Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

3rd reading
Wednesday 5th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)]

I will now speak to the government amendment tabled in my name. The Government are firmly committed to protecting children’s personal data and ensuring that online services likely to be accessed by children are designed with their safety and privacy in mind. We have listened carefully to the concerns raised in this House during earlier debates and have worked quickly to bring forward this amendment, which reflects those discussions. During the debate on 21 January, I made clear that, while we could not accept Amendment 22 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which would have placed new duties on all data controllers, the Government were open to a more targeted approach that addressed the areas of greatest concern.

This amendment delivers on that commitment. It amends Article 25 of the UK GDPR, which already requires data controllers to design appropriate organisational and technical measures to implement the data protection principles. The amendment strengthens these obligations for information society services providers, such as social media and the streaming sites likely to be accessed by children.

They will be required to give extra consideration when deciding which measures are appropriate for online services likely to be accessed by children. Specifically, information society services providers must consider

“the children’s higher protection matters”

set out in the clause when designing their processing activities. These are:

“how children can best be protected and supported when using the services, and … the fact that children … merit specific protection with regard to their personal data because they may be less aware of the risks and … their rights in relation to such processing, and … have different needs at different ages and at different stages of development”.

The new duty expressly applies to

“information society services which are likely to be accessed by children”.

They are the same organisations that should already be following the ICO’s age-appropriate design code. Organisations that are already complying with the code should not find it difficult to comply with the new duty, but organisations that have treated compliance with the code as optional will now be under a clear legal duty to design their services with children’s rights and interests in mind.

I also want to make it clear that other organisations that process children’s personal data may need to consider these matters on a case-by-case basis and depending on the context. Although this amendment creates an express duty on information society services providers, those matters may sometimes be relevant in other contexts. Proposed new subsection (4) makes that clear.

I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and other noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. I hope this amendment, together with the other steps we are taking in the Bill to protect children, including the new duty on the ICO to consider children’s interests when carrying out its regulatory functions, will be welcomed across the House. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the Minister, to which I have added my name, and welcome his words from the Dispatch Box. As he said, this new duty provides a direct and unequivocal legal duty on all information society services likely to be accessed by a child and acknowledges in the Bill that services outside the definition of ISS must also consider children—indeed, they must consider children’s specific protections when determining how to process their data.

For the last decade, I and others have fought to establish minimum standards to ensure the safety and privacy of children in the UK and, over time, we have learned that we cannot assume a trajectory of progress. Standards can go down as well as up, and we cannot be sure that the intentions of Parliament will always be interpreted as robustly as promised.

I am concerned about the impact of tech lobbying on this Bill, the regulator and the Government’s wider digital strategy. I hope that the companies represented by those lobbyists will take note of this amendment as a sign that, when it comes to children, they have absolute responsibilities under the law. The Bill team has persuaded me that the child-specific duties on the ICO in the Bill, in combination with its new reporting duties, mean that the ICO will report separately about steps it has taken and will take to uphold children’s heightened data rights. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that that is also the Government’s expectation.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I will do exactly the same. It is extremely important that magistrates should have the power to imprison as well as to fine.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I have spoken to these amendments at every stage of the Bill. One of the unfortunate outcomes of being a campaigner for online safety is the abuse that we get directly from people who do not want the online world to be safe. That abuse comes in all forms, including that which the noble Baroness is trying to criminalise. I say to the House that we must support the noble Baroness. I am so disappointed that the Government are not here with us. Support the noble Baroness.

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I have a couple of quick things to say. First, there is no reason not to put this into the Bill here; it can be amended in the Commons quite happily. Secondly, without solicitation in the Bill, there is a massive loophole. One can work out exactly how to get round the whole thing by just inserting someone soliciting in the middle. The other thing is that this can happen to men and could be used for blackmail, so this could be used against that, which is very dangerous. We need imprisonment in the Bill, because if someone makes enough money out of whatever it is that they put out there, a fine is nugatory and they will not worry about it. We need to have imprisonment as well.

Non-Consensual Sexually Explicit Images and Videos (Offences) Bill [HL]

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 13th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I remind the House of my interests in this area, particularly as adviser to the Institute for Ethics in AI at Oxford and chair of the 5Rights Foundation.

The argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, is wonderfully put and unimpeachable. We have a patchwork of laws in the UK that are intended to prevent intimate image abuse, but new formats for abuse and the failure to tackle each element in the abuse cycle creates gaps. When dealing with digital systems, it is necessary to tackle harm as far upstream as possible and then consider each stage of creation, spread, current and future use, and deletion, which is what this Bill does.

In 2022, the Law Society wrote that,

“making intimate images is a violation of the subject’s sexual autonomy. We were less sure whether the level of harm was serious enough to criminalise simple making.”

That is wrong, wrong, wrong. I know children and women who live with the threat, or knowledge, that such images exist. If they exist, they are more likely to find a shared use, but the mere threat or their presence can be enough to lead someone to take their own life.

Labour has made a commitment on sexually explicit deepfakes, amid a broader promise to halve the violence against women and girls, yet government sources suggest that the Government have issues with the drafting of the Bill in front of us and that another Bill may be a better vehicle. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, would be happy to accept changes to the drafting, so long as the aims of the Bill are fully realised. We hear murmurs of the Government replacing the idea of consent with that of intent, but intent has proven unenforceable and is therefore unacceptable. Similarly, failing to future-proof the offence by taking out definitions carefully honed to fill gaps would rightly concern the noble Baroness, but drafting issues that do not change the purpose of the Bill can surely be quickly agreed.

As for waiting for another Bill—why? The horrors that the noble Baroness set out are not problems of the future; they are here and now. Every week brings more victims and allows AI to learn from the images that it already has. It feeds a system that normalises the consumption of sexual humiliation, violence and the abuse of women and children. Tidy government business is a small virtue compared to the thousands of images that delay would allow. The world has changed immeasurably since 2003, when the Sexual Offences Act was passed, but the likely victims have not. They are women and they are girls.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I absolutely heard what the noble Baroness said about strict liability offences. The Government’s position is as I just said. However, I listened very carefully to what the noble Baroness said.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

For those of us who have been dealing with sexual offences for some time, the one thing we know is that if you have to prove intent, it is worse than useless. I urge the Minister to take that away and to say to the House as a whole that intent will not be a satisfactory solution to the noble Baroness’s Private Member’s Bill.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I am afraid I will have to repeat the point I made previously: we understand very well the strength of feeling on this argument, and we are actively considering it.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kidron (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my interests, particularly as chair of 5Rights Foundation and deputy chair of the APPG on Digital Regulation and Responsibility. Like others, I welcome the long anticipated online safety Bill and the provisions it will make for children. The change in the Bill’s name from “online harms” to “online safety” reflects the journey the Bill has been on, and the widespread acceptance that we must stop arguing over what is and is not acceptable after children have suffered harm, and instead seek to tackle risks inherent in the technology they are offered and make it safe from the get-go.

Less welcome is the change of language from the promised “duty of care” to a list of “duties of care”. It is the expectation of parents, teachers and children up and down the country that the Bill will introduce a duty that, both philosophically and legally, requires the tech sector to think first before it puts its products and services in the hands of children. While specific duties can improve the safety, transparency and fairness of digital products, it is dangerous to set a path in which each special interest or expert group fights to include or omit every potential risk. Risks are interconnected and cumulative; they impact on different users in different ways; and they can expand and contract across different services and across time. We have been promised an end to the “Move fast and break things” culture of the sector, and the Bill must introduce a duty to care as a matter of principle, not a laundry list of pre-circumscribed duties.

As drafted, the Bill spends the bulk of its pages on rules that pertain to content. This undermines the stated ambition to tackle risk at a systemic level, as it leaves only cursory mention of the algorithms, functionalities and operating practices that drive user experience. No doubt we will revisit this, but before we lose ourselves down the rabbit hole of how to police content and who owns the truth, we must first ask whether companies are responsible for recommendations that they monetise. What is the legal status of a company’s published terms and community rules? What oversight does the regulator need to identify manipulative nudges, dark patterns or unfair practices? Or—my own personal favourite—if a company can confidently identify a 14 year-old child to target them with a Home Office awareness campaign on child abuse, should they simultaneously be able to recommend to the same 14 year-old self-harm content or extreme diets, or enable adults to direct message them with pornographic material? If the Bill does not take a systemic approach to curbing what have become industry norms, then children will continue to suffer the lack of what in every other industry is simply the price of doing business.

We have many months to scrutinise every line of the Bill’s 145 pages, but some things cannot wait. Like the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, I believe that the Government must ask regulators to bring forward minimum standards and codes of practice on urgent matters such as age assurance, safety by design, child impact assessments and algorithmic oversight, with the stated intention that they will be absorbed into the Bill, just as they are planning for guidance for video-sharing platforms. We need this Bill badly, but it is cruel to make children wait years for protections they could have now.

There are some startling omissions, some unwelcome exceptions and some shifts in emphasis that we must contest, but ultimately the biggest work of Parliament will be to ensure the Bill’s enforceability. The current matrix of duties and responsibilities of the regulator are neither fully independent nor properly enforceable, and this must change. I understand that there are pressures from all sides, but the UK delivering systemic change on behalf of UK children that will, over time, become the new normal for children the world over is a great prize, and it is my sincere wish that that is the prize Her Majesty’s Government have in their sights.

Digital Bill of Rights

Baroness Kidron Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I am happy to agree with the noble Lord that this is an appalling practice, and I deplore what has been said about those with a particular viewpoint. The internet being used in this way is the enemy of democracy. We should nevertheless be hesitant before we prevent access to the internet. Russia, China and some of the Arab states prevent access to the internet. Once you start doing so, you prevent some of the advantages, economic and otherwise, of this extraordinary phenomenon, now 25 years old.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, given the centrality of the internet and digital technologies to the lives of young people, can the Minister tell me what the Government are doing to make certain that young people can explore the creative potential of the online world knowledgably, fearlessly and with an understanding of the privacy issues?

[Lord Faulks]

The Government are certainly trying to protect children from access to parts of the internet to which it would be most ill advised for them to have access. We are trying to promote by a number of means responsible use of the internet but, once again, my answer is that, for the moment, we ought to hesitate before using legislation to do this. However, I entirely accept what the noble Baroness says about the importance of responsible access.