Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for instigating this debate, although the precedent he sets of seeking to put right past legislative mistakes is rather disturbing for some of us. We would not have much Summer Recess this year if we were to follow his course of action. I had an enjoyable two years as Health and Safety Minister and dealt with the Health and Safety Executive on a regular basis. I recall discussions with the Minister of Defence on some similar issues; not in relation to Armed Forces in the theatre, but certainly in training exercises where some of the same issues obtained because of the need in training to help the Armed Forces understand the dynamics of being in theatre. I have some sympathy with where the noble Lord and noble Lords who have served as police officers are coming from.
However, my experience of health and safety is, first, that the legislation since 1974 has had a hugely positive impact in terms of a dramatic reduction in the number of lives lost and injuries suffered by people in the workforce. One ought to pay tribute to the Health and Safety Executive for the work that it has done. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Condon, when he recognised that and described the HSE as taking what he described as a common-sense approach. Secondly, my experience is that the HSE moved away from a kind of performance-management culture which judged the inspectors on the number of prosecutions that they instituted to one that was much more proportionate. That starts from the basis that if we can encourage employers to do the right thing in health and safety that is our preferred option unless there has clearly been a gross abuse of the law by an employer.
To be fair to the HSE, it has come under considerable criticism in recent years as the number of prosecutions that it has undertaken has gone down, but I think that that has been a common-sense approach. I am sure that the focus of inspectors on giving advice and guidance and seeking improvement is right. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, referred to the urban myths that often surround health and safety stories in the media. I share that view. When you dig down into some stories in the media, you find that, far from the Health and Safety Executive inspector saying, for example, “You can’t have hanging flowers in pots”, that is often an excuse used by public authorities for reducing expenditure.
The second problem relates to health and safety advisers. I very much agree with the comments of my noble friend Lord Harris, who has great experience of this. One of the problems is that a whole plethora of health and safety advisers has grown up and the advice that they give to organisations is often very risk averse. Sometimes employers run away from the fact that in the end this matter is not the responsibility of the health and safety adviser but of management and the employer. Sometimes employers need to say to health and safety advisers, “You may have given this advice, but it defies common sense and we are going to carry on doing what we want to do”.
If the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, were tempted to press the amendment either today or on Report, he would risk compounding his original error by encouraging us to pass bad law. This matter is much better dealt with through effective dialogue between police forces, the DWP and the Health and Safety Executive. I invite the Minister to encourage her colleagues in the DWP to institute discussions between the police service, the HSE and the Police Federation because it is important that the staff in the police force own any future development. The development of a dialogue and a greater understanding between the three parties is probably the best way forward rather than the way proposed in the noble Lord’s amendment.
My Lords, I am relieved at the way this debate has developed because, when I first saw this amendment, knowing of the noble Lord’s seniority in his party I wondered whether this was some sort of “done deal”. Clearly, that is not the case. It sounds terribly patronising to say this, but the balanced attitude which noble Lords have displayed in their speeches is extremely welcome. The noble Lord, Lord Condon, talked about not exempting the police force en bloc, but where is the demarcation line? I think that all noble Lords have recognised that there needs to be one. Like other noble Lords, I think that health and safety, with a capital H and a capital S, is important and has had an unjustifiably bad press—not that I tend to read that press but one cannot avoid hearing about it. The law in regard to health and safety, and certainly the way in which it is applied, may have gone too far one way, but the pendulum should not swing too far in the other direction.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing this fascinating debate. However, I should make clear that we on this side join the Police Federation in opposing the amendment, which would remove from police officers the statutory protection afforded by the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. We believe that this would be a seriously retrograde step.
I had made a note to remind the noble Lord that a Conservative Government had brought the police service within the health and safety legislation through the 1997 Act but clearly I did not need to do so. Therefore, I congratulate him on mentioning that. Notwithstanding the debate that we have had, I believe that it was the right thing to do. I am not familiar with the detail of the prosecutions that took place, which were clearly traumatic and difficult for two very senior members of the police force. The message I take from that is that the prosecution did not succeed and that common sense prevailed. That is the real message. I am grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Condon, said that and recognised that events have moved on.
Perhaps I may pick up the issue around myths, because health and safety is beset by myths, half-truths, and sometimes downright fabrications. The police have been on the receiving end of this too often. As my noble friend Lord Hunt said, this is sometimes because people want to use health and safety as an excuse for not doing something, sometimes by overzealous application of health and safety requirements and sometimes due to ignorance of the law. The HSE, together with partners in local authorities and the wider health and safety community, has gone to great lengths to push back against these myths and to explain what is required. I shall come back specifically on that in relation to a case that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, mentioned.
My noble friends Lord Harris and Lord Hunt got it absolutely right. My noble friend Lord Harris said that it was important to inculcate health and safety into the mainstream of an organisation and to address it proportionately. Analysis shows that organisations, whichever one we are talking about, with good health and safety management invariably have other good management systems in place. My noble friend Lord Hunt referred to the positive impact of the 1974 legislation. That is right. It has stood the test of time. It is non-prescriptive and is meant to be operated proportionately. My noble friend said that sometimes it is the role of overzealous consultants to encourage people down paths that are not required under the legislation. One of the things on which I would congratulate the Government is the introduction of a register for consultants. It is work that we could claim to have started in our term of office and it will help to address this issue.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to the bad press that the Health and Safety Executive and others get. Let me refer to the report of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Graffham, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. In Appendix D, entitled “Behind the myth: the truth behind health and safety hysteria in the media”, he picks up one of the issues referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Dear. The appendix refers first to the “Story” and states:
“In May 2007, newspapers published a story concerning the death of a 10-year-old boy who drowned while fishing for tadpoles with his siblings in an outdoor pond. Questions were asked about the role of the emergency services and accusations were made that the policemen involved stood by and watched a boy drown because health and safety rules forbade them from entering the water to save him”.
The report goes on to record the “Reality”. It states:
“Fishermen noticed that two children had fallen into the pond and they tried to bring the children in with their fishing tackle. They managed to drag a girl out of the pond but were unable to reach her brother. One of the fishermen tried to call 999 but was unable to get through so he called his wife. She rang the police and reported the incident. There was some confusion over the location of the incident and this resulted in the police attending the incorrect location. At the same time Police Community Support Officers were undertaking a normal patrol when they came across the incident. They alerted police officers to the correct location. The boy’s step-father and friend arrived at the pond just before the police officers. They immediately dived into the water and brought the child to the surface. The police officers then arrived and one of them dived into the water and helped to bring the boy onto the bank. Unfortunately by this point he had been underwater for 20 minutes”.
That is the gap between the myth and the reality.
I am bound to say that there are responsibilities on us all not to recycle these myths. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Graffham, when addressing the IOSH conference a little while before he was formally appointed, cited an incident some 18 months before when two police community support officers had stood by and watched a 10 year-old boy, who had jumped into a pond to rescue his sister, drown. The noble Lord said that they explained afterwards that they had not had their health and safety course on rescuing people. He also said that if that was thought to be completely exceptional, there was a case only a few weeks before where a man allegedly drove his car containing his two children into the river. He and the boy escaped but his sister was trapped screaming in the car. The two policemen stood by for 92 minutes while a diving team was brought from the other end of the county and said later that they were not allowed to rescue the girl themselves on health and safety grounds, and she died the following day. We all need to be mindful not to recirculate these myths.
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 233A on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill. Reference has just been made to experts. I am not as expert as my noble friend, and I may get into trouble because I am not going to use all the briefing that he has given me.
Amendment 233A would exclude from Section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 a constable in the course of his duty. That section is what noble Lords might know as the Tony Martin defence. It was enacted in response to the case of Tony Martin, who shot two intruders in his home thinking they were attempting a burglary. It provides that the court must give permission for an offender to bring a civil suit for an assault committed at the time and in the circumstances that the offender committed the act for which he was convicted. It provides the defendant with a defence to such proceedings provided that his action was not grossly disproportionate. The defendant must believe the offender was about to commit an offence, was in the course of committing one or had committed one and that his actions were necessary to defend himself or someone else, to protect or recover property, to prevent or stop the offence or to catch and secure the conviction of the offender.
At the time that the section was being debated, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland of Asthal, said that the section,
“would strengthen the civil law to improve protection for victims of crime against civil claims for damages by offenders”.
She also said:
“It benefits third parties who are not the direct victim of the offence, but who may have intervened to protect the victim or deter the criminal”.—[Official Report, 11/11/03; cols. 1307-08.]
That was the only indication of the intended use of the section by those who are not direct victims of the crime.
In 2009, there was a case in the Court of Appeal: Anthony Adorian v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. In his judgment, Lord Justice Sedley said:
“There is nothing on the face of the section or in its shoulder-note which manifests an intention to afford the police a novel protection from claims by offenders for objectively unreasonable or unnecessarily violent arrests”.
Only police defendants have invoked this section. Lord Justice Sedley went on to say:
“The consequences should not go unnoticed. In place of the principle painstakingly established in the course of two centuries and more, and fundamental to the civil rights enjoyed by the people of this country—that an arrest must be objectively justified and that no more force may be used in effecting it than is reasonably necessary—the section gives immunity from civil suits, not confined to those involving personal injury, to constables who make arrests on entirely unreasonable grounds, so long as they are not acting in bad faith, and accords them impunity for using all but grossly disproportionate force in so doing”.
In summary, Section 329 has only ever been used by the police, and my noble friend tells me that it has led to a mismatch between civil and criminal proceedings with no equality of arms between police and private individuals. The current position does not recognise that the police are public officers of the state endowed with special powers and that as a corollary they have special obligations that Section 329 allows them to circumvent. My noble friend says that ordinary people may be given some leeway for honest and instinct overreactions when protecting or defending themselves or another from a crime but, on the other hand, a police officer trained in the use of force must be required to justify his or her actions objectively and to use no more force than is reasonably necessary.
I had not appreciated until listening to the previous debate how neatly this followed on in some ways. My noble friend Lord Lester has tabled this amendment and as he is not able to be here this afternoon he asked me to move it.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on having picked up this point so well from her noble friend Lord Lester. I congratulate him too on putting down this amendment. I hope he will forgive me in his absence for describing him in this instance as a dog with a bone. He has come back to this issue today after first raising it following the judgment in the case that the noble Baroness referred to when the previous Government were in power. He did that in the course of a couple of Bills. At that stage Ministers, including me, I have to admit, had to tell the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that consultations would take place with the police.
There is undoubtedly a point here—the noble Baroness has described it very well. This particular section of the 2003 Act was clearly intended as some sort of response to the Martin case and the Act’s purpose was really intended, or so it said, for other citizens as opposed to the police. There is some sort of at least theoretical clash, as Lord Justice Sedley pointed out in the instant case, between the position of police officers and others on arrests, so it does require an answer from Government.
We said on 25 February 2010—it was me, I am afraid to say—that the consultation that we had said would take place had not taken place by that date. But of course the noble Baroness will know that her Government have now been in power for a good 13 months now—it is 15 or 16 months since I uttered those words—and I am quite sure this consultation will have taken place regardless of government. I therefore look forward to hearing her response to this small but quite important point about the 2003 Act. I presume the consultation has taken place and the Government will be able to tell us what they intend to do about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lester.
My Lords, it falls to me to answer this debate. I have to say that I am not fully briefed on whether or not the consultation has taken place. I suspect there was a little bit of irony there from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and his confidence that this will automatically take place regardless of changes in government, but I will write to him to inform him about how far it has got.
We are talking of course about Section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The intention was to benefit victims of crime, together with third parties who are not the direct victim of the offence but who may have intervened to protect the victim or deter the criminal. We are aware that it has so far been invoked only in respect of damages claims by police rather than by others who have sought to rely on the provisions as a defence in a number of cases. As noble Lords have mentioned, Lord Justice Sedley, in the case of Adorian v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, made a number of criticisms.
Section 329 of the 2003 Act is not a licence for the police to use disproportionate force as under the criminal law. The police can use only reasonable force. Neither does the section affect the criminal liability of householders, victims and others. Let us also keep in mind that the section applies only when the offender has been convicted of an imprisonable offence committed on the same occasion as the incident he is now suing for.
With these points in mind, this amendment raises a number of issues. First, is it fair and reasonable under general law to treat a person who holds the office of constable less advantageously than any other member of the public? Secondly, we should be very clear on what the practical consequences will be before making an amendment which would result in making it easier for a convicted offender to sue the police for damages. Thirdly, we need to be a little clearer on how this amendment might work, given that the powers of constables apply 24 hours a day, seven days a week. An off-duty constable who exercises this power to arrest a suspect found breaking into his own private dwelling or a neighbour’s dwelling would still be acting in the course of his or her duty. We also need to consider how the amendment would apply to special constables or others who are lawfully employed to prevent crime.
We note the thrust of the comments in the Adorian case and that the application of Section 329 to the police was not expressly discussed in Hansard at the time that that legislation was passing through Parliament. However, we are currently unconvinced that for the police to invoke Section 329 is really an unintended consequence of that section. Arguably, the police are the people most likely to rely on a provision which restricts liability towards a person who is committing a criminal offence at the time. The reference in Section 329(5)(b) to the defendant believing that his act was necessary to,
“apprehend, or secure the conviction, of the claimant after he had committed an offence”,
might suggest that it was not so very far from Parliament’s contemplation that the police could seek to invoke this provision. But what matters is whether it is right, fair and proportionate for this protection to apply to constables.
I am afraid that as yet we remain unconvinced that the provisions in Section 329 are not right, fair and proportionate in their application to the police. Therefore, we remain unconvinced that they require amendment as the noble Lord suggests. In particular, we cannot see any reason why the civil liability of a victim and a constable who act jointly on the same occasion, or act as individuals on separate occasions, to resist and detain the convicted offender should not be subject to the same threshold.
Nevertheless, as this amendment raises important issues relating to the role and powers of the police, and given that the noble Lord has been patiently pursuing this matter for some time, I can give the noble Lord and the noble Baroness on his behalf the assurance that this Government, while bearing in mind other government priorities, will take one final look at this matter before the next stage. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend may be a dog with a bone, but he is quite a pedigree sort of dog. Clearly, the noble Lord as an outgoing Minister did not leave a letter on his desk for his successor, so we have no amendments.
My noble friend has made a number of detailed points on the amendment, which I understand. I am prepared now to undergo a seminar by my noble friend when he has read Hansard but the important point is that the Government have acknowledged that this amendment is deserving of some thought. I am grateful for that and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 244, which unashamedly originates in Wales. Its aim is to make sure that “Licensed Premises Cumulative Impact (saturation) Policies” for local authorities have teeth and apply to off-licence premises, because at the moment they do not. The problem is the rise in alcohol consumption, in particular in our city centres, to which supermarkets have greatly contributed, with cheap alcohol often being a loss leader with price promotions. Young people buy alcohol to preload before going out, so they get intoxicated even before the beginning of the evening. They then tank up again on more alcohol from these outlets, because it is far cheaper than buying it on licensed premises. The problem is what to do in our city centres. The cumulative impact saturation policies do not have statutory status; they are only guidelines, so they are not enforceable and they are easily overturned by a legal challenge from retailers. I spoke about this at Second Reading and will not go through the argument again. However, the size of the problem in city centres warrants being addressed briefly.
We know that 60 per cent of liver disease is caused by alcohol abuse. Thirty years ago, that was seen in chronic alcoholics. Now it is seen in young drinkers who kill themselves with acute pancreatitis and liver failure. Individual human tragedies are known to everyone in the NHS: the student deformed for life, the student who falls under a train, the child burnt because somebody has got intoxicated and set fire to their home, or the 14 year-old who gets drunk and pregnant at a party. We have seen them all, and there is an increasing catalogue of these disasters. The other problem is the litter and environmental damage caused by alcohol misuse. Let us not forget that Damilola Taylor was killed not with a knife but with a supermarket lager bottle that had been left in the street.
In the UK, average consumption is now a staggering 9.7 litres of neat ethanol for every man aged 45 to 64. Sadly, women are rapidly catching up, with a 30 per cent rise in the incidence of heavy drinking in the past decade. In Cardiff city centre recently, a study asked people to be voluntarily breathalysed. One in three of the men and one in six of the women had damaging blood alcohol levels. The high-risk drinking patterns are concentrated particularly in ex-industrial heartlands such as the north-east, Humber and Yorkshire, and my own home, south Wales. Alcohol misuse accounted for 1,000 deaths in Wales in 2009, and the harm costs £1 billion annually—equivalent to £770 per Welsh household. Our trends in the UK are going in the opposite direction to those of many other countries. We have a rising incidence of liver disease deaths, but in France and Italy it is falling. Consumption by teenagers in England has overtaken that of teenagers in Spain and Italy.
The amendment would introduce a provision that “Licensed Premises Cumulative Impact (saturation) Policies” should include supermarkets and other off-licence premises. It will make it clear that they are included, with the result that managers of supermarkets and other off-licence premises will not be able to argue, as they have to date, that they are not included. It will also remove the current discrimination against licensed premises such as pubs produced by the current lack of clarity. Giving the impact policy statutory status would also allow revision and monitoring of the decisions taken.
The final part of the amendment includes a provision to ban the sale of alcohol in petrol station outlets. I have had representations about this and I recognise that in these outlets, drink is often purchased to consume later, and there is no evidence of a direct link between alcohol bought on those premises and drink-driving—although it appears to give a slightly inconsistent public message in relation to driving and alcohol. However, selling alcohol sometimes makes these outlets viable. I accept that this amendment is not perfect, and it may well be that it warrants refining in relation to that last part.
However, the other parts are important because it will finally allow local authorities to take decisions, empower the voice of people at a local level and make sure that those decisions are not challenged, as happened with Sainsbury’s in Cardiff by very highly paid barristers coming down from London with their managers and effectively driving a coach and horses through the guidance because it could not be enforced as it did not have statutory standing. It would also demonstrate consistency in those areas that are particularly bad hot spots of alcohol consumption, violence and crime, which are known to the local authorities in that area and would avoid inappropriately penalising rural areas where the sale of alcohol has to be managed in a different way. I commend the amendment to the House.
My Lords, my noble friend will speak to the substance of the amendments, but noble Lords may have noticed a minor flurry on these Benches when I went out to check whether there had been a reissue of the groupings and to see if I could find out just what was happening. We were not aware of the degrouping—that became clear before—nor of the grouping of the amendment to which the noble Baroness has just spoken with this amendment. I simply make a plea that if there are any further changes to the groupings in the list we are working to, noble Lords will use the informal arrangements of the House to make sure that we all end up speaking to the same group. That was in no way directed at the noble Baroness, who may have thought that this had all been sorted.
My Lords, I apologise to the Committee. I was part of the discussions, but I did not double-check that everybody knew. I apologise to the Benches opposite.
My Lords, my understanding of the background to the change in wording brought in by the Government is a little different from that of my noble friend Lord Astor, although closer to that of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. My understanding is that it has proved to be difficult and costly for some licensing authorities to prove, on challenge in the courts by applicants, that such-and-such a condition or restriction to the licence was necessary to promote the licensing objectives. In the face of strong legal challenges by trade interests with deeper pockets than local authorities, particularly in these parlous times, some authorities have backed down. I am glad to say that Westminster City Council is a praiseworthy exception.
It is difficult for a local authority to prove that some restriction is “necessary” in advance of a licence being granted, even if on the basis of probability it would be sensible to do so. My reading is that the Government have effectively decided to reduce the burden of proof so that a licensing authority would in future have to prove only that a particular measure is appropriate to promoting the licensing objectives, as the Bill states. Members of my former constituency in Soho and Covent Garden certainly think that the Government’s proposals are sensible and should stand.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Shipley and I have not necessarily taken the same view on this part of the Bill as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. If I may put it crudely, we start from the localist rather than the business position, but I deliberately said on Second Reading that I thought that local authorities have responsibilities to businesses in the area as well as to residents. However, we are both sympathetic to these amendments—except, perhaps, for one of them.
The issue has been cast as a subjective versus objective test. Can the Minister say whether, on either or both “appropriate” or “necessary”, the term “reasonably” would be implied? That might help us to see the position as a little less polarised. My noble friend Lord Shipley, with his local government experience, reminds me that it could be difficult for the licensing authority to administer what is appropriate. That could be much more difficult to assess.
I depart from my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones on one amendment: Amendment 240P. I can see an argument for using the appropriateness test for making the new early morning alcohol restriction orders. We are talking about something a little different there, but I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
My Lords, I have added my name to those who have given notice to oppose the question that Clause 110 stand part. I do so as a way of probing the intentions of the Government. We will have to see what the Government have to say in deciding what view we take on Report.
I start from a position of supporting a rigorous approach to licensing. In this area, it is right that we have a rigorous approach. Equally, it is important that those bodies and individuals who apply for licences are clear what is required to be done under the law. My concern at the moment is that the arguments for changing the law as the Bill suggests do not seem to have been supported by the publication of policy, or anything more than the anecdotal evidence referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in discussion in another place. If it is true that the LGA is concerned about the changes—I can imagine the uncertainties that they bring to local authorities—there is a problem here. I invite the noble Baroness, between now and Report, if she cannot do so today, to set out the evidence that supports the change in the policy. If she could do that, we could come back on Report and have a more thorough debate.
My Lords, this is a device to elicit from the Government their motives for introducing a barrage of new provisions relating to temporary event notices. We seem to be building up a parallel system through the TENs system. It has worked extremely well. The notices are used extensively by community groups. They are not intended for commercial purposes, but are used for community events, village fetes, charity fundraising events and so on. It would be extremely interesting to hear from the Government why they feel that it is necessary to introduce so many new elements into the TENs system.
It was always designed as a form of flexible licensing for community groups. What is now happening under the various clauses relating to temporary event notices is that we are adding environmental health to the scrutiny process and are adding cost to the regime for local government as well. I do not know whether it is because the Government feel that TENs are being used by commercial operators, but the evidence given to me—I think, in particular, that increased hours during the new year celebrations was cited by the Government in their response to their consultation—has not painted that picture about how they are used. Ironically, it is likely that in any event there will be greater reliance if premises are caught by the late-night levy. There will be a greater use of TENs by commercial premises in those circumstances.
What is the justification for all these changes? What seems particularly odd is this extension: the change from a duration of 96 hours to one of 168 hours under Clause 116 and the increase in the number days from 15 to 21. If anything, one is making them more available for commercial purposes. We are changing from a temporary type of licensing to something much more permanent as far as I can see, so we have a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now we will have more conditions, and if there are going to be conditions, they should be standard conditions, so I have some sympathy with the amendments that follow in this group. I look forward to hearing from the Minister why we have to have more objectives, more bureaucracy and an extension of TENs as a concept in these circumstances. I beg to move.
My Lords, I do not think my noble friend is moving that the clause stands part of the Bill. I have Amendments 240C, 240E, 240F, 240G, 240H, 240J and 240K in this group. My noble friend mentioned parallel provisions. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I have managed a degree of parallelism which probably adds to the confusion, but I think we are heading in the same direction.
In response to my noble friend, I say first that when we get to some amendments later on the subject of New Year’s Eve, I have a lot of sympathy for them. As I understand it, temporary event notices or TENs—I have always known that word in a completely different context—have grown in number far more than was anticipated. Almost 125,000 were used in the financial year to March 2010. They were introduced as a means of minimising the regulatory burden on small, ad hoc events, as my noble friend said, but they have grown somewhat. The Bill proposes that only following a representation from the police or environmental health will licensing authorities be able to insist that relevant conditions from the licence also apply for the duration of the temporary event notice and that regulations will stipulate the process, format and timescales for notifying applicants of the conditions.
I was glad to hear my noble friend’s comment about standard conditions. We know the view of the Local Government Association on this matter. It has briefed noble Lords that a more transparent and less burdensome approach would be for all existing premises licence conditions to apply automatically, apart from those that will be altered by a temporary event notice, such as hours. Licensing authorities should be given the ability to add appropriate conditions to a temporary event notice. Currently, there is no mechanism for adding controls in unlicensed premises. During the Commons stages, the Government responded that TENs would increase bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is not always a bad thing. Some bureaucracy is necessary. Giving authorities an effective tool would give them greater, but not disproportionate, control. Standard conditions would actually reduce bureaucracy.
Secondly, on the time allowance for temporary event notices, I share the LGA’s concern about the extension of the duration to seven days from the current four. Seven days seems to me to be qualitatively different from four. The Bill does not introduce a mechanism whereby unlicensed premises can be conditioned when using a temporary event notice, and the LGA is concerned about the scenario of periods of up to seven days with no conditions on things like closing times, door staff and so on. There would be a qualitative difference, and I think this extension would go too far.
My Lords, may I in parallel—if that is a word—follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and not for the first time in this Bill? I am very puzzled because the argument the Government have used in relation to this clause about increasing bureaucracy and their concerns about it seem to contrast with their approach to Clauses 113 and 114. There does not seem to be a consistent approach here. I do not understand why the proposals that the noble Baroness has talked about would increase bureaucracy. I would have thought they would be more straightforward. The Bill proposes, in relation to a TEN, that only following representation from the police or environmental health will licensing authorities be able to insist that relevant conditions from the licence ought to apply for the duration of the TEN. Surely a more transparent and less burdensome approach would be for all existing premise licence conditions to apply automatically, apart from those to be altered by the TEN. I do not understand why the Government are taking this approach.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I do not understand the extension from four days to seven days. We heard from the Minister when we debated earlier clauses why the Government think there has to be extra vigour in the licensing process. Why, when we come to temporary events, has it suddenly been loosened up and the four-day limit extended to seven days? I would have thought that extending to seven days changes the circumstances. I would have thought it likely to lead to contentious, more costly disputes between operators, police and local authorities, and certainly on the part of the general public. The clauses are very close to each other. It seems they have been drafted by different bits of the Home Office, and they are wholly inconsistent.
I am grateful to my noble friend. Because of the noise factor, we are allowing environmental health departments to take powers with regard to these things. As I mentioned, environmental health officers will have more authority than they had under previous legislation. I should have thought he would quite like a week-long music festival on his doorstep, but perhaps not. However, if he is concerned about the effect of noise on residents, he can contact the environmental health office, which can object on noise grounds. If, as a local resident, my noble friend felt that he needed to make that point to his local environmental health department, it would have the new power to object.
My Lords, in a less regulated world, I wonder if the Minister can help me. The proposals for standard conditions would allow but not require licensing authorities to prescribe standard conditions. To my mind, those conditions would be the basis on which one would build conditions appropriate to the event. Do the Government object to a licensing authority having the power to set up its own standard conditions, which I would have thought would be quite helpful for prospective licensees? They would then know what they might be subject to. Can she also tell me how this aligns with the provisions in the Localism Bill? I am sorry that we keep throwing this at the Minister. It is inevitable since the Bills are running concurrently and a number of us are looking at both of them. I can stop talking because the Minister probably has an answer by now. Again, my question is that where local authorities are to have a power of general competence, I do not quite see how these things will work together.
My Lords, I am pleased to say that I already have the answer. I can tell my noble friend that the conditions must be tailored, which I hope meets some of her concerns. However, I will have to write to my noble friend so far as the Localism Bill is concerned. I am not familiar enough with that Bill to be able to make a comparison of how it interposes with this legislation, but I will find out for her.