Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Angela Eagle and Katie Lam

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Katie Lam]

It was a privilege to hear about Thomas Roberts’s life. The hon. Member for Bournemouth East did himself great credit in telling us about him so movingly. Thomas’s mother, Dolores, whose pain is impossible for us to imagine, has also done his memory great credit by finding a way in her grief to talk about her son to her Member of Parliament and to the Minister.

Securing the border is a genuinely difficult job, and the Opposition are genuine in our desire to support the Government in doing that. We really believe that the new clause would help the Government to expand their ability to do that job. We deeply hope that they will consider it. I also thank the hon. Member for Clwyd East for her generous words.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I start by endorsing what my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East said about Dolores, Thomas Roberts’s mum, whom I met last night. She has gone through a searingly awful life experience. It is difficult even to think about that, let alone to offer any comfort. Unfortunately, I do not think that her experience would have changed much had scientific age assessment been in place, although the person in question had been assessed by his local authority as a child and was therefore in a separate environment from that which he would have been in had he not been assessed.

I am determined to see whether we can connect up our information about people coming from Europe, following Brexit and the disintegration of our access to Eurodac and various other pieces of information collected in Europe on asylum seekers and those arriving illegally—not all of them are asylum seekers. Reconnecting, if possible, to those databases would give us more comfort than we have at the moment. However, I emphasise that when people come to this country, we do check them against all our biometric records and the terrorism lists and watch lists that we have. It may be possible for us to do more in future.

We have had a debate about new clause 26 from the Opposition and new clause 43 from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire on behalf of the Scottish National party. That has again demonstrated the wide range of opinion that there is at both ends of the argument whenever we consider such issues. I will deal with both arguments in my response, and I hope to find a middle way.

First, repealing section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which the Bill seeks to do, does not stop our capacity to do age assessments. Listening to some of the contributions from members of the official Opposition, one would have thought that repealing section 58 will take off the table—completely and utterly—all age assessment. That is simply not true. The age assessments in section 58 were about the duty to remove somebody to Rwanda; they were not connected to anything else. As I understand it, the issue with that legislation was that the then Government’s intention was not to remove children to Rwanda, so it became more important to have a way of assessing whether somebody was a child. The Safety of Rwanda Act and the IMA—the previous Government’s approach to this issue—would have created even bigger incentives for people to claim that that they were children, because they would have avoided being sent to Rwanda, not that anyone ever actually ended up there. The previous Government’s approach of deportation permanently to Rwanda actually created even more incentives for people to lie about their age.

The fact is that there are people who are genuine asylum seekers who are children, people who are not genuine asylum seekers who are adults who claim to be children, and children who sometimes claim that they are adults. When that happens, one has to look at modern slavery issues and coercive control. There are safeguarding issues on both sides of the age assessment argument. Children pretend to be adults for reasons that we can imagine, but we will not go into those, because they are not very pleasant. There are also incentives created by the way in which the Children Act 1989 deals with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. As a Kent MP, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent knows exactly what happens with the Kent intake unit and the pressure that her own local authority has been put under. However, she also knows about the Government support that her local authority has been given to disperse unaccompanied asylum-seeking children around the rest of the country so that some of the burden can be shared.

We are dealing with people who arrive without papers. Some of them wish to lie about their age, and some have been told to lie because the people-smuggling gangs perceive it as a way for people to access more resources than they could if they were seen as adults. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, the system can get it wrong on both sides. People who are children have been judged to be adults and put in inappropriate places, and people who are adults have been judged to be children and put in appropriate places. There is no guaranteed scientific way of making a judgment. We can make judgments about people who are much older, but we are dealing with that uncertain four to five-year range on either side, which is the difference between 18 and 24 or 17 and 23; you will know about that, Dr Murrison, from your work as a medical doctor.

On new clause 26, I want to reassure Opposition Members that there is already provision in law for the use of age assessment, and our repealing of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act does not remove that provision. That is because the Immigration (Age Assessments) Regulations 2024, which followed scientific advice from the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee in the Home Office, specify for the purposes of section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 the scientific methods currently recommended for age assessment. We have retained those bits of legislation; neither the 2024 regulations nor section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act have been repealed by the Bill, so the capacity to use scientific age assessments remains on the statute book.

The hon. Member for Stockton West did not seem to know which age assessment methods we were talking about. The 2024 regulations specify the power to use X-rays and MRIs, and that it is possible to take a negative view of the credibility of a person who refuses to consent, where there are no reasonable grounds for refusing that consent.

With those measures on the statute book, the Government continue to explore methods to improve the robustness of age assessment processes by increasing the reliability of the scientific methods being used. At the moment, we do not have enough certainty about the gap that exists in the current assessments, which are still being assessed. The hon. Member for Stockton West and the Conservative party put these things on to the statute book but then did not operationalise them. At the moment, we are doing as much work as we can to see how reliable they are, with a view to operationalising them. But as I wrote in a response to shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South, when he wrote to me about this issue, we are in the middle of that process. I hope that we will soon be in a situation to make announcements one way or the other, and those announcements will be made in the usual way.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Angela Eagle and Katie Lam

Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I would respectfully say that the hon. Gentleman’s party had many, many years to think of a solution, and most of the cases that Opposition Members have raised today had their genesis in the years that they were in power. Close to the very end, as they became more and more frustrated, they started coming up with more and more outlandish approaches.

Obviously, one wants the entire judicial process to be used, as speedily as possible, and if the Home Office wishes to appeal a particular case, it will do so. We keep a constant eye on the issues and we think about reforms that we could make. Obviously the hon. Gentleman will be the first to hear if we decide to make changes, but we do not wish to abrogate from the Human Rights Act, the ECHR and the human rights framework. That is where we and other Opposition parties differ from him and his party. That is why I do not accept new clause 33 and I hope that the Committee will vote against it if it is pressed to a vote.

[Katie Lam]

I hope it was clear in my remarks, but for the avoidance of doubt or ambiguity I want to say that the Opposition do not criticise our judges. Indeed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West said, they are doing the best they can with the rules and precedents under which they operate. That is why the new clause seeks to change those rules—

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

In that case, I am happy to reassure him that I wrote every word.

The short answer to the question about Albania is yes. We think that would be completely appropriate. Why would Albania refuse to accept one of its own citizens that should, by our rules and our laws, be returned to that country? If it refuses to do so, we would absolutely consider that to an appropriate trigger for that response.

To continue what I was saying, new clause 40 amends section 70 of the Nationality and Borders Act, and it expands the Act to cover both nationals as well as citizens. We consider that it should be a basic and fundamental principle that we should be able to remove from this country those who break our rules. That is harder than it might sound, particularly when individuals are determined to lose their documents and obfuscate their identity and origin in every way they can. What we propose here will align other countries’ incentives with our own. It will create substantial pressure on other nations to co-operate with us to secure our border, and we strongly hope that the Government will consider adding it to the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clauses 34 and 42 reprise some of our debate on the last group of new clauses, but they also introduce the idea of the visa penalty that, as the hon. Member for Weald of Kent has just explained, is encompassed in new clause 42. New clause 34 seeks to extend automatic deportation to any foreign national convicted of an offence in the UK, or charged with an immigration offence, without consideration of their human rights. We dealt with some of that in the last debate. It would remove protections for under-18s and victims of human trafficking, and it seeks to extend the automatic deportation provisions to certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who are currently afforded exemption from deportation.

I do not believe these new clauses would be workable. They are unrealistic and would undermine our international obligations. We already have the power to deport any foreign national on the grounds that doing so would be conducive to the public good, regardless of whether they have had to serve the 12-month prison sentence that the UK Borders Act 2007 requires. If they are subject to a 12-month prison sentence, it is a duty to deport them.

The hon. Member for Weald of Kent was a special adviser in the Home Office, so she knows about these things, and the hon. Member for Stockton West is a spokesperson in the shadow Home Office team. The Conservatives talk a lot about deportation, but they did not do a lot about it when they had the power to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

New clause 36 would give access to asylum accommodation centres to our immigration enforcement officers. Members of the public may be surprised to learn that this power does not already exist. It seems to me common sense that when a person has come here illegally and is being housed by the state, immigration enforcement—an arm of that state—should be able to enter that accommodation to carry out their work.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West rightly set out, these accommodation centres exist because the volume of those coming here illegally is such that it is not possible to hold everyone in immigration detention. There are therefore substantial numbers of people on immigration bail, and a reasonable number of those are held in accommodation centres. Immigration decisions are made elsewhere, but this is the criterion set out in current legislation. In our view, this is a quirk of the current system, and not how one would design it if starting from a blank page. These sorts of accommodation centres did not exist when our rules were written, and we think that this corrects that quirk.

I echo the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West: does the Minister think that this would be of operational benefit to immigration enforcement officers? If so, will she include it, and if not, why not?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 36 seeks to provide a right of access upon request for Home Office teams working within immigration enforcement to asylum accommodation centres in order to visit those centres and residents at any time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

We have spoken many times today, and over the course of this Bill Committee’s proceedings, about the fundamental principles of fairness upon which we believe that our immigration system should be built. We have also spoken extensively about the generosity of the British state, and how much it costs to support those who, according to our rules, cannot support themselves. But that generosity, while admirable in what it says about our approach to our fellow man, costs the British taxpayer dearly. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West set out, it costs many billions of pounds a year. It also causes additional pressure on infrastructure and public services, which is not covered by what we suggest here.

We consider that new clause 37, which would introduce the asylum support repayment scheme, is a totally fair way of proposing that people who come to this country are responsible for contributing for the services that they receive. That includes the accommodation that they live in. We do not see any reason why that should be viewed as a negative change, and we really hope that the Government include it in their Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 37 would give the Secretary of State regulation-making powers to set out arrangements for asylum seekers to receive loans towards their maintenance and accommodation—but, as we have discussed in this Committee during scrutiny of the Bill, the costs of accommodating and supporting asylum seekers has grown significantly. The reason for that increase is that the Government inherited an asylum system under exceptional strain, with tens of thousands of cases previously at a complete standstill—the perma-backlog, which we have referred to on many occasions during our proceedings in the past few weeks—claims not being processed, and a record number of people having arrived on small boats in the first half of the year.

While immediate action was taken to restart asylum processing, we cannot resolve the situation overnight. It nevertheless remains our commitment to reduce the cost of asylum accommodation, including by ending the use of asylum hotels. The size of the existing backlog, particularly in appeals, means that we are forced to use hotels in the meantime. That is not a permanent solution, but it is a necessary and temporary step to ensure that the system does not buckle under exceptional strain.

Increasing the speed at which asylum claims can be processed and dealt with is the best way of dealing with this issue of cost, in my view. I think on all sides we want to see the costs come down. We want to see a properly functioning immigration system that delivers fair, timely decisions and manages public funds. Hotel costs have actually dropped from over £9 million a day to under £6 million a day. Overall the Department is planning to deliver £200 million of additional in-year savings in 2024-25, and £700 million of savings against 2024-25 levels during the following financial year, on asylum costs. These measures, taken together, would represent a saving of over £4 billion across 2024-25 and 2025-26 when compared with the previous trajectory of spending.

The Home Office has a legal obligation, as set out in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, to support asylum seekers—including any dependants—who would otherwise be destitute: “destitute” is the word that people need to remember there. Asylum seekers can apply for accommodation, subsistence, or both accommodation and subsistence support when they are destitute. Once official refugee status has been given, the individual is able to work in the UK.

Although asylum seekers generally do not have the right to work in the UK while they are waiting on a decision about their asylum claim, there are some instances in which they can apply for permission to work. They are eligible to do so if they have waited over 12 months for an initial decision on their asylum claim, or for a response to a further submission for asylum, and they are not considered responsible for the delay in decision making.

In that context, the new clause proposed by the hon. Member for Stockton West is an interesting one. I would welcome clarification on how such a loan scheme would operate alongside or instead of the current system, and the details of any assessment of the practical or economic benefit of such a scheme. Further scoping would be necessary in order to establish whether it is a feasible option. As such, its inclusion in this Bill is premature.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

I welcome the Minister’s response. Might she please commit today to a date by which the Home Office at least aims for all migrant hotels to be closed, as per her party’s manifesto commitments? I also welcome what she had to say about bringing down costs. She is right to say that the best way to minimise the Home Office’s bill for asylum accommodation is to process applications as quickly as possible. Where asylum applications are approved, though, most of those costs transfer to the welfare system, so I would be interested to hear her response on who in Government is currently responsible for tracking and understanding that cost.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We inherited a system that was very siloed, where work was not really cross-departmental at all. One example that occurs to me is that the system dealing with all the legacy applications, which the previous Government embarked on dealing with at first-tier tribunal in 2023 and then boasted about having achieved. However, that was only the initial decision in the system; if it was granted, I suppose people felt lucky, but those who were not granted appealed the decision. While the Home Office, under the previous Government, congratulated itself publicly on dealing with that legacy system, many people were actually still in the system.

One important thing we have done since coming into government has been to begin working cross-departmentally to develop metrics on how to deal with an end-to-end system. We are not there yet, and we understand that costs can sometimes be transferred to other areas; that is why I am working closely with the Local Government Association, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the MOJ to try to get the system working more effectively end to end.

I cannot give the hon. Member for Weald of Kent a date on when hotels will close, but I can say that we are doing our best. Given the huge cost and the fact that the contracts for providing them that we inherited from the Conservative party are so expensive, it will certainly be in the interests of saving a lot of money to close them as soon as we can, and we certainly aim to do so.

[Katie Lam]

Again, rightly and reasonably, the Minister talks about lowering costs, but might she say a few words about fairness and the principle that this new clause seeks to speak to: should those who have lived in that accommodation, who have benefited from that provision by the state, ultimately pay it back, if they can afford to?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady will have noticed that I have not dismissed the idea completely, but I do not think the idea is anywhere near a position where one could talk about how it might be practicable, and certainly it is not at a stage where one could consider putting it into primary legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

Throughout our long history, Britain has been an unusually compassionate place. From time to time, people have come to this country to seek sanctuary from tyranny and authoritarianism elsewhere in the world. My county of Kent became home to many of the Huguenots who fled religious persecution in France in the 16th century. Indeed, Canterbury cathedral still hosts a French-language service every Sunday, in honour of those who came to this country in search of tolerance and religious freedom.

My grandmother came to Britain in 1937 at the age of 13, as a refugee from Germany. Her grandfather was a state senator and a fierce critic of the Nazis. When Hitler came to power, the whole family were stripped of their citizenship and several were arrested. After years imprisoned and various daring prison escapes, the family first made it over the border to Czechoslovakia, where they set up a resistance radio station broadcasting back into Germany. One night, that was raided by the SS and one of the operators was shot dead. They then fled to England and to freedom.

We should be proud of our history. There are so many Brits like me who would not be here and would never have been born without the past generosity of this great country. But as I said earlier, we must also be realistic about the very many ways in which our system can be exploited by the cynical and the sinister. There are, of course, people who come to these shores legitimately seeking asylum, but we must also be honest about the fact that not everyone who comes to this country and applies for asylum has a legitimate case for doing so. We can see that evidenced in the fact that not all claims are approved.

Too often, asylum is used as an immigration route for those who otherwise would not be able to come here. Our compassion is therefore exploited by those who are in no real danger at all, a sad truth made clear by the fact that many would-be asylum seekers regularly return home without issue. The bar to claiming asylum should rightly be high. People should be in serious danger in their home country to qualify. Government Members are right to say that the new clause might cause difficult and, in some instances, heartrending situations, but that in and of itself does not make it the wrong thing to do.

Last December, as I mentioned earlier when discussing our human rights legislation, a Turkish heroin dealer was allowed to stay in the UK after first seeking asylum here in 1988. Despite claiming that he would be persecuted in his home country, the man had returned to Turkey at least eight times since arriving in Britain. On one of those trips, he even got married to a woman with whom he had been having an affair, despite already being married with children in the UK. Nevertheless, he escaped deportation, as it was ruled that deporting him would interfere with his right to a family life. That kind of scenario is clearly wrong and contributes to the persistent feeling that so many ordinary British people have that our asylum system is broken and unfair.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 41 would require the revocation of protection status or leave, or discontinuation of asylum claims, where an applicant returns to their country of origin. The Government are in absolute agreement on the principle behind the new clause. Although we are committed to providing protection to those who genuinely need it for as long as it is needed, in accordance with our obligations under the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights, such protection status must be granted only when it is required. As such, I want to reassure Opposition Members that, under our existing policy, where an individual returns to their country of origin, we consider whether they have re-availed themselves of the protection of that country. Where that is the case, we seek to revoke their protection status under the appropriate provision set out in the immigration rules.

We are also clear that asylum claims may be discontinued and withdrawn where the applicant fails to comply with the asylum process, which includes leaving the UK before a decision is made on their claim. I hope Opposition Members are therefore assured that the immigration rules enable protection status to be revoked already and applications to be discontinued where an applicant has returned to their country of origin. As such, new clause 41 is not required.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is a probing amendment tabled by the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), to tease out what he feels are important issues to discuss in the context of the Bill. I would like to make it very clear that the Opposition are neither supporting nor opposing this new clause. Ideally, my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire would have spoken to this new clause, but she has Parliament-related business elsewhere today, so I am standing in.

The background to the new clause is that various international treaties impose, or have been interpreted as imposing, an obligation on states not to send people back to a country where they would face harm. This is known as non-refoulement. However, not all non-refoulement obligations are the same, and there are important differences. The new clause seeks to tease out the differences between the ECHR on the one hand, and the refugee convention and torture convention on the other. One key difference is whether there are any exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement, which is to say: are there any circumstances in which someone can be sent back to a country where they would face a real risk of relevant harm?

Under the refugee convention, the obligation not to refoul is not absolute; it is subject broadly to two exceptions. The first of those is the article 1F exclusion from protection of the refugee convention. That exclusion applies to those who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes abroad and acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. The second exception is provided for in article 33(2), which concerns those who pose serious risk to the security of the host country and those who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes, and therefore pose a danger to the community of the host country.

As the UNHCR said in respect of article 1F exclusions, the rationale is that certain acts are so grave as to render their perpetrators undeserving of international protection as refugees. The Court of Justice of the European Union has said that its purpose is to maintain the credibility of the protection system, and as Professors Hathaway and Foster have noted, the realpolitik reason was that the drafters of the refugee convention were persuaded that if states parties were expected to admit serious criminals as refugees, they would simply not be willing to be bound by the convention.

The same is presumably true of the article 33(2) exceptions. It would be surprising if states would have been willing to sign up to a duty not to refoul if there were not that exception for those who were a threat to their countries. In 1987, the UN convention against torture came into force. It now has 173 states parties. Article 3 of the torture convention provided for an absolute non-refoulement rule in cases of torture.

Although the convention also dealt with cruel, inhumane and degrading treatments, states were careful to limit the absolute non-refoulement rule to torture. The result is that even if an individual falls in the scope of article 1F or article 33(2) of the refugee convention but would face a real danger of torture, they cannot be removed. It was felt by states that torture was such an absolute evil that the credibility of the international protection system would be undermined by preventing the removal of such individuals if they faced torture.

While the refugee convention and the torture convention both explicitly addressed non-refoulement, the ECHR did not. It prohibits states from engaging in torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, but it says nothing about refoulement. That is not surprising, as the ECHR was drafted at the same time as the refugee convention, and arguably it was felt that those issues were best addressed by the refugee convention. None the less, in the late 1980s, the Strasbourg court interpreted article 3 as prohibiting refoulement. It did so not just for torture, but for all forms of treatment contrary to article 3, and it held that the rule was absolute. As the court put it:

“The conduct of the person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account.”

The consequence is that the protection afforded by article 3 is broader than that provided for in articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 United Nations convention relating to the status of refugees. That interpretation by the Strasbourg court completely negated the careful balance struck by the international community with the refugee convention and torture convention.

The new clause posits that that interpretation threatens the legitimacy of international human rights law and that the conclusion by Strasbourg is the means by which that happens. The KM case provides a good illustration. KM was a police officer in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He entered the UK illegally in 2012 and applied for asylum. His application was refused by the Home Secretary on the grounds that he had been involved in torture. The upper tribunal upheld that finding and held that he should be excluded from protection under article 1F of the refugee convention. However, because of article 3 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the Strasbourg court, he could not be removed.

There are many more cases of serious criminals and terrorists—people who are a threat to those who live in the UK—who could be deported under article 33(2) of the refugee convention but cannot due to article 3 of the ECHR. In Saadi v. Italy, two Strasbourg judges wrote that they would not be surprised if some citizens of Europe

“find it difficult to understand that the Court by emphasising the absolute nature of Article 3 seems to afford more protection to the non-national applicant who has been found guilty of terrorist-related crimes than to the protection of the community as a whole from terrorist violence.”

Indeed, the Father of the House, were he here, would say that he suspects that the vast majority of Britons and Europeans would be baffled by that conclusion. That is also precisely the reason why the drafters of the refugee convention saw fit to include exceptions for criminals and terrorists: they knew that with rights come responsibilities, and that those who act in this way completely violate the social contract and cannot properly claim its protection. The interpretation that Strasbourg has given has, in the view of the Father of the House—at least, he would like us to debate this—weakened the legitimacy of the international humanitarian protection system.

The new clause, tabled by the Father of the House, seeks to find a solution to the problem—one that he says will restore common sense. The first step of the new clause would put a duty on the Secretary of State through careful litigation before our courts to identify cases of individuals who could be deported under the refugee convention and torture convention but would be blocked under the ECHR. He sees cases such as KM, which I discussed, as exemplars of that. The new clause would disapply the duty on the Secretary of State to comply with the Human Rights Act in such cases. That is to ensure that the Secretary of State can proceed to deport such people, and if they want to challenge their deportation, their recourse will be to bring a case to Strasbourg.

I know that the Father of the House would be comfortable with putting a duty on Ministers to still deport such individuals even the face of a Strasbourg judgment or rule 39, but he knows that the firm commitment that the Government have to international law mean that they will refuse to do so—although he also said that we should ask why they would privilege the ECHR over the refugee convention. Instead, the new clause would allow the Government to comply with Strasbourg, while requiring them to argue with Strasbourg that it is wrong to interpret article 3 in a way that negates the provisions of articles 1F and 33(2) of the refugee convention.

Were Strasbourg to apply the principle of lex specialis properly, it should conclude that it cannot be unlawful for states to rely on articles 1F and 33(2) of the refugee convention in order to deport criminals. The Father of the House would be interested to hear from the Minister whether the Government would be interested in running such an argument before the Strasbourg court. Even were we to lose in such efforts to be reasonable, he feels that the new clause would allow the Government still to decide to comply with the flawed jurisprudence from the Strasbourg court; however, it would require that, were they to do so, they must be transparent with the British public and publish a report telling us who the criminals are whom we could have deported under the refugee convention, had the Strasbourg court’s flawed interpretation of the ECHR not prevented us from so doing.

I will not press the new clause to a vote, and I repeat that I did not table it, but I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I compliment the Father of the House on his ingenious approach to the slightly different signals, as the hon. Lady set out, that the international conventions, with their judge-made law, have left us with over the years. The new clause would create a duty to remove people who are not protected by the refugee convention, irrespective of our obligations under the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights as it has developed. The hon. Lady set out that issue extremely well.

We will always seek to deport or remove foreign nationals who pose a threat to the UK or whose behaviour is such that they are not entitled to international protection. Where the UK’s obligations under the European convention on human rights prevent us from doing that, we will consider granting restricted leave, sending a clear message that the person is not welcome in the UK and will be removed as soon as possible. As the hon. Lady will remember, we amended the Bill to allow us to closely monitor people who pose a threat to the public but cannot be deported because of our obligations under domestic and international law. She will remember that that involves such things as curfews, and inclusion and exclusion zones.

The Government are clear: Britain will unequivocally remain a member of the ECHR, and work with international partners to uphold human rights and international law. Leaving would undermine protections for UK citizens and isolate Britain from its closest allies. The new clause would provide a mechanism to disregard a ruling of a court or tribunal that removal from the UK will breach a migrant’s human rights. That would place the UK in direct conflict with the European Court of Human Rights. The law does not permit us to operate with one foot in and one foot out; we are either in, as signatories to the ECHR, or we join Russia and Belarus as countries that do not accept its jurisdiction.

The law does not permit us to operate in that way; nor can it be said that the ECHR takes precedence over the refugee convention. They are distinct treaties of international law that deal with different issues. The new clause would therefore create a situation that would be wholly unworkable. I know that the Father of the House will look at this in due course. He has had a good go. We do not think that the proposal is workable. I therefore hope that it will not be pressed to a vote.

[Katie Lam]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is at this occasion, traditionally, that those who have shouldered the burdens under your expert guidance of the Committee, Dr Murrison, thank all the officials—both the House officials and my own—for their sterling work.

I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions, all of which have come from positions of principle and concern. We have had some robust debates during our time in Committee; we have even had a bit of fashion commentary. I think we will all be pleased to get out of Committee today, because the room is getting colder as the week goes on—goodness knows where we would be if we had to come back on Thursday to finish our deliberations. I hope that members of the Committee have enjoyed scrutinising the Bill and having these debates as much as I have.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Angela Eagle and Katie Lam

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a great pleasure to see you, the fourth Chair of our Committee, Dame Siobhain. I welcome you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve with you directing us.

The clause is a simple consequential one: it removes references to and amendments made by the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 when they no longer serve a purpose. During the passage of those two pieces of legislation it was necessary to amend existing Acts of Parliament, to cross-reference them and to enable enactment of the provisions within them. Few, if any, of those provisions were ever properly commenced or enacted but, since this Government intend to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act and large parts of the Illegal Migration Act, which we spent most of this morning discussing, those references no longer serve any practical purpose. They should therefore be removed from the four existing Acts of Parliament.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Siobhain, as it was yesterday afternoon. It is good to see you two days in a row.

The clause, as the Minister said, makes consequential amendments necessary as a result of the two clauses that we discussed this morning: clause 37, which repeals the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024, and clause 38, which repeals provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. As we do not support either of those repeals, we do not support these revisions or agree that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We have had our debates about the contents of those Acts. The clause concerns truly miscellaneous aspects, although I understand the logic of the hon. Lady’s argument. I certainly hope that we will press on and agree clause 39.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The clause introduces schedule 1, which will allow the governance arrangements for the Immigration Services Commissioner and deputy commissioner to be made more flexible. That will bring them in line with other public appointments by allowing for interim or shorter appointment lengths.

Schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner and deputy commissioner are to hold office for a term not exceeding five years. That allows the appointments to be for less than five years; currently, there is a fixed five-year term. Schedule 1 will make it discretionary to appoint a deputy commissioner, allowing for the governance arrangements to remain flexible to meet the demands of the organisation. It will enable the Home Secretary to appoint a senior, experienced member of staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances. It is to be used, for example, to ensure that cover is in place during a public appointment process where there is a vacancy in the commissioner and deputy commissioner posts. It does not replace the provision to appoint a deputy commissioner and will ensure continued regulatory oversight of immigration advisers, which is the point of this organisation.

The schedule will mean that the work of the Immigration Services Commissioner will continue and will operate more flexibly to ensure that good immigration advice is readily available. That is critical to the effective running of a coherent, efficient and fair immigration system.

[Katie Lam]

As the Minister has outlined, clause 40 inserts schedule 1 into the Bill. That provides that the Immigration Services Commissioner is not to hold office for a term exceeding five years. The current regime is based on there being a commissioner and deputy, so schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner may appoint a deputy. There is also a provision to enable a member of the commissioner’s staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances, such as the roles of commissioner and deputy both being vacant. That effectively allows for the appointment of an interim commissioner.

As was said in evidence to the Committee, these amendments do not seem to us to have operational consequence. We will not oppose them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 41

Detention and exercise of functions pending deportation

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The clause seeks to put beyond any doubt that the Home Office has the power to detain, in conducive deportation cases, at the earliest point. It has been doing that for many years. The clarification in the clause applies retrospectively to ensure that those who have been detained in the past have not been detained unlawfully. We do not believe they have, but this puts it beyond doubt. To clarify, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is putting beyond doubt in the Bill the understanding of how and when these powers can be used—at the earliest opportunity, if it is a conducive deportation. The powers, including to detain at the earliest opportunity, have always existed.

If the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire were agreed to, it would cast doubt on many of the arrests and detentions ahead of deportations that have happened in the past, which I do not think the hon. Gentleman would want to do. To reassure the hon. Gentleman one final time, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is a clarification of the way that they have always been understood to work. The clause puts beyond legal doubt that if somebody is being detained pending deportation, they can be detained lawfully at the earliest opportunity. That understanding has always been the case, but the clause puts it beyond any legal doubt.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 41 confirms that the Home Office may detain someone subject to deportation from the point at which the Home Office serves the notification that deportation is being considered, when that deportation is conducive to the public good. We support this provision to allow for detention before a deportation order is signed, but that only applies if the Secretary of State has notified the person in writing. Can I seek reassurance from the Minister that the requirement for a written notice will not build any delay into the process? We also support the provision in clause 42 to allow the Home Office to capture biometrics at the new, earlier point of detention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

May I ask for a response from the Minister to my question?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am happy to give the hon. Lady the assurance that she sought. If somebody is going to be detained, it will always be done with written notice, and that should not delay anything—it has not in the past.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

You are getting a lot of practice with locking and unlocking the doors and having Divisions, Dame Siobhain—it is quite exciting this afternoon.

Clause 42 modernises our powers to capture biometric information, so that we have greater flexibility over who can take that information. It will enable a wider range of appropriately trained people to take biometric information, strengthening processing resilience following instances of small boat crossings or unexpected arrivals. In a situation where it is essential to capture biometrics at the earliest opportunity and through streamlined processes, we will be able to utilise our resources more effectively. For example, the measure will enable contractors working at a short-term holding facility to capture biometrics in the same way as other contractors based in detention centres currently do. The clause also includes a power to make secondary legislation where there is a need for others to be able to capture biometric information. That is a future proofing of the legislation.

These are sensible and necessary measures to ensure that we can identify people quickly and establish whether they pose a threat to public safety if they have arrived in an irregular or illegal way.

[Katie Lam]

We are essentially supportive of clause 42, which among other things allows a person employed by a contractor in a short-term holding facility to be an authorised person to take fingerprints. The clause also includes a regulation-making power to allow other types of people to be authorised for this purpose.

May I ask the Minister how the regulation-making power is intended to be used? Are there currently other categories of people whom the Secretary of State or others in the Department would like to authorise to take fingerprints, or is this essentially a future-proofing measure, as the Minister mentioned?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

This is essentially future proofing. If another category or range of people became available, we may future proof this power and use the regulation-making power to ensure that they are taking biometrics lawfully.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Articles for use in serious crime

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 43 and 44 cover the creation of two new offences concerning articles for use in serious crime. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly encountering individuals in possession of, or supplying, articles suspected to be intended for serious crime. However, proving intent or knowledge for a prosecution is often difficult, as the connection to a specific crime may not be immediately clear and facilitators frequently go undetected.

To address that challenge, clause 43 introduces two new criminal offences. The first criminalises the possession of specified articles; the second targets the importation, manufacture, adaptation, supply or offer to supply of those articles where there is a reasonable suspicion that they will be used in a serious offence. The specified articles include templates for 3D-printed firearms components, pill presses and vehicle concealments. Those concealments are particularly concerning in relation to smuggling operations, as they are often used to hide individuals for irregular immigration purposes.

The accused will need to prove that they did not intend for the article to be used in a serious offence, or that they could not have reasonably suspected it—given the few, if any, legitimate uses for the articles I have just mentioned. Those offences will be triable either way, with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.

Clause 43 defines “serious offences” broadly, to include drug trafficking, firearms offences and assisting unlawful migration, as outlined in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. The clause strengthens the ability of law enforcement agencies to target those facilitating serious crime. It does that by closing legal gaps and addressing emerging criminal tools.

Clause 44 defines the specific articles to be included in the new criminal offences in clause 43. As I said, the articles are templates of 3D-printed firearms or their components, pill presses and encapsulators, and vehicle concealments. Law enforcement agencies have been clear that those articles are being increasingly used by organised crime gangs, and they will continue to be used unless we take action now. 3D-printed firearms templates are increasingly being used by organised criminals, and they are at present not illegal to possess. Pill presses are being used to manufacture illicit drugs, particularly benzodiazepines. Similarly, vehicle concealments have become a significant concern for law enforcement agencies, and they are used as aids in people smuggling and irregular migration.

Clause 44 also provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the list of specified articles, allowing the law to adapt to emerging threats. Any changes will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Home Office will continue to work closely with law enforcement agencies and other partners to monitor and update that list, ensuring that it remains relevant as criminal tactics evolve. By capturing those articles, the aim is to disrupt the enablers and facilitators who profit from supplying tools for organised crime.

[Katie Lam]

The clauses seem broadly reasonable, but we have a few questions on which I would appreciate some clarification from the Minister. Clause 43 creates two new offences: the possession of articles for use in serious immigration crime, and the importation, manufacture, and supply or offer to supply of articles for use in serious immigration crime. Could the Minister explain whether she feels that UK Border Force currently has the right capabilities to identify and intercept the harmful materials captured by the clause?

Clause 43 reverses the evidential burden of proof, in that a person charged with offences under it can successfully prove their defence if they provide enough evidence in court to raise a question about the issue, and the prosecution cannot prove the opposite beyond reasonable doubt. Could the Minister please explain why the decision has been taken to do that? The maximum penalty for the offences created under the clause is imprisonment for five years, a fine or both. Could the Minister please explain how and why those penalties were decided on?

Clause 44 defines “relevant article” for the purposes of the offences created in clause 43. Could the Minister please explain whether clauses 43 and 44 provide any operational benefit in terms of tackling smugglers operating abroad, and if so, how?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 45 amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to include offences related to the possession and supply of articles intended for serious crime, as outlined in clause 43. It will enable law enforcement agencies to seize the assets of individuals convicted under clause 43.

Specifically, the clause adds:

“Offences relating to things for use in serious crime”

to the criminal lifestyle schedules for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. A defendant convicted of an offence listed in those schedules will automatically be deemed to have led a criminal lifestyle and to have benefited from criminal conduct over a period of time. That means that assets obtained or spent in the six years prior to conviction are presumed to be derived from criminal conduct and are subject to confiscation unless the defendant can prove otherwise. However, the court is not required to make that assumption if it would result in injustice or is shown to be incorrect.

Confiscation orders are calculated based on the defendant’s monetary gains from crime—known as the benefit—and the assets they have available to them when the order is made. Orders are made to reflect the amount gained from crime and can be increased if the defendant’s finances improve. Non-payment of orders can lead to the defendant returning to prison.

By including these offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, we can target financially criminals who profit from facilitating crime, disrupting both the crime and the financial gains that support it.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 45 allows the relevant articles listed under clause 44 to be confiscated under the Proceeds of Crime Act. We support this measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Electronic monitoring requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The purpose of clause 46 is to remove any ambiguity about the court’s power to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of a serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order.

As currently drafted, the clause applies in England and Wales for any serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order, and in Scotland and Northern Ireland in terrorism-related cases only. However, since the Bill’s introduction, further legal complexities have come to light regarding the devolved Governments’ powers to impose an electronic monitoring condition. Pending agreement from the Scottish Cabinet Secretary, an amendment will be tabled to remove that express provision for Scotland. Northern Ireland’s position is still to be determined. I point that devolution complication out to Committee members and will keep them informed as those discussions develop.

Electronic monitoring serves as a deterrent, but it also improves the detection of any breaches. If the subject violates the conditions, it enables quicker intervention by law enforcement agencies. The clause outlines specific requirements for both the courts and the individual, including the obligation for the subject to consent to the installation and maintenance of monitoring equipment and to avoid tampering with it.

Additional safeguards are included. For instance, electronic monitoring can be imposed only for up to 12 months at a time, with the possibility of extension. A further safeguard requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on handling monitoring data, ensuring consistency and clarity for law enforcement.

This clause on electronic monitoring for those subject to serious crime prevention orders will enhance the effectiveness of such orders and interim SCPOs, supporting efforts to disrupt serious and organised crime, reduce harm and protect the public. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 46 allows the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a serious crime prevention order. The clause is helpful for investigating suspects who are already in the UK, and we broadly support it. Will the Minister confirm that the requirement for electronic monitoring will apply to those who are on immigration bail? What value does the Minister feel serious crime prevention orders might have as a deterrent for those operating abroad?

Clause 46 specifies that there will be a code of practice to outline the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the data gathered, retention and sharing of information on these orders. When will that code of practice be issued, and can the Minister please outline what the Government expect to be included?

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I would like the Minister to define electronic monitoring for us, if she can. I do not believe that there is such a definition in the Bill or in other Acts of Parliament. As a result, I worry that there is confusion, so I would welcome her thoughts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

Clause 47 introduces a new provision for interim serious crime prevention orders. These allow the High Court to impose immediate restrictions, pending the determination of a full serious crime prevention order application. The Court can do that if it considers that it is just to do so. Can the Minister explain a little more by what process the Court will decide whether it is just? Is the criterion that it is necessary for public protection?

Proposed new section 5F of the Serious Crime Act makes provision for without notice applications. That is where the application for an interim serious crime prevention order, or the variation of an interim serious crime prevention order, is made without notice being given to the person against whom the order is made, in circumstances where notice of that application is likely to prejudice the outcome. Subsection (2) of proposed new section 5F makes provision for the Court to allow the relevant person to make representations about the order as soon as is reasonably practicable. Can the Minister explain whether that will always happen after the order is granted?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The High Court will be empowered to impose an interim serious crime prevention order if it considers it just to do so. In other words, it is not an evidential test, because the Court does not apply a standard of proof. Rather, it invites the Court to impose an order before it has heard and tested all the evidence in instances that require fast-paced action to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime. It is therefore an exercise of judgment or evaluation. There is a precedent for this approach in interim sexual risk orders and interim slavery and trafficking risk orders, which are currently a feature of the system and work reasonably well.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 48

Applicants for making of orders and interim orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Currently, the High Court can make a serious crime prevention order only upon application from the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office and the police in terrorism-related cases. However, High Court serious crime prevention orders have not been fully utilised; between 2011 and 2021, only two applications were made, and only one resulted in a successful order. Clause 48 extends the list of agencies that can apply directly to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order, or an interim serious crime order, to the National Crime Agency, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the police in all cases, including the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police. The clause also specifies who within each agency is authorised to apply for these orders.

This extension will simplify and expedite the application processes for serious crime prevention orders, making it easier for agencies that are directly involved in tackling serious crime to make an application where appropriate. It gets rid of a gateway process that has proven to be so tight that it has not allowed very many of these orders to go forward at all. Those agencies are often best placed to apply for a serious crime prevention order as they already have an in-depth knowledge of the case.

The clause also requires the CPS to be consulted by the applicant authority, as it will continue to have responsibility for ensuring that the order is not used as a substitute for prosecution. That is a very important part of ensuring that these orders work appropriately. In practice, this clause will make serious crime prevention orders more readily available to the agencies that are most likely to use them, to ensure that this powerful tool is used to best effect to protect the public by preventing and disrupting serious and organised crime.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 48 details who can apply to make orders and interim orders, and it replaces and extends the previous list in section 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Can the Minister please explain how long an application for an interim serious crime prevention order might take when made to either the High Court or the Crown court?

[Tom Hayes]

I want to reflect on where we have got up to. We have moved through the clauses at quite a pace, and that is very pleasing to see. The Bill responds to the requests of operationally and frontline-focused people in law enforcement and border security, and it is an attempt to give them the tools and powers that they need. I particularly wanted to mention that in the context of interim serious crime prevention orders, which we have spoken about in clauses 47 and 48.

That cuts such a sharp contrast with what has happened over recent years. In 2022, one Home Secretary introduced the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. At the time, the Government said that that would deter people from crossing in small boats, but it did not. In 2023, another Home Secretary brought in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. At the time, the Government said that that would turn people away from crossing the channel in small boats, but it did not. In 2024, another Home Secretary brought in the Safety of Rwanda Act, which happily we have just repealed today. At the time, the Government talked about the prospect of sending people to Rwanda, and they said that alone would be sufficient to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. It is no wonder that that failed, too.

I wanted to set out how in 2022, 2023 and 2024 we had three separate Acts, which all aimed to do something and failed to do so. They have not delivered what operationally focused people have requested. We really need to look at how, just eight months into this new Government, we are turning the page on our asylum system and giving enforcement powers to the people who need them. We are also tidying up the statute book and ensuring greater co-ordination across the key agencies that can secure our border. I commend clause 48 to the Committee, as I do the series of clauses before it and the Bill overall.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 49 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to introduce a standardised list of notification requirements for individuals and bodies corporate that are subject to serious crime prevention orders. This is a process of standardisation. Currently, notification requirements are added at the court’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. The clause will standardise those requirements for all serious crime prevention orders, improving the consistency and monitoring of the orders across police forces.

We have worked closely with law enforcement partners to identify appropriate requirements. The standard list will include monitoring legitimate income, checking addresses or communication methods for signs that criminal activities are being re-established, and monitoring foreign travel to assess potential indications of a return to crime. The courts can then impose additional requirements and conditions as part of the serious crime prevention order.

For bodies corporate, a designated individual must be named to liaise with the police and provide the notifiable information—including personal details, employment, financial data and contact information—which is essential for law enforcement to ensure compliance and assess risk to public safety.

The clause includes a delegated power to add to the list of notification requirements, ensuring flexibility to meet operational needs as technology evolves. The statutory instrument will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order must provide the notifiable information within three days of the order coming into force. Failure to provide information, or providing false information, will be a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment. The standardisation of notifications will improve consistency in managing serious criminals and improve law enforcement agencies’ ability to assess risk and therefore more effectively protect the public.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 49 sets out a prescribed set of notification requirements, so that a person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order is required to provide the police or the applicant authorities with certain information. We support the clause, although can the Minister explain why three days has been given as the deadline to respond with the notifiable information requested?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Three days seems a reasonable amount of time to allow the individual or body corporate concerned to gather the information, but also to ensure that the authorities get it in a timely way, so as to prevent any potential harm that might come from delay.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Currently, the High Court has the authority to impose a serious crime prevention order without a conviction, provided that the Court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting their involvement in serious crime.

Clause 50 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to grant the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on individuals who have been acquitted of an offence, or in circumstances where the appeal has been allowed, if the same two-limb test is met. There may be cases where a person is acquitted but a serious crime prevention order is still needed. This can happen if the threshold for a criminal conviction is not met but there is still enough evidence to show that the person is involved in serious crime, and that the order would protect the public.

The Crown court would have just heard the evidence of the case and would be in the best position to assess whether an order is necessary to protect the public. Again, this approach is not new; similar provisions are found in other laws, such as domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, where orders can still be issued even after an individual has been acquitted. The effect of this clause is to streamline the process, enabling serious crime prevention orders to be applied more regularly and effectively in appropriate cases.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 50 allows the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. Subsection (2) provides that in order to impose a serious crime prevention order in these circumstances, the court has to be satisfied both that the person has been involved in serious crime and that the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by that person in serious crime in England or Wales. Why do both tests need to be satisfied for a serious crime prevention order to be imposed? Where these cases involve acquittal, as the Minister outlined, it might be hard to satisfy the first test. It seems to us that the second test of protecting the public is sufficient grounds to impose a serious crime prevention order.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a two-limb test. Obviously, the evidential test for criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. There is a lower evidential test in other court instances, and it may very well be that someone who did not pass the “beyond reasonable doubt” test in a criminal trial would still be considered by the court to be involved in criminal activity, and therefore they would pass the first limb of the test. They would pass the second limb as they would still be likely to be involved in criminal activity in the future. We think that the two-limb test is an appropriate response to protect civil liberties, while protecting the public from the behaviour of those who are involved in serious and organised crime. We think that that balance is about right.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Angela Eagle and Katie Lam

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Again, I will reserve my comments on the new clause until after I have heard what Members on the Opposition Front Bench have to say about it.

The group entails clauses 27 to 29, which cover the arrangements for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions. The group also covers new clause 23, which I will try and separate out so that I can try to answer the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, once he has put them.

Government Departments like the Home Office and law enforcement partners rely on information sharing for a range of purposes, including law enforcement and border security-related purposes. Key datasets are held by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, many of which are held in connection with HMRC’s customs functions. Existing statutory provisions to share this information are complex, fragmented and restrictive in ways that prevent the Government from taking full advantage of technology such as modern big data analytic tools.

Clause 27 will create a new power for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions to a range of recipients, including UK Ministers, Government Departments, police, and certain international partners. HMRC will be able to supply information for use for the purposes of any of the functions of the recipient.

The sharing of entire datasets and the use of customs information for more than just customs purposes will enable the Home Office and other partners to analyse the information to identify suspicious activity that would not be apparent if each dataset were considered in isolation. This will support key Government objectives, such as disrupting and dismantling organised crime groups, preventing the unlawful movement of people and goods into the country, prosecuting offenders and protecting vulnerable people, as well as the Government’s safer streets mission.

Clause 28 regulates how the information supplied under clause 27 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded while also enabling Government Departments to use information received for any of their functions. That will ensure that maximum benefit can be derived from the information received.

Information shared under clause 27 is subject to a general rule: the person who receives it must only use it for the purposes for which it was supplied. They may not further disclose it to anyone without HMRC’s consent. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule that will enable certain recipients to use and disclose information more flexibly. UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police will be able to reuse customs information for any of their functions and further share it between themselves for specified border security and law enforcement-related purposes. Additionally, there will be extra onward disclosure permissions for the Home Secretary so that she may disclose the information to any person for use for certain immigration and customs-related purposes.

Clause 29 regulates how the information supplied onwards in accordance with clause 28 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded. The clause focuses on making clear the restrictions surrounding the reuse and onward disclosure of information supplied under clause 28. Any person supplying information in reliance on clause 28 or 29 must notify the recipients of these restrictions, as they apply to the reuse and onward disclosure of the information. In recognition of the particular importance of protecting HMRC information, which can include a great deal of personal information, clause 29 extends the existing criminal offence of wrongful disclosure under section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 to apply to any person who discloses information in contravention of these restrictions.

The intent of clause 29 is a continuation of the safeguards laid out in clause 28, while ensuring that none of the restrictions go against the spirit of the overall information-sharing provision. Clause 29 protects information from being shared beyond the provision’s intent. I will not deal with new clause 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West until he has spoken to it.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

rose—

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Ah, the hon. Lady will speak to it.

[Katie Lam]

We welcome the powers in these clauses to share HMRC data. Border Force is responsible for clearing both people and goods at the UK border. There is international precedent for moving towards joint targeting centres for people and goods. From a law enforcement perspective and from ours, the more customs information that can be shared with UK and other Government agencies, the better. HMRC has a range of customs functions, including the collection and management of customs duty, monitoring and controlling the movement of goods, and control of cash entering or leaving the UK. HMRC is bound by a statutory framework of confidentiality and needs a lawful basis to disclose information.

Clause 27 will allow HMRC to share customs information in support of defending the security of the UK borders. The clause allows UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police to reuse customs information for any of their functions, as the Minister laid out. The clause also allows data to be shared with international organisations that have functions relating to the movement of goods or cash across international borders, or if an international arrangement makes provision for co-operation between that organisation and HRMC. We welcome the powers in clause 27. I would like to ask the Minister how often she expects these data-sharing powers to be used for law enforcement and her assessment of what practical effects the powers will have on making it easier to disrupt organised crime networks.

Clause 28, which we support, specifies the circumstances in which UK Government Departments, Ministers and the police can further share customs data. We also support clause 29 on the safeguards included in this clause. We have tabled new clause 23 to disapply data protection laws from data on those who have entered the UK illegally or are foreign national offenders. The purpose of the new clause is exactly the same as the purpose of clauses 27 to 29, which is to minimise barriers to data sharing between agencies for immigration and law enforcement purposes. We table it in the spirit of the support I have already mentioned for the Government’s aims regarding data access.

If someone has entered the UK illegally or is a foreign national offender, law enforcement for their removal is vital and GDPR legislation should not stand in the way of being able to gather and establish any necessary evidence for use in immigration appeals or law enforcement. We wish to remove the barriers to data sharing in these cases, and we know the Government want that too. We hope that they will find the suggested new clause useful.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Lady for speaking to new clause 23. As she said, it seeks to disapply the protections afforded by the UK GDPR regulations to people who have entered illegally or who are foreign criminals. I think that would massively complicate data protection legislation, given that we would always have to keep an eye on who is a foreign national criminal or an immigration offender, over time as well as in the moment. That could make it harder to apply some of the data-sharing rules.

We believe that with the protections in clauses 27 to 29, we can get and share the information that we need to share, to its greatest effect, while protecting people from unlawful disclosure, without complicating things further by trying to check whether somebody is a foreign national offender or has entered the country illegally.

We have a strong history of maintaining high data protection standards. The legislation permits the use of personal data for legitimate purposes, such as immigration control, while giving the public the reassurance that such use will be subject to proportionate safeguards. Our approach will be to rely on the proportionate safeguards, rather than to disapply the entirety of data protection laws to certain groups of people who happen to be in our society at the moment. The proportionality test, with the focus on organised immigration crime, is important.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is certainly a good idea to create legislation that can actually be commenced. Otherwise, we are just all having a fun time in Committee— I can see everyone agreeing with me—and not affecting the statute book, making it easier to do what must be done or enabling the law to help with that rather than having a gigantic problem. As a Minister, I am certainly in favour of enacting laws that we can commence, and I hope that we will be able to commence large parts of the Bill as soon as it has made its proper progress through both Houses.

The UK has a long history of maintaining high data protection standards. Complicating them by trying to disapply them for certain individuals who are in our society whether we want them to be or not implies that we would have to keep very up-to-date, regular records of every single person in the country to check their status. That sounds like ongoing identity checks across the whole population, and that is easier said than done. It is not Government policy, and I did not think it was Opposition policy either. Although the new clause is well meaning, it is a complication rather than an assistance.

Where the exercise of data subject rights, such as the right to seek access to personal data, could undermine the tasks, appropriate exemptions can be applied on a case-by-case basis. Disapplying data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups is unnecessary and could disadvantage some of the most vulnerable people in society, such as victims of trafficking. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Weald of Kent will not press new clause 23, with the reassurance that we think that these clauses give us the power to use big data and big data analytics in a way that is in keeping with data protection laws, the GDPR and the ECHR.

[Katie Lam]

I take the Minister’s points about practicality, but in situations where new clause 23 created additional complexity, the Home Office would retain the option to adhere to the GDPR if it wished to; it would just not be forced to do so. We really think that the provision would be a useful addition and we hope the Government will consider it further. However, we do not intend to press it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 28 and 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Supply of trailer registration information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. That is at the higher end of the harms that one would hope could be prevented by more timely access to this kind of information. These clauses will ensure that those charged with securing the border and beyond can use the information in line with the range of threat types enabled by cross-border lorry movements such as the one my hon. Friend just mentioned, to ensure that the law enforcement community engaged in tackling organised immigration crime, and wider serious and organised crime, are able to tackle it at pace.

Clause 31 complements clause 30 by setting out how information received by the Home Office and the police may be disclosed onwards, with whom and for what purposes. Robust inter-agency and international co-operation is crucial to smashing the criminal gangs. Border Force routinely works with the National Crime Agency and the police for the purposes of criminal investigations connected with the smuggling of people and illicit goods, and with HMRC for customs purposes.

The police, in turn, need to be able to alert law enforcement partners to identify specific trailers of interest. Border Force and the police also need to be able to alert European law enforcement partners to intercept trailers where there might be a threat to life and in support of cross-border co-operation against illicit goods. This clause, subject to safeguards contained in clause 32, enables just such an outcome to be achieved.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 30 provides a power for the Secretary of State for Transport to supply trailer registration information to the Secretary of State for the Home Department for immigration purposes, law enforcement purposes, human welfare purposes, purposes connected with functions under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, protecting national security, and responding to an emergency. The information can also be shared with the National Crime Agency and HMRC.

We support the powers in the clause. As with the previous group of clauses, this is about being able to bring together the information held by different arms of the state to defend the border, and we wholeheartedly agree with that. I must confess that this is going to be a fairly friendly section of the afternoon, for which I can only apologise to all involved.

Clause 31 provides powers for the onward sharing of information in clause 30. It is important that that information can be shared with those exercising public functions, including those outside the United Kingdom. We also support the new powers in the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Sections 27 to 31: general provision about disclosure

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 33 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

This group includes clauses 32 and 33, which provide for safeguards with respect to the customers and trailer registration information-sharing provisions, which we have just agreed will stand part of the Bill, as well as providing clarity about the meanings of terms within those clauses.

Clause 32 makes general provision about the disclosure of information with respect to clauses 27 to 31. That is information held by HMRC in connection with its customs functions, as set out in clauses 27 to 29, and the DVLA’s trailer registration information in clauses 30 to 31. The clause does two things. First, it clarifies that clauses 27 to 31 do not limit how information may be disclosed outside of the scope of this legislation. It does not tie the hands of a named party to disclosing information subject only to the regime established here if another information gateway exists. Secondly, it clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would contravene UK data protection or investigatory powers legislation. In deciding on that, the clauses are to be taken into account. Clause 32 neither treads upon other legal regimes to disclose information outside of the scope of this legislation nor permits anything that would fall foul of existing statutory safeguards—a perfect, balanced approach.

Clause 33 makes provision for the interpretation of clauses 27 to 31—the terms used, their scope and limits. First, it defines the meanings of certain terms through direct definition and in reference to other legislation. Secondly, it seeks to capture all UK police forces and bodies that might be the end users of the information, referring to a “UK authorised person” and a “UK authorising officer” for the purposes of clause 30, and defining what it means in this clause.

The use of the terms “UK authorising officer” and

“the person under whose direction and control the constable…is”

avoids reliance on references to chief constable, commissioner and chief officer, because those terms have prescribed legal meanings that exclude the commanders of the very important ports police and the even more important Mersey Tunnels police, which rely on other ranks to command. That ensures that the definitions apply to everybody, whatever the force. The ports forces and the Mersey Tunnels police are an extremely important part of defending the border, for obvious reasons.

For “UK authorised person”, the term constable, which includes special constable, is used. The clause also refers to

“other person who is under the direction and control of a person who has the direction and control of a body of constables”.

Such is the poetry of legislative diction, but lawyers know exactly what that means. Instead of police civilian staff, or similar terms with prescribed meanings, we have that rather long and convoluted explanation, which includes everybody. That is because not all forces employ police staff subject to employment contracts. Some also use police volunteers. The MOD police uses civil servants in such roles, while the Police Service of Northern Ireland has powers to use civil servants separately from employed police staff. Use of “other person” accommodates all these cases, so it is all-encompassing, and I hope we have not missed anybody out.

Thirdly—this applies only to the trailer data—we have worked with the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar to identify persons undertaking statutory functions equivalent to their UK border security and law enforcement counterparts. We have defined them as a non-UK authorised person and specified them in a table along with the authorising officers.

Finally, the clause establishes a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State to define the meaning of specified purposes related to policing to ensure that the data requirements are met today and can be updated from time to time as operational requirements evolve. Such an extension would be subject to consultation with policing bodies across the UK, Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and it would require the affirmative resolution of both Houses. With those reassurances, I hope members of the Committee will be happy to support clauses 32 and 33.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 32 makes general provision about the powers of disclosure in clauses 30 and 31. Subsection (2), as the Minister laid out, clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would otherwise contravene data protection or investigatory powers legislation. How much difficulty does the Minister envisage these provisions causing for the sharing of information? I seek reassurance—she has offered some already—that the safeguard will not frustrate legitimate data-sharing activities. Clause 33 defines key terms included in clauses 27 to 31, and we have no problems with it.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I reassure the hon. Lady that we do not envisage the definitions causing any practical problems with data sharing and the powers defined in clauses 27 to 31.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Provision of biometric information by evacuees etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

Clause 34 provides a power for an authorised person to take biometric information when the Government are in the process of facilitating their exit from a state or territory. The purpose of the power is to ensure that only those who qualify under particular evacuation schemes are able to come to the UK. The power to take biometric information should help to verify identity and conduct screening checks, as individuals in these circumstances are often undocumented. We fully support the provision.

We would be interested to hear more about whether the Government intend to take further action on biometrics, which could be brought about through the Bill. Countries such as Dubai and Singapore are investing in biometric entry and exit systems, as is the EU. The UK does not routinely capture biometrics at the border, although with the new UK electronic travel authorisation, we will collect digital photographs of all non-visa nationals, with the option of retaining fingerprint scans.

We are aware that there are logistical and financial challenges to enabling Border Force to collect biometrics routinely from all passengers on arrival and departure, but there are also substantial benefits, including helping to match illegal migrants and asylum seekers leaving the country, thereby giving a clearer picture of those who are overstaying through more accurate migration figures. We would be interested in hearing how the Government are thinking about biometrics more broadly in the context of their not extending the power to capture biometrics more widely in the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Working out the potential for electronic borders and a more sophisticated approach to the hundreds of millions of journeys that cross our borders every year is an important part of the day job of my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston. This is a more limited clause, but we are certainly investigating the potential, costs and benefits of a much more digitalised border. We are not about to introduce that through this Bill, but there will be more to be said when that work has been done in due course.

We understand the potential for making border crossings much more convenient for everybody while having more robust information about who has crossed borders, and when and where they were crossed. Some of this is about goods, trailers and a range of other things crossing borders, and ensuring that we have information on when people smugglers and clandestines cross borders, too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 36 will enable the biometrics of persons detained in Scotland under schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 to be taken at ports, thereby bringing the position in Scotland into line with that in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Those schedules allow an examining officer—a constable, or a designated immigration or customs officer—to stop, question, search and detain a person at a port, or at the border area in Northern Ireland, for the purposes of determining whether the person appears to be a person who is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. An examining officer may stop and question a person whether or not there are grounds for suspecting that the person is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. Those are important powers that allow counter-terrorism police officers to detect, disrupt and deter terrorism and hostile activity at the border.

The powers for taking biometrics in Scotland are contained in paragraph 20 of schedule 8 to the 2000 Act and paragraph 42 to schedule 3 of the 2019 Act. Clause 36 amends those paragraphs, removing the unnecessary restriction unique to Scotland that requires that those detained under those powers are taken to a police station to have their biometrics taken. The clause will allow biometrics to be taken much more easily and quickly in situ, rather than the person having to be transported to a police station.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 36, as the Minister has laid out, extends biometrics powers to ports in Scotland. As we understand it, immigration enforcement already has the power to take biometrics from people arrested in the UK, including at ports, if they are suspected of having entered or remained in the UK illegally. How does the Minister think that the clause will add to existing operational powers?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a lacuna in Scotland rather than a problem elsewhere. It is simply that, in Scotland, biometrics cannot be taken except in a police station. In his 2020 report on the operation of the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation recommended that we address the issue. We saw the Bill as an opportunity to deal with what is obviously an unintended kink, so we are ironing it out.

[Katie Lam]

That is very helpful, but I just want to check that I fully understand what the Minister is saying. The power already exists, but it is about locational flexibility—is that right?

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Angela Eagle and Katie Lam

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

We on the Opposition Benches struggle to understand why the law must set out that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant. The Minister said that amendment 10 implies the commander should not be a civil servant, but all it seeks to do is remove the requirement that they should be. If the Home Secretary and, presumably, the Home Office permanent secretary believe that the role is best filled by a civil servant, perhaps for the reasons of co-ordination that the Minister set out, so be it—they can still be appointed as a civil servant—but the legislation will mandate that they have to be, and we struggle to understand why that requirement is necessary.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I made it clear in my response to the hon. Member for Stockton West that the recruitment could be done externally. Were somebody to be appointed who was not a civil servant when they applied, they would then come into the Home Office on civil service terms, bringing with them whatever experience they had and that the recruitment process had determined would be suitable for the role. I am not sure there is much between us, unless the hon. Lady is implying that, by the act of becoming a civil servant, the commander would somehow be less effective. I do not believe that is the case, especially as the idea is to ensure that the Border Security Commander can convene the entire system across Government Departments. Having a base in the Home Office, albeit designated as a civil servant, will make that more effective rather than less effective. To be clear, if the legislation gets on the statute book, any future office holder would not have to come from the civil service. I hope that reassures the hon. Lady.

[Katie Lam]

I thank the Minister for that response, which is reassuring, but it does not quite address the concern. These issues are very difficult, and I presume the Minister accepts that it is possible that it might be better, either in due course or in relatively short order, for the commander to be operationally independent. If that is the Home Secretary’s judgment as time goes on, the Government will have to come back to Parliament to change the law. Would it not be better for them to give themselves the flexibility?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady implies that total independence from the machinery of government would somehow assist in the job that we wish the Border Security Commander to do. I do not agree with her in that analysis. The job of the Border Security Commander is to convene and cohere and to strategically focus, across Government Departments, with a focus on checking that our border security is as effective as it can be. I do not think that total independence is going to add to effectiveness in that context. In fact, we believe that having the commander operating out of the Home Office at a director general level, but appointed by the Prime Minister with a special place in primary legislation, is a more effective way to ensure that the commander’s basic role has the biggest-percentage likelihood of being effective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not want to read out the job description, which was put out there ahead of Martin Hewitt being appointed last year. It is there for all to see, it is a public document. The role is very much about being able to operationally cohere the system and to make certain by the operation of the Border Security Commander’s board, upon which sit many of the other parts of Government that need to have regard to the strategy, that we decide how to take forward and deal with threats to our border security. It is not really rocket science, and I do not think that there would be much to be gained from putting the details of all of that into primary legislation.

It is important that as the threats to our border security evolve, which they certainly will do over time, that we do not find ourselves with a very rigid set of requirements in primary legislation, which is hard to change. The idea is to have convening powers to give flexibility to the commander to ensure that he can bring together all of the forces across Government that are charged with security in this area and ensure that the focus on organised immigration, crime and border security is always at the forefront of the work that they do.

[Katie Lam]

I am a little confused by some of the contributions from Labour Members. They seem to be advocating for the commander to be a civil servant, and that is fine, but that is not actually what we are discussing. The question here is whether there could be any benefit in having some flexibility for the Home Secretary to do something different, and we do not feel that that point has been answered.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Could the hon. Lady go into more detail about what she means with respect to that? I have given her an assurance that the Border Security Commander could come from outside of the civil service and be appointed from outside of the civil service, but would then take up a civil service role of convening within Government and with the support of Government. That means that we do not have to set up an entirely new independent structure and fund it separately, which would be more likely to disintegrate rather than integrate the strategic approach to this multifaceted problem. I am beginning to wonder what the hon Lady has got against civil servants?

[Katie Lam]

Nothing whatever. There are lots of parts of the Home Office where the principle is accepted, that sometimes, particularly for difficult things and things that the Department has struggled to achieve, independence can be valuable. It sounds like the Minister is saying that she does not feel that that is the case. We must accept that, but we do not have to agree with it.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is true that independence has a very valuable part to play, particularly in holding Government structures to account. For example, the independent inspectors of our detention or prison estates who are allowed to go in and publish without fear or favour regarding what they find there. That is obviously a very important role where independence matters. But in this context, the Border Security Commander is cohering the effect and the work across Government that is trying to keep our borders properly protected. That is operational. It ties into the diplomatic and political as well, although obviously Ministers have an important part to play in that too.

The hon. Lady has nothing to worry about when it comes to the Border Security Commander sitting in a civil service context given that nothing in this Bill means that anyone who was not a civil servant when they applied to the post of Border Security Commander would be excluded from consideration. Being in the civil service to begin with is not a requirement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is quite revealing that the hon. Gentleman seems to think that the natural order of things is for Ministers to be at loggerheads with civil servants and the people who are operationally charged with delivering on objectives. That may say more about Opposition Members than about the way we are seeking to achieve operational effectiveness and objectives in what we are doing.

Finally, new clause 21 focuses on the Border Security Commander’s functions in relation to tackling small boat crossings to the UK. This is an all-encompassing new clause, which goes far beyond the commander’s functions as set out in the Bill. The new clause seems to want the commander to be all things to all people.

The immediate priority is organised immigration crime-enabled small boat crossings. The Border Security Commander will, and necessarily must, evolve over time to provide the systems leadership across all threats as they emerge. Such crossings did not really emerge until 2018, but they have become embedded and more of a threat over time. Had we been discussing something like this in 2017, small boat crossings would not have featured at all. It is therefore important that our legislation allows the Border Security Commander to change approach or focus as new threats emerge. Threats evolve and change over time. Our approach accounts for that by stipulating in legislation that the Border Security Commander has particular objectives that might be important now but less important in the future. The new clause seems to me to present an overly difficult and inflexible way of moving forward.

[Katie Lam]

Presumably, it would always remain an objective to bring an end to illegal migration, as far as is practical?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes.

I was going to talk about what new clause 21 suggests we should do. For example, the subsection on asylum processing seems to say that the Border Security Commander should somehow take over the duty to ensure that those who arrive illegally are processed within six months—something that the Conservatives did not achieve at all during their time in Government. I am not certain why the Border Security Commander should be empowered to take over the entirety of the asylum system.

Next, the new clause states that the commander should also be in charge of immigration enforcement, and that they should do removals as well as asylum processing and defending the border. The authors of the new clause seem to think that the Border Security Commander should be not only independent, but virtually all-seeing, all-singing and all-dancing, and that they should do absolutely everything with which the entire immigration and asylum system is currently charged. That is overreach, to say the least.

The new clause also suggests that the commander should remove people to a safe third place within six months for processing. In all their years in office, the Conservatives never managed to achieve any of those things. To put them into a new clause for a Government that has been in office for seven months—a Government who were left with the most appalling mess, with an asylum system that had crashed and had massive backlogs, and with a structure in the Illegal Migration Act that made it illegal for us to process any new arrivals who claimed asylum after March 2023—and to complain that we have not sent small boat arrivals home fast enough takes the biscuit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Not for the first time today, I agree with my hon. Friend. When the time comes, we will be voting against this new clause.

[Katie Lam]

The Minister perhaps slightly mischaracterises new clause 21. It states that the Border Security Commander should “have regard to”, not manage, the wider aims of the Home Office in securing the border. Why would the Minister not want the Border Security Commander to have regard to that?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 21(1)(c) talks about:

“making arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of a person who enters the United Kingdom without leave, or with leave that was obtained by deception”

and new clause 21(1)(b) mentions:

“ensuring that a decision is taken on a claim by a person under subsection (1)(a) within six months of the person’s arrival in the United Kingdom”.

If that is not asking the Border Security Commander to take over the workings of the asylum system, I am not sure I understand what the new clause is trying to do.

[Katie Lam]

The new clause clearly does not do that. The two points that the Minister just mentioned are part of a broader sentence that states that the Border Security Commander

“must have regard to the objectives”

in subsection (1). The new clause does not state that the Border Security Commander should do those things themselves.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

But how on earth could asking the Border Security Commander to have regard to those things lead him or her to deal with border security? The new clause would take away the focus in the current Home Office arrangements on immigration enforcement and the asylum system. The new clause says that the Border Security Commander must have regard to all the processes in areas of the Department they have nothing to do with. It would upend working relationships. It would make it impossible and incoherent to deliver any kind of—

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Angela Eagle and Katie Lam

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The provisions in clause 16 create an additional tool to act earlier to disrupt criminal gangs smuggling people into the UK. The new offence targets specified preparatory activities associated with people smuggling. These activities relate to the collection, recording and possession, viewing or accessing of information that is likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a journey of more than one person into the UK, where their entry or arrival constitutes an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. These specified activities must also be conducted in circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the information being collected, recorded, possessed, viewed or accessed will be used in organising or preparing for such a journey.

This clause is levelled strongly against people-smuggling gangs and their associates. It includes a defence for someone of undertaking these specified activities for their own journey only. Also included as a defence is a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, where one express excuse is conducting these activities to carry out or to prepare to carry out the rescue of a person from danger or serious harm. The maximum sentence for this offence is five years’ imprisonment.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 16, as the Minister has just set out, creates a new offence of collecting information for use in immigration crime. A person commits such an offence if a person:

“collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey or part of such a journey…possesses a document or record containing information of that kind, or…views, or otherwise accesses, by means of the internet a document or record containing information of that kind.”

This is an extremely wide set of information that is being criminalised. We understand the desire to keep these offences broad in order to capture as many offenders as possible, and we support that aim. However, if the definition is too wide, there is a risk that it becomes meaningless and therefore self-defeating. So, it is important to understand how the Minister believes law enforcement will assess whether the information is of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey. Could she please explain how this test will be met in practice? It would also be helpful, for similar reasons, to know when the CPS will publish its guidance on what might meet the threshold for an offence to be committed under this clause. Finally, it is again a defence for an organisation that aims to assist asylum seekers if it does not charge for its services. So, we have the same questions and concerns about this defence as we did in relation to the preceding clauses.

[Mike Tapp]

I will quickly talk about this clause, because it is one of my favourite clauses in the Bill. Having worked in a counter-terror role in the past, I know that one of the most effective ways of preventing terror attacks on the streets of the United Kingdom is by identifying hostile reconnaissance, whether it is physical or online. That is why I am so happy to see this clause in the Bill, because it gives our authorities the opportunity to get to these vile criminals before they take to the seas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 17 provides for the offences set out in clauses 13 and 14—the supply and handling of articles for immigration crime—and clause 16—the collecting of information for immigration crime—to apply to activities committed both inside and outside the UK, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. The activities criminalised by these offences are often carried out overseas, as well as in the UK, by perpetrators of various nationalities to facilitate people smuggling to the UK. This clause will strengthen the offences, enhancing the ability to disrupt those involved in this trade, indiscriminate of their nationality and the location of their crime.

Clause 17 also makes provisions for, where an offence under clauses 13, 14 or 16 is committed outside the UK, proceedings to be taken in the UK. For application in Scotland, this clause provides that those proceedings are to be made in accordance with the relevant processes and bodies of the devolved Administration. Finally, this clause provides that section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, which requires consent from the Secretary of State for certain prosecutions of non-UK nationals on territorial waters, does not apply. In doing so, the impacts of these offences are not narrowed and law enforcement is able to pursue perpetrators of these offences when committed on territorial waters.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 17 sets out that the offences of supplying articles for use in immigration crime, handling articles for use in immigration crime and collecting information for use in immigration—so the clauses that we have just discussed—apply to things done both inside and outside the United Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. In essence, clause 17 makes these three new offences extraterritorial. Subsection (2) provides that where the offence is taken outside the United Kingdom, proceedings may be taken in the United Kingdom.

When we heard evidence from Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead, she said that this provision and subsection (7) of clause 18, which extends the offence of endangering lives at sea to acts committed outside the UK, create challenges. She said,

“we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level…the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world…we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 31-33, Q30.]

However, she also said that, for these new offences to work, there has to be “dual criminality”; that is to say,

“there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 33, Q33.]

Can the Minister reassure the Committee that offences equivalent to those in clauses 13, 14 and 16 exist internationally in relevant partner countries so that we can be assured that the extraterritorial scope of the offences will be effective in tackling organised immigration crime? Can she name those offences or share a list? We fully support the aims of the Government but are keen to establish the efficacy of these measures in disrupting the vile work of people-smuggling gangs.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Angela Eagle and Katie Lam

Monday 13th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

Housing asylum seekers in hotels—of which there were 6,000 more cases in just the first three months of this Government—is spectacularly expensive. The Home Secretary’s policy is to make asylum decisions quickly, so that any costs of the migrants she accepts can be hidden in the welfare system. The Home Office admits in its impact assessments that it has no idea how much her policy will cost in benefits claims and council housing bills. Will the Minister commit today to recording and publishing all those costs for migrants whose asylum claims she accepts?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I will take no lessons from the Conservative party, which spent £700 million to send four volunteers to Rwanda and left huge backlogs of more than 90,000 stopped asylum claims—people in hotels, unable to leave because the Conservatives were trying to get their fantasy Rwanda programme off the ground.