Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI hope that I can reassure the House. In discussions with my noble friend, neither of us realised that we would reach this group quite so soon. My noble friend should be able to be here until well after we have got through this group—unless she is going to take an hour and a half, in which case there will be other problems.
I apologise to the House if I have got it wrong yet again and I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee. My amendment relates to the handling of complaints against senior police officers in London. The Bill proposes that responsibility for complaints against senior ACPO officers—that is, officers below the rank of deputy commissioner—should be moved from the Metropolitan Police Authority to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. My concern is not that this would make the commissioner responsible for employing, promoting and disciplining officers—I do not have a major problem with that—but that it would also make him responsible for sackings and, crucially, for hearing appeals against his own rulings. It would remove all the elements of independence and transparency that the Metropolitan Police Authority currently provides and would in effect make the commissioner judge, jury and executioner.
The proposals are deeply flawed because they concentrate too much power in the hands of the commissioner without any proper checks and balances. There is also no effective framework to safeguard impartiality. I am aware of the Government's response to the argument. They argue that it is commonplace for complaints to be decided within an organisation rather than by an external arbiter. However, this fails to appreciate that police officers are in a unique position. They are officers of the Crown who have the power to detain members of the public and to take away their freedom through arrest. Consequently, there is no valid analogy with how other organisations—even the Armed Forces—deal with complaints, conduct, dismissals and appeals. It is in the interest of the police that they should be able to demonstrate an independent element in the assessment of the seriousness and reputational risks of allegations made against their most senior ranks. The Bill envisages allowing appeals to the IPCC, but only at the end of the process. That is no substitute for an independent review of whether standards of conduct may have fallen below those that the outside world would recognise as proper.
Lack of independence also creates another problem. A very likely consequence of the new system is an increase in the number of complaints against the commissioner for failing properly to investigate complaints against ACPO officers under his command. If those making complaints against a senior officer feel that the issue has not been properly or sufficiently well dealt with in the first instance, they will almost certainly lodge a complaint against the chief officer. The whole rigmarole in turn creates an increased possibility of legal challenge.
I believe there is a more fundamental problem. In any closed institution, such as the police, it is common for custom and practice to become entrenched. An independent element is vital to provide a counterbalance and to ensure due process. It is worth considering the virtues of the current system for handling complaints. At present the Metropolitan Police Authority hears complaints through its professional standards cases sub-committee and there is a right of appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal. This current system is not an accident of history. It evolved to address concerns about the perceived lack of independence and accountability in how complaints and conduct matters had been handled previously. Are we really confident that policing has matured sufficiently to deal with these concerns? The Government seem to be ignoring the lessons of the past and are therefore likely to repeat the errors of the past.
Since the Bill abolishes the Metropolitan Police Authority, the purpose of my amendment is to restore equivalent safeguards to the new arrangements. The amendment would, within London, make the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime the relevant appeals body. It is also essential that the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime has statutory access to all information and systems where complaints are recorded. Without this, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime will be totally reliant on the commissioner advising it of complaint or conduct matters. It would also be unable to discharge the functions proposed in the Bill to ensure that chief constables have fulfilled their duty in the handling of such complaints. The Government’s proposals do no favours to the PCC. They expose him or her to accusations—unjustified, one would hope—of conflict of interest, bias and favouritism. This amendment would avoid these pitfalls without in any way affecting the proper authority of the PCC and the correct limits to his or her discretion. I therefore commend this amendment as a means of preserving the necessary elements of independence, transparency and impartiality. I beg to move.
My Lords, I joined in the debate on these two terms at the previous stage, and on rereading Hansard I wonder now even more than I did at the time how assessing whether something is appropriate could be evidence-based. If I were still a councillor having to decide whether a condition is appropriate, I do not think I could avoid it being a subjective judgment. My noble friend has referred to this. I also asked at the last stage whether the assessment had to be reasonable. If it is “appropriate” rather than “necessary”, I assume that it would have to be, but the Minister very elegantly sidestepped that question. I do not blame her because I had not given her notice of it.
My final point refers to the statutory guidance, again just mentioned by my noble friend. We are not talking about a particular application, but licensing in general is a quasi-judicial activity. Perhaps this is not strictly quasi-judicial, but it comes quite close to it. I am concerned about the need to rely on guidance as distinct from primary legislation in the way this is approached.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and the Minister will recall that I spoke on this matter in Committee. I have no intention of running the risk of prolonging the debate by repeating what I said on that occasion, but nothing that has happened since the previous stage alters in any way the views I then expressed. The only thing I would say in a wholly friendly manner to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones is that I used the human rights argument on a series of occasions during our debates on the Licensing Bill in 2003. I have to say, in a manner which I hope he will not find too discouraging, that on every single occasion the Front Bench of the then Government shut me up and told me that I did not actually have a case to argue.
My Lords, we discussed this matter in Committee and we want to probe further whether the Government have moved in their thinking. We welcome the Government’s move through Clause 123 to allow licensing authorities the ability to set fees locally on the basis of full cost recovery. Operating the licence system since 2005 has cost council tax payers over £100 million more than they anticipated due to the current, centrally set fee structure, which does not allow licensing authorities to set cost-neutral local charges. Given the economic climate, there is a real imperative to allow cost-neutral fees to be set as soon as possible. However, as we discussed last time, there is a drafting error within Clause 123, which would mean two-tier authorities not being able fully to recover all the costs associated with licensing. This was debated in Committee. When the Minister replied, he acknowledged that, as drafted, the Bill would exclude the relevant costs of trading standards and social services departments and that, even though they were discharging duties under the Licensing Act, they would not be able to recover them. He concluded by saying:
“I see sense in the intention of [the amendment] and, if I may, I shall reflect on it further”.—[Official Report, 16/6/11; col. 911.]
The purpose of the amendment is to press the Government for their response on this issue. I hope that they have some good news for us.
I support the amendment. I reacted rather to the suggestion that what is a marginal cost is therefore almost irrelevant in the case of the authorities affected. I, too, look forward to hearing the outcome of the reflection.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has explained, Amendment 305ZB seeks to ensure that the costs of social services and trading standards, in their role as “responsible authorities” only, can be covered by fees when they are located outside the licensing authority as well as within it. I certainly acknowledge that I said in Committee that I would reflect further on the proposal. I have done so very carefully and taken legal advice. Having examined it, I have found that the practical difficulties unfortunately outweigh the benefits.
The role of responsible authority involves, for example, considering applications and, in rare cases, applying for review. The costs arising will be very marginal—I am sorry that my noble friend Lady Hamwee objects to the use of that wording—in the context of overall fee income and the wider functions of these bodies. To set fees locally, each licensing authority will be required to calculate its own costs. We would not wish to require it to calculate the costs of another body without very good reason. The amendment would also imply a duty on county councils to report fractional costs and on the licensing authority to pass the funds to the county. The cost of this would then be passed on to fee payers even if the net gain to local government was very little or even nothing. The current fees regime makes no provision for district councils to pass funding to county councils in respect of these functions and we understand that no money has been transferred.
As I said, I have considered this matter carefully. In a nutshell, I am asking noble Lords to accept that the amendment would result in substantial extra bureaucracy and costs which would be passed on to licence holders for very little benefit. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, can the Minister tell the House whether these practical difficulties have been discussed with the Local Government Association, which would undoubtedly have an input into this? If not, that is a pity.
My Lords, flicking rapidly through my papers, I cannot find the answer to my noble friend’s question. I shall write to her about it.
My Lords, I think that the noble Lord opposite and I would have heard if there had been a discussion. I put that rather gently but firmly.
There was, I think, a hint of menace in what the noble Baroness was saying. She was leaning forward slightly, and it was well judged to deliver that blow.
The LGA has indeed been concerned about this issue and has circulated documents widely which address the issue and make the main points that I repeated in the discussions earlier. It has also made it clear that it is very concerned about this matter. Although the Minister said that it was a marginal cost, every pound is important to local government. It is unfortunate that the Government have said that the cost of the bureaucracy of this might outweigh its benefits when those who are responsible for delivering it say that they want it to happen.
The Government are hiding under the question of bureaucracy. They promised a very important principle—that there would be a full cost recovery basis for licensing. They have gone so far down the line but they are not prepared to go the further stage. This is a disappointing result and we would like to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I intervene extremely briefly. On the strength of my own experience in the two cities, where there is of course an enormous amount of late-night activity and in other parts of the constituency there is absolutely nothing happening at all, I would like my noble friend, to whom I was not very helpful on the last occasion, to know that on this occasion I am sympathetic to what he is saying.
My Lords, I have Amendment 306ZZA in this group. On the issue of the division of the levy between the police and the local authority, at the previous stage I attempted to reverse the proportions, as provided by the Bill. This time I am suggesting a 50-50 split. I am sure that my noble friend will understand how completely reasonable that must be.
At that stage, my noble friend told me as reassurance that the levy had,
“been designed to raise money for the police, who bear the brunt of late night enforcement costs”.—[Official Report, 16/6/11; col. 943.]
I do not doubt the costs borne by the police, but to some extent they are already taken into account in the way that their funding operates. I am concerned that the costs to local authorities, particularly as regards environmental health and some of the organisation involved in dealing with late-night activity, are not acknowledged.
I have brought this back not only to change the proportion but because of a thought that occurred to me after the previous stage. If an authority is to receive little financial benefit from the levy, it may take a decision not to impose it at all. I wonder whether the Government have considered that risk, if I may put it that way.
I will be brief. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to what my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara said in Committee in respect of the amendments that the noble Lord has moved, in particular the support that we on these Benches gave for a more targeted application of the late-night levy. That continues to be our position.