Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

I intend to move Motion E1 at the appropriate point to test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness Kidron (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Motion D, the government amendment in lieu of Lords Amendment 4. I, too, thank the Minister for her time and the care that she showed when we met. I wish also to recognise Stella Creasy MP, who has done so much to advance this issue.

I warmly welcome the enhanced protections, most particularly on the definition of exceptional circumstances. Experts have made clear to me that if that is applied rigorously, coupled with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, it will indeed make a real difference on the ground. Asking children to undertake illegal activities on behalf of the authorities is a place that none of us wants to be in, but as the Bill does precisely that, by formalising and giving permission to instruct child operatives to commit crime, it must be to the highest order of protection. It is the question of what a child is that I wish to raise once more.

A child of 16 or 17 is still a child, as defined by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and in our laws, and treated in our communities and families as a child—by right, by law and by practice—and yet the Bill does not afford 16 and 17 year-olds the protections due to children. While under-16s have the absolute right to have an appropriate adult with them when they meet a relevant person, in the case of 16 and 17 year-olds, a relevant person can decide that there are

“circumstances which justify the absence of an appropriate adult”,

even when that is a meeting that will lead to the child undertaking illegal activity on behalf of the authorities. This introduces an extraordinary conflict of interest that structurally undermines the Bill’s other requirement to act in the best interest of the child because it denies a 16 or 17 year-old child the automatic right to the presence of an adult who has the child’s interests as their unfettered concern.

Moreover, while I know the Minister’s assurance that more than one person must be involved, those circumstances can happen at the beginning of a child’s use as a CHIS, during their term as a CHIS and again under proposed new article 10 concerning the renewal of each four-month term, thereby making it possible for a child to be introduced, managed and repeatedly renewed as a CHIS, with no appropriate adult present at any time.

When we last debated this matter, a number of colleagues robustly criticised the amendment in my name, arguing that we should ban child CHIS altogether. However, while my heart is entirely with them, I had accepted the Government’s argument that if gang leaders knew beyond doubt that a child could not be a CHIS, it would drive further recruitment and exploitation of children by gangs. My, albeit reluctant, view was that the best way in which to protect children from being exploited by gangs was to allow the possibility of a child CHIS but to shroud the process in robust protections. We have failed to do that for 16 and 17 year-olds.

This is a failure of which the Front Bench of the Official Opposition in the other place should be ashamed, given that they have not fought for it. I am further disappointed that the Government have used their majority to walk through the Lobby rather than to protect the citizens they are elected to serve—in this case, vulnerable children being made more vulnerable at the behest of the state. All that is being asked here is that every child has an appropriate adult whose role is to make sure that what the child is being asked to do meets the bar of exceptional circumstances, and is understood, agreed to without pressure and in their best interests.

I do not doubt the principled behaviour of many in the enforcement community. I will work alongside officers in the UK and internationally whose commitment to exploited children online is nothing short of humbling. However, history is littered with examples of people in authority who have abused their position. In creating this glaring loophole, not only are we clearly exposing these children to the possibility of abuse by those in authority, we are also exposing those in authority to suspicion, and the Home Office itself to reputational and legal risk from even one bad apple.

Therefore, while the Bill is all but done, I still have some practical questions on both safeguarding and arrangements for meeting, as set out in proposed new Clause 29C(3)(b)(ii) and proposed new subsection (3)(c), where the word “believes” is the bar. In spite of the Minister’s assurance, that still appears to allow a relevant person to say that he or she thought that there was no harm in asking the child to do something illegal. Can she confirm that the guidance will include an objective test for both issues? Similarly, does the IPCO have to work out whether the officer “believed” that the illegal activity was in the child’s best interests or will they be looking to establish whether the action was “compatible” with the child’s best interests? In the event that the IPCO does not like the explanation, how quickly and by what process would it be challenged, bearing in mind that all the while a child is acting as a CHIS with no support? If the final port of call is reporting to Parliament, as we have heard, what level of detail is the IPCO to provide to Parliament? If, God forbid, something went wrong, is there an expectation that the police would reveal that a child was acting as an informant to serious case review, and would that automatically trigger an investigation?

The guidance, the code of conduct or, as the Minister rightly suggested, secondary legislation may be the last port of call for these children. Perhaps she can say when it will be ready, what form it will take and whether she would consider sharing it in advance so that parliamentarians with an interest in this matter can comment and input. Will the guidance be subject to a child rights impact assessment? I understand that it is frustrating to have to deal with so many questions at this late stage but almost every child CHIS has been or will be 16 or 17 years old. If the Bill fails this age group, it will have failed children overall.

In these extraordinary times, we have byzantine rules that make it difficult for colleagues to participate, so I want to put on the record that while the form of expression is mine, the view I am expressing is shared by scores of noble Lords on the Government Benches, the Opposition Benches and my own Benches, and a veritable flock of Bishops, who regret the lack of opportunity to make their views known.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Young, has spoken passionately and eloquently about protecting children, as he did in Committee. He made an excellent start to this debate.

I shall speak to Amendment 14, which prohibits the authorisation of criminal conduct by children without specific prior judicial approval. I thank the Minister for arranging for my noble friend Lord Dubs and me to meet officials in the Home Office to discuss this amendment. This was useful and informative but my concerns remain about the use of children in criminal circumstances.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, reported on the Bill last November. The government response to the report was published on Monday and makes substantial reference to criminal conduct by children, for which I am grateful. I shall refer to those reports.

I come to the Bill as someone who has worked with children—anyone under the age of 18, as defined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—for many years. I am not sentimental about children, but I believe that they have rights as set out in the UNCRC— not just legal rights, although they are important, but moral and ethical rights such as protection, safety, family life and the right to be heard. Societies that nurture, cherish and attend to the total welfare of children are civilised societies. No society should endanger children. They need protection but also empowerment to take responsibility for themselves and others, and to learn to express opinions constructively. I like to think that the UK aspires to these principles of the UNCRC which it has ratified. We are fortunate in this country in having an articulate, dedicated voluntary sector for children that keeps us vigilant to their needs.

I cannot see how a child could be used to commit a criminal offence without there being a risk of danger, physical or psychological. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, said, I would prefer children not to be working as CHIS at all, but if they do we must make the situation as watertight as possible. I and other noble Lords know of cases where children have been let down and exploited by systems, and fallen through the net to physical and psychological harm, sometimes death. That must be prevented at all costs. It is why my amendment seeks high-level judicial approval before a child can take part in criminal conduct. The organisations Justice, Just for Kids Law and the Children’s Rights Alliance for England call that “meaningful safeguards”.

Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and other noble Lords is very worthy. The noble Lord, Lord Young, referred to it as a useful advancement. I recognise also that she and her co-signatories are people who also care deeply about children’s welfare. That amendment extends additional protection not only to children but to vulnerable adults. That is important but, and this is a big “but”, it does not provide for independent judicial scrutiny of a CCA being made in respect of a child or other vulnerable person. It imposes a requirement that there should be exceptional circumstances before an authorisation is granted and makes it clear that other interests cannot be more primary than the child’s, and that it must have been determined that the child will not be in any danger of foreseeable physical or psychological harm. That amendment also makes compulsory the presence of an appropriate adult for all under-18s when meeting with the investigating authority. It requires any use of a CCA in respect of a child to be reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within 18 days.

Amendment 24 meets most of the concerns of the Joint Committee on Human Rights about the welfare of children under CCAS. However, a major concern is that there is no independent decision-maker—only independent review after the event by the IPC. This system can pick up an abuse of power only when it has happened. Tough, independent assessment of whether a child should be used as a CHIS should be made before the child moves into a dangerous situation. I am sure the people working with these children are caring and professional, but this is such a serious issue for children that a judicial commissioner should look at each case and make the final decision.

I know that the Minister, speaking on different amendments on Monday, said that she could not agree with prior authorisation. I am not sure why. It may be that she can tell me more. There are not that many children in such a position—between 12 and 17 between 2015 and 2018. Undue delay would therefore be unlikely and the children’s cases would have double scrutiny, which is what they deserve, due to the seriousness of what they are being asked to do. If Amendment 24 is accepted by the House, I shall not put my amendment to the test but will suggest further action. The government amendment does not add much to what we have already heard, and we need to go further. That amendment, however, recognises that there are concerns about authorising children as CHIS and makes efforts at reconciliation, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, said.

This issue is not new. The Joint Committee on Human Rights raised concerns in 2018 and 2019 with the Minister for State for Security and Economic Crime and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. In 2019, the High Court assessed whether the scheme in place to regulate the use of children as CHIS provided sufficient safeguards to comply with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court concluded that the scheme was compliant. However, it was accepted that the use of a child as a CHIS was

“liable to interfere with the child’s ‘private life’, which covers the physical and moral integrity of the person. The dangers to the child of acting as a CHIS in the context of serious crimes are self-evident.”

The Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the Bill must be amended to exclude children or to make clear that children may be authorised to commit criminal offences in only the most exceptional circumstances. I suggest that those exceptional circumstances should have independent consideration at the highest level.

The Government’s response to the JCHR report gave considerable space to discussion of these issues in relation to chapter 6 of the report. But they came up with, to me, a rather tenuous argument, stating that

“young people may have unique access to information that is important in preventing and prosecuting gang violence and terrorism. This helps remove from the cycle of crime not only the young person … but other young and vulnerable individuals caught in criminality. We should also acknowledge that by universally prohibiting the authorisation of young people to undertake criminality we are increasing the risks to them and placing them in an even more vulnerable position. If criminal gangs … know that a young person will never be authorised by the state to undertake criminality, such groups will be more likely to force young people to engage in criminality, confident in the knowledge that they could never be a CHIS”.—[Official Report, 3/12/20; cols. 937-8.]

I can see absolutely no logic in that statement.

Indeed, a former undercover police officer, with experience of being a CHIS, has said that

“Children recruited as informants are also highly likely to end up getting drawn back into criminality and feeling trapped in their situation.”


I am aware that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, knows something about those situations.

A leading and highly respected child psychiatrist has said that

“the deployment of children as a CHIS could incur significant … emotional damage to the child and could in fact engender the creation of new criminals by placing them in criminogenic environments.”

This is not child protection; it is not respecting children’s rights. It is dangerous and potentially destructive. Every care must be taken, and we have a duty to see that that happens.

I have the greatest respect for the Minister and admire her common sense, sensitivity and practicality. Might I suggest that this whole operation needs to be taken away and looked at again very carefully, with an independent review? This should cover: the types of involvement by children; how children are assessed as suitable for such work; how the views of children, parents if appropriate and those accompanying children are taken into account; what psychological support is offered; and how children are assessed and supported after their involvement as CHIS, and for any long-term effects.

This may result in a recommendation not to use children in this fashion—I would welcome that—or in more stringent methods of prior independent authorisation being employed, as suggested by my amendment. The current situation in which children are used as CHIS cannot remain the same. I hope that the Minister will consider this suggestion. This issue is not going to go away; indeed, it is likely to intensify. I look forward to her comments and thank noble Lords for their time.

[Baroness Kidron (CB) [V]]

I speak to Amendment 24 in my name and that of the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This sets out the safeguards and protections that should exist if we ask a child to commit a crime as a covert human intelligence source. I pay tribute to the work that many have done on this issue, including the noble Lords who support this amendment; the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, who raised these concerns so admirably in Committee; the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who has left us with no doubt where right lies; and my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool, who has taken time to go through the interlocking amendments and considerations with me.

I also acknowledge the tireless efforts of Stella Creasy MP, in bringing this issue forward in the other place, and the children’s rights advocates Just for Kids Law, which brought the court case on this matter last year. I have taken up the baton for this work at their request. As many of your Lordships know, my time, both in the House and beyond its walls, is spent as an advocate for children’s rights online and offline. I have great sympathy for the other amendments in this group, but I speak to Amendment 24 only and will make some points about government Amendment 26. I note and take to heart the words of both the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham; while I have their support for what I propose, it is the absolute minimum that children require and is not ideal, in their view. I declare my interests set out on the register.

Children do not all have the same circumstances. It is simply a fact that some children will not be as well-loved as others, some not as well-cared-for and some not as well-behaved. None the less, whether they are loved, cared for or well-behaved, any person under the age of 18 is a child. In a context where a person under the age of 18 is being asked to be a covert source and do something illegal, we must ensure that they remain a child in the eyes of all who play a part. In every other interaction with the criminal justice system, we try to remove children from criminal activity to take them away from harm and towards safety, but before us is legislation that formalises our ability to do the opposite.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

24: Clause 1, page 3, line 16, at end insert—
“29C Criminal conduct authorisations: granting to children and vulnerable sources (1) This section applies when the source is—(a) under the age of 18,(b) a vulnerable individual, as defined in subsection (5), or(c) a victim of modern slavery or trafficking, as defined in subsection (6). (2) No criminal conduct authorisations may be granted for a source to whom subsection (1) applies unless the authorising officer believes that exceptional circumstances apply that necessitate the authorisation.(3) Where a criminal conduct authorisation is granted for a source to whom subsection (1) applies, the arrangements referred to in section 29(2)(c) of this Act must be such that there is at all times a person holding an office, rank or position with a relevant investigating authority who has responsibility for ensuring that an appropriate adult is present at all meetings between the source and a person representing any relevant investigating authority.(4) In subsection (3) “appropriate adult” means—(a) the parent or guardian of the source;(b) any other person who has for the time being assumed responsibility for his or her welfare; or(c) where no person falling within paragraph (a) or (b) is available and deemed appropriate, any responsible person aged 18 or over who is neither a member of nor employed by any relevant investigating authority.(5) A “vulnerable individual” is a person who by reason of mental disorder or vulnerability, other disability, age or illness, is or may be unable to take care of themselves, or unable to protect themselves against significant harm or exploitation.(6) A “victim of modern slavery or trafficking” is a person who the relevant investigating authority believes is or may be a victim of trafficking as defined by section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (human trafficking), or exploitation as defined by section 3 of that Act (meaning of exploitation).(7) The “exceptional circumstances” in subsection (2) are circumstances—(a) where authorisation of the criminal conduct authorisation is necessary and proportionate considering the welfare of the covert human intelligence source;(b) where, if the covert human intelligence source is under 18, the relevant investigating authority has determined in its assessment that the criminal conduct authorisation remains compatible with and does not override the best interests of the covert human intelligence source;(c) where all other methods to gain information have been exhausted; and(d) where the relevant investigating authority has determined in its assessment that the source to whom subsection (1) applies will not be at risk of any reasonably foreseeable harm (whether physical or psychological) arising from the criminal conduct authorisation.(8) Where a person grants a criminal conduct authorisation to anyone specified in subsection (1), that person must give notice of that authorisation to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.(9) A notice under subsection (8) must—(a) be given in writing;(b) be given as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any event within seven days of the grant; and(c) include the matters specified in subsection (10).(10) Where a person gives notice under subsection (8) in respect of the granting of a criminal conduct authorisation, the notice must specify—(a) the grounds on which the person giving the notice believes the matters specified in section 29B(4) are satisfied;(b) the conduct that is, or is to be, authorised under section 29B(8); and(c) the reasons for believing that “exceptional circumstances” as set out in subsections (2) and (7) apply.”

Black Lives Matter: Protests

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Monday 15th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I wholeheartedly agree with my noble friend. To take things down is to erase history, and erasing history is absolutely not what we should be about in educating our children about the misdemeanours of the past, as well as the great things of the past—the people who built our country. He is absolutely right: we should take down racism but not legacies of our history, which seek to educate us all. I pass many statues in and around Westminster. Some of them are offensive to me. I understand why others are there and they are a learning point for history.

[Baroness Kidron (CB) [V]]

I agree with those who say that we should not attempt to erase history, but our public spaces, just like our curriculum, our cultural narratives and our public institutions, reflect only a partial history of Britain. Protestors are not trying to forget that; rather, they are demanding to be remembered. This morning, the PM wrote that he will resist with every breath in his body the editing or photoshopping of history, but perhaps the Minister will acknowledge that the most egregious editing in the last week was not the removal of the statue of a slave trader in Bristol but the Government’s decision to delay publishing the Public Health England recommendations that found that systemic racism and inequalities led to excessive deaths of BAME Britons from Covid-19.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I cannot concur with the noble Baroness. This Government have acted on the advice of scientists. Any life that is lost is a life too many, and this is a novel virus that has affected some communities more than others. We are still trying to understand why, but we should not conflate that with addressing where the roots of racism lie in our country, because there is no doubt that the events of the last two weeks have not just happened randomly. There is a deep-rooted feeling of inequality in some communities in this country.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 10th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, many noble Lords will know that my particular interests, clearly stated on the register, are concerned with making the digital world fit for children and young people, and so the greater part of my comments concern that. However, I wanted to say at the outset that dealing with this Bill without having had the opportunity to scrutinise the GDPR or understand the ambition and scope of the Government’s digital charter, their internet safety strategy or even some of the details that we still await on the Digital Economy Act made my head hurt also.

I start with the age of consent. Like others, I am concerned that the age of 13 was a decision reached not on the advice of child development experts, child campaigners or parents. Perhaps most importantly of all, the decision lacks the voice of young people. They are key players in this: the early adopters of emerging technologies, the first to spot its problems and, so very often, the last to be consulted or, indeed, not consulted at all. Also, like others, I was bewildered when I saw Clause 187. Are Scottish children especially mature or are their southern counterparts universally less so? More importantly, it seems that we have to comply with the GDPR, except when we do not.

As the right reverend Prelate has outlined, the age of 13 is really an age of convenience. We have simply chosen to align UK standards with COPPA, a piece of US legislation that its own authors once described to me as a “terrible compromise”, and which dates from 2000, when the notion of every child carrying a smartphone with the processing power of “Apollo 11” and consulting it every few minutes, hundreds of times day and night, was not even in our imagination, let alone our reality.

Before considering whether 13 is the right age, we should understand what plans the Government have to require tech companies to make any provisions for those aged 13 to 17, or whether it is the considered opinion of the UK Government that in the digital environment a 13 year-old is a de facto adult. Will the Government require tech companies to publish data risk assessments setting out how children are likely to engage with their service at different ages and the steps they have taken to support them, including transparent reporting data? Are we to have minimum design standards in parts of the digital environment that children frequent, and that includes those places that they are not supposed to be? Will the ICO have powers to enforce against ISS providers which do not take steps to prevent very young children accessing services designed for people twice their age? My understanding is that age compliance will continue to be monitored and enforced by the ISS companies themselves.

As Ofcom pointed out, in 2016 in the UK, 21% of 10 year-olds, 43% of 11 year-olds and half of all 12 year-olds had a social media profile, in spite of COPPA. Are the Government planning to adequately resource and train all front-line workers with children, teachers, parents and children in a programme of digital literacy as the House of Lords Communications Committee called for, and in doing so inform all concerned—those 13 and under and those between the ages of 13 and 18—on the impact for young people of inhabiting what is increasingly a commercial environment? Until these questions are answered positively, the argument for a hard age of consent seems weak.

In contrast, in its current code of practice on processing personal data online, the ICO recommends a nuanced approach, advising would-be data collectors that:

“Assessing understanding, rather than merely determining age, is the key to ensuring that personal data about children is collected and used fairly”.


The current system places the obligation on the data controller to consider the context of the child user, and requires them to frame and direct the request appropriately. It underpins what we know about childhood: that it is a journey from dependence to autonomy, from infancy to maturity. Different ages require different privileges and levels of support.

If being GDPR compliant requires a hard age limit, how do we intend to verify the age of the child in any meaningful way without, perversely, collecting more data from children than we do from adults? Given that the age of consent is to vary from country to country—16 in the Netherlands, Germany and Hungary; 14 in Austria—data controllers will also need to know the location of a child so that the right rules can be applied. Arguably, that creates more risk for children, but definitely it will create more data.

In all of this we must acknowledge a child’s right to access the digital world knowledgeably, creatively and fearlessly. Excluding children is not the answer, but providing a digital environment fit for them to flourish in must be. There is not enough in this Bill to fundamentally realign young people’s relationship with tech companies when it comes to their data.

Much like the noble Lord, Lord Knight, my view is that we have got this all wrong. In the future, the user will be the owner of their own data, with our preferences attached to our individual online identity. Companies and services will sign up to our bespoke terms and conditions, which will encompass our interests and tolerances, rather than the other way round. If that sounds a little far-fetched, I refer noble Lords to the IEEE, where this proposal is laid out in considerable detail. For those who do not know the IEEE, it is the pre-eminent global organisation of the electrical engineering professions.

While this rather better option is not before us today, it must inform our understanding that the Bill is effectively supporting an uncomfortable status quo. Challenging the status quo means putting children first, for example by putting the code of practice promised in the Digital Economy Act on a statutory footing so that it is enforceable; by imposing minimum design standards where the end-user is likely or may be a child; by publishing guidance to the tech companies on privacy settings, tracking, GPS and so forth; by demanding that they meet the rights of young people in the digital environment; and by a much tougher, altogether more appropriate, regime for children’s data.

All that could and should be achieved by May, because it comes down to the small print and the culture of a few very powerful businesses for which our children are no match. The GDPR offers warm words on consumer rights, automated profiling and data minimisation, but with terms and conditions as long as “Hamlet”, it is disingenuous to believe that plain English or any number of tick boxes for informed or specific consent will materially protect young people from the real-life consequences of data harvesting, which are intrusive, especially when we have left the data poachers in charge of the rules of engagement.

We could do better—a lot better. I agree wholeheartedly with other noble Lords who are looking for structures and principles that will serve us into the future. Those principles should not only serve us in terms of other EU member states but be bold enough to give us a voice in Silicon Valley. In the meantime, the Government can and should enact the derogation under article 80(2) and in the case of complainants under the age of 18, it should not only be a right but a requirement. We cannot endorse a system where we create poster children on front-line battles with tech companies. We are told that this Bill is about data protection for individuals—a Bill that favours users over business and children over the bottom line. But the absence of Article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights is an inexcusable omission. The Bill in front of us is simply not robust enough to replace Article 8. I call on the Government to insert that crucial principle into UK legislation. It must be wrong for our post-Brexit legislation to be deliberately absent of underlying principles. It is simply not adequate.

I had a laundry list of issues to bring to Committee, but I think I will overlook them. During the debate, a couple of noble Lords asked whether it was possible to regulate the internet. We should acknowledge that the GDPR shows that it can be done, kicking and screaming. It is in itself a victory for a legislative body—the EU. My understanding is that it will set a new benchmark for data-processing standards and will be adopted worldwide to achieve a harmonised global framework. As imperfect as it is, it proves that regulating the digital environment, which is entirely man and woman-made and entirely privately owned, is not an impossibility but a battle of societal need versus corporate will.

As I said at the beginning, my central concern is children. A child is a child until they reach maturity, not until they reach for their smart phone. Until Mark Zuckerberg, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Tim Cook, Jack Dorsey and the rest, with all their resources and creativity, proactively design a digital environment that encompasses the needs of children and refers to the concept of childhood, I am afraid that it falls to us to insist. The Bill as it stands, even in conjunction with the GDPR, is not insistent enough, which I hope as we follow its passage is something that we can address together.

EU Action Plan Against Migrant Smuggling (EUC Report)

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Wednesday 15th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

Many noble Lords will recall the last weekend in May, when more than 700 refugees drowned in quick succession. It is in their memory that I wish to call on this Government to open up further safe and legal routes of migration as requested in this excellent report.

Desperate people do not make rational decisions. They take to unstable dinghies, put their families at risk and entrust their future to the hands of the unqualified, who may well have pure motives, or the unscrupulous, who do not. In either case, neither offers very good odds. The report we are debating expresses regret at the refusal of the UK Government to participate in EU relocation strategies, and it urges, both at UK and EU level, that more emphasis be put on establishing safe and legal routes of migration. Many noble Lords have called for community-based private sponsorship, medical evacuation, humanitarian visas, family reunion, academic scholarships and labour mobility schemes. Any one of these offers an orderly and controlled form of migration. Collectively they describe a minimum human response to desperate neighbours.

The arguments against such mechanisms were also captured in the report. It is suggested that the number of beneficiaries would be so few in relation to potential refugees that it is not worth it. There is a fear that these routes would expose us to terrorist threat, and that establishing such routes would act as a pull factor.

These are poor arguments. The fact that we can do little is a wholly inadequate reason for refusing to do what we can. In spite of intelligence from Europol, it is simply the case that people are coming in in this way, those intent on doing harm will do so by any means, and they do not need the sanction of formal status to do so. The bloodshed in Syria and the conflict in failed states within the Middle East and north Africa are driving millions to flee. They are not being pulled. They are being pushed. Even those in the relative security of refugee camps face decades in limbo, in circumstances that do not offer a life with prospects or dignity.

All this is not just about what is right for those fleeing. This is about what is right for us. This is the country that gave refuge to my parents, Michael and Nina, the children of Samuel, Ruchel, Soloman and Maternal, who themselves had been given serial refuge both as children and as adults—five countries in just three generations, three generations that survived and prospered, unlike so many of their friends and family because they were given repeatedly safe and legal routes of migration until my siblings and I were born in the safety and security of the United Kingdom.

The philosopher Peter Singer famously asks: “If you had just bought a beautiful pair of shoes and saw a child drowning in a shallow pond, would you save your shoes or save the child?”. Unanimously, people answer, “Save the child”. He goes on: “If there are others present, would you still save the child?”. Invariably, the answer is yes. People recognise that their obligations belong to them, irrespective of the obligations of others. Finally, he asks: “What if the child were far away, perhaps in another country, but it remains equally within your means to save them at no great danger to yourself?”. Virtually all agree that distance and nationality make no difference to one’s obligations.

Her Majesty’s Government talk of solving the problem “upstream”, yet upstream we have problems of great magnitude, poetically described by the right reverend Prelate—proxy wars, climate change, unequal distribution of global wealth, food scarcity, conflicts, failed states and terror. And we have no expectation that those problems will be resolved very soon. That leaves us, I am afraid, with Peter Singer’s challenge: do we let people drown because they are out of our sight?

The safe and legal routes proposed describe an achievable lifeline for a human being in desperate need. They undermine smugglers, give hope and choice in the intractable lives of those forcibly on the move, and allow us the privilege of not standing by, dehumanised by our inaction.

I had hoped to say the names of the dead, just as we do for those who perished in 9/11, 7/7 and Hillsborough, and just as we do for fallen soldiers or indeed Members of your Lordships’ House when they pass away—we name our dead to honour their memory—but in spite of considerable effort, no one could provide me with names. The final indignity of the desperate is that they are a number, not a name. But I can remind the House of three year-old Alan Kurdi, who washed up on a beach last year, and the outpouring of compassion that accompanied that young child’s death. It is in his name that I ask Her Majesty’s Government to reflect the long-standing values, compassion and leadership that my family benefited from and open up new, safe and legal routes to the UK and, in doing so, offer safety to the few—too few perhaps—but dignity to us all.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, my name is also on this amendment. The question of public trust has been raised, and this amendment is an attempt to restore public trust. The Minister referred yesterday to the overwhelming support in the other place for this emergency legislation. Of course if one looks at the vote in terms of numbers alone he is completely correct. However, the most cursory glance through the past two days of Hansard reveals that even those who support this Bill have grave reservations about a system of warrants that very experienced legal colleagues are suggesting may prove unenforceable, and about whether this Bill has answered all the findings of the ECJ reservations over whether Clause 4 represents an extension of powers. Very importantly, there are also reservations about the level of understanding of the technology itself, and exactly what gathering “who, what, when and where” can mean for the individual. These reservations have been expressed in other places, such as the Constitution Committee and the Law Society, and among senior legal experts as well.

Like others, I absolutely accept that the noble Lord has done his utmost to reassure the House on all points. Even if he is completely correct that this indeed represents business as usual, there remains the outstanding case that this Bill is a response to the ECJ ruling hurried through in fear of an impending judgment in the domestic courts, and that it is sitting on top of RIPA legislation that is generally accepted as inadequate. This Bill has gone through the House so rapidly that it is impossible for it to incorporate effectively all the expertise and views that have been given.

It is not overwhelming support for the legislation that has resulted in there being only four amendments this morning. It was the lack of time to articulate and design useful and necessary clarifications without undermining the needs of the security and intelligence services, which, I say again, nobody present would wish to do. A sunset clause two and half years hence gives no comfort to those who suspect that this Bill came to the House deliberately without time to challenge it. December 2015 is a reasonable time for review, parliamentary scrutiny, public debate and collective agreement. Three days certainly were not. I commend the amendment to the House.

[Lord West of Spithead]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, spoke to me before the debate to ask if I would be supporting this amendment, so I have thought about it in some depth, and the answer is that I cannot. I am very supportive of my noble friend Lord Rooker’s comments. What he said about that toxic word “snooper” is exactly what I said in my speech yesterday at Second Reading. It is a very bad and emotive term, for the reasons that I gave then. I support a number of the other things that my noble friend said as well.

Both Houses are clearly in accord that the maintenance of these powers is critical for the safety and security of our people. Removing this provision before something has replaced it is an absolute nonsense. Having been involved over a number of years in this sort of legislation and this sort of work, it is clear to me that, in reviewing something like RIPA, if we are to do it properly, there is no way that we can achieve something in place of this provision in such a short time, because it will be removed. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, mentioned, it will have gone before we could do it. Actually, it will be tight to achieve it even by December 2016. We need to do a proper review. We will need something like a new communications data Bill. We so nearly got one before political shenanigans stopped it happening, but we need to look at this and go into great detail in reviewing RIPA. All this has to be done. It is extremely dangerous to try to shorten these timescales. It would be a dreadful mistake to make it any earlier than December 2016.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, it is an honour to follow such a speech from the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I feel that I had better declare my involvement in iRights, a civil society initiative that seeks to establish five principles that would frame all interactions with children and young people under 18 when they use the internet and digital technologies.

There seem to be four aspects of the Bill that cause concern: the process by which it came to your Lordships’ House; whether it does or does not represent the status quo; whether the status quo is what we want to reproduce; and, given the uncertainty of the first three, whether the sunset clause is too far away.

Given how much has been said on the first point, I just want to share the dismay of others at the lack of both foresight and oversight. I understand that heading off opposition and consulting stakeholders are legitimate parts of the legislative process but, somewhat unusually, in considering this Bill it is worth us noting that nearly all the UK population uses the technologies that the Bill addresses. They, too, are stakeholders, and to deny them a proper understanding through the reporting of public debate that the parliamentary process provides is at the very best disrespectful and most probably a further blow to public confidence in the political establishment.

The question of security versus freedom and privacy will be central in a world in which web and digital technologies become the organisational technologies of our society. Rushing through emergency legislation that has been privately consulted upon by an elite group of parliamentarians and international companies does not send a reassuring message of transparency and accountability that such an important issue deserves.

We are repeatedly told that this Bill is not intended as an extension of powers but that it simply upholds the status quo, that Clause 1 restores the previous position on communications data retention, and that what had previously been assumed about the extraterritorial application of communications data acquisition and interception powers was now being properly put on the face of the Bill in Clause 4. This reassurance has been repeated in briefings, in the Explanatory Notes attached to the draft Bill, in the impact assessment, in the other place and today in this debate, but it is in this Chamber on multiple occasions, listening to the likes of my noble friend Lord Pannick, the noble Lord, Lord Lester, my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf and many others that I have experienced the powerful art of clarification.

The companies at which the extraterritorial reach of RIPA is established and aimed want clarification, by Ministers’ own admission. If they need clarification, it must mean that there is some doubt. If there is no longer doubt then there has, de facto, been an extension, the purposes and meaning of which have not adequately been tested by the British public nor by their Parliament.

My noble friend Lady Lane-Fox, in her debate that celebrated the 25th anniversary of the world wide web and again today, suggested that we as a nation and we as a Parliament had not properly responded to the revelations contained in the leaks orchestrated by Edward Snowden. In spite of what we now know and the Pulitzer prize-winning efforts of the Guardian and the Washington Post to make us care, we are rushing through a Bill without the opportunity to determine whether the status quo should be underlined and underscored or whether, in a world where communications are central to every aspect of our lives, we now need to think again.

I should like to make it clear that I have little appetite for a lawless and untended communications highway with no responsibilities to real-world outcomes. Like most others who reject this emergency legislation, I would actively support a more carefully considered Bill that sought to address some of the broader issues that have been raised today and some of the newer technologies on the horizon. However, imposing suspicionless blanket communications data retention on the entire population challenges the basic premise of a free society. For that reason, this policy has been struck down in constitutional courts across Europe and, for that reason too, we must have a regime that takes account of all possible consequences of data retention, as well as the absolutely legitimate needs of the police and security forces.

The European Court of Justice found that on 10 counts the 2009 regulations failed to deliver proportionate retention of data. It laid out specific criteria that needed to be met. We have been told by Ministers in briefings that the Bill in front of us answers some of those findings and that others are answered by existing UK legislation. In spite of reading many late briefings, I cannot fully comprehend in sufficient detail whether all 10 counts have been fully answered. I ask the Minister whether there is any danger that the Bill simply re-enacts the disproportionate retention that has already been found unlawful by the European Court of Justice—a point put much more eloquently and precisely by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead.

It is disappointing that the Bill has come to your Lordships’ House in such unhappy haste and that its progress to becoming law does not serve to educate Members of both Houses about the issues at stake. Nor does it ignite a desperately needed public debate about who is gathering the data, what those data are, and when and how they are being gathered. It is desperately worrying that its development has taken place entirely in private. I find myself wondering whether the explanations given by Ministers for conceiving this Bill in private suggest that Her Majesty’s Government’s need for privacy is a little more equal than the need for privacy of the population as a whole.

Given the inevitable passing of the Bill without it being subject to the parliamentary journey that it deserves, your Lordships may wish to send a message to the citizens of the UK by inserting an earlier date for the sunset clause. It would be a date not designed to serve the needs of the election cycle but one that reflects the urgent need of the British people—indeed, it is an emergency—for their Parliament to understand, investigate and decide how we are going to balance their need for security against their need for privacy and liberty.