Police: Misconduct and Corruption

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Tuesday 15th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a number of points. First, I make it clear that this is not just a matter for the coalition Government; it is a matter that goes back to the 2002 Act which brought in the IPCC. I think all sides of this House agree that there should be an Independent Police Complaints Commission and that it should be independent. It can be independent of government only if government cannot intervene. It would be quite wrong for my right honourable friend the Home Secretary to intervene in individual cases. It would surely undermine the IPCC’s independence if she tried to second-guess its decisions. The noble Lord went on to mention two cases. Gary McKinnon has nothing to do with any allegations of police corruption because his case is purely about extradition. The case of the Hofschroer family is, as the noble Lord knows, a matter that has gone to the IPCC. It is a matter for it to produce its decision and if those involved in that case do not like that decision, they can then take the appropriate action in the courts.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, the revelations that senior Metropolitan Police officers accepted inappropriate hospitality have led to the Met setting up a monthly register that now lists all gifts and hospitality that police officers have accepted. Do the Government agree that all police forces should be required to set up such a register and to publish it monthly?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I welcome what the Met has done. I think it is something that other police forces should consider doing, but that is a matter for them to consider. As I said in response to the original Question and the first supplementary, I believe that complaints should be dealt with in the manner that they are; that is initially by the police and then, in more serious cases, by the IPCC. I do not see a case for the Home Secretary intervening.

Police: Vehicles

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Wednesday 14th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the noble Lord refers to his time in government. I was trying to make clear in my original Answer that there have been considerable changes since then. That is why we have brought in the framework, which brings in co-ordination of a great deal of procurement across all police forces that we believe will save something of the order of £350 million a year. This is money that we need to save.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, do the Government agree that there is no justification for the Metropolitan Police keeping 32 luxury cars not for security purposes but to chauffeur senior officers to and from their homes?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, obviously I cannot comment on decisions made by the Metropolitan Police Authority —that is a matter for the mayor’s office. If it is spending money inadvisably, I hope that it would look carefully at the circumstances in which it could possibly save money in the future.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Tuesday 6th December 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

74: Clause 79, page 70, line 38, at end insert—
“(3) In section 113B of the Police Act 1997, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) Prescribed purposes under subsection (2)(b) include licensing authorities determining the fitness of—
(a) taxi drivers to be licensed in London under section 8 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 and paragraph 25 of the London Cab Order 1934;(b) private hire vehicle drivers to be licensed in London under section 13(2)(a) of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998;(c) taxi drivers to be licensed outside London under section 47 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 and section 59(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976; and(d) private hire vehicle drivers to be licensed outside London under section 51(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976.””

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that licensing authorities have access to information disclosed in enhanced criminal records checks, for the purpose of licensing the drivers of taxis and private hire vehicles. I declare an interest as a Member of the London Assembly.

Local licensing authorities must determine whether an applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a licence or whether public safety would be compromised by issuing a licence to a particular individual. Licensed taxis and minicabs provide a vital service in many parts of the country. Both are crucial to the vibrancy and sustainability of the night-time economy. They are particularly important late at night, as other services wind down or become less frequent, but there can be risks. This is why Transport for London, which is responsible for licensing in London, has launched a “Safer Travel at Night” campaign, which stresses the importance of using a licensed taxi or minicab and warns that using an unlicensed car is the same as getting into a stranger’s car.

Anyone who uses a taxi or minicab is effectively putting their faith in the checks that the licensing authority has made into the background of their drivers. Department for Transport figures suggest that women aged 16 to 20 undertake the greatest number of trips in taxis and private hire vehicles. These women would not fall into the legal definition of a vulnerable adult, but they are vulnerable when they get into a taxi or a licensed minicab late at night, particularly if they have been drinking. To ensure the public's confidence in licensing, authorities rely heavily on the information disclosed in an enhanced criminal records check. This provides the authority with valuable information relating to offences and so-called soft intelligence on the interaction between applicants and the police or the judicial system that is not available under a lower level of disclosure. It allows the authority to consider information on the balance of probabilities and to look for patterns of behaviour, which is very important. In some instances, there may never have been any convictions or cautions. However, the additional information provided through an enhanced disclosure can often show a pattern of behaviour that raises alarm bells with the police force and/or the licensing authority.

Earlier this year, licensing authorities were informed by the Criminal Records Bureau that enhanced criminal records checks should no longer be sought for taxi and private hire drivers unless they transported children or vulnerable adults under a contract. That move by the Criminal Records Bureau would end a system that has operated well for the past 10 years in which authorities have been able to base their decisions on information from an enhanced disclosure. In London, approximately 10 per cent of applications for a licence were turned down in that period on the basis of something picked up from the enhanced disclosure. In London alone, that amounted to at least 240 licences annually that were not issued on the grounds of public safety.

The bodies representing the taxi trade recognise the importance of the information provided by an enhanced disclosure to the reputation of their members. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust and London TravelWatch both agree with licensing authorities that the information in enhanced disclosures is crucial to ensuring public safety. This amendment would address their concerns by amending Clause 79 to add at the end a subsection inserting in the Police Act 1997, as amended, a clarification that the prescribed purposes for which an enhanced criminal record check can be sought include the licensing of taxi and private hire vehicles in London and by other licensing authorities in England and Wales. I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness in her amendment. It seems extraordinary that taxi companies are going to have to desist from requiring enhanced disclosures. I completely agree with her point that it is not just children and vulnerable adults at risk; many young women, especially when they have had a drink, are extremely vulnerable. I fully support the noble Baroness.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

Anyway, my Lords, I express my gratitude to my noble friend for moving this amendment. She is seeking to amend the Police Act 1997 to make taxi and private hire vehicle drivers eligible for the enhanced criminal record checks. The legislation currently provides that, in the majority of cases, they are eligible for only standard criminal record checks. I assure my noble friend that we have had representations on this issue from the Mayor of London and Transport for London, and at this stage we are actively considering whether a change in the law is needed. In examining this issue, our priority obviously will be to ensure the safety of the travelling public. Further, we hope to come to a decision on this issue very soon indeed—certainly in advance of Report. I undertake to write to my noble friend and, on this occasion, to all other noble Lords who have taken part in this debate when an announcement is made.

I also offer an assurance on one small technical point. Were we to conclude that it was appropriate that all taxi drivers and private hire vehicle drivers should be eligible for that enhanced criminal record check, we could effect that approach through secondary legislation. On this occasion, primary legislation would not be needed as we could do that under the Police Act 1997. Briefly, I say to my noble friend that we are alive to this issue and intend to come to a very early decision that will certainly be before Report, which we have worked out is not likely to be before the beginning of February. I hope, therefore, that on this occasion my noble friend can withdraw her amendment and await that sympathetic letter, which she will get in due course.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that sympathetic response and I look forward to receiving the letter. I hope that this can be sorted out because it is a very serious matter. Most parents, in my experience, say to their young children, “Whatever you do, make sure that you get into a licensed taxi or a licensed minicab so that you will be safe”. I am sure we all want to make sure that it is kept that way. With that assurance from the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 74 withdrawn.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

23: Schedule 1, page 102, line 23, at end insert “and subsequently arrested for an offence directly related to the reasons for detention”

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 23, I shall speak also to Amendment 41. Both amendments deal with the collection of DNA under the Terrorism Act 2000 and the governance surrounding the storage of that DNA. I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority.

Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act, the police have considerable power and may act “whether or not” they have “grounds for suspecting”. They may also, under Schedule 7, take DNA and fingerprint samples from suspects, although the proportion of cases where this occurs is rather small. However, there remains a need for clarity and transparency in relation to this biometric information, its storage, and the governance surrounding it.

The Bill limits to six months the retention of DNA profiles taken as a result of Schedule 7 examinations. This is a great improvement on indefinite retention, but it is still contentious to retain such profiles at all, bearing in mind the nature of the power under which they were first obtained. The six-month period is recognition of the time required to obtain a DNA profile and carry out the necessary checks to identify whether or not an individual poses a threat and then for a national security determination application to be made, which, if approved, would allow for a further two-year retention but on a renewable basis.

Therefore, in theory, a DNA sample obtained from an individual who has never been convicted of a crime can be retained by the police indefinitely. Amendment 23 would redress this balance by ensuring that whenever DNA is taken, the same governance rules apply, whereby the data are not retained if the person is subsequently not arrested.

Amendment 41 deals with the governance of all databases where DNA material is held—not just the DNA database. The Bill would strengthen the oversight and governance of the National DNA Database, but these rules should apply also in respect of all databases, including the counterterrorism DNA database. This would be in line with the findings of the 2011 Annual report of The Ethics Group: National DNA Database, which concluded:

“All databases containing DNA information including the counter terrorism database held by the police service should be subject to a robust statutory governance framework, appropriate systems and controls, and should be transparent and only be used for statutory purposes”.

This was accepted by the National DNA Database Strategy Board.

The Bill limits to six months the retention of DNA profiles taken as a result of Schedule 7, but there must be clarity in terms of where such profiles and the physical samples are retained. The National DNA Database retains all profiles obtained as a result of individuals being arrested for a recordable offence. However, if only certain DNA profiles obtained from a Schedule 7 examination, which are not recordable, are retained on the separate counterterrorism DNA database, we need clarity about where the remaining profiles are retained and, more importantly, who has access to them. We cannot have a system where DNA profiles from individuals not convicted of any crime are not stored and managed with the same safeguards as DNA obtained from an individual as a result of an arrest.

There are certain elements of governance that need to be observed for the counterterrorism DNA databases, including scientific standards, ethical oversight and meeting the Data Protection Act requirements. Amendment 41 would ensure that suitable governance arrangements are in place for all DNA samples and profiles that are retained by the police. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, forgive my intervening at this stage. I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. From what I heard of his response, I think that I would agree with him that her amendments should not be pressed, but I imagine that they are probing amendments.

As I mentioned earlier this afternoon, I intend to bring forward amendments on Report relating both to a period during which evidence can be collected before the Government’s proposals were introduced and to the period for which DNA samples and fingerprints could be retained—for six years rather than three years. If my amendments are accepted, a consequential amendment will be required to subsection (6) proposed in government Amendment 28, but that is for a later stage. For the moment, I am content to accept the noble Lord’s amendments.

[Baroness Doocey]

I thank my noble friend for the clear way in which he addressed my concerns. I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that as soon as he got to his feet, I thought to myself, “I hope I will never get to court and meet someone like him”, because I think I would just throw my hands up in horror and plead guilty, regardless of how innocent I was. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

39: Clause 21, page 16, line 17, at end insert—
“( ) The Commissioner must make a report to the Secretary of State about the impact of the retention periods for fingerprints and DNA profiles on the police service, in particular, the estimated cost of processing samples on an individual basis.
( ) Such a report must be made within six months of this section coming into force.”

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, the Bill will place a large administrative and financial burden on all police forces. I believe that we need to monitor the impact of this, particularly in the current climate, when police budgets are under threat and facing severe cuts.

Each DNA profile and sample will need to be processed individually to ensure that they are deleted within the correct time parameters. Furthermore, this process must take into account any subsequent reoffending by the individual, as well as an application for extended retention.

The Metropolitan Police estimates that implementing the Bill will entail a one-off cost of £2.5 million, with ongoing costs of nearly half a million pounds a year. That is a huge sum of money when you consider how tight budgets are going to be, and it could pay for 10 police officers per year. Amendment 39 would ensure that the impact on the police service of the retention periods for fingerprints and DNA profiles and, in particular, the estimated costs of processing samples on an individual basis were reported back to Parliament.

An operational risk is also inherent in the complexity of the retention regime. While the Bill will in theory put in place mechanisms to ensure that DNA data are deleted at the right time, no system is perfect. If, as could well occur with the volumes involved, the deletion process were out of sync and not carried out at the appropriate time, DNA profiles which should have been deleted could remain on the database. If these profiles were then to be matched with the DNA from a crime scene or the victim of a serious crime, this evidence could not be used, since by law the profile should not have been there in the first place as it should not have been retained.

That is what happened in two cases, both of which necessitated changes to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In both, a DNA match was obtained but their profiles should already have been deleted from the DNA database. In the first case, which concerned a rape, the judge refused to admit the evidence and the prosecution was abandoned, and in the other case a conviction for murder was quashed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the DNA evidence should not have been admitted. The House of Lords subsequently ruled that it should be left to the discretion of the trial judge as to whether evidence in these circumstances should be admitted. We would not want history to repeat itself.

We therefore need some form of reassurance that we will not be put in the invidious position of perhaps identifying another rapist or a murderer but not being able to use the DNA match in evidence. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Does a case collapse just because one bit of evidence is not quite right? I cannot believe that that one bit of evidence would be the only thing to bring about a conviction, in which case why on earth do we let people off? That seems quite dotty to me, as a lay man, unless the whole thing hinged on that one bit of evidence, in which case there could be some ambiguity about it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

Of course questions from my noble friend are not criticisms. I hope that I answer them as well as I am able to do.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, which goes some way to reassure me but I still have major concerns, particularly about the financial implications on the Met. I would like to address these and the other issues that I raised perhaps outside the Chamber. At this stage, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 39 withdrawn.

Human Trafficking (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill [HL]

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Friday 25th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, for introducing this Bill, which proposes some significant changes and much needed improvements on the current system. Clause 9, which provides for the appointment of a legal advocate for child victims of human trafficking, is sensible and in line with the ECPAT proposals. It would also fulfil the UK’s obligations as a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. I should like to focus my remarks on the problem of the international trafficking of children through our airports, ports and railway stations. I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority.

An unfortunate side-effect of the globalisation of the economy is the globalisation of crime. The trafficking of people into slavery, although reprehensible, is nothing new and has been going on in one form or another for many centuries. But the increasing ease of international travel has brought fresh challenges and the law must keep up with these changes because the current system is not adequately equipped to deal with the problem. The greatest challenge is the large number of children brought into Britain as domestic slaves. The number of unaccompanied children entering Heathrow Airport gives some indication of the scale of the problem.

Some years ago, the Metropolitan Police and the UK Border Agency jointly set up a pilot project at Heathrow called Operation Paladin Child. In just three months, it found that 1,800 unaccompanied children came through the airport. Of these, it judged that 600 were vulnerable and almost half were under the age of 11.

Children are trafficked for a variety of reasons. Many are put to work as domestic slaves or childminders. Some, like Oliver Twist, are forced into street crime. Others are used for benefit fraud and, when they come of age, many are sexually exploited. Criminal gangs make very big money out of children. The Metropolitan Police estimates that each child forced into street crime makes £100,000 a year for their gangmasters. Benefit fraud is also hugely profitable, particularly the widespread practice of passing one baby from one gang to another so that gang members posing as the child’s relatives can make multiple benefit claims in many different parts of the country. Often, the children’s parents are tricked into sending them to the UK with a promise of a good education but, instead, their children are condemned to a life of slavery. Perhaps the most notorious case is that of Victoria Climbié, who was brought into Britain by her aunt to be used for benefit fraud.

Let me give two examples of the pain and suffering that these children often endure. A 14 year-old boy from South Africa was smuggled here on a containership with a number of other boys. By day, they were locked into the containers; by night, they were taken out and gang-raped by the crew. When the ship docked in the UK, one of the boys was put to work in a London factory by his uncle. After a while, he could not cope with it much longer. When he complained, his uncle showed him a photograph of his mother, dead from gunshot wounds, and gave him a choice: he could either continue to work in the factory or he would receive another photograph of the rest of his family who would suffer the same fate.

My second example is an eastern European woman accompanied by three children who was stopped at a regional airport in the UK. After much questioning, she finally admitted that the children were not hers—she did not know them; she had just met them; and she had been paid to deliver them to a central London address. More shocking still was her admission that this was her third such trip. Each time, she had been accompanied by three children. Who knows what fate awaited these children?

The team at Heathrow is very successful and has made it much more difficult for child traffickers, so the gangs have simply moved to easier points of entry such as the Eurostar terminal at St Pancras International railway station. Entry to the UK by train does not have such rigorous standards of security as air travel. Children of 12 and above may travel unaccompanied provided they have a form signed by their parent or guardian. However, there are no checks on the authenticity of the parent or guardian who signed the form, so the whole procedure is less than useless. Unaccompanied minors are on their own from the time they get on the train until the time they get off at St Pancras. To make matters worse, there are no dedicated child protection measures in place at St Pancras, so children can just get off the train and simply disappear into the ether.

The way we treat our children defines us as a society. It is totally unacceptable that, in the 21st century, children are still being trafficked into this country. This Bill will go a long way towards helping stamp out this evil trade.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I focus my remarks on aspects of the Bill relating to policing matters. I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority.

I begin by expressing concern about the proposals in the Bill regarding the regulation of biometric data, particularly the DNA database. DNA profiling is critical to the successful investigation of crime, particularly in cases of serious violence and sexually motivated crime where the perpetrator is a stranger to the victim. At the same time, the blanket and indiscriminate retention of DNA profiles is wrong, as the recent judgment in the European Court of Human Rights made clear.

There are some very welcome provisions in this Bill: the intention to put the National DNA Database and the National DNA Database strategy board on a statutory footing; the destruction of DNA samples within six months; the assurance that the DNA profiles of those found not guilty of an offence will in future not be loaded on to the database; and the deletion of existing DNA profiles of those who have been found not guilty of an offence.

However, there remain some concerns and areas that I believe could be improved. I have a particular concern regarding the complexity of the new retention regime for biometric data. We need a regulatory system that is robust and which enjoys public confidence, but we do not need one that is excessively burdensome. Deciding how long to retain DNA profiles is a complex business. The retention periods stated in the Bill are not fixed, but are subject to complex decision-making—for example, the provision for the biometrics commissioner to extend the retention period by two years in certain circumstances. While not every profile will need to be assessed, it is unlikely that it will be possible to automate the process of deletion as a result of this provision. The administrative burden on the Metropolitan Police service—and indeed other police services—is likely to be significant. The Metropolitan Police estimates the initial cost of implementing the Bill at £2.5 million plus ongoing costs of £500,000.

There is also an operational risk inherent in the complexity of the retention regime. No system is perfect and, if the deletion process is out of sync and is not carried out at the appropriate time, there is a real risk of “illegal” matches that could connect someone with a serious crime such as rape but then could not be used. The police must not be put in the invidious position of identifying a rapist or murderer but being unable to use the DNA match in evidence.

A further concern in this section is about the regulation of the counterterrorism DNA database. Given the proposals within the Bill to strengthen the oversight and governance of the National DNA Database, for the sake of consistency, similar moves should be made in respect of all police databases relating to DNA and other biometric materials, including the counterterrorism DNA database.

We should also consider Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and how this Bill relates to it. At present, the police may obtain DNA profile data and fingerprints from people stopped under Schedule 7. However, there is a need for clarity regarding the treatment of these data. The proportion of people stopped under Schedule 7 who have their DNA and fingerprints taken is low, but Schedule 7 gives the police very considerable power. An examining officer may exercise his powers,

“whether or not he has grounds for suspecting”.

There is consequently a need for clarity and transparency regarding where this biometric data information is then stored, and if it is subject to the same safeguards governing DNA taken from an individual on arrest.

I will refer briefly to the question of closed circuit television and automatic number plate recognition, included in Part 2 of the Bill. The regulatory framework proposed in the Bill is a positive step. However, the code should specifically address the covert use of both automatic number plate recognition and CCTV. The Minister in his opening remarks referred to Project Champion, which is a very good example of how ill thought through proposals and a lack of engagement and consultation can undermine confidence in policing. We also need clarity as to whether the responsibilities of the proposed Surveillance Camera Commissioner could be undertaken by the existing Chief Surveillance Commissioner. When we move to Committee stage, I shall be seeking to return to some of these issues.

Police: Station Closures

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am aware of the research in the Sunday Times to which the noble Lord refers. I am not sure it was conducted on the most scientific basis and therefore we will not take much notice of it. I am also aware of what my honourable friend Ms Featherstone had to say about issues in her own constituency. I understand her views were purely about her own constituency, and she is a very good constituency MP. I can assure the House that, like all government Ministers, she is fully committed to what the Government and the Home Office are doing to make the necessary savings—savings forced on us by the profligate manner in which the party opposite behaved when they were last in government.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority. Does the Minister agree that the economic situation and budget cuts may force the new police commissioners to choose between maintaining police numbers and selling police properties?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that question, and I am aware that she is a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority. The question is about police contact, and the important thing to remember is that police contact is not just about stations; as I made clear in my original Answer, it is about police stations and all other means by which we can achieve that police contact. Police stations are not necessarily always the best means of doing that.

St Paul’s Cathedral

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hughes of Woodside]

My Lords—

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords—

[The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde)]

My Lords, we have had a very good Question Time and the clock is now at 30 minutes. Perhaps we should go on to the next business.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Browning)]

My Lords, the government amendments to Schedule 14 correct a number of drafting errors that have come to light during the passage of the Bill. The changes are necessary in order to ensure that the changes to the existing police complaints legislation work properly. I assure noble Lords that in the main they are technical, drafting points that, for example, correct incorrect numbering and add consequential amendments that were missed. I realise that there are other amendments for debate in this group. I beg to move.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 256 in this group. Before doing so, I apologise to the House that I may be unable to stay until the end of the debate. I have to attend a special meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority where the commissioner is coming to answer questions about the events surrounding the various police investigations into the News of the World.

The amendment relates to the handling of complaints against senior police officers in London.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

I apologise to my noble friend Lady Doocey and I am most grateful to her for allowing me to intervene. This is the first time that I have heard a Member move their amendment and say that they might not be here at the end of the debate. Clearly, the Minister has to be in a position to respond to my noble friend. Perhaps she will consider her position and either continue and undertake to remain until the end of the debate on the amendment, or perhaps ask one of her very able colleagues to move the amendment on her behalf. I am concerned that we should not deviate from the normal practices of the House. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, may be about to offer her assistance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

I hope that I can reassure the House. In discussions with my noble friend, neither of us realised that we would reach this group quite so soon. My noble friend should be able to be here until well after we have got through this group—unless she is going to take an hour and a half, in which case there will be other problems.

[Baroness Doocey]

I apologise to the House if I have got it wrong yet again and I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee. My amendment relates to the handling of complaints against senior police officers in London. The Bill proposes that responsibility for complaints against senior ACPO officers—that is, officers below the rank of deputy commissioner—should be moved from the Metropolitan Police Authority to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. My concern is not that this would make the commissioner responsible for employing, promoting and disciplining officers—I do not have a major problem with that—but that it would also make him responsible for sackings and, crucially, for hearing appeals against his own rulings. It would remove all the elements of independence and transparency that the Metropolitan Police Authority currently provides and would in effect make the commissioner judge, jury and executioner.

The proposals are deeply flawed because they concentrate too much power in the hands of the commissioner without any proper checks and balances. There is also no effective framework to safeguard impartiality. I am aware of the Government's response to the argument. They argue that it is commonplace for complaints to be decided within an organisation rather than by an external arbiter. However, this fails to appreciate that police officers are in a unique position. They are officers of the Crown who have the power to detain members of the public and to take away their freedom through arrest. Consequently, there is no valid analogy with how other organisations—even the Armed Forces—deal with complaints, conduct, dismissals and appeals. It is in the interest of the police that they should be able to demonstrate an independent element in the assessment of the seriousness and reputational risks of allegations made against their most senior ranks. The Bill envisages allowing appeals to the IPCC, but only at the end of the process. That is no substitute for an independent review of whether standards of conduct may have fallen below those that the outside world would recognise as proper.

Lack of independence also creates another problem. A very likely consequence of the new system is an increase in the number of complaints against the commissioner for failing properly to investigate complaints against ACPO officers under his command. If those making complaints against a senior officer feel that the issue has not been properly or sufficiently well dealt with in the first instance, they will almost certainly lodge a complaint against the chief officer. The whole rigmarole in turn creates an increased possibility of legal challenge.

I believe there is a more fundamental problem. In any closed institution, such as the police, it is common for custom and practice to become entrenched. An independent element is vital to provide a counterbalance and to ensure due process. It is worth considering the virtues of the current system for handling complaints. At present the Metropolitan Police Authority hears complaints through its professional standards cases sub-committee and there is a right of appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal. This current system is not an accident of history. It evolved to address concerns about the perceived lack of independence and accountability in how complaints and conduct matters had been handled previously. Are we really confident that policing has matured sufficiently to deal with these concerns? The Government seem to be ignoring the lessons of the past and are therefore likely to repeat the errors of the past.

Since the Bill abolishes the Metropolitan Police Authority, the purpose of my amendment is to restore equivalent safeguards to the new arrangements. The amendment would, within London, make the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime the relevant appeals body. It is also essential that the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime has statutory access to all information and systems where complaints are recorded. Without this, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime will be totally reliant on the commissioner advising it of complaint or conduct matters. It would also be unable to discharge the functions proposed in the Bill to ensure that chief constables have fulfilled their duty in the handling of such complaints. The Government’s proposals do no favours to the PCC. They expose him or her to accusations—unjustified, one would hope—of conflict of interest, bias and favouritism. This amendment would avoid these pitfalls without in any way affecting the proper authority of the PCC and the correct limits to his or her discretion. I therefore commend this amendment as a means of preserving the necessary elements of independence, transparency and impartiality. I beg to move.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I understand the thrust of the noble Baroness’s argument, but it is interesting that in her amendment she seems to be proposing that outside the Metropolitan Police area the chief constable still carries out that function. I wonder why she has not amended the situation outside London. The logic of what she is saying is that if it is the MOPC in relation to the Metropolitan Police area, it would presumably be the police and crime commissioner who would do the same thing in other areas. I should be grateful if she would clarify that point for me.

[Baroness Doocey]

I can only plead ignorance and apologise. My amendment was meant specifically to deal with London and I do not think I was sufficiently good at checking that the final version of the amendment dealt just with London. I crave your Lordships’ indulgence.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that. She has raised an important matter of principle and it will be interesting to see what response the Minister gives. If it were a sympathetic response, in which we had an opportunity at Third Reading to discuss this again, she might wish to look at the wording of the amendment. That depends on the Minister.

The principle that the noble Baroness has enunciated must be right. I hope she will pursue this. As for the government amendments, we, of course, welcome them.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

206A: After Clause 50, insert the following new Clause—
“Transitional arrangements
(1) The provisions of sections 1 to 50 are subject to this section.
(2) Sections 1 to 50 shall not come into effect until 1st October after the first ordinary elections under section 51 have taken place.
(3) The Secretary of State shall make regulations to ensure that the police authorities established for police areas under section 3 of the Police Act 1996 (establishment of police authorities) and the Metropolitan Police Authority continue to exercise their functions until such time as the provisions of sections 1 to 50 come into effect.”

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 310. The purpose of Amendment 206A is to delay the implementation of Clauses 1 to 50 until October 2012 and to allow for a transitional period. During the period until then, the existing arrangements will continue to operate, so in London the Metropolitan Police Authority will continue to exercise its functions until such time as the provisions of Sections 1 to 50 come into effect. The purpose of Amendment 310 is also to move the implementation of this Bill in London from December this year to October next year.

The Government and the Mayor of London are keen to introduce the new system as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent. The Bill as it stands would allow this to happen. The Government’s prime duty is to keep London and the country safe. Therefore implementation should be timed optimally to ensure that the transition does not compromise public safety. When we consider issues around public safety, we need to bear in mind that there are some very significant events in 2012. We will have the Olympic Torch Relay from May to July, the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee in June, the Olympic Games in July and August and the Paralympic Games in September. These major events will require a policing operation on an unprecedented scale, so it is difficult to understand why the Government are hell-bent on implementing the changes before these events take place.

My main concern is the policing of the Olympic Games. The Metropolitan Police has described the Games as one of the,

“biggest security challenges the British police have ever faced in peacetime”.

Presidents, kings and queens, heads of state and athletes from all over the world will come together. Their protection will require a security operation of extraordinary complexity. In order to meet this challenge, the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office have spent years planning for every eventuality. As circumstances develop and situations change, these plans are subject to continual revision. The vast majority of Olympic events will take place in London and police officers will be drafted in from every police force in the country to help with the huge operation. For the Government to force the Metropolitan Police to divert their efforts from the security of the Games to a major reorganisation at this critical time almost beggars belief.

Besides the major events I have listed, there is another important event happening in London next year; namely, the mayoral election in May. This election creates a different but no less significant set of problems. It could result in a change of mayor. The new mayor may have a very different vision for the direction of policing in London. If so, this could confront the Metropolitan Police with yet further disruption before the Games. One wonders whether the Government’s unseemly haste may be designed to create a fait accompli ahead of the mayoral election.

Whenever this Bill is implemented, it will require a major reorganisation of the Metropolitan Police. The changes proposed have been described by Sir Hugh Orde, president of ACPO, as,

“some of the most radical changes to police governance since 1829”.

Reorganisations are very disruptive. We all know the anxieties being expressed around the NHS. This particular reorganisation will require the police to change all their reporting structures and to get to know, brief and get up to speed a completely new set of stakeholders and board members. As anyone who has ever served on a police authority will know, gaining an understanding of policing issues is no easy task; it takes time. Let us not forget that this huge organisational change is to be delivered within a framework and climate of an expected reduction in the Met’s spending of some £600 million by 2014-15. Savings to be delivered this year, of £163 million, have already resulted in a two-year pay freeze for police officers and staff, the withdrawing of special payments for police officers and a review of the terms and conditions of police staff.

The reorganisation will be work-intensive, expensive and time-consuming. It should happen at a time when it does not conflict with the London Olympics, so that the police may concentrate their energies and efforts on the huge security challenges surrounding the Games.

The Government have said on a number of occasions that they want to implement the Bill before the Olympics because the Met is in favour of early implementation. In a previous debate in this House on 16 June, my noble friend the Minister said that,

“not just the Mayor of London but the Commissioner of the Metropolis is also keen for the transition from MPA governance to that of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime as soon as possible after Royal Assent is achieved for this Bill … we have double-checked that there is no real concern with the mayor or the commissioner”.—[Official Report, 16/6/11; col. 1033.]

Well, of course there is no concern from the mayor: he wants the changes before the mayoral elections next May. But what the commissioner actually said to Nick Herbert in his letter of 22 June is:

“London should move forward with the new model as soon as is practicably possible ... there are some measures that need to be put in place in order that the new structures can work effectively. Clearly if these cannot be implemented in the time available, the arguments for going early become less compelling”.

This is somewhat different from the Government’s claim that the commissioner is “keen” and that there are no real concerns.

In addition, the commissioner has always been entirely consistent in his view that it is for the Government and Parliament to decide the governance and accountability arrangements for policing, so it is not surprising that he will carry out the democratic wishes of Parliament. It is therefore disingenuous for Ministers to claim that the Metropolitan Police wants early implementation so we must do as it says. Governments ignore the advice of the police whenever it suits them. Detention of suspects is just one example.

A delay until October 2012 is not drastic; it is only a few months later than the Government envisage. By October 2012, Londoners will have enjoyed the Diamond Jubilee celebrations and the Olympic and Paralympic Games. They will have a mayor who has been elected for four years setting a direction over how London is to be policed. Let us allow this direction to be set in a period of calm, with time to think. Let us also give senior police officers the time and space to prepare for these new directions. We need only to delay these changes for a few months, and London will be a better place for it.

I have no doubt that if the Government go ahead and implement this Bill before October 2012, it will cause serious disruption to the policing of the London Olympics and other major events taking place next year. This proposed reorganisation will cause immense disruption at the worst possible time and compromise the safety of our citizens. I therefore appeal to the Minister, even at this late stage, to reconsider this seriously flawed decision. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Browning]

My Lords, I reiterate what I have said in previous discussions on this subject to my noble friend Lady Doocey: the commissioner has personally asked the Home Secretary to go as early as possible with London. That is a fact. The commissioner, deputy commissioner, the mayor and deputy mayor are very keen for the London provisions to be commenced as soon as possible.

My noble friend mentioned a letter. That letter outlines issues that the commissioner has flagged up for the Government to look at so that London can go early. The issues in the letter are being looked at and many of them have already been agreed in earlier amendments in the House. We debated earlier today the government amendments to the transitional provisions in the Bill to ensure that the PCCs and the MOPC can operate effectively from the outset and that there is no need for a period of shadow operation. The changes to policing governance do not affect operational control and so will not impact on operational issues.

We are going round this circuit for about the third time. My noble friend may totally disagree with me but I have checked and double checked—as has my right honourable friend the Minister of State in another place—to make sure that our understanding of both the commissioner’s and the mayor’s view on this subject are as we have described them in this House. I can but repeat what I have already said to my noble friend in the House: they are keen to commence as soon as possible and they have in no way sought to delay London.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I have listened to the Minister with a very heavy heart because, being an eternal optimist, I had hoped against hope that the Government might take some responsibility upon themselves and say, “We are the Government and we are making the decision. On reflection, we do not think that it is a good idea to put citizens’ lives at risk in order to implement the changes in the Bill immediately”.

I have concluded that I have done everything possible to persuade the Government that this is not only a bad idea but a positively dangerous one. I have also concluded that all my pleas have fallen on deaf ears, and it is with a heavy heart that I feel I have no choice but to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 206A withdrawn.