Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
Subsidy Control Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist
Main Page: Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI thank the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord McNicol of West Kilbride, for tabling Amendments 1, 13, 16, 17 and 20, and all other noble Lords who participated in this debate. I say at the outset, in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, that the use of the Moses Room is not intended to minimise the importance of this Committee stage. We agreed through the usual channels that this would be the best use of time.
Before I discuss each amendment in turn, I start by saying that the proposed UK subsidy control regime empowers public authorities, including the devolved Administrations, to award subsidies flexibly and quickly to meet their policy objectives. As noble Lords have said, the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 amended the relevant devolution Acts to make the regulation of subsidies a reserved, or in Northern Ireland an accepted, matter. The devolved Administrations are, and will remain, responsible for spending decisions on devolved subsidies within any subsidy control system.
As the Minister in the other place clarified, the devolved Administrations have standing to challenge UK Government or any other subsidies in the Competition Appeal Tribunal in instances where the interests of people in the areas in which they exercise their responsibility are affected. Some provisions of the Bill engage the legislative consent Motion process, as they alter executive competence; for example, they confer new functions on DA Ministers. We hope that the devolved Administrations will agree with us on the importance of the Bill and be able to give us their legislative consent for the relevant provisions. Those discussions are continuing and I will keep the Committee updated.
We have engaged closely with the devolved Administrations throughout this process at ministerial and official level, not only on the LCM process but on our policy development ahead of the Bill’s introduction, in advance of our publication last week of the illustrative documents, and as we continue through the parliamentary process in the run-up to implementation. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, I confirm that the Minister for Small Business met the Welsh Minister for Finance and Local Government, Rebecca Evans, last Thursday—27 January. The meeting discussed the Bill as part of ongoing engagement to understand concerns on it and to provide reassurance.
I will begin with Amendment 1. Clause 1 provides an overview of what each part of the Bill will cover and establishes its application to other legislation. Clause 1(7) and (8) specify that if a subsidy is granted, or a scheme is created, using powers contained in either primary or secondary legislation, the subsidy control requirements will apply, unless an Act of Parliament specifies otherwise. The specific reference to an Act of Parliament here is solely to clarify that nothing in the Bill should be interpreted as conflicting with the fundamental principle that no Act of Parliament may bind a future Parliament; in other words, it reflects the constitutional reality and does not create any further exemption or special treatment.
Amendment 1, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, extends this clarificatory statement to cover the Senedd and the Scottish Parliament. In doing so, it fundamentally changes the character of this statement from a clarification to an exemption from the subsidy control requirements. The amendment would allow the Senedd and the Scottish Parliament to set aside the subsidy control requirements set out in the Bill, not only for the purpose of subsidies given directly in primary legislation, for which specific provision is made in Schedule 3, but for subsidies given by means of a power in that legislation; in other words, for all devolved spending powers in Scotland and Wales.
The discrepancy highlighted here between the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales is not a matter of government policy but a reflection of constitutional reality. The subsidy control regime differentiates between devolved legislatures and Parliament in a way that respects the devolved legislatures and reflects this Parliament’s status as the supreme legislative body of the United Kingdom. The devolved legislatures have a unique constitutional status and we have ensured that the requirements placed on subsidies given directly in devolved primary legislation are proportionate and respectful of their status and processes. Schedule 3 sets out the specific arrangements that take account of this. None the less, it is important that the subsidy control requirements apply comprehensively and that we do not create exemptions.
As for subsidies given through powers conferred by Parliament or the devolved legislatures in secondary legislation or otherwise, it is essential that these are compliant with the subsidy control rules without exception. As it stands, the clause simply clarifies that express or implied repeal by a future Act of Parliament remains a possibility. It does not suggest that the Government will, on a whim, propose legislation that exempts a particular project or power from the subsidy control requirements.
It is absolutely right that subsidy control is a reserved matter: by its very nature, it affects how all public authorities in the UK, including devolved authorities, may exercise their spending powers. That is because its purpose is to establish common rules for different authorities with different interests and policy objectives to protect UK competition and investment. The Bill will also facilitate our compliance with our international obligations, including those set out in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which reflect exactly this constitutional reality.
I turn to Amendments 13, 16 and 17. Clause 10 concerns the making of subsidy schemes and streamlined subsidy schemes. Public authorities using a streamlined subsidy scheme will not have to access any subsidies they award under the terms of the scheme against the subsidy control principles. Streamlined subsidy schemes will have parameters for use that must be complied with by the public authorities using them, and can be made by a Minister of the Crown. Two illustrative streamlined subsidy schemes were published by the Government last week; I trust that they provide practical examples for noble Lords of the possible terms of these parameters for use.
Together, Amendments 13, 16 and 17 would have the effect that a Scottish Minister, a Welsh Minister or the Northern Ireland department would have the power to make streamlined subsidy schemes and lay them before their relevant devolved legislature. I will therefore take them together. The first amendment would allow streamlined subsidy schemes to be made by Ministers in Scotland or Wales or the Northern Ireland department. The second and third amendments would require such streamlined subsidy schemes to be laid before the relevant devolved legislature when made or amended.
Related amendments on this matter, regarding the role of the devolved Administrations, were made in the other place. The position of the Government remains that we will create streamlined subsidy schemes for public authorities across the UK to use to award subsidies that help UK-wide priorities. Streamlined subsidy schemes will therefore function best when they apply across the length and breadth of the United Kingdom. The Government will design these streamlined subsidy schemes such that they are fit to be used by public authorities in all parts of the United Kingdom.
Given that these streamlined subsidy schemes will be part of the UK-wide subsidy control regime, the appropriate place for them to be laid is in this Parliament. We have published two illustrative streamlined subsidy schemes and an accompanying policy statement that sets out for Parliament how the Government intend to use these schemes. We have worked with the devolved Administrations while developing this policy at both official and ministerial level. Officials will continue their close engagement with the devolved Administrations as the regime continues to develop. Finally, it is important to note that Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or a Northern Ireland department, as primary public authorities, can also make schemes for use by other public authorities where that is within their existing functional powers; for example, the Scottish Government may choose to make a scheme for use by local authorities in Scotland.
On Amendment 20, Clause 11 sets out the terms for making regulations to define subsidies and schemes of interest or schemes of particular interest. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of each of the devolved Administrations before making regulations on subsidies, schemes of interest or schemes of particular interest under the clause. If this consent was not forthcoming, the Secretary of State would be required to make a statement to the other place explaining why they had chosen to proceed with the regulations without DA consent.
This amendment was also raised in the other place; the Government’s position on it remains the same. Regulations made under Clause 11 will define subsidies, schemes of interest and schemes of particular interest to ensure that the work of the subsidy advice unit is focused on subsidies and schemes that are most likely to cause negative effects on competition and investment in the United Kingdom, or which may do the same to our trade with other countries.
These regulations are key to the functioning of a reserved policy area. It is right, therefore, for the regulations to be debated and voted on here in the UK Parliament. I simply do not believe that it is appropriate to require the Secretary of State to seek consent even when the Secretary of State may ultimately proceed without that consent from the devolved Administrations on a reserved matter. A requirement to seek the consent of the devolved Administrations each time regulations are made under Clause 11 also risks introducing significant delays into the process, particularly if regulations need to be amended quickly in the future, such as in the event that economic conditions change rapidly. In such cases, the Government may need to legislate rapidly without consent, so the amendment would not achieve its aim.
The Government have had numerous discussions with Ministers and officials in the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive and we are committed to continuing to engage regularly with them. We have published illustrative regulations on subsidies and schemes of interest and of particular interest, in addition to the accompanying policy statement outlining the Government’s approach to this important question. Ahead of publication, officials have discussed the approach to these regulations with each of the DAs, taking on board their comments and suggestions as the policy has developed. We have also provided early sight of the draft regulations for comment ahead of publication. I assure noble Lords that this engagement will continue as we prepare for implementation of the regime. I also welcome any comments or questions that my noble friend may have regarding the illustrative products. Indeed, I welcome any further comments or questions from the devolved Administrations. I therefore humbly request that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response, which I will come back to in a moment. First, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this short debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke of respect and co-operation between Westminster and the devolved Administrations. That goes to the heart of what we are talking about. We need a regime, as far as these aspects of business are concerned, that has mutual respect and co-operation between all parties; otherwise, we are bound to find ourselves in a position where one body is trying to outdo the other and perhaps to gain political kudos for doing so. That is not what this should be about.
The noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, whose support I was grateful to receive, spoke about the Bill giving no consideration to the issues that arose in respect of earlier Westminster Bills taking powers from the devolved Administrations. That is the feeling that exists, certainly in Cardiff Bay and the Senedd and, as I understand it, in Edinburgh as well.
I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan of Partick, for her comments. She highlighted the failure of Westminster to adequately consult in good time. That, again, is an element of this lack of respect. By properly consulting in time, there is an opportunity to be able to amend proposals taking such consultation on board. But it is done at the last moment. I understand that one consultation took place last Saturday—not from this department, I think—on something that is happening today. That is no good. There has to be an active engagement between the Governments of our three nations, or four nations if we include Northern Ireland—I have not included Northern Ireland in this because of the complex situation there, but of course the principles apply equally.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, spoke of the need to have proper respect for devolved Administrations. That should run through every Bill. I noted the strong feelings that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, who spoke mainly to Amendment 20, had concerning the consent of the devolved Administrations. The parity of esteem that the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, talked about goes to the heart of this issue.
The other amendments in this group will no doubt be taken at later stages in different guises, because they touch on subjects that arise in different parts of the Bill, but the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, said that the question of the relationship between the Governments in Cardiff, Edinburgh and here at Westminster “reflects the constitutional reality”—those are the words that she used. Those words will create a reaction in Edinburgh and Cardiff that will cause even greater problems.
We need to seek a new partnership approach. If the unity of purpose within these islands is to mean anything, it must be on the basis of respect between all three or four partners and not the idea that because Westminster was the original one and the all-powerful one, it can overrule or ignore what is felt in Edinburgh, Cardiff or Belfast. I believe that it is possible in the general context to get a formula that can reflect that need for recognition and respect, but it is not going to be achieved in the way that the Bill is drafted. The reaction in Cardiff and Edinburgh was totally foreseeable and it could have been avoided—and it needs to be avoided.
My Lords, I have very little to add to what other noble Lords have said. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and my noble friend Lord Chandos for Amendments 2, 2A and 3. As has been said, they go to the heart of the Bill. Clause 2 is titled “Subsidy” and lays out the effect and explanation of what a subsidy is or can be. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has come up with an interesting means of looking at protecting the devolved authorities’ interests by making it clear, as we have heard, that certain forms of payments would not be classified as subsidies and would therefore fall outside the control and requirements of the Bill.
The amendment from my noble friend Lord Chandos raises an interesting point in relation to the illustrative documents that have just been released. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said, my noble friend’s amendment was tabled late but that was because the guidance papers were released so late. If some of the guidance and regulations had been shared and published earlier, some of our colleagues in the elected Chamber may well have been able to pick up and dig into some of these issues.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, touched on the use of subsidies as a legitimate tool for securing economic benefit when done correctly, but also when done transparently. This is one of the fundamental issues we will come on to in later amendments. The big difference from European state aid is obviously that an agreement had to be reached before state aid was brought in. With this system, and this is one of the benefits of it, the subsidy can be brought in very quickly beforehand. But that creates a huge dilemma if the information on the subsidy is not transparent, and if there is no proper opportunity to analyse and challenge it. That is why we will be going into far more detail on this.
Tidying up some of these issues and getting them into the Bill, rather than in secondary legislation and regulations, would help to move it into a far better position. With that, I look forward to the noble Baroness’s response to the issues, especially the one raised by my noble friend Lord Chandos on why equity cannot be added straightforwardly. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has tabled a number of government amendments. It would be great if we could do some of the tidying up as we move through Committee.
My Lords, again, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for tabling his amendments, and to all noble Lords for participating in the debate.
Clause 2, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said, is the cornerstone of the new subsidy control regime as it sets out the definition of a subsidy for the purposes of the Bill. The definition consists of a four-limb test, and all four limbs must be satisfied for a financial measure to be considered a subsidy. I also draw the Committee’s attention to Clauses 3 to 8, all of which are necessary to understand the definition of “subsidy”. I believe that those provisions collectively provide sufficient clarity and legal certainty to ensure that all public authorities can give subsidies with confidence. We will provide guidance on this matter as the Bill comes into force.
In response to my noble friend Lord Lamont, I believe the Bill sets out a series of overarching principles that provide a level playing field for all public authorities in the UK. The Bill is not a framework for funding; therefore, in response to my noble friend, spending decisions are of course for the Chancellor. It is a set of rules that all public authorities must follow in their decision-making when they give a subsidy or make a scheme. I do not recognise the criticism that it is too streamlined or too narrow, or that it will not be accessible to the devolved Administrations and to other public authorities outside Westminster. The streamlined subsidy schemes that we create will be beneficial but also entirely voluntary for public authorities to use. I note too that we have adopted helpful suggestions from the devolved Administrations for the illustrative Subsidy Control (Subsidies and Schemes of Interest or Particular Interest) Regulations on the treatment of rescue and restructuring subsidies to ailing businesses, as well as in relation to the identification and selection of sectors of interest.
Amendment 2, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would exclude from the definition of a subsidy financial assistance offered by a public authority to all enterprises operating wholly or largely within its territory. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that it is of the utmost importance that public authorities are responsible for the financial assistance that they provide within the areas for which they are accountable, and that when a devolved Administration—or, for that matter, a local authority—design a scheme that is general to enterprises in their territory, subsidies should not be specific. Of course, those subsidies should be designed in support of the economy and community for which the public authority is responsible in order to address market failures or issues of disadvantage. I am pleased to inform the noble Lord that that is what Clause 2 provides, with particular reference to the notion of what constitutes a specific subsidy in Clause 2(1)(b) and Clause 4. I am grateful to him for raising this important point.
The requirement that is relevant to the noble Lord’s amendment is that a subsidy must be specific. In order to be specific, Clause 2(1)(c) provides that it must benefit one or more enterprises over one or more other enterprises with regard to the production of goods or the provision of services. When determining whether a subsidy benefits one or more enterprises over others, it is necessary to consider what constitutes the reference framework for that subsidy by reference to the legal basis for that subsidy, the authority giving the subsidy and how it is financed, in order to determine who is in the same legal and factual position.
Where a UK-wide power is conferred on a UK Minister, the reference framework is the whole of the UK, while a subsidy that will benefit only enterprises in a specific part of the UK—such as Wales or, indeed, London—will meet the definition of a specific subsidy. However, when an Administration covering a discrete area, such as a devolved Administration, make a subsidy under the powers conferred on them, the reference framework will be the territory of that Administration.
Therefore, in the case of Wales, for example, a disadvantaged workers’ subsidy scheme that is available equally to all enterprises in Wales will in most cases not be specific because the subsidy will not favour any enterprise in Wales over another enterprise in Wales in the absence of factors limiting the availability of the subsidy. However, a disadvantaged workers’ subsidy by the Welsh Government limited to enterprises in Newport, or which was otherwise limited in availability, would be a specific subsidy because it favoured enterprises in Newport over other enterprises in Wales. It can also be said, with reference to Clause 4(2), that the notion of the reference framework is inherent in the design of subsidies by the devolved Administrations because they can act only in pursuance of their devolved competences.
Similar provisions are made in relation to taxation in Clause 4 to ensure that, where a devolved Administration are acting autonomously in relation to a devolved tax or a variation of a national tax, there will not be a subsidy if the scheme of taxation does not contain elements that are specific to their areas of responsibility. Acting autonomously includes having the competence to set the tax and being responsible for the fiscal consequences of setting the tax at the chosen level.
I hope to persuade the noble Lord, therefore, that the discretions he wishes to maintain for subsidies that are general to enterprise in Wales—and not confined to certain enterprises in Wales—are inherent in the general principles in the Bill, which are derived from the TCA, without need for a specific amendment.
Thank you. If the Minister wishes to write to us, that is fine. I am sure we will come back to this.
I think I said that an equity investment is still considered a direct transfer of funds from one entity to another. The whole point of not putting in an exhaustive list is to avoid worry about what you leave out of a list, rather than what you have in it. I believe this is already covered by the Bill.
My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has participated in this short debate. I am not sure whether the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, is happy with the response he got, but no doubt there will be opportunities to pursue that further. I also noted the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lamont. There is clearly an issue here that needs some further consideration.
I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord German, for his contribution. He was Minister for Economic Development in the Welsh Government. Was it 20 years ago?
Subsidy Control Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist
Main Page: Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it is with great pleasure that I follow my noble friend Lady Sheehan and the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, in support of these amendments. Subsidy schemes seem to be designed as monoliths with no granularity at all. Why is that one of the central theses of this Bill? What possible advantage do the Government seek to gain, other than the ability to hide what money is going to whom? To those of us on this side of the Committee, that appears to be what is going on.
Amendment 21 would ensure that subsidy schemes cannot be used to hide subsidies that would, if they were stand-alone subsidies, be reported, as my noble friend set out. It is clear to all three of us that there is huge scope for significant and expensive subsidies to be hidden in these schemes. That seems to be the only reason why this is in the Bill. I am sure that the Minister will want to explain the reasons, because that must be the response to these amendments. I am sure that we will all be happy to throw our hands up if we are wrong and there is a hugely important reason why this is needed for the operation of the subsidies.
Amendment 24, co-signed by my noble friend, would require individual subsidies given under the subsidy scheme to be judged against the energy and environment principles. Once again, we are back to Monday evening, when my noble friend Lord Purvis posed a question regarding principle G in Schedule 1. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, got to answer it; I suppose that this time it is the turn of the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield. During that debate, the Minister seemed to make it clear that sustainability considerations are indeed implicit in every aspect of the Bill. He suggested that, by implication, there must be some benefit for these things to be legal, but there is no explicit reference to that. I apologise if I am putting words in his mouth because principle G says the opposite. Therefore, rather than repeat what I have said, I have invented another one of my little examples, for which I apologise in advance.
Let us say that I have won a subsidy to expand my pottery business. As part of the submission, I cite increased employment and increased local sourcing of services as the beneficial effects that investment in my pottery business would bring. Nothing in the schedule or the rest of the Bill says that I have to benefit the environment by using less energy. If I am successful, I employ 30% more people and use 30% more local services, therefore achieving the scheme’s objectives, while also using 30% more energy to fire my products. That would appear to be how the Bill will work. Therefore, we need Amendment 24 to include consideration of the environmental impact that that subsidy would bring. It is very simple.
Amendment 68 would allow individual subsidies given under a subsidy scheme to be reviewed. Once again, it is cracking open the monolith and being able to look at the granularity within a scheme. Again, it follows my initial points: we need to be able to see inside these schemes for transparency to be available.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, for tabling Amendments 21, 24 and 68. Perhaps it would be helpful if I started by explaining the status of subsidy schemes in the Bill and why the Government have taken this approach.
Public authorities that seek to give multiple subsidies have three options available to them. First, they can consider each subsidy separately and assess its compliance with the principles and the other requirements in the Bill. Secondly, they can set up a scheme—that is to say, they can identify a group of possible subsidies, with defined parameters, and ensure that any possible subsidy within that group complies with the subsidy control requirements. Thirdly, they can use a streamlined subsidy scheme or another scheme where a public authority—perhaps the UK Government or one of the devolved Administrations—has already assessed that defined group of possible subsidies as compliant with the requirements.
Clauses 12 and 13 place a duty on public authorities to consider the subsidy control principles and the energy and environmental principles respectively before deciding whether to give an individual subsidy or make a subsidy scheme. A public authority cannot go on to give the subsidy or make the scheme unless it is of the view that it is consistent with the principles, including the energy and environmental principles the noble Lord, Lord Fox, emphasised. Once created, public authorities can then award multiple subsidies under that scheme with the confidence that they comply with the subsidy control principles.
By making a scheme instead of assessing multiple individual subsidies against the principles, public authorities will save themselves the administrative time and effort—ultimately equating to taxpayers’ money—it takes to consider any assessment, even one that is light touch and common sense. Schemes also provide a way for public authorities to grant subsidies with greater confidence and security because anyone wishing to make a challenge in the Competition Appeal Tribunal must do so to the scheme itself within the limitation period of one month following publication of information about the scheme on the transparency database. That one month period can be extended by a pre-action information request. We believe that this strikes the right balance between facilitating proper scrutiny of the scheme and removing any perpetual threat of challenge, which can make public authorities more reluctant to give, and recipients more hesitant to accept, beneficial subsidies.
Noble Lords will be aware that this subsidy control regime presents a new approach tailored to the specific needs of the United Kingdom. I do not believe that it is generally useful to justify elements of the Bill on the grounds that they correspond to how things used to be done in the EU state aid system, but it is helpful to underline that public authorities have been making use of subsidy schemes for the purposes of administrative simplicity for a long time. Although the EU mechanisms for decision-making and challenge were quite different, public authorities that gave subsidies in compliance with pre-approved schemes generally did not need to obtain further approval for each individual subsidy under a scheme and could proceed to give those subsidies with confidence.
I also add, as the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, pointed out, that transparency is very important. Subsidies given under schemes over £500,000 must be uploaded on the transparency database under the Bill as it stands. We believe that the £500,000 threshold represents an appropriate balance between minimising the administrative burden and requiring subsidy transparency in the public interest.
On Amendment 21 to Clause 12, if that amendment was agreed to and the line
“In subsection (1) ‘subsidy’ does not include a subsidy given under a subsidy scheme”
was taken out, it would have no impact on a public authority’s ability to continue to allow subsidies under the subsidy scheme. It would not slow the process up.
I take the noble Baroness’s point on that. I would like to discuss it with the team when I have had a chance to look into it more thoroughly.
As I have just set out, under the terms of Clause 70, an interested party may not submit an application for the Competition Appeal Tribunal to review a decision to give an individual subsidy under a scheme. This is to ensure that scrutiny and challenge occur at the scheme level. The noble Lord’s amendment would enable applications for review to be made to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for individual subsidies granted under a subsidy scheme without the requirement for the broader subsidy scheme also to be reviewed.
I am glad that the Minister has come to this point. Earlier on, I think I heard her say that transparency on a subsidy would raise the potential for a challenge to happen, but the whole system of policing this is through challenge, so how can challenge happen if invisibility is the result of this?
The Minister was suggesting that you can challenge only the overall scheme, not the individual granularity of a scheme within it, but that flies in the face of the central principle of the Bill which is that if I am a business and another local business gets a subsidy, I can challenge that through the CMA, assuming that there are grounds for it. If I do not know that my local competitor is getting that money because its subsidy is locked inside one of these schemes, I cannot challenge it. So the Minister is correct: transparency will lead to more challenge and that is the purpose of the systems put in place within the Bill. We need some working through of this from the Minister—it may not be now but perhaps in writing—because it seems that there are two things working in opposite directions.
Given that the whole structure of the subsidy regime is to have the overarching scheme, compliant with all the principles contained in the Bill, and then a series of other subsidies given within that, if you increase the likelihood of challenge and therefore reduce people’s confidence in it, why would a local authority or a government body give a subsidy? Why would there be any incentive for them to give a scheme? While we are wholly appreciative of the importance of transparency, there is a balance to be struck here. Perhaps we could make more progress and I can write to the noble Lord.
It was the Government who chose to put the principle of challenge on the face of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, and I are coming to the idea of creating a body that can police those things. Perhaps that would solve some of the problems that the Minister suggested—but those problems are central to the way in which the Government have decided that subsidies should be policed under the Bill.
I understand the point the noble Lord is making, but I suggest we would do better to continue this discussion with officials, and come back to him and to the whole Committee in writing.
Making individual subsidies granted in line with the terms of a subsidy scheme eligible for review by the tribunal would undermine a key benefit of creating a scheme—which, as I was saying, would be the administrative simplicity for public authorities, including the security that subsidies can be granted under the terms of a scheme without additional challenge or assessment. However, I fully recognise noble Lords’ underlying concern that schemes could be used to shield unlawful subsidies from challenge. If a subsidy purports to be part of a scheme but does not comply with its terms, an interested party may indeed bring a challenge. This would be on the basis that the subsidy should not enjoy the protection of the scheme but was instead a stand-alone subsidy where the public authority did not consider the subsidy control principles.
On that point, how would another business or organisation know the subsidy existed if it was part of the scheme?
May I intervene too, on the same point? If a business does know about a subsidy and thinks it is unfair, it cannot go to the public authority and ask for a review. The bar is so high that the review can only be at the level of the scheme—which the business had nothing to do with designing. The public authority would have to do it. The business has no comeback.
Every grant made over £500,000 will be visible. Noble Lords may be arguing that that bar is too high, but maybe we will come to that at a later stage.
The fundamental point remains: how do people know that the subsidy has been given if it is part of a scheme? They cannot challenge it.
If it is over £500,000 it will be visible.
As I was saying, a challenge would be on the basis that that the subsidy should not enjoy the protection of the scheme but was instead a stand-alone subsidy where the public authority did not consider the subsidy control principles. The CAT could be asked to determine that question. If the CAT finds that the subsidy ought to have been treated as a stand-alone subsidy, it could also be asked to determine whether the relevant subsidy control requirements had been met.
It is also important to note that subsidies given under the schemes may be subject to other obligations and other forms of challenge. A public authority that gives a subsidy in breach of its general public law duties may be challenged through the judicial review process in the general courts, even if the subsidy is given under a scheme. And of course, if the scheme is substantially changed beyond the parameters set out in Clause 81 on permitted modifications, it must be reassessed and uploaded to the transparency database, and can again be challenged. For the reasons I have set out, and with the caveat that we shall return to some of these questions, I ask that, for the moment, the amendment be withdrawn.
As we have said in the back and forth of the discussion on these three amendments, there are still a number of real concerns about the subsidy schemes: how they operate and, more importantly, how they can be challenged and dealt with. I will withdraw Amendment 21 at this stage, but I seek some conversations with the department and the ministerial team before we progress to Report.
We are extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for tabling these amendments and outlining his thoughts on this incredibly complex and very difficult issue, as the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, stressed. This needs huge sensitivity in dealing with it. I do not think that we have anything to add at this stage, but we welcome the fact that a light has been shone on this issue. The feeling we had was that it is surprising that more amendments have not been tabled on this topic, but we expect that there will be more as the groups progress. For now, having heard from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Lamont, we will be extremely interested to hear the Minister’s initial response to the matters being raised.
It might indeed be an initial response, because the noble Lord has the advantage of me: I was not aware of the announcement made this afternoon by Northern Ireland’s Agriculture Minister, while we have been in Committee. However, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Fox, for tabling these amendments. I appreciate that they are intended to be helpful and generate some discussion about these issues, which I suspect will be ongoing.
I begin with Amendment 22, which would require public authorities to make an explicit statement as to whether a subsidy scheme falls under the new domestic regime or EU state aid rules before it is made. Clause 48 already makes it clear that the subsidy control requirements do not apply to a subsidy given, or a subsidy scheme made, in accordance with Article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol, nor do the requirements apply to a subsidy or subsidy scheme to which Article 138 of the EU withdrawal agreement applies.
It follows that, in the very limited number of cases where public authorities determine that schemes are operating under EU state aid law, the required information will be uploaded to the relevant EU databases on the Commission’s website. All other schemes, which represent the vast majority, will fall under the new domestic regime and be uploaded to the UK transparency database. As such, we do not consider it necessary to include a requirement on public authorities to make a statement as to whether a scheme operates under the Bill or EU state aid rules.
I thank my noble friend Lord Lamont for his comments. I understand his concerns about the interaction between the state aid regime and the subsidy control regime. I assure him that the EU state aid rules under the Northern Ireland protocol currently apply only in certain circumstances to aid that affects trade in goods and electricity between Northern Ireland and the EU. Such subsidies are within the scope of the protocol only where there is a genuine and direct link to Northern Ireland and a real, foreseeable impact on trade between Northern Ireland and the EU. The Commission’s unilateral declaration of December 2020 made it clear that Article 10 could affect a subsidy in GB only if there was a genuine and direct link in Northern Ireland. This would be the case if, for example, the beneficiary had a subsidiary in Northern Ireland.
EU state aid rules also apply under Article 138 of the withdrawal agreement in relation to aid for EU programmes and activities within the multiannual financial framework as a transitional provision. To respond to the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that state aid rules would continue to apply even if the UK’s negotiating position were accepted, these are specific and limited circumstances. I trust that this will allay the Committee’s concerns on this important issue.
Amendment 53 from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Fox, would require a mandatory referral to the CMA’s subsidy advice unit, or SAU, for any subsidy which the public authority believes has a connection to economic activity in Northern Ireland, but where that authority has decided that the proposed subsidy is not within the scope of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol. The SAU would then, as part of its report, determine whether EU rules would apply.
I am afraid that I must reject this amendment as we believe that it is unnecessary. The Government have already provided guidance for public authorities to determine in advance whether the subsidy they are planning to give will be in scope of the Northern Ireland protocol. A requirement for the subsidy advice unit to make a report in advance would needlessly delay the deployment of a large number of subsidies that are clearly not in scope of the Northern Ireland protocol. It would also significantly increase the workload of the SAU and the cost to taxpayers.
The Government have published guidance for public authorities on the Northern Ireland protocol, making it clear where it does or does not apply. This guidance was last updated in June 2021, and we will continue to update it as needed. This guidance supports public authorities to make an informed decision on whether their proposed subsidy is in scope of the Northern Ireland protocol, and there exists in the department an advisory team that any public authority can contact for additional support. We need not bring delay into the system unnecessarily.
I emphasise that this amendment is at odds with the Bill’s position that a measure that would currently fall within the scope of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol should not be subject to the rules and processes contained in this Bill. That is the whole purpose of Clause 48. This means that it cannot be referred to the SAU for any reason, and the SAU will not undertake any evaluation in relation to the protocol or the EU state aid rules. It is the responsibility of central government to ensure that the UK is compliant with those rules. As such, any subsidy in scope of the mandatory referral provisions in Clause 52 is, by definition, not in scope of the Northern Ireland protocol provisions for the application of EU state aid.
The SAU has important advisory and scrutiny functions: to evaluate public authorities’ own assessments of compliance with the subsidy control requirements; and to monitor and evaluate the operation of the domestic regime as a whole. However, it is not a regulator with responsibilities for making definitive judgments, including on whether a specific subsidy is in scope of the Northern Ireland protocol.
I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, to withdraw his amendment and other noble Lords not to press theirs.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. As much as the Government are asserting that there will not be a challenge or confusion, it is necessary to have greater clarity for those who are putting the schemes together and those who will potentially challenge some of the recipients.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, for raising the issue of reach-back. It will remain an issue. The fact that the Government state that they will take responsibility for notifying the Commission about subsidies given does not necessarily mean that they will be free from challenge. Given the fact, from our discussions with my noble friend Lord Fox, that this is fundamentally a challenge-based system, greater clarity on this matter will be important—particularly given that there could be areas of dual approach.
We all know that Northern Ireland has a high number of intermediary businesses. These are for both businesses that have activity in Northern Ireland and GB and businesses based in Ireland or the European Union that have some form of manufacturing or processing in Northern Ireland as well as in GB. These enterprises will, by definition, operate under dual systems and potentially apply for either state aid or subsidy control operations; indeed, I would be amazed if they did not. This means, therefore, that any of those applications or schemes are potentially open to challenge.
I did not agree with the Minister when she said that increasing the role to provide that certainty will represent an increased cost to taxpayers. I have read the impact assessment. If the Government are right that this applies to limited areas, I do not think that it will be a massive burden on the 19 people in the CMA who will be operating on this anyway. The Government seem to be relying on the fact that any confusion or uncertainty can be resolved by seeking advice from BEIS or Defra and the department’s subsidy control team.
Subsidy Control Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist
Main Page: Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I wish to ask the specific question of how, if this Bill includes all agricultural support without the delineated areas we have discussed previously in Committee—such as for upland farmers and areas with less favoured status—it will interact with the internal market Act.
My noble friend Lady Randerson specifically referenced hill farmers. I represented many hill farmers; I will debate with my noble friend separately the merits of Welsh lamb as opposed to Scottish Borders lamb, but it is fairly obvious which is the superior product. The point is that specific subsidy support for the type of production rather than the end product is allowed under the subsidy scheme because upland farms have less favoured area status. It was delineated.
However, the Government proposed under the internal market legislation that no discrimination would be allowed on any of the end product—the lamb. We allowed that discrimination because of the less favoured area status for hill farming. I question whether, if all this is now wrapped into the subsidy Bill, this is open to challenge in terms of competition and non-discrimination, as specific support for the production of one product—lamb—will be provided to certain farmers in certain areas but will not be available to others who do not have less favoured area status.
This Bill removes all those delineated areas. Presumably, all that is now within scope of the internal market Act. That means, I think, that none of this area of support can have the assured status that it did beforehand. I strongly support my noble friend’s efforts to get clarity on this.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, and the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, for tabling this amendment and for their concern for the agricultural sector. This amendment seeks to exempt agricultural subsidies and schemes from the requirements of the new domestic regime. I appreciate that the devolved Administrations are particularly concerned about the inclusion of agriculture in the new domestic regime. This issue has come up during our regular engagement, both at ministerial and official level. We have worked hard to understand concerns here, particularly in relation to existing schemes and how they might be considered under the new regime, as well as in relation to the development of guidance on the principles. We have sought to reassure that existing schemes and subsidies will be able to continue indefinitely.
I am grateful to the Minister for her response on the points that I raised, but does she accept that agriculture is a very different industry from the others covered by this sort of Bill and should have its own legislation? She mentioned consultation. What was the response to consultation from the agriculture industry and the farming unions?
While I absolutely accept that the agriculture industry is completely different from others that will be covered by the Bill for many of the cultural reasons that have been brought up by others, I do not have the information that the noble Lord requests, but we will write, because we undoubtedly have it back in the department.
Less favoured area status was mentioned by my noble friend. In Scotland, 86% of the land has less favoured area status. If we have gained, as we have over many years, a reputation for prime Scotch beef, for example, it has been done by an integration of finishing farmers and suckler cow premiums on the hills. The Minister said that that could be a legacy scheme, but we are doing trade deals with New Zealand and Australia, which may want to challenge that. I think that people want reassurances that such schemes, legacy or adapted in future, will not fall foul of the implications of the Bill. That is the sort of concern that our farmers are facing at the moment.
I register those concerns. Consultation with the devolved Administrations continues, but I repeat that the subsidy schemes of each devolved Administration can be devised in the context of the particular differentiation between each separate authority.
I do not think the Minister addressed the point regarding the interaction with the UK internal market Act, which has also given rise to some concerns. She said that the Bill would be able to focus on agriculture-specific market failures. As my noble friend indicated, it is not market failure as such; it is the circumstances in which the industry operates. Is the Minister saying that, for all these schemes, the CMA will be the unique body that now determines the viability of all the geographical areas? The CMA is the body that has the authority under this Bill to consider whether the schemes are operating according to the principles. Defining what market failure would be within agriculture, on the different types of land, will now ultimately be for the CMA, which is a ridiculous situation to be in.
I reassure the noble Lord that the CMA has an advisory function; the tribunal will be the body that decides. The subsidies will be devised by the local authority, or the devolved Administration, so that they can use the CMA for advice.
To go back to the earlier point, the Bill will allow the Scottish Government to provide subsidies to less favoured areas should they so wish.
To reiterate, the CMA has only an advisory function. It is the responsibility of the public authority to decide.
We have to read this debate in the context of the previous debates. As the Minister has previously said, the Government want to move away from delineating support for geographical areas, so it is utterly pointless to say that a scheme for less favoured area status could be devised, because the flexibility from this Bill means that Glasgow could provide any agricultural subsidy to any farm anywhere, which is frankly ridiculous.
If it is not the CMA’s responsibility under this Bill, it is the competition tribunal’s. How on earth will the competition tribunal have the capacity to judge all the areas for geographical support, for agricultural support and for industry support? It seems a bit of a nonsense.
The public authorities can devise their own schemes according to their own policy priorities, as long as they comply with the principles of the Bill.
Let me give a specific example. Herefordshire County Council decides, within the seven principles of the Bill, to subsidise the production of beef in Herefordshire, brands it “Herefordshire beef from Hereford animals”, and then markets it in Aberdeenshire at a rate that undercuts Aberdeen Angus or whatever it is that my noble friend Lord Bruce is peddling in his area. It seems to me that this Bill puts in place a chaotic situation that cannot be managed. We do not know what an area is, we are allowing flexibility for any authority to take action as long as it sits within the seven principles, and then we are going to rely on the CAT to adjudicate. Is this really what the Government have in mind?
I think a lot of this overlaps with the internal market Act, which we will debate at length on a later group of amendments. All I can say is that the set of principles will cover the position of the Herefordshire farmer.
This has been an interesting debate. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will understand my point when I say that, as a former Assembly Member for Cardiff Central, I did not think I would be leading on a debate on agriculture—at one point I still had a farm in my constituency, but they built on it.
I learned a lot about agriculture as a Minister in two Governments. I learned about the concept, which comes up time and again, that farming is a way of life. It is a way of life wherever you are a farmer. I have lived in East Anglia and it even applies there where you have the grain barons, because if your farm fails, you lose your home. That is what makes things different from most other occupations. All speakers, with the exception of the Minister, have echoed my concerns.
I want to pick up a couple of points very briefly. Clause 41 refers to a specific amount of money for subsidy below which you will not have transparency. That amount of money is astronomical in relation to subsidies for farming and totally inappropriate. If those figures are used, there will be no transparency even for subsidies of the largest order for the largest farms. That cannot be right.
This is, of course, a probing amendment and I am specifically seeking information on how the special circumstances of agriculture will be dealt with. I hope the Minister will send us some very long letters to explain the situation because there are so many complexities and contradictions in the Government’s position. The EU treated subsidy as exceptional, in general, and something that must be justified, but it treated agricultural subsidy as normalised within a strict policy structure. The WTO treats agricultural subsidy as normalised, but the Government are now apparently applying the approach where subsidy is exceptional for agriculture. That is the basis of the seven principles. You cannot apply those seven principles in the same way that you do to other industries and businesses. Agriculture is not subsidised because of market failures; it is subsidised to ensure supply of a basic requirement of life at a reasonable price. The complexity of the Government’s situation is made worse because of the uncertainties already being felt within the market from the trade deals with Australia and New Zealand which provide additional hurdles.
There are a couple of points I would like to address now, and obviously I will cover the other points in greater length in writing. Just to reassure the noble Baroness, on the minimum financial assistance in the Bill that she referred to, for most subsidies, including agriculture, it is £315,000 rather than the figures in Clause 41. If the figures are far too high for agriculture, then they will simply be exempt from the requirements and none of those concerns will apply. We are looking at whether the £315,000 is set at the right level, and we have the power to change it for specific sectors.
In answer to the noble Baroness’s question, I am afraid that we did not ask respondents to the consultation where they were based because it is a UK-wide regime, but we will write with more detail if we have it back in the department.
Lastly, as the noble Baroness brought up the difference between the WTO and the EU regimes, I just say that the Agreement on Agriculture within the WTO and the new subsidy control regime fulfil very different purposes. The AoA is an international agreement aimed at reducing distortion of international trade in agriculture; the proposed domestic subsidy control regime facilitates compliance with our international commitments but goes beyond this by protecting UK competition and investment. The WTO provisions are no substitute for a domestic subsidy control regime. The EU is a case in point of a system that has both WTO subsidy commitments and its own internal regime, and this is the approach that we are taking for subsidies in all sectors in the UK.
I will write with any further responses that I need to make, having reviewed Hansard in the morning.
I thank the Minister for that. I fear that she makes my point for me in terms of Clause 41. My argument is that there needs to be transparency on this, and the amounts of money are set so high that there will not be that transparency. If this scheme is going to work on a farm-by-farm basis, which is what it will have to do, the Government will need to set separate, different and lower figures for agriculture. The Government really need to go away and look at this again.
Please could the Government consider applying some real-life worked examples of how this would apply in different parts of the UK—even within different parts of England? They need to be worked through, and public authorities need to have further information on how this would work. I urge the Government to discuss this issue with local authorities and the devolved Governments before the walls of our systems are bulldozed through in the latter stages of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Subsidy Control Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist
Main Page: Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 62 and 63. Amendment 62 seems pretty basic post-legislative scrutiny, so I am not quite sure why it is not in the Bill already. The Government are bringing in this legislation and it makes sense for the Competition and Markets Authority to report on whether the legislation works in practice. That is fairly fundamental, is it not? If it does not, then, obviously, we can improve the legislation; if it does, then the Government can pat themselves on the back. The amendment should have been in the Bill. I am expecting the Minister to say, “Yes, of course, we’ll write it in now.”
On Amendment 63—I wish I had added my name to it; I agree with everything that we have heard so far from noble Lords—I have said before that we should have a provision such as this in every single piece of legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, just said, it is basic to what the Government claim to care about. The principle should underpin everything that they do. We know that the scale and size of the net-zero problem is huge, and the Government will need a lot of help. They will need a lot of private and public investment, and it will involve a lot of changes to government taxation and spending.
Any aspect of government that thinks that the climate emergency is not part of its remit is not thinking hard enough about it. We need both the whole of government and the whole of society to address the work on the climate and ecological emergencies. Every Bill that comes through here, every tax levied and every pound of government spending should move us towards net zero. There is an environmental saying: doing nothing risks everything. The Minister will say that the Government are doing a lot. I would argue that they are doing bits and pieces, so the saying could be: doing bits and pieces risks everything as well. We need a coherent approach.
I was asked whether I would still like a meeting with the Minister. Yes, I would, and I would like to throw down a little challenge. If the Minister or his team can come up with any issue that is not relevant to our climate emergency, I will be happy to argue how it is relevant. I look forward to that meeting, and I might bring some heavyweights with me.
My Lords, each year, the CMA is required by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 to prepare a report on its activities and performance that year. The report must be sent to the Secretary of State and laid before Parliament.
Clause 66 requires that the CMA include details within its annual report of any subsidies and schemes which have been referred to the subsidy advice unit in that year. This includes referrals made on both a mandatory or voluntary basis, including those made by the Secretary of State, and it is designed to mirror the level of detail required for information on the CMA’s other functions. This information will help to provide transparency as to the number and types of subsidies and schemes referred to the subsidy advice unit. Among other things, it will help both the CMA and Parliament to understand whether the subsidy advice unit is operating as expected and has the appropriate resources to fulfil its functions.
Amendment 62 would add the requirement for the CMA to set out an assessment on the extent to which the regime is meeting its stated policy objectives. On this matter, it is important to draw a clear distinction between the purpose of the CMA’s reporting under this clause, as opposed to the more in-depth review and reporting that it will do under Clause 65. The effect of this amendment will be to combine the purpose of these two distinct categories of report, and in doing so place an unnecessary burden on the CMA in producing its annual report.
In response to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, on what effect the CMA reports will have, the monitoring reports will already be published for all to see. The Bill contains numerous provisions for amending specific aspects of the regime though secondary legislation. This ensures proper parliamentary scrutiny of any proposed changes to the regime. The purpose of the subsidy advice unit’s regime-level monitoring function is to provide an objective source of information about the functioning of the new system. This feeds into the Government’s objective of monitoring and continuous improvement for the regime, while also providing confidence in the regime to stakeholders and the public across the UK. Requiring more frequent monitoring reports from the CMA, with improved scrutiny and transparency, might indeed seem attractive but in reality, it could cause the opposite effect to that intended by the noble Baroness, resulting in more superficial reports that will be less useful in assessing the overall effectiveness of the subsidy regime.
The information required by Clause 66 is designed to sit within the CMA’s existing reporting requirements. The annual report is a descriptive and limited tool for the CMA to publish key information about its workload and resources and to ensure that it is moving towards achieving its own organisational objectives across all its functions. This report must include summaries of its significant decisions, investigations or other activities carried out during the previous year.
As currently drafted, the requirements under this clause similarly require summary descriptive information in relation to the subsidy advice unit’s functions, which will give an indication of how those functions are being used and whether it has the appropriate resource to fulfil the demand for those functions. This should be placed in contrast to the five-yearly reports specific to the subsidy advice unit under Clause 65, which will provide the CMA with the opportunity to publish a substantive analysis of the operation of the regime and the subsidy advice unit’s role within that regime. Of course, the CMA may include further data or case studies on subsidy control in its annual report if appropriate. Clause 66 is only a minimum list of the information that it will be required to include.
Under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, the CMA must also include a survey of developments in relation to all its functions, which may include developments within the subsidy control regime that the CMA deems of significant enough importance to publish, and thereby inform Parliament. The Government’s position is that the five-yearly reporting under Clause 65 is the appropriate place for the CMA to provide an assessment of the regime’s performance. The five-yearly report provides for an appropriate timescale for producing such assessments and the CMA is empowered under Clause 67 to gather information for this purpose. This will provide the CMA with the time and resources necessary for the subsidy advice unit to provide for a considered review of the subsidy control regime.
Amendment 62 also requires that the SAU produce its assessment only
“on the basis of the reports it has prepared”.
It is our view that any assessment of the regime’s performance will need to take a much wider view of the regime than only that part of it to which the SAU has reported that year. That is why the five-yearly reporting requirement in Clause 65 has been drafted to give the CMA the scope and power it needs to consider the matter thoroughly. Supplementing those powers with additional requirements in the annual report may only lead to the production of an assessment that is relatively narrow and partial, and that does not have the benefits of a more extensive review over a longer period.
I support the view that there may be circumstances in which we need more analytical and evaluative information more frequently than every five years. I would like to reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State has the power under Clause 65 to direct the SAU to produce a report for a specified period. It is also worth noting that, under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, the Secretary of State already has the power to request a report or advice from the CMA on any matter relating to its functions.
Regarding parliamentary scrutiny, there should be no reason for any committee of this House or the other place to wait for the CMA’s reporting under either Clause 65 or Clause 66 in order to take a close look at the subsidy advice unit’s functions. It is always open to noble Lords and honourable Members of the other place to examine this regime and the SAU through the usual process of parliamentary committee.
Amendment 63 would expand the scope of the CMA’s annual report to include an assessment of the effect that the regime is having on the UK’s ability to achieve its net-zero carbon emissions goal, set out in the Climate Change Act 2008, and the targets set under the Environment Act 2021.
Given that the UK has committed to a 50% cut by 2030, a review that takes place only every five years does not seem wholly practical, given that we have only eight years.
It is the Government’s position that five-yearly reports are sufficiently frequent to take a view of how successful this is. They are the appropriate tool to conduct a review of the environment and energy principles. Clause 65 provides an achievable timescale for delivering complex and substantive analysis of this sort. To ask that we prepare something every year would be an unnecessary burden on the whole subsidy control regime and the structures we have put in place to support this.
The CMA will have the ability to gather all the information needed to conduct such an analysis for these five-yearly reports, through Clause 67. These are powers that the CMA will not have in relation to its annual reports. I therefore humbly request that the noble Baroness withdraw the amendment.
The other day, we discussed the inclusion of agriculture in the Bill, but the Government have made it clear that, basically, the future of all agriculture subsidy will be environmental objectives. The Minister’s reply to my noble friend’s amendment suggests that she agrees that agriculture should not really be covered by this approach, or that it should at least be treated substantially differently. What she has said, effectively, is that we cannot judge the environmental side; we have to approach it in the same way as every other sector.
On the specific point about agriculture, I do not know whether the letter addressing those points has been issued yet. I can say that 99.5% of subsidies given to the agriculture industry in the UK would not fall within the remit of the subsidy; they are lower. We do not have the data for Scotland or Wales, but it captures only the very largest subsidy given to the very largest farms. That may include some in Scotland with that sort of acreage—
I hope that that addresses the noble Lord’s concerns.
Can I ask the Minister about her remarks about the OEP’s remit? I think that she said that it would cover whether the Government are meeting their climate change requirements. However, the OEP’s remit does not cover whether the subsidy control regime is working towards our net-zero targets. What the amendments are trying to say—as we tried to include in the Financial Services Act and the pensions Act, successfully—is that a more granular approach will be needed, which has to be provided by the regulatory authorities within the sectors concerned because, otherwise, we really will not know whether each sector is working towards the net-zero targets that we are all trying to achieve in the timespan that we have.
One of the noble Baroness’s concerns was that there was no overarching principle for the Government’s drive towards net zero. I think that the Environment Act provides the overarching context for whatever we are doing. As I say, the Office for Environmental Protection will also scrutinise the Government’s progress towards targets annually. I do not know what further level of granularity the noble Baroness wishes to apply.
There is also the Climate Change Act, as my noble friend has just reminded me.
I shall not repeat what I have said, but I do not think that the OEP will be able to tell us whether the subsidy control regime is working in the way that subsidies are being allocated in terms of meeting our climate change requirements. There is precedent in this, as I keep saying, with the Financial Services Act and pensions Act, and the actions that the Pensions Regulator took on the back of that Act. They all speak volumes as to how important it is to have each sector being held to account. Those are the points that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made. Every single sector within the country needs to be shown to be pulling its weight and we need to know where we have to put in greater effort, if it is not working towards the net-zero targets.
I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns, but I am not able to go further than I have done at the Dispatch Box. On the point that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, made about the steel industry, followed up by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, we are directing subsidies towards greening industries like that, so we can invest in electric arc technology, and hydrogen as well. It is part of an overall drive by this Government to be consistent with the environment principles that we have laid out.
But can the Minister see our point that the climate emergency has to be part of every part of government thinking and at the moment it is not? It just gets dropped out of piece after piece of legislation as if it was not really part of government thinking. It is all right talking about zero carbon, about how we are on our way and all that sort of thing, but if it is not in every single piece of legislation, it will not happen.
We are just going to have to agree to disagree on this point. I believe that it is part of the overarching principles of this Government that the environment is one of our most important points. I do not believe that it needs to go on to the face of every Bill. I know that it is in the pensions legislation, but I cannot go further than I have already gone at the Dispatch Box in the context of this Bill.
My Lords, given how huge this area is in terms of the amount of public money that gets spent and given that the Government have a public commitment to net zero, it seems astonishing that we do not have the legislation blended in to this Bill. We are not talking about minor amounts of money; we are talking about the way in which whole communities live, work and operate.
I remind the noble Baroness that we have a legal commitment to net zero.
I thank the Minister for her full response to the two amendments before us. In the contributions that have been made both in the debate and in our following up and further probing, there is a sense that we have to go into this more deeply.
Again, we are asking for the same principles that we have talked about with regard to many of these issues around clarity, sense of purpose and benefit. I do not believe that public authorities will find some of this assessment and monitoring onerous, including having to account for the subsidies that they put forward. That is part of established practice and it needs to be formalised in the sense put forward by my noble friend Lord McNicol in Amendment 62, with annual reports as a mechanism for picking it up.
I absolutely agree on the issue of five-yearly reports. We are already in 2022. Are we saying that the first report into progress in these areas around net zero will not be heard until 2027—possibly even 2028, with the way things are going? That cannot be what the Government intend, given the urgency of the situation in front of us in moving towards net zero.
I will not unpick all the excellent points made by noble Lords in this debate because I know that we will come back to this area. I look forward to hearing how we can bring this together and come up with a sensible way forward. As I said in my opening remarks, if we carry on with the Bill in its current form, we will be sitting on a missed opportunity to do something constructive and positive—particularly, in the context of this debate, around net zero but also, looking further afield, in the wider area of levelling up. The climate emergency is a major contributor to the unequal experience of people right across the four nations. Addressing the matters raised in this discussion would be a sensible way forward. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I want to add to that list of questions. Does the Minister have any information on where the CMA is to be based? It is one thing if it is in London, and quite different if it is in Cardiff, Glasgow, Birmingham or Manchester, for example. One of the concerns is the constant pressure that the devolved Administrations have against the south-east and London-based administrations. If there were some way in which the CMA could locate itself further away from the south-east and closer to other areas, that would at least be to some advantage.
My Lords, Clause 68 requires that the CMA establishes a new committee of its board called the subsidy advice unit for the purposes of undertaking the subsidy control functions set out elsewhere in the Bill. I recognise that nothing I can say at the Dispatch Box will completely allay the fears of the DAs that this is a power grab or that we have malevolent intent in all this. All I can say is that the Government are very well aware of these issues. We talk about them constantly and will endeavour to continue the dialogue as we go forward on many fronts.
To return to these amendments, the subsidy advice unit will be a specific committee within the CMA dealing with subsidy control. It will comprise exclusively staff and members of the CMA. In this instance, “members” of the CMA refers to, among others, the chair and individuals who sit on the CMA board, the CMA panel of competition experts and the office for the internal market panel and its chair; “staff” refers to the civil servants employed by the CMA.
Amendment 64 seeks to allow the CMA chair to appoint to the subsidy advice unit non-executive members
“with relevant experience in relation to each of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.”
The CMA was chosen as the home of the subsidy advice unit because of its experience and credibility in acting as a regulator and adviser in matters of competition and consumer law on a UK-wide basis. In carrying out its new functions under the SAU, the CMA will continue to act as it always has successfully, with the whole of the UK in mind.
It is notable that the amendment does not make any mention of “relevant experience” in relation to England, perhaps implying that the CMA already has an excess of England expertise but a deficit in relation to the other parts of the UK. I cannot possibly agree with the noble Lord on that point, if indeed that was the implication.
The amendment is unnecessary because the CMA can and does already recruit to the unit personnel with “relevant experience” in relation to all its functions, various different markets and all parts of the UK. The CMA has an excellent track record of recruitment and retention of staff and members from across the UK, and currently employs staff in Belfast, Cardiff, Edinburgh and London. The CMA has already undertaken external recruitment to a number of posts in the SAU. These were advertised on a location-neutral basis and were open to applicants willing to be based in any of the CMA’s existing offices. It is unnecessary to impose excessive and unhelpful complexity on the CMA’s recruitment process when it has already proved quite capable of finding persons with the “relevant experience” to carry out its functions.
I turn to Amendment 65. Part 4 of the Subsidy Control Bill represents an important pillar of the new domestic regime. The additional flexibility that public authorities will enjoy to design bespoke subsidies and schemes and quickly bring them to fruition to address identified policy problems must be balanced by a proportionate mechanism to provide an appropriate degree of scrutiny. This scrutiny will be crucial for the most potentially distortive subsidies and schemes, which is why the SAU has been given a role in advising public authorities before they award the most potentially distortive subsides or schemes. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, I say that neither the SAU nor the Secretary of State will be able to block a subsidy being awarded.
The CMA will also have the role of monitoring the efficacy of the entire regime through a periodic review and report to Parliament. This will ensure appropriate oversight and scrutiny of the regime by Parliament to confirm that it remains relevant to the needs of the whole of the UK.
Amendment 65 requires that the Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the CMA’s capacity to fulfil its new functions under Part 4 of the Bill and make a Statement to both Houses on their findings. If the Secretary of State finds that the CMA is not sufficiently resourced, their report to Parliament must also outline the steps the Government intend to take to address this. I appreciate the noble Lord’s intention and that this is a probing amendment to ensure that the CMA is properly prepared to carry out its new statutory functions. I therefore offer the following statement on preparations for the new subsidy advice unit.
The CMA was allocated funding of some £20.3 million at the spending review in 2020 to establish three new functions within the CMA: the subsidy control function, the office for the internal market and the digital markets unit. Following the 2021 spending review, this budget of around £20.3 million will be maintained for the next three years. The CMA will continue to allocate funding in the 2022-23 financial year to reflect the estimate of resources needed to establish the new subsidy advice unit. This estimate reflects both the functions set out in the Bill on introduction, and the estimated number of subsidies and schemes of interest and particular interest that would be referred to the SAU.
The estimated case load of around 20 cases of both categories per year was arrived at using the methodologies set out in the Bill’s impact assessment. There is unavoidable uncertainty in this estimation, since the SAU’s referral functions are new and unprecedented. However, Her Majesty’s Government remain confident that this represents a reasonable estimate based on the best available evidence.
In terms of recruitment, to establish the SAU, the CMA has estimated that approximately 50 new posts will need to be created across all its professions. The CMA has recently undertaken external recruitment to fill several policy and project management posts in the subsidy advice unit, as well as allocating resource internally. The CMA will continue to recruit to its pools of economist, legal and business adviser resource over the coming months. The CMA is looking to recruit staff with a range of skills and experience, which includes building on its core competition expertise, as well ensuring the necessary skills in areas such as stakeholder engagement.
Before the Minister concludes, I listened carefully to her comprehensive reply, for which I thank her. I think I heard her mention an additional 50 posts. The impact assessment indicated an assumed additional headcount of 19. What happened between when the impact assessment was put together and the current commitment was made? Presumably, there is an understanding that the role is much greater than when the impact assessment was put together.
Secondly, given that agriculture and fisheries will be involved, can the Minister assure us that those with a specific understanding of the geographical, agricultural and fisheries market—as opposed to the other sectors, which previously the CMA did not have—have been part of the recruitment process? At the moment there is no indication that they have.
On the noble Lord’s first point, it has been a year since the Bill was introduced and therefore things have moved on since the impact assessment was done. On his second point, we are looking for a broad range of expertise that will enable the CMA and the SAU to fulfil their functions.
Can I ask that in future, all impact assessments be given a time lapse, so we know how many weeks they last for, until such time as they cease to be? Seriously, if one year on the impact assessment for this means that the number of people triples, then it was not necessarily a very accurate impact assessment.
I wonder if, in concluding, the Minister could indicate the deadline for when the 50 extra advertised posts have to be filled? She may have to do so in writing, I understand that. Also, what is the difference between those who will be allocated to the traditional work of the CMA—competition, mergers and anti-trust—and those on the subsidy side of this split? They are distinct areas of work and quite distinct skills are needed. At some stage, could the Minister also tell me how many lawyers have been recruited so far, and how many they are short of. That would be very helpful.
I think the noble Lord might have to declare an interest on that front, but we will let that lie. I will have to write to him with the specifics on this. Obviously, recruitment is an ongoing process that will continue throughout the next year.
Before the Minister sits down, I have what is meant to be a helpful question. Given that there may be a need for expertise in certain areas in the work of the CMA—expertise it does not have in house—could staff be taken on on a secondment basis to overcome the restriction in subsection (4) referred to earlier? This would provide the expertise for the duration necessary in undertaking specialist areas of investigation. I do not expect an immediate answer, but perhaps the Government might consider it.
The noble Lord makes a very interesting point. It does have operational independence, and I am sure that is something it would be able to consider.
I thank the Minister for her detailed response. When she, the other Minister or the department reply, could the letter be shared between all those who have spoken in this debate?
I have one other question—and I do not expect the Minister to have the answer just now. She talked about a budget of £20.3 million being divided between the SAU, digital and one other body. Could we have the split between the three of them, because they have three distinctive functions, and the one we are concerned about and talking about is the funding of the SAU?
Likewise, I listened in detail but I am not clear whether I missed the point about why Clause 68(4) is so prescriptive and detailed in stating that the SAU will consist
“only of persons who are members of the CMA or its staff”.
If it is that prescriptive, it seems to rule out the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, so maybe it could be opened up a little.
The Minister, in referring to some of the concerns and issues around devolved authorities, said that the department was well aware of them. These amendments are meant to be helpful and to try to create, foster and build a better relationship—as the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, has outlined—especially as we move from European state aid to our own authorities being able to create and deliver subsidies. One hopes that there are some things in not just this small group of amendments but other groups that will help to generate and foster that better relationship between central government and the devolved authorities. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Subsidy Control Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist
Main Page: Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before I turn to this amendment, I want to take this opportunity to correct the record. During the fourth Committee session of the Subsidy Control Bill on 9 February, I stated that data for England from the Rural Payments Agency showed
“that 99.5% of subsidies given to the agriculture industry in the UK would not fall within the remit of the subsidy”.—[Official Report, 9/2/22; col. GC 428.]
This figure was also provided in a letter dated 8 February responding to the points raised by several noble Lords during the third Committee session on 7 February. Late last week, the data was reviewed, uncovering a calculation error. In reality, Rural Payments Agency data for England shows 96.4% and not 99.5% of farm payment recipients are paid below the level of the minimal financial assistance threshold. I wish to clearly correct that for the record today.
But my conclusion still stands. The vast majority of agricultural subsidies will indeed fall below the MFA threshold and will not be subject to the substantive subsidy control rules, including the principles. It is only the largest subsidies, many of which will be to relatively large and well-off landowners, that will need to be assessed to ensure they comply with the common sense principles in this regime.
I turn to Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Baroness, Baroness Randerson—I wish her a speedy recovery—which was so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie. It seeks to add an additional principle to Schedule 1 that would require agricultural subsidies to be connected to the purposes listed under Section 1 of the Agriculture Act 2020. It would also require subsidies for agriculture to take particular account of areas of agricultural disadvantage and levels of marginality of land.
The subsidy control principles set out in Schedule 1 to the Bill are designed to apply equally to all strands of the UK economy. Their central purpose is to help protect domestic competition and investment, as well as trade and investment between the UK and other countries, from undue distortion which can arise from the giving of subsidies. This amendment, however, would radically depart from this. It would create a new principle which is not aimed at reducing distortion to competition, investment, or trade and is of no relevance to most types of subsidies.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is quite correct: I am fully aware of the concerns of the farmers’ unions—particularly those in Wales, whose representatives I have met—and indeed those of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. I reassure both noble Lords, however, that nothing in the new system will work against the granting of subsidies because, building on what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, both agricultural and non-agricultural subsidies have much in common and need to work together to support rural economies.
The Bill establishes a clear, flexible framework for granting subsidies and will not inhibit public authorities from taking into account areas of agricultural disadvantage if they wish to do so. Agriculture is of course an area of devolved policy under the devolution settlements of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Spending decisions on agriculture are for the UK Government on behalf of England, and the three devolved Administrations in the areas in which they exercise their responsibilities. It is for them alone to take these spending decisions, so long as they are compliant with their domestic and international obligations, including the subsidy control regime. I cannot accept an amendment that would have the effect of putting further constraints on how devolved authorities exercise their powers.
My noble friend the Duke of Montrose rightly mentioned that the existing agricultural schemes and subsidies will be able to continue. The Bill provides broad and flexible grandfathering provisions for legacy schemes. Subsidies and schemes in existence prior to the Subsidy Control Bill coming into force may continue indefinitely if provided for under the original terms of the scheme. The Bill does not require subsidies made under legacy schemes to carry out an assessment of compliance against the subsidy control principles.
In particular, I cannot accept a reference to the Agriculture Act in this Bill. This section of the Agriculture Act is an excellent list of legitimate reasons to give financial assistance, many examples of which will be considered subsidies under the definition in the Bill. But I do not know whether my counterparts in the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive would welcome the application of this largely England-only legislation to their own agricultural policy, when it was never intended to serve that purpose.
The Bill has been designed to support public authorities in giving subsidies in line with their policy goals and the specific circumstances of their areas of responsibility, and the subsidy control principles are conducive to that. Principle A, for example, sets out that subsidies or schemes must be designed to remedy a market failure or address an equity concern. A subsidy designed to address agricultural disadvantage could certainly fall under one or both of these categories, depending on the type of disadvantage meant. Indeed, the Government’s amendment to add “local or regional disadvantage”, as an example of an equity rationale, underlines that.
Marginality of land may also need to be factored into the design of the subsidy or scheme where it is relevant. The subsidy control principles require a public authority to design their subsidies and schemes to change the economic behaviour of the beneficiaries, and to limit the subsidy to what is necessary to bring about the policy objective. It may very well be relevant to take into account the marginality of land to ensure that these principles are met. Fundamentally, however, it is not for the subsidy control regime to dictate whether agricultural subsidies—whether given by Defra, the devolved Governments or another authority—should account for less favourable pastoral land. In many cases it may well be appropriate for agricultural subsidies to factor in unfavourable conditions faced by farmers. However, this is for the public authorities themselves to determine and to incorporate into the terms and conditions of their own schemes.
The noble Lord, Lord McNicol, mentioned the common frameworks. The new domestic subsidy control arrangements and the UK common framework on agriculture are complementary. The inclusion of agriculture in the domestic subsidy regime will minimise the risk of distortions to UK competition and investment and ensure consistency across sectors. The common UK frameworks will enable policy proposals to be discussed and areas of disagreement resolved.
I hope I have managed to reassure noble Lords and, for the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, to withdraw the amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and all noble Lords who have taken part in this important and useful debate. There are just two or three things that need to be picked up. The noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, started off with some sympathy for what we were saying but then turned against it, citing the continuation of the existing schemes. As the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, pointed out in his intervention, however, the world is changing—rapidly—and it may well be that, in the coming years, new schemes may be introduced and therefore that assurance would not have validity. Indeed, there is a general concern that marginal farms could be bought up by big institutions and squeezed out of existence.
I take the Minister’s point about the Agriculture Act, but we just wanted to make sure that we could add into the Bill the very good principles in the Act. I accept that it applies to England, but it would be very surprising if the Government of Scotland took issue with the principles in it. The point, nevertheless, is that farmers want an assurance that the support that they have had under various schemes since the Second World War is likely to continue in some form or other. There is a very real worry that that is not the direction of travel in which the Government are heading. That the matter is devolved does not preclude it also costing a significant amount of money, which previously came from the European Union’s common agricultural policy and now has to fall on the budget of the devolved Administrations.
I hope the Minister will understand, therefore, that the reason we are trying to put this in the Bill is to set out an explicit assurance that marginality will be a criterion that will be encouraged, just as a minor detail. Moreover, if that is in the Bill, it will make it more difficult for New Zealand or Australia, for example, to suggest that the subsidy is somehow incompatible with a trade agreement. Speaking with the experience of an MP for a farming constituency, I can assure the House that the suckler cow premium and the hill farmers have been the basis of building up the pre-eminence of Scotch beef and Aberdeen Angus beef. It is a system that has worked extremely well. Take the subsidies away from the hill farmers and prime Scotch beef will be much harder to deliver economically. The same applies to lamb in Wales and in Scotland. The hills of Scotland, Wales, the Borders and the Lake District without lambs and sheep would not be the attraction that they have been in the past.
I regret to say that I do not think that the Minister’s assurances go far enough, and I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Subsidy Control Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist
Main Page: Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the amendments in the name of my noble friend address the findings of the 17th report of this Session by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The report’s recommendations on the powers that the Bill delegates to Ministers have been endorsed with vigour by your Lordships’ House. This is a clear indicator of the high regard in which the DPRRC’s expertise is held, and I am sure that that will continue under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord McLoughlin, to whom my noble friend wrote last week to set out how the Government were addressing the committee’s concerns with regard to the Bill.
As various noble Lords have noted throughout the passage of the Bill, the DPRRC’s report took issue with some of the ways in which it delegated specific powers to Ministers. I trust it will be reassuring to noble Lords that the amendments I shall now speak to respond to those concerns.
First, Amendment 7 amends Clause 10. Clause 10 provides, among other things, that Ministers may make streamlined subsidy schemes to facilitate the granting of subsidies in accordance with the subsidy control requirements. Streamlined subsidy schemes would be laid before both Houses of Parliament after they are made or amended. The DPRRC report recommended that the power to make streamlined subsidy schemes should be exercised by regulations, and that the negative procedure would be appropriate.
I am pleased to say that Amendment 7 does, I believe, meet the spirit of the committee’s proposal. The amendment provides for every new or modified streamlined subsidy scheme to be subject to the negative resolution procedure, meaning that either House of Parliament may resolve not to approve the scheme within 40 days of it being laid. I remain of the view that the nature of these schemes means that the power to make them should not be exercised by regulations. Specifically, they are designed to be easily comprehensible and used by smaller public authorities and include numerous economic criteria that would not be easily expressed in the form of regulations.
I turn to Amendments 10 to 13 to Clause 16, which concerns short-term export credit insurance as provided by UK Export Finance. The committee’s report recommended that the power to amend the list of marketable risk countries, which is included in Clause 16, should be exercised by regulations subject to a parliamentary procedure, instead of by ministerial direction. I trust the House will be reassured to hear that the Government fully accept the recommendation of the report and these amendments achieve this effect.
Amendments 15 to 17 relate to Clauses 25 to 27, which provide for definitions of “deposit taker”, “insurance company” and “insurer” respectively. The clauses include a power for the Treasury to change the definitions in these clauses via regulations. The committee took the view that the Government have not identified with sufficient precision the circumstances in which these powers would be necessary, and consequently recommended that the powers given to the Treasury to amend these definitions be removed from the Bill. The Government accept this recommendation of the DPRRC’s report. Amendments 15 to 17 will remove from the Bill these powers to make regulations in Clauses 25 to 27.
I turn to the committee’s recommendations on the much-debated Clause 47. Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that Amendments 45 and 46 respond to these concerns. The DPRRC raised several concerns on the drafting of Clause 47, in particular subsection (7). I will restate briefly the Government’s position on the necessity of this clause.
The flexibility to delay publication of a financial stability direction is important where that publication would prematurely disclose the existence of a subsidy. Immediately disclosing certain subsidies could potentially cause further damage to confidence in the recipient enterprise, cause a run on that recipient, and damage wider market confidence. While it may be possible to interpret Clause 47(6) as allowing for a delay in publication, that is not the intended purpose of the subsection, which is intended to provide for a duty of publication. The Government’s view is that it is much more appropriate to provide for an explicit process for delay in publication, with a limited and specific condition for such a delay. This is what the Government have done in subsection (7).
The absence of a parliamentary procedure is not to prevent non-approval of the direction by Parliament, but rather to ensure that the effectiveness of any intervention is not impaired by fear among stakeholders that support could be withdrawn. If there is concern that support could be withdrawn, there is a material risk that a recipient enterprise will reject the support offered or that the market will not be reassured by such support. That is why similar powers to act without parliamentary approval are provided for in the special resolution regime, reflecting the importance of legal certainty for the success of emergency interventions.
As the DPRRC report on this provision made clear, legal certainty was one of several factors considered in relation to a parliamentary procedure for this measure and was not the sole deciding factor for choosing the process in Clause 47. Other factors included protecting information flows and necessary secrecy in certain circumstances, and the speed of deployment.
Amendment 46 makes provision for a delay in publication of a financial stability direction in the event that the Treasury considers that doing so would undermine the purpose of issuing the direction. The amendment makes explicit the need to publish a direction and lay it before Parliament when doing so would no longer undermine the reason it was given. It constitutes a temporary delay in publication, not permanent secrecy, as was perceived by the committee, but which I assure noble Lords was never the Government’s intention. This amendment makes that explicit.
Clause 47(6) requires the Treasury to publish a direction in whatever manner the Treasury sees appropriate. In direct response to concerns regarding parliamentary accountability, Amendment 45 adds to this subsection the requirement for the Treasury to lay a direction in Parliament when publishing a direction. This ensures a direct route for parliamentary visibility of a direction in addition to the requirement in Clause 47(6) to publish a direction to the public. The Government fully agree with the committee: parliamentary scrutiny is vital to our democracy and this Government will not try to avoid it.
To further assuage the concerns of the House, I am happy to announce that my honourable friend in the other place, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, has written to the Public Accounts Committee and the Treasury Committee; these letters commit to confidentially notify the chairs of the use of a financial stability direction to disapply requirements of the Bill where the publication of a direction is delayed.
Before I conclude with this suite of amendments, I must inform the House that there is one area where the Government have not amended the Bill in line with the committee’s recommendations. The committee stated in its report that it considers the powers in Clause 11 to be inappropriate, recommending instead that key terms relating to the definition of “subsidies and schemes of interest” and “subsidies and schemes of particular interest” are placed on the face of the Bill.
The Government do not agree that these definitions should be added to the Bill. It is important that the Government fully engage with external stakeholders as well as Parliament to ensure that this important element of the new regime is fit for purpose. The Government have already published, in January, a set of illustrative regulations, setting out a suggested approach for defining “subsidies and schemes of interest” and “subsidies and schemes of particular interest”.
In that vein, we can commit that the Government will undertake a public consultation before making the first set of regulations under Clause 11 that establish definitions for “subsidies and schemes of interest” and “subsidies and schemes of particular interest”. This consultation is expected to launch very shortly.
I trust that this demonstrates the willingness of the Government to design this important part of the subsidy control regime in an open and collaborative way, and in a manner that uses the expertise of the devolved Administrations and of legal and subsidy control practitioners at all levels of government within the UK. Following the consultation, the final regulations will be laid before Parliament for approval under the affirmative procedure before the regime comes into force.
Finally, Amendment 8 is a minor and technical amendment to Clause 11. It clarifies that regulations made under Clause 11 may make specific reference to the value of the subsidy or scheme or to the sector in which the recipient of the subsidy operates, as well as other appropriate criteria as necessary. I trust that this amendment makes it clear that the list in subsection (2) was always intended to be indicative as opposed to exhaustive. I beg to move.
My Lords, we now come to the first mass grouping of a government concessions package. Like others, I express the thanks of these Benches to the noble Lord the Minister and the noble Baroness and the Bill team for the discussions and this good set of revisions to the Bill. There are 11 amendments in all, and as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has said, many have been previously moved and supported by noble Lords from across the House, especially in Committee.
As we have heard, this group relates to the recommendations in the DPRRC report, which were plentiful and uncharacteristically forceful. Like everyone else, we are glad that common sense has prevailed, particularly in relation to the situation around Clause 47, whereby certain information could have been withheld from Parliament and, by extension, the public.
The concessions made by the noble Baroness in the name of the noble Lord the Minister are most welcome, but the bigger issue at play here is the frequency with which the Government have attempted to take broad powers for themselves, often without proper justification. We hope that that trend will change as we move towards a new parliamentary Session, and these concessions and these moves help to show that. Like the noble Lord, Lord Fox, we would have liked to see movement on Clause 11, on definition of schemes of interest and schemes of particular interest—but we will take these 11 amendments, with thanks.
My Lords, this has been a short but constructive debate, and I welcome noble Lords’ support for this suite of amendments.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, requested a report on the obstacles to the granting of LCMs by the devolved Governments, and I am happy to make that commitment: we will bring a report at Third Reading. We also wish to note the constructive engagement of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, who has successfully picked up the mantle on the issues highlighted in the DPRRC report. I am sure that his speech made some difference, alongside the good standing of the DPRRC and our respect for its work.