Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 16th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I am not saying that some Members of your Lordships’ House are not veterans on this subject, but I came in today with my hard copy of the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards—Code of Practice. I may be the only person who has one, but I went back to look at it over the weekend in preparation for this. I am very glad to be taking part in this debate, alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, who will bring to it her fresh eyes: I think that that perhaps shows one of the great strengths of your Lordships’ House.

I start by saying that the legislation we are considering came about because a vulnerable adult, HL, was detained in a place he did not want to be and which his carers knew was not right for him. It turned out that he had fewer safeguards than someone who had been sectioned under the Mental Health Act, or who had been detained under the criminal justice system. As we dive into the detail of what is inevitably quite a technical Bill, I urge us all to keep that person, and the hundreds of thousands of people like him, in mind. As we look at a piece of legislation that is essentially more than a decade old we need to think about updating this legislation in light of changes in society. We know that by 2030 there will be 2 million people over the age of 65 who are ageing without children: they will not have close family members to look after their interests. I rather think that our acid test ought to be whether we think that what is being proposed will look after those people.

It has been apparent since 2007—we should bear it in mind that the legislation we are talking about was not part of the Mental Capacity Act but part of the mental health legislation—that the safeguards have been poorly understood and practised. That is because the two pieces of legislation do not work well together or, indeed, at all. The mental health legislation rests on the judgment and expertise of individuals, saying ultimately what they believe to be right for the safety of other people. The Mental Capacity Act is instead based around the principles of autonomy, empowerment and the importance of supporting decision-making. Mental health legislation is very strictly overseen by statutory oversight bodies. The Mental Capacity Act never has been and therefore it is not surprising that when it has been implemented, it has been implemented very patchily and has been reliant largely upon the dedication of interested professionals.

Noble Lords will have had a number of briefings which talk about the welcome extension of these safeguards to settings such as care settings. I do not have a problem with that; in fact, I welcome it. I think many care facilities, particularly those run by charities, which have long and dedicated experience in looking after people with learning disabilities, will implement this extremely well, but they will do so without sufficient oversight or a sufficient guarantee that if they do not do their job properly the people concerned and their carers will have the relevant access to information and right of appeal. If the Government had intended to sort out this fundamental issue that has been hanging around for 20 years, they would have waited until the current review of the mental health legislation, which is being carried out by Sir Simon Wesley and which is inevitably looking at DoLS, had been concluded, but they have not.

Unlike the Law Commission, which took great care to consult on its proposals, the Government have come forward with this piece of legislation on which there has been very little consultation. It is quite clear that the Government have gone through the Law Commission legislation and selectively picked pieces out of it, when in fact the Law Commission was trying to bring together a whole package of measures which, taken as a whole, would have been a robust defence of the liberty of individuals. So my first question to the Minister is: why this legislation and why now? Why not wait until the mental health legislation is reviewed? Why not have a consultation on which people with interests, such as the parents or the families of people who have been detained, could talk about what has gone wrong and what has not worked in the current system? I say to the Minister that if the hurry is about saving money, that is something your Lordships’ House will have to bear in mind as we scrutinise the Bill.

The Select Committee which reviewed the implementation of the Act, on which I sat, was concerned about very patchy introduction. We were right. We now have the figures, which show that in some parts of the country the waiting time for having one of these assessments done is longer than the time for which somebody is supposed to be detained. There is no doubt that this has to be changed. But the changes which the Government are choosing to bring in do not strike me as being sufficiently robust. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, began to outline some of the main areas of concern.

There is also concern about the limiting of legal aid. I hope that other noble Lords, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, will perhaps look at the limitation of legal aid. We are all in favour of having a system in which fewer people need to go to court fewer times, but when they do have to go to court they need to be able to be properly represented. Very few of them are in a position to represent themselves against local authorities or other authorities which have access to their own legal services. I would like us to look at that.

Secondly, the new definition of “proportionate” does not adequately reflect the best-interest tests that were in the original legislation. That is a severe problem. I understand, and noble Lords will appreciate, the desire to cut down on repetitious assessments and so on, but there is a danger that we might end up with decisions being made about a person’s capacity to make one decision which rest on information that was gathered for a wholly different purpose. That would not be right. I also think we have missed a trick in relation to the recognition that there are a number of people whose capacity to make decisions fluctuates. The Law Commission recommendation on that subject has not been picked up in the Bill.

Finally, I do not doubt for a moment that the Government have good intentions but there are several areas in which the detail of the Bill is deficient. We should also bear in mind the strong possibility that people who found themselves in the position that HL did all those years ago may not have the protection of the European Court of Human Rights in the future. Therefore, it is incumbent upon people in this Parliament to make sure that the human rights of those people enjoy greater safeguards than they have ever done in domestic legislation before. For those reasons, I conclude that the Bill before us is extremely flawed and deficient. I suggest that your Lordships bring their considerable experience and expertise to bear to change it radically before it goes to another place.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 16th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for an incisive, illuminating, at times technically complex but always wise debate, which has been a credit to the House. I will attempt to answer as many questions as I can. I will not try to cover all of them as we actually would be here all night, but I will have time to explore the major categories of issues. I hope noble Lords will indulge me as I do that.

I welcome my noble friend Lady Barran and congratulate her on a very passionate and moving speech. It is clear that she has already been a force for good in the world and we look forward to her bringing her singular qualities to the stage which she now fills with such great authority. I hope noble Lords also noticed the attendance for the first part of the debate of my honourable friend the Minister for Care, Caroline Dinenage, who obviously takes a close interest in this. She was at the briefing and we are working closely together to try to get the right Bill through this process.

I think the general tone of the debate was that there is a strong desire to reform the DoLS system and to end, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, pointed out, the lawlessness and the highly unsatisfactory current situation. My noble friend Lady Barran brought this to life. The truth is that the current system has overwhelmed local authorities and others. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, pointed out, Cheshire West has extended the definition to whom this should apply, such that the backlog of cases is now extraordinary. The only consequence of that is a denial of access to justice. The challenge we have in the Bill is to make sure that we do not have access to justice just in theory but that it actually happens, and it cannot happen if more than 100,000 people are getting it in theory but not in practice.

As somebody who was new to this before preparing for the Bill, the situation almost sounds too good to be true. We are going to extend the number of people who have access to safeguards but we are also going to stop the system being overwhelmed and save money. This is achievable because it is about introducing a proportionate system that reflects the needs and wishes of the people whom it is there to protect, rather than having a maximalist approach that in theory applies to everyone but in reality does not and is sometimes random in its application, which is clearly unacceptable.

As many noble Lords have pointed out, the system that we need to create must be patient-led. It needs to have proper oversight and to deliver that access to justice which we have discussed. Clearly, if, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, only one in 20 have benefited from the current system, it is highly inefficient. As many noble Lords also pointed out, there is a huge urgency here.

Many noble Lords pointed out the benefits of the new system. I will come to some of the challenges but, ultimately, this is about making sure that caring organisations take a more active role in the assessment of deprivation of liberty. Where they do so and integrate it into their care planning, we will provide a proper system of oversight and support for individuals deprived of their liberty in general but, specifically, for those who object, or whose families who care for them object. That is ultimately what we are trying to do and it is the intention of the Bill.

Several noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Greengross and Lady Thornton, asked about our consultations to date. There have been very wide consultations but this debate has shown that there is much work to be done over the summer, not just with noble Lords but with stakeholder groups, to ensure that we are not only explaining the consequences of what is proposed—I think there are still some misunderstandings about that—but able to demonstrate the benefits and, critically, learn how we can further improve what is proposed.

I turn to some of the issues raised. Several noble Lords including the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross and Lady Tyler, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, talked about the absence of a statutory definition. I can tell the House that we are aware of that and are listening particularly to the recommendations of the Joint Committee. However, the debate demonstrated some disagreement over the right way forward. There are various options, such as definitions in the Bill or through a code of practice, but we clearly need to get to an answer in order to proceed.

We have talked about wanting a system that has the person’s wishes and best interests at the heart of the process. That was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and endorsed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross, Lady Meacher, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins. It is absolutely right for us to be clear that there is no watering down of the interests of the individual concerned through this process. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, pointed out, capacities can fluctuate; as the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins, pointed out, they can also be varied—strong in one area and weak in another. Any system needs to take account of that and I can tell the House that it is absolutely not our intention to water down the role of a person’s expressed wishes. The best interest test still applies absolutely in the care setting, but the necessary and proportionate test is to account for those cases where a person may wish to do something regarding their liberties which is contrary to their best interests for their individual care. Striking that balance and making sure that there is proper oversight, with proper advice for people who are unable to enunciate their own wishes, is at the core of getting the Bill right.

As noble Lords have also pointed out, getting the Bill right is actually about getting a statutory code of practice right. It is out of date and there is a degree of urgency about improving it. I will return to that in a moment but, in talking about the statutory definition, I will finish on the power of attorney and the role of families. They still have primacy under the Mental Capacity Act, the principles underpinning which still apply. It will not be possible to deprive a person of liberty when the attorney acting on their behalf has stated that their best interests are served otherwise. I want to make that clear but it is something that we will need to explore and explain better. Attorneys will be part of the group that is to be consulted, and the Bill creates an explicit requirement for further consultation with families. Family members can also act as appropriate persons, so I think there is a greater strengthening of the role of those acting on behalf of a person deprived of their liberty in the process of scrutinising that and making sure that it is done appropriately.

[Baroness Barker]

If this matter is unclear to some of us who can claim to be fairly well informed on it, clearly, there has been a communication problem. Might I suggest to the noble Lord that it would be enormously helpful—as it has been in similar situations—to have a copy of the Act, as amended by the Bill, for us and interested parties to look at? Believe me, it makes the whole business a great deal clearer and easier to understand.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

That is an excellent suggestion. I should be clear: any confusion comes from a failure to communicate on our behalf, rather than there being any suggestion that noble Lords who are extremely expert on this do not understand what is proposed. There is a need to explain better exactly how all this will work in practice.

Obviously, the system depends on the quality and independence of the reviews, assessments and authorisations that take place; that issue was particularly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. There were also questions asked by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler, Lady Murphy, Lady Jolly and Lady Thornton, about the capacity of those carrying out assessments in local authority care homes, the NHS and so on to do them properly and in a way compliant with the law. I agree with noble Lords that in the coming weeks we will need to set out much more clearly how that independence support and those assessments will be staffed and provided, making sure that there are sufficient resources and proper training. I am reassured that training in the implications of the Mental Capacity Act is part of medical training, and that there are Health Education England resources for that. Clearly, all that will need to evolve as we go through this process and the Act itself is amended.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Greengross, Lady Tyler and Lady Murphy, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, asked about the interaction with mental health legislation and whether we should have delayed publication. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, described a tension between the two Acts. We are conscious of the interface—that is the term used—but there is an urgency to reform the system, notwithstanding its interaction with the Mental Health Act. We do not yet have a timescale on completion of the review and any subsequent legislation that might be required. There has been lots of talk about the work to reform—the committee, the Law Commission, the Joint Committee and so on—and we need to get on with this, cognisant all the time that subsequent changes may need to be made once we have the outcome of the Mental Health Act review. It is not in my gift to promise time for legislation in the future but we are cognisant of the need to make sure that our interface works, once we have the review itself completed.

Several noble Lords asked why the Bill does less than the Law Commission. We could spend a lot of time going through that, but I do not propose that we do so at this point. We can achieve non-legislatively several of the Law Commission’s proposals; it is made up of lawyers, so they prefer law but there are other ways of doing things. One of the key issues raised is the Bill’s not applying to 16 and 17 year-olds. There is clearly an important interplay here with the education, health and care plan process, but I have listened to noble Lords on the subject today and shall reflect on whether we can do something about it.

The code of practice was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Greengross, and my noble friends Lady Barran and Lady Browning. Getting it up and running quickly is critical. Detailed work is going on, and we need to be very specific in it to provide reassurance about how it will work. Unfortunately, I do not have a timetable yet for its production, but I will endeavour to get hold of one. We need to make sure that its implementation is properly resourced. The CQC will continue to inspect its implementation, so there will still be that quality oversight.

A few other issues were raised. Many noble Lords referred to “unsound mind” being an unhelpful and, frankly, out-of-date phrase. I do not disagree. The concern here is the interaction with the jurisprudence and the ECHR itself. If we were to move on that—I make no commitment at this point—we would need to think it through very clearly, but I would like to explore it.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, asked about legal aid. I can confirm that it is, and will still be, available on a means-tested basis. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and my noble friend Lady Browning asked about advance consent—an issue that the Law Commission also raised. Again, there is an important distinction to be made here between an advance decision to refuse treatment, which will continue to be respected and is untouched, and advance consent to a future deprivation of liberty. Although that was in the Law Commission report, officials engaged in the process indicated that this did not receive support from families. There was a concern that you could sign yourself up to being deprived of your liberty at some point in the future, so it did not garner support. Perhaps it was the wrong subset or sample of people; nevertheless, we need to consider the best way forward on that.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked about the equality impact assessment. I do not have an answer at this stage about why it was not carried out but I will endeavour to get one.

To conclude, I hope that I have been able to summarise the main issues and topics. Clearly, there are some very big questions that still need to be answered, but I return to the point that my noble friend Lady Browning made, which is that we need to solve the problems this time. We cannot introduce another Bill or piece of legislation that just creates a problem three years down the line. It is not just about the Bournewood gap; it is about making sure that we avoid, and do not create, any other gaps. The words “nightmare” and “disaster” have been used to describe the current system, and that is why we need to act now, but clearly we need to act in such a way that we do not create another problem further down the line.

It has been clear from this debate that there is still much work to be done to provide the right kind of reforms that we all want to see. Looking at the Chief Whip, I am sure that we will have adequate time in Committee to make sure that the Bill is in the best possible shape. We saw a nod of the head from the chief, so that is good. This debate has demonstrated—the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said as much—that there is no group of people better qualified to improve this legislation and make sure that we get the right reforms. I look forward to engaging with noble Lords and others throughout the coming months to make sure that we can achieve that and deliver a Bill that provides for people deprived of their liberty the fair and proportionate access to justice that we all want to see.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with an apology, as I have not spoken on the Bill before. I thank, in particular, POhWER, the organisation of which I am a patron, for alerting me to the Bill and to its concerns, as well as the concerns shared by a wide range of groups, including Liberty, Age UK, Mencap and so on.

As other speakers have outlined, it is essential that we get this absolutely right, because we are talking about potential deprivation of liberty. According to those organisations, people with dementia or a learning disability are at risk under the proposed changes. Therefore, I speak in support of Amendment 1, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and Amendment 20 in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton. I believe that this amendment would ensure that the views of the donees and deputies already appointed by cared-for persons to make decisions in their best interests were given appropriate weight with regard to where the cared-for person resides for care and treatment.

I will say no more than that because there are experts on this issue in the Chamber. I sit willing to support but more willing to listen and learn.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for being slightly late. I was taken by surprise at the swiftness with which we concluded our previous business.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for many of the points that she made in her speech. It took a lot of work to get the concept of an advance statement on wishes into this legislation, and I, like her, regret that it has not been more widely adopted or accepted, particularly by the medical profession. She will know that when the Select Committee reviewed the legislation, one of the biggest disappointments was the extent to which the Mental Capacity Act had not been understood by the medical profession. She will perhaps remember that when representatives of different parts of the medical profession come to talk to us, they began by saying that in an A&E department it is extremely difficult to work out somebody’s advance decision. We knew that when we passed the initial legislation, but that legislation was not meant solely to take its lead from that; it was meant to apply to a whole range of matters just within medicine. It is a shame that the medical profession still relies on a very conservative interpretation of the existing legislation and takes a read-out from emergency situations when it really should not, as there is plenty of time to discuss with the person what is happening and to understand their previously stated wishes and feelings.

I am glad that the noble Baroness has raised this issue. She is right that at the heart of the Bill is a fundamental change from the Mental Capacity Act. There will no longer be a whole series of decision-specific assessments of people who lack capacity, and that is not something that I object to. Over the last few years while this legislation has been in place, we have quite often found people being subjected to unnecessary assessments. It is quite clear that when somebody has a medical assessment for advanced dementia, say, they will not have the capacity to make the same decision, even though they go to live in a different place. I accept that it is possible to make a decision of a lack of capacity and to carry that forward throughout a person’s care. What I am not clear about, though—given that people will be subject to fewer assessments, and therefore be less likely to have changes in their conditions brought to light—is the extent to which that will interplay with somebody’s statement of advance wishes. I would rather like it if the Minister, in his response, could talk about how that will work.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The safeguards on liberty and safeguarding have been thoroughly confused by many people. That is fundamental. Whether we turn this around from safeguards against deprivation of liberty or safeguarding the liberty of somebody, I do not think that anything I have seen in the Bill has yet addressed that fundamental misunderstanding. In fact, in some cases, it probably compounds it. I want to put that on record as we discuss the many issues the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has introduced so well.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her amendment and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, for their amendments. I am delighted that the noble Baronesses were able to make it on time so that we could start on our deliberations of what are clearly very important issues.

The purpose of these amendments is to clarify that a liberty protection safeguard authorisation cannot override a valid decision to refuse care or treatment by the donee of lasting power of attorney or a court-appointed deputy or contained in a valid advance decision to refuse treatment. The comment that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made at the start of the debate, about conflict and avoiding conflict by recognising valid decisions where they have been made, was very important. I hope that all noble Lords know that the intention of the Bill is to enhance the role and agency of those deprived of their liberty and those with an interest in the care and welfare of that cared-for person. That is why this debate on the first grouping of amendments is so important.

This debate gives me the opportunity to clarify and confirm that the Bill does not allow a decision to be made that conflicts with that made by a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a court-approved deputy’s valid, best interests decision. I am glad of the opportunity to do that. Section 6(6) of the Mental Capacity Act already provides for this, and the Bill does not change that. Therefore, an authorisation under the liberty protection safeguards could only be given if it was in accordance with a valid decision—namely, one that is authorised in the lasting power of attorney—by the attorney or deputy.

The Bill also does not change the current position regarding advance decisions to refuse treatment, and those will remain an important part of care planning. I absolutely recognise the important role that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and others in this House played in introducing that. I assure all noble Lords that there is neither the intention nor action in the Bill to water down the power and validity of those in any way. If a person has made a valid advance decision to refuse medical treatment, that treatment cannot be given and it would not therefore be possible to deprive someone of liberty in order to provide it. We intend to give further explanation of the legal position in the code of practice. I hope that that answers some of the key issues raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, in their comments.

Those comments were echoed by my noble friend Lady Browning, and she is quite right to discuss the importance of support for those with communication difficulties so that they are able to enunciate the kinds of decisions and indications of future treatment that would adhere to their own wishes. We will return to this issue later in Committee, particularly when we get on to the issue of IMCAs—the advocates—but she is right to reiterate the point made in the proposed amendments that those acting on behalf of the cared-for person, whether they are the family, have an interest in care or have been formally appointed to do so, are, in the end, responsible for taking those decisions on behalf of that person, and their decisions should be respected, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out.

The fundamental question that underpins these amendments is: why is the Bill not explicit on these issues when, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, the Law Commission’s Bill is? Because there is no change in the current position, there is therefore no reason to outline what is already the case. Nothing is changed about what is already in the Act by what is being proposed through this Bill. Therefore, there is no need to reiterate what is already the case and will not be changed. I hope through the course of this debate that we have aired this issue. It is one that the Government agree with and, in the way that the Bill is structured, I can confirm to the Committee that there is no change in the status quo about the validity of those decisions.

With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Baroness is prepared to withdraw her amendment. I recognise that there is great concern, not least among many of the campaign groups, service providers, commissioners and others who are implementing these rules and laws every day, and they need to know that there is consistency. As we move between now and Report, I am more than happy to meet with noble Lords and others to discuss these issues and make sure that we can give every reassurance so that they can be sure that the law as it stands today has not changed and will not change as a consequence of this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I make a brief intervention, primarily to underline the importance of two points that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made when introducing his amendment. Like my noble friend Lady Jolly, I fear we have no alternative other than to carry on and scrutinise this Bill. The reasons for doing something have just been set out very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, but I retain two really key concerns which I raised at Second Reading.

The first—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—is that of timing and understanding the relationship with the review of the Mental Health Act. I understand that it is due in the autumn—I am not quite sure when—together with amendments to the Mental Capacity Act, given that both Acts relate to non-consensual care and treatment. It seems that the overlap between the two systems is one of the reasons why the current system is so complicated, and why so many staff struggle with it. Frankly, it is why I struggle with it so much. There must be real concerns that changes to address problems under one system will have unintended consequences for the other. Clarity is needed from the Government over when patients should be subject to one Act over the other, so that, in the words of Sir Simon Wessely, chair of the Mental Health Act review,

“arguing over the framework does not get in the way of delivering the care that the person needs”.

I could go on at length—I will not, your Lordships will be pleased to hear. I have just one more thought on this. In addition to the need for clarity on when the Mental Capacity Act or the Mental Health Act should be used, it is really important that patients do not find that they are deprived of their liberty by both Acts at the same time. There are examples of this happening, particularly when a patient has both a mental disorder and an unrelated physical disorder.

That is my first point. My second point, which was made very cogently by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is about the consultation that is taking place with the sector. Like everyone else, I have received a large number of briefings in the past few days. Frankly, it has been difficult to take them all on board. I have done my best. I was particularly concerned by a survey that was published only a couple of days ago by an organisation called Edge Training. I do not know it personally, I do not know exactly what else it does, but I do know that it was a survey of 900 people and nearly half the respondents were best-interests assessors, with the rest being primarily social workers, health professionals and independent mental capacity advocates. I will not go through what they said, other than to say that there were really very high levels of concern—80% this and 90% that—particularly in relation to the new roles being placed on care home managers, the potential conflicts of interest, plans to charge care home managers with deciding whether it is in a resident’s best interests to have an advocate if they lack capacity to request one, and the lack of a specific requirement to consult the person themselves about a proposed deprivation of their liberty.

My conclusion from all this is that the sort of consultation that should have gone on with the sector for a change such as this, which really has to work—this is not political, it is about something that has to work on the ground and people who do this have to understand it and feel that it does work—cannot have happened to the extent to which I think it should have happened, and that has real importance for the pace at which this can be taken forward and the consultation and implementation timescale.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I just want to share the thoughts that I had over the summer, when we had a very long time to look at this proposal. I have been wrapping my head in wet towels looking at this legislation, trying to work out what it is all about, and to answer a key question: why this Bill now? I am still not happy that I have the right answer.

The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, referred to the Mental Capacity Act as a “monstrous” Act—the DoLS part of it. But let us be fair, when the Select Committee did its review, we found that the Act was held in quite high regard; the problem with it was that it was not properly understood and that had caused problems with its implementation. It is true that we said in the Select Committee report that there needed to be an absolute root and branch review of DoLS, but we prefaced all our recommendations for the review of the Act on one other premise, which has been ignored by the Government. We said that one of the reasons that we saw for the failure of the Act to be properly implemented was that there was no central ownership of the Act and no single body responsible for its implementation. The Government have chosen to ignore that. Instead, they have shoved responsibility for the MCA on to the CQC, where it does not get specialist attention. There is nothing like the attention paid to the Mental Capacity Act that there is to the mental health legislation, and yet if it is not properly implemented, people can be deprived of their liberty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I am grateful to the Minister, although I am reeling from the shock that he thinks that I called for a second Second Reading debate to take place on a Clause 1 stand part discussion.

I of course agree that the current system is not fit for purpose. I agree with the Minister and with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords. I agree with the need for a streamlined system, but it has to be the right system. I say to the noble Baroness that one of the briefings that I received was from 39 Essex Chambers, which is pretty expert in this area. It was a very interesting piece by Victoria Butler-Cole which sets out seven changes to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill that the courts are likely to make unless Parliament gets there first.

We have to be very careful that in wishing to support the Government to get a streamlined process through we do not build in mistakes and errors that, rather like the Cheshire West decision, will lead to the court, and then to further legislation. In her piece, Victoria Butler-Cole says that the Court of Protection has a record of rejecting capacity assessments conducted by consultant psychiatrists with years of training in mental health and specifically in relation to the MCA. The Bill permits care home managers to assess capacity in this context. There is no way that will withstand scrutiny by the court, and there are likely to be even more cases in which assessments of incapacity are overturned as care home managers with little or no relevant training are required to carry out what can be a complex task. That seems to me to be the problem.

I know that this has to be signed off by the local authority. The impact assessment makes it clear that in the vast majority of cases that will be a desktop exercise. That does not fill me with confidence that these assessments will be scrutinised effectively by local authorities which themselves are very hard pressed. That is why I think that, when it comes to the detailed amendments, this is a very important part of this legislation. We need to be very careful to ensure that this is going to work effectively.

On training, the noble Lord has made some very welcome comments, but I refer to the fact that there is an annual turnover of 27% in this sector among the people who are going to have to do this work. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that I was trying to be polite. This is a very vulnerable sector, with low-paid people who have low qualifications being asked to deal with issues to do with the fundamental liberty of people in this country.

My gut feeling is that it will not do. This cannot be left to care managers. The Government will have to look again at the Law Commission’s assumption that local authorities would do the work. I of course do not wish to prevent Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I hope that it is permissible for me to rise again. For the avoidance of doubt, will the Minister confirm that I understood him correctly? Is he saying that the role of the care home manager has not changed? I understand that, under the existing law, a care home manager may request that somebody’s capacity be assessed, but that assessment is not usually done by them. That assessment is done by somebody else. Is he saying that that is not going to change? I am sorry, but I think it very important that noble Lords understand what the Minister says.

[Baroness Thornton]

I understood that the Minister said “escalate”, which means that something changes. Perhaps when he is answering the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, he could also explain the word “escalate”.

The Government may need to think about carrying out some form of assessment of the appropriateness and suitability of care home managers to undertake this task. If that has not been done, perhaps it needs to be done in the next month or so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has produced a perfectly adequate descriptor which would substitute perfectly well for “unsound mind”. We always face this difficulty in discussing terms that relate to stigmatised disorders. We have to keep changing the language to keep it up to date and to refresh people’s thinking about what we are dealing with. “Unsound mind” went out in the 1960s and 1970s—I do not think that I have ever diagnosed anybody as being of unsound mind—and we must now have an alternative. We do not need the convenience of it remaining as it was back in the 1950s. Therefore, I support the descriptor given by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. It is a very good one. We have used it before and it would be perfectly adequate. Let us ditch “unsound mind”.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee for long but it is important to recap on a bit of history. The original legislation that came before your Lordships’ House on this issue—the Mental Incapacity Bill—was subject to the first ever pre-legislative scrutiny. In going through that then very innovative procedure, Members of this House and another place did a couple of things which at that time were game-changing. One was that we invited people who lacked capacity to come and give evidence to us. But we went further than that. When we produced our report, we invited them back to discuss with them what we had listened to and what we had changed. One of the first and most important things that we did was to change the title from the Mental Incapacity Bill to the Mental Capacity Bill. We also, for the first time ever, produced an easy-read version of a Bill.

I strongly support my noble friend Lady Tyler because this feels like a real regression in thinking. I understand that the term is there because somebody somewhere believes that it has a legal meaning. We came up against those same arguments all those years ago and this House led the way in getting lawyers and counsel to change their minds. I do not see a reason for us not to do the same again.

I wish to add one point. I vividly remember listening to the people whom we invited back to talk to us after we had produced our report. At this point, there were only Members of your Lordships’ House in the room—the Commons were busy and had not turned up. I remember one particular gentleman who said, “When I first saw this, I thought it was really rubbish, but actually you’ve done quite a good job”. I have to say that in all my years in your Lordships’ House I do not think that I have ever received a more sincere accolade. That is not to belittle anybody’s contribution to this, but I think that my noble friend has made a very strong point.

[Baroness Thornton]

These Benches support the amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others have said, the reference to unsoundness of mind is offensive to those with learning disabilities, dementia and brain injuries and their families. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has just demolished all the legal arguments for including the phrase in the Bill, and indeed a lot of organisations, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, say that it out of place in today’s society. The GMC argues that it is not clear what added protection or benefit is achieved by using the term. VoiceAbility says that “unsound mind” is not used in modern psychiatry and that it could lead to debate in disputes. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be as agreeable about this amendment as he was about the last one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

If the real purpose is to ensure protection under the Human Rights Act for those we are concerned about, has the Minister considered whether that might not be achieved merely by stating that the category of people we are looking at should have the benefit of the relevant section of the Human Rights Act? When I say the Human Rights Act, I mean the convention.

[Baroness Barker]

The Human Rights Act was in force when the Mental Capacity Act was being debated. During the passage of that Act we considered very carefully what language we should use. Is the Minister saying that we got that wrong, and have there been cases of people who have fallen into the gap? If so, how many are there, and can he give the evidence by which the Government arrived at the conclusion they have now?

[Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)]

It might be complex to find the right nomenclature, but I heard the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, say that this was a starter for 10. I cannot see why we have to regress to 1959 language in the Mental Health Act without further exploration of whether we could redefine the term about perhaps affecting the mind, to take in that very small minority of people with severe physical illness that occasionally affects the mind. We have worked so hard to destigmatise both learning disability and mental health that it seems very sad that we cannot work a bit harder at this point on this issue.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

7: Schedule 1, page 10, line 7, leave out “and” and insert—
“(ba) the arrangements are in the best interests of the cared-for person, and”

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, Amendments 7 and 8 in my name are yet another attempt to make some sense of this Bill. Perhaps they might not have been tabled had we been able to have more discussion over the Recess. As several noble Lords have already mentioned, there has been considerable disquiet about the non-appearance of best interest assessments in this Bill. Indeed, a number of noble Lords attempted to table amendments that, at the very least, like this amendment, were trying to probe where the best interests of the cared-for person would come into play.

This particular part of the Bill—Part 2 of Schedule 1 —is on “Authorisation of arrangements”. In putting down these probing amendments, I was particularly taken by the briefing given to us by the Law Society, which suggested:

“Remove the distinction between the ‘arrangements’ and ‘care and treatment’ as it will result in difficulties when applied in practice. For example, how would a person’s capacity to make medical treatment decisions or decisions about contact with others be distinguished from decisions about the ‘arrangements’ to provide that treatment or to prevent contact with others?”.


In light of that, at the very least we ought to be asking the Minister how this is going to work. I accept a number of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the clumsiness of the existing DoLS procedure, but the removal of best interest assessors is one that has caused a fair degree of disquiet among the different groups.

Amendments 7 and 8 are also meant to begin to probe a key provision in the Bill—the assertion that the arrangements need to be “necessary and proportionate”. There is no further explanation in the Bill about what the term “necessary and proportionate” might mean, who will make the decision and on what basis it will be judged and reviewed. This goes back to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that, given the increased role— let us say that—of care home managers, they will be making the assessments of what is necessary and proportionate.

No doubt I am going to be told that these amendments are either deficient or unnecessary, but they are here to begin to probe some very unclear but key parts of the Bill about the authorisation of arrangements. In that vein, I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I support the principle behind Amendment 8 in particular. Perhaps this is something the Minister will want to view as going in the code of practice, as I am not sure that putting this on the face of the Bill is necessarily the right place for it—although I completely understand the sentiment, which is to avoid serious risk. We live in a risk-averse system, and it is serious risk that we must be concerned with.

A case that I heard about in the last few days came to mind. An elderly lady with dementia became extremely agitated when it snowed. Because of her tendency to wander, she was not going outside unescorted. A conversation with her son revealed that she had been a meteorologist, so her view was that when it snowed she had to go outside and measure the depth of the snow and telephone the Meteorological Office. What they did was simply wrap her up really well, let her go out and measure the depth of the snow, give her a telephone and let her make a mock phone call to the Meteorological Office. She was very calm and happy. You do not want her to go wandering because she is near a main road and a railway line and all the other risks, but it was not a serious risk to let her out in the garden, well-wrapped up when it was snowing. That illustrates the granularity of the need to take appropriate decisions focused around the individual person.

Other cases that do concern me are those people who will become sexually disinhibited when exposed to great temptation. That struck me about a case I came across in a home for people with a history of sexual offences. There had been a DoLS in place for somebody not to go unescorted through woodland because, if he came across a young girl on her own in woodland, his sexual drive would overcome his rational behaviour—exposure to porn sites would also overcome his rational behaviour. However, the rest of the time, he could live well. Sadly, that DoLS was apparently overturned by the Court of Protection and, within weeks, he offended and ended up being imprisoned for his offence, but he had been living well with an enormous degree of freedom prior to that point. I think that the serious risk to the cared-for person has to be considered, because there the risk to him was that he would offend and, sadly, that came true.

I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on the sentiment behind this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate for their desire to be brief, which I know was shared by others who have not been part of the discussions on the Bill, but it is also important to be comprehensive in discussing these issues because, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the best interests of the people being cared for is what this is all about.

I know that this is an issue for noble Lords; it was raised at Second Reading and has been raised again in this debate. It is important to state that best interests decision-making for care and treatment remains fundamental to the Mental Capacity Act. In a way, it is the founding stone around which the rest is built. The liberty protection safeguards sit under the aegis of the Act. The Bill does not change that. One request made by noble Lords at Second Reading was for us to publish the Act as amended by the Bill. We have done that; I understand that it is in the Library. I can make sure that a digital copy is circulated, and I will make sure that it is sent to all concerned. Clearly, understanding the flow of how it is read in not just legislation but the code of practice is critical. I want to make that clear and I understand that important desire.

Under the current system, there are two different best interests tests: one exists under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act—the decision, usually made by a clinician, to provide care or treatment—and a second, separate, additional one falls within the tests required for the DoLS system. The Law Commission recommended that the DoLS tests be replaced with a necessary and proportionate test. In that sense, we are following where it led. Prior to a liberty protection safeguards authorisation being considered, the decision will need to be taken, normally by a clinician, that the care or treatment enabled by the arrangements is in the person’s best interests. As I said, that will apply under Section 4. Subsequently, it must be demonstrated that the arrangements to enable that care and treatment are necessary and proportionate. Of course, that is the single test applied by the liberty protection safeguards; it is a secondary test following a consideration of best interests.

The current requirement that the deprivation of liberty must be necessary, proportionate and in the person’s best interests is instead replaced by a single, primary best interests test in an attempt to avoid confusion and conflict—the word used by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, at the beginning of the debate—between two determinations. The focus of the second-stage test on what is necessary and proportionate is an attempt to remove this confusion. It is not an attempt to downgrade in any way the primary and prior importance of a person’s best interests being taken into consideration.

As well as giving that assurance, I want to pick up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that avoiding risk to the cared-for person will form part of the necessary and proportionate test. There is already a principle in the Mental Capacity Act to use less intrusive arrangements, which will continue to remain, unamended, an important principle in the new model. As was brought to light by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords, the application of “necessary and proportionate” requires a degree of granularity that makes it difficult to overdetermine in legislation, and that is the reason why the code of practice is so important. That is why it will contain a range of scenarios, principles, circumstances and so on of what the application of a necessary and proportionate test should look like.

I hope that I have been able to assure noble Lords, whose considerations I take very seriously, that best interests are foremost in our minds and will remain so in the legislation, unamended by the changes brought in by the Bill. Clearly, I want to make sure that this sentiment and its legal power are understood by all concerned, particularly if there is concern in the wider sector. As I said, I do not believe that a second test is necessary; as said by the Law Commission, it could be counterproductive. It is important that we make sure of a clear understanding of the primacy of the best interests test. I would like to explore that with noble Lords to make sure that it is properly understood by all; we can do that between now and Report. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for his helpful response. As we begin to get to the heart of the debate, he will understand that he and the Bill team can perhaps see the Bill as a whole, but the rest of us are struggling to do so. Therefore, we have to test individual elements of it, perhaps to a greater degree than he may think is warranted. None the less, it was helpful of him to put those statements on record. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

9: Schedule 1, page 10, line 8, at end insert “to safeguard the well-being, wishes and feelings of the cared-for person.”

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, we return to the topic that we were discussing before the break: the conditions that have to be met for authorisation of deprivation of liberty arrangements. During the dinner break, I reflected on what the Minister said in response to the previous Amendments 7 and 8, which were in similar territory. I understand entirely what he said about the best interests test being in the Mental Capacity Act and that being the first stage of assessment. However, on the secondary assessment for arrangements for either care and treatment or deprivation of liberty, the Minister seemed to suggest that there was a possibility of conflict between those two things or a misunderstanding of them. I will go back over some of that territory again; that may irritate the Minister, but it has been clear all afternoon that one of the main purposes that these proceedings in your Lordships’ House may serve is to enable people outside in the lobby groups, who, like us, have not been able to see a clear read-across from this Bill back to the original legislation, now to do so.

Amendments 9, 10 and 30 seek to reiterate or reintroduce concepts which will be very familiar to all those who took part in the deliberations during the passage of the Mental Capacity Act. Under that legislation, it was always to be made clear to a person who was possibly going to be subject to a deprivation of liberty, and to anybody involved in that decision-making, that the well-being, wishes and feelings of that person had to be taken into account, that any decision would be the least intrusive as possible, and that the arrangements being made for the person were the least restrictive, particularly with regard to where somebody should reside. That is for many people, particularly older people, perhaps one of the most contentious decisions. It is often one of the subjects on which there can be conflicting views between families and individuals or between professionals and individuals.

I have said before and—given that the one thing that has stuck out in the Bill is the enhanced role for care commissioners and, particularly, home care managers—I do not think it is unreasonable to go back again and satisfy ourselves that, when the authorisation of arrangements happens, these key parts of the Mental Capacity Act will again form part of the assessment. I hope, when we come to further amendments down the line, that they will be part of the record of decision-making. I do not make any apology for raising these amendments. I am sure the Minister will bat them back, but if he will do so with a deal of explanation then I think we will have served a purpose. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for that reply. We started with the mental capacity legislation, which is explicit in having the person at the centre of everything that happens. Yet we know from several reviews that have been conducted, including the review by the Select Committee, that the implementation of that legislation has been very patchy. To then be faced with a piece of legislation in which consultation with the person is not on the face of the Bill seems to be moving a long way from that original principle.

I have let the Minister talk about the code of practice repeatedly and I have not mentioned it so far, given that we have other amendments to debate. However, we found out with the Mental Capacity Act that reliance on the code of practice was one of the reasons why the Act was not implemented as well as it should have been. We will come on to that in far more detail, but there are some things that are so fundamental to the operation of this that we should know by now that leaving them to the code of practice is not acceptable. We can talk about implementation within the code of practice, but there are some things that need to be on the face of the Bill. For me, we really have hit that. If we are not even going to attempt to consult people, that for me is a red line, so I am pleased that the Minister has agreed to talk to us about that.

The points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, about the weighting of the wishes and feelings are also important. Those wishes do not sit on an equivalent level with the views of everybody else. They should be pre-eminent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hollins]

This needs emphasis because of the culture of care that we have in this country. There is still such a paternalistic attitude towards the person, that not to emphasise it is to miss the point.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank noble Lords for their support. We will need to return to this and I am glad that the Minister has taken that point.

Another reason for tabling the other amendments to ensure that arrangements are the least intrusive and least restrictive option is that, as we will debate on later amendments, the Bill is somewhat deficient in the extent to which it requires that people should be given information on which to base the consultation.

I make no apologies for raising this again at this time. It is something that I hope we will discuss between now and later stages of the Bill. I hope that the Minister can understand the reasons for the concerns that lay behind the amendment. Having said that, at this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I shall give just a brief response to that. It is a good idea. The Government think that the proposals for care homes, how they will carry out commission-needs assessments and the process for reviewing and authorising where necessary are a critical part of creating a more proportionate system that does what it says it will do, rather than the current system, which says it will do a whole bunch of things and then does not actually do them. That is where we want to get to.

I am being robust, as it were, in defence of the model. I want to explain—I think noble Lords are enthusiastic about this—how this will work in practice with the kinds of people who are most likely to be in the most difficult situations, so there is a clear understanding of the safeguards that exist to prevent conflicts of interest, provide independent oversight, make sure there is advocacy to support, and so on. It is clearly the case that there is not yet that understanding, and we need it to proceed.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for his explanation, which has been very helpful. Over the next few weeks, while he is seeking to give further clarification, I wonder whether it would be possible to explain this. One of the Government’s arguments is that the consideration of deprivation or the safeguarding of liberty should come much earlier in the care planning process. Most care is commissioned, most of it by local authorities. Can the Minister explain—perhaps not now at this late hour—how the commissioning of services will change to reflect the new system?

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

There is a useful flowchart that exemplifies it and brings it to life. I will make sure that it is shared. I agree that we need to find ways of bringing it to life, and that is something we can do outside this Chamber.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is our job to look at how things will and will not work and what the alternatives are. The noble Baroness takes a perfectly legitimate position that says, “If this won’t work, what will?” In a way, that underlines a lot of the discussions we have been having in this House: we need some time to discuss this Bill and we have not been able to have that.

My name is to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt. We are questioning the ability of the care home manager to be able to do this at all. The words that have been used to us by the stakeholders—we have now talked to dozens of stakeholders in the last month or so—are “capability” and “capacity” of care home managers. Professionals question the capability and local government and other institutions question the capacity. Those words are being used constantly while we discuss this issue.

It is also worth mentioning the voice of the care home managers themselves, which is starting to emerge. We recently had a briefing from a large group of care home managers who feel that they are not qualified to take on this role or to carry out assessments and that the administrative burden they could carry could mean that they will not have the capacity to take on the extra work to carry out liberty protection safeguard assessments.

There is some confusion here with what the Minister said during the first day in Committee and in the letter he wrote to us all following Second Reading. I admit that I am confused as to whether we are talking about initiating and carrying out assessments and what the powers of the care home managers are. It seems that the Bill team and the Minister have given us several different descriptions of what those roles might be. That has not helped our consideration of our concerns.

Mencap has stated that it believes that the views of the cared-for person have to be at the heart of this part of the Bill and that it should be refocused accordingly. The comments made by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, suggest that that has not yet been achieved, and that the role of the care home manager makes it less rather than more likely. That has been said to us not just by Mencap but by many stakeholders. They are concerned that the cared-for person is not at the heart of the Bill. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the Government have got this aspect of the Bill right and whether they need to find a different way of delivering it.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I wanted to respond in part to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. The original legislation was brought in on the basis of agreement across all parties in the House; so, too, was the report which reviewed the workings of the Mental Capacity Act. There was a unanimous view that DoLS need to be revised; they are not working.

It is interesting that many of the criticisms that have come to light in recent months have been from people who do not defend the current system but who have grave concerns not just about capacity but about some basic assumptions being made—not just about the role of care managers but about how the arrangements will work in practice. There is a quite legitimate view that the legislation will not solve the problem nor necessarily deal with a backlog; it will just shove it somewhere else. We need to think our way carefully through that because, as I will go on to say in debates on later amendments, there is no doubt that there is a watering down in the legal protections proposed by the Government. The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, are therefore right that we should examine in some detail exactly what the Government are proposing, because up until this point it has been quite difficult to understand it.

I thank the Minister for sending his letter of 4 October —he did so in the characteristically open and respectful way in which he treats this House. However, I want to ask a question which is germane to what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is trying to achieve in her amendment. The letter states:

“Care home managers will be responsible for arranging the assessments that are needed for the authorisation. In most cases, they will use assessments that have been completed by a social worker or a medical professional or others as part of the care planning process. This means we will reduce the duplication that exists in the current DoLS system and ensure that people access the safeguards they need”.


Exactly what assessments is the Minister talking about? DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. It would be very helpful if he could say that, because it is one of the fundamental assumptions that we are all working to and which may turn out to be incorrect.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

My Lords, I want first to thank noble Lords for their amendments and for their contributions to the debate. Reflecting on our first day in Committee and on Second Reading, it seems to me that an enormous number of the questions with which we are dealing are about the creation or definition of a new role for the care home manager—a number of the amendments that we will consider today deal specifically with it. I shall deal with those and the many questions that noble Lords have asked.

Given that it has been more than a month since we had the first day in Committee, I would like to reflect on some of the other issues that were discussed on that first day to demonstrate that there has been some progress. I will also explain why, although we are undoubtedly dealing with some difficult and complex issues that we know we have to get right, I am confident that if we work together, we can do that. I am quickly going to pick three issues in respect of which there has been some progress.

The first issue that was raised is extending the scope of the Bill to include 16 and 17 year-olds. I said in Committee that we would look at that and I can tell noble Lords that we will bring forward proposals to include that group in the scheme. I will also reflect on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, about the role of the cared-for person being front and centre. In fact, that was the one obligation to consult that was not translated from the Law Commission report into the Bill. Clearly, if we want to get the improvements that we want to see, it is essential that that person’s wishes and feelings about proposed arrangements be at the heart of the model, so we will ensure that the Bill reflects this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

As the noble Baroness says, there are conflicts of interest of various kinds; the important point is that there are protections against any conflict of interest. Typically, those will be through the regulatory authorities, whether the professional bodies or the CQC, which of course inspects all care homes and has found that 80% of them provide good or outstanding care. I believe that there are systems within the current regulatory framework that will provide for that oversight and prevent conflicts of interest. There is also the fact that the responsible body will carry out the reviews and that there is an opportunity to refer to an AMCP.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, the Minister has made several points, each of which needs to be gone over with great care—but I want to take him back to one of them. In his letter of 4 October, he said that the Bill is explicit that a necessary and proportionate assessment must be completed by someone who is suitably qualified and that case law establishes who is qualified to conduct other assessments. However, that is not actually so. What the Bill says in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 is:

“The determination required by this paragraph is a determination that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate … The determination must be made by a person who appears—(a) to the care home manager, if the arrangements are care home arrangements, or (b) to the responsible body … to have appropriate experience and knowledge”.


So that wording does not say that it has to be a medically qualified person, and I am not sure whether case law establishes that a capacity assessment must be carried out by a nurse or a social worker. Under the Mental Capacity Act, you get best interest assessors who are not medically qualified; that relates to an amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I suggest to the Minister—and I will suggest this quite a lot—that it should be in regulations rather than in the code that the minimum standards for completing assessments should be made.

On the first day in Committee the Minister said:

"Care home managers are already required to make applications and to consider capacity and restriction. Effectively, the new model recognises what they are doing but also allows for a further escalation”.—[Official Report, 5/8/18; col. 1829.]


At the moment care home managers do not make many of the assessments. They do not do capacity assessments. They do not make decisions about whether somebody is objective. It is not up to them whether an advocate comes in to see somebody. It is taking the truth to its outer limits to liken what happens now to what is intended under LPS.

When the Minister uses the word “escalate”, what is clearly understood not just by noble Lords but by stakeholders is that many of the protections, such as access to an advocate or to an AMCP, have deliberately been weakened in the Bill from what they are under DoLS. So I do think the Minister is somewhat overstating the case. That is what has given rise to many of the fears that have been expressed by a remarkably wide range of stakeholders. I therefore take some issue with what he said.

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

We believe that case law does establish that suitably qualified people need to be appointed. Clearly that is something we need to continue to discuss to persuade the noble Baroness that that is the case, but that is our understanding. As she pointed out, “suitably qualified” can include medical and other qualifications.

On care home managers’ capacity, they are of course carrying out some assessments. The intention is they will carry out more assessments. I agree with the noble Baroness on that point. The point that the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, raised was about the capability and capacity of this group of people to carry out these roles. On our previous day in Committee I committed to explain how we would ensure that that group of people had the requisite training and skills to carry out these kinds of assessments.

The noble Baroness made a point about weakened access. I want to update the House on our thinking about making sure that the person is consulted. We are trying to create a more proportionate system such that, where all those concerned with the care of a person are content that the arrangements have been properly put in place, it does not need to be escalated and reviewed by an AMCP or similar person. The problem we have at the moment is that the system takes every decision to the highest possible level. This is not about weakening access but about trying to have a proportionate system and also about making sure—we will debate this further tonight—that at every stage there are the right opportunities to seek advocacy support and to refer concerns so that an AMCP or responsible body can intervene and review a case if necessary.

Unless we find a way to deliver a more proportionate system we will simply be re-enacting the system we have now, which is not working. This is why I am so keen to work with noble Lords to make sure that we can determine the proper role and responsibilities of, and checks and balances on, care home managers so that we can get the system right and deliver a reform that saves money, enables more people to have their cases reviewed and enables us to make sure that people are protected, which is what we want to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment. It gives me the opportunity to return to the question I asked previously, to which I do not think we have yet got the right answer. It is about the nature of the assessment. The noble Baroness talked about the sort of assessments made under the Care Act—assessments to support somebody. They are not DoLS assessments, which assess whether someone is being deprived of their liberty. In what the Minister has said so far, in reference to care home managers, there is a failure to make that distinction. A DoLS assessment is a very serious assessment of whether someone has been deprived of their liberty. It can also be viewed in court. It is some stretch for a care home manager or someone in a community setting—making genuine operational assessments about supporting somebody—to make a decision that deprives that person of their liberty. We will come on to records of authorisation, but I have to say nothing the Minister has said so far has reassured me we are talking about an assessment system that would come anywhere near DoLS or be accepted by a court.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, if I may come back very briefly on that, the noble Baroness makes an important point. I worry that some of the DoLS assessments are very long and complex, yet make little difference to the lived experience of the person on the receiving end of care, so I hope they will become better tailored. A badly drawn-up care plan could also be presented in court if there was a dispute, not only the assessment forms. Some of the forms I have seen will have taken a great deal of time to complete; I wonder whether the detail replicates that obtainable elsewhere, and whether there is a problem of proportionality. Also, I worry that we should be looking at the minimum amount of restriction on liberty, rather than deprivation of liberty. If someone is imprisoned, the whole system has failed. They must be encouraged and empowered to live as well as they can while being kept safe from dangers that, without due care and attention, would probably end for some of them in their deaths—wandering on to a motorway or whatever.

[Baroness Barker]

I take the point made by the noble Baroness; she is absolutely right. There are some pretty awful assessments. I am not sure the Bill will stop that—I think she is rather wishful in her thinking if she thinks otherwise. She will have talked to practitioners, as I have. Sometimes DoLS work really well, particularly when trained assessors use the conditions. These can be something quite simple, such as the right to see a priest once a week or go out on a pass. I find myself in a slightly different position from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. As I sit in these debates I find myself becoming ever more defensive of DoLS because some of the case made against them is exaggerated. A lot of the reason for the backlog is not that the system is complicated but that there are not enough assessors out doing the work. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, but I still go back to the need for assessors who are trained, understand their purpose and carry it out in a proportionate and timely way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to Members of the Committee for their sympathy and for giving me breathing space. I was flustered by flipping forward and almost missing out this group of amendments.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, the issue of concern is the distinction between the person who is responsible for somebody’s care and the person who manages a care home—they are of course different. What we are trying to get right here—I understand that this is what the amendments are exploring—are the relevant responsibilities of those people, bearing in mind that we want to integrate liberty protection safeguards into the process of care planning.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, knows huge amounts about this topic and I very much respect her opinion. She pointed out that DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. There are some overlaps. As she will know, there are similar questions or parts in both assessments concerning consent, for example, but she is right that they are different types of assessments. I want to explore whether her or indeed the Committee’s concern is that those assessments should not be carried out by care home managers or whether—a more positive view—they should be carried out by certain types of professional. Those are subtly different points. Perhaps I may give her the opportunity to respond in a moment, as I am really keen to explore this matter.

Clearly, we are trying to make sure that those who have the professional expertise to carry out certain types of assessments do so. Equally, we are trying to make sure that a co-ordinating body has responsibility for ensuring that these assessments are carried out in a proportionate way and are included with care assessments in an overall care plan, with people being answerable to the relevant regulatory bodies. If the noble Baroness would not mind, I would be grateful if she, along with other noble Lords, gave her perspective on that. I want to make sure that we determine the appropriate role of the care home manager.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister very much for that because it enables me to point out something that I am sure he and all noble Lords know—that, when it comes to deprivation of liberty, the body which is ultimately responsible for that in court is not the care home but the state body, which would be the NHS body or the local authority. The Minister said that responsible bodies currently receive from care homes the referral forms and then do a desk-top assessment of those. Yes, they do that; however, they do it in the knowledge that the person will be seen by a qualified person. The problem with the Bill as it stands is that that is not an automatic assumption that a responsible body can make because of the gatekeeping role of the care home manager.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I thank the Minister; I am very grateful to him. If I have understood it correctly, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, supports my Amendment 30A, which requires that a registered professional—who, if they really get it wrong, would lose their registration—who has responsibility for the care plan and appropriate experience and knowledge, should make the determination. In other words, it is not good enough just to be a professional. I go back to the example of people with a head injury, who need a highly specialised assessment and overview so that a lead can be taken on the care planning process.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords—

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I will just finish, if I may. I completely share the concern about self-funders. They must have a care plan, because they are in receipt of care once they are in the system. It is appalling if there are people who are paying to be cared for in some kind of chaotic way without a proper, co-ordinated plan that they and their family can know about, so that everyone coming and going, be it out of hours or whatever, can understand what is happening.

I am beginning to think that there is not that much difference between us, and I agree that the current forms are inadequate. I apologise if, in the previous debates we have had, my comments about notification from the care home manager to the local authority were not well worded—on re-reading, I can see that, and I accept that I was wrong in the way that I worded it.

[Baroness Barker]

I do not want to get up the hopes of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, too strongly. She is a medic and therefore her go-to place is medical qualifications. There are some excellent best interests assessors who are not engaged in the care of the person. I wish to make that point. I shall keep coming back to the valid point of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the need to wind up with an affordable and manageable system. Noble Lords who have been involved in discussions with stakeholders will not be surprised to know that some of us think there is a way in which that could be done but it would involve reliance on advocates and assessors. Having said that, I agree with the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, a cared-for person has rights, and it is the duty of all those dealing with that person to understand those rights and to ensure that they are respected and recognised. I am certain that the rights of a cared-for person should be at the heart of liberty protection safeguards. One way to ensure this is to provide an automatic referral pathway to an AMCP in those cases of dispute, objection or disagreement that cannot easily be resolved. We know that a group of cases referred to court has been pivotal in ensuring that people’s rights are upheld in the field of mental capacity. These cases provide AMCPs with the authority to refer to the court. If this authority is on the face of the Bill, it will provide an added level of reassurance that the interests and wishes of the cared-for person will be fully considered.

Cared-for people are found in many different settings in this context—in hospitals, care homes and, indeed, their own home—whether they are supported by friends and family or by a care provider. I believe that this amendment will have particular relevance in cases involving potential deprivations of liberty within the cared-for person’s own home. Although the Minister’s letter addressed after Second Reading stated that all applicants will be subject to an independent review before authorisation, the Bill as it currently stands does not reflect this—nor the ability of the AMCP to refer to the court any issues that have evaded amicable resolution. I wonder whether the Minister will look at this when he sums up, and bring back some government amendments on Report to resolve these omissions.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, some amendments in this group are in my name. The purpose of putting these amendments down is to enable a debate about the extent to which the Bill relies on family members to take responsibility for escalating up and—as it seemed to us when we started to read the Bill—challenging care home providers, as well as challenging any deprivation of liberty. We know from the experience of Mark Neary that he relied heavily on provisions of the Mental Capacity Act—particularly covering review procedures—to equip him with what he needed to challenge what was being done to his son. It seemed to us that, because of the way the Bill was written, there was a greater expectation that it would fall to relatives to bring matters before the court, which is not easy to do.

We realise that going to court is an expensive and time-consuming business. We do not want to refer cases to court where there is no need to do so—we want to rationalise—but in our view this part of the Bill is inadequately written. It does not contain sufficient safeguards, and therefore we wanted a debate on these matters to probe exactly what support family members will have where there is a need to challenge decisions made under LPS.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to two of these amendments. We heard earlier that the Minister has agreed that the Bill at some point in the future will reflect the need to consult the cared-for person. This is clearly a great advance and sets the context for the debate on this group of amendments. I particularly commend the suggestion that the consultation should be not just about what the assessment has concluded should be done to the cared-for person—I fear that the sense of the Bill at the moment is “done to”—but what the alternatives are.

This is where I come back to one of our problems with the architecture of the Bill. So much responsibility is given to the care home manager who, inevitably it seems to me, must think about residence in a care home as being the only option because their job is to make sure that occupancy is of the highest level in order to maximise the viability of the home. It would be good to know how the Government think with this Bill and the new arrangements we are going to ensure that the alternatives are properly looked at before someone’s deprivation of liberty is actually authorised.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, can I take this opportunity to ask the noble Baroness some questions? Can she confirm my understanding that this duty to consult does not come under Article 4 of the Mental Capacity Act? As I read the Bill, the responsible body or the care home manager is under a duty to consult only in so far as they deem it to be practicable or appropriate to do so. They make that decision. Is that correct? Under DoLS, if somebody was “unbefriended” and if there was nobody to consult, that automatically triggered the right to an advocate. I do not believe that is the case under the Bill. Finally, this duty to consult is a stand-alone one. What happens as a result of that consultation? For example, it does not make it clear that if a family—like Mark Neary—objects to a placement, it does not trigger the need for an AMCP or another assessment. Yes, there is a long list of people but, as I understand it, there is no nearest-relative rule as there is under mental health legislation. There is no sequential order. My basic question is: what happens as a result of this duty to consult? It is not clear to me that anything necessarily happens.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hollins]

My Lords, my Amendments 38, 39, 40, 41 and 43 would add in families, friends and carers. They build on and support Amendments 15 and 16, which were debated earlier and tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. They would require that every cared-for person has access to an approved mental capacity professional, regardless of whether the assessor considers that the cared-for person might object to the care and treatment proposed.

Not everyone will be able or willing to risk expressing an objection to those currently providing their care. It can be very hard for a person to object to care given by a staff member on whom they may be totally dependent, and may feel obliged to agree with, when they view them, correctly, as somebody who has power over them. I suggest that for some people this will not be an easy judgment even if they are trying to object, particularly if they have difficulty communicating. It is often the case that family members are the most skilled at communicating with their loved ones, as I suggested earlier, and are therefore most likely to understand their feelings and wishes—feelings which may be communicated with subtlety or nuance, and which are unlikely to be confided to unfamiliar people or people perceived to have power over them.

In those situations where someone is not able to communicate their objections, it is vital that their family and others with an interest in their welfare are able to object for them and to trigger a referral to an AMCP—someone whom they can be confident has the right expertise. Otherwise someone with profound communication impairments might not be able to object while those close to them have serious concerns about the arrangements, yet are not able to request an AMCP. Those with the most profound impairments must not miss out on the involvement of an AMCP in this situation. In the 2014 report from the House of Lords post-legislative scrutiny committee, Nicola Mackintosh spoke about the compliant nature of many incapacitated adults. She said that,

“if you have a vulnerable person detained in a care home who is physically or verbally expressing a wish to leave, those cases are more likely to be raised before the court than cases involving a compliant, incapacitated person. That was the case in the Bournewood case. I do not think the DoLS scheme has cured the illegality”.

I do not think that the Bill, as amended, will fill the Bournewood gap. My Amendment 44B has identified a similar issue to that in Amendment 44A, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. It has been tabled to protect the rights of people detained for treatment in assessment and treatment units, and other hospital settings, for treatment for mental disorder. It would include NHS and independent hospitals. These are often the most restrictive settings where the liberty protection arrangements will apply and there are serious concerns about the rights of patients with learning disabilities who are placed in these settings.

However, due to the rules governing the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act, which this Bill leaves largely untouched, these patients will not receive any independent assessment by an AMCP. The reason for this, as I understand it and put as simply as possible, is that the Mental Capacity Act cannot be used to authorise a detention if the person is viewed as objecting to their detention; the Mental Health Act must then be used. This means that patients detained in hospital under DoLS or its successor, the LPS, will by definition be regarded as not objecting by those responsible for their detention. This would include people such as HL in the Bournewood case, who may not be capable of expressing an objection or whose behaviour is hard to interpret by those who do not know them well.

Under the Bill, a person will qualify for an assessment by an AMCP only if there is reason to believe that they are objecting, so for this group a specific trigger is needed to ensure that their detention is scrutinised by an independent, specially trained professional to ensure that it is justified, having regard to the alternatives. Last year there were 4,670 DoLS applications for patients in this category. I hope the Minister will agree that it is important for people in these settings to have access to an AMCP automatically.

I have also had some communication with Professor Sir Simon Wessely today, but I did not achieve the same certainty as my noble friend, who is not in her place. I hope that the Wessely review will remove the learning disability exemption in the Mental Health Act, which allows people with a learning disability to be detained if their behaviour is abnormally aggressive and so on, and that instead their detention will be on the same grounds as for any other person. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

There are two amendments in my name in this group. Amendment 44 is designed to probe an issue that is clearly worrying lots of noble Lords: that the condition that triggers an AMCP is that the person is objecting to their care in a particular place. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, is always very good at helping us to understand legislation from the point of view of people with learning disabilities. My background and my chief concern is with older people with dementia who are probably disproportionately likely to be overlooked by this provision because they will not necessarily be vocal.

I return to the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton: why would you object if you do not know what you are objecting to? What will happen if you do object? Will you receive any help? Currently, best interests assessments are required for DoLS detentions but, as I understand this, where a person does not object they do not get to see an AMCP. If they are in a care home, it is the care home staff, but in hospital and community settings the responsible body can use evidence from other assessments to make a determination for somebody. What is the evidence base for this? Do we know how many people currently object to their care and treatment? Why is that considered a sufficiently robust basis on which to make this a criterion in law? There is something deeply flawed and deeply wrong about this.

Amendment 59 may seem a bit strange on the face of it. It inserts a requirement to keep a record of refusals of authorisations. One of the things that the Select Committee of your Lordships’ House found was that the evidence base for DoLS is very sketchy. I have to make it clear that the Select Committee’s report was put together and came out just around the time of the Cheshire West ruling. In the light of that ruling, the number of applications shot up. We have never had a robust evidence base for the way DoLS work. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, that this is not going to close the Bournewood gap, but we should at least try to cover up some of the deficiencies there have been in the past. Therefore, trying to get together some basic stats and information, including how many times things like DoLS have been refused, is important.

I know, as will other noble Lords, that among professionals, or rather among stakeholders, there was a big discussion prior to Cheshire West about whether having lots of DoLS applications was an indication that in fact you were a good provider or whether that would somehow be indicated by the fact that you had none. That is not the right calculation; you can argue it either way.

We still need to get to the bottom of the transparency of the decision-making around this. That was my reason for tabling what might seem to be a rather strange amendment.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I beg your pardon; I have an amendment in this group as well. Oh dear, I seem to have spattered them in every group.

I have a real concern that triggering a review that is based on whether or not the person is thought to be objecting is far too narrow, and that anyone who has concerns about that person should be able to trigger a review independently—whether that is family, friends or somebody working in the place where the cared-for person is supposed to be being cared for.

I have an interest, or at least an experience, to declare: some years ago I was asked to help the police look at a care home where they had serious and justified concerns. The alert had come from somebody working at an extremely junior grade within the care home, not from anybody senior or from a professional. Following that, I was asked to review the case notes in detail. The people concerned all had severely impaired capacity and, often, an inability to express themselves—but, by meticulously looking at the case notes, one could see trends, and when I mapped them against the staff off-duty rota the trends became clearer.

I am very concerned that, if we leave this just as it is written, we will not allow the very people who have contact, possibly on a day-to-day basis, to put up a red flag about what may be happening in one person’s life. It may be that nine out of 10 people in an institution are very happy, but if one of them is not and one member of staff has got to know them and sees subtle changes in their behaviour, that member of staff must be empowered, with the cover of anonymity, to trigger an independent review, because that may be the only way to protect the cared-for person.

I put in my amendment that a review should be triggered if,

“the rationale … is based on the risk to others”.

The concept of “risk to others” is quite difficult to justify being in this Bill rather than in the Mental Health Act as the sole rationale for using the Bill, so I think that it becomes an exceptional circumstance that warrants that type of review. Similarly, if the restrictions are on contact with named persons, I worry that there could be a bias from the staff towards the named person. When somebody is very upset, they may appear to be an aggressive or angry visiting relative and may be a bit more difficult to handle—but actually it may be that that is simply the way that they are expressing their anxiety and their emotions towards the person who is now deteriorating and want to do their best for them. I worry about excluding a close relative without great justification; it should not be undertaken lightly.

[Baroness Barker]

When the Minister responds, will she confirm the point made to us by a number of stakeholders that harm to others, rather than harm to self, which is the basis of decision-making in best interests, is included in the Bill—because it is not explicitly ruled out and it was in the Law Commission’s proposals. If that is the case, that is a very significant change. The number of people included may well differ solely for that reason.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

I appreciate that very much; I am touched and can confirm that you have passed that exam with flying colours.

This is clearly another important element of the Bill, and I thank everyone for their contributions. I pick up the point about independence in the system, and have always been of the view that when you have situations like this, some independence is greatly helpful. Without wishing to make you laugh or belittle what we are trying to do, I say that I have just spent some time in the States and was subject to the awful rigours of President Trump and the Kavanaugh situation. I can tell you there was no independence there whatsoever. So I am absolutely at one with all noble Lords about independence when making judgments and trying to help people improve their lives.

I think the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, made a terribly important point. Where somebody is having something explained to them and does not feel comfortable objecting, or feels the environment is not right—I doubt there is one of us who has not been in that position at one time—it is horrible. We have to make sure the environment is correct and healthy for people to do so.

I think the points the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made, in referring back to the evening exam question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton—how do people know?—have to be answered. I take on board the point raised and think we must get to the bottom of that. However, I can tell you that approximately 30% of people do object to their DoLS review, if that is helpful. Also, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, raised an important point about evidence base. In a job once, someone wanted me to get the evidence for what we thought we were doing, and I was terribly nervous about it because I thought I would be out of a job. Actually, when we got an independent group in to look at it, we were just blown away by the evidence, which you could not argue with. I know it is costly to gather evidence, and I have no idea if it is practical or realistic here, but I have no doubt the case will be stronger one way or the other for having some evidence. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made numerous excellent points today, but the independence and the review is what is resonating in my mind. I am glad to confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that harm to others is included.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister very much for saying that. It is a very significant point she has just made, and perhaps one that noble Lords may have to come back to at a subsequent stage.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

The noble Baroness is pleased with me; that makes me worried.

The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, would mean that the referral to an approved mental capacity professional would also be required in the following circumstances: if any person interested in the person’s welfare does not wish them to receive treatment at the place, if any other person interested in the person’s welfare makes a request, or if there is reason to believe that an approved mental capacity professional should carry out the review. I am assured that the Bill is already explicit—where it is reasonable to believe that the cared-for person does not wish to reside or receive care or treatment at a place, an approved mental capacity professional must consider their arrangements. If an objection is made on the person’s behalf by a family member of the person or someone who is interested in their welfare, we would generally consider this to constitute a reasonable objection. We will provide detail—including examples—of when an approved mental capacity professional should complete a review in the code of practice. We plan to set out in detail where this would apply in the code of practice but it will include complex cases such as arrangements proposed for people with acquired brain injuries, and people in independent hospitals receiving mental health treatment.

While I understand the intention of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, the effect would be that any objection by any person with an interest in the person’s welfare would trigger a referral to an approved mental capacity professional. In short, this would mean that anyone could trigger a referral. An acquaintance from social media or a distant relative would be able to raise an objection. While this might be appropriate in some cases, there may be others where it would not represent the person’s wishes and feelings. As currently written, the amendment would undermine the purpose of the duty, which is to ensure that the views of the person are central to the process. I am sure that noble Lords agree that a focus on the views of the cared-for person is vital. That is why the Government have made this core to the new model.

The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would require a referral to an AMCP when others have expressed concerns, when an authorisation is being justified because of risk to others, or when the arrangements involve restrictions on contact with named persons. I thank her for raising these points and we will consider this carefully for the code of practice. I also hope I can provide reassurance that the Bill only enables authorisation of arrangements that give rise to a deprivation of liberty necessary for the purpose of receiving care or treatment. We would not ordinarily expect the liberty protection safeguards to be used to authorise a restriction on contact and we will make this clear in the code of practice. I am also sure that the noble Baroness is aware that risk to others is being considered as part of the Mental Health Act review.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, wants to ensure that an AMCP conducts the pre-authorisation review for everyone in an independent hospital receiving a mental health assessment or treatment. I am sympathetic to this and wish to consider the matter. Such cases should be referred to an AMCP. Detail of this will be provided in the code of practice.

We have tried to respond to all the points made by noble Lords this evening, but there is more to do. If it is acceptable to your Lordships, we should carry on talking about these issues. The Government are absolutely committed to doing this. On that basis, I hope that I may have passed the exam set by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, will be able to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

This group of amendments relates to the authorisation record. I have added an additional criteria in Amendment 50B because there may be arrangements put in place after an initial authorisation has begun—or that were subject to conditions—and parts of the authorisation may need early review. Amendment 62A is designed to ensure consistency—the care home manager will not do the assessments but will arrange them. Amendment 58B relates to renewal; if part of an authorisation no longer has effect it must be reassessed from scratch, not simply renewed. Amendment 58C requires that original evidence is submitted, not a second-hand report. It would allow the responsible body to see the authentic assessment rather than an interpretation of any original material.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I am afraid that I think some of the amendments standing in my name have been wrongly grouped. I am sorry; I have been busy this afternoon going through everything else and I am now a bit stuck regarding the procedure and what I should do. I will speak to them, although I am rather reluctant to start this group.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

My understanding is that the noble Baroness does not have to speak to them.

[Baroness Barker]

But am I right in thinking that if I do not speak to my amendments today, they will automatically fall?

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

It might be of assistance if I intervene here. If the noble Baroness is referring to amendments in the group beginning with Amendment 58A, I understand that if she does not speak to them now, they can be dealt with in the next group.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am no expert in parliamentary procedure but my understanding is that, as they come after the amendment we are considering now and indeed the one that we would consider next, they can be retabled.

[Baroness Barker]

I am grateful. I will do that.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for initiating this discussion. Clearly the purpose of her amendments is to make sure that an authorisation cannot be renewed if it wholly or in part ceases to have effect. In some cases, an authorisation will not be renewed if in part it is no longer valid, but there might be other cases where minor changes to the restrictions are needed and that should not prevent an authorisation being renewed. We want to provide further detail in the code of practice and I would appreciate the opportunity to work on that with her.

The noble Baroness has also tabled amendments outlining that authorisation records should detail when arrangements are not authorised or if they are authorised with conditions, and that in care home cases responsible bodies should consider other relevant information, as well as information provided by the care home manager. I can tell her that in some cases if arrangements are not authorised, it might be useful to include them in the authorisation record. However, given the debate that we had on the previous grouping about the general trend towards the inclusion of data or information within records that are then made available to patients, their families and so on, I want to reflect on whether they should always be included and I will come back to that on Report.

The Bill allows the responsible bodies to consider information other than that provided by the care home manager, and further detail on the circumstances and kinds of information will be provided in the code of practice. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured and will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting - (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 22nd October 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

55: Schedule 1, page 14, leave out lines 17 to 32 and insert—
“23(1) An authorisation ceases to have effect—(a) at the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day it first had effect,(b) at the end of such shorter period determined by the responsible body at the time it determines that the conditions for authorisation are met,(c) on such earlier date than the date given by paragraph (a) as the responsible body may from time to time determine,(d) if the authorisation is renewed in accordance with paragraph 37, at the end of the renewal period, or(e) when a suspension comes to an end as described in paragraph 41(2)(b).(2) An authorisation also ceases to have effect if, at any time, the responsible body believes or ought reasonably to suspect— (a) that the cared-for person has, or has regained, capacity to consent to the arrangements which are authorised,(b) that the cared-for person is no longer of unsound mind, or(c) that the arrangements are no longer necessary and proportionate.(3) But an authorisation does not cease to have effect for the reason described in sub-paragraph (2)(a) if—(a) the capacity assessment which was relied on in determining that the condition in paragraph 14(a) is met states—(i) that the cared-for person’s capacity to consent to arrangements is likely to fluctuate, and(ii) that any periods during which the person is likely to have capacity to consent is likely to last only for a short period of time, and(b) the responsible body reasonably believes that the gaining or regaining of capacity will last only for a short period of time.(4) The Secretary of State must by regulations prescribe a definition of “fluctuate” and “short” for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a)(i), (ii), and (b) above.(5) In a case where—(a) an authorisation relates to arrangements which provide for the cared-for person to reside in, or to receive care or treatment at, a specified place, and(b) at any time, the responsible body believes or ought reasonably to suspect that there is a conflicting decision about the cared-for person residing in, or receiving care or treatment at, that place,the authorisation ceases to have effect in so far as it relates to those arrangements.(6) There is a conflicting decision for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(b) if there is a valid decision of—(a) a donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the cared-for person, or(b) a deputy appointed for the cared-for person by the court,that the cared-for person should not reside in, or (as the case may be) receive care or treatment at, the specified place.(7) If at any time an authorisation relates to arrangements which conflict with requirements arising under legislation relating to mental health, the authorisation ceases to have effect in so far as it relates to those arrangements.”

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to be the first speaker on our third day in Committee. We are under some time pressure this evening because of earlier business. But, having spent yet another weekend going through the Bill, trying to understand its full intent, I have to say that it really is a shockingly bad Bill. Therefore, whatever pressure may be brought to bear, we should spend adequate time going through all the amendments before us. I will not speak at great length and I know that other noble Lords will be very disciplined, but there are some very serious issues and the potential for harming some of the most vulnerable people in our society if we get this wrong is great. Therefore, I make no apology for initiating what I hope will be a series of quite searching debates.

Amendments 55, 56 and 58 stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Tyler. They deal with one of the most serious issues at the heart of this legislation—although you would not really know that just from reading it—which is the interaction with the Mental Health Act. I do not need to repeat what was said at earlier stages about the interaction of the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act because there are many people here who understand that and have discussed it as many times as I have. But I will say one thing as a result of contributions made by some noble Lords last week about Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Mental Health Act. People reading the Hansard of our debate last week might well have come away with the understanding that, if a person has mental health issues, they are dealt with by the Mental Health Act, and if a person lacks capacity, they are automatically dealt with by the Mental Capacity Act. But that is not true, in two particular ways.

One is that a person may have a mental health condition but may also have a physical condition, and the question is: what happens about their capacity to make that decision? It is not a decision covered by the Mental Health Act, even though they may be residing in a secure unit. Secondly, there are some people who are wrongly detained under the Mental Health Act: increasing numbers of older people with Alzheimer’s are wrongly diagnosed and detained. Therefore, as was recognised when the mental capacity legislation was initially developed, it is very important that we get these two pieces of legislation and their interaction right. That will explain to the Minister why, when we had the initial briefing on this from civil servants, some of us were rather astonished that there was no mention of the Mental Health Act at all until we brought it up.

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[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I feel that I should contribute to this debate although I have no speech prepared because, in the discussion with Sir Simon Wessely that I referred to last week, I challenged him about this issue. I asked what we were doing by debating this Bill before his review came out. He was clear and while I cannot say what he is proposing, maybe I can indicate the sort of areas he is looking at. These may help to illuminate the clear differences in certain ways between the two sets of debates and legislation.

For example, he is looking at the role of the Ministry of Justice in relation to people under restriction orders. There are specific mental illness issues in that area. He is looking at how community treatment orders operate—there might be less use of such orders—and how detentions in hospital for people with psychotic illnesses operate, and so on. Those areas are, in general, probably quite distinctive to the Mental Health Act. The bit where I feel there really is a potential overlap is in the area of mental health tribunals, which I will raise when we come on to deprivation of liberty concerns in the context of specific domestic situations. I will have a proposal to make then. I will not go into it here, as it would not be appropriate.

Sir Simon Wessely’s position is clear: he feels that the Mental Health Act needs reform and I think he will have very interesting proposals to make about that. We also all agree that the DoLS system needs reform and we are discussing how that should be done. What he is doing and what noble Lords are trying to do here are both quite complex sets of reforms. Sir Simon Wessely’s view—I hope that he would agree with me—is that these two sets of reforms need to be in place for quite a period. He talked about a decade, actually. There is also the Northern Ireland situation; there are proposals for some bringing together of these things there. There is of course no Government in Northern Ireland but Sir Simon Wessely wants that Northern Ireland Government to be formed and for them to be the pilot of all this and see how that works over a period of years. We would then come forward with some proposals, as and if appropriate, for bringing these two pieces of legislation together.

I hope that I have represented Sir Simon Wessely properly. It is important for us all to be aware that we do not have the support of the person in charge of the review of the Mental Health Act when we say, “Come on, what are we doing by having this first? Surely it should all be done at once”.

[Baroness Barker]

I want to make it clear to the noble Baroness that I am not talking about bringing these two pieces of legislation together. I know some people have suggested that that should be done, but I am not asking for that. I am simply suggesting that this legislation, which makes a substantial change to what has been the basis of decision-making about best interests on the basis of harm to self, is now going to include harm to others. We were told back in the summer, when the Minister sent us a letter, that the Government were waiting for the outcome of the Mental Health Act review to see what the impact would be. We are now being told, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, confirmed, that that basis of decision-making is changed by this legislation. It is linked to the necessary and proportionate assessment that people will have to make. I think that is a major change that will perhaps result in the detention of quite a number of people. I do not think it is unreasonable for the Government to wait until Sir Simon Wessely has published his report to ensure that the two pieces of legislation are not drifting further apart.

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I think I see the intention behind the amendment, but it might become really complex legally and I do not think it would do anything to solve the Bournewood gap. The more you look at the Bournewood gap, the more you see that it should never have happened in the first place, irrespective of the legislation in place. There has been a problem looking at Bournewood and at legislation as a solution. I hope that as a result of the way this Bill is drafted, the patient’s wishes and feelings and those making representations on his behalf would have been listened to and should be listened to, and that we will have a mechanism to trigger so that he would not remain detained.

[Baroness Barker]

I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Mark Neary had to resort to the law, not to a code of practice, to get his son out of a place where he should never have been detained. We need to have further discussions about what needs to be in the Bill and the role of regulation and the code of practice. I think she has a fundamentally wrong take on this. This is about legal protection for very vulnerable people. That sometimes has to be in a brief outline in law. It has to be stated in the Bill that a person has to be spoken to face to face. We can then go on to put a load of stuff in the code of practice about how we do that.

To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I think this is a terrible Bill containing huge holes and some real problems. If the Government take the tack they took last time, we may be able to improve it substantially, but we are in danger of putting one bureaucracy in place of another bureaucracy, and the only difference between the two is that there are far fewer protections for the most vulnerable people. We would be somewhat negligent to go ahead on that basis. I cannot approach the Bill in that way.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, for tabling this amendment. I agree with the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about the state of the Bill. I am rather—“disappointed” may not be quite the right word—surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, who has brought discipline to the House to focus on good legislation and how it should work, is suggesting that we have to have something, so this is it. I really hope that that is not the case and that this Committee will have revealed to the Minister, and particularly to the Bill team, that many elements in the Bill need clarification, need to be changed and can be improved. That is our job, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is highlighting but one of those elements. In fact, the amendment that I am due to talk about next refers to the difficulties that the Bill has brought and the differences between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act.

The last month or so has been very revealing. The Bill was sold to us as something really quite simple that was going to streamline things, get rid of the backlog, save some money and so on, and it really needed only one day in Committee. That is certainly how it was sold to me on these Benches and, I am sure, to other people in the House. In fact, what has happened over the last couple of months is that all the stakeholders and people who are writing to us are saying, “No, this will not do. This Bill does not work. It is dangerous and difficult”. It needs clarification, and these amendments highlight the areas that need it. We are going to move on to other areas that need clarification and which will certainly need amendment. This is an important and legitimate question to ask about the Bill.

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[Baroness Barker]

I thank all noble Lords for taking part in that debate, which was a useful exchange of views and information. The Minister is in some difficulty, because the two organisations that he cited are on record as saying that they do not support the Bill in its current form. I remain of the view that we run the risk of attempting to deal with an underfunded, under-resourced system by putting in place another underfunded, under-resourced system which dilutes the protection of vulnerable people.

Ahead of debates on other groupings, I simply ask how many times the Mental Capacity Act and DoLS codes of practice were changed. How many times were they amended? I do not disagree that a code of practice is a good place in which to put examples; I do not think it is a substitute for having well-drafted legislation and regulations—regulations can often be changed.

I will read Hansard with great care, but I reserve the right and hope, with the assistance of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who is not in her place but is equally concerned about these matters, to return to the matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 55 withdrawn.

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[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for tabling these amendments and precipitating this discussion. I will move straight on to the substance of the amendments. Amendment 61 provides that local authorities must make arrangements for a named person to be in charge of training and revalidation of approved mental capacity professionals and that local authorities must make arrangements for contracts with neighbouring local authorities and health bodies as required.

On the issue of approvals and training, the Bill is clear that local authorities must approve individuals to become AMCPs, and regulations under paragraph 33 will make provision around training, qualifications and other eligibility criteria. The question of what kind of training there should be and who pays is something that we discussed at some length on the last Committee day. That was more in relation to care home managers, which was primarily the focus of the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The same read-across applies to AMCPs as well. On that occasion, I committed to bringing forward more details of what the training would look like. I also confirmed that, in England, Health Education England and ADASS would be responsible for working with Skills for Care, and Social Work England. Those are the bodies that would be responsible for overseeing and designing the training. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked about the rights of individuals. Of course, that would be the centrepiece of any training programme to make sure that those rights are properly respected.

On the specific question about local authorities naming an individual, I say that the Bill does not prevent them doing so. It is something that they are able to do and, in our view, it does not need to be set out in primary legislation. There is no such requirement for best-interests assessors or approved mental health professionals, I understand, and that has not caused any difficulties in practice. To that extent, we can mimic the arrangements in place there.

Making arrangements with other local authorities is again not precluded by the Bill. Clearly, that is something that local authorities will want to do, depending on the arrangements they have commissioned in care across different authorities. I can confirm that we will provide guidance on this in the code of practice.

Amendment 61A adds to the criteria that must be met for a person to become an AMCP. They must be,

“a registered professional, with a minimum of three years clinical experience”.

A list sets out whom that could include; that list has been added to by one tonight, which in some senses exemplifies the nature of the problem. I completely agree with the noble Baroness: we need to set out not only the kind of professionals but the kind of qualifications and experience. There has to be a balance and a mix between all of those. That will be set out in regulations. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked about the proper place to set out the rigidity or robustness, and we believe that the appropriate place would be in regulations, which provide a degree of flexibility that would not apply if we enshrined this in primary legislation. That is why we are proposing the approach of defining the groups that should be acting as AMCPs.

[Baroness Barker]

How many cases have been taken to the Court of Appeal on the basis of regulations not being observed, as opposed to something in an Act? I do not expect an answer now, but I would like to know.

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I am afraid that I do not know, but I will write to the noble Baroness and circulate the letter to all noble Lords.

To conclude, I hope that I have provided the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, with the reassurances that she was looking for and that she will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, in this group of amendments we begin to get into the issue of IMCAs and how that whole system will operate. In Amendment 63 I use the words,

“there is reason to believe”,

because I feel strongly that anyone who is concerned about the cared-for person—whether they are family, a friend who knows them well, a care assistant in the care home, if they are in a care home, or somebody who is coming into wherever they are being cared for, such as supported living—must be able to raise them independently, if necessary anonymously, and to request that an IMCA is appointed to go and see what is happening.

In Amendment 64 I removed the word “only” because I was attempting to remove the veto from a care home manager. The potential veto of a care home manager has caused so much concern in debate, and a great deal of anxiety in the briefings that have come through to us. I stress that advocacy—we will come on to that overall—needs careful monitoring, too, and people who act as advocates need support and supervision. Not just anybody can be an advocate, and we have to be careful that we do not exclude family and those who know a person well by having an advocate come in when in fact a family member who has known them for years may be in a much better position.

Also, we have to have a way of screening out advocates who, for whatever reason, may not be the right people to do this at the time. Unfortunately, it is inevitable and part of human nature that people will want to work in a field if they have had some experience of being on the receiving end. But certainly, when you look at bereavement counsellors and so on, they need to have a clear period before they are selected, and they need to be carefully selected and screened, and supervised. We are talking about extremely vulnerable people here, and the last thing we want to do is somehow to open the door to them being vulnerable at somebody else’s hands through our best intentions. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, this is again a rather fundamental indicator of some of the things that are badly wrong with the Bill. The words “best interests” appear in it three times, and twice they are used in relation to a care home manager being able to restrict access to advocacy. As the Bill stands, referral to advocacy is controlled by a relevant person, either the responsible body or the care home manager, and an advocate must be appointed if a person has capacity and requests an advocate—that is quite rare, and I have to say that under the Bill it would be something of a miracle, because they do not have the right to information about not only their current circumstances but about other less restrictive options. The Minister’s statements on information last week, when he referred to GDPR, were so strange that it has taken me a considerable time to work out that he had completely misunderstood that under the current system people have a right to information. They have the right not to request information but to be provided with information, which this amending Bill severely restricts.

However, the second condition is by far the most worrying. Somebody can request an advocate if the person lacks capacity and the relevant person is,

“satisfied that being represented and supported by an IMCA would be in the … person’s best interests”.

I invite noble Lords to think what would have happened if those words had been in law during Winterbourne View. That is why I am quite happy to use the word “shocking” about the Bill, as this is unacceptable. My amendments would try to get rid of the abuse of the term “best interests” to limit vulnerable people’s access to support. The Minister knows that under the DoLS system, by and large, if somebody requests an advocate, it is up to the relevant body to try to do their best to find one, or that they find an appropriate person. I refer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that under case law at the moment, local authorities have the right to override if an appropriate person is not doing their job properly on behalf of the person. That too will be undermined by the Bill.

The Minister will also know that if somebody has no relatives and nobody else in the world—they are “undefended”, to use that rather archaic but useful and clear term—they have an automatic right to advocacy. I know that much will be made of advocacy being expensive, advocates being a resource that is not readily available, and that people who do not need advocacy will be unnecessarily interviewed. I am quite happy to talk at length to the Government about ways in which advocates or advocacy resources could be better used and better targeted—but absolutely not by drawing it like this, putting this sort of hurdle not even in a code of practice but in a Bill.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, we on these Benches very much agree with the purport of these amendments, which again bring to light some of the ambiguities in the Bill and some of the rights that are not properly respected by it. Over the next period the Minister will not only need to give us a theoretical answer but have to answer things such as the question about Winterbourne View, and look at the hard examples of real experience which some of us have been receiving in our postbags over the last month. We will need to return to this over the next few weeks, and possibly even at the next stage.

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[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for that explanation. Given that the Bill as drafted is essentially a “get out of jail free” card for bad care home owners, the Government must have a really good evidence base to have come forward with a proposal as sweeping as that. I wonder whether the Minister can share with us the evidence that has led to the Government putting this in the Bill. It really should be quite convincing, given that it has got to this stage. It would be helpful if he would let noble Lords see that evidence.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am happy to discuss the issue with all noble Lords, as I have said in the past. I return to where I started: the intention of this approach is to make sure that independent advocacy is not imposed on someone who genuinely does not want it. It is not to provide a “get out of jail free” card for poor care home managers. If that is a concern, I take it very seriously, but it is not the intention of the Bill. However, if it is the case, something needs to be remedied. Let me assure noble Lords that I will make best efforts to do so as we move forward from Committee.

This has been a very useful discussion. In some sense it has provided a degree of continuity from our discussion last week, while moving on to the issue of advocacy, which we will clearly explore further. I hope that, with the reassurances I have given at this stage, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, this debate has been extremely interesting and, in many ways, gets to the nub of some of our concerns. In looking at the Bill, one thing I have tried to do is to benchmark its procedures to see how they would work. I was involved in prosecuting appalling care in EMI homes. I am trying to see how we could have discovered sooner that there were problems there.

I share the concern about the care home manager having too much power. Having said that, I have found the Minister’s answers today reassuring, as they were on the second day in Committee. I suggest, however, that the number of objectors will be very few, because many of these people have such impaired capacity and are not in a position to object—it may be other people who speak up on their behalf.

[Baroness Barker]

I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, agrees that, when you watch well-trained advocates at work, you see that they absolutely understand if their presence is upsetting somebody. They are not routinely attempting to force themselves on to people who definitely do not need their help. The question of whether somebody wants their help or not is a more nuanced professional judgment.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I agree with the noble Baroness that when they work well, they can work extremely well. As I said earlier, I would also caution against the family and other people being potentially pushed aside, and people being not adequately supervised or monitored.

We have a great deal to consider outside the Chamber tonight. I am grateful to the Minister for being in listening mode so far. This group of amendments and the next are the ones that we will need to have a big discussion about. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 78, but I should like to say a word in support for the amendments spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to which I have added my name. These amendments concern the arrangements for the appointment of independent mental capacity advocates and they sensibly seek to ensure that an IMCA must be appointed if the appropriate person would have substantial difficulty helping the cared-for person to understand their rights, involving them in decisions and assisting them to exercise rights of challenge if they wish to do so without the support of an IMCA. I want to make it clear that relevant rights include the right to make an application to the court and the right to request a review of the arrangements. The responsible body must ensure that cases are referred to the court when a cared-for person’s right to a court review is engaged.

The concern is that at the moment, referral to advocacy is controlled by the relevant person, who is the responsible body or the care home manager. An advocate must be appointed if the person has capacity and requests an advocate, which is likely to be very rare, or the person lacks capacity and the relevant person is satisfied that being represented and supported by an IMCA would be in the person’s best interests. The problem, which we have now debated a number of times, is that the right to advocacy seems to be more limited than under DoLS, and it is at the discretion of the relevant person not to refer if it is not considered to be in the best interests. As has been commented on, there are only three references to best interests in the entire Bill, and two are used at the discretion of the care home manager or the responsible body to actually limit the right to an IMCA. We have to build in some more safeguards, including referral to the Court of Protection. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which looked at the original Law Commission work, said that the responsible body should be under a clear statutory duty to refer cases where others fail to do so.

I was interested to receive over the weekend an email from the carers for HL in HL v UK ECHR 2004, otherwise known as the Bournewood case. They have always been critical when they observe bad practice and the failure to uphold a person’s rights. They say that reading the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill and following its passage through the parliamentary process so far has been depressing and leaves them feeling extremely frustrated and angry that the work they started in 1997 and the protections for the person that came about from that work are now being thrown away by this Bill. The lack of any of the protections they argued for individually and collectively, which at least had a fair hearing when they gave oral evidence to the JCHR and, they believe, were mostly reflected in its recent paper, appear to have been completely ignored, as has most of what the JCHR had to say. They say that anything less than the JCHR recommendations, along with nearly all of the proposals from the Law Commission, would be a reduction in the value of a person’s individual rights and against the concept of the MCA and even of the existing DoLS.

Interestingly, their acid test is this: if HL against Bournewood happened today under these proposals, would he be any better protected than in 1997 or under DoLS? They say that given the attitude of the professional employed by the hospital managing authority at the time, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill places more control in the hands of those very professionals and shows less consideration of HL and those who were trying to get him out. In its current form, it is a monumental failure. I know that the Minister thinks that this is an exaggeration, but coming from the carers of HL, it suggests that there are real and genuine concerns about where the Government are going. My fear, as I said last week, is that essentially we are seeing a streamlining of the bureaucratic process and many of the safeguards are being reduced. That is why access to the Court of Protection is so important.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 75. I do not wish to rehearse the arguments we had on the previous group but I want to put one question to the Minister. Why in paragraphs 36 and 37 do we suddenly see the term “relevant person” being introduced? It is quite confusing and I shall need to go back and look at Hansard. I do not want to make a wrong accusation, but I think there is confusion about the terms “relevant person” and “appropriate person”, when in fact they are two completely different things. My understanding is that a “relevant person” is either the responsible body or a care home manager, so why do we not talk about that? If that is what is meant, let us be up-front about it.

Amendment 75 asks why the appropriate person as we know them under the Mental Capacity Act has to have capacity to consent to being supported by an IMCA if the purpose is not just to put another hurdle in the way to make sure that these people—let us bear in mind that they do not have a right to be given information under this Bill—have to make a request of the care manager or the care home manager. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is right to say that the Minister has talked about care home managers and care managers; they are different, but all of them have a potential vested interest in making sure that someone does not have access to an IMCA. That, I think, would be a gross dereliction.

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments go some way to ensuring that a cared-for person is not left without an independent mental capacity advocate or the support of an appropriate person. Much of the Bill as it stands represents what I think is a real assault on human rights. For heaven’s sake, we should be listening to the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt. He has shared with me the email from the carers of HL and it is very powerful. My father was a miner and he would have said, “This is the experience from the coalface”. We can take this as an important contribution to understanding the difficulties that families face when they have to deal with the issues we are discussing.

Amendment 66 would give a local authority discretion to appoint an appropriate person or an independent mental capacity advocate without notification from a care home. Mencap and others have argued most powerfully that this amendment would minimise the risk of conflict of interest. That is important, as we have seen in other debates. It would mean that a care home arrangement could be more easily challenged and subject to scrutiny. Is not challenging and scrutinising what we do every day in this House? We challenge and scrutinise legislation brought forward by the Government; that is our role. Why would we deny that opportunity to the vulnerable people we are talking about in this Bill?

As it stands, the process for deciding whether to appoint an appropriate person or advocate requires a series of capacity assessments and best interest decisions made by the responsible body or the care home manager, even though both convention and domestic law have made it clear that there is no place for best interests in Article 5 appeal rights. Unless we effect change, this Bill will pass into law and we will see a cared-for person without the appropriate support of either an independent mental capacity advocate or an appropriate person—and that at a most crucial time in their life. That cannot be right. Amendments 76 and 77 are important if we are to ensure that the appropriate person gets the support they need for the role they have undertaken. We have had several long and important debates during the passage of the Bill. These amendments are reasonable and surely the Government must now start to listen.

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We are on the cusp of new technology coming in to help people who need to have some kind of restrictions. I recently went to a fascinating presentation at the Academy of Medical Sciences about using the equivalent of GPS devices to help people who are inclined to wander and to be able to set off an alarm. I think the way things will move forwards is far greater than we can ever envisage and I have a concern that, if we put advance consent into this, we may inadvertently lead to people being far more restricted and far less empowered than all of our arguments so far have tried to encourage.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, this is a fascinating discussion which will be familiar to the noble Lords who took part in previous legislation on mental capacity and on mental health. The thing I am most heartened by is the prediction made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, of what Sir Simon Wessely might do in his review of the Mental Health Act. Way back when the law was reviewed in 2005—I think it was then but I am hopeless with dates—I was one of a number of Peers who argued the case that people with fluctuating mental health conditions should be able to say, at a point when they had capacity, “At some future point, if I have an episode, it is likely that I may refuse treatment but, right at the moment, now that I am well, I wish to say that I want you to ignore that”. That was resolutely turned down by the small bunch of forensic psychiatrists who were behind that change to legislation. So I am glad that the world of mental health is moving to catch up with other parts of medicine, where greater involvement of patients and exercise of patient choice is something to be encouraged and not dismissed.

Many of the arguments that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, put forward were arguments which were put up against the original proposals of the Mental Capacity Act. I believe that, were this to be in legislation, we should be able to put a lot of safeguards around it. At this stage, I encourage the Minister to take these proposals and put them into the future discussions that will take place on the Bill.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I do not want to prolong this too much but I will ask the noble Baroness: has she in any way lost confidence in the proposal that she put forward when the Mental Capacity Act was a Bill before us? It was for an advance statement of wishes, which has, when properly used, been a very powerful tool to make sure that somebody is listened to. My concern has been that our discussion to date has been about the wishes and feelings of the person as previously expressed. From the way she was talking, I am concerned that it sounds as if she might have lost confidence in the ability of that—because, as I have said, I have a real concern that tying somebody legally to enforcing something which was said in advance could potentially be really dangerous.

[Baroness Barker]

No, I have not lost confidence in that; I simply wish to undertake further discussion, given that—I say it again—it looks entirely likely that mental health legislation may be changing. I think, in light of that, that it is a wise discussion to have.

[Baroness Murphy]

May I just add that I think it is important to read all the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton? She provides for any opportunity, any chance, that the individual may indicate that they have changed their mind, at which point those things come to an end, essentially. They have to be quite specific that if there is any doubt in somebody’s mind that this is no longer something that can be continued, that there is anxiety about them being implemented, then it comes to an end. So I think those things can be taken care of.

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[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for tabling this amendment, which I support. I will keep my remarks very brief and make just two points.

The first point is about the spirit of the amendment. Clearly it aims to avoid broadening the scope of the legislation to apply to people who lack capacity and are living at home but who may need their liberty to be restrained. My comments relate to the 450,000 people mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy: those for whom there may be no formal care plan in place. I want to consider how issues relating to safeguarding and deprivation of liberty would be identified; namely, how do we uphold the rights of vulnerable people in those situations?

If we think in practical terms, there are potentially two routes to safeguard those cared-for people: one is the Mental Capacity Act and the other is the Care Act. I strongly agree that the Care Act 2014 is the route that we should go down. In almost every family, there will be multiple health professionals involved, either by going into the home or through appointments. They are equipped to identify both the safeguarding and the deprivation of liberty issues. It is through the Care Act that we can have the most human and proportionate response for those families.

Secondly, I want to deal with the point behind what the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, alluded to: cases where somebody is being cared for at home but then perhaps their carer has a fall and has to go into hospital, and the cared-for person then briefly goes into a care home and is therefore subject to liberty protection safeguards. What is the status of those safeguards when that person returns home? It would be very helpful if the Minister could clarify that.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, said, these arrangements might be idiosyncratic, but almost all of us have had experience of them and we value them greatly.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I want to make a couple of quick points. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, is of course right that the whole issue of DoLS and the community is known to be a problem. However, the examples she gave seem to me to be examples of people not understanding the DoLS legislation and applying it wrongly, rather than the legislation necessarily being wrong. It is always important to make the case for the rights of families to reject undue intrusion, but I want to share with her the case of a young man with whom a learning disability organisation was working. The organisation achieved great results and he did really well. Prior to his involvement with the organisation, he would sit all day in a part of the living room that had been bricked off by his parents, with his own chair, his own television and being fed through a hatch. That was in a domestic setting. I need not tell the noble Baroness that we need to be quite careful when drawing up legislation.

It is a great shame that we have been presented yet again with a piece of legislation that came out of nowhere when we could have had a proper consultation. The people who are out working in the field at the moment having to administer DoLS understand many of the problems. They know that issues that arose partially from the application of the Cheshire West ruling and the High Court judgment have caused a problem. But amending a really bad Bill is not the way to deal with this problem.

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

I want to make a couple of points, but I first draw the attention of noble Lords to my interests in the register relating to learning disability. It is interesting how to read this amendment. I looked at it and thought about individuals in domestic settings, and the charity that I chair does just that. We put four or five individuals into a domestic setting. A proportion of them will have a DoLS. If noble Lords go into the house, it looks just like an ordinary home. Each resident pays rent and would consider it very much their home. Carers offer 24-hour support and locks are well and truly in evidence. Over the weekend, I asked our director of operations what proportion of the people we support were subject to DoLS, and she said thousands. It is just the norm.

I understand that the noble Baroness’s intention was to take this into a family setting where there is mum, dad and a child who may well be an adult—certainly, we see parents in their 80s caring for their children with a learning disability who may be in their late 50s or late 60s, and the parents are at their wits’ end. All that fits with this amendment so, whatever its merits, the wording needs to change but it is certainly worth pursuing.

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[Baroness Thornton]

This is the last amendment, and I will be very brief. It is quite appropriate that the last amendment we consider is about Article 5 of the ECHR, which is about the core of the Bill: people’s liberty and the deprivation of it. I have four things to say. The reason this amendment is so important is because it addresses the things that we have found lacking in the Bill which we feel need to be addressed. They are: the availability of information; advocacy and the fact that people need to have access to champions; representation; and the conflict of interest that arises when a detainer is required to assess a detainee. Particularly where a financial interest is in play, it is obvious that it has to be addressed if the proposals in the Bill are to be Article 5 compliant, which they need to be. That is the test that we need to apply to the Bill all the way through. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Baroness has given us this opportunity to discuss a really important matter, albeit that it is late at night. I noted what the Minister said at various times throughout the debate about reliance on the code of practice. He will know that, as we have been trying to make clear all the way through the debate on the Bill, if some rights are not statutory rights in the Bill, then compliance is inn question. I rather suspect that the Bill that was presented to us was not compliant. I do not see how a Bill which, on the face of it, would enable somebody to be detained without being met and assessed by a professional person could be compliant.

There are a number of key matters which the Government are, at the moment, talking about putting into the code of practice—perhaps, possibly on a good day, into regulations—but which need to go back into the Bill. If they do not, the responsible body will not have the statutory responsibility to see that they are carried out. They are: the basis for the detention and the necessary and proportionate test and when that test applies; the role of IMCAs and access to appropriate persons; professional qualifications and training for people undertaking those pre-authorisation reviews; where an AMCP referral should be made; and the obligation to provide information to the person and their family about authorisation. All those things are important.

I say from these Benches that if we do not have considerable movement towards putting those things into the Bill, however briefly, the Bill will still be in trouble when we come to Report.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 21st November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I will come to that. I am using that technical point to illustrate that there are concerns with the amendments as laid. We recognise the importance of this issue and the strength of feeling on it in the House. As I have said, I see merit in the argument for having this defined in statute, and I am sympathetic to that point of view. I can therefore give noble Lords some assurance, and confirm today not only that we are working on this matter, but that we intend to bring forward an amendment in the Commons to give effect to a definition. We want to work with all noble Lords and other stakeholders, and of course the JCHR, to ensure that we can table an effective amendment that achieves our shared aims and gains the level of consensus that we all want to achieve, and that we shall be able to lay it and have it agreed during the Commons stages of the Bill. I hope that in providing that commitment, I have been able to reassure noble Lords of the strength of our intentions. We absolutely want to do this, and we want to get it right. I still think it will take a bit more time, but I know that, working together, we can achieve that.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I thank the Minister very much for his response to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Tyler and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I acknowledge that he has listened to the arguments made in this House over the past few weeks. I understand why he cannot make a commitment to come back within the timescale of the Bill in this House. This is an important matter, and many different people have a great deal of expertise, practical knowledge, legal knowledge and so on, to put into the process of coming up with a definition, which will be extremely difficult.

Would the Minister therefore be so good as to write to noble Lords as soon as he can, setting out the timetable of the work the department intends to undertake and the people they intend to involve in discussions, which I hope will include practitioners, stakeholders and academics, medical experts and so on, as well as Members of your Lordships’ House who have reviewed the operation of the current law and found it deficient? Could he do that as soon as possible so that, when we come to consideration of Commons amendments when the Bill comes back to this place, we will be able to give this subject the attention it merits rather than the rather perfunctory consideration that we usually have to give to arguments that come back to us within a very technical parliamentary framework?

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I realise that in the last group I mentioned general medical practitioners. I ought to inform the House of my forthcoming appointment to the General Medical Council.

We have had a lot to read in the last few days, and are clearly going to have to take a lot of this on trust, but the thrust of the amendments is welcome, and I am grateful to the Minister for tabling them. As he said, they strengthen the role of local authorities and give them a clear remit to intervene where they feel that, for one reason or another, the care home manager cannot discharge the responsibilities given in relation to the authorisation application appropriately.

In the letter that the Minister sent to a number of noble Lords, he set out factors that might be considered by the local authority as a responsible body. These would be:

“Whether the person has a care plan with the responsible body … local intelligence about a local provider of care homes”,


which would suggest that the responsible body takes over the process;

“insight from local commissioners or concerns about performance … sustained absence of a registered manager”—

or presumably when the turnover of managers is high, as it can be; and—

“an increase in concerns raised by residents, their carers or families … a new service or category of care provision, and/or … provision of poor or incomplete statements”.

To me that sounds very comprehensive and welcome.

What arises from this is that the responsible body will have to make a considerable judgment and, to make it, will need a very clear understanding of the care homes in its area. Could the Minister say a little about how he thinks that local authorities might be supported in that role? Clearly, they now have a major role which they have found it hard to discharge, for reasons that have been discussed. It is important they are able to do this in a consistent way.

The Minister mentioned the code of practice. It is a statutory code of practice, which I think means that it must be followed unless the local body has very good reason not to do so. It would be interesting to know what plans the department has for checking with the local authorities—not in a heavy-handed way—how well it is going after time and implementation, and seeing whether there is consistency across the country as a whole.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I too welcome the Government’s change of mind. They started with a very different understanding from ours of the current roles of care home managers, local authorities, best-interests assessors and DoLS assessors. I think we still have a difference of opinion about how life works in practice, but these amendments show a considerable movement, if not complete agreement on that part, and therefore we welcome them. I feel it is right to remind the Minister that when the Select Committee of your Lordships’ House did the post-legislative scrutiny on the Mental Capacity Act and its workings five years after its implementation, there was an overwhelming lack of information and data both in local authorities and throughout the health service. I rather think that we have been perhaps unnecessarily preoccupied in this Bill with who carries out a particular function rather than looking at the way those functions could possibly be streamlined and better audited.

I do not think that the work of a local authority best-interests assessor or a DoLS lead, however they may be termed under the new scheme, is actually going to change that much, but I welcome the attempt here to meet us half way, and I thank the Minister for that. Well, perhaps it is more than half way in terms of our assessment that what was being asked of care home managers was beyond their capacity to deliver. Big questions still need to be asked about their role in the overall scheme. If we had not spent quite so much time on this, we might have been able to look more closely at greater efficiencies in terms of reporting and so on. For the moment, however, I welcome these amendments.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

16: Schedule 1, page 8, line 10, at end insert—
“(aa) if the arrangements are carried out in an independent hospital, the designated NHS trust;”

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, following our previous discussion, we turn to an area that has not received sufficient attention because we were so focused on care homes and care home managers. My Amendment 16 addresses the position of independent hospitals. I think independent hospitals in Wales might in part be addressed in Amendment 16A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and grouped with my amendment.

In the process of talking to stakeholders over the past few weeks, it became clear that many of the concerns that we have expressed over conflicts of interest for care homes also apply to independent hospitals, and therefore it seemed to us important to state in the Bill that where a person is deprived of their liberty and is in an independent hospital, the CCG or the local health board is the responsible body as, as we have discussed in great depth and tortuous detail over the past few weeks, is the parallel case for care homes and local authorities.

It is unfortunate that we missed this and have not discussed it as much as we should have. People deprived of their liberty in independent hospitals perhaps have the worst of both worlds. They do not have the protection of the Mental Health Act and they are perhaps less likely to come to the attention of an external body, such as a local authority, because their care is unlikely to have been through the care planning process. Therefore, they could be at a greater point of vulnerability. They may also be more likely to be deprived of their liberty because the deprivation may be something to do with medication. That is why I tabled this amendment, so that we could perhaps return to this at Third Reading. It is important that the Government make clear their intention that there should be clarity about the position of people held in these establishments, and that they do so swiftly and in sufficient detail. I beg to move.

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[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

Absolutely—I would be more than happy to do so. I have tried to demonstrate our intention to deal with the issue, but we remain open-minded about the best way to do it. We have concerns with the amendments as laid—we were trying, if anything, to turbo-boost the approach. I recognise that the noble Baroness is concerned about an overfamiliarity between individuals, which she is trying to make sure that we avoid. There may be other concerns with the model that we are considering. I am more than happy to take that offline, and that would be a very fruitful discussion.

[Baroness Barker]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response, which I will need to think about long and hard. One thing that noble Lords will have to take into consideration is whether an AMCP would have the power to refer a case to the Court of Protection if they felt it necessary. That would be a big factor. I listened very carefully to the Minister, who used the term “hospital manager”. He will know that it has a particular meaning in the Mental Health Act. I have no crystal ball, and neither do other noble Lords, but were the role of the hospital manager in the Mental Health Act to be something on which the forthcoming review sought to make a decision, then would this not be another case for our looking in detail at the synchronisation between this legislation and the Mental Health Act? I welcome the Minister’s response. There is a bit more work to do, and considerable constructive welcome for continued work. With that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

27: Schedule 1, page 10, line 8, after “necessary” insert “to prevent harm to the cared-for person”

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I have good news for the Minister. After all these weeks, I have finally accepted his argument that the best-interests principle in the Mental Capacity Act remains and applies to all decisions made under the Bill. I now agree with him that it is therefore not helpful to reiterate the term “best interests”, as we suggested in previous amendments at a previous stage. The even happier news is that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, agrees with me on that.

However, I am afraid that peace and harmony may not have broken out completely. Noble Lords will recall from previous debates that we have argued that the requirement that an arrangement be “necessary and proportionate” seems to be a weakening of the protections for an individual, sitting as it does with no direct connection back to those earlier best interests. We all agree that deprivation of liberty is a very important matter, and the law needs to be in compliance with Article 5. That is why we think the Bill contains a deficiency, because lawful detention is not considered directly in relation to best interests. Therefore, through these amendments, which relate both to the authorisation and the determination, we have attempted to reiterate the current wording of the DoLS legislation regarding a determination being necessary and proportionate in relation to harm to the person. In other sets of amendments and at previous times, we have had discussions about whether decisions are taken on the basis of harm to the person whose liberty is being deprived, or of harm to others. We have tabled this amendment to make it clear that it is harm to the person, and that the proportionality relates to the potential harm to that person if they are not deprived of their liberty.

Much of today’s discussion about deprivations of liberty in domestic settings originates in the failure of many professionals, in making judgments, to remember the part of the safeguards which states that deprivations of liberty must be the “least restrictive option”. It is not wrong to deprive somebody of their liberty, but it must be the least restrictive option to avoid harm to that person. We have therefore concluded—again, in discussion with stakeholders—that this amendment to the Bill would lead to greater clarity.

I can hear the words “code of practice” coming to the fore. One point on which we have never had an agreement is reliance on the code of practice. Very few pieces of legislation have a code of practice, and in health there are only two: this Act and the Mental Health Act. Anything which resides in a code of practice rests upon statute in order to be lawful. When there are arguments about whether a deprivation of liberty is lawful, those arguing the case, particularly judges, do not go to the code of practice but to the statute. What is contained in the statute may be minimal, as this is; we are simply talking about a sentence which says that that action must be “necessary and proportionate” with regard to the harm to that person. A code of practice can go on for pages and pages and include numerous examples, as it should, so that practitioners know where they are. But it does not and never will carry the legal force which comes from the wording in the Act.

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[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

As the noble Baroness knows, I am all for harmony and agreement.

I thank the noble Baronesses for laying these amendments, and I accept the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about her gracious acceptance of the role of the best-interests test. I recognise that she has some serious concerns about this legislation, which I take seriously. I have been determined to work closely with her, and I am grateful for her reciprocation in that process as we have moved ahead.

These amendments seek to specify that the necessary and proportionate assessment must be undertaken by reference to whether an authorisation is needed explicitly to prevent harm to the person. We know that an assessment of whether the arrangements are necessary and proportionate is key to ensuring that liberty protection safeguards will afford people their protections and human rights, and is a requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights. There are many factors which would need to be considered in the necessary and proportionate assessment, including the wishes and feelings of the person, whether any less restrictive measures can be put in place and the risk of harm. That is the issue that is the subject of these amendments.

Importantly, these amendments raise the issue of considering risk of harm to the cared-for person during the assessment by including that expressly and explicitly in the Bill. However, my concern is that that may be at the cost of other factors that ought to be properly considered during the assessment process. If these amendments are passed, one of the factors which may not be properly considered in the assessment process is the risk of harm to others, which the Law Commission said should be explicitly considered within a necessary and proportionate assessment, as well as risk to self. There are cases currently under the DoLS system where the risk of harm to others is an important factor in the justification for deprivation of liberty, such as a person with Lewy body dementia who may need restrictions in order to prevent harm to people in the community.

Furthermore, ensuring that no harm could come to a person is in some cases intertwined with ensuring that no harm comes to others. For example, there could be a retaliatory attack as a result of harm caused by a person to someone else. These amendments would mean that by focusing solely on harm to self in the Bill, it could be more difficult for assessors to make those balanced decisions. I therefore have some concerns about the amendments tabled by noble Baroness, as they could perpetuate the current confusion surrounding cases that involve some degree of harm to others. They could also lead to an increased use of the Mental Health Act, since the liberty protection safeguards might be interpreted as being ruled out in all harm-to-others cases. We would not want to see the Act used in this way.

Therefore, in the spirit of consensus and moving forward, I have carefully considered whether the Bill should be amended—or whether the Government could support such amendments—to explicitly set out inclusion of the risk of harm to the person. I am afraid I am going to disappoint noble Lords by saying that it would be better set out in the code of practice. I emphasise that we have considered the issue in detail, and we believe that the code of practice has sufficient force. On that basis—although I know that she will not do so—I encourage the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for his reply. The problem that I have is that it leaves the guidelines for decisions to deprive people of their liberty because of harm to others in a code of practice, not the legislation. I do not believe that that is the right place in which to make that law. I absolutely accept that it is sometimes necessary to make a decision about a deprivation of liberty, and that part of that decision-making might be about the risk the person poses to others. However, that should not be determined in legislation fashioned on a set of principles and practices that are about harm to self, which is what the Mental Capacity Act is all about. A substantial judgment that will impact on people’s lives is buried away in a place where it is very unlikely ever to rise sufficiently up the scale of legal concerns or ever to be tested in court. That is my problem; that is what I think is wrong. It is therefore important that we in this House make a statement now to the Government about the importance of this issue, so I would like to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

28: Schedule 1, page 10, line 8, at end insert “in relation to the likelihood and seriousness of harm to the cared-for person”

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 27th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, my name is attached to some of the amendments in this group, most notably Amendment 88. I endorse everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, said in her introduction. It is paramount that those detained under this legislation, and their friends and family who care for them, must know in exact detail that they are being detained under a law that stipulates that their detention should be the least restrictive option for their care and what their rights are.

In speaking to my amendment, I wish to return to a theme I have spoken to throughout our discussions: the role of a code of practice. As I said in our previous discussions on the right to information—as set out in cols. 335-38 of Hansard on 15 October—there is a fair amount of unease and disquiet among stakeholders about the Government’s understanding of the duty to provide information and its place in legislation. It is important to state again that statutory codes do not exist without a statute, and the majority of laws do not have a code of practice. Codes are there only for when non-legal people are using a law directly. No one expects non-legal people to read or necessarily understand a statute and so a code is provided. Such a code follows what is in statute and sets it out in lay terms and at length. But it would not exist if the obligation in law was not clearly set out.

We have had some case law about the Mental Capacity Act code of practice. In 2018, in the case of An NHS Trust and others (Respondents) v Y, the Supreme Court said:

“Whatever the weight given to the Code by section 42 of the MCA 2005, it does not create an obligation as a matter of law to apply to court in every case”.


In the Mental Health Act code, which has been in force for a very long time, and to which the original drafters of the Mental Capacity Act looked when drawing up the legislation back in 2005, there is an explicit duty on hospital managers to provide information to a person who is detained and to the relevant interested persons responsible for their welfare.

No doubt the department will stick to its line that a code of practice is adequate. However, for the reasons I have outlined, which I think are compelling, we do not. I therefore simply wish to indicate that if the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is minded to push her amendment to a vote, she will have support from this side of the House.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

My Lords, I first thank the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, for introducing this group of amendments, both for her own speech and for representing the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, as she does. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments clearly relate to providing information to the cared-for person, which is a critical issue that we have debated throughout this Bill.

Amendments 49 and 85, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, require that the authorisation record must be provided to the cared-for person, or their representative, their donee of lasting power of attorney, or a court-appointed deputy, and also to the team providing care in the person’s place of residence. Amendment 83, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, specifies that the authorisation record must also include details of how the deprivation of liberty, or its effect on the person, will be reduced. I will deal with Amendment 29, the first amendment in this group, shortly.

I introduce these amendments in order to talk about less restrictive care. Less restrictive care is a central aspect of the new liberty protection safeguards, as a result of the necessary and proportionate assessment. This was emphasised by the Law Commission in its final report, which concluded that,

“integral to the question of whether the deprivation of liberty is proportionate (as well as necessary) is consideration of whether there is a less intrusive alternative”.

Less restrictive care is also a vital principle of the Mental Capacity Act—as set out in Section 1(5)—and therefore should be considered at all stages of the process. It is already considered as part of the current DoLS system.

Given the abiding role of “best interests”, as discussed in the last day of Committee, as a principle of the Mental Capacity Act, it does not need to be restated in the Bill. Indeed, our belief is that the liberty protection safeguards scheme will drive less restrictive care, as it will require the responsible body to specify a programme of regular reviews. This review should be triggered if there is a significant change in the cared-for person’s circumstances. Critically, this means that if there are practicable, less restrictive alternatives available, the authorisation will cease to have effect as the arrangements will no longer be necessary and proportionate.

Amendment 86, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly and Lady Watkins, would require the responsible body to ensure that the cared-for person, appropriate person and IMCA, or independent mental capacity advocate, are given a copy of the care plan as soon as possible and those consulted with should be provided with a copy unless there is good reason not to do so. As has been mentioned, this was discussed at every stage of the Bill, in the Chamber and outside it. I agree that it is vital that relevant people are given full information about the authorisation and the rights of a cared-for person, including rights to review and to challenge authorisation.

The key point, and the reason why we do not support these amendments, is that this is already the case in law, which clearly provides that people must be given appropriate information. This is required by Article 5 of the ECHR, as enacted into UK law by the Human Rights Act. Article 5(2) sets out that everyone deprived of their liberty must be informed promptly and in a language that he or she understands. This should set out the reasons for the deprivation of liberty. Where a person has been informed of the reasons, he or she may apply to a court to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in accordance with Article 5(4). It is plain from the wording of Article 5(2) that the duty on the state is to proactively provide specific information to the individual or their representative. Whether the information provided is sufficient must be assessed depending on circumstances, but, as a minimum, people must be given information in simple, non-technical language that they can understand.

It is also worth noting that the Law Commission’s draft Bill did not explicitly outline what information should be provided. The Government took forward the Law Commission’s approach, as we have been encouraged to throughout by noble Lords, because we are satisfied that Article 5 makes it clear that a person has the right to information. So while I have carefully considered whether the Bill should be amended to explicitly state what information should be provided, I believe that it would be better to set out specific details in the code of practice.

On the specific point from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about statutory codes of practice having to sit within a framework of law, the Human Rights Act, which enacts the ECHR into British law, provides the route into law. Therefore, I believe that the code of practice is the appropriate place and has that anchor in statute. Furthermore, it is appropriate to set this out in the code of practice because it will allow us to fully and accurately capture the detail of all the people who should be provided with information, exactly what information should be provided and how, and to be able to amend it without having to amend primary legislation over time.

One of the problems with the original DoLS legislation is that it is overly prescriptive. Indeed, this House found in its post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act that the provisions for DoLS were “overly complex”. These amendments set out, for example, who should be provided with the authorisation records, but they exclude others who might need the care plan, such as members of the care team providing support in the community, not in the person’s place of residence. We believe it is precisely that level of detail that is better set out in the code of practice.

Amendment 29, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly and Lady Watkins, specifically seeks to address this point. This amendment outlines that a person must be fully informed of their rights and ensure that appropriate persons and IMCAs understand their rights and duties. Further to this, Amendment 88, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, would require the cared-for person and their representative to be informed, in addition to any person likely to be carrying out the arrangements, if their authorisation ceases to have effect.

I absolutely agree that it is vital that people are informed of their rights. Let me be clear that this Bill does not take away or amend any rights. Article 5 is already clear that people have a right to information. However, we want to use the code of practice, rather than the Bill, to outline how this applies. As I said, this is so that we can provide a level of detail there that would simply not be appropriate in the Bill. We would also use the code to detail, for example, the role of the IMCA and/or the appropriate person’s role in the provision of information and ensuring that people are supported in understanding their rights.

In closing, I want to address Amendment 87 which supports, as it were, this set of amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, Amendment 87 would require an approved mental capacity professional to complete an investigation where the relevant parties disagree over any aspect of an authorisation. If agreement is still not reached, it would require independent mediation. I agree with her that it is vital that the new system of liberty protection safeguards ensures that the voice of the person is heard and that there is an appropriate level of scrutiny in all authorisations. That is why we have been explicit that the person must be consulted with, as we will discuss later, and why, as a result of government amendments brought forward after listening to noble Lords, if there is no appropriate person acting as a representative, there is now in effect a presumption that an IMCA should be appointed. Again we will discuss that later. It is also why we have tabled amendments to remove conflict of interest and to make clear who should and who should not carry out pre-authorisation reviews.

So while the Government recognise the important role that mediation plays within the NHS, we do not believe that it is necessary to make it a compulsory feature of the system. There are fantastic systems of mediation already available, through private, public and charitable sectors; indeed, the noble Baroness gave us an example of a further initiative in this area. It is worth noting, on this point, that the Mental Capacity Act code of practice already provides guidance about mediation. In answer to her specific question, while we do not think it is necessary to have it in the Bill, I can confirm that guidance on the use of mediation will be in the code of practice and we will make sure that that is as up to date as possible and comprehensive in taking account of new schemes.

I will finish by saying that while I applaud and recognise the importance of the right to information, not just for the cared-for person but for everybody representing them, the Government’s view is that this is already adequately accounted for in law, so we do not need to set it out in the Bill. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to do so, by not being able to be comprehensive of every category of person. For that reason, I fear that we are not able to support these amendments.

[Baroness Barker]

Can the Minister confirm that, if the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is passed, it does not preclude the Government from setting out anything they like in the code of practice, at considerable length, to explain the detail of what information should be conveyed to whom and how? Does he agree that it might be helpful to have her amendment in the Bill, if only to bridge the rather large chasm between Article 5 rights and the code of practice? Would her amendment not be rather helpful?

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

On the noble Baroness’s first point, of course there is nothing to stop us setting out anything in the code of practice. The concern would be whether there would be a clash between what was set out in the Bill and what was set out in the code of practice or in Article 5. That is one of our concerns and it is for that and other reasons that unfortunately we are not able to support that amendment.

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[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I do not intend to pay much attention to many of the amendments in this group because the Government made significant moves last week in relation to the role of the care home manager.

In relation to Amendment 121, I take this opportunity to raise again an issue I mentioned during our deliberations last week. There has been a great deal of talk about the Bill and the code of practice, but there has been very little said about regulations under the Bill. In particular, very little has been said about the functions of IMCAs in representing and supporting people under the schedule which are a bit different from the role of the IMCA in other circumstances under the rest of the Mental Capacity Act. Unlike DoLS, the Bill does not make detailed provisions for this or any regulations.

Can the Minister confirm whether amendments will be forthcoming in this area in relation to the functions of IMCAs? Specifically, will the Government look at amendments in relation to Section 35 of the Mental Capacity Act to place a clear duty on the responsible authority to make arrangements to enable IMCAs to be available and to represent and support cared-for persons under paragraph 36 of Schedule 1 to this Bill and in addition to support the appropriate person to fulfil their functions under paragraph 37? Can the Minister also confirm that the existing regulation power under Section 36 of the Mental Capacity Act will be extended to reflect the IMCAs’ function under the schedule?

A particular concern that has been raised with us by stakeholders is that there is no current reference in paragraph 36 to maintaining contact with the cared-for person and supporting their rights under the schedule. Given that the intention is that under the Bill authorisations will be made for much longer periods than was intended under the original Bill—longer than 12 months—it is rather important that someone who is acting in the role of an IMCA continues to have an ongoing involvement with that person. I understand why on this occasion it may not be entirely appropriate to put that in the Bill, but it is an issue of such significance that it might well come under the aegis of regulations.

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I thank the noble Baronesses for speaking to the amendments in this group. Before I deal with their questions, I say to the House that I take note of the significant margin in the vote on the previous group of amendments. That is something that the Government will reflect on.

I am grateful for the recognition by the noble Baronesses of the progress that we made on the last day of Report in defining the care home manager much better. I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to that process; we have made progress.

I turn to the specific questions posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. She asked about determining that arrangements are necessary and proportionate and inspecting proposals, conditions and indeed the care plan. The preauthorisation reviewer—as we are about to discuss, we are tightening up who can carry out that role—will thoroughly scrutinise arrangements and need to satisfy themselves that they are necessary and proportionate. It is also worth saying that in making the determination they have the power, if they so wish, to meet the person to determine that, which clearly is important. There is another critical matter, although we will come to this when we talk about conditions so I do not want to pre-empt that discussion too much: in making an authorisation, the responsible body can also then set a timetable of regular reviews to take place so that there is a process of ongoing review to ensure that the “necessary and proportionate assessment” test is always being passed.

We also said—this deals slightly with one of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, was making—that if the responsible body is not satisfied that the care home manager is capable of fulfilling this function, they can take on the role of organising assessments themselves. That is, to use the phrase that we coined last time, a backstop that provides some reassurance that any variable quality in provision should not affect the process by which assessments are made and organised and the preauthorisation reviews carried out.

It is absolutely the case that responsible bodies will be able to demand to see care plans and care and support plans as part of their deliberations. That is something that they can ask for, and we would expect that they will be provided because the whole point of the process that we are trying to move to is that decisions on and circumstances around deprivations of liberty are actually integrated into care planning and therefore ought not to be divisible in that sense. I hope that that provides reassurance, but if I can provide more by follow-up, I shall be happy to do so.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked some specific questions, which I shall need to consider, on the regulation-making power. I do not want to get that answer wrong without considering it, but we can meet in the coming days to ensure that she is reassured on that. A group of government amendments about IMCAs that we will discuss later provides greater reassurance on their role, in that, if they are agreed to, there will be a presumption in favour of an IMCA, removing the gatekeeper role that we have discussed. Also, the preauthorisation review will be carried out only by a responsible body, which must apply that presumption of access to an IMCA, so there will be much greater rights to advocacy on an ongoing basis.

The noble Baroness makes an excellent point about maintaining contact. As we move to a system of regular reviews, it is important to make sure that someone is alongside the cared-for person who can flag up any problems—for example, that a less restrictive care option is available, or that there is an objection. As we discussed, passive objections can materialise many weeks or months later. That ongoing role is clearly very important, whether it is for the IMCA or the appropriate person, the family member, or whoever. I give her the commitment that we will determine that in the code of practice.

I hope that I have answered the questions from both noble Baronesses and that on that basis, the noble Baroness will feel comfortable withdrawing her amendment.

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Doing this in regulations allows us to provide the necessary detail and, given the complexity of the care home sector, will ensure that there are no loopholes. It will also provide a further opportunity for consultation with the sector, given the wide range of issues that will need to be considered. I am confident that these amendments strengthen the preauthorisation review process and in turn ensure that everyone’s arrangements receive proper, independent scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I think the Minister deserves our congratulations on having met all the conditions that we around the House said we believed were important. I am sure that the Government always intended to have some of these matters as part of the legislation, but making them explicit in the context of the Bill is helpful. Not least, it will be helpful to care home managers themselves, who will welcome the protections from unjust accusations of undue influence in future. On behalf of these Benches—and, I should imagine, others—we welcome that.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and welcome these amendments. As the Minister said, they are very important and deal with the issues of conflicts of interest and the preauthorisation review. I congratulate the Minister on navigating us to this point, and certainly we will be supporting the amendments.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, Amendment 35 is a failsafe mechanism that will save a great deal of court time in the future and make it clear where the process has halted if things go awry. The failsafe is that an approved mental capacity professional—AMCP—can veto authorisation if the AMCP has grounds to object. However, it is important that the AMCP cannot authorise arrangements. In other words, the default position is to preserve liberty and not to impose restrictions on a person without a very sound reason. It is important that we are explicit about the extent of the AMCP’s powers, whether on the face of the Bill or in subsequent regulation, as we will need to be more prescriptive about these powers in the statutory code of practice than we have been to date, for the sound reason of flexibility and the independence of the AMCP.

The reason I tabled the amendment and feel it should be in the Bill is that there is a risk that local authorities facing financial stringencies might be inclined to authorise arrangements that are less costly, thereby revealing an inherent conflict of interest where a local authority is funding a person’s care. We have had many debates about conflicts of interest in relation to care homes but we must remember that in a whole-health and social care system which is under financial pressure, all kinds of little conflicts and pressures can creep in.

The other amendments in this group specify the different criteria whereby an approved mental capacity professional must conduct the review. I am not going to go through each line of these amendments—they are quite self-explanatory—but they show the importance of that degree of independence before taking the major step of imposing restrictions on somebody’s liberty and conditions under the new liberty protection safeguards process. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 77 in my name, which was drawn up because of the experience of many relatives. I make particular reference to the case of Stephen Neary, where relatives had to deal with local authorities which were telling them wrongfully what their position was in law. A great deal of responsibility was put on to the relatives to oversee the right interpretation of the law. This amendment seeks to ensure that, where they are acting in the best interests of someone who is cared for, relatives would be able to meet an AMCP and trigger their involvement. In our earlier discussions, there was an underlying sense on the Government Benches that the involvement of professionals can often be an unwelcome intrusion into families. In fact, many of them do not find that at all. Many find that the first occasion when they come into contact with a professional is the point at which all sorts of information and understanding becomes available to them in support of their loved ones.

Although I am not seeking to press this amendment today, I hope that the Minister might think about it and, if he is disposed to do so, make some supportive statements.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 46, which is in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. It provides that the care home manager, or any person interested in the cared-for person’s welfare, is responsible for being satisfied that an AMCP should carry out a pre-authorisation review. The Committee has already discussed this and the important safeguards which we will be seeking come under Amendment 76A. Some of the important matters raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, have been addressed by the Minister in the Government’s amendments. I look forward to his reply.

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[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, at Second Reading I said that there was much to be concerned about in this Bill and that I really hoped the Government would be in listening mode. For the most part, the Government have listened and have made improvements, thanks to the willingness of the Minister and Bill team to listen and to the hard work and commitment of noble Lords on all sides of the House, who have pursued improvements with all the energy they could command.

Government Amendments 41 and 96, requiring a care home manager to provide a written statement to the responsible body to authorise and renew arrangements, seem pretty obvious. Most of us would think that it is common sense to provide a statement in writing, but my late mother would often lament that I would find that, in life, sense is not that common. We certainly welcome these amendments.

The same applies to Amendments 47 and 59, which will ensure that the determination that arrangements are necessary and proportionate is to be made in an assessment, and that a record of this assessment must accompany the statement from the care home manager to the responsible body before an order to authorise arrangements is made. This is also most welcome. On this side, we certainly welcome these amendments.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I also welcome these amendments and want to make a brief observation. Since the summer, like many other noble Lords, I have spent a great deal of time talking to practitioners and stakeholders. If one were to try to thoroughly amend and improve the DoLS and LPS systems, you would start not with the role of the care home manager but with the paperwork and the bureaucracy. Before the code of practice is written, the Government would do well to spend some considerable time talking to local authorities and practitioners about paperwork and communication, because that is perhaps the biggest cause of the backlog of people who have yet to have a proper assessment.

I hope that the Minister will take on board what noble Lords have said on this matter. It is not a commitment to the current way of doing things; rather, although noble Lords are committed to ensuring that people are sufficiently informed, we are not averse to changing and modernising the systems to make them work more efficiently.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for their support for these amendments.

I want to reflect on the last point made, which is very important. The reference is to a written statement, which tends to bring to mind a piece of paper, but of course what we are really talking about are digital records. A great deal of thought has to be put into whether a paper system—or digital records—passing back and forth is the best way to go about this, or whether we can make a technological intervention. That is particularly true if we want these authorisations to be much more dynamic, so that their consistency and application can be assessed over time. There might be technological interventions we can make to make that process easier. I take that advice on board. We will absolutely talk to local authorities, cared-for people, their representatives, charities and others in making sure that we do it right. Noble Lords will be aware that the Secretary of State is a true technophile, and I imagine he would relish the opportunity to inject a bit of innovation into this area to make everyone’s life easier. I will take that point forward.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

60: Schedule 1, page 12, line 12, after “necessary” insert “to prevent harm to the cared-for person”

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Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

61: Schedule 1, page 12, line 12, at end insert “and that the arrangements will continue to be necessary and proportionate for the period of time for which the arrangements are sought.”

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, Amendments 61 and 67 return to two issues that I and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raised at earlier stages in our debates.

Amendment 61 pertains to what happens when the circumstances or condition of a person deprived of their liberty change. As we have said on previous occasions, that may be someone with dementia whose condition deteriorates or, as in the cases cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, it could be someone with a brain injury whose condition improves and who regains some of their capacity. It is the intention under the Bill that deprivations of liberty will last considerably longer than under current circumstances.

I seek an assurance that there is an ongoing duty on care home managers and those responsible for arranging and carrying out assessments to revisit people whose conditions are likely to change to ensure that their detention is still the least restrictive option.

In Amendment 67, I use the word “conditions” in a completely different sense. As has been said, under DoLS people carrying out assessments and authorisations have the right to say that it would be in order to detain someone and deprive them of their liberty provided that certain conditions are met. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has given us memorable examples of what those conditions might be. However, in truth, the most common condition concerns medication and reviews of medication.

The Government have consistently said that the Bill does not alter that—and that, as ever, the matter will be dealt with in the code of practice—but I am simply asking for a statement from the Minister setting out the legal force by which it will be possible in future for those who are responsible for depriving people of their liberty to do so on the basis of conditions which must be met. The importance of those conditions— particularly when we talk about DoLS in the community —is that they can make something a least restrictive option and therefore admissible.

It is for that reason that I have returned to these two amendments today, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I have added my name to Amendment 61 because it is important that we recognise that no one has a crystal ball—we cannot predict what is going to happen. Even people we think might be seriously impaired, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, can sometimes improve and it can be quite unexpected.

It is inconceivable that the course of a person’s illness will match the timetable of annual reviews—that is not the way bodies behave when they have an impairment; if someone does not improve within an expected time frame, they must be reassessed. Otherwise, there is a real possibility that they will languish with inappropriate restrictions on their liberty when such restrictions are no longer necessary or proportionate. In fact, in the case of medication reviews, they may have become inappropriate because they may be on medication that is unnecessarily a sedative.

Of course, those who deteriorate will also need phased authorisations and reviews. Without the Government laying out explicitly this degree of uncertainty in the timeframe and the fact that wherever there is expected to be uncertainty, it should be specified, I fear that there will be pressure to define the amendment’s principle by going to court. We will then end up with a court precedent that is not necessarily applicable to a lot of people, but which they will get caught up in anyway. We will end up with a risk-averse response. I hope the Government will be able to accept, if not the actual wording of the amendment, the principle that the timeliness and the timeframe need to be specified wherever possible to avoid that confusion.

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[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I thank the noble Baronesses for introducing their amendments and giving us the opportunity to discuss this important issue. I will set out why the Government have taken a different approach and attempt to explain it.

It is not that we do not think conditions are important. The use of conditions should be baked into the care plan and the arrangements put forward for authorisation, rather than being added only at the point of authorisation. This is not to say that the conditions—let us call them the elements of the arrangements—pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and other noble Baronesses are not critical. Obviously, they are critical to making sure that the elements are the least restrictive. This is about when they are put in place in the care planning and authorisation process. I shall explain our approach, which I hope will satisfy noble Lords, but we can see whether further discussions are required.

I will deal with the amendments in order. Amendment 61 states that it should be determined by the responsible body,

“that the arrangements will continue to be necessary and proportionate for the period of time for which the arrangements are sought”.

We absolutely agree that this should form part of our model and I confirm that this will be considered by the responsible body.

Furthermore, under the Bill, the responsible body is required to specify a programme of regular reviews at the point of authorisation. In a sense, it gets to specify at the point of authorisation how frequently reviews should take place, to seek whether changes in arrangements or other changes have taken place. This means that the care home manager—or the responsible body, if it is carrying it out directly—will be continually required to consider whether arrangements are necessary and proportionate. That is baked into the system we are introducing.

Amendment 67 specifies that conditions can be put on authorisations and, of course, conditions exist under the current DoLS system. However, with the backlog, by the time they come into force, it is often too late, because the person has been subject to the arrangements for some time before the conditions can be applied. In developing the liberty protection safeguards system, we have taken a different approach; for that reason, conditions have not been included in the Bill. Again, it is worth pointing out that this is consistent with the approach adopted by the Law Commission, which concluded that conditions, as currently provided for under the DoLS system, were not necessary under its new scheme. The Law Commission’s final report states on page 112 that, instead of DoLS conditions, the scheme,

“focuses on particular arrangements and what will be authorised are very specific arrangements. Further, it is only arrangements which result in the minimum amount of deprivation of liberty possible that will be authorised, otherwise the necessary and proportionate condition will not be met. So the arrangements will need to be described in a way which builds in any conditions”.

In other words, arrangements under the Bill can be detailed in such a way as to have the same effect as conditions. For example, the authorised arrangements could include enabling the person to be taken out on trips with one-to-one support, or their care plan could specify that additional staff should be provided to enable the person to be taken out more frequently.

It is our view that doing this provides greater protections for the person. This approach means that conditions—or, if noble Lords prefer, specific arrangements—are considered as part of care planning, before an authorisation is sought, rather than being bolted on afterwards. Rather than being something that happens after the person is deprived of liberty, they would be an integral part of care planning, with the proposed arrangements submitted to the responsible body for review.

Notwithstanding this approach, I know the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is keen to have a statement from me about current practice, under which a DoLS lead, or best-interests assessor, can insist that deprivation of liberty is authorised only if stated conditions are made. We are not proposing to change the ability of the responsible body, whether the responsible body itself or an AMCP, to make conditions as part of an authorisation. It will still be possible for that to happen. We are trying to ensure that the decision on appropriate conditions is made earlier in the care-planning process, so that they are incorporated into the arrangements that are then put to the responsible body for review, rather than being added when the review takes place. Failure to comply with these conditions, specifically because they have been within the authorisation, would mean that the authorisation would cease to have effect, and must be reviewed. There we come to the ongoing important role that appropriate persons, IMCAs and others will have, in making sure the person is supported, so that if there are any changes in their condition, or their circumstances, a review is triggered.

I recognise this is a fiendishly complicated thing to describe, and I have probably done a fairly inadequate job of it. However, I strongly believe that, in making this change, we are not trying to remove conditions, but move the concept of applying conditions to earlier in the care-planning process. That is the right thing to do. The responsible body will continue to be able to add subsequent conditions if it feels it is necessary for an authorisation. I genuinely believe that is a better system. Clearly, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. On how this will happen in practice, there will need to be clear guidance and training to make sure that people are trained to do this, both at the care home, and in other NHS bodies, and to make sure that reviewers are capable of assessing such arrangements and making their own subsequent conditions, if they feel it is necessary. That guidance and training is something we aim to provide, of course.

I hope I have explained why we take the point the noble Baronesses made in tabling these amendments very seriously, and shown that the system allows for it. It puts this consideration earlier in the planning process, we hope with better effect. We have been guided by the Law Commission’s approach in this way. I hope this has been persuasive, but if further discussion and elaboration is needed, I would be more than happy to give it following today’s debate.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister very much for his response. We are arguing not about two opposites but about a gap that I am trying to close, the answer to which lies in why conditions happen. They happen not necessarily because of any failure of care planning, which I think the Minister is talking about, or to improve care planning, but because in real life people end up being cared for in a particular place. Things to which they object or limitations in their care become apparent at the point at which someone goes to do the authorisation.

I am all in favour of improving personalised care planning and so on, but the one thing that DoLS and best-interests assessors have been absolutely united in saying is that this makes a practical difference when they go to see people. I am very happy that the Minister said that it would still be the responsibility of a responsible body to make sure that conditions are being met, and that, if they were not or if it became apparent that further conditions needed to be put in place, they would still be able to do so. With that reassurance, I am content that we have probably closed the gap that I was trying to close. On that basis, I am willing not to press the amendments.

Amendment 61 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

62: Schedule 1, page 12, line 12, at end insert “in relation to the likelihood and seriousness of harm to the cared-for person”

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[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, right from the beginning of this Bill—at Second Reading and in Committee—concerns have been expressed across the House about how the interests of the cared-for person can be ensured through the process of using the AMCP when that person is at their most vulnerable and may not be articulate at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, articulated exactly what we are saying. Amendment 76A, in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, is an essential fail-safe that we believe needs to be in the Bill.

Like the Minister, we have sought across the House to prioritise the issues that we thought were most important for the cared-for person. I think we have come through rather well in improving this Bill together, and mostly without having to resort to Divisions. I hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 76A, because it is certainly in line with the aspirations that he has expressed to the House about safeguarding the cared-for person. If he is not prepared to do that, certainly on these Benches we hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will seek the opinion and support of the House, because it is certainly there.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, it has been a concern of all noble Lords who have taken part in discussions on the Bill that a person could be deprived of their liberty without seeing an appropriate professional at any time. We have argued back and forth about the extent to which access to an appropriate professional should be universal, automatic or whatever.

With this amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and those of us who have attached our names to it are trying to ensure that where the people who are most closely associated with a person have a genuine and deep concern—I imagine it would be a shared concern—but not necessarily a formal role, they can alert a professional to come in and make an assessment. We are trying to close a loophole that we think is still there.

If we can do that, we will be well on the way to doing what the Minister has indicated the Government are trying to do: to make the most effective and efficient use of professional resources amid a level of demand which we know cannot currently be met. We have moved some way from what we would ideally like to see and this amendment represents something of a compromise. I hope we can reach agreement on this last part of the link.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for tabling these amendments and giving us the opportunity to debate this very important issue. I will come to Amendment 76A last, because clearly that is the one about which there has been the most debate and, in a sense, has the most import. First, I will deal briefly with the other amendments in the group.

Amendment 81 would require the person who conducts the pre-authorisation review to be a,

“registered health or social care professional”,

with appropriate skills, knowledge and experience. I think and hope that we dealt with that adequately on our previous day on Report. Those qualifications will be set out in the code of practice. Indeed, we might want to go more broadly than we have done historically on this.

Amendment 76 would require that where there is a dispute between the responsible body and the professional who completed the pre-authorisation review, it would automatically go up to an AMCP. I agree that in some cases that would be the right and prudent thing to do. In other cases, it may be able to be resolved between the two parties. Again, we dealt with that before and it is something I want to consider in our deliberations about the kinds of cases that an AMCP would look at.

The debate on Amendment 76A has been helpful in bringing out the core concern here: the role of whistleblowers. We have talked about the cared-for person, their family members, the appropriate person, IMCAs and others, but this is about the people who are doing the caring or who are employed by the organisation or organisations that are doing the caring. It is absolutely right—indeed, the Bill requires—that an AMCP must conduct a pre-authorisation review if there is a reasonable belief. Clearly, a note of concern being raised by a staff member would qualify because they would have understanding and knowledge of the care of that person.

Last week we had a Statement on the Gosport inquiry, in which the health system not listening to whistleblowers was critical in these issues not being dealt with for years and people losing their lives as a consequence. As the Government said in response to that, we are working with BEIS—the department with responsibility for such legislation—to see if there is anything we can do to strengthen the rules around whistleblowers. I take very seriously the concerns that have been raised by noble Lords. As I said, with Gosport and indeed many other instances, whether they involve one person or, sadly, dozens of people, this kind of issue crops up again and again. I understand its importance.

The concern I have at this point actually relates to the drafting. Because it would provide an automatic trigger, rather than one that gave some consideration to the seriousness of the case, there is a risk that it could be abused or that frivolous cases could be raised and put to an AMCP when it was not really justified. That is, in a sense, an issue with the drafting

I want to deal with this if we can. My suggestion, if noble Lords are willing, is to meet between now and Third Reading to discuss this topic—as well as any others we want to discuss, of course—to work out the right approach. This would enable us to get to the bottom of it, work out what is right and think about that in the context of other whistleblowing issues, of which we are all aware. It would ensure that if we all agree on the need to legislate, we can agree on what that ought to look like. Again, I emphasise the importance with which I regard this issue. I hope and believe that we can do something in the coming days to deal with it in a way on which we all agree, while having the effect that we want. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness is prepared to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

Before I address this amendment, I again thank noble Lords for their willingness to talk further on Amendment 76A so that we can reach the right conclusion.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, quite rightly talked about the role of Amendment 82 being to make sure that the cared-for person has rights and that they are at the centre of the authorisation process. Of course, that is absolutely right. The reason why we have not taken the approach that the reviewer should meet all people in the system is because we want to provide a more proportionate system that nevertheless contains significant safeguards so that if there are any concerns about the nature of a review then not only would the reviewer, whether a responsible body or an IMCA, meet the person but there are opportunities for escalation beyond that.

Let me be absolutely clear that in cases where the person objects to the arrangements, the Bill already requires AMCPs to meet the person, where practicable and appropriate, when they complete the preauthorisation review. This amendment would require a face-to-face visit in all preauthorisation reviews, not only those completed by an AMCP, regardless of whether it is appropriate or practicable to do so.

I of course appreciate there will be circumstances where it is right and proper for the person conducting the preauthorisation review to meet the person, even in cases where the review is not completed by an AMCP. That is not precluded by the Bill. Indeed, it would be our expectation in some cases that that would happen. For example, if the person completing the preauthorisation review is concerned that adequate consultation has not taken place or if there is a question over the validity of any of the assessments provided, we think it right and proper for the person conducting the preauthorisation review to meet the cared-for person. Details about that, including scenarios, will be set out in the code of practice.

However, we also want to make sure that the system is proportionate. One of the problems we have at the moment is that it is not proportionate, and that is why we have a backlog. There are straightforward cases. For example, when someone who consented to living in the care home subsequently loses capacity and there is no reason to suspect that they would object to continuing to live in the care home, a meeting with the cared-for person would be very unlikely to change the outcome. In such cases, the person may have already undergone an assessment process and the person will also have access to representation—we are about to come on to IMCAs. Unless there are concerns about the validity of the assessments, it would not normally be necessary or proportionate to meet the person who, after all, had agreed to live in the care home.

A further potential effect of this amendment would be to require the person completing the preauthorisation review to meet the cared-for person, even if the person refuses. This is a topic we have discussed before. We do not think it goes with the ethos of the Mental Capacity Act, particularly in cases where someone has expressed a desire not to do so. It is important to stress that that is not just our conclusion but is also the conclusion of the Law Commission after its work. We believe that a targeted approach will be much more effective in making sure that those safeguards are in place.

While I understand the noble Baroness’s desire for reassurance that the cared-for person will be met, I do not think it would be appropriate in all cases. We have been clear during the passage of the Bill in the amendments that we have laid, and as we will specify in the code of practice, that there will be many circumstances when it is appropriate to do so but equally there will be circumstances when it is not appropriate. Therefore, we do not think it would be right to have a blanket application of this approach of the preauthorisation reviewer meeting the cared-for person. I hope that on that basis the noble Baroness will feel reassured and will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Barker]

During our deliberations the Minister has several times talked about people being forced to meet an IMCA or an AMCP when they do not want to. We have asked him to supply evidence of that. He has not yet done so, even though we are at this stage in our deliberations. Clearly this is a matter that may well return at a further stage in the Commons. I ask him again please to write to noble Lords with that evidence.

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

I would be more than happy to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

89: Schedule 1, page 15, line 8, at end insert—
“(d) there are practicable less restrictive options that would meet the authorisation conditions”

[Baroness Barker]

This amendment follows on in some way from the previous discussion. It relates to a practical issue. We keep returning to the fact that authorisations are going to be made, potentially for a longer time—they can be renewed for up to three years —yet there is not much in the way of safeguards for those people for whom the initial authorisation and the process of review is no longer the least restrictive option. This again uses the importance of putting something in the Bill rather than sticking it in the back of a code of practice to ensure that in the process of reviewing an authorisation and bringing it to an earlier conclusion there is information about less restrictive options for that person that would meet the authorising conditions.

This is mostly the case for people who are discharged from hospital into a care home and whose care is then very often not reviewed. At that stage their care may be taken into consideration along with the sale of their own property. That is why it is important that we consider this issue as the Bill goes through, so that by enabling there to be longer authorisations for most people we are not putting a subgroup of people in jeopardy by not having this requirement to continue to look at less restrictive options. I beg to move.

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[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment and the other noble Baronesses who have spoken to it. The example given was very illuminating, and I rather like the idea of that happening automatically if you leave a vacuum cleaner in someone’s room. I might try that with my children and see what happens.

The key point here is that we want the least restrictive arrangements necessary to provide for the person’s ongoing care. That is the animating idea behind the liberty protection safeguards system. We believe that the effect of the amendment is catered for through the “necessary and proportionate” test. Let me explain that. When the Law Commission published its final report on this, it concluded that,

“integral to the question of whether the deprivation of liberty is proportionate (as well as necessary) is consideration of whether there is a less intrusive alternative”.

So consideration of whether an ongoing restriction continues to be necessary and proportionate is already baked in.

As I said, the nature of the authorisations to be given by the responsible body under the new system will instigate a system of regular reviews. To give an example, it might stipulate a review for someone with fluctuating capacity, where there is reason to believe that a review might be required after a period. The system being set up enables regular reviews in a way that provides greater specificity than is the case now.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, was concerned that, as the length of an authorisation was extended, although that might be all right for some people, it might not for others. That is a fantastically important point, but in the process of authorisation the responsible body will be able to stipulate more frequent reviews. Our hope would be that that would come from the care home manager or other person organising the arrangements in the process of their care planning, because they will have worked out, by looking after that person, that there is reason for regular review, but it could equally be something that the responsible body attaches as a condition to the arrangements.

The effect is that when less restrictive alternatives are practically available, the authorisation ceases to have effect. It is no longer applicable. As I said, that could be determined by continuous review, regular review or be flagged by anyone—a staff member, a family member or others—with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare, which would trigger an updated review of the situation to see what less restrictive care was available.

Although I absolutely agree with the intent behind the amendment, the “necessary and proportionate” test is already in the Bill. It provides precisely the effect that the noble Baronesses seek. Indeed, because of the way we are dealing with specific arrangements in the authorisation process, it is something for which the responsible body can stipulate a system of regular reviews. I hope that, on that basis, they will be reassured that we are conscious of the importance of this issue but believe that it is dealt with in the Bill as amended, and that the noble Baroness will feel comfortable withdrawing the amendment.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the noble Lord very much for those statements. He will understand that, given the state in which this Bill arrived in your Lordships’ House, there was a great deal of genuine concern among stakeholders that the people making the decisions—largely, care home managers—might not be in a position to know what would be a less restrictive option for somebody: to be either in their own home, or supported in the community. In this Report stage, it has been useful to go back over that ground and to put more clarification around the frequency and timing of reviews. That will be a tremendous test for this new system, given the way in which it has been set up for there to be a period of two-year renewals. Nevertheless, at this stage, I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 89 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, like all other noble Lords, I welcome the Government’s change of heart on this matter and am glad that they have understood the very real concerns about conflict of interest in relation to care home managers. However, I would like to take this opportunity to raise one other potential conflict of interest to which we have not really had time to pay much attention, and that is within the responsible body. The responsible body may well be the local authority which is funding somebody’s care home place. During meetings, stakeholders have been very concerned that the person within the responsible body who makes these decisions should not be within the commissioning part of that body, as there is the potential there for another conflict of interest.

Some further work will have to be done—I suspect either in regulations or in a code of practice—to make sure that we do not enable another conflict of interest to take place which is probably more important than a conflict of interest relating to a care home manager. It is just a case of being sure that all the decisions—although principally these decisions—are taken by a person within the responsible body but not within the financial decision-making parts of it.

[Baroness Thornton]

I have an amendment in this group which covers the same ground that we have been talking about for the last 20 or so minutes. It is probably not essential to pursue this amendment because the government amendments on this matter seem very comprehensive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker]

I just want to be clear: am I right that the code of practice would not be amendable when any debate came? Would it come before this House simply for information purposes?

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

That would be correct at the point at which it came before the House, but it would be published for consultation before then. There will be an opportunity for everybody—noble Lords, Members of the other place and stakeholders—to consider a draft and to recommend changes. The final product would be laid before Parliament.

We discussed the Mental Health Act review a little bit last week. We await its conclusions. Many of us have had conversations with Sir Simon Wessely about what it is likely to conclude, and about the interaction between the Mental Health Act and the mental capacity Bill when enacted. Since we are expecting its recommendations in the middle of next month—I think the scheduled date is the 12th—we will have an opportunity to consider the review’s recommendations before we move to the new system. Indeed, given that those recommendations will be out at about the time the Bill moves to the Commons, they will clearly be the subject of debate there. The Government will need to respond to those findings as we go through the Commons stages.

Amendments 143A and 147A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, would require the Government, before the new system could come into force, to conduct public consultation on the Act with vulnerable people and other stakeholders and publish a report on its findings, as well as to publish their response to the Mental Health Act review and an equality impact assessment. I hope that I have dealt with the issue of public consultation, as well as consultation on the code and, equally, on the Mental Health Act review. The noble Baroness is quite right to bring the equality impact assessment to the House’s attention. It was prepared prior to introduction and required amendment following input from the Welsh Government. It will now need to be amended further to reflect the changes made in the Bill. I can commit to publishing the equality impact assessment before the Bill makes it to the Commons so that there will be ample time for consideration before it is debated there.

If the House will allow me, I will finish by thanking all noble Lords for their perseverance and patience during a sometimes difficult and challenging debate. We know that we all want to achieve the same end to our journey; there has been disagreement at times on the right way to get there. I am deeply grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. The Bill has been immeasurably improved already in its passage through this House. That is a very good thing in itself and will have a very positive impact—notwithstanding the slightly gloomy prospect given by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—when it goes to the other place and on to implementation.

Once again, I extend my sincere gratitude to all noble Lords. I hope that I provided reassurances on the amendments in this group and that they will feel able not to press their amendments.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)]

My Lords, I concur with what other noble Lords have said and ask the Government to take one more look at the remaining conflict of interest relating to independent hospitals. It appears they will be able to employ their own AMCPs and, as the responsible body, authorise the deprivation of liberty of people in the hospital. This could pose a huge conflict of interest. The team has taken a great deal of trouble to remove this in the care home setting, and it seems it would be relatively straightforward to do so for independent hospitals. I fully support the amendments outlined today.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward this amendment and for having taken the time and effort to discuss the thinking of the department with many of us. I pay tribute to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott. They were rookies—this was their first ever Bill—and they have done a tremendous job, not least because it is a fairly open secret that many of us think this is one of the worst pieces of legislation ever brought before this House. I seriously mean that; we have said it several times. Together, they have enabled all of us in this House to play a very responsible role in turning some very bad legislation into legislation that is still in many regards highly deficient, but not as bad as it was.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, inevitably we failed to see the wood for the trees. We were so busy dealing with big defects in what was presented to us that we did not really get the chance to stand back and look at what would be an efficient overall system. It is for people in the House of Commons to look at what remains to be done to improve the Bill as it comes to them.

Part of it is that we spent so much time looking at the role of care home managers, we did not get around to thinking about how AMCPs, IMCAs and appointed persons could work together more efficiently to ensure that the most vulnerable get the most attention. It is unfortunate that Sir Simon Wessely’s review came to us only last week, with, at its very heart, the important issue of objection, the implications of which we should have been able to discuss in this Bill. I am sure we will need to return to that.

On this amendment, I thank the Minister for widening the triggers to include the involvement of an AMCP. But I want to flag up to those who will look at this in future the change in the role of care home managers and the role they will continue to play in renewing deprivations of liberty for up to three years, which is a big concern.

I also want to return to an issue that has been raised before: why, in this Bill, do we continue to deploy the best interest argument when it comes to ensuring that somebody has an IMCA? Several times we have asked to see the evidence base for creating that hurdle to access an IMCA, and the Government have yet again not given us any. A lot of people, particularly older women with dementia, will not get an IMCA because they will not be deemed to be objecting.

Perhaps the Bill’s biggest deficiency, and one we have not discussed much, is that practically nothing is in regulation; large swathes of it will be left to a code of practice. If one goes back to the Mental Capacity Act, however, one finds regulations that relate primarily to those who will be enacting this legislation. Regulatory conditions are applied to those who can be an AMCP, and to what their training has to be, and to those who can act as an IMCA, and to their ongoing duties to maintain contact when people move and to step in when the appropriate person, for some reason or another, ceases to fulfil the obligations it was initially assumed they would.

I say to those who will look at this in the House of Commons: the Government must be required, apart from anything else, to come forward with a great deal more detail than we have been able to elicit from them. With that, I welcome what is before us today.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I join other noble Lords in welcoming this amendment, which we will of course support. It is a little disappointing that we have not made all the progress that we wished around the AMCP. We are half way there with the pre-assessment regime in this amendment and have a commitment that the other part will be undertaken in the Commons. As the Minister and other noble Lords will be aware, the Bill has to end its passage here anyway, so we will be able to see whether those commitments have been fulfilled to ensure that the safeguards are in place.

As we discussed on Report, and in the helpful meeting with the Bill team, the amendments we were seeking—to ensure that the care home manager is not responsible for decisions about independent consultation —have been responded to. However, I am not sure we are quite there yet.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, pointed out, a question remains about independent hospitals employing their own AMCPs and whether that is a conflict of interest that needs to be dealt with by the Bill. As other noble Lords have said, we need to ensure that if the person who expresses concern is a member of staff, they will be protected under the whistleblowing regime. I accept that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, that would not necessarily be included in the Bill, but it simply has to be there, otherwise this will not work.

The noble Baroness said that we are going to congratulate each other, but I shall do that next.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord O’Shaughnessy]

My Lords, I will use the opportunity of my closing speech to offer my sincere thanks to all those in the House who have contributed to the passage of this Bill. I hope that I will not miss out any names from this list, but I want to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly, Lady Tyler, Lady Barker, Lady Wheeler, Lady Finlay, Lady Hollins, Lady Murphy, Lady Watkins and Lady Meacher, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Touhig, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for their contributions. I also thank my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott for her steadfast support. In her first time at the Dispatch Box she was stupendous and set a high bar for future performances. Lastly, I thank my noble friend Lady Barran, who gave us an excellent maiden speech during the passage of the Bill, and congratulate her on her promotion to the Whips’ Office.

I believe that, by working together constructively over the past six months, we have much improved the Bill. In doing so, we have provided a system that will protect much better the 2 million people in our society who have impaired capacity. As noble Lords have brought to life during the passage of the Bill, that is something of which many of us have personal experience. I think that there is broad agreement that the current system does not work and needs to be changed, to put the cared-for person at the centre of it. I also believe that during the passage of the Bill through this House, and in response to suggestions and ideas from noble Lords, we have made some significant improvements. Once again I beg to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. We have not made just superficial changes: rather, some really important changes have been made.

The Bill will now apply to 16 and 17 year-olds as well as those aged over 18. We have carefully designed a role for care homes while eliminating conflicts of interest and being clearer about their role in the system. We have been explicit that the person completing assessments must have appropriate skills and knowledge, and a statement to the responsible body must be written. The Bill no longer contains the outmoded and unwanted references to “unsound mind” and we have also strengthened the provisions around appointing IMCAs, including a presumption that they now will be appointed. I hope that in practice that deals with the concern just expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. We have also made sure that the cared-for person must be consulted so that their voice is heard in every case, and today we have amended the Bill to enable families and staff whistleblowers to raise concerns much sooner and for those concerns to be acted on.

I should also say that the House has made its own opinion known in defeating the Government on the issue of specifying that arrangements should be necessary and proportionate in order to prevent harm to self, and I can confirm that the Government will not seek to change this position in the Commons. The Government will also carefully consider the amendment passed by noble Lords on rights of information being provided to the person.

The Bill will now move forward to the Commons and I can give some reassurance about several of the issues that noble Lords raised in the last debate. As I say, we have committed to make sure that the amendment passed today will be reflected in the sense of being able to raise concerns at the review stage. We will also provide clarification about referrals to AMCPs, including independent hospitals. That was a commitment I gave on Report and I am very happy to repeat it. It will look not only at independent hospitals but at whether there are other circumstances, and what they ought to be, when a referral to an AMCP ought to be direct.

I should also say a word in response to the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Hollins, about the definition of deprivation of liberty. Again, I can confirm that this is something we intend to deal with in the Commons. I hope the noble Baronesses will be reassured on that. We have achieved a lot, and even if there is more that we wanted to achieve, the contributions of noble Lords have directly influenced the changes that we intend to make in the Commons. So, although it is for those in the other place to pass the amendments, noble Lords should be congratulated on their role in designing them. I hope that they will get support when we move them in the other place.

A further question was asked about the flexibility of reviews by, I think, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Barker. We will need to consider that. It is worth pointing out that it is a flexibility, not a timeframe, and that it is meant to allow for continuity in situations where the circumstances of the person are not changing. Clearly, safeguards in the system will allow for much quicker reviews if there is a reason for them. Indeed, the amendment we passed today is another way in which such a review could be triggered. So I will certainly take on board the noble Baronesses’ points about flexibility, but I think that there are enough safeguards in the system.

I hope that I have answered all noble Lords’ questions. I am sure that the conversation will continue. There is much work still to do. I thank the hard-working policy team for their engagement in this process, as well as all the stakeholders who have contributed, given us their thoughts, challenged us at times and as a consequence made this legislation better.

I want to end with some reflection. We know that these are difficult and divisive times in our country and in Parliament, but we have shown through the passage of the Bill that we can work together to improve legislation, reform public services and protect vulnerable people. We should all bear that in mind as we move through the days and weeks ahead. With that, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and I beg to move.

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I do not want to detain the House but I have one or two important things to say. First, the House owes a debt of gratitude to the ministerial team for their work in getting us to this point. The noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, should take a great deal of the credit for enabling all the things he listed as achievements of the House, going forward. Obviously, the Bill leaves us in a much better state than when it arrived.

There was one contribution by a Member of your Lordships’ House that we have not acknowledged but should: that of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning. She has not been able to take part in many of our debates but she made an important contribution when she stood up and said that the Bournewood gap still exists. For all our work, it does, and it will continue to exist until such time as we sit down and really consider mental health and mental capacity legislation, including who makes the decisions about who comes under what piece of law. Until we sort out that gap, people will still be deprived of their liberty. We can call it by a different name, but they will be.

I will ask the Minister to reflect on one thing. Nobody came to this legislation believing that DoLS had to be preserved. Everybody knew that it was wrong. Everybody understands that we need to make greater and better use of the limited professional resources for overseeing the lives of people detained for one reason or another. We should listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and reflect on what else Parliament may have to do over the next five, six or seven years to make sure that the gap is addressed once and for all so that people are not wrongfully detained.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I will very briefly add my thanks to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and the Bill team, for listening. I also thank everyone from outside who brought their own experience, either individually or as part of a professional group, a voluntary sector group or the care home sector. I thank personally those in the Welsh Government who arranged meetings for me and also brought expertise, coming from a different health service framework. That was important because this legislation must apply across England and Wales. So I add my thanks to others.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord O'Shaughnessy (Con)]

My Lords, I want to speak briefly to offer some thanks to everybody who has participated in getting the Bill to this point.

First and foremost, I thank noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said that the Bill had been given a bumpy ride. As I was in the driving seat for some of that, I can tell noble Lords that it certainly did feel rather bumpy. However, once we got over the bumps and decided we could work together, we made considerable improvements to the Bill, driven largely, it has to be said, by this House and the expertise within it. The compromise reached on the issue of a code of conduct is a good example of that and reflects extremely well on the process this House has gone through in its desire to reach pragmatic solutions—perhaps there is a wider lesson for politics in that.

I want also to express my thanks to those in the Bill team, who have stuck with this and shown considerable and growing intellectual flexibility as the process has gone on. I am sure all noble Lords would want to thank them for both their input and feedback and the grace with which they have dealt with this.

I thank also my noble friend the Minister. This Bill was one of many passes I gave her when she took over, and she has handled it with great intelligence and grace, as she always does. I am delighted we have got to this point and that she has steered it so safely.

Finally, and most importantly, I thank those affected by this legislation: the cared for and the carers. I am sorry to hear the opinion of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, which I take very seriously. I am an optimist naturally, but it is not just my natural optimism that means I cannot agree with her gloomy outlook. I hope she is wrong, and I hope she will not mind my saying so. I believe that through this legislation we have made some positive changes and done some good for the cared for and their carers. I am sure this is a subject to which we will return, but, in the meantime, I hope the lives of those people have been improved by the work we have put in over the past few months.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, it has been a privilege to work again on a subject that we have now worked on several times in this House, from the original pre-legislative scrutiny and original legislation through to the post-legislative report on the implementation of the previous Bill. Apart from anything else, it shows the excellent results that can be achieved from the process that we put into scrutinising legislation and scrutinising its subsequent implementation. In light of all of that, I will say that I take a slightly different view from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. I think that we have done a very good job. The problem is that the legislation that came to us was fundamentally flawed, and we could not change that. But we changed the legislation where we could, and those changes will make it better.

The noble Baroness hit on two fundamental issues that are problematic. The first is the nature and scope of the Cheshire West ruling and the second is the lack of understanding of the original DoLS legislation. When it was introduced, the training for professionals—all sorts of different professionals—was lacking. Much of what has happened since has meant that we have fallen into a system that is deeply bureaucratic. A number of professionals are scared to exercise their professional judgment. Consequently, a whole bureaucracy has grown up around DoLS which, had it been introduced in the right way, would not have happened. Therefore, the noble Baroness was right to say that the Law Commission was trying to deal with that issue and could not. I have no doubt that what we have in front of us will not solve the problem. I doubt very much whether it will deal with the backlog of cases, about which people are rightly exercised.

My question is one that we were all concerned about—the resourcing for this. One of the first things that we did when we met the Bill team was to query the resourcing—half a day’s training for some doctors and no need for training for people in care homes. Much of that has got lost as we have gone deeper into the wording of the Bill. Will the Minister talk about the resourcing of training and the implementation of the code of practice? I have no doubt that, in due course, there will be further test cases that will shine a light on the deficiencies of this legislation and we will come back to dealing with the fundamental issue: how do we ensure that someone whose liberty is going to be deprived by an agency of the state can be enabled to understand their rights, and their carers enabled to understand their rights, in order that they and the professionals who work with them can ensure that everything is put in place to minimise the deprivation of liberty? If we had done that properly in the first place, we would not be dealing with the deficient legislation that we are now.

The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, is right that we have not dealt with it, but I take some hope from a lot of the stramash, to use a Scottish word, that we have been through and the attention that has been paid to all of this by the department, by people in the sector and by the lawyers themselves. This is not the greatest job we have ever done, but what we should do today is put a marker down for the evidence that needs to be collated and gathered for the time in the future when we will, inevitably, return to this subject.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

I have a couple of points. Other noble Lords made detailed points about the work of this House and the contribution that noble Lords have made to the Bill—very effectively, I think. My experience, although in a sense peripheral, has been that this House has worked very effectively with both the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blackwood, in their roles as Minister and with the Bill team, and has achieved a certain amount—which is all we ever expect. We do not normally expect to turn Bills upside down and back to front, but we have achieved certain things.

I will mention a couple of things for which I am grateful to the Government, if I am right that we have really seen them home. One of my concerns was the huge and growing number of people in domestic situations where very vulnerable carers are caring for very vulnerable loved ones. Of course we need some sort of safeguard to ensure that the deprivation of liberty, if it occurs, is proportionate, reasonable and all the rest of it, but I was very worried that these poor carers would have layers of bureaucracy that they really could cope with, in addition to the bureaucracy they already had to deal with. I think we had an agreement from the Government that the procedures for assessing deprivation of liberty, proportionality and the rest of it will be undertaken in the local authority’s normal care-planning process, in the work that local authority officials are already doing. That seems a very constructive way forward which will greatly benefit a huge number of carers and cared-for people. It is a small thing, but it may be quite significant.