Lord Green of Deddington
Not when I use the term, and I do not think that it applies to those people. It applies to those whose cases have been rejected, and rejected on appeal, and they do not return home when they could do so.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie)
I wonder whether I might, as it were, intervene at this point. I was obliged for the contributions from all corners of the House about what is a difficult and demanding issue. Having regard to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, I notice that the immigration system with which he is struggling is a product, at least to a material degree, of the Immigration Act 2014, which is in turn the product of a coalition Government, in which I believe he was a Minister. That said, clearly there is room for improvement. On that we can agree, and that is why the Bill is before the House.
Lord Stunell
I thank the Minister for giving way, and of course he is absolutely right. I am very proud of the fact that we secured some mitigation of the existing scheme in what was achieved on child detention, which I am sure he welcomes.
Lord Keen of Elie
One of the points that the noble Lord referred to, and which was referred to also by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, was the question of set time limits, and the limits that apply in the context of the EU returns directive. It is important to have a full understanding of the EU returns directive. It sets a limit on immigration detention of six months and is extendable to 18 months. Some EU countries have shorter limits—France, for example—but Germany allows for the full 18 months’ extension under the directive. So one has to have regard to the full terms of the EU directive.
The United Kingdom has not signed up to the EU returns directive; we prefer to maintain control of our own borders. There are other issues to be considered as well. The very legal system within each of these European countries is distinct, so for example, in some there is no concept of judicial review of executive action, as we understand it, and therefore no scope for review of executive action in the context of immigration control and the application of immigration policy. So one has to be a little careful when seeking to rely on comparative law and comparative data.
We are, of course, working towards the voluntary return of illegal migrants to this country, as well as implementing various schemes to deal with those who refuse to return. I notice that during the last two years there have been more than 50,000 voluntary returns by migrants to this country. Again, that is simply to put the matter in context.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, raised issues about the Bill itself and whether, given the amendments that have been made, it should not at this stage simply be withdrawn for the Government to consider many of the changes that they might have in mind, or, indeed, have regard to the amendments that have already taken place. Again, at a general level, I note that the Bill deals with a whole series of issues: labour market reform, housing, driving and driving licences, illegal working, the appeals process, immigration and bail. Only one or two aspects of that are immediately impacted by the issue that we are addressing in the context of detention.
The noble Lord also alluded to the number of amendments—but again, to put that in context, amendments took place following the consultation on labour market enforcement. When one examines them, one sees that a great number of the amendments address only a few discrete issues. For example, a whole series of amendments were required because of the nature of the local rules that apply to taxis and taxi licensing. From Portsmouth to John O’Groats, there seem to be varying rules regarding that matter. In addition, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, noted, there had to be extensive amendments with regard to warrants under the judicial system in Scotland. So one has to get this into context and have a sense of proportion about what the Bill is doing.
Reference was made to Stephen Shaw’s report, which we welcomed, considered and continue to consider. Stephen Shaw did not make any recommendations about legislation. Much of what he says, so far as it is to be implemented, will be implemented by guidance, not by primary legislation. Again, it is important to get these points into context so that we understand what we are dealing with.
I will come back to some of the individual points raised, but first I will deal with the individual amendments, beginning with Amendment 216. This would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent report into the use of immigration detention, which would need to consider: how effective current use of detention is; how effective current safeguards are; how to reduce the numbers in detention; and the practical steps needed to introduce a maximum time limit for detention of 28 days.
While I understand the intentions behind the proposed new clause, in our submission it is not necessary. Stephen Shaw has undertaken an independent review of our approach to the detention of vulnerable individuals. The Government have published his report and our initial response to it, through a Written Ministerial Statement published on 14 January. It is not the length of that response that is material; it is the quality of it that truly matters. In it, we have set out our ambition to see a reduction in the number of those detained, and the duration of detention before removal, which in turn would improve the welfare of those detained.
The Government have broadly accepted the recommendations that Stephen Shaw made, and in particular will introduce a strengthened presumption that adults at risk should not be detained unless there is clear evidence of immigration risk factors. I take this opportunity, which I am sure that the whole Committee will echo, to thank Stephen Shaw for his thoughtful and in-depth consideration of these very material issues and for his associated recommendations.
If Amendment 216 is agreed it will simply duplicate the work that Stephen Shaw has undertaken and delay the Government’s programme of implementation while the outcome of the new review is considered. Here we are addressing this Government’s manifesto commitments.
Amendment 216ZA would place a statutory requirement on the Secretary of State to review our policy on detention and bail conditions, and consult as part of that exercise. Again, Stephen Shaw has already done much of this. He has undertaken an in-depth review of our policy and made recommendations for improvements. We will take forward this work and, again, it will be implemented not by primary legislation but by consideration of guidance.
Amendment 216ZB requires a review of the rules and regulations about how individuals are treated while in immigration detention. I wish to make it clear to the Committee that the Secretary of State takes her duty of care to these individuals very seriously indeed. Healthcare is provided by the National Health Service and there are meaningful activities provided. Individuals also have access to legal advice—a point that was raised earlier—and to translation services.
Immigration removal centres are not prisons and do not have as strict a regime as prisons. Individuals are allowed to associate and move freely throughout the centres. However, the Government have accepted the broad thrust of Stephen Shaw’s report and will be taking further action to review our policies and procedures to ensure that detainee welfare is at the heart of immigration removal centres’ regimes.
Amendment 216ZC would mean that an individual who claims to be vulnerable could not be detained on the authority of the Secretary of State; a request would need to be made to the tribunal to authorise detention. It would also have the effect of preventing the detention of pregnant women in any circumstances. I understand the intention of this amendment, and the whole House will agree that vulnerable individuals should not normally be detained. That is our current published policy. In response to Stephen Shaw we will be further strengthening our approach, introducing a new “adult at risk” concept into decision-making on immigration detention. This means adopting a wider definition than at present of what constitutes an adult at risk, with a clear presumption that people who are at risk, including pregnant women, should not be detained.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
I may be pre-empting what the noble and learned Lord is about to say. However, Stephen Shaw is very clear that presumptive exclusion should be replaced with an absolute exclusion. The noble and learned Lord talks about strengthening presumption. That is qualitatively different from absolute exclusion. Do the Government accept the recommendation of absolute exclusion and, if not, why not?
Lord Keen of Elie
The present published guidance means that we do not, and should not, detain pregnant women except in exceptional circumstances. There are, in fact, very few pregnant women in the estate. The Government are reflecting on how to implement Stephen Shaw’s policy in regard to adults at risk, and will address that in due course. However, as I say, it will be a matter of guidance.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
I am sorry to press this. I accept that it is a matter of guidance. We put it in an amendment to have a debate on it. However, it seems to me that there is an attempt to slide out of answering the question of whether presumptive exclusion in the guidance will be replaced by absolute exclusion, because that is very clearly what Stephen Shaw recommended. I am not getting a clear answer on that.
Lord Keen of Elie
The clearest answer I can give is that it is a matter for consideration at present by Ministers. They will consider it because they have already said that. They noted the recommendations in Stephen Shaw’s report. They have not yet determined in a black and white way that they will implement all 64 recommendations and no one would expect them to have done so in this timescale, but they will address them.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has probably exhausted that line of argument for the moment. However, he was also asked during the debate not whether there are few or many but how many pregnant women are in detention centres at present, what their length of stay has been and whether any babies have been born there. If he cannot give those figures this evening, rather than simply saying “very few”, which was the phrase he used a few minutes ago, perhaps he will agree to write to noble Lords and let us know exactly what the numbers are.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am perfectly happy to write to noble Lords to give the figures for the number of pregnant women at present in detention and perhaps over a period of six months to cover both before and after Stephen Shaw’s report, so that there are some meaningful figures they can work from. I cannot give exact figures. That may not surprise your Lordships. I am advised that there are very few pregnant women in the estate. However, more precise figures will be given.
The adults at risk policy will take a more holistic and dynamic approach to the assessment of vulnerability, based on the best available evidence. That is what Stephen Shaw has identified as the most ambitious approach to ensuring that adults at risk are safeguarded. However, the approach in the proposed new clause would not be workable in practice. It does not take into account the realities of how individuals are discovered. For example, how would we handle cases at the border who can be returned on the next flight? Following this amendment, an individual could not be lawfully detained without an order of the tribunal. That would be an administrative challenge to obtain and would require significant extra resources. The same would be true of an individual encountered jumping off the back of a lorry. And what would happen if someone was already detained and raised these issues? Would they be unlawfully detained until an order of the tribunal was given? It is simply not workable in practice.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
I am sorry to intervene again, but “indefinite” does not mean that people are there for ever. It means that people do not know how long they will be there, and that is what has had the terrible psychological impact on people. From that perspective it is “indefinite”, because there is no clear time limit that gives people certainty and hope.
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect, it is not possible to say to somebody that they will be in detention for X period in this context. For example, if they choose not to co-operate by producing any documents, or they do not tell the truth about their point of origin or their journey—where they arrived in Europe, for example—it may be very difficult to investigate their circumstances, and they may yet during that period pose a risk, whether to the public or otherwise. Therefore, detention is not necessarily, and cannot be, dictated by reference to a fixed period. But of course, it is open to them to go to a tribunal and apply for bail—and that is the whole point. So it is not, in that sense, indefinite: they have the opportunity to canvass before the tribunal the issue of whether or not they should remain in detention.
At Second Reading, we heard a number of noble Lords speak on detention. As has been said, there was a contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. He rightly identified that:
“There are two basically different circumstances in which people are detained under the legislation: first, on initial application for asylum and, secondly, when, much further down the line, it is sought to remove people whose rights of whatever sort have expired and it is proposed that they finally be deported”.—[Official Report, 22/12/15; col. 2473.]
The detained fast track generally related to the first category that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, identified. Many noble Lords will be aware that the detained fast track has been suspended since July following my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister’s decision that he could not be certain of the level of risk of unfairness to certain vulnerable applicants who may enter the process. I can confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that the detained fast track will remain suspended until my right honourable friend is sure that the right structures are in place to minimise any risk of unfairness and that effective safeguards can be put in place. A Statement will be made when that point is reached.
Lord Roberts of Llandudno
Can the Minister tell me in what circumstances that was suspended? Was it not because of a High Court action, which found that it was illegal?
Lord Keen of Elie
There was, among other things, a determination as to the legality of the process. I accept that—but that is why it was suspended and why it remains suspended at the present time.
Those who are detained for any length in the removal centre estate will normally be cases that fall into the second category mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown: those who have had their application to remain in the United Kingdom refused, whose rights have expired and who it is proposed should finally be removed. I ask the Committee to reflect on the fact that if all individuals complied with a notice that they should leave the United Kingdom, there would be little need for immigration detention, and certainly very limited need for detention beyond a very short period. However, some individuals choose not to comply with the law and do not leave the United Kingdom when they should. That is the position we are in.
Amendment 218A would require a bail hearing in every case of detention within 28 days. As I have explained previously, mandatory bail hearings by set deadlines are incredibly resource-intensive for the tribunal and have been rejected previously as being unworkable in practice. Amendment 218B would impose a requirement to release on immigration bail after 28 days of detention, unless an individual had been convicted of an offence under the Modern Slavery Act.
I can understand the noble Baroness’s reasoning for the amendment. The offences listed in Schedule 4 are very high-harm offences. But what justification could there be for detaining beyond 28 days anyone other than these high-harm criminals? Matters are not that simple. We seek to remove national security threats under deportation powers—individuals who do not have a conviction but where there is clear intelligence that they pose a risk to the public. This power would prevent detention of these individuals beyond 28 days. It would lead to the release, for example, of Abu Qatada, despite the clear threat that he and others like him pose.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, went on to say:
“Many participants in this debate have urged and will urge, benevolently, for fixed limits—sometimes as little as 28 days—to immigration detention. I say to those noble Lords: do not underestimate the ingenuity and persistence of many of those who seek to defeat immigration controls. Time and again, down the years, the system has been cleverly played, often by those who are least deserving of our sympathies. In the present edition of one of the standard textbooks on immigration law, the chapter on detention and bail extends to 96 dense pages and endless footnotes. A case on this topic in the Supreme Court in 2011 … stretched to 115 pages of judgments. This is a difficult area of the law and I respectfully suggest that we should not rush to impose some limit”.—[Official Report, 22/12/15; col. 2474.]
Again, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, summarised the position well. I ask this House to heed his wise words and not to legislate in haste. It is for these reasons that I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Before I sit down, I notice that I have not responded fully to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. In particular, he raised the question of consultation on the short-term holding facility rules. It is regrettable that we have not yet consulted on those rules. However it has to be remembered that they operate not in a vacuum but under the statutory framework contained in Part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and its associated schedules. They are also covered by the Home Office’s detention services orders. Now that the Shaw report has been published, we will take forward consultation on the draft rules.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, responds, the picture that has been painted of the situation, including those who are subject to detention, does not seem to accord with the observations which so many of us have heard, including those of Stephen Shaw. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, quoted the last sentence of Mr Shaw’s conclusions, which is in paragraph 11.8. He said:
“Immigration detention has increased, is increasing, and—whether by better screening, more effective reviews, or formal time limit—it ought to be reduced”.
It seems unlikely to me that it has been increasing because the number of people who have been convicted of offences and are due for deportation, but for some reason or another are not being deported, would account for that increase in the way in which I heard the explanation.
I took seriously the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood. I ask again whether there is not a way in which those of us who are concerned properly to get to a situation where there is not the lack of hope to which noble Lords have referred cannot together find, with some imagination, a way of dealing with this that will give a structure to detention immigration but allow for the very rare exceptions that it might be proper to make.
Lord Keen of Elie
I believe that I did observe that we accept the broad thrust of his recommendations. At this stage, we have not determined which of the 64 individual recommendations we will implement. I cannot see that as surprising in the time available.
Lord Rosser
That comes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, made about this legislation in relation to an inquiry that has just taken place. In my opening contribution, I commented that a statement that we are accepting the broad thrust of the recommendations is as long as a piece of string. Perhaps I can test the Minister on that. Recommendation 62 states:
“I recommend the Home Office give further consideration to ways of strengthening the legal safeguards against excessive length of detention”.
Is that one that the Government intend to accept? I am only asking about one recommendation out of 64. The Minister shakes his head. That makes my point.
Lord Keen of Elie
With great respect, one could ask about one out of 64,000. It is not a question of which one but of addressing all of them in due course and in the context not necessarily of primary legislation but of the need for further guidance. The noble Lord has underlined the potential need for further guidance in this area.
Baroness Hamwee
I suspect that the noble Lord may be coming towards a halt, if not to the end of the issue. It occurs to me that I do not think that any of us asked about the Home Office’s internal review on this subject, which we heard about in previous debates.
Lord Rosser
The reason for asking about recommendation 62 was that the Minister sought to tell us there was not a problem because people could apply for bail. But recommendation 62 is based on Mr Shaw looking at the situation with regard to bail. It is in the light of having looked at it that he said:
“I recommend that the Home Office give further consideration to ways of strengthening the legal safeguards against excessive length of detention”.
So I would have thought that the Minister, having referred to the very issue that prompted recommendation 62, might have a view on what the Government’s response was to it. But clearly there is silence from the Government on that particular score.
I do not know whether the Minister intends to respond to the question about the Home Office internal review. As I understand it, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has said that he raised the question and has not had a response to it. Is there an internal Home Office review going on? I am obviously not going to get an answer, so it looks like a secret review.
Lord Keen of Elie
There could well be a secret review, but in so far as there is an ongoing review, we will write to the noble Lord about its progress. However, I have mentioned the matter which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, raised, about the short-term holding facility rules and the review of those rules. I indicated that we were going to consult on those draft rules in the light of the Shaw report.
Lord Rosser
Is the purpose of the Home Office internal review to decide whether to accept any or all of the Shaw report recommendations, or is it on another issue?
Lord Keen of Elie
There is an internal review, and I have already indicated that we will set out the position in writing.
Lord Rosser
That is a very interesting reply; the Minister is not prepared to tell me what the purpose of the review is. That is a fair comment, because he could have stood up and told me. I asked him the question and he has not answered it. I will just leave it in this context. We detain people who are not criminals for an unknown period of time as an administrative or executive decision and not as a judicial one at any meaningful stage. The message that has come over from the debate so far, in the absence of anything very specific from the Government, is that the Government find that situation entirely satisfactory. A number of noble Lords in the Committee this evening do not find that situation satisfactory. None the less, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this is a shorter group. Amendments 224A, 224B, 224C and 224D are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick.
Paragraph 7 of Schedule 7 gives powers to the Secretary of State to enable a person to meet bail conditions. Paragraph 7(1) provides for when a person is subject to a condition requiring him to reside at a particular address and he would not be able to support himself at that address without assistance. Sub-paragraph (2) allows the Secretary of State to,
“provide, or arrange for … facilities for the accommodation … at that address”.
My first amendment would again change this from permissive to mandatory. If the Secretary of State requires someone to live at a particular address, it seems to us that, in the circumstances spelled out of the person not being able to otherwise support himself, the Secretary of State should provide the facilities. Sub-paragraph (3) limits the power I just described,
“to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks that there are exceptional circumstances which justify the exercise of the power”.
We would take out the thinking element of that to make the limitation more objective.
Sub-paragraph (4) gives the power to make a payment for travelling expenses which the person incurs,
“for the purpose of complying with a bail condition”.
Similarly, it applies,
“to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks that there are exceptional circumstances”,
and we would make the same two amendments.
I rather wish now that we had also sought to delete the reference to “exceptional circumstances”, given that by definition the person who is the subject of this cannot support himself. I failed to do that, but I do not think it invalidates the amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baroness. As she observed, Amendments 224A and 224B would create a duty to pay, in exceptional circumstances, for accommodation to anyone released on bail if the individual were required to live at a bail address not of their choosing or if the person could not otherwise support themselves. In turn, Amendments 224C and 224D would require the Secretary of State to pay an individual for travel costs incurred while complying with conditions of immigration bail where there were exceptional circumstances, again limiting discretion.
We would submit that these amendments are unnecessary. As was noted by the noble Baroness, paragraph 7 of Schedule 7 provides a power for the Secretary of State to ensure a person can meet bail conditions by paying for the costs of their accommodation and travel expenses in appropriate circumstances. It is important to note that the Secretary of State is given a discretion on the matter of exceptional circumstances. Individuals released on bail will be able to be supported by the Home Office under the Bill if their individual circumstances warrant it, generally because they do not have the funds to obtain adequate accommodation, cannot obtain it from friends or relatives, and are unable to avoid the risk of destitution while they are here except by leaving the United Kingdom.
However, if a person is an asylum seeker, they will be able to apply for support under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and the Bill makes no changes to the support available to asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute. They will continue to be provided with accommodation and a cash allowance to cover their other essential living needs.
In our submission, it is right that the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament, has the final discretion on whether to provide accommodation to, or to pay the travel expenses of, those released on bail. It is not a matter that she should be obliged to respond to. In those circumstances, I ask that these amendments be withdrawn.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. It seems that whether the amendments are necessary or not depends on whether you are the Secretary of State or the person subject to the bail condition. However, I heard what the Minister said. I do not think it would be appropriate to pursue the matter now. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
“In section 11(1) (construction of references to entry)—
(a) omit “, or temporarily admitted or released while liable to detention,”, (b) omit “or by Part III of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999”, and(c) for “or by section 68 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002” substitute “or on immigration bail within the meaning of Schedule 7 to the Immigration Act 2016”.”
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baroness. As she observes, Amendment 225 seeks to change the wording of Clause 33 so that leave extended by Section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 may be cancelled only when the failure to comply with a condition of their leave relates to a “material” condition. That would leave us in the situation whereby the original grant is not subject to that condition, but the extension was. The Immigration Rules allow for leave to be curtailed when a person has failed to comply with any condition attached to their grant of leave. However, the Home Office has published guidance on when failure to comply with conditions of leave may lead to curtailment of leave. For example, if a student is granted leave with the condition that they work no more than 10 hours each week, the guidance states that curtailment is appropriate if the student is working full time. However, when the breach of leave is very minor—for example where a student worked for 10.5 hours for one week only and was compliant with their conditions of leave in all other respects, the guidance states that it would normally be disproportionate to curtail their leave. In considering whether to cancel leave extended by Section 3C, caseworkers will apply the same principles as they do when considering whether to curtail leave under the Immigration Rules. So there is here consistency between the original leave and the extension allowed for, which is why the wording is as it is. The same considerations of proportionality will apply as in terms of the guidance that I have just indicated.
The effect of Amendment 226 is to change the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C so that a person has to “deliberately” use or have used deception in seeking leave to remain. The wording of Clause 33 is the same as that used in the offence of deception in Section 24A of the 1971 Immigration Act and the wording used in the Immigration Rules to curtail immigration leave. The courts have confirmed that “deception” means something that is knowingly done and so the addition of the word deliberate is, with respect, unnecessary.
Both Amendment 225 and Amendment 226 would mean that the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C would differ in its wording from equivalent powers to curtail leave under the Immigration Rules. This creates the risk of perceived differences between the circumstances in which Section 3C extended leave and leave granted under the Immigration Rules can be cancelled. I fear that if either of these amendments were to pass, much time and cost would be spent in the courts considering whether these differences in wording have the effect of creating different powers in practice.
I understand the concerns about how the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C is to be exercised. I reassure noble Lords that the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C is discretionary. For example, it would not be right to cancel leave extended by Section 3C where a person was unaware of the deception. In deciding whether to cancel leave extended by Section 3C, the same principles will apply as when considering the curtailment of immigration leave. For the benefit of the noble Baroness, the relevant decision on deception is the case of AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2010. In these circumstances, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I did not disbelieve the noble and learned Lord when he said that there was case law on this. I understand that the term “deliberately” is encompassed within deception. As I said, my concern was to probe how the power would be used and why it would be necessary. From what we have heard, it seems to have been something of a tidying-up exercise, rather than because there has been a bad experience—the Minister is nodding his head.
I suspect that I am not alone in, as always, feeling just a little uneasy when we are told that the answer is “in guidance” so it will all be okay. Having made that observation, though, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baroness. Just to be clear, if I were to take the black letter of her amendment, I, like many of your Lordships, would be a little confused. Indeed, one part of the amendment appeared to remove the affirmative procedure of Parliament in approving the addition or removal of names from the safe list. I have no doubt that that was never her intention. I will therefore respond in the spirit in which the amendment was addressed.
There are various lists, of course; one has to be careful about this, because there are lists of countries for the purposes of Section 94, but in addition there are potential lists of safe third-party countries—that is, where someone has left one country but arrived in a safe country within Europe and then moved on to the United Kingdom. I will therefore deal with this at a fairly high level of generality, because the various lists have various different aspects to them. Indeed, the Part 3 list does not have any countries in it at the moment.
The Government have already made an announcement that they will not opt into the common EU list—just to be clear about that. However, in so far as we maintain lists of safe countries, we are conscious of the issues that can arise with respect to them. Indeed, it has been the subject of litigation in case law in this country, which cited, for example, Jamaica and the issue of whether it was a safe country of return. The Home Office keeps these lists, whether they are under the Immigration Act or under Part 3, under constant review, and consider all aspects of the list when deciding whether or not to maintain a country on that list or to remove it. I apologise for addressing the matter at that level of generality, but I hope that the noble Baroness will forgive me for responding to her amendment in that form.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
I would be grateful if I could ask him something about these lists—whether the Government accept that the guidance the Home Office gives can sometimes have extraordinary consequences. He will know that his noble friend Lord Bates was good enough to meet me to discuss the situation of detainees held in detention centres in the Far East—people who had escaped from Pakistan. These included people from the Ahmadiyya community, Shia Muslims, Hindus, Christians—they came from many backgrounds but all had faced what seemed to be absolute examples of persecution. However, the Home Office guidance simply said that these were people who risked discrimination. As the noble Lord, Lord Bates, knows, that became like holy writ as far as the UNHCR—which I met during the same visit, in September last year—was concerned. I had the Home Office guidance quoted back at me as though this was a trump card they were able to use to show that these people were perfectly safe and no consequences would befall them. However, in reality, because of that guidance many of those cases will not even be considered until 2020, and those people will go on living beneath the radar between now and then, living illegally in the country where they are because their asylum claims have not been settled and they are not allowed to work. Therefore the implications of Home Office lists and guidance can often be more far-reaching than maybe we ever imagine.
Lord Keen of Elie
I notice what the noble Lord says and I do not take issue with it. I add only that, where an individual does identify particular circumstances pertaining to themselves, whether it be religion or whatever, those circumstances are taken into consideration. However, I appreciate the point that the noble Lord has made.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Jamaica is indeed an example, and maybe the Democratic Republic of Congo as well. In defence of my rubbish drafting, one of my then quite new colleagues told other colleagues that the most reassuring thing she had encountered in giving her confidence to speak in the Chamber was when I moved the wrong amendment and the sky did not fall. I may use this example in encouraging other new colleagues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 226C standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. This amendment deals with the requirement for certain immigrants to register with the police and calls for a review of the arrangements.
The matter was brought to our attention by Universities UK because of the experience of foreign students being required to register with the police within seven days. Failure to register in that time limit may lead to the curtailment of leave or may affect future applications. We heard of students having to queue through the night or round the block to register. The question that was asked of us, and which I now ask of the Minister, is: what is done with the information garnered through that registration process? That is why subsection (2) in the proposed new clause refers to an assessment of the resources that are required, how useful the registration is, the uses to which the information is put, the need for the requirement, and any recommended changes, including efficiencies. I have not used the term “cost-benefit analysis”, but that is essentially what it amounts to, together with a concern for the individuals.
I also wonder about the cost of the administration for this. There is a fee of £34: not only do you have to register but you have to pay £34 for the privilege of queuing through the night. The numbers arising at particular times make the administration really quite difficult to handle. There is also the issue of this country’s reputation internationally as a result of this procedure. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
Again, I am obliged to the noble Baroness for highlighting this point. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the requirement that non-visitor migrants of specified nationalities register with the police, and then lay before both Houses a report on that review. In our submission, such a review and report is not necessary.
The noble Baroness correctly identified that there is a police registration scheme. The provision is set out in Section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971. The requirements to register with the police are specified in the Immigration Rules. The requirement to register with the police is normally placed on a migrant who is aged 16 or over, from a non-EU country and who is given leave for longer than six months. The requirement is to register within seven days of obtaining qualifying leave to enter or remain. There are a number of exceptions where the requirement will not usually apply, including ministers of religion, people exercising access rights to a child resident in the UK, and those granted refugee status.
The requirement to register with the police is not onerous. In the Metropolitan Police area, where there is the highest concentration of migrants required to register, there is a designated office in Borough. For all other police force areas, the individual should register at the nearest police registration office. As the noble Baroness noted, there is a registration fee, currently £34, which reflects the administration costs of the police registration certificate.
The noble Baroness mentioned an occasion when students were reported to have had to queue. In October 2012, some long queues of migrants, mainly students, were seeking to register at the London Overseas Visitors Records Office. OVRO made changes to its process following that incident, including providing pre-booked timeslots for migrants required to register, and I am advised that there has been no recurrence of those queues. Universities are also given the option of collating the relevant paperwork from their students who are required to register and delivering it to the OVRO in bulk. The police continue to work and engage with those involved to manage peak flows in registrations and to minimise any inconvenience from that. I accept that there was an occasion in 2012 when there were delays, but that has not repeated itself.
The information required for registration is all information that will be held by the individual, including personal details, a current photograph, passport details, address in the United Kingdom, their last place of residence outside the UK, and details of their employment and/or place of study. This information is then on record for the police and other law enforcement to access, as necessary, in order to maintain security.
The various requirements for those seeking to stay and live in the UK, as set out in the Immigration Rules, are periodically under review to ensure that they strike the right balance between immigration control and security in the UK. I believe that this current approach is proportionate, particularly in the current state of heightened security concerns, and it is unnecessary for there to be a statutory requirement for a formal review to be conducted and a report laid before both Houses. In light of these points, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser
How many people should have registered under this arrangement in 2014, or any other year that the Minister is aware of, and how many did register? What is the penalty for not registering and how many people have been penalised for not registering?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Lord for his three questions and I will write in response to provide the detail, which I do not have immediately to hand at this moment. I hope that was not a surprise to the noble Lord.