Baroness Howarth of Breckland
Main Page: Baroness Howarth of Breckland (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Howarth of Breckland's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(11 years ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, in a personal capacity I very much support this amendment. I have been an officer to the Parents and Families Group for a long time. The noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, is chairman of the group. I fully agree with the remarks made by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, on the importance of family relationships on how children emerge. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, it seems absurd that the only law we have in this country relates to property and not to responsibilities. In all conscience, we are keeping responsibilities on local authorities, on schools and on all kinds of people in this Bill. However, to some extent, those who have prime responsibility for bringing up children should be made to recognise that they have such responsibilities. As the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, said, the Scots have this law. It is a good law and there is a lot to be said for copying their example.
I may be a lone voice here but, much as I agree—who cannot agree?—with the essence of what the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, has said, I do not view legislation as the answer. I am sure that the Minister will say that we have a plethora of legislation. I have worked in this field and I could list it but I will not do so because it would take all the time in the world. The important message that we should take from the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, is how vital it is that we should do what the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, has been saying for so long. We still are not doing well in terms of PSHE and helping young people and children to understand as early as possible what it is to be a parent, to be part of a community and all that you have to do as a citizen. Teens and Toddlers is still going and the programmes through which young people learn at first hand about bringing up children are very important.
However, I believe we live with a myth that modern young men are all the same, which we need to face if we are to deal with some of these issues. The young men I deal with, and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, deals with, who end up in prison or in serious difficulties certainly are not among those who see themselves as hands-on in childcare. They see themselves as at the football match, the pub or an alternative. Until we are able to get programmes that work directly with such young men, we will not make a difference to them while they are growing up. We should forget the myth that all young men are the same, particularly in understanding the wide range of cultures. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, mentioned young men from certain cultures. There are difficulties in many different groups and we have to be sensitive to all that.
I say to my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss that I do not think that there are many good reasons for men walking out on their families. They do it because they have not been helped to face up to those issues. However, the courts are getting tougher in ensuring that they face up to their responsibilities, which I am pleased about. I know that CAFCASS has been working for a considerable time on trying to make parents face up to what they will do to their children if they leave them.
Although my heart is with what the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, has said, we need to get on with the practical application and the proper support for good social work intervention that will make a difference, rather than have yet more legislation on the statute book.
Perhaps I may say that I had no intention of saying that it was right for young men—or older men—to walk out on their families. They may be justified in walking out on their spouse or partner, but to leave the children behind, or not to look after them, is unacceptable.
My Lords, I support this amendment. There is something close to my heart that the noble Lord also supports. Twenty years ago my production company tried to get a schools programme on parenting commissioned. I was told that could not happen because it was not part of the national curriculum. Thankfully it now is. Some schools are attempting to address this important issue. Parenting is not about sex education, but about teaching young people about life skills, relationships, respect for one another, responsibilities, basic money matters, social policies and solving domestic problems. That applies to everybody’s family life, no matter what their background is. All schools should promote parental responsibility and make it an essential part of delivering holistic education to all our children. That is why I support this amendment.
I rise very briefly to support this amendment, and to ask for it to be looked at in a broader context of social policy. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, talked of young men in prison. I want to give one example—something I heard last week—which relates to how young people can learn. I was told of a hostel for young women with their babies that was closed, probably for financial reasons. The young women and their babies were dispersed. Six of them were at university, and no consideration was given to this fact, to the support they received at the hostel or to what would happen to them in future. If we are thinking about how we can ensure that each generation gets the support they need, that story is a good example of how broader policy could make a difference.
My Lords, for the reasons already given, which I will not repeat, I, too, support this amendment.
My Lords, it is terribly important that this debate is kept in perspective. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has done that very well, making it clear that we are talking about a very small number of cases, involving very difficult issues, where of course an expert’s advice will be very helpful.
More broadly, I very much support the thrust of what David Norgrove said in the report of the family justice review and it is really important that we are seen to be limiting expert evidence to what is really necessary to decide, so that the judges narrow it down to the key issues where we need that expert advice and it does not add to yet more reports, with all of that adding to delay.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, quoted Anthony Douglas, the chief executive of CAFCASS. I declare an interest as chair of CAFCASS. In the intervening period I have had the opportunity to have a quick word with Anthony Douglas and the context in which he made those remarks is one in which we have done a lot of work to ensure that both local authority social workers and CAFCASS guardians are working up to the absolute limit of their professional knowledge and capacity, and that you need an expert report only in that very small number of cases which take them beyond their limits.
I have spoken recently to groups of CAFCASS practitioners who tell me that they now feel empowered and have renewed confidence because in the majority of cases their expert advice, analytical skills and the assessment that they can offer to the courts are being accepted as expert social work opinion and advice. Sometimes recently they have felt that their professionalism has been questioned, which is a danger when we have too many of these expert reports. So I hope that we can conduct this debate with a sense of perspective and balance, while understanding that we are talking about a small number of cases where we need those expert reports to deal with very specific issues.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have put this very precisely. I was the chair of CAFCASS when the problem significantly arose and began the work to tackle the issue, together with the chief executive and the board. The real issue was the length of time that children were waiting for decisions in their cases, and every day for a child is vital. Experts were called to verify what another expert was saying or to give another opinion, and there has been a great improvement in the time taken to reach a decision in these cases since we have streamlined that.
I declare an interest as vice-president of the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, which prepares extremely complex expert witness reports in cases of very serious child sexual abuse. I think the Minister is well aware of its work. In those cases there have been real difficulties in getting the right expert to the right place because, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, mentioned, local authorities themselves have called the experts in to add to the decision.
All I want to say in this debate is: let us keep the focus on the child and make decisions as quickly as possible, but in complex cases let us make sure that those decisions are based on the right information.
My Lords, perhaps I should make it clear from the start to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that we will resist this stand part Motion, and I am sure that he will withdraw it at the appropriate time. We want this change in the Bill. Let me be clear: experts play a vital role in many care proceedings. Their evidence can be necessary to assist the court in resolving a case justly and in a child’s best interests. It is the Government’s intention to ensure that where the court considers that expert evidence is necessary to assist it to resolve the proceedings justly, including evidence provided by independent social workers, that evidence should be used.
The reason for the measures in Clause 13 is simple: the family justice review found that, too often, expert reports were being commissioned in care proceedings when they added little real value to the decision-making process and contributed to delays. In many cases, expert evidence was provided where the evidence could be obtained from a party already involved in the proceedings. The Government believe that most social care evidence in cases could and should be supplied by local authorities and CAFCASS guardians, and I know that that view is strongly held by the present president of the Family Division, Sir James Munby. However, where a judge considers that it is necessary to have expert evidence, including an independent social work report, to resolve the proceedings justly, then that evidence will still be permitted.
We know that improvements to social work practice will be needed to deliver these changes. That is why the Children’s Improvement Board, together with Research in Practice, delivered a series of regional family justice training seminars to local authorities to highlight good practice in this area and how it may be replicated. In addition, CIB and RiP also recently ran a series of “train the trainer” workshops aimed at those responsible for training within local authorities. The workshops focused on the practical skills that social workers need to progress cases without delay. We have also funded new research distillations to assist social workers when assessing children on the edge of care, and continue to work with the College of Social Work to ensure that social workers receive training in the specific competencies required.
With regard to legal aid fees, which the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, raised, the hourly rate for independent social workers was introduced in May 2011 following consultation. As the response to that consultation recognised, independent social workers undertake a variety of work for different organisations but the qualifications and experience of those undertaking that work, plus similarities in the work undertaken, meant that it was not considered an effective use of public money for the Legal Services Commission, as it was then, to pay higher rates than those payable by CAFCASS for similar services.
The Government have met organisations representing independent social workers on several occasions, but we have no evidence to suggest that the majority of work undertaken by this group should attract a higher rate than is paid to other social workers. However, where independent social workers provide services that are significantly different from those normally expected of other social workers, significantly higher rates are payable—for example, when acting as an expert risk assessor in cases where there is a substantiated relevant criminal allegation in the immediate background of the case, or where a finding of sexual abuse relevant to the case has been made by a court and the report is specifically required to address this risk.
As I have said, I believe that what we are doing meets the requirements that Dr Brophy set out, as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked me. We understand the concerns that expert witnesses should be used when necessary, and I hope that I made it clear that that will continue to be the case. However, when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, tells me that in one of her cases she had 11 expert witnesses, that almost makes me think that that is what we are facing, and indeed what Norgrove identified. As I said before to the noble Earl, although I take note of what he has said, this is something that I cannot offer a meeting on because we will continue to resist.
My Lords, I want to make just a couple of remarks. First, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for the note that he has sent to us and for his very clear exposition today of a very complicated issue.
There is an issue here. In my own previous academic experience I did a considerable amount of government-funded research into child abuse, and child sexual abuse in particular. Apart from any other kinds of cases, we found a very significant although small number of men who quite deliberately target families and go round seeking one woman after another. In each case, there is harm to the child but it cannot necessarily be definitively proved which individual committed the harm. For a small number of children this is a problem.
It is quite difficult for those of us who are not lawyers and who have not followed the detail of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court and are not steeped in all this language and the issues to evaluate precisely—I cannot do so—whether there is an issue here and, if so, how the Government should act. It seems that there may be an issue here. I would be grateful if the Minister could say whether he thinks there is a problem and that it is the problem that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has identified. Is there a potential problem now where some children could be left in situations of risk when perhaps previously there might have been an intervention to protect them? If so, what is the best course of action for the Government to take?
I can perhaps understand the Government’s reluctance to intervene in or be seen to meddle with Supreme Court adjudications. None the less, if there is an issue here, clearly it is within the Government’s power to rectify or revert to the original intention of the Children Act, whether by Amendment 64 or by some other course of action. I certainly feel, as I suspect do other Members of the Committee, that it would be very helpful to have the Minister’s clarification on whether there is an issue here and, if so, what is the best remedy.
My Lords, I am not a practising lawyer either but I was a social worker of long standing. I want to say very briefly that the social work organisations are extremely concerned about this situation, and we should have that on the record.
The concern is that in the past, social workers would have been able to move cases forward through the courts easily because of the previous judgments, but now they cannot move to the welfare principle quickly enough, which means that often they cannot gain access to the home where the perpetrator is living. The issue is actually being able to ensure that children can be protected by social care staff or voluntary workers, if that is where the work is, being able to gain access to a home quickly and simply through a court order such as that proposed in the amendment.
My Lords, I am extremely sad to have to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. I am also indebted to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, for what they would like to have said, but they are both unable to be here today.
It is important to realise that there are two views of the judiciary, of the academics and of the lawyers, not only the view put forward by the noble and learned Lord. The first view is that of seven Supreme Court judges. Normally in the Supreme Court they sit in a five-judge court. In this case, no doubt because it was either the seventh or eighth case, they sat as a seven-judge court. I have the highest possible regard for Lord Justice McFarlane, but two of the judges of the Supreme Court were family judges of even greater experience and expertise than him. Both those judges, both of whom are family practitioners and both of whom have worked with me, were absolutely unanimous with the other five that the decision to which the Supreme Court came was the right one.
There are two issues. One concerns a situation where there has been no significant harm to the child, or in Re J, the case with which we are concerned, three children. However, there was very significant harm to one child who died. In that case, the mother and the father were the only possible perpetrators. Under the current law, it did not matter which of them had killed or injured the child. The child may have died of asphyxia from being rolled on to in the bed—the child was lying in the bed with the parents, which is a terrible habit. This child had been seriously injured before it died. Those are the facts. The mother, during the time she lived with the father, was in that pool of perpetrators and it was clearly not safe for the older child, born while the parents were engaged in the process of care, to live with them. They then parted and went to live with different people. The mother eventually went to live with a man who was the divorced father of two children who lived with him, and with him she had two further children. The pool was then a different pool, not the pool of two perpetrators, one of whom was bound to have done it, but a different pool in which nothing had happened so far. The judges in the Re J case said that there had to be some evidence from which to infer the likelihood of significant harm in the new group, and it could not be said that the mother had injured or helped to kill the child when she lived in the other group, where she and the father were the obvious suspects. In Re J, the seven Supreme Court judges, who were unanimous, said that you had to have some evidence to cross the threshold. Unfortunately in that case the only issue that the local authority presented to the Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court was the fact that the mother was in the area pool of perpetrators; no other facts were presented at all.
The alternative view put forward by the noble and learned Lord was one he put forward in the earlier case of Re H, where he was in the minority; the majority found against him. In that case, there was a girl of 16 who the elder sister of younger children. The girl said that she had been raped by the stepfather. In the criminal proceedings, he was acquitted. In the family proceedings, the judge said he was not satisfied as to the appropriate standard that the stepfather had raped this girl, but there was a strong suspicion. In that case the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court held that they could not infer sufficient facts to say that the other children were at risk.
The noble and learned Lord referred to another judgment by that great judge, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, who gave a leading speech in a case called B, or A, which I was on in the Court of Appeal. It involved three people; namely, the mother, the father and the childminder. In that case, the noble and learned Lord said that in relation to those three in that pool where the child was injured—I think that the child died—clearly it was “grotesque” to say that because they could not prove which of the two, or possibly three including the childminder, had actually committed the injury, they should not take steps to protect the children.
However, that is not the present case. In that case, it was the pool of potential perpetrators, one of whom had done it. In this case, the mother had moved away. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, raised an interesting point. He asked whether there were any recorded cases where the only evidence was that the mother or father had moved from the pool of perpetrators into a subsequent pool where the current law meant that nothing could be done and the child had suffered. I have to say that I have not heard of such a case. I do not think that there is such a case because it would undoubtedly have been referred to in the later cases, particularly in Re J. I thought that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, made an extremely pertinent point that there was nothing to show that the current law has been to the detriment of children potentially at risk.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed to the crucial fact that the mother in Re J was in a new pool. No one has suggested that the father of the other children had ever committed any offence. He was a totally respected man. In his note, the noble and learned Lord said that the fact that the mother was in the earlier pool of perpetrators was relevant, but by itself that was not sufficient. He went on to say that it could be relied on, together with any other facts or circumstances that might be relevant, to support the conclusion that the three other children in Re J were likely to suffer harm.
It is interesting that there are other important factors that neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court were allowed to deal with. The first factor was that the mother was very young when she was living with the man and the child died. Secondly, it was a new relationship with a totally respectable person. Thirdly, there were two further children and she was much more mature. There were factors against her which they did not take into account; namely, that she had colluded with the man in the first case. If they had taken that into account, they might well have crossed the threshold. Unfortunately, those facts were not taken into account.
Therefore, as I understand it, this is a sole issue that is unlikely and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, it is extremely rare. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who is one of the great family experts, and Lord Wilson, were both satisfied in this case that the threshold was properly not crossed. Lord Reed said in paragraph 98 of Family Law Week that if the current law as stated in this case was causing consternation, it would appear to be an overreaction because the one clear-cut point was not one that was likely to come up very often, if at all. I am extremely concerned that we maintain a balance between the right of children to their own family, the right of parents to family life and their own child, and the crucial importance of the protection of the child where there is danger to that child.
The very delicate balance in Section 31 has been studied and subject to the most careful judgments by the Supreme Court. I think it is a little unjust to the Supreme Court that while the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, spent a lot of time on what Lord Justice McFarlane said, he did not quote a single passage of what anyone in the Supreme Court said. They are worth reading and they have a very good point. I would say to noble Lords that we have to be careful to protect families from too ready an interference on the part of the state unless there is sufficient evidence to take the child or children away.
It is not being suggested that the children should be taken away. The suggestion is whether we are able to move to the welfare question.
I have to say that in my experience as a family judge, speaking perhaps as the only family judge present, although of course the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is a family magistrate, those judges would be issuing care proceedings immediately and removing the child while they debated whether the issue could be concluded in favour of the local authority’s view at the care hearing. On the interim care proceedings I have no doubt about the protection issues. Based on this, they would remove the child.
It is also interesting to note that despite some very strong attacks by two well known and respected family academic lawyers, another well respected family academic lawyer, Andrew Bainham, a reader in family law at Cambridge, has gone exactly the wrong way and has taken the view that the Supreme Court was right.
The last point I want to make is this: are we really right to change the point at which the threshold should be crossed, something on which seven Supreme Court judges have reached a conclusion with the greatest possible care? I urge the Committee not to do so.