they are loved, cared for or well-behaved, any person under the age of 18 is a child. In a context where a person under the age of 18 is being asked to be a covert source and do something illegal, we must ensure that they remain a child in the eyes of all who play a part. In every other interaction with the criminal justice system, we try to remove children from criminal activity to take them away from harm and towards safety, but before us is legislation that formalises our ability to do the opposite.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

24: Clause 1, page 3, line 16, at end insert—
“29C Criminal conduct authorisations: granting to children and vulnerable sources (1) This section applies when the source is—(a) under the age of 18,(b) a vulnerable individual, as defined in subsection (5), or(c) a victim of modern slavery or trafficking, as defined in subsection (6). (2) No criminal conduct authorisations may be granted for a source to whom subsection (1) applies unless the authorising officer believes that exceptional circumstances apply that necessitate the authorisation.(3) Where a criminal conduct authorisation is granted for a source to whom subsection (1) applies, the arrangements referred to in section 29(2)(c) of this Act must be such that there is at all times a person holding an office, rank or position with a relevant investigating authority who has responsibility for ensuring that an appropriate adult is present at all meetings between the source and a person representing any relevant investigating authority.(4) In subsection (3) “appropriate adult” means—(a) the parent or guardian of the source;(b) any other person who has for the time being assumed responsibility for his or her welfare; or(c) where no person falling within paragraph (a) or (b) is available and deemed appropriate, any responsible person aged 18 or over who is neither a member of nor employed by any relevant investigating authority.(5) A “vulnerable individual” is a person who by reason of mental disorder or vulnerability, other disability, age or illness, is or may be unable to take care of themselves, or unable to protect themselves against significant harm or exploitation.(6) A “victim of modern slavery or trafficking” is a person who the relevant investigating authority believes is or may be a victim of trafficking as defined by section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (human trafficking), or exploitation as defined by section 3 of that Act (meaning of exploitation).(7) The “exceptional circumstances” in subsection (2) are circumstances—(a) where authorisation of the criminal conduct authorisation is necessary and proportionate considering the welfare of the covert human intelligence source;(b) where, if the covert human intelligence source is under 18, the relevant investigating authority has determined in its assessment that the criminal conduct authorisation remains compatible with and does not override the best interests of the covert human intelligence source;(c) where all other methods to gain information have been exhausted; and(d) where the relevant investigating authority has determined in its assessment that the source to whom subsection (1) applies will not be at risk of any reasonably foreseeable harm (whether physical or psychological) arising from the criminal conduct authorisation.(8) Where a person grants a criminal conduct authorisation to anyone specified in subsection (1), that person must give notice of that authorisation to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.(9) A notice under subsection (8) must—(a) be given in writing;(b) be given as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any event within seven days of the grant; and(c) include the matters specified in subsection (10).(10) Where a person gives notice under subsection (8) in respect of the granting of a criminal conduct authorisation, the notice must specify—(a) the grounds on which the person giving the notice believes the matters specified in section 29B(4) are satisfied;(b) the conduct that is, or is to be, authorised under section 29B(8); and(c) the reasons for believing that “exceptional circumstances” as set out in subsections (2) and (7) apply.”

Black Lives Matter: Protests

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Monday 15th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I wholeheartedly agree with my noble friend. To take things down is to erase history, and erasing history is absolutely not what we should be about in educating our children about the misdemeanours of the past, as well as the great things of the past—the people who built our country. He is absolutely right: we should take down racism but not legacies of our history, which seek to educate us all. I pass many statues in and around Westminster. Some of them are offensive to me. I understand why others are there and they are a learning point for history.

[Baroness Kidron (CB) [V]]

I agree with those who say that we should not attempt to erase history, but our public spaces, just like our curriculum, our cultural narratives and our public institutions, reflect only a partial history of Britain. Protestors are not trying to forget that; rather, they are demanding to be remembered. This morning, the PM wrote that he will resist with every breath in his body the editing or photoshopping of history, but perhaps the Minister will acknowledge that the most egregious editing in the last week was not the removal of the statue of a slave trader in Bristol but the Government’s decision to delay publishing the Public Health England recommendations that found that systemic racism and inequalities led to excessive deaths of BAME Britons from Covid-19.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I cannot concur with the noble Baroness. This Government have acted on the advice of scientists. Any life that is lost is a life too many, and this is a novel virus that has affected some communities more than others. We are still trying to understand why, but we should not conflate that with addressing where the roots of racism lie in our country, because there is no doubt that the events of the last two weeks have not just happened randomly. There is a deep-rooted feeling of inequality in some communities in this country.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 10th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, many noble Lords will know that my particular interests, clearly stated on the register, are concerned with making the digital world fit for children and young people, and so the greater part of my comments concern that. However, I wanted to say at the outset that dealing with this Bill without having had the opportunity to scrutinise the GDPR or understand the ambition and scope of the Government’s digital charter, their internet safety strategy or even some of the details that we still await on the Digital Economy Act made my head hurt also.

I start with the age of consent. Like others, I am concerned that the age of 13 was a decision reached not on the advice of child development experts, child campaigners or parents. Perhaps most importantly of all, the decision lacks the voice of young people. They are key players in this: the early adopters of emerging technologies, the first to spot its problems and, so very often, the last to be consulted or, indeed, not consulted at all. Also, like others, I was bewildered when I saw Clause 187. Are Scottish children especially mature or are their southern counterparts universally less so? More importantly, it seems that we have to comply with the GDPR, except when we do not.

As the right reverend Prelate has outlined, the age of 13 is really an age of convenience. We have simply chosen to align UK standards with COPPA, a piece of US legislation that its own authors once described to me as a “terrible compromise”, and which dates from 2000, when the notion of every child carrying a smartphone with the processing power of “Apollo 11” and consulting it every few minutes, hundreds of times day and night, was not even in our imagination, let alone our reality.

Before considering whether 13 is the right age, we should understand what plans the Government have to require tech companies to make any provisions for those aged 13 to 17, or whether it is the considered opinion of the UK Government that in the digital environment a 13 year-old is a de facto adult. Will the Government require tech companies to publish data risk assessments setting out how children are likely to engage with their service at different ages and the steps they have taken to support them, including transparent reporting data? Are we to have minimum design standards in parts of the digital environment that children frequent, and that includes those places that they are not supposed to be? Will the ICO have powers to enforce against ISS providers which do not take steps to prevent very young children accessing services designed for people twice their age? My understanding is that age compliance will continue to be monitored and enforced by the ISS companies themselves.

As Ofcom pointed out, in 2016 in the UK, 21% of 10 year-olds, 43% of 11 year-olds and half of all 12 year-olds had a social media profile, in spite of COPPA. Are the Government planning to adequately resource and train all front-line workers with children, teachers, parents and children in a programme of digital literacy as the House of Lords Communications Committee called for, and in doing so inform all concerned—those 13 and under and those between the ages of 13 and 18—on the impact for young people of inhabiting what is increasingly a commercial environment? Until these questions are answered positively, the argument for a hard age of consent seems weak.

In contrast, in its current code of practice on processing personal data online, the ICO recommends a nuanced approach, advising would-be data collectors that:

“Assessing understanding, rather than merely determining age, is the key to ensuring that personal data about children is collected and used fairly”.


The current system places the obligation on the data controller to consider the context of the child user, and requires them to frame and direct the request appropriately. It underpins what we know about childhood: that it is a journey from dependence to autonomy, from infancy to maturity. Different ages require different privileges and levels of support.

If being GDPR compliant requires a hard age limit, how do we intend to verify the age of the child in any meaningful way without, perversely, collecting more data from children than we do from adults? Given that the age of consent is to vary from country to country—16 in the Netherlands, Germany and Hungary; 14 in Austria—data controllers will also need to know the location of a child so that the right rules can be applied. Arguably, that creates more risk for children, but definitely it will create more data.

In all of this we must acknowledge a child’s right to access the digital world knowledgeably, creatively and fearlessly. Excluding children is not the answer, but providing a digital environment fit for them to flourish in must be. There is not enough in this Bill to fundamentally realign young people’s relationship with tech companies when it comes to their data.

Much like the noble Lord, Lord Knight, my view is that we have got this all wrong. In the future, the user will be the owner of their own data, with our preferences attached to our individual online identity. Companies and services will sign up to our bespoke terms and conditions, which will encompass our interests and tolerances, rather than the other way round. If that sounds a little far-fetched, I refer noble Lords to the IEEE, where this proposal is laid out in considerable detail. For those who do not know the IEEE, it is the pre-eminent global organisation of the electrical engineering professions.

While this rather better option is not before us today, it must inform our understanding that the Bill is effectively supporting an uncomfortable status quo. Challenging the status quo means putting children first, for example by putting the code of practice promised in the Digital Economy Act on a statutory footing so that it is enforceable; by imposing minimum design standards where the end-user is likely or may be a child; by publishing guidance to the tech companies on privacy settings, tracking, GPS and so forth; by demanding that they meet the rights of young people in the digital environment; and by a much tougher, altogether more appropriate, regime for children’s data.

All that could and should be achieved by May, because it comes down to the small print and the culture of a few very powerful businesses for which our children are no match. The GDPR offers warm words on consumer rights, automated profiling and data minimisation, but with terms and conditions as long as “Hamlet”, it is disingenuous to believe that plain English or any number of tick boxes for informed or specific consent will materially protect young people from the real-life consequences of data harvesting, which are intrusive, especially when we have left the data poachers in charge of the rules of engagement.

We could do better—a lot better. I agree wholeheartedly with other noble Lords who are looking for structures and principles that will serve us into the future. Those principles should not only serve us in terms of other EU member states but be bold enough to give us a voice in Silicon Valley. In the meantime, the Government can and should enact the derogation under article 80(2) and in the case of complainants under the age of 18, it should not only be a right but a requirement. We cannot endorse a system where we create poster children on front-line battles with tech companies. We are told that this Bill is about data protection for individuals—a Bill that favours users over business and children over the bottom line. But the absence of Article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights is an inexcusable omission. The Bill in front of us is simply not robust enough to replace Article 8. I call on the Government to insert that crucial principle into UK legislation. It must be wrong for our post-Brexit legislation to be deliberately absent of underlying principles. It is simply not adequate.

I had a laundry list of issues to bring to Committee, but I think I will overlook them. During the debate, a couple of noble Lords asked whether it was possible to regulate the internet. We should acknowledge that the GDPR shows that it can be done, kicking and screaming. It is in itself a victory for a legislative body—the EU. My understanding is that it will set a new benchmark for data-processing standards and will be adopted worldwide to achieve a harmonised global framework. As imperfect as it is, it proves that regulating the digital environment, which is entirely man and woman-made and entirely privately owned, is not an impossibility but a battle of societal need versus corporate will.

As I said at the beginning, my central concern is children. A child is a child until they reach maturity, not until they reach for their smart phone. Until Mark Zuckerberg, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Tim Cook, Jack Dorsey and the rest, with all their resources and creativity, proactively design a digital environment that encompasses the needs of children and refers to the concept of childhood, I am afraid that it falls to us to insist. The Bill as it stands, even in conjunction with the GDPR, is not insistent enough, which I hope as we follow its passage is something that we can address together.