Immigration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2016 Lords Chamber

All my amendments reflect my agreement with the Detention Forum that the Shaw review is a damning demonstration of the need for fundamental reform. I do not believe that such reform can be carried out during the time that this Bill is being processed through Parliament. Therefore, in order not to waste the time of either House, I recommend that the Bill be withdrawn so that due consideration can be given to the legislative implications of processing the recommendations contained in reports that the Government have commissioned. There is more than enough evidence of what is required of the system, and many people are only too happy to contribute their expertise to such a process. I await the Minister’s response with interest.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, were my noble friend Lord Avebury able to be here, I think he, too, would have started with short-term holding facilities. I feel I am letting him down by not having a specific amendment on the point.

When the all-party group undertook its inquiry, to which much reference has been made, I was particularly struck by the paradox of detainees both fearing and hoping for sudden change—or that things would stay the same way. It was well expressed by Dr Melanie Griffiths, who is quoted in the report as saying:

“By being detained indefinitely, without knowing how long for and with the continual possibility of both imminent release and removal, detainees worry that detention will continue forever and also that it will end in unexpected deportation the next morning. They have the simultaneous concern both that there will be sudden change and never-ending stasis. It is the lack of temporal predictability that prevents deportable individuals not only from being able to plan for the future, but also from having the ‘stability’ of knowing that the present will remain uncertain for a protracted length of time”.

A number of these amendments are concerned with time limits and timescales. The inquiry made a number of recommendations and comments, one of which was about the link with mental health. As the report expresses it, there is,

“a considerable mental health cost to detainees”.

The report also said that,

“the lack of a time limit, far from aiding Home Office effectiveness, was itself an incentive to poor case-working”.

The Government say that an arbitrary time limit is unnecessary, because we should have whatever is reasonable—although of course what is reasonable is often in the eye of the beholder. They also say that an arbitrary time limit—“specific” would perhaps be a better word—would become the norm and an incentive for non-compliance. However, those of us advocating a time limit do not wish to overlook the individual characteristics or indeed the changes over time and the changes of combinations of factors which may apply to individuals. We do not like a tick-box approach to vulnerability.

There are a lot of amendments in this group. I have signed up to all of those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and started by supporting Amendment 218, which is the straight 28-day amendment, rather than the proposal for a review, which is in the first of the amendments in the group. After the Shaw report was published, and after we had addressed the issue at Second Reading, I discussed with the noble Lord, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and other members of that inquiry whether we might look for an alteration—I was going to say slight relaxation, as it were, but that would be a very bad term for me to use in the context—to the 28 days in the event of something exceptional.

The first of the two approaches in Amendments 218A and 218B is that the Secretary of State would go to the tribunal on the basis that bail is not in the public interest. I hope that would answer the critical comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, at Second Reading that there must always be some exceptions. We have had a go at a reference to offences which are in Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act. That was suggested by somebody who has been concerned with this subject for a long time. I am not sure that it would be my preferred approach, but the intention was to present some possibilities to the Government as to how they might achieve 28 days, or a specific time limit, but with any absolutely necessary exceptions.

The other amendments—particularly Amendments 216ZA, 216ZB, 216ZC and 216ZD—are drafted directly from the Shaw report in the hope that the Government will give a detailed response to each of them. As the noble Lord said, we had a short response in the Written Ministerial Statement. I hope that the Minister, whose task tonight is considerable, has been briefed to give a response to each point. We could have tabled 64 amendments but that might have tested the patience of the Committee a little too much. Of course, none of this actually needs legislation; the Government could just get on with it. The essential items that lend themselves to an amendment are ones to which I and, I know, others would like a detailed and specific response.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support the various amendments in this group, focused in particular on the case for a time limit and for the absolute exclusion from detention of pregnant women.

As has already been said, like the noble, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I was a member of the all-party parliamentary inquiry into detention. Unlike them, I knew very little about detention beforehand and so was perhaps the more shocked by what I heard from both professionals and people who had been detained. One message that hit me with particular force was the impact of detention on the mental health of detainees—we have heard a bit about that already. It is clear that this was true for Stephen Shaw, too. In his very fine report, he states at the outset that,

“the impact of detention upon detainees’ mental health, has been at the heart of this review. For that reason alone, it is not possible to distinguish the fact of detention from the consequences for welfare and vulnerability”.

He based this conclusion in part on a literature review by Professor Mary Bosworth, to which my noble friend Lord Rosser referred and which Shaw suggests was perhaps the “most important contribution” made by his report. He concludes that it,

“demonstrates incontrovertibly that detention in and of itself undermines welfare and contributes to vulnerability”.

Professor Bosworth’s review found a clear link between duration of detention and mental health outcomes. She also points to qualitative studies that indicate that the uncertainty arising from no time limit creates additional difficulties, and concludes that in the absence of clinical studies,

“it is clear at the very least that uncertainty makes detention more difficult”.

That resonates with what we heard in our inquiry. For instance, Dr Robjant of the Helen Bamber Foundation told us that its clients talk about it increasing their sense of hopelessness and despair.

Despite the restrictions placed on his remit, Stephen Shaw raised serious questions about numbers detained, the length of detention, the impact of the unknown length of detention on vulnerability, and the need for alternatives. He emphasises from the outset that his recommendations, in themselves, do not go far enough. We must take seriously what in my view is a clear steer that we need to go beyond recommendations designed to mitigate the “diswelfares” associated with detention, important as they are, and address the underlying question of the role of detention itself, and in particular the question of the absence of a set time limit on its duration.

Since the parliamentary inquiry’s report, the UN Human Rights Committee has recommended that the UK introduce a time limit. In oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee on this Bill, a representative of the UNHRC stated that his one wish would be the introduction of a time limit on detention—which, he underlined, was within the scope of the Bill. In addition to the unanimous vote in the other place in support of our inquiry which has already been mentioned, there was strong support for a time limit when the report was debated in your Lordships’ House in March, including from the former Home Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Hurd of Westwell, who deemed it “deeply unsatisfactory” that detainees,

“have no certainty in their lives about when they might be removed from detention”.—[Official Report, 26/3/15; col. 1569.]

This point was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, who said that,

“it is worse than that, because it deprives people of hope”.—[Official Report, 26/3/2015; col. 1578.]

We have heard other arguments in favour of a time limit, which I shall not go into. Let us now use the opportunity of this Bill to provide hope for migrants and asylum seekers deprived of their liberty by a detention system shown to be deeply unsatisfactory by legislating for a time limit and encouraging the Government to develop effective community alternatives.

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[Lord Green of Deddington]

Yes indeed, but I would imagine that the conditions are very different in Hong Kong and to a certain extent in Belgium. You have to look at the circumstances that you find in a particular country. What we have here is a very large illegal population which people can quite easily join. I am not against looking at the kind of alternatives being suggested, but let us be pretty sure that they are going to be just as effective. Any move at this point to weaken, not so much the asylum system but our capability to remove those who have failed asylum, would be an extremely foolish step to take.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this may be the last intervention, before the noble Lord sits down—again, using the language of this place. He has based his comments on immigration offenders. I wonder if he could explain what he means by that term. Certainly there are individuals who have committed offences within our criminal justice system and who are—not on the way to being deported; that being the problem—liable to deportation. There are people who have sought asylum but who are not offenders in the way that I would understand the term. Indeed, their claims have not been determined, which as we have heard in other debates, is a big problem. Could he just disaggregate that term?

[Lord Green of Deddington]

The noble Baroness’s point is rather similar to the point she made about bail earlier in the debate. The term “immigration offenders” is a broad term and applies to anyone who does not have, or no longer has, a legal right to be in the UK. It could be a whole range of people who do not have a right to be here; they have not taken opportunities for a voluntary return, or even an assisted voluntary return, both of which are available to them. Therefore, they might find themselves in detention for those reasons.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Does that include those who have sought asylum but whose claim has not been determined?

[Lord Green of Deddington]

Not when I use the term, and I do not think that it applies to those people. It applies to those whose cases have been rejected, and rejected on appeal, and they do not return home when they could do so.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

There was, among other things, a determination as to the legality of the process. I accept that—but that is why it was suspended and why it remains suspended at the present time.

Those who are detained for any length in the removal centre estate will normally be cases that fall into the second category mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown: those who have had their application to remain in the United Kingdom refused, whose rights have expired and who it is proposed should finally be removed. I ask the Committee to reflect on the fact that if all individuals complied with a notice that they should leave the United Kingdom, there would be little need for immigration detention, and certainly very limited need for detention beyond a very short period. However, some individuals choose not to comply with the law and do not leave the United Kingdom when they should. That is the position we are in.

Amendment 218A would require a bail hearing in every case of detention within 28 days. As I have explained previously, mandatory bail hearings by set deadlines are incredibly resource-intensive for the tribunal and have been rejected previously as being unworkable in practice. Amendment 218B would impose a requirement to release on immigration bail after 28 days of detention, unless an individual had been convicted of an offence under the Modern Slavery Act.

I can understand the noble Baroness’s reasoning for the amendment. The offences listed in Schedule 4 are very high-harm offences. But what justification could there be for detaining beyond 28 days anyone other than these high-harm criminals? Matters are not that simple. We seek to remove national security threats under deportation powers—individuals who do not have a conviction but where there is clear intelligence that they pose a risk to the public. This power would prevent detention of these individuals beyond 28 days. It would lead to the release, for example, of Abu Qatada, despite the clear threat that he and others like him pose.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, went on to say:

“Many participants in this debate have urged and will urge, benevolently, for fixed limits—sometimes as little as 28 days—to immigration detention. I say to those noble Lords: do not underestimate the ingenuity and persistence of many of those who seek to defeat immigration controls. Time and again, down the years, the system has been cleverly played, often by those who are least deserving of our sympathies. In the present edition of one of the standard textbooks on immigration law, the chapter on detention and bail extends to 96 dense pages and endless footnotes. A case on this topic in the Supreme Court in 2011 … stretched to 115 pages of judgments. This is a difficult area of the law and I respectfully suggest that we should not rush to impose some limit”.—[Official Report, 22/12/15; col. 2474.]

Again, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, summarised the position well. I ask this House to heed his wise words and not to legislate in haste. It is for these reasons that I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Before I sit down, I notice that I have not responded fully to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. In particular, he raised the question of consultation on the short-term holding facility rules. It is regrettable that we have not yet consulted on those rules. However it has to be remembered that they operate not in a vacuum but under the statutory framework contained in Part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and its associated schedules. They are also covered by the Home Office’s detention services orders. Now that the Shaw report has been published, we will take forward consultation on the draft rules.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, responds, the picture that has been painted of the situation, including those who are subject to detention, does not seem to accord with the observations which so many of us have heard, including those of Stephen Shaw. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, quoted the last sentence of Mr Shaw’s conclusions, which is in paragraph 11.8. He said:

“Immigration detention has increased, is increasing, and—whether by better screening, more effective reviews, or formal time limit—it ought to be reduced”.

It seems unlikely to me that it has been increasing because the number of people who have been convicted of offences and are due for deportation, but for some reason or another are not being deported, would account for that increase in the way in which I heard the explanation.

I took seriously the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood. I ask again whether there is not a way in which those of us who are concerned properly to get to a situation where there is not the lack of hope to which noble Lords have referred cannot together find, with some imagination, a way of dealing with this that will give a structure to detention immigration but allow for the very rare exceptions that it might be proper to make.

[Lord Green of Deddington]

May I give one example of how this arises? There are some countries that require an interview with their consul in London to re-document someone who is here as an illegal immigrant and in detention. That requires an interview to which the person in detention has to agree. If there is a time limit of a month, he will know perfectly well that all that he has to do is to refuse the interview for a few weeks and he will be out.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am not quite sure how that fits in with what I was saying. I am certainly not arguing that there should not be a good returns process; in fact, I have tabled an amendment to that effect later in the Bill.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

If the noble Baroness will allow me, one thing that does not seem to have been referred to in the course of our debates is the exponential increase in the number of people detained. I think that there was an 11% increase last year, with around 31,000 people being detained in this country. Does that not underline the importance of what she is saying about looking for alternatives to this? I gave the figures earlier: the cost to the public purse is around £36,000 per person detained. Millions of pounds are being spent on something that does not give great credit to our nation. Surely we should look for an alternative to this. We know that such alternatives exist elsewhere, which is where Stephen Shaw seems to be pointing us. Is that not what we should be doing between now and Report?

[Baroness Hamwee]

Indeed, and the sentence before the one which I quoted referred to a system,

“both … more protective of the welfare of vulnerable people and”,

delivering,

“better value for the taxpayer”.

[Lord Rosser]

I am sure the Committee will be relieved to know that I do not intend to say a great deal but, first, I thank everybody who has contributed to this debate and for the views that have been expressed.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect, one could ask about one out of 64,000. It is not a question of which one but of addressing all of them in due course and in the context not necessarily of primary legislation but of the need for further guidance. The noble Lord has underlined the potential need for further guidance in this area.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I suspect that the noble Lord may be coming towards a halt, if not to the end of the issue. It occurs to me that I do not think that any of us asked about the Home Office’s internal review on this subject, which we heard about in previous debates.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

I think I asked.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Well, I do not think the question was answered. Has the Minister any news about that? I appreciate that we are taking a long time on this, but the size and substance of the issue justifies it.

[Lord Rosser]

The reason for asking about recommendation 62 was that the Minister sought to tell us there was not a problem because people could apply for bail. But recommendation 62 is based on Mr Shaw looking at the situation with regard to bail. It is in the light of having looked at it that he said:

“I recommend that the Home Office give further consideration to ways of strengthening the legal safeguards against excessive length of detention”.

So I would have thought that the Minister, having referred to the very issue that prompted recommendation 62, might have a view on what the Government’s response was to it. But clearly there is silence from the Government on that particular score.

I do not know whether the Minister intends to respond to the question about the Home Office internal review. As I understand it, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has said that he raised the question and has not had a response to it. Is there an internal Home Office review going on? I am obviously not going to get an answer, so it looks like a secret review.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

224A: Schedule 7, page 106, line 16, leave out “may” and insert “must”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this is a shorter group. Amendments 224A, 224B, 224C and 224D are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick.

Paragraph 7 of Schedule 7 gives powers to the Secretary of State to enable a person to meet bail conditions. Paragraph 7(1) provides for when a person is subject to a condition requiring him to reside at a particular address and he would not be able to support himself at that address without assistance. Sub-paragraph (2) allows the Secretary of State to,

“provide, or arrange for … facilities for the accommodation … at that address”.

My first amendment would again change this from permissive to mandatory. If the Secretary of State requires someone to live at a particular address, it seems to us that, in the circumstances spelled out of the person not being able to otherwise support himself, the Secretary of State should provide the facilities. Sub-paragraph (3) limits the power I just described,

“to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks that there are exceptional circumstances which justify the exercise of the power”.

We would take out the thinking element of that to make the limitation more objective.

Sub-paragraph (4) gives the power to make a payment for travelling expenses which the person incurs,

“for the purpose of complying with a bail condition”.

Similarly, it applies,

“to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks that there are exceptional circumstances”,

and we would make the same two amendments.

I rather wish now that we had also sought to delete the reference to “exceptional circumstances”, given that by definition the person who is the subject of this cannot support himself. I failed to do that, but I do not think it invalidates the amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. As she observed, Amendments 224A and 224B would create a duty to pay, in exceptional circumstances, for accommodation to anyone released on bail if the individual were required to live at a bail address not of their choosing or if the person could not otherwise support themselves. In turn, Amendments 224C and 224D would require the Secretary of State to pay an individual for travel costs incurred while complying with conditions of immigration bail where there were exceptional circumstances, again limiting discretion.

We would submit that these amendments are unnecessary. As was noted by the noble Baroness, paragraph 7 of Schedule 7 provides a power for the Secretary of State to ensure a person can meet bail conditions by paying for the costs of their accommodation and travel expenses in appropriate circumstances. It is important to note that the Secretary of State is given a discretion on the matter of exceptional circumstances. Individuals released on bail will be able to be supported by the Home Office under the Bill if their individual circumstances warrant it, generally because they do not have the funds to obtain adequate accommodation, cannot obtain it from friends or relatives, and are unable to avoid the risk of destitution while they are here except by leaving the United Kingdom.

However, if a person is an asylum seeker, they will be able to apply for support under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and the Bill makes no changes to the support available to asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute. They will continue to be provided with accommodation and a cash allowance to cover their other essential living needs.

In our submission, it is right that the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament, has the final discretion on whether to provide accommodation to, or to pay the travel expenses of, those released on bail. It is not a matter that she should be obliged to respond to. In those circumstances, I ask that these amendments be withdrawn.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. It seems that whether the amendments are necessary or not depends on whether you are the Secretary of State or the person subject to the bail condition. However, I heard what the Minister said. I do not think it would be appropriate to pursue the matter now. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 224A withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

225: Clause 33, page 38, line 31, after “a” insert “material”

[Baroness Hamwee]

In moving Amendment 225, I shall speak also to Amendment 226, which takes us on to the next clause, about cancelling leave to enter or remain where there is an extension of limited leave. Leave which is extended may be cancelled if the applicant has failed to comply with the condition attached to the leave. I suggest that in the first of the amendments, that should be a reference to a material condition, not to a trivial condition, although the Bill does not use that language. Leave may also be cancelled if the individual has used deception in seeking leave to remain. I suggest that if there is deception, it should be deception directly for the purpose of seeking leave.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. As she observes, Amendment 225 seeks to change the wording of Clause 33 so that leave extended by Section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 may be cancelled only when the failure to comply with a condition of their leave relates to a “material” condition. That would leave us in the situation whereby the original grant is not subject to that condition, but the extension was. The Immigration Rules allow for leave to be curtailed when a person has failed to comply with any condition attached to their grant of leave. However, the Home Office has published guidance on when failure to comply with conditions of leave may lead to curtailment of leave. For example, if a student is granted leave with the condition that they work no more than 10 hours each week, the guidance states that curtailment is appropriate if the student is working full time. However, when the breach of leave is very minor—for example where a student worked for 10.5 hours for one week only and was compliant with their conditions of leave in all other respects, the guidance states that it would normally be disproportionate to curtail their leave. In considering whether to cancel leave extended by Section 3C, caseworkers will apply the same principles as they do when considering whether to curtail leave under the Immigration Rules. So there is here consistency between the original leave and the extension allowed for, which is why the wording is as it is. The same considerations of proportionality will apply as in terms of the guidance that I have just indicated.

The effect of Amendment 226 is to change the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C so that a person has to “deliberately” use or have used deception in seeking leave to remain. The wording of Clause 33 is the same as that used in the offence of deception in Section 24A of the 1971 Immigration Act and the wording used in the Immigration Rules to curtail immigration leave. The courts have confirmed that “deception” means something that is knowingly done and so the addition of the word deliberate is, with respect, unnecessary.

Both Amendment 225 and Amendment 226 would mean that the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C would differ in its wording from equivalent powers to curtail leave under the Immigration Rules. This creates the risk of perceived differences between the circumstances in which Section 3C extended leave and leave granted under the Immigration Rules can be cancelled. I fear that if either of these amendments were to pass, much time and cost would be spent in the courts considering whether these differences in wording have the effect of creating different powers in practice.

I understand the concerns about how the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C is to be exercised. I reassure noble Lords that the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C is discretionary. For example, it would not be right to cancel leave extended by Section 3C where a person was unaware of the deception. In deciding whether to cancel leave extended by Section 3C, the same principles will apply as when considering the curtailment of immigration leave. For the benefit of the noble Baroness, the relevant decision on deception is the case of AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2010. In these circumstances, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I did not disbelieve the noble and learned Lord when he said that there was case law on this. I understand that the term “deliberately” is encompassed within deception. As I said, my concern was to probe how the power would be used and why it would be necessary. From what we have heard, it seems to have been something of a tidying-up exercise, rather than because there has been a bad experience—the Minister is nodding his head.

I suspect that I am not alone in, as always, feeling just a little uneasy when we are told that the answer is “in guidance” so it will all be okay. Having made that observation, though, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 225 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

226A: After Clause 33, insert the following new Clause—
“Return of asylum seekers: countries deemed safe
(1) Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (removal of asylum seeker to safe country) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 8, omit sub-paragraph (2).
(3) In paragraph 12, omit sub-paragraph (2).”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I apologise to the House; if any noble Lords have tried to follow my drafting, they may have thought either that I had completely lost it or that my drafting skills had gone out of the window. They might be right on both counts because what I have produced is the direct opposite to what I intended. I contacted the Bill team to explain that earlier today, and was very grateful to receive a sympathetic response from the Bill team manager. Having managed to communicate what I intended, it will take me about two or three minutes—perhaps five— to cover the principle of what I wanted to deal with: the use of a list of deemed safe countries of origin to which asylum seekers could be returned.

The Minister may be able to tell us whether there is any news about the common EU list that has been proposed and whether the UK is still not minded to opt into it. It is no secret that Liberal Democrats consider that there is a good deal to be said for an EU-wide approach to asylum and refugees.

It was not this that prompted my interest. I can see that it is administratively convenient to have a list of countries that are safe to return people to; I understand the rationale. However, this does not take account of the different characteristics and situations of different individuals. If there is a presumption that a country is safe, it becomes that much harder to counter the presumption by evidence, particularly if one is on the fast track, which is not being operated now, or any other equivalent of it.

There was a ruling in Canada in July that Canada’s safe-country-of-origin list is unconstitutional because it is discriminatory on its face and serves to marginalise, prejudice and stereotype asylum seekers coming from countries that the Government have designated as unsafe. I have no doubt that the Home Office is aware of this and will be able to counter that if it were to be challenged on it.

The article which I saw said that:

“While it might seem reasonable to weed out claims of people coming from stable countries that respect human rights, the fact that Ukraine remained on the United Kingdom’s SCO list throughout the crisis there—and still is today—is a warning how these lists can quickly become obsolete and not reflect changes in countries of origin”.

I therefore wonder whether the Minister can give us any news on the EU list—I suspect that I know what the answer will be—but in particular, deal with the point about keeping lists up to date and that a country which might be safe for you and me might not be safe for him and her. I beg to move.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I notice what the noble Lord says and I do not take issue with it. I add only that, where an individual does identify particular circumstances pertaining to themselves, whether it be religion or whatever, those circumstances are taken into consideration. However, I appreciate the point that the noble Lord has made.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Jamaica is indeed an example, and maybe the Democratic Republic of Congo as well. In defence of my rubbish drafting, one of my then quite new colleagues told other colleagues that the most reassuring thing she had encountered in giving her confidence to speak in the Chamber was when I moved the wrong amendment and the sky did not fall. I may use this example in encouraging other new colleagues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 226A withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

226C: After Clause 33, insert the following new Clause—
“Registration with police: requirement for review
(1) The Secretary of State shall undertake a review of the requirement that immigrants register with the police in accordance with section 4(3) of the Immigration Act 1971 and shall, within one year of the passing of this Act, lay before each House of Parliament a report on that review.
(2) The report shall include an assessment of—
(a) the resources required to conduct the registration process;(b) the usefulness of registration;(c) the uses to which the information obtained through registration is put;(d) the necessity for the requirement; and(e) any recommended changes including efficiencies.”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 226C standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. This amendment deals with the requirement for certain immigrants to register with the police and calls for a review of the arrangements.

The matter was brought to our attention by Universities UK because of the experience of foreign students being required to register with the police within seven days. Failure to register in that time limit may lead to the curtailment of leave or may affect future applications. We heard of students having to queue through the night or round the block to register. The question that was asked of us, and which I now ask of the Minister, is: what is done with the information garnered through that registration process? That is why subsection (2) in the proposed new clause refers to an assessment of the resources that are required, how useful the registration is, the uses to which the information is put, the need for the requirement, and any recommended changes, including efficiencies. I have not used the term “cost-benefit analysis”, but that is essentially what it amounts to, together with a concern for the individuals.

I also wonder about the cost of the administration for this. There is a fee of £34: not only do you have to register but you have to pay £34 for the privilege of queuing through the night. The numbers arising at particular times make the administration really quite difficult to handle. There is also the issue of this country’s reputation internationally as a result of this procedure. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Again, I am obliged to the noble Baroness for highlighting this point. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the requirement that non-visitor migrants of specified nationalities register with the police, and then lay before both Houses a report on that review. In our submission, such a review and report is not necessary.

The noble Baroness correctly identified that there is a police registration scheme. The provision is set out in Section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971. The requirements to register with the police are specified in the Immigration Rules. The requirement to register with the police is normally placed on a migrant who is aged 16 or over, from a non-EU country and who is given leave for longer than six months. The requirement is to register within seven days of obtaining qualifying leave to enter or remain. There are a number of exceptions where the requirement will not usually apply, including ministers of religion, people exercising access rights to a child resident in the UK, and those granted refugee status.

The requirement to register with the police is not onerous. In the Metropolitan Police area, where there is the highest concentration of migrants required to register, there is a designated office in Borough. For all other police force areas, the individual should register at the nearest police registration office. As the noble Baroness noted, there is a registration fee, currently £34, which reflects the administration costs of the police registration certificate.

The noble Baroness mentioned an occasion when students were reported to have had to queue. In October 2012, some long queues of migrants, mainly students, were seeking to register at the London Overseas Visitors Records Office. OVRO made changes to its process following that incident, including providing pre-booked timeslots for migrants required to register, and I am advised that there has been no recurrence of those queues. Universities are also given the option of collating the relevant paperwork from their students who are required to register and delivering it to the OVRO in bulk. The police continue to work and engage with those involved to manage peak flows in registrations and to minimise any inconvenience from that. I accept that there was an occasion in 2012 when there were delays, but that has not repeated itself.

The information required for registration is all information that will be held by the individual, including personal details, a current photograph, passport details, address in the United Kingdom, their last place of residence outside the UK, and details of their employment and/or place of study. This information is then on record for the police and other law enforcement to access, as necessary, in order to maintain security.

The various requirements for those seeking to stay and live in the UK, as set out in the Immigration Rules, are periodically under review to ensure that they strike the right balance between immigration control and security in the UK. I believe that this current approach is proportionate, particularly in the current state of heightened security concerns, and it is unnecessary for there to be a statutory requirement for a formal review to be conducted and a report laid before both Houses. In light of these points, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Rosser]

It was not, but I am grateful to the Minister for his response.

[Baroness Hamwee]

When the Minister writes, will he explain what he described to me to be functions of UK Visas and Immigration—if I have its current title correct? It sounded as though a degree of duplication is required on the part of the police. One would have thought that the visa implications of all the administration, particularly around students, would have been taken care of without having to go to a central point to register. I agree that the amendment is not necessary, because it does not require an amendment for the Government to undertake a review. However, on the Minister’s comment that the arrangements are not onerous, I wonder why it was so specifically raised with us by Universities UK, which will no doubt read the comments and give us its response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 226C withdrawn.