Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Bach
Main Page: Lord Bach (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bach's debates with the Home Office
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg to move Amendment 233A on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill. Reference has just been made to experts. I am not as expert as my noble friend, and I may get into trouble because I am not going to use all the briefing that he has given me.
Amendment 233A would exclude from Section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 a constable in the course of his duty. That section is what noble Lords might know as the Tony Martin defence. It was enacted in response to the case of Tony Martin, who shot two intruders in his home thinking they were attempting a burglary. It provides that the court must give permission for an offender to bring a civil suit for an assault committed at the time and in the circumstances that the offender committed the act for which he was convicted. It provides the defendant with a defence to such proceedings provided that his action was not grossly disproportionate. The defendant must believe the offender was about to commit an offence, was in the course of committing one or had committed one and that his actions were necessary to defend himself or someone else, to protect or recover property, to prevent or stop the offence or to catch and secure the conviction of the offender.
At the time that the section was being debated, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland of Asthal, said that the section,
“would strengthen the civil law to improve protection for victims of crime against civil claims for damages by offenders”.
She also said:
“It benefits third parties who are not the direct victim of the offence, but who may have intervened to protect the victim or deter the criminal”.—[Official Report, 11/11/03; cols. 1307-08.]
That was the only indication of the intended use of the section by those who are not direct victims of the crime.
In 2009, there was a case in the Court of Appeal: Anthony Adorian v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. In his judgment, Lord Justice Sedley said:
“There is nothing on the face of the section or in its shoulder-note which manifests an intention to afford the police a novel protection from claims by offenders for objectively unreasonable or unnecessarily violent arrests”.
Only police defendants have invoked this section. Lord Justice Sedley went on to say:
“The consequences should not go unnoticed. In place of the principle painstakingly established in the course of two centuries and more, and fundamental to the civil rights enjoyed by the people of this country—that an arrest must be objectively justified and that no more force may be used in effecting it than is reasonably necessary—the section gives immunity from civil suits, not confined to those involving personal injury, to constables who make arrests on entirely unreasonable grounds, so long as they are not acting in bad faith, and accords them impunity for using all but grossly disproportionate force in so doing”.
In summary, Section 329 has only ever been used by the police, and my noble friend tells me that it has led to a mismatch between civil and criminal proceedings with no equality of arms between police and private individuals. The current position does not recognise that the police are public officers of the state endowed with special powers and that as a corollary they have special obligations that Section 329 allows them to circumvent. My noble friend says that ordinary people may be given some leeway for honest and instinct overreactions when protecting or defending themselves or another from a crime but, on the other hand, a police officer trained in the use of force must be required to justify his or her actions objectively and to use no more force than is reasonably necessary.
I had not appreciated until listening to the previous debate how neatly this followed on in some ways. My noble friend Lord Lester has tabled this amendment and as he is not able to be here this afternoon he asked me to move it.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on having picked up this point so well from her noble friend Lord Lester. I congratulate him too on putting down this amendment. I hope he will forgive me in his absence for describing him in this instance as a dog with a bone. He has come back to this issue today after first raising it following the judgment in the case that the noble Baroness referred to when the previous Government were in power. He did that in the course of a couple of Bills. At that stage Ministers, including me, I have to admit, had to tell the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that consultations would take place with the police.
There is undoubtedly a point here—the noble Baroness has described it very well. This particular section of the 2003 Act was clearly intended as some sort of response to the Martin case and the Act’s purpose was really intended, or so it said, for other citizens as opposed to the police. There is some sort of at least theoretical clash, as Lord Justice Sedley pointed out in the instant case, between the position of police officers and others on arrests, so it does require an answer from Government.
We said on 25 February 2010—it was me, I am afraid to say—that the consultation that we had said would take place had not taken place by that date. But of course the noble Baroness will know that her Government have now been in power for a good 13 months now—it is 15 or 16 months since I uttered those words—and I am quite sure this consultation will have taken place regardless of government. I therefore look forward to hearing her response to this small but quite important point about the 2003 Act. I presume the consultation has taken place and the Government will be able to tell us what they intend to do about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lester.
My Lords, it falls to me to answer this debate. I have to say that I am not fully briefed on whether or not the consultation has taken place. I suspect there was a little bit of irony there from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and his confidence that this will automatically take place regardless of changes in government, but I will write to him to inform him about how far it has got.
We are talking of course about Section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The intention was to benefit victims of crime, together with third parties who are not the direct victim of the offence but who may have intervened to protect the victim or deter the criminal. We are aware that it has so far been invoked only in respect of damages claims by police rather than by others who have sought to rely on the provisions as a defence in a number of cases. As noble Lords have mentioned, Lord Justice Sedley, in the case of Adorian v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, made a number of criticisms.
Section 329 of the 2003 Act is not a licence for the police to use disproportionate force as under the criminal law. The police can use only reasonable force. Neither does the section affect the criminal liability of householders, victims and others. Let us also keep in mind that the section applies only when the offender has been convicted of an imprisonable offence committed on the same occasion as the incident he is now suing for.
With these points in mind, this amendment raises a number of issues. First, is it fair and reasonable under general law to treat a person who holds the office of constable less advantageously than any other member of the public? Secondly, we should be very clear on what the practical consequences will be before making an amendment which would result in making it easier for a convicted offender to sue the police for damages. Thirdly, we need to be a little clearer on how this amendment might work, given that the powers of constables apply 24 hours a day, seven days a week. An off-duty constable who exercises this power to arrest a suspect found breaking into his own private dwelling or a neighbour’s dwelling would still be acting in the course of his or her duty. We also need to consider how the amendment would apply to special constables or others who are lawfully employed to prevent crime.
We note the thrust of the comments in the Adorian case and that the application of Section 329 to the police was not expressly discussed in Hansard at the time that that legislation was passing through Parliament. However, we are currently unconvinced that for the police to invoke Section 329 is really an unintended consequence of that section. Arguably, the police are the people most likely to rely on a provision which restricts liability towards a person who is committing a criminal offence at the time. The reference in Section 329(5)(b) to the defendant believing that his act was necessary to,
“apprehend, or secure the conviction, of the claimant after he had committed an offence”,
might suggest that it was not so very far from Parliament’s contemplation that the police could seek to invoke this provision. But what matters is whether it is right, fair and proportionate for this protection to apply to constables.
I am afraid that as yet we remain unconvinced that the provisions in Section 329 are not right, fair and proportionate in their application to the police. Therefore, we remain unconvinced that they require amendment as the noble Lord suggests. In particular, we cannot see any reason why the civil liability of a victim and a constable who act jointly on the same occasion, or act as individuals on separate occasions, to resist and detain the convicted offender should not be subject to the same threshold.
Nevertheless, as this amendment raises important issues relating to the role and powers of the police, and given that the noble Lord has been patiently pursuing this matter for some time, I can give the noble Lord and the noble Baroness on his behalf the assurance that this Government, while bearing in mind other government priorities, will take one final look at this matter before the next stage. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend may be a dog with a bone, but he is quite a pedigree sort of dog. Clearly, the noble Lord as an outgoing Minister did not leave a letter on his desk for his successor, so we have no amendments.
My noble friend has made a number of detailed points on the amendment, which I understand. I am prepared now to undergo a seminar by my noble friend when he has read Hansard but the important point is that the Government have acknowledged that this amendment is deserving of some thought. I am grateful for that and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.