Subsidy Control Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord German
Main Page: Lord German (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord German's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I have attached my name to Amendment 65 and want to examine the cash and resources which the Government intend to put into the CMA.
Talking of cash and resources, I was very disappointed to read the Minister’s letter to my noble friend Lord Purvis today, in which he says of a previous debate about money:
“I regret that I am not in a position to confirm the per capita allocation of the UK shared prosperity fund in each nation at this stage. However, I emphasise that the Government is meeting its manifesto commitments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The fund will match previous EU funding in real terms for all these places.”
The letter says that the fund will match previous funding, but it also emphasises that they are meeting their manifesto commitments. How on earth can you say that you are meeting your manifesto commitments when you cannot tell us whether you are giving £780 per head to Wales in the way that it was described, as a per capita allocation? Clearly, having a per capita allocation is how you judge whether you are meeting your manifesto commitments. I am very disappointed that the Government say that they are meeting their commitment but are unable to provide the figures to show that they are doing so. I hope they will rectify this swiftly.
Turning to the CMA and its resources, we were very fortunate some years ago to receive evidence from the CMA on its readiness to take part in the new world we were entering. However, it is very important to separate out the CMA’s need for resource to carry on its traditional functions of mergers, acquisitions and so on. The chair of the CMA said then, regarding the non-subsidy side:
“We will be involved in much bigger and arguably more complex cases than we typically deal with. We will have to deal with mergers. We will also be involved in the enforcement cases. The extra workload, the complexity and the likely litigation that follows such cases ... implies significant expansion in our activities.”
The chief executive then said:
“We expect a 30-50% increase in mergers coming our way. However, these will tend to be bigger and more complex mergers. On the antitrust side we think we will do between five and seven large extra antitrust cases a year. That will mean an increase of at least 50% on our current workload in that area.”
Between the two of its own size, it is clear that the CMA found that cash was very important.
The chair went on:
“The key point on resources … is that we need approval for the extra cash that we need … We need the cash, but then we need the time to attract and recruit the talent and get them up to speed in terms of the work. We need to start having action relatively soon, given the timescales that we are talking about.”
Given that this was a few years ago, the timescales are now upon us because this Bill is where it all happens. On state aid, he said:
“We have no experience in this area … It would add, I would emphasise, to the expansion that we have to undertake anyway”—
that is, on the other side of the CMA’s work—
“and we would have to find the skills … given the lack of experienced people in the UK itself. It would be a challenge”.
The key challenge identified was the recruitment of lawyers. How is that going? As far as I can tell, lawyers do not come cheap and, with respect to my colleagues behind me, good lawyers come even less cheaply. It is a matter for the CMA to have the appropriate lawyers. At one point, the chief executive said that they are difficult to find and that
“we are now thinking about expanding our office in Scotland, to tap into talent there.”
So it will have talent from Scotland but no representation regarding the decision-making powers of the board—but there we are. He went on:
“We want to see where talent is and what we can do to attract people and keep them in the CMA.”
The price of the challenge was that of finding appropriate salary levels.
In replying, can the Minister tell us how much money, in raw terms, has been put into both sides of this equation: into the traditional work of the CMA, which has now fallen upon it because we have left the European Union; and into the subsidies side? How many new lawyers has the CMA been able to attract? At the time, the chair said that there are lawyers working in private practice
“who are well experienced … in dealing with state aid applications”
on the side of the role now needed by the CMA. How many lawyers with this sort of experience have now been recruited, and at what level? Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, talked about the need to have experience on the side of the regulator that is greater than the experience of the people operating the subsidies. We will need lawyers who are even more skilled and who have the greatest skill in managing this sort of operation. I repeat: I suspect that they do not come cheap.
In replying, can the Minister outline specifically where and when the recruitment will take place, how much money is on either side of the equation and whether the Government have a deadline for making sure that all the resources are in place? Also, I will continue to pursue my claim: can the Minister tell me when the Government will match the £780 per head that was promised and is now in the letter?
My Lords, I want to add to that list of questions. Does the Minister have any information on where the CMA is to be based? It is one thing if it is in London, and quite different if it is in Cardiff, Glasgow, Birmingham or Manchester, for example. One of the concerns is the constant pressure that the devolved Administrations have against the south-east and London-based administrations. If there were some way in which the CMA could locate itself further away from the south-east and closer to other areas, that would at least be to some advantage.
Can I ask that in future, all impact assessments be given a time lapse, so we know how many weeks they last for, until such time as they cease to be? Seriously, if one year on the impact assessment for this means that the number of people triples, then it was not necessarily a very accurate impact assessment.
I wonder if, in concluding, the Minister could indicate the deadline for when the 50 extra advertised posts have to be filled? She may have to do so in writing, I understand that. Also, what is the difference between those who will be allocated to the traditional work of the CMA—competition, mergers and anti-trust—and those on the subsidy side of this split? They are distinct areas of work and quite distinct skills are needed. At some stage, could the Minister also tell me how many lawyers have been recruited so far, and how many they are short of. That would be very helpful.
I think the noble Lord might have to declare an interest on that front, but we will let that lie. I will have to write to him with the specifics on this. Obviously, recruitment is an ongoing process that will continue throughout the next year.
My Lords, I will be equally brief. The omission of Ministers of the devolved Governments at this stage of the Bill is stark and astonishing. It immediately begs the question why, because the devolved Governments are specifically mentioned elsewhere in the Bill, although they are not given equality of treatment. Here, they are simply omitted. As indicated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, we need clarity here.
We particularly need clarity because there is equality of treatment on issues such as common frameworks. There could well be a conflict between what has been agreed by the UK Government in that context and what is in the Bill. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 79, which neatly follows the questions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, about standing.
On 13 January, the following fanfare was announced from Downing Street:
“Prime Minister to chair new council with devolved governments”.
The No. 10 press release described this as a
“Landmark agreement on how UK government and devolved governments will continue to work together”,
and how an agreement on this “has been reached”. It promised “new ways of working”, “Reaffirmed principles” of
“mutual respect, maintaining trust and positive working”
and formalised a “council”, led by the Prime Minister, “overseeing strengthened working”.
I am going to come to the document that lies behind the press release in a moment. Of the five things the Government say this is going to achieve, they end with the principle about conflict resolution:
“Resolving disputes according to a clear and agreed process”.
I am trying to seek consistency in this Bill, which has been severely criticised for the relationships it is trying to and has to build with the devolved Administrations. At the same time, we have another document, setting up more machinery of government, which will look at resolving disputes. I understand that resolution of disputes is in the common frameworks procedure, but there is very little in the Bill about how the devolved Administrations can resolve disputes. I suspect—I am pretty certain—that there will be a lot of criticism over the coming months and years from the devolved Administrations.
In the document which lies behind the Prime Minister’s announcement, about the review of intergovernmental relations, there is a two-page section in which the first paragraph states:
“No Secretariat”—
it is an independent secretariat managing the council—
“or government”—
and that is all Governments in the United Kingdom—
“can reject the decision of a government”—
again, that is any Government—
“to raise a dispute.”
So this is a dispute mechanism which has clearly been put in place by the Government to provide an opportunity for the Administrations to raise their disputes. I do understand that if it is enshrined in law, if the legislation is there, it makes it trickier, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, asked, what happens when somebody wants or objects to an interpretation, particularly that of the Secretary of State, and this process escalates?
The Bill contains a lot of procedures which could well lead to a dialogue between the devolved Administrations and the Secretary of State. There is also a huge amount of what is called “guidance”—which we shall come to later—and a number of documents are going to emerge which will perhaps put flesh on the bones of some of the things we have been talking about in the Bill.
My question is this: will this arrangement announced by the council and by the Prime Minister, no matter what this Bill comes to and no matter what the processes described in it are, allow, as the intergovernmental relations document states, any Government to bring a dispute before all the other Governments? There are 30 or 40 lines and another page about how that dispute has to be resolved and the use of an independent secretariat.
If the right relationships as described in the document from the Prime Minister were built into this Bill, I would rather hope that it would minimise the necessity for such a dispute mechanism to arise. My test of this is to ask the Minister the following question. Given the announcement, and given the availability of this procedure, is there anything that he can see apart from the legislation before us that a devolved Administration could not refer to this council? If that is so, there is a strong case for making it easier for the devolved Administrations to engage through the mechanisms of this Bill without having to go through all the processes which would lead to the dispute mechanism outlined by the Prime Minister. I am asking for consistency, and I hope that the Minister can provide it.
My Lords, I am delighted to support the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and agree strongly with the points that he made in opening this short debate. The devolved regimes must surely be in a position in which they can be regarded as interested parties. It stands to reason that that must be the case in certain circumstances, and there must be provision within legislation for those certain circumstances to be looked after in the context of this Bill.
I was delighted to have the opportunity to add my name to Amendment 79 put forward by my colleague, the noble Lord, Lord German. I support the points he made in regard to it. The need for some indication to the devolved regimes that they are partners has surely come out of the debates we have had in the last three or four sittings of this Committee. It is time that the Government found some way of indicating that they are prepared to work on a partnership basis. These two amendments pave the way for that, and I hope the Government can respond positively.
My Lords, I rise to speak to two amendments that have a relationship I shall endeavour to explain as rapidly as possible, bearing in mind the hour. Amendment 73A relates to Schedule 3 and deals with the very extraordinary powers in this Bill, giving the High Court the power to overrule primary legislation of the devolved legislatures. This is a very real problem. I shall speak largely from the point of view of the judiciary and what we are intending to do.
Before I turn to that, I would say that, if we look at agriculture or anything else where there is an attempt by the four Governments of the UK to agree something that deals with the support of subsidies, it is extraordinary that anything that is legislated for in England is exempt, but what is legislated for elsewhere is not. There is a constitutional reason for that, and I know what the Minister will say, but it is not a matter of practical reality or public perception. It is important that we consider this.
The first extraordinary part of this is that power is given not to the Competition Appeal Tribunal but to the High Court or the Court of Session in Scotland. To my mind, it is worrying that you give to a first-instance court the power to overrule a decision and an Act of a democratically elected primary legislature. Normally, these matters would go to the Supreme Court. Secondly, and much more importantly, is it right that we should put our judges in a position to make decisions about what are effectively the principles in the Bill? People may remember something called the Human Rights Act and the very broad powers it is said to give judges to make decisions. That has had a degree of criticism. Why do we want to do this in a piece of legislation where the phrases are so ill defined? I shall come to that in the second amendment I intend to speak to. We should exercise the greatest degree of care in giving judges the right to overrule the legislature. I am not certain about the extent to which there has been widespread consultation with the judiciary about this, or with others, but this is the first and very significant step.
There is an extraordinary constitutional provision that has to deal with whose rationale is looked at. I do not want to go into the details of that, because that is more a subsidiary point, and I bear in mind the time—but there is an extraordinary constitutional innovation in the clauses in this part of the schedule.
Of course, it might be said of these principles—and I think this is possibly the Minister’s line—that all of this is very vague and there are not going to be many challenges, so do not worry. However, I am afraid people have left provisions in legislation on that basis and it has come back to bite them. What would worry me about this is if something enshrined in the decisions of the Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish Parliaments or Assemblies, is challenged by someone. What about it happening in the field of agriculture? Someone who is importing goods would have the right to initiate this sort of action, with its very serious constitutional consequences, whereby a judge would have to make a decision, quite often, I imagine, in relation to the principles that are so ill defined.
That takes me neatly to my second series of amendments, which deal with the definitions and status of guidance. I will leave the noble Lord, Lord German, to deal with the question of whether the guidance is binding. It seems unarguable to me that it is not binding.
What I am much more interested in—this highlights the difficulties caused by Schedule 3 and the construction of the Bill as a whole—is the Minister’s power to give guidance as to the meaning. Ordinarily, it is Parliament that decides what something means and, if it does not, it leaves it to the judges. Sometimes, it is put in secondary legislation. However—this is extraordinary—here we are putting the meaning of the wording into guidance.
There are two fundamental problems with that. First, we have visited the word “equity” on a number of occasions—I might call it a word for all seasons—but, even at this late hour, I feel that I ought to refer to John Selden’s famous note about equity. He said:
“Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a Chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: ‘tis the same thing in a Chancellor’s conscience.”
I refer to that because it is the essence of the problem with the word “equity”. With the utmost respect, I believe that this Committee ought not to shirk its responsibilities in defining what is meant by this and how it applies in certain circumstances. It might be said, “Well, we are constrained by the fact that these are taken directly from the TCA”, but is that in fact a constraint—or do we hanker for the way in which these vague principles were left to the judges in Luxembourg? Do we want to give our judges that pleasure as well? I doubt it, but I am not sure that it has been fully thought through.
It therefore seems to me that we ought to look at this very carefully. There is the constitutional principle in relation to the Minister being able to give guidance on meaning; it plainly is not binding but he should not be giving such guidance because that is a matter for the courts or Parliament. Parliament should not shirk its responsibility to define what some of these things mean. We should not leave it to judges—unless, of course, there is a hankering for, as they do in Europe, leaving things to the judiciary in Luxembourg. This time, however, it would be the judiciary in Westminster, Edinburgh or possibly Belfast—but not possibly in Cardiff.
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to talk after the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who manages to enlighten us all with observations that might have passed us by if we had not had the wonder of his words.
In Amendment 74 in my name, which would amend Clause 79, I treat “non-binding” as a sine qua non. The reason I put it in was to allow us to have a discussion and debate about the whole extraordinary clause on guidance. All I seek, of course, is for the Minister to agree that it is non-binding. I am sure that he will do so because all the facts speak for themselves, but there is a high head of steam building up in this Committee about the way in which guidance is being used. I will come back to the spearheading on that and how it has moved on but, basically, this Bill has what we call—Parliament also uses this phrase—“have regard to” guidance. This is a problem because it places an expectation that the guidance will be followed unless there are cogent reasons for not doing so.
Subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 79 give the game away a bit. Clause 79(5) says
“the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”
before making the guidance. What is appropriate is not specified. Clause 79(6) says:
“A public authority must have regard to guidance issued under this section.”
“Must” is very important in this respect.