(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberLast week the Secretary of State confirmed that he was taking legal aid away from brain-damaged children and disabled people unlawfully denied benefits. In answer to questions from my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Angela Smith), the Minister with responsibility for legal aid, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), admitted that the Department of Health pays up to £183 an hour for legal advice, Work and Pensions pays £201 an hour and Communities and Local Government pays £288 an hour. Some of those well-paid Government lawyers will be up against our unrepresented constituents, especially on appeal. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman think that that is fair?
Most of those do not get legal aid now, and most personal injury cases are not brought using legal aid. They are brought using no win, no fee arrangements. As the hon. Gentleman knows, in the new proposals for how no win, no fee ought to work, we have made special arrangements for particularly difficult cases and the insurance of the costs of medical reports.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberI want to try to avoid delay today, so I shall speak to Government amendments now and respond to the points made in debate later, rather than pre-empting in my opening remarks what hon. Members may have to say about their amendments.
Government new clause 4, which is a technical amendment, has two purposes. First, it seeks to provide clarity about the role of the director of legal aid casework, by ensuring that the exercise of the functions of the office is on behalf of the Crown, and that service as the director is service in the civil service of the state. The second purpose of new clause 4 is to ensure that the Lord Chancellor is treated as a corporation sole for the purposes of part 1 of the Bill.
The new clause is necessary in order to clarify the position in relation to the Lord Chancellor’s ability to hold an interest in land for those purposes, and so applies to charges that transfer from the Legal Services Commission to the Lord Chancellor at the point when the LSC is abolished, and for future charges to be taken over property under clause 24. The statutory charge is the charge that arises under clause 24 on any property recovered or preserved, including costs, by a legally aided person in respect of the amounts spent by the Lord Chancellor in securing their legal aid services and any other amounts payable by them under clauses 22 and 23. The amendment is essential, as the current value of charges held by the LSC is £212 million.
Government new clause 9 and new schedule 3 make provision on information sharing in relation to checking a person’s financial eligibility for legal aid in Northern Ireland. They replicate for Northern Ireland the information gateway for England and Wales created by clause 21 and further provided for in clause 32. Government amendments 26 and 27 are technical amendments that make it clear that regulations made under new schedule 3 will be prescribed not by the Lord Chancellor but by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Government amendment 54 is also a technical amendment that makes it clear that the Bill extends to Northern Ireland for the purposes of new clause 9 and new schedule 3, which create the information gateway, and for the purposes of clauses 38 to 40. I should point out that under paragraph 2(4) of new schedule 3, it will be a criminal offence to use or disclose information contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2.
Government amendments 25 and 64 to 68 relate to the transfer of LSC employees to the civil service when the LSC is abolished. The powers currently set out in the Bill include a power, in schedule 4, for the Lord Chancellor to make transfer schemes to transfer to the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State the LSC’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with an LSC occupational pension scheme, of which there are currently two, or compensation scheme. The occupational pension and compensation scheme arrangements for LSC employees are different from those for existing civil servants. When the employees transfer to the civil service and become civil servants, they will join the principal civil service pension scheme.
Amendment 64 confers new powers upon the Lord Chancellor that can be exercised as part of any transfer scheme. Proposed new sub-paragraph (6A), set out in amendment 64, allows for the Lord Chancellor to apply legislation with modifications as far as it is necessary to give effect to any transfer scheme. That is appropriate when transfer schemes are of an administrative nature relating to the specific issues in question. For example, it will allow the Lord Chancellor to provide that an aspect of pensions legislation applies in a particular way to that particular scheme. It will assist, as appropriate, in enabling the continuation of the LSC pension scheme or schemes after the abolition of the LSC so that they can continue for the benefit of their pensioner and preserved members. Those are members who have contributed to the schemes before leaving LSC employment and either draw a pension from the scheme or will be entitled to do so in future.
For compensation scheme arrangements, as well as allowing the modification of legislation, proposed new sub-paragraph (6B), set out in amendment 64, provides that the transfer scheme may amend or otherwise modify the existing LSC compensation scheme. That will allow compensation arrangements for LSC employees transferring to the civil service to be brought into line with those of other civil servants over a transitional period.
Amendment 65 reflects the fact that when LSC employees transfer to the civil service there will no longer be any active members of the two current LSC occupational pension schemes, known as the No. 3 and No. 4 pension schemes. The amendment provides the Lord Chancellor with the power to make a scheme to merge the two residual pension schemes. It is explicit that a scheme exercising this power must not result in members of the pension schemes, or other beneficiaries under the schemes, being deprived of any rights accrued prior to the merger.
The LSC’s No. 3 pension scheme has fewer than 100 pensioner and preserved members, and no current LSC staff members. The No. 4 scheme is for current staff and also has a number of pensioner and preserved members. At present there is much duplication in the administration of the No. 3 and No. 4 schemes, such as producing two sets of accounts and actuarial valuations. Merging the schemes would allow us to cut significantly the administration costs of running two trust-based schemes. The amendment will also give the power to wind up an LSC occupational pension scheme.
Amendment 25 corrects a slip in clause 38(7)(j). The intention was not to make regulations that contain free-standing provision that modifies an Act either directly or indirectly, subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendments 66 to 68 clarify the fact that the regulation-making power provided to the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 10 of schedule 4 can be used in connection not only with transfers affected by schedule 4, but with schemes under schedule 4, meaning schemes dealing with something other than a transfer.
Government amendments 137 and 138 concern schedule 4 to the Bill, which governs transfers of employees and assets following the abolition of the LSC. They are purely technical amendments that simplify existing provisions. Paragraph 10(1) of schedule 4 currently allows the Lord Chancellor to make consequential supplementary, incidental or transitional provision by regulation, and paragraph 10(2)(b) specifies separately that such regulations may include transitory or savings provision. Rather than continue to separate these related provisions, for the purposes of simplification amendment 137 brings them together in a revised paragraph 10(1) and amendment 138 amends paragraph 10(2) to reflect that simplification. That mirrors an identical amendment to clause 115.
Finally, Government amendments 1, 2 and 19 are minor and technical amendments to clause 32 and schedule 5, consequential on the removal in Committee of what was then clause 71.
If the Minister was sincere when he said in his opening remarks that we will make good progress and deal with as many of the groups of amendments as we can today, I applaud him for it, but it is a challenging task. There has been a statement so we have barely four hours left to debate huge chunks of the Bill, which is impractical. It will no doubt be assisted by the fact that, with the exception of the Minister’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, who has just appeared, there is not a single Conservative Back Bencher here. [Interruption.] I apologise to the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr Offord); I thought he was a Liberal Democrat. I withdraw that slur on his character immediately.
There is a serious point. We had a disgraceful situation in the House on Monday when the Minister called in Conservative Back Benchers, one by one, to speak on domestic violence and clinical negligence, particularly as they affect the most severe injuries and brain-damaged children, and to waste time. By wasting time and then voting against amendments that would deal with those issues, the Government prevented us from moving on to a substantive discussion on legal aid. I will not dwell on that point, because I wanted to move on, but I hope that in discussing these amendments, of which there are a broad range, we will be able to do justice to that important subject.
I will speak principally to amendment 123, which stands in my name. I will get my contributions out of the way in one go by speaking to new clause 17, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue), amendment 148, tabled by Liberal Democrat Members, who for some reason rejected a similar amendment I tabled, and new clause 43, tabled by the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards), which is a very good one. I will say at the outset that we support all those amendments. I will not deal with amendment 116, which stands in my name, because my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Mrs Chapman) will make a contribution on that later. For the avoidance of doubt, I will say at the outset that the Opposition will press amendment 116 to a vote, and other hon. Members may wish to press their amendments to a vote.
Amendment 123 deals with a fairly straightforward point, but an important one, which is in no way party political. The independence of the new director has raised considerable alarm and concern across the professions and the voluntary sector, and indeed with anyone who deals regularly with legal aid. We attempted many times in Committee, with a variety of amendments, to try to push at this and get the Government to give a little. We asked for an appeals process, a vetting process before appointment, which would give some independence, and for assurances in relation to the civil service, which will be working in this area. Every amendment, as was the case throughout the Committee’s proceedings, was rejected. I hope—this is the case in other common law jurisdictions which have moved to a similar system—that the Minister is listening to these proposals. This is not an issue that divides the parties on the abolition of the Legal Services Commission, but it is an issue that strongly divides the parties on the adverse influence, be it perceived or real, that the Government will bring to bear on to the director post once it is firmly ensconced within the Department.
There is a trend in this Bill towards Government control and authoritarianism, and we will see it when we debate clause 12, whereby the same director of legal aid will get the power to decide whether legal aid is granted to those in extremis—in the worst circumstances—when they have been arrested. We also see the trend in relation to the constraints on the powers of the judiciary, and, although I doubt that we will get time to debate remand today, I note that the Government wish severely to tie the hands of magistrates and judges in relation to whom they can remand in custody. All the time, these measures restrict either citizens’ rights or the rights of independent parties, whether they be the director or the judiciary, to make decisions.
The presenter made a mistake—I hope the Minister is not making the same one—in relation to talking about legal aid, as presenters often do, but I assure the House that Mr Jefferies was clearly talking about conditional fee agreements and no win, no fee. The answer is—
I know the Minister does not want to hear this, but in relation to the director the point is that the Government wish to decide who has merit and who does not. That is the charge that the Government have to answer, and in this case they will do so only by ensuring the independence of the director.
Let me move on, because we are in the midst of a radical reform of the social welfare system. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has embarked on restructuring the way benefits are assessed, calculated and provided, local authorities have had budgets radically reduced, and a housing benefit cap is being introduced. In short, the benefits system is in a period of turmoil, and as a consequence the system of checks and balances on state decision making through the first-tier tribunals is also significantly under pressure, such that more staff are being taken on daily to deal with a growing number of appeals against decisions taken by Jobcentre Plus.
When in October last year the coalition produced its Green Paper on the reform of legal aid in England and Wales, we were shocked to see that there were cuts of £450 million, as defined in the latest impact assessment, and that they overwhelmingly came from civil legal aid. Things such as education, employment, welfare benefits, debt, housing matters and clinical negligence were taken out of scope, either in their entirety, as in the case of employment, welfare benefits and clinical negligence, or substantially, as in the case of debt, housing and education.
Means-testing will also change. The Government have proposed the abolition of capital passporting, by which those receiving certain income-based benefits are automatically eligible for legal aid, and the introduction of a new minimum capital contribution, a personal financial contribution towards legal costs.
The philosophy behind the cuts is explained in the Government’s impact assessment, in which they state:
“Legal aid may be regarded as a redistributive transfer of resources from taxpayers to those who are most needy, in relation to both the nature and merits of their case and also to their financial position… The Government may consider intervening if there are strong enough failures in the way markets operate…or if there are strong enough failures in existing government interventions”.
The amendments under discussion simply seek to address the Government’s failure to abide by those principles as set down in their own impact assessment. We are in a period of great need and of great changes to the system, and many meritorious cases are being referred to tribunal. By definition, the financial position of those requiring help with welfare benefits, employment law, debt and housing is necessarily the most precarious of any in society, and £70 a week is often all that stands between some of my constituents and utter destitution. They are in a desperate place.
Let me give the House one example, in relation to eligibility for disability living allowance. There are so many problems with the private contractor Atos that many seriously ill people are being judged fit for work. I leave aside operational issues, such as the fact that, according to its own website, 20% of Atos’s 141 medical assessment centres do not have wheelchair access, because, according to a newspaper report, one third of those refused DLA by Atos have appealed to the first-tier tribunals, and 39% of decisions have been overturned. Furthermore, the report states:
“The tribunals service…has had to double its capacity in the social security section to deal with the large number of appeals, recruiting an extra 170 paid medical panel members.”
In a letter to The Guardian, leading mental health charities and a senior consultant from the Royal College of Psychiatrists say:
“We’ve found that the prospect of incapacity benefit reassessment is causing huge amounts of distress and tragically there have already been cases where people have taken their own life following problems with changes to their benefits.”
These are not just economic issues; they profoundly affect the most vulnerable individuals.
The Government’s proposals will seriously damage access to justice for the most vulnerable in society, and their own impact assessment shows that there will be a disproportionate impact on women. Similarly, there is the potential for the cuts to impact disproportionately on black and ethnic minority clients and on those with disabilities.
That is something the Minister himself acknowledges. When it was put to him that groups with protected characteristics would be affected, he dismissed it, as only a Conservative Minister can, although the Liberal Democrats are getting there, by saying, “Well, that’s because they are disproportionately represented among the most vulnerable.” That is the logic of the Government’s case—“Because vulnerable people get legal aid, and we are cutting it, what do you expect to happen?” Those principles show an absolute absence of moral guidance.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s argument, but is he proposing cuts in other areas of legal aid in order to maintain his objective of cutting the overall cost while putting legal aid back in place in those fields?
I was going to deal with that at the end of my remarks, but let me do so now. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to do so, because two days ago the Minister said, “Oh, the Labour party wants to reinstate £245 million of cuts.” On the same day, however, he put out a press release saying that the Labour party wanted to reinstate £64 million of cuts, and I have grown tired of responding to him. He has heard my response from this Dispatch Box, in Westminster Hall and in Committee time and again, and it is simply this: we would not have made at present the cuts to social welfare legal aid.
The Minister quantifies those cuts as £64 million, but why did he not proceed with the final parts of Lord Carter’s review and go through the criminal tendering exercise, which was in place and ready to go when the Government took office last year, and which included savings that might have raised twice that sum? I anticipate the figures changing. The figures on savings have changed from £350 million to £450 million within two impact assessments, but, without being more precise than that, we believe that if the Government looked for efficiencies in the criminal legal aid system, first they would save more money than they are by cutting social welfare legal aid, and secondly there would not be the same social or financial consequences.
The Green Paper talks frequently about the possibility of self-representation as a reason for withdrawing legal aid provision, but data provided in answer to a written parliamentary question indicate that there are considerable differences in success rates between those with and those without representation. Owing to a lack of representation, 51,223 meritorious cases that were successful in 2010 at the first-tier tribunals, many of which involved applicants for DLA, incapacity benefit, jobseeker’s allowance and so forth, would not have been successful if the proposed cuts had been in place. The changes will close or severely reduce the operation of law centres, citizens advice bureaux and hundreds of independent advice centres, and limiting the scope of issues which legal aid-funded advisers can help with means that they will not be able to solve people’s problems fully.
New clause 17, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield, addresses precisely that issue. At the end of Monday’s debate, I gave the example of the Wiltshire law centre in the constituency of the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland). That will lose 90% of its funding, and that is not untypical of the cuts being made. In most cases they are above 80%.
The specific issue that is dealt with my hon. Friend’s new clause is the interconnectivity of people’s problems. We are all too familiar, as constituency MPs, with the individual who comes in with two plastic bags full of paper and is unable to convey the scale of their distress, let alone the complexity of their problems, which may include unpaid debts, threats of eviction, underlying mental health problems and the inability to access the welfare benefit system. Sometimes we can help, and I pay tribute, as I am sure all hon. Members do, to the constituency staff who have developed phenomenal skills at unpicking these issues and dealing sympathetically with them. In many cases, however, legal expert help is needed, but that help will now be severely compromised. If one is allowed to deal only with the threat of eviction but not with the underlying issues of accessing benefits and dependency on debt, one is working with one hand tied behind one’s back.
The exceptions to the withdrawal of legal aid in certain cases, such as when an applicant for legal aid is at risk of homelessness, are nonsensical distinctions. People who come for aid early on, while they still have manageable rent arrears, can see their case deteriorate rapidly and drastically. The legal aid that would help exactly those people has been withdrawn, and that is Shelter’s No. 1 priority for what should be restored. Let me add, at this point, that we support the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr in his wish to undo what is a calumny in the Bill—measures allowing the Secretary of State by order further to restrict what is in scope for legal aid, but not to expand it. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman is going to press his amendment to a vote tonight but I hope that, if he has an opportunity to speak, the Minister will give an indication that that glaring error in the Bill will be corrected.
The cost of dealing with a single case of homelessness has been estimated at £50,000 by Shelter. Early intervention is an extremely efficient and cost-effective way of preventing cases from becoming more complex, difficult to resolve and commensurately expensive. The legal aid Green Paper suggests a shift to telephone advisory services, and this brings us to amendment 148. Although these methods are an efficient and often effective means of delivering certain types of advice, clients presenting with complex or chronic problems gain far better outcomes from face-to-face advice.
Research by the Legal Action Group has highlighted the issues faced by the most vulnerable in utilising telephone advisory services. It found that full-time employees were the most likely to access an advice service through the telephone line or the internet, at 43%, whereas people in the lowest social class, DE, were least likely to access advice through an advice line or the internet, at 26%. This class of people was also the most likely to experience a social welfare law problem. The Minister’s own impact assessment says that the bottom 20%, in terms of income, will represent 80% of those who suffer from the withdrawal of these services. Overall, people of social class DE are twice as likely as people in all other social classes to experience problems with debts or benefits.
Issues facing the most vulnerable people include language, comprehension and somewhat more prosaic economic issues such as the expense of calling an 0845 number from a pay-as-you-go mobile when trying to get advice upon being rejected for jobseeker’s allowance. Citizens Advice has noticed a dramatic rise in the volume of cases and the number of people seeking advice in this recession. Advice has been focused on debt, housing, employment and difficulty accessing the benefit system. For example, between April 2008 and 2009, CABs in England and Wales saw daily inquiries relating to redundancy increase by 125%. Local authority cuts combined with the cuts in the Ministry of Justice have inflicted a double whammy on law centres, CABs and third sector organisations. Many organisations that are staffed by a mixture of volunteers and modestly paid staff will be forced to close or reduce staff and service breadth, depth and reach. Indeed, that is already happening.
We agree that the legal aid budget needs to be contained, as I have already said in response to the intervention of the Chair of the Justice Committee, the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), and that ways of making savings need to be found. When we were in power we did not shy away from taking those decisions and containing the budget. We had begun and were continuing to implement the recommendations of Lord Carter of Coles and we believe that those outstanding recommendations should have been implemented by this Government. Frankly, we are at a loss to understand why the Government have not looked at the scope of criminal legal aid or at how it is delivered in this country, preferring instead to target the poorest and most vulnerable. I accept that those changes would not have been popular with all the legal sector but they would have delivered substantial savings, which would have been greater than the total cuts to social welfare legal aid we have discussed this week. Let me pay tribute to my colleague the noble Lord Bach who, as Minister with responsibility for legal aid, took exactly that line. He was prepared to be very tough on his own profession but he always protected social welfare legal aid.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The Liberty briefing paper states that the
“Community Links advice service records that…73% of the benefits related cases handled by their staff arose as a result of errors on the part of the Department of Work and Pensions.”
The Opposition agree with him, but we are where we are, and particularly at this time of change, we need certainty that those people will be properly represented. I think he said that he would not support new clause 17, but will he support amendment 116 and, later, the new clause in his name or the new clause relating to the Dowlers, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant)? He has given assurances outside the House and said that he supports those positions, but he now seems to be resiling from them. Will he and his hon. Friends support those measures? Will he answer that question now?
I have never been a tribal politician, and I understand the dynamics of the House, but I am very disappointed that the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Mike Crockart) and his colleague, the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), had nothing to say on this issue in Committee. Worse still, an amendment that would have dealt with clause 12 was pressed to a Division, but they declined to vote for it. Indeed, they voted against it. The right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) came to the debate in the House on Monday and said that he was interested in dealing with the immigration law aspect in the Bill, but again, his colleagues said nothing about that in those lengthy Committee proceedings. The right hon. Gentleman said that he would pursue the matter. The modus operandi of the Liberal Democrat party is to sit on a Committee, do nothing, and then come back on Report and pretend they have done a hell of a lot. I am rather disappointed in the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington in that regard. I have never been a tribal politician, but when I see this kind of behaviour, it makes me a bit sick.
I have three headlines from The Guardian, which are like a tableau. From September, we have “Liberal Democrats urged to defy plans to cut legal aid”; from October, we have “Lib Dem MPs rebel against proposals to cut legal aid funding”; and from yesterday, we have “Lib Dems have their cake and eat it”. That last article features a lovely picture of the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake). They rebel, and at the last moment, they do not.
I have made my point, so I will move on to the substance of this important debate, because others wish to speak.
I support the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue) on new clause 17, the amendments tabled by the Official Opposition, and new clause 43 and amendment 162, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards).
However, I am against clause 12, which threatens through secondary legislation to limit advice and assistance at police stations. I shall not speak for long, but it is important to deal with one or two aspects of the measure. Clause 12 could thwart the fundamental right to legal advice when held in police custody, which frankly is a time when individuals are at their most vulnerable. That the Government did not consult on that measure has been widely criticised by many, and not simply those who allegedly want to raise money. The Lord Chief Justice is not dependent on legal aid, as far as I am aware.
I spoke in Committee of the importance of people having legal advice and assistance when they are detained in police stations. No consultation was held, but the measure was pushed through. Clause 12(3) is particularly worrying, because it would allow the Lord Chancellor to introduce regulations requiring the director to apply means-testing provisions if he or she considers them appropriate. It is well known that advice and assistance on arrest are not currently means-tested. The introduction of that in a police station is utterly inappropriate. What is more, as the Bar Council has pointed out, experience over the years shows that errors and abuses at police stations are responsible for very many miscarriages of justice, which cost not only lives, but finances.
Amendments 90, 104 and 125, which are in my name, would ensure that as a matter of course advice and assistance would continue to be made available for individuals held in police custody—they would not be subject to any means or merits testing. Amendment 104 would remove the word “station”, and amendment 125 would remove the need for a determination by a director. Furthermore, amendment 90 would remove subsection (9) and state in its place that:
“Sections 20 and 26(2) do not apply”.
The first point clarifies that means-testing cannot be introduced at police custody. Negating the application of clause 26(2) would ensure that the Lord Chancellor was unable to replace advice in person at police stations with
“services to be provided by telephone or by other electronic means.”
Clause 12 has a grave potential to destabilise access to justice for some of the most vulnerable in our society. As Liberty has pointed out:
“Justice requires that, as a bare minimum, all individuals taken into police custody have access to legal advice and representation when facing criminal allegations with the potential loss of liberty, disruption and damage to reputation they entail.”
As anyone who has practised criminal law will know, the first couple of hours in custody can be crucial in determining whether a case goes further, even on to an interview. Most people, when facing a police interview, particularly for the first time, are unable to think clearly and may not be cognisant of their best interests. As I said in Committee, at the very least the initial interview at the police station should proceed on the basis that the solicitor will be paid for the first couple of hours. It seems that the Government were unwilling to listen to that concession.
I hope that we can make some progress in this debate now. This is not helping—[Interruption.] The Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) is laughing. I hope that he is not going back on his earlier promise that we would make progress today. Had the hon. Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) been here earlier, he would have heard me deal with that point, in terms and at length, in response to an intervention from the Chair of the Select Committee. Will he stop wasting time?
The hon. Gentleman is a little previous. Had he allowed me to continue my point, as I had asked, he would have heard me address exactly what he said. I did hear what he said, albeit outside the Chamber. Let me deal with this point about the Opposition. If they are to be credible, they have to make alternative proposals for cuts to legal aid, which they promised in their manifesto and have promised since, to this Chamber. A few months ago, during the Public Bill Committee, they clung to the proposals made by the Bar Council and the Law Society, until those proposals fell apart. They fell apart to the extent that the Bar Council and the Law Society have had to revise them in a resubmitted document provided earlier this week. That was the Opposition’s first cost-reduction plan and it was not one of their own making—it was made by others.
Some £245 million-worth of amendments were tabled by the Opposition in the Public Bill Committee, along the lines of those proposed by the hon. Member for Makerfield, but with no suggestions as to where cuts might be made elsewhere. So we get to a point where there is a complete absence of the other side of policy from Her Majesty’s Opposition—it might provide some credibility to what they propose—until perhaps today, when the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) appears before the House saying, “We are going to bring in accelerated competitive tendering in criminal defence work.”
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 150, page 29, line 36, at end insert—
‘(4A) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to proceedings which include a claim for damages for loss or bodily injury resulting from exposure to a harmful substance or process where the claim is made against a person who—
(a) carries on business in more than one country, or
(b) owns (wholly or partly) one or more businesses carried on in more than one country or in different countries.’.
Amendment 164, page 29, line 36, at end insert—
‘(4A) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to a success fee payable under a conditional fee agreement made in relation to—
(a) any proceedings in relation to a claim for—
(i) libel,
(ii) slander,
(iii) misuse of private information;
(b) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings to which sub-paragraph (a) refers.’.
Amendment 163, page 29, line 41, at end insert—
‘(7) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to a success fee payable under a conditional fee agreement made in relation to—
(a) any proceedings based on a claim of defamation; or
(b) any proceedings based on a claim of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; or
(c) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings to which paragraphs (a) or (b) refer.’.
Amendment 22, page 31, line 1, leave out clause 43.
Amendment 151, in clause 43, page 31, line 45, at end insert—
‘(6) This section does not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings which include a claim for damages for loss or bodily injury resulting from exposure to a harmful substance or process where the claim is made against a person who—
(a) carries on business in more than one country, or
(b) owns (wholly or partly) one or more businesses carried on in more than one country or in different countries.’.
Amendment 165, in clause 43, page 32, line 4, at end insert—
‘(4) The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings in a cause of action in relation to a claim for—
(a) libel,
(b) slander,
(c) misuse of private information.’.
Amendment 72, page 32, line 5, leave out clause 44.
New clause 39—Road traffic accident pre-action protocol—
‘(1) The Table in Rule 45.29 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) (Amount of fixed costs under the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents) is amended as follows.
(2) The figure for Stage 1 shall be £200.
(3) The figure for Stage 2 shall be £400.
(4) The figure for Stage 3 for Type A fixed costs shall be £125.
(5) The figure for Stage 3 for Type B fixed costs shall be £125.
(6) Any further amendment to the Table shall not be made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee but may be made by the Lord Chancellor by rules made by statutory instrument and may not be made until a draft of the rules has been laid before and approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.’.
This is an important group of amendments to part 2 of the Bill, which deals with a complex and vital area of access to justice. Because there are only 20 minutes left to debate this group, and I want to be fair to the Minister and give him 10 minutes to reply, I shall speak quickly in the hope of getting through the main part of my argument. I should make it clear at the outset that I wish to press to a vote amendment 21, which would undo the destruction of conditional fee agreements that the Government are pushing through in the Bill. I also ask, with the leave of my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), the lead signatory to amendment 163, that we press that amendment to a vote.
Conditional fee agreements, also known as no win, no fee agreements, were brought in by a Conservative Government to preserve access to justice for those on moderate means at a time when vast areas were being removed from the scope of legal aid and eligibility criteria were being removed. The provisions were amended, with a remarkable lack of contention from the Conservative Opposition, in the Access to Justice Act 1999, to create their modern form.
The idea of contingency fee agreements was to create a viable market in legal services by introducing success fees paid by losing defendants—wrongdoers, in other words—to compensate lawyers for the cases that they lost, for which, of course, they received no fees. For lawyers, that form of payment by results meant not that they would take on spurious cases, but that they were allowed to take on cases that might be 75:25 or 50:50. That has created a system that works, for the main part, very well. It has created a viable market in legal services and permitted access to justice for millions since it was introduced.
What sort of people have availed themselves of contingency fee agreements? More than half of those who have used them have had an income below £25,000 a year and only 18% have had an income of more than £40,000 a year. Government Members carp on about footballers and models using them, but the average claimant is the average constituent.
How do the Government’s proposals work? First, winning claimants will lose. Victims will have to pay the costs of their insurance and their lawyer’s success fees from their damages—up to 25% of damages, aside from damages for future care, can be taken by the lawyer, and the insurance premium will take up even more of those damages, perhaps wiping them out altogether. To make up for part of those losses, the Government plan a 10% increase in damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity. Simple maths should be sufficient to show that that will not make up for all losses.
Losing claimants, including those bringing speculative and nuisance claims, will gain. They will benefit because it is unlikely that they will have to pay the costs of the winning defendant—that is part of the perverse, qualified one-way cost-shifting scheme that the Government intend to introduce when the Bill passes.
Losing defendants—wrongdoers, in other words—and their insurers will gain. Wrongdoers will benefit, because they do not have to pay the cost of after-the-event insurance or the victim’s lawyer’s success fees, thus limiting their liabilities and those of their insurers. Winning defendants will lose out. A winning defendant will no longer be able to reclaim the cost of their defence, thanks to qualified one-way cost shifting. To summarise, winners lose and losers win. That is simply wrong.
There was a time when the Conservative party worried about access to justice, but now it appears to be nothing more than the parliamentary wing of the insurance lobby, which according to an investigation by The Guardian has donated £4.9 million to the Tories since the Prime Minister became leader.
I have spent the past few months speaking to victims who have used contingency fee agreements to get justice. I have heard them tell me how our justice system helped them, and their fears that others who suffer in future will not get the help they need. A number of areas of law will be badly—
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
I would love to give way to the Secretary of State, but I have very little time—[Interruption.] If I have time at the end I will do so.
A number of areas of law will be badly affected by this legislation, and I should like briefly to touch on a few of them—[Hon. Members: Give way!]
I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman had to be bullied to give way to me, but there we are. I do not want him to exaggerate his case. No win, no fee was introduced by the Major Government and worked perfectly satisfactorily until the previous Government amended it. We are talking about how much winning lawyers are paid. The principles of access to justice and of no win, no fee are agreed on a bipartisan basis. They are not threatened at all by the Bill.
I began my speech by informing the house how contingency fee agreements came about. Because the Secretary of State has merely repeated that, I will penalise the Minister by taking a minute off his time.
The Secretary of State believes that there are faults in the current system whereby lawyers are unjustly enriched—he may be right, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and I, and many other hon. Members, would probably agree with him—but let us cure those faults. Let us not throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Some categories of proceedings are particularly expensive to advance, yet lead to relatively minor awards. For instance, the largest award in a privacy case is £60,000, and below that, £13,000. The vast majority of libel cases end up with awards of less than £100,000. The problem is that in those cases, families such as the Dowlers, and people such as Christopher Jefferies, who was on the radio this morning, would have no chance of access to justice.
That is why I will be very pleased to support amendment 163, which is in my hon. Friend’s name. As I have indicated, there are some cases—libel is a good example—when damages are small, but the defamation is important. Under the Secretary of State’s scheme, more than the sum of the damages could therefore be taken in fees.
Let me go through other areas of law, and I will come to privacy at the end if I have time. On clinical negligence, it is unavoidable that there will be good and bad doctors, just as there are good and bad in any profession. It is just and proper that compensation is paid to anyone harmed as a result of inaction, negligence or incompetence when a medical professional fails to live up to their obligations. I say that despite the fact that when the Secretary of State gave the figures, he conflated the cost of damages, claimant costs and defendant costs and pretended that they were a cost figure in themselves, for which he had to make another apology to my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan).
On professional negligence, taking on a professional is always risky. No one knows the system better. People are never 100% likely to win such cases. Without success fees to compensate for the risk, many such cases will not be brought in future. So who will lose out? It will be the first-time home buyer whose surveyor negligently fails to spot subsidence, the pensioner whose financial adviser negligently makes a high-risk investment, the hard-working small businessman whose accountant negligently fails to prepare accounts and lands him with a huge tax bill that he cannot pay, and the bereaved family whose probate solicitor takes three years to deal with the case and then charges huge fees. Those are the kinds of case that our constituents experience.
Order. That is not a point of order and the matter was dealt with earlier in the week. Let us have no more of that.
Let me just say that if the Government start talking about conflicts of interest on this Bill, they will open a Pandora’s box.
Order. We are not going to open Pandora’s box. We are going to deal with the amendments before us.
I was not talking about the Minister; I was talking about the Bill. I am not surprised that the Minister’s PPS is embarrassed by the Bill, after sitting through our proceedings in Committee.
The common link between parts 1 and 2 of the Bill is the destruction of access to justice in a way that we have not seen since the introduction of legal aid by a Labour Government after the second world war. The insurance industry is being given one of the biggest pay-offs in history which, as we know from experience, will go into the pockets of their directors and shareholders. While other aspects of this Bill display the startling incompetence of this Government, none shows their intent more truly than the provisions in part 2, which would give the whip hand to large public and private corporations, while taking rights away from ordinary people. What is the point in having rights if they cannot be enforced?
I ask the Liberal Democrats to look at amendment 21, which would deal with cases such as Trafigura and pleural plaques, and amendment 163, which would deal with cases such as that of Milly Dowler, and join us in the Lobby tonight.
Amendments 21, 22, 72, 163, 164 and 165 all seek to undermine a fundamental element of the package of reform of civil litigation funding and costs based on the report prepared on behalf of the judiciary by Sir Rupert Jackson and now included in this Bill—the abolition of recoverability of success fees and after-the-event insurance premiums. I must say that I am rather perplexed by the amendments as in Committee the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) agreed that the intention of part 2 is
“perfectly sound, and it is one with which we have a great deal of sympathy.”––[Official Report, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2011; c. 501.]
I will also deal with new clause 39, which is on the related but slightly separate matter of recoverable costs for low-value road traffic accident claims.
It is worth emphasising, as the Justice Secretary has just said, that we are not proposing to end conditional fee agreements or no win, no fee deals. What we are addressing is the substantial legal costs that go to lawyers under the current no win, no fee regime. Our reforms are designed to make these legal costs more proportionate, while enabling meritorious claims to be brought. This applies equally to defamation and privacy claims and multinational claims as to other categories of case, but it is worth reminding ourselves of some of the disproportionate costs that have arisen and that emphasise the need for our reforms across the board.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberAlternative business structures will be set up by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, probably before or just after the end of this year, so the hon. Lady makes an important point. At that stage, claims management companies will be able to purchase solicitors, and vice versa, which means that it would indeed be possible, as we discussed in the Transport Committee, for a claims management company to own a solicitor and effectively act as the advertising arm of a firm of solicitors. However, the important difference is that the claims management companies will then be regulated by the SRA, which will give consumers a significant amount of comfort.
Referral fees are one of the symptoms of the compensation culture in this country. The Government are determined to put an end to them while at the same time addressing the underlying cause of recoverability of no win, no fee success fees.
Following what my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State for Justice said earlier this afternoon, I rise to discuss proposals that have not been given due scrutiny in Parliament. We are all aware that the Government were bounced into taking action on referral fees only by the sustained campaigning by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). In their haste to cover up their inaction and disregard of the abuses of the insurance industry, they have failed to consult on their proposals, which are incompetent, ineffective and will lead to problems further down the line. Indeed, it was reported this week that a judicial review has already been launched citing that lack of consultation.
Referral fees are paid by one party to another in exchange for what are essentially sale leads. They are analogous to brokers’ fees, commission for salespeople, marketing agreements or, in the most basic sense, advertising, because each of these represents part of the cost of sales. Every non-monopolistic industry has a cost of sales. Let me take the example of the insurance industry, an industry with which the Minister has more than a passing familiarity. Admiral is the UK’s leading specialist motor insurance company. Last year it received net insurance premium revenue of £288 million, but its total net revenue was £639 million, part of which was made with referral fees. It spent £151 million on the acquisition of insurance contracts and other marketing costs, including brokers’ costs, paying insurance websites and expensive advertising. Those costs drive up premium costs and the desire to make profit also drives up premium prices—Admiral made £283 million in profit last year on its net revenue of £639 million. That is how it works in the insurance industry.
It works in a similar way when law firms pay independent brokers, some of which are known as claims management companies, another area with which the Minister has more than a passing familiarity. They will pay referral fees in order to get leads for their practice. The lawyers often do this because, frankly, they are not very good at sales, marketing or advertising. However, the problems arise in the behaviour that that encourages. Although there are reputable and decent claims management companies out there that bring together those who want help with those who can provide it, there are also many claims farmers, often based overseas, that abuse the system, send unsolicited spam to people’s e-mail accounts and mobile phones and abuse their data.
It is right to deal with people who act in such a way, but the claims management regulator, which until a few weeks ago was the Minister, but which I understand is now the Secretary of State, has proven singularly unable to do so. An internal review of claims management regulation from the Ministry of Justice, dated 25 October 2011—just last week—states:
“It is evident that many of the more objectionable practices of Claims Management Companies such as cold calling in person, unauthorised marketing in hospitals and using exaggerated marketing claims have been reined in as a result of action taken under CMR.”
Nothing could make clearer what delusions have set in with claims management regulated by the Minister, because we all know from personal experience that the opposite is true and that such abuse is still out there at large and, if anything, is increasing. Our constituents are harassed by claims farmers, and their objectionable messages, but the Department that he has mismanaged for the past year and a half believes it is doing an excellent job. That is why we must take corrective action.
I note what my hon. Friend is saying about the claims regulatory authority, but my experience at the tail end of the miners compensation scheme was that it was effective in driving out of the industry some of the more unscrupulous claims management companies, which were often just front companies that wound up as soon as they had passed the claims on. I caution my hon. Friend not to be too harsh on it.
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention. I am sure that some companies have been driven out of business, but the everyday experience of hon. Members, and certainly of our constituents, is that the industry is not properly regulated, which is why corrective action must be taken. However, the proposals in the Government’s new clauses are, I fear, insufficient. They are riddled with inconsistencies and loopholes, which is another symptom of the haste with which they were prepared.
I will deal with the point that the Minister dealt with. New clause 19(8) states that a payment is
“to be treated as a referral fee unless”
it can be shown
“that the payment was made…as consideration for the provision of services, or…for another reason”.
The Minister’s impact assessment explains what that means. Claims management companies may adapt their business models so that they are not reliant on referral fees paid by lawyers, or they may move into alternative types of business such as marketing or advertising. That is staggering to those of us who recognise that it is precisely that marketing and advertising, whether on daytime TV adverts or via spam messages, that lead to perceptions of a compensation culture.
What is the point of the new clauses? The truth is that they are an afterthought to a package of changes in the Bill, some of which we will debate tomorrow, that have far more bite but a different purpose. The changes to conditional fee agreements mean that losing defendants—wrongdoers—and their insurers will benefit at the expense of winning claimants—victims—and that is the real objective of the Government’s legislation. Tomorrow, we will seek to overturn those provisions.
As Bob and Sally Dowler have told us; as the lawyers that brought Trafigura to justice have told us; as victims of asbestosis, who have been fighting insurers that simply do not want to pay out to hard-working and long-suffering people; as those who have been unfairly dismissed or subject to harassment in the workplace have told us; and as Christopher Jeffries, who was persecuted by the media last Christmas, as he wrote in The Guardian this very day, has told us, the changes are unacceptable. The Government’s proposed changes, which they had thought about and on which they had taken instructions from the insurance industry, are in the Bill, but very little thought has gone into the new clauses before us today, and none would have gone into them had it not been for my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn.
In summary, we believe that there is merit in a ban on referral fees as part of a package to stop the abuses that I have talked about. That is why I tabled amendments not just to clamp down on those fees, but to make the payment and solicitation of referral fees in road traffic accident personal injury cases a criminal offence. My right hon. Friend has tabled amendments to new clause 18, and I hope that he will press them to a vote. If he does so, I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will join him in the Lobby if the Government still refuse to accept the criminalisation of referral fees.
We sought to make unsolicited text messages and phone calls regarding personal injuries a criminal offence. We would have strengthened the rules against the sale of personal data. We would have restricted whiplash claims by placing a lower limit on the speed at which a vehicle must be travelling before damages may be paid. We would have outlawed third-party capture, another dirty secret of the insurance industry. I freely acknowledge that we plagiarised some of that from my right hon. Friend’s private Member’s Bill.
If the Government had had the courage of the conviction in the Minister’s speeches earlier in the year, we would have got to the heart of the perception of a compensation culture. In doing so, we would have done what the Government are now failing to do. The new clause alone will have little effect. We believe that it deserves further scrutiny, and we hope that amendments in another place will toughen it up, if that does not happen tonight. We also hope that amendments to make these practices criminal offences will be accepted. We therefore have no intention of voting against the new clauses; we simply regard them as not going far enough.
The Minister’s incompetence in getting to grips with claims farmers who engage in unscrupulous practices and his Department’s failure even to recognise the scale of their failure to regulate effectively have got us here. These are symptoms not of a litigation culture, as he would have us believe, and of the rhetoric that goes along with the cuts in legal aid to the poorest, as well the neutering of no win, no fee agreements which will affect almost everyone except the super-rich and will prevent access to justice, but of regulatory incompetence by the Minister’s Department. Indeed, he has now surrendered responsibility for that regulation.
I commend my right hon. Friend’s amendments to the House. We accept the new clauses as far as they go, but it is about time the Government stopped using their rhetoric as a mask for preventing victims from obtaining justice and used it to ensure that the abuses that we all put up with day to day from fraudulent and criminal practices are stamped out.
I shall be brief. I welcome the Government’s action to address referral fees. There is no doubt that consumers have paid a significant price. I hope that we can clamp down heavily on other things, such as unsolicited text messages and spam, which we have all experienced, through other measures such as those on data protection.
I would like the Minister to deal with just one point. The industry has been pressing for these changes, and consumers in particular want to understand what guarantees, if any, they will have that when the changes have taken effect they will see a difference in the prices they pay for services.
The other problem is that if solicitors did not believe that they would get paid for the work, they might hang on to the case and take it to conclusion, despite not being an expert. That presents a huge risk to the individual, who possibly has a case.
I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). To put it slightly differently, the hon. Gentleman is quite right that firms might want to hang on to work even after it goes beyond their expertise, so an inducement to pass it on might work. I am not saying that in favour of referral fees, but it does happen, and we have to be aware of it.
He is absolutely right about the definition of referral fees. When the Minister announced, rather hastily, in response to my right hon. Friend, that the Government were banning them, he admitted that he could not define “referral fee”. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, therefore, that a number of problems still need to be resolved, but those are questions that he should be putting to his Front Bench team. He should be asking why they have not sorted out these matters, including on his point about text messages.
If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I need to conclude my remarks and allow the Opposition to respond.
The second change these clauses propose is to give the Secretary of State a power to increase the current maximum fine amounts for levels 1 to 4 on the standard scale of fines for summary offences. These amounts are currently £200, £500, £1,000 and £2,500. The new power would be to increase these so as to keep them in the same ratio to one another as at present. There is already a similar power to change them in line with changes in the value of money, so the new power would be an extension of that. We intend to consult on the right level at which to set these new maxima.
That should form part of a wider review of sentences served in the community, so I want to use this debate to notify the House that we are entering a review process, which we intend will in due course lead to a formal public consultation on community sentences. For too long, community sentences have failed to punish offenders properly for their actions, and the Government are committed to changing that. We are already taking action, including through this Bill, to strengthen community orders, but we want to go much further and deliver a step change in the way sentences operate. They must, of course, address the problems that have caused the offending behaviour in the first place—the drug abuse, the alcoholism, the mental health problems—but they must also punish properly and send a clear message to society that wrongdoing will not be tolerated. We want to see a clear punitive element in every sentence handed out by the courts.
We will consult on further reforms to ensure that community sentences effectively punish and rehabilitate offenders. That should include consulting on what constitutes effective delivery of the principles of sentencing, punishment and rehabilitation, as I have mentioned, but also on protection of the public, restoration and how the whole package can produce the most effective deterrent to crime. A part of this consultation will be on the new maxima at levels 1 to 4 in the magistrates courts.
The Government want offenders to be in no doubt that the courts have the powers they need to punish their crimes. Once the victim’s compensation has been addressed—and if an offence presents no wider issues of reparation or public protection—if a court believes that a fine would be the best way of punishing an offender and deterring future offending, then we want to ensure that there are no barriers to courts setting the fine at the appropriate level.
To sum up, these new clauses would remove the £5,000 cap on fines that magistrates can impose, so that they are able to use their discretion and set fines that are proportionate to the offences before them. That will also improve the efficiency of the court system, by removing the need for magistrates to send cases to the Crown court when they feel the current maximum fine is not a severe enough punishment for the offenders before them. For offences with caps set at less than £5,000, we propose to retain the current structure of differential maxima, with a power to increase them as necessary.
I urge Members to support the measures.
I thank the Minister for his clear account of the effects of these proposals, but I wonder why they are being introduced at this stage. He may wish to explain that. They are not controversial. We do not intend to oppose them as we think their measures are sensible, and we are glad that the Government are, for once, in favour of judicial discretion. They made certain concessions in Committee, one of which was not withdrawing magistrates’ powers to impose longer custodial sentences. We believe the magistrates system serves this country extremely well—this year marks its 650th anniversary. However, although these are sensible changes to current magistrates powers, we are concerned about the fact that, once again, they are part of a package of new measures.
I will not take up any more of the House’s time as we shall shortly come on to discuss two very important and significant new provisions in the criminal law, of which we have had very little notice as they have been introduced at a very late stage. I therefore simply ask again why we have had to wait until Report stage for the measures currently under discussion to be introduced. We do not oppose the proposals, however, as we consider them to be sensible and uncontentious.
How nice it is to hear the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) in conciliatory mood. The Minister has made a perfectly good case for increasing the level of fines available in magistrates courts. He gave several reasons for doing so, and I would add to them the giving of further encouragement to magistrates to deal with cases themselves wherever that is possible, rather than referring them upwards to the Crown court. This is part of a general increased empowerment of magistrates to deal with cases.
The Minister has mentioned the wider issue of community penalties and non-custodial sentences, and the review and consultation that will address them. I hope that proves to be a fruitful process. There is a danger that he is giving two signals at once, however. He is hoping to give the necessary signal to the public that many offenders consider community sentences to be more demanding and rigorous, and much less congenial, than very short terms of imprisonment. Some offenders who have appeared before the Justice Committee have said they committed further offences because it was easier to spend the time in prison than to continue with a community sentence. The Government must also give a signal to the judiciary that it should make the maximum use of the available range of penalties, on the basis of what is most likely to reduce reoffending. If a rigorous, well-supervised and policed community sentence is more likely to reduce reoffending, the judiciary should be encouraged to choose that option. I hope people do not find the signals too confusing, that we end up with a well-supported system of community penalties, and that people have confidence that for many offenders such penalties reduce reoffending more effectively than prison does.
It is pleasure to have the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt), at the Government Dispatch Box this evening. It is a shame that the Lord Chancellor is not here, but of course he was also absent when the provision was announced by the Prime Minister at the famous press conference on 21 June, when most of today’s business first saw the light of day, including the clause we have just debated. At times it appears that there is a parallel Bill: the agenda that the Government wish to present to the media, or which the media dictate to the Government.
Sadly, the consequence for the House is that we do not have the opportunity to scrutinise the legislation properly. I do not know whether that is because the Government have no confidence in or commitment to their own legislation and are simply going through the motions, as we saw a little while ago, but the process of formulating the policy has been absurdly rushed, even by their standards. It is wholly inappropriate to introduce major changes to criminal law on Report. For that reason, among others, I suspect that the provisions will have a rather more torrid time in the other place than they will have here tonight.
Squatters are a nightmare for homeowners and tenants alike. The Criminal Law Act 1977, which the Minister mentioned, makes it a criminal offence for any person not to leave premises when required to do so by “a displaced residential occupier” or “protected intending occupier” of the premises. Furthermore, parts 55(1) and 55(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules allow owners to evict someone from a residence they do not occupy. An interim possession order, backed up by powers in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, mean that a criminal offence is committed if an individual does not leave within 24 hours of such an expedited order being granted.
As the Minister confirmed in his opening remarks, new clause 26 seeks to deal with squatting in vacant properties for which there is no imminent plan for residency. The clause, as drafted, applies only to residential properties and will not apply where there has been a previous landlord and tenant relationship between the occupier and the owner. Those are not the cases that typically attract the media’s attention. For example, the case of Dr Cockerell and his wife, who was pregnant at the time, was widely reported this September, in the Evening Standard and other newspapers. In that case the police wrongly said that the case was a civil issue and not one for them. As I understand the facts as reported, Dr Cockerell and his wife would have been protected intending occupiers and the police should have intervened. I fear that their failure to do so is not atypical. I remarked in Committee that if we had a pound for every time the police said that something was a civil matter when someone goes to them, we would probably be able to build affordable housing in the country, unlike what the Government are doing. I worry that the Government are trying to introduce new legislation without implementing the legislation that already exists, which is clearly the case in the examples I have given so far.
My hon. Friend is old enough to recall the lengthy consultation that took place before the 1977 Act was introduced. It specifically distinguished between an occupied property and a property that had been left empty for a very long time. The issue at the time, particularly in London, was that vast numbers of empty properties were being squatted. That law was a product of consultation. There has been no consultation on this—[Interruption.] Well, there has been very limited consultation, but certainly not in the House, about criminalising people who are actually extremely desperate for all the reasons pointed out by my friend the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas).
I think I was doing my politics A-level at the time, so I might have studied the Act as part of that. My hon. Friend makes an important point about housing need that the Minister, to be fair to him, also addressed, and I will move on to that in a moment. I will not say what grade I got in my politics A-level—[Interruption.] Let us just say that it probably would not impress the Education Secretary.
We share the anger of people whose properties are damaged or vandalised by squatters. That is always wrong, and it is right to decry such behaviour. It is also right to say that there are, for want of a better term, lifestyle squatters—people who are part of the something-for-nothing society. We disagree with that, and we support the criminalisation of their activities. However, many squatters are homeless, and often have severe mental health or addiction problems.
It may be a sign of the Government’s topsy-turvy logic that in one part of the Bill, which we support, they seek to divert those with mental health and drug problems from the criminal justice system, but this part may criminalise those very people. At the same time, we are seeing some of the most swingeing benefit cuts in history. Housing benefit has been mentioned. In constituencies like mine, thousands of families will be forced to move because of the cuts in housing benefit, or may lose their properties. Incompetence by the Department for Work and Pensions and its private sector agents, such as Atos Healthcare, is causing a rise in poverty and homelessness. We are seeing a massive increase in appeals on welfare benefits, and 170 extra staff have been hired by first-tier tribunals to deal with those appeals, many of which are successful. That is one reason why we oppose the Government’s proposals on social welfare legal aid.
I wish that yesterday we had had the luxury that we have today—a timetabled programme with knives to grandstand some of the Government’s proposals. The House is thinly attended and the debate is frankly low key, whereas yesterday the Government engaged in talking out important measures on which many hon. Members wanted to speak. I noted what the Secretary of State, or it may have been the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), said about our debates tomorrow. I hope that we will have the debates that we want tomorrow, including those on part 2, and that Government Whips will not employ their tawdry tactics again.
Some 40% of homeless people have squatted, as my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) said, and 6% of homeless people are squatting at any one time. There is a significant prevalence of mental health problems, learning difficulties and substance addiction in those who are homeless.
This afternoon, I opened a new project for homeless people in my constituency. Very experienced people from organisations for the homeless—they were not trying to be party political in any way—asked me a question that I could not answer. They said that the Work and Pensions Secretary talks about an underclass, or a feral class as the Justice Secretary also said, and says that the Government want to take action to help problem families and to relieve poverty at the bottom of society, so why do they wish to take measures that could criminalise those same people?
The Government are clearly being tough on squatting, and we have no objection to that, but they are being incredibly weak, contrary to what the Minister said, on the causes of squatting. In fact, their impact assessment gives a hint of who the people are who often end up squatting. It says:
“Local authorities and homelessness…charities may face increased pressure on their services if more squatters are arrested/convicted and/or deterred from squatting. Local authorities may be required to provide alternative accommodation for these individuals and could also face costs related to increases in rough sleeping in their areas. An increase in demand for charities’ services (food/shelter etc.) may negatively impact current charity service users…There may also be a cost to society if this option is perceived to”
be
“unfair and/or leads to increases in rough sleeping.”
The pièce de résistance is:
“It has not been possible to quantify these costs.”
The Government accept that there will be pressure on services, but say that they cannot quantify the cost. Why? They do not know how many people squat. I believe—the Minister will no doubt correct me if I am wrong—that the civil servants have used figures from squatters’ organisations to estimate how many squatters there may be. The Government’s estimate is that there are between 340 and 4,200 criminal squatting cases across England and Wales, and that the Crown Prosecution Service will charge between 850 and 10,600 offenders.
The Government accept in their response to the consultation that
“as with any criminal offence there would be an operational discretion as to whether a person should be charged with an offence.”
I think that goes without saying, but they say it in particular with respect to hikers who take refuge in a house to take shelter from the elements. [Interruption.] I am glad that the Government Whip, the hon. Member for Lichfield (Michael Fabricant), is interested, and I will say a bit more about that. It is a problem that the Government see as a possible unintended consequence of the new legislation. They state:
“The Government accepts that hikers who occupy a residential building in these circumstances might be committing an offence as a result of its proposals. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that the property owner would make a complaint”,
so that is all right. They continue:
“Even if a complaint were made, as with any criminal offence there would be an operational discretion as to whether a person should be charged with an offence. The Government considered creating a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence to allow for this type of situation, but was concerned that such a defence would be open to abuse and might render the new offence toothless.”
I have seen some pretty shoddily justified legislation in my time, but that really is an “on the one hand, on the other hand” explanation.
I hope that at the very least the Minister will tell us whether his intention is to apply the discretion that he wishes to see applied to hikers, an important category of citizen, to those who occupy empty properties out of desperation—the people the Government’s own impact assessment states would now have to resort to sleeping rough. They could include people with mental health or addiction problems whom it may be more appropriate to treat than to detain in jail. I have heard the Minister make that argument in another context in Committee. I note that this farrago and confusion would not have happened had the appropriate parliamentary process been followed.
It is common practice in a Second Reading debate—this increasingly feels like Second Reading, when we see measures for the first time and pass general comments on them—for a proposal that has some merit but needs refinement to be allowed through. That is what we intend to do today. We support the idea that there may be categories of squatters who need to be criminalised, although we say that the current criminal law is not being properly used in that respect.
I hope that the Minister will not think that our decision to allow matters to proceed is an unthinking endorsement of his position. Those who think squatting an acceptable lifestyle choice should be under no illusion about the fact that we disagree, and we support the criminalisation of what is, frankly, arrogant behaviour. For that reason, we believe it is right to allow the matter to be scrutinised in another place. However, there remain issues to consider and more thought and deliberation to be done before the new clause reaches the statute book.
I hope that the Government will at the very least consider the issues that I have raised today, and those that other hon. Members will no doubt raise, and keep them in mind when they feel the endorphin rush of a few cheap tabloid headlines again. I hope that they will think seriously about all the implications of the new clause and come up with something a little clearer, better defined and less vague.
The Minister will no doubt say that I am giving less than wholehearted support. Not true. We support the Government’s intention, but we believe that because they have once again rushed matters towards the statute book, they have not given them proper and clear consideration thus far. Once again, they leave it to another place to do that.
Today is a good day for the law-abiding citizens of this country and a bad day for those wanting something for nothing. Since my election nearly 18 months ago, I have been campaigning to criminalise squatting, including in an excellent Westminster Hall debate with the Minister about a year ago. I congratulate the Government on tabling the new clause.
I wish to dispel once and for all the myth that squatters and homeless people are one and the same. My Hove and Portslade area contains both wealth and deprivation. It is a Mecca for every character imaginable, and that is what makes it such a wonderfully diverse place to live. Homelessness is an issue, and we have a fantastic support network of local charities, including Emmaus, Brighton Housing Trust, the YMCA and Off the Fence, which looks after a great number of vulnerable people through Project Antifreeze—indeed, I will visit Off the Fence again this Friday. It is our duty to look after homeless people. I fully support all the excellent work being done and the Government’s commitment to do even more.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberBecause I and the Government consulted at some length on the proposals and received a lot of positive responses. As a result of that consultation we broadened the definition concerned, so we have listened. Indeed, we have tabled a further amendment today in relation to immigrants to broaden it even further.
I hope the Minister accepts that, although amendment 74 and other amendments would enlarge the evidential tests, they would still require a degree of evidence to be given. That evidence may not come from such limited places as he wants, but it may be from GPs or women’s refuges. Yet he is saying that he cannot accept such evidence, because it would be part of “unfounded allegations”. Is he suggesting that those organisations collude in false allegations?
The hon. Gentleman makes a frankly ridiculous comment. He mentioned GPs, and of course a GP is qualified to tell whether someone has been subject to violence. However, they are not always well qualified to tell whether someone has been subject to domestic violence, because they may not have seen the circumstances in the home and may be looking only at the injury of the party coming to their surgery. The Government are looking for objective evidence.
I would like the Minister to respond to my question. As the tests in question are evidential tests, not subjective or self-referred, does that support his point about false allegations? Evidence from GPs is commonly used to support cases in criminal trials, including sometimes when a woman is unwilling to give evidence herself because she is intimidated or in fear.
The hon. Gentleman makes the exact point that I would have made in response to him. Evidence is used in a trial, but the GP does not make the decision, he gives evidence. We see the trial as being the objective evidence, and that is what we suggest in the Bill.
I certainly agree with my right hon. Friend that some immigration cases are complex, and I think that the point that he has raised is one for me to look at after today. I will do so, and I will come back to him on that.
On the basis of everything that I have just set out, I therefore urge the House to support Government amendments 10, 11, 13 to 18 and 55 to 63. I also hope that right hon. and hon. Members will be reassured by what I have said about the other amendments.
I shall try to be a little briefer than the Minister—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I was about to say that I was going to make some preliminary remarks, but the last time I did that they went on for three hours. I shall address my comments almost exclusively to amendment 74, which stands in my name. The Opposition also fully support amendment 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), which deals with the related matter of domestic violence. I give notice that we hope to press amendment 74 to a vote later this evening.
The Minister was slightly dismissive when he said that a number of the amendments on domestic violence had been dealt with in similar terms in Committee. They were indeed, and they were dealt with in some of the Committee’s most heated sittings. He has again shown a rather dismissive manner today, although Labour Members gave him a very clear expression of what they think of the Government’s attitude in the Bill to domestic violence. Perhaps he needs to get out more to see what is happening in the real world.
At 1 o’clock today, for example, the Minister could have attended the launch in Committee Room 8 of “Legal Aid is a Lifeline”, in which women speak out on the legal aid reforms. This report on domestic violence was produced jointly by the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and Justice for All. He could have heard the stark, moving testimony of women such as Jenny Broomfield and Sam Taylor, who were—let us make no bones about it—the victims of attempted murder by violent partners who, in at least one case, continued to stalk and pursue them for many years. They find quite abhorrent the Government’s attempt to restrict the criteria to 12 months, which amendment 74 seeks to change, and to restrict the terms of domestic violence. Those women relied on legal aid, in its current form, to get residence for their children, to find a safe place to live and to obtain a separation from their violent partners. They believe that, without it, their plight today would be much worse than it is.
Earlier this afternoon, the Housing Minister launched a very good report by St Mungo’s entitled “Battered, broken, bereft”, one of the leading findings of which was that 35% of women who have slept rough left home to escape domestic violence. It shows double standards and hypocrisy for the Government to cut provisions to tackle domestic violence on the same day in the Commons Chamber. I urge the Minister to listen to voices such as that of the Mayor of London, whose briefing for this debate states:
“The Mayor would like assurances that women who have experienced domestic violence will not be barred from legal aid due to their having a lack of evidence.”
I would also like the Minister to listen to organisations such as Gingerbread, which states:
“Many individuals experiencing violence do not report that violence to the police or seek an injunction via the family courts. This is for a variety of reasons, including lack of faith in the justice system and fear that instigating proceedings would escalate violence. The evidential criteria in the Bill do not reflect the pathways that victims of domestic violence take to find help and support. The eligibility criteria must be broadened to include other forms of evidence such as evidence from a specialist domestic violence support organisation, health or social services.”
Those are the voices that the Minister should be listening to, as well as those that he hears in the Chamber today. So far, he has not done so.
Is my hon. Friend aware that many victims of domestic violence have a great sense of shame, and feel that they cannot reveal through a legal procedure and third parties what is happening to them? None the less, they want to take legal action to get out of the relationship, but they might be so demoralised, afraid and intimidated that they cannot do so without proper assistance.
My right hon. Friend is right. Only 40% of women who suffer domestic violence report it at all, and many go for years without reporting it. They certainly do not have the wherewithal to report it when they are imprisoned not only by violent relationships but by economic circumstances and by having to care for their children. That is what I meant when I said that the Minister does not live in the same world as those victims.
I have here a report from a local newspaper. Kay Atwal, a reporter on the Newham Recorder, describes the lives of women she has met, saying:
“Your mail is opened by your in-laws, you can’t call your family or friends and you are not allowed out of the house. Your days are an endless round of cooking, cleaning and clearing up punctuated by threats and criticisms. And hanging over you is the constant fear that you could be deported from Britain if your husband divorces you.”
Does my hon. Friend agree that women such as those could well be affected by the changes that the Government are making today?
We all have similar cases in our constituencies, and I am sure that the Minister must have, too. Those are the people to whom he should be listening.
Does my hon. Friend agree that women who are particularly fearful will not go to formal sources of support such as the police, and that, when they do pluck up the courage to go for advice, they are much more likely to go to a women’s agency or a domestic violence specialist? Does he agree that it is regrettable that the Minister is not prepared to take evidence from such bodies?
I will come to that later in my speech, but it was exactly the point that I tried unsuccessfully, as so often, to raise with the Minister in my intervention. In the amendments, we accept the evidential basis, but we are seeking to broaden it to include exactly the sort of organisations that my hon. Friend mentioned. Last time I checked, at least 21 right hon. and hon. Friends supported amendment 74, some of whom wish to speak in the debate, and we have other important debates this evening, so I will try to keep my comments relatively brief.
According to the Home Secretary’s November 2010 publication, “Call to end violence against women and girls”, 1 million women a year experience domestic abuse in Britain. When those women make the decision to leave their abusive partners, often quite suddenly, they need care and expert legal help to escape safely and, if they have children, to ensure their safety too. For more than 60 years, family legal aid has provided that expert legal assistance, helping millions of people, mainly women, to escape violent, abusive and sometimes life-threatening relationships.
In November last year, the Government announced consultation on their plans to reform legal aid. As the Minister said, they plan to take family law out of the scope of legal aid, except when domestic abuse has occurred, but reason that making domestic violence the “gateway” to legal aid will also create an incentive for false claims of domestic violence. So they proposed a limited range of objective proof of domestic violence that would need to be presented before legal aid was granted.
Five thousands groups and individuals responded to the Government’s consultation, and almost all were opposed. As a result, on Second Reading, the Secretary of State announced a partial U-turn, adding to his list of evidential criteria. In the revised list, legal aid will be granted when a victim has obtained a civil injunction or criminal conviction against her abuser. We welcome that additional criterion, but fear that it is insufficient. Research has shown that, whereas more than half of women have suffered some form of domestic abuse during their lifetime, only a minority ever apply for injunctive release or report the abuse to the police. Women who, for whatever reason, do not want to go through legal proceedings, whether because of fear or simply because they are unwilling to relive the abuse again and again during the judicial process, will be disfranchised by the Government’s plans.
Legal aid will be granted when a victim has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference—a MARAC—as the Minister confirmed today, or domestic violence must have been established as fact in the family courts. MARACs are a great success, but they are typically used for very serious cases. The final criteria that the Government allow are especially perverse, given that legal aid will not be available to obtain a finding of fact in the family courts. The Minister may say that that is not the case, but that is what the Bill seems to say. As such, the Government’s plans to remove family legal aid, except when a narrow and onerous range of objective proof is present, will place thousands of vulnerable women at considerable risk. That is why women’s groups, practitioners and the Opposition continue to harbour deep concern.
Labour’s amendment seeks to widen the evidential criteria of domestic violence to ensure that as many victims as possible receive help, while retaining the Government’s decision to limit private family legal aid to victims of domestic abuse. In doing so, we have tried to come to a joined-up, comprehensive view of the evidential criteria for domestic abuse that already exist in various Departments. The Government’s statement of intent, “Call to end violence against women and girls”, recognises that violence against women requires a focused and robust cross-government approach, underpinned by a single agreed definition. The Opposition entirely agree, as do the courts.
The recent Supreme Court case, Yemshaw v. London Borough of Hounslow, reinforced the courts’ view that there is but one definition of domestic abuse, and the Association of Chief Police Officers has promulgated that definition. The evidential criteria for domestic abuse are not currently set out in the Bill, but they are set out in the response to consultation. The Government plan to promulgate the evidential criteria by order, which is why I fear that the amendment of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) is insufficient by itself. We entirely support her amendment, but mine would go further in placing the evidential criteria into primary legislation.
The criteria in my amendment are an amalgamation of the objective criteria for ascertaining whether domestic violence has occurred from the Government’s response to consultation and the UK Border Agency’s criteria used in immigration cases. The amendment would do nothing more than unify best practice across government by ensuring that we have one singular evidential definition of domestic violence, much as the hon. Lady’s amendment would ensure that we have one singular descriptive definition of domestic violence.
The sort of evidence that my amendment would allow is as follows:
“a relevant court conviction or police caution…a relevant court order (including without notice, ex parte, interim or final orders) including a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction…evidence of relevant criminal proceedings for an offence concerning domestic violence or a police report confirming attendance at an incident resulting from domestic violence…evidence that a victim has been referred to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (as a high-risk victim of domestic violence) and a plan has been put in place to protect that victim from violence by the other party…a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party giving rise to the risk of harm to the victim”.
I suspect that, so far, the Government are broadly with us, but what I sought from the Minister and did not obtain, is the reason the following evidential criteria are inappropriate:
“a medical report from a doctor at a UK hospital confirming that the applicant has injuries consistent with being a victim of domestic violence, such injuries not being limited to physical injuries…a letter from a General Medical Council registered general practitioner confirming that he or she has examined the applicant and is satisfied that the applicant has injuries consistent with those of a victim of domestic violence…an undertaking”—
the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) is not in his place, but he raised this point—
“given to a court that the perpetrator of the abuse will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse”.
I hope that the Minister has read the Law Society’s comments—he may be familiar with practice in the family courts—that many more matters are dealt with by way of undertaking than by way of trial process. Excluding undertakings from his criteria makes it not only logistically more difficult, but almost certain that the trial process, with all the inherent difficulties of inflaming the situation, will be the norm rather than the exception.
On a point of clarification concerning the undertaking, which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) raised, an undertaking is a legally binding document. It is signed by the parties and usually sealed by the court. It is a solemn promise that is given to the judge. If it is breached, the person who breaches the order can commit on it, so it is specific and clear, and eminently acceptable in my opinion to be part of the criteria. Having been a domestic violence and family lawyer for the past 23 years, I am worried that the exclusion of undertakings from the criteria will create a perverse incentive not to dispose of a matter at the earliest opportunity, but to continue with the litigation from fear that further problems may come out of the woodwork, which, as family lawyers, we believe are coming in the future. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to reconsider that.
If he wishes, I will give the Minister the opportunity to intervene on me, and to reply to the hon. Lady, or he may wish to deal with the matter subsequently. I have nothing like her experience, but I have had the experience many hundreds of times of explaining undertakings and their seriousness to clients. She is absolutely right. In law, there are clear differences, but in practice the effect of an undertaking is the same in relation to perpetrators as the outcome of a trial in terms of the penalties available against them. Excluding undertakings is a huge and glaring omission from the Bill.
The other criteria are
“a letter from a social services department confirming its involvement in connection with domestic violence…a letter of support or a report from a domestic violence support organisation…or…other well-founded documentary evidence of abuse (such as from a counsellor, midwife, school or witnesses.”
On paragraph (j) of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, I can see where he is heading, but would that require a state registry of domestic violence organisations to exist so that they could be validated in order to put in a claim legitimately?
I think the hon. Gentleman is trying to be helpful, but he is over-complicating matters. He is also missing the central point, which is that our issue is not, as the Mayor of London’s appears to be, with self-referral or with the Minister’s point about false claims, but with the scope for evidential support. We believe that organisations, whether they be medical or domestic violence organisations should be sufficient to be regarded as evidence, just as they often are in trial processes.
I am genuinely trying to helpful, though I know that the hon. Gentleman might find that difficult to believe. All his other examples—general practitioners, hospital doctors, undertakings from a court, social services departments—are instruments of the state, as it were. I would be happy for many organisations in my constituency that support women in a domestic violence situation to give evidence to a court, but that does not mean that all organisations that claim to speak for women should be able to do so.
The hon. Gentleman is being a little pernickety. It is a practical reality that in many cases voluntary organisations, which have vast experience of supporting women, will be providing that support, not only in an emotional and a practical sense but in an evidential sense.
Does my hon. Friend agree that many women go backwards and forwards to the likes of Women’s Aid time and again and do not disclose it to anyone else—including, often, their GP—and that had it not been for such organisations, the problem would not have been addressed as it has, although it has been totally undermined, as an assessment of a societal problem, by what the Government are doing today?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for sharing her experience.
Contrary to the Government’s guidance, the amendment would not limit the time since which such evidence was generated to a year. I am not seeking to derail the Government’s intent but merely to ensure that they live up to their own aspirations—to utilise a single agreed definition of domestic violence and to ensure that those who suffer domestic violence get access to requisite public services. This ought to be uncontroversial, yet the Government have so far resisted our submissions on all points. This is the last opportunity for this House to make a difference on the Bill. This is critical if we are to protect women—it is mainly women—who are victims of domestic violence.
It is not just me who is saying this. The Women’s Institute is demanding changes, as are Rights for Women, End Violence Against Women, and some Government Members. In Committee, Members were whipped—some unwillingly, I am told—to vote against these amendments. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) is not in her place, because after the Committee she told the press:
“We’re not happy about the changes in legal aid…we’re fearful they will affect women who are separating from husbands. We’ve identified that as a problem.”
She is right about that. I ask her and the hon. Member for South Swindon, and other Members who have genuine concerns about this—I am sure that that goes for Liberal Democrat Members as well—to join me and my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Lobby later this evening, when will we have a chance to vote for a practical, joined-up, consensus-based solution on domestic violence
I speak in support of amendment 74 and endorse many of the comments made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) about her amendments. I shall add a couple of points about the definition of domestic violence and abuse and say a little more about the appropriate role of mediation.
We are all at a loss to understand exactly what distinction the Minister is drawing between the definition given by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the definition in the Bill. He variously says that there are differences and that different standards are required in cases where an investigation is taking place rather than action in court. Then he says that there is not much difference and he described the definitions earlier as broadly similar. Frankly, I think this definition is simply all over the place. That matters significantly, because it will put extra uncertainty and pressure on victims of domestic violence and abuse at precisely the time when they do not need to be uncertain. They have become brave enough to speak up and pursue their case, but it is not clear whether they will be covered by the scope of legal aid.
I am particularly concerned that the Minister seems to be putting in an extra hurdle for women who are victims of domestic violence but who are nevertheless able to make a case that they should be in receipt of legal aid. They can make an application saying that theirs is an exceptional case. They will presumably have to go to the new decision-making authority set up in the Bill, but we have no understanding of how that will be done, how much delay it might cause or what sort of evidence will be required to get access to exceptional funding to bring a case. All that is left unclear and simply adds further pressure and difficulty for victims of domestic abuse.
Amendment 74 is designed to be more precise about some of the evidential factors that should be considered. I would like to respond to the important point raised by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) when he asked my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) whether it would be helpful to have some sort of national register of agencies, from which such evidence could be received. I am sure that that will not be of any great attraction to the Minister, but the UK Border Agency is already well placed to accept evidence from such voluntary sector and third sector agencies. That provides a model that could apply here.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right and made the point better than I did. Of course, the UK Border Agency accepts evidence from GPs, which the Minister appeared to pooh-pooh in his earlier comments.
Indeed, the Minister was more concerned to avoid the number of false allegations that he seems to regard as the major difficulty with domestic abuse cases. Opposition Members are far more concerned about the protection of vulnerable victims and believe that that should be the first and overarching priority. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]
Finally, I want to say a little more than I was able to raise in interventions about the use of mediation. Of course we all want to see mediation used wherever it is appropriate and possible for separating couples to reach agreement through that route. We also know, however, that one thing that is particularly damaging to children is conflict. If there is a high degree of conflict, it is unlikely, even if domestic violence or abuse is absent, that mediation is going to be effective or can possibly work.
We are therefore again a bit puzzled about the Minister’s intentions on the use of mediation. I think he said earlier that the requirement was not to undertake mediation but to go through a process whereby it would be determined whether mediation was suitable for a separating couple. Then he said that there would be no compulsion on people to accept mediation. Well, that is certainly true, but if there is no other form of help or assistance available, it is very much a Hobson’s choice.
Can the Minister see any scope for extending access to legal aid to those small number of cases where there is a high degree of conflict and perhaps no abuse or violence as such, but where the conflict would certainly be damaging to the well-being of children? What assessment has he made of that? What does he consider might be the extent of such cases? Has he any idea or any calculation? What consideration has he given to the impact on children and will he look at ways to offer particular protection to children from the very harmful effects of conflict, which we all know to be the case?
Again, the hon. Lady speaks with far more experience than I on this matter, and I was getting to her point. I am merely suggesting that the idea that we can address all these problems of domestic violence through an overheated politicised discussion about where the Government are heading on this Bill not only misses the point, but will damage the cause at hand.
On amendment 74, which was tabled by the shadow Minister, I return to the point I made in my intervention. I regret the fact that he said that I was being pernickety, because many of the things that he is driving at have reason and substance behind them. However, there is a problem if we include, within a list of organisations that would help women to report, a general definition of
“a domestic violence support organisation”
without providing clarification about the efficacy of that organisation.
The hon. Gentleman clearly was not listening when my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) pointed out that that definition is perfectly acceptable to the UK Border Agency, as are the others. It is a composite of definitions acceptable to Departments, so that is a rogue point. May I add that he is doing no service to this House by padding out this debate, as the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) did, when we have several other serious debates to come? If the Conservatives are afraid to debate social welfare legal aid, they should say so. Otherwise he should get on with it and allow the House to debate these important amendments tonight.
The right hon. Gentleman misses my point about the Public Bill Committee. There are many issues that needed to be raised that we could have fleshed out at greater length, but the Opposition tabled so many specious amendments, many of which were completely contradictory—largely in the name of the shadow Minister, not that of the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), who is shaking her head—that we did not get to the meat of some of the issues in the amendment we are debating. Had we been able to discuss sub-paragraph (10)(j) of amendment 74, which the shadow Minister has tabled, we might have been able to improve the Opposition’s amendment so that it could be acceptable to Members on both sides of the House. Instead, we have an amendment that was tabled a couple of days ago with aspects that clearly would not hold up to further legislative scrutiny. It is a pity that we did not have that discussion in Committee instead of discussing a series of amendments, some of which I doubt the shadow Minister had even read before he started speaking to them.
Putting all that aside, a principal issue for me is that many of the amendments tabled by the shadow Minister in Committee would have committed his party to spending increases costing £245 million, but whenever I or other members asked whether the Opposition had any alternative spending plans, they told us to look at the Law Society’s plans. Unfortunately, the Law Society has had to revise its plans, which were found wanting.
I am just coming to that if the hon. Gentleman will listen.
When they table amendments, the Opposition have a duty to explain how their changes would be paid for and what balances would be made elsewhere in the Bill, but so far we have had nothing to substantiate how they would do that, and neither do we have any idea how their changes would fit into the general pattern of the Bill. I cannot therefore vote for their amendment or that of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion—amendment 113 —as neither is complete and nor have they been properly discussed.
In conclusion, I hope that we can continue our proceedings without trying to politicise the issue of domestic violence. I hope we can discuss the precise provisions in the Bill without throwing what I feel have been intemperate and sometimes misjudged accusations at one side purely because they happen to disagree with the assertions put by the other.
May I say what an enormous pleasure it is to follow the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and to commend at least some of his comments to my colleagues, particularly to those seeking the promotion of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox)? I make no comment about any other Queen’s counsel on this side of the House.
There is undoubtedly a fundamental problem with civil legal aid. The simple fact is that to bring cases for which legal aid is available to trial in this country costs more not only than it does in civil law systems that do not recognise the extensive discovery that we have here in England and Wales and in other jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, but more than it costs in other common law jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Australia and in other jurisdictions that have essentially inherited our legal system. That fundamental problem is one with which, because of the deficit we were left by the last Government, this Government have had to grapple. [Interruption.] I can see the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) mouthing something from a sedentary position. If he wants to intervene, I am happy to allow him.
I felt that the hon. Gentleman was about to get into a long peroration that would be more suitable for a Second Reading debate. I was simply reminding him that the amendments we are debating are about clinical negligence.
I am grateful, but I see Mr Deputy Speaker in the Chair this evening. I am sure that if I am out of order at any stage, he will upbraid me. I do not need any lessons from the hon. Member for Hammersmith about how to speak in this Chamber or indeed about the remarks I intend to make tonight. [Interruption.] The simple fact of the matter is—[Interruption.]
I am referring to human rights mainly in relation to exceptional cases where the money would indeed go towards satisfying someone’s medical negligence claim.
Other claims will be excluded from scope and alternative sources of funding, such as conditional fee arrangements, may be available for meritorious claims. I confirm for my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) that we always have an open mind on these issues. I am happy to engage with him as the Bill progresses.
It is good to hear the Minister talking about possible future concessions in this area. To be fair to him, he has always said that the Government’s aim is to protect the most vulnerable. How does he square that with the fact that he has orchestrated the talking out of the main group of amendments today, which affects many of the lowest-income and most vulnerable people in this country? Why are we not getting on to talking about other areas of social welfare law? Is it to protect the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), whose law centre is losing all its funding? Is it to protect the Minister’s coalition allies from withdrawing—
I say to the hon. Gentleman that I have enjoyed listening to my hon. Friends and to some of his hon. Friends this evening, in what has been a very informed debate. We have heard some expert contributions, not least from my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham, who started by saying that he had acted in 100 clinical negligence cases. I do not think that there has been any time wasting at all—not nearly as much time wasting as when the hon. Gentleman held a three-hour debate on the first group of amendments on the first day in Committee.
We spent the first 10 minutes of this debate talking about the Minister’s declaration of interests, which was very substantially overdue. All I would say to him, as a last contribution, is that many people will be watching this debate tonight, particularly in another place. They will draw their own conclusions from his unwillingness to debate those issues.
I hope those many people will be as unimpressed as I am by what the hon. Gentleman just said.
Let me address the interaction of legal aid and the Jackson proposals, which was mentioned by three or four hon. Members. In addition to reforming legal aid, the Government are introducing fundamental reform of no win, no fee conditional fee agreements, as recommended by Lord Justice Jackson. During the consultation on his recommendations, concerns were raised about the funding of expert reports in clinical negligence cases. Those reports can be expensive and we need to provide a means of funding them to ensure that meritorious claims can be brought by those who cannot readily afford to pay for them up front. That is why, in making changes to the CFA regime, we are making special arrangements for the funding of expert reports in clinical negligence claims.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East suggested that victims of clinical negligence who take their cases on CFAs will lose their damages in legal fees. As recommended by Lord Justice Jackson, we are reforming CFAs because of the high costs introduced by changes that were made by the previous Government in relation to the recoverability of success fees and after-the-event insurance. Lord Justice Jackson recommended that there should be a cap on damages in personal injury cases that can be taken in lawyer success fees—the cap should be 25% of the damages, not including damages for future care and loss. The Government have accepted that recommendation, so that victims of personal injury, including from clinical negligence, will have their damages protected under CFAs.
The Civil Justice Council is looking at some of the technical aspects of implementing the Jackson recommendations. I spoke with it on this issue only this morning, when I also attended a conference on issues such as how the 25% cap will work to protect damages.
The hon. Gentleman said that the proposal would be fairer if the Government were not introducing the Jackson reforms, and asked why we were implementing both at the same time. We are considering all those major changes together and in the round. At the same time as seeking to make savings from the legal aid budget, we are taking forward those priority measures that were recommended by Lord Justice Jackson, to address the disproportionate and unaffordable cost of civil litigation. It is essential that those proposals are considered at the same time. The current CFA regime, with its recoverable costs, causes a significant burden on, for example, the NHS. Withdrawing legal aid for clinical negligence without reforming CFAs could increase that burden significantly.
The hon. Gentleman said that claimants in severe injury cases are more likely to be disabled and frail and so forth, and being unable to bring proceedings—[Interruption.]
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Withington (Mr Leech) on securing this debate. I understand his concerns, and this debate gives me a welcome opportunity to address them. There are two points I would like to clarify before turning to his key concerns. The first is that the Government’s reforms do not limit in any way the circumstances in which relevant parties to proceedings are entitled to the services of an interpreter. An interpreter is made available as soon as practicable once an apparent need is identified, irrespective of the language involved. That will not change.
Secondly, I believe that we need to take care in our use of the word “outsourcing”, which has characterised this debate. I am referring not only to this Adjournment debate, but to the wider debate taking place on this matter outside the House. Interpretation and translation services are not currently provided in house; they have always been outsourced. The difference is that, in future, the Government will be outsourcing to a single supplier rather than to individual freelance interpreters and translators.
There is no doubt that, at a time when we are striving to make savings across all public services, there is an opportunity to make savings in this area. Currently, the annual spend on these services is in the region of £60 million across the justice sector, so it is by no means insignificant. We estimate that moving over to the framework agreement will result in savings of at least £18 million a year—significant savings.
The decision to move to a single supplier is not a snap decision. Officials in the Ministry of Justice have conducted a lengthy, thorough and robust procurement process, as required by EU law, engaging with a range of bidders to ensure that we get the best possible service for the best possible price. The single supplier with which we have signed a framework agreement is Applied Language Solutions. ALS will provide a single point of contact, available to staff 24 hours a day, seven days a week, through which the provision of face-to-face interpreting, telephone interpreting, written translation and language services for the deaf and deaf-blind can be obtained.
Under the framework agreement, the Ministry of Justice will sign a contract on behalf of MOJ central functions, Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and the Prison Service. Other organisations—for example, individual police forces and the Crown Prosecution Service—can also sign contracts with ALS, but the MOJ cannot mandate this. It is important to be clear that a wide range of justice organisations support the need to make these changes.
The changes will primarily affect England and Wales. However, it will be open to justice organisations in Scotland and Northern Ireland to sign contracts under the framework, although the Scottish Court Service already has its own contract with a commercial supplier.
The Minister has said that the tendering process is robust. Will he assure us for the record that he is clear that what he is doing in the single tendering to ALS will conform to the directive on the right of interpretation in criminal proceedings?
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs I suggested a moment ago, I regard it as just a little disingenuous—I hate to say that about UN agencies—to suggest that we are in any way undermining the jurisdiction here for dealing with racial discrimination or serious personal injury cases involving British companies. What we are talking about is how much the lawyers are paid by way of success fees and other costs. The Trafigura case was a classic scandalous personal injury case involving a British company and an incident in Côte d’Ivoire, in which £30 million in compensation was awarded by the British courts to the plaintiffs and £100 million was paid in legal costs to those who brought the action. All we are doing is going back to where no win, no fee used to be—in getting the costs and the claims back in proportion to each other.
What we are talking about is whether such cases will get into court at all under the regime that the Government are proposing. It appears they will not listen to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs on insolvency, or to Amnesty International, Oxfam or the United Nations on multinational cases. Now, Admiral, the leading specialist motor insurer, is saying that premiums will go up as a result of the proposals. Is it not time to think again, and to stop favouring insurance companies, crooks and multinationals over their victims?
If the hon. Gentleman wants to widen this argument, which is perfectly legitimate, to include a general proposition as well as multinational company cases, the questions must be: how much is proportionate to the claim when it comes to paying costs, and what effect does no win, no fee, since it was changed, have on the judgment on both sides? We do not want such cases to be such a high earner for the plaintiffs’ lawyers that they are prepared to bring more speculative cases, which is happening at the moment. Nor do we want pressure to be put on defendants who have a perfectly sound defence, forcing them to say, “We cannot defend ourselves, because it will cost us less to pay a nuisance fee by way of settlement.” Justice involves striking a balance between what the lawyers are paid and what the plaintiffs get by way of compensation.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs the Minister says, the directive forms part of a defence rights road map agreed by the European Council in 2009 that aims for greater harmonisation of fundamental tenets of the criminal law. We have opted in and supported the previous two limbs of that. The current proposals concern principally the right to access to a lawyer on arrest, the right to have someone notified on arrest, and the right to communicate with a third party on arrest. As such—I do not think the Minister resiled from this—it articulates what most British people would consider not only uncontroversial but essential civil liberties. Since 2009 the EC has sought to harmonise these rights across Europe. I think the Government welcome that.
Notwithstanding the points the Minister made, which I shall come to in a moment, it is difficult to see why the Government oppose the proposal as far as this country alone is concerned, at least for the present. If introduced, it would give us confidence that members of the British public would be subject to due process when overseas. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, more than 19 million British nationals travel to France every year, 13 million to Spain, 4 million to Italy and 2 million to Greece. Hundreds of them will, sadly, end up being arrested for a criminal offence. In Spain more than 2,000 Britons a year are arrested for criminal offences.
As the Minister said, Europe is not a homogenous legal environment and not all justice systems operate in the same way or to the same standards. I am grateful for the briefing that Fair Trials International provided for the debate. The organisation helps to ensure a fair trial for anyone facing charges in a country not their own. In its research it highlights some notable examples. I shall not spend a great deal of time on that, as it would take up the time of other Members who wish to speak.
Some of the cases are familiar, such as that of Garry Mann, a 51-year-old fireman and football fan who was arrested in Portugal, allowed to leave the country, subsequently arrested on an arrest warrant and imprisoned for two years. It was a case of mistaken identity and on arrest he did not have the benefit of a knowledge of Portuguese law, which would have allowed him a stay.
Another case is that of Edmond Arapi, who was convicted in absentia of committing a murder in Italy at a time when he was working in the UK. It got to the point where he was about to be extradited and imprisoned for a term of 16 years. Had legal advice been available to him at the time of his arrest, it would have become apparent much earlier that this was a clear case of mistaken identity.
I am reasonably familiar with the Arapi case because it took place in Staffordshire, not far from my constituency. Of course, the real mischief was the arrest warrant itself. There was no reason whatsoever why that man was dealt with in that way. I think that it is absolutely futile to attempt to argue the case on access to lawyers on the basis of the complete failure of the arrest warrant system.
The hon. Gentleman makes part of my point for me. There are concerns about the operation of the European arrest warrant, but that is one of the reasons we wish to see the provision of good-quality legal advice and access to lawyers throughout the European Union. He might have his own solution on our relations with Europe, probably a rather more fundamental one than mine or the Minister’s, but we are where we are and it is therefore important that these safeguards exist.
I was going to mention a third case, that of John Packwood. There are unfortunately a large number of such cases, but those are the three famous ones that have featured heavily in the UK press, particularly the Daily Mail, which has championed many of the cases in which the most perverse decisions have been made in foreign jurisdictions. For the people involved and their families, the experience was a nightmare. They were in a foreign country trying to communicate with officials who spoke an unfamiliar language and subject to procedures that were often summary and perverse, and yet they had no knowledge or advice with which to challenge them. It should be a matter of concern to the Government to protect our citizens overseas and ensure that they are given the same consideration as we would grant citizens of other countries visiting Britain, and that they are given the opportunity to do so and, at least for the present, decline.
We should not be slow to see the high standards of justice that British people expect of our criminal justice system applied to other countries. The directive would assist that process. After all, it was the previous Conservative Government who enacted the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which provided a suspect in police custody with a statutory right to legal advice. Section 58 of the Act states that a person arrested and held in police custody is entitled to consult a solicitor privately at any time. The detention code provides that the consultation may be in person, in writing or by telephone and that free and independent legal advice is available. Therefore, the decision not to opt in to a directive that has the same intention as those provisions seems strange, and I will move on to what the Minister says are the differences.
First, the directive’s requirements are broadly in line with current UK legislation. Where there are divergences—the Minister mentioned one or two—they are negotiable. This is a process of ongoing negotiation, and in some cases they are subject to the requirements of national law. The example of searches, which the Minister gave, is one of those.
Secondly, the negotiations are continuing. As the Minister said, many other countries are concerned that there is inadequate room for derogation and are questioning aspects of the directive. It is therefore unlikely that it will remain in its current form. It seems pointless to send negotiating teams, as the Minister proposes, when we are the only country that intends to opt out at this stage, which fatally undermines the authority and leverage that this country will have. We appear to be throwing away an advantage to British citizens for reasons that are at best unconvincing and at worst spurious. Why have the Government taken this position? The Minister might have seen the briefing from JUSTICE, which takes the Government’s points of objection and states that they are either points that can be negotiated, or points that the Government have got wrong. It looks as though the Government are looking for reasons to opt out at this stage.
Tomorrow, the Minister and I will meet again for the next Committee sitting of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, and I look forward to that in Committee Room 12 at 9 o’clock. One of the first clauses that we will consider is clause 12, which gives the new director of legal aid casework and, by extension, the Lord Chancellor the power to decide who does and who does not get access to a lawyer in a police station—and to do so on the basis of an interests of justice test.
There has already been an outcry throughout the criminal justice system at that attack on a basic right, which was introduced to avoid the risk of a miscarriage of justice. PACE itself was in part a response to the appalling miscarriages of justice of the 1970s, but, in answer to the criticism that the Minister is taking on a power that will allow the state to regulate who does and who does not get advice in a police station, he says that he has absolutely no intention of taking away legal help from police stations, so why is he then arrogating to himself the power to do so?
Taken together with the premature decision tonight to opt out of the directive while negotiations continue and before any decision needs to be taken, clause 12 of that Bill suggests that the lessons that led to PACE are being forgotten by this Government.
May I ask the Minister three questions, which, if he replies at the end of the debate, he may wish to answer? First, why are the Government not going to do what they did with the earlier stages of the road map and continue negotiations before making a decision on opting out? Secondly, why are they opting out now when there is further time to negotiate? And, thirdly, can the Minister confirm that the Government are committed to the current system of access to counsel in a police station and do not intend to erode that right, and if so explain why they are pursuing clause 12?
The objections that the Government have raised are nugatory and susceptible to change, if there is any merit in them, whereas the advantages to British citizens abroad are clear and substantial. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that we can get all the benefits of the directive if it is enacted in 26 other countries, but that we do not need to bother with it ourselves. That sounds like a clear Eurosceptic “have your cake and eat it” voice from the Minister, and I am not sure that that is what he is saying, but it is a—[Interruption.] I am not sure that Government Members think that that is what he is saying, either, but it is a knee-jerk reaction to opt out at this stage.
The hon. Gentleman has on a couple of occasions in the past couple of minutes referred to opting out of the directive, but we are not opting out, we are simply not opting in, and in fact there is a big difference, because if we opt in we will never be able to opt out.
The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. The Minister is at least open and clear about attempting to take the benefits. He wishes to do so, and in that I agree with him. Appalling miscarriages of justice occur regularly, and we want British citizens to be protected from that, but we cannot do so without engaging. We can negotiate what are for us as a country relatively minor changes, if changes at all are needed, but if we accept the experts who briefed Justice we find that the Government have misinterpreted those minor changes, to which the Minister alluded, in any event.
In the end, it comes down to this: do we wish seriously to see the proposals implemented, in which case we should be in the game and negotiating clearly, or do we wish to take the Government’s somewhat disingenuous position tonight? For that reason, and notwithstanding the Minister saying that he may change his mind in due course, we will oppose the Government this evening.
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThank you for calling me, Mr Deputy Speaker. During the early part of the speech preceding that by the hon. Member for Sunderland Central (Julie Elliott), I absented myself to go and have a sandwich, not having had any lunch, so I was not expecting you to call me quite as early in the debate.
This is obviously an important debate. I shall not necessarily speak for the full time that is available to me, but I want to focus on the sentencing aspects, specifically of the Green Paper. I do so from my perspective as one of the two sitting recorders in the House; I am not sure whether the other intends to speak. It seems to me important that I do so in circumstances where sentencing has got itself into a bit of a mess in this country. At least in England and Wales, it has become exceptionally complicated for the judiciary, and for that reason the proposals that the Government are putting forward in the Bill are important, not only from the perspective of “breaking the cycle,” which was the concern of the consultation document, but from the perspective of the judiciary and the operation of the criminal courts in effectively sentencing criminals and meting out due punishment for the offences of which they have been convicted by a jury.
The starting point with sentencing, of course, is the fact that in 2003 a Criminal Justice Bill was placed before the House and passed by the previous Government. It was amended on a number of occasions thereafter but was in fact a complete minefield. It was so complicated that in one case, the Court of Appeal commented that the relevant provisions were “labyrinthine”; in another they were described as a “legislative morass”. In a case called CPS v. South East Surrey Youth Court, the Court of Appeal said:
“So, yet again, the courts are faced with a sample of the deeply confusing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the satellite statutory instruments to which it is giving stuttering birth. The most inviting course for this Court to follow, would be for its members, having shaken their heads in despair, to hold up their hands and say: ‘the Holy Grail of rational interpretation is impossible to find’.”
I have to tell the House that the position in which the courts have found themselves in relation to sentencing during the last decade has been utterly intolerable. Judges have had to spend considerably more time than they ought to when they should be trying cases on preparing sentences, giving reasons above and beyond those which they were previously obliged to give, and in fact giving reasons that are probably immaterial for either the victims of crime or, indeed, those who are on the receiving end of the sentence to hear.
The simplification of that aspect of sentencing by the Bill, assuming that it becomes law, is therefore much to be welcomed. But I want it to go further, because the issue is important. I hope that the Lord Chancellor will listen to what I say in this regard and to what others, including the Sentencing Council—and, I think, the Bar Council and the Law Society—have said.
What we need, and what I hope we will see during this Parliament, is a consolidating statute that brings together sentencing for the entirety of the criminal law. Only then will the process become simpler and judges be able to give sentences that they are satisfied will not be taken to the Court of Appeal unless they have got things very wrong. Only then will people know precisely what sorts of sentences the courts are likely to hand down for the same sorts of offence. In due course, I imagine that that will ensure that considerable public support is given to the criminal justice system.
I want to say a few words about legal aid. My hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant) spoke for many of us in expressing concerns about the removal of legal aid in relation to some of the areas proposed by the Ministry. I hope that those will be explored in great detail in Committee, particularly given the Lord Chancellor’s comments in his intervention on her. I want the Bill to come back with a report from the Committee that it is satisfied that the most vulnerable in our society will continue to have access to justice in precisely the same way as those who are able to buy justice. I say that from the perspective of one who, as a lawyer, considers access to justice extraordinarily important.
Like my hon. Friend, I am concerned about those particular provisions and how they might discriminate against some of the most vulnerable. That said, I have no doubt that the Bill will be amended in Committee and that the Government will listen; I hope that they will. I am not sure that the Bill has absolutely everything right, but it is a step in the right direction, particularly in respect of the burgeoning legal aid budget under which we in this country pay eight times as much as the French taxpayer to give access to justice to those entitled to legal aid. It is not suggested that there is some desert in France where nobody has access to justice, so it must be possible to reduce the costs of legal aid.
Indeed, the shadow Lord Chancellor said that last year, when he accepted that if Labour was in power, it too would have to make cuts to the legal aid budget. It is a matter of regret and shame that rather than coming to the House to say where he would be making those cuts, he made a series of—[Hon. Members: “No, he didn’t; he spelled it out.”] It is extraordinary to hear at least one Opposition Member saying that the shadow Lord Chancellor spelled it out. I listened to the entirety of his speech, and I did not hear anything spelled out at all. [Interruption.] The shadow Minister is on the Opposition Front Bench. Perhaps he will tell us now where Labour would make the cuts in the legal aid budget.
There is a publication called Hansard, which the hon. and learned Gentleman might wish to read tomorrow. He will see what I will repeat now, although I feel that I am taking Back-Benchers’ time. The proposals in the March 2010 consultation, which were put forward by the then Labour Government and have not been taken forward by this Government, would more than compensate for the cuts being made in social welfare legal aid. If the hon. and learned Gentleman has a look at that consultation, he will see.
I will go and have a look, and I am sure that Government Front Benchers will, too. We will be able to see during the winding-up speeches whether that is accepted as correct. For my part, I rather doubt that it will be.
This has been a mature and authoritative debate, and a better debate than this Bill deserves. Some 29 right hon. and hon. Members have spoken from the Back Benches, and by my reckoning, only four gave the Government unqualified or nearly unqualified support: the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) and for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti), the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry)—no surprise there—and the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake)—and increasingly no surprise there either.
Many Members spoke about cuts to legal aid and advice: my hon. Friend the Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson); the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd); my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner); my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman); the hon. Member for Hastings and Rye (Amber Rudd); and my hon. Friends the Members for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey), for North West Durham (Pat Glass) and for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander).
Many Members discussed their concerns about the Bill’s sentencing provisions, including the hon. Members for Shipley (Philip Davies), for Dewsbury (Simon Reevell) and for Mid Bedfordshire (Nadine Dorries) and my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Mrs Chapman). My right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) made a forensic examination of the appalling provisions on remand. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Alun Michael) discussed the cuts in youth offending that occurred under the Labour Government. We heard from the Chairman of the Select Committee on Justice that the inefficiency of Departments is partly responsible for legal aid costs. My hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) told us about cuts to the probation service. My hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy) gave a fine speech about conditional fee agreements and their importance in multi-party actions, particularly against large corporations. The hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth (Sarah Newton) spoke movingly about victims, the hon. Member for Battersea (Jane Ellison) spoke about drug dependency and the hon. Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) spoke about reoffending.
They were all excellent speeches, but I will mention three or four in particular. The hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant) spoke about the need for litigation in some cases, despite what the Lord Chancellor says. My hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue) spoke from experience about the effects that the cuts will have on citizens advice bureaux and advice services. The hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) spoke about the need for sentencing reform and—I hope that I am not putting words in his mouth—the reasons why this Bill will not deliver it. Notwithstanding his tone, the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) made a fine speech. Those and many other speeches came from knowledge and experience of the criminal and civil justice system over many years. Therefore, whatever side of the House they came from, I hope that the Government will heed them.
The Bill was supposed to launch a rehabilitation revolution. Then the spin doctors decided that it would be the Bill to punish offenders, but it is neither. It is a damaging and unfunded mess. It will not protect the public, reduce crime, support victims or reform offenders, but do the opposite. It will place victims at risk, cut access to justice for all but the wealthiest and take away even basic legal advice and representation from the most vulnerable in society.
Legal aid, no win, no fee litigation, remand pending trial, access to legal advice on arrest, and a system that diverts young people from offending are coherent parts of a coherent justice system that is envied around the world. The Government put that at risk through the Bill. A dizzying series of U-turns on sentencing and swingeing cuts to police, probation and youth offending teams have created a shambles that will not keep us safe in the short term or lower prison numbers in the long term. We have already had the first warning. Yesterday’s figures show that, under this Government, crime in London is increasing, not decreasing, for the first time in years.
Access to legal aid for the poorest and most vulnerable people will now be the exception, not the rule. Cutting legal aid for housing, education, welfare benefits, debt and family cases will be an economic as well as a social disaster. That is the view of 5,000 individuals and organisations, many with decades of experience, expressed in their responses to the Government’s consultation. Citizens Advice, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Shelter, the Law Centres Federation, the Children’s Society and End Violence Against Women, to name but a few, explained why legal help and representation is good value for money. It is provided by lawyers who earn, on average, less than £25,000, citizens advice bureaux staff and volunteers, supplemented with pro bono advice. They explained why helping people at an early stage prevents homelessness, debt, family breakdown and crime, which end up costing society and the Treasury far more in the long run. They also explained—it should not be necessary to do so, but it is for this Government—the moral duty of a civilised society to support those most in need in the times of greatest stress.
The Government’s impact assessments confirm that women, children, disabled people and minority groups will suffer disproportionately from the cuts, to which the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), who is responsible for legal aid, responds, “What do you expect? They’re the ones getting legal aid now.” The Under-Secretary sounds increasingly like Marie Antoinette. I will do what the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington asked and cite Lord Carlile. Last week, at a meeting of the all-party parliamentary group on legal aid, Lord Carlile put a compelling case to the Under-Secretary. He asked:
“What would the Minister tell the mother of a child with catastrophic injuries caused by clinical negligence who could no longer get legal aid?”
The response was:
“I don’t know. She’d better ask a lawyer.”
Despite the Lord Chancellor’s protestations, the Government have not listened to the women’s institute or Amnesty on domestic violence. They have not listened to people such as Jeannie Bloomfield, president of the women’s institute in Suffolk, who survived domestic violence years ago and has become an advocate for those who suffer it today. She wrote to me, fearful for the future. She said that, under the Government’s definition of domestic violence, she would not have received the legal aid that allowed her and her daughters to escape abuse. Under the plans, the Government will abandon many women like Jeannie.
Let us also consider the Government’s meddling with civil litigation.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and for his remarks about my speech. He will remember that I made the point that we had heard nothing from the Opposition about what they would do, given that the shadow Lord Chancellor again accepted in his speech that cuts had to be made to legal aid. The hon. Gentleman told me to read Hansard. I have done that and I am none the wiser. The information is not there. I wonder whether he would like to apologise to me and the House for inadvertently misleading it. What cuts would the Opposition make if they were in government?
I am delighted to respond to that. I thought that the hon. and learned Gentleman had slightly more perception. He should look at the Green Paper that was published on 22 March 2010, entitled “Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services”. That is the document to which my right hon. Friend the shadow Chancellor and I referred. How many more times do we have to explain it to the hon. and learned Gentleman? [Interruption.] The Lord Chancellor, who has only opened the Bill for the first time today, could perhaps go and look at the document himself.
Turning to the Government’s meddling with civil litigation, they justify the need to upend no win, no fee by reference to the compensation culture, but their own investigation, led by Lord Young of Graffham, found:
“The problem of the compensation culture prevalent in society today is one of perception rather than reality.”
The Government are legislating to fit false perceptions. A system that allows people on moderate incomes to access justice is being overturned to please the insurance industry and large corporations.
While the justification for reform may be imagined, the victims are all too real: children brain-damaged by medical negligence, workers injured by unsafe machinery or suffering industrial disease and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy) said, hundreds of thousands of overseas victims of multinational companies in cases like Trafigura.
Again, public money will be wasted. The Revenue has objected that insolvency cases in which it is a major creditor will not come to court in the future. The NHS and the Department for Work and Pensions will have to pick up the tab for individuals who cannot get compensation from those that harmed them. There is a need to control costs of civil cases; all parties agree on that. We were already doing that by controlling costs in road traffic claims, which are 75% of all personal injury claims. Costs could be further controlled by capping success fees and encouraging early settlement by both parties, but the Government prefer to put all the onus on claimants and force them to pay up to 25% of the damages that they have been justly awarded. A Supreme Court judge, Baroness Hale, warned this week that we risk returning to an England where justice is denied to all but the rich.
Finally, we come to sentencing. What a mess. What an extraordinary debacle—the product of a Government who just don’t get it on law and order. The coalition agreement promised a full review of sentencing. This is the opposite: a mixture of U-turns, delays, false promises and sleights of hand. Some things that were in the Bill are now out, like 50% discounts. Some, such as indeterminate sentences, have gone off for even more consultation. Some, such as the new knives offence, have been added with the ink hardly dry. Some may be added later, on burglary and squatting. Many of the tough measures announced by the Prime Minister are not in the Bill, but lots of the so-called “soft” measures are. Courts will be allowed to take no action for breach of a community order or impose a fine for breach of a suspended prison sentence. Magistrates’ power to impose sentences of up to 12 months will be repealed rather than implemented. Judges and magistrates will have their hands tied on remand. To limit the use of remand as the Government have done is fundamentally to misunderstand its purpose. Judges, magistrates and victims’ representatives all oppose that measure. It is an extraordinary step for any Government to take. It undermines law and order and the discretion of the judiciary, and it is solely here—as was the sentencing discount—to save money.
Under Labour Governments, crime fell 43% over 13 years. Youth offending fell 34% over the last Parliament alone. That was the product of investment in youth offending teams—which this year will see an average cut of 18% in their budgets—and of a long-term strategy to reduce criminal behaviour. The legacy that we left has been squandered by a Department that is in chaos—a Department of chaos. Cuts of 23% will be achieved by restricting access to justice for the vulnerable, taking money from injured parties, and meddling with sentencing to reduce prison places.
The faults are clear in the process of the Bill—rushed out on the same day as the responses to consultation, rushed to Second Reading in one week and now being rushed into Committee, but with new provisions promised for the autumn and a raft of key measures left for secondary legislation. It is a lazy Bill. It lacks integrity. The Secretary of State should feel embarrassed to present it to the House for Second Reading tonight. I urge all right hon. and hon. Members on all sides to vote against.
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe are certainly concerned about the transparency of fees and how they are calculated. We are looking at this very carefully as part of our overall reform of legal aid, particularly for the Legal Services Commission.
Women are often at risk of domestic violence when relationships break down, even when there is no previous history of it. According to the Association of Chief Police Officers, attempts to end a relationship are strongly linked to partner homicide and a higher risk of physical violence and sexual assault. Now no legal aid is proposed for divorce or child custody cases, and the definition of domestic violence is still very narrow and requires a history of complaints. How will the Minister ensure the safety of women now that they have to negotiate face to face with potentially violent partners?
I think the hon. Gentleman misunderstands the present system. At the moment, perpetrators rarely receive legal aid; it is the victims of domestic violence who receive it. That means that in the current system the victims face the perpetrators of the crime. The reality is that on a day-to-day basis the judiciary are having to deal with this and have set procedures that they go through to make the process as good as possible for the victims.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe Secretary of State has accepted Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations on civil litigation reform. He said they were “very attractive” and he was “impressed” by them, so why is the Minister ignoring the report’s recommendation that the Government make
“no further cutbacks in legal aid availability or eligibility”
because
“The legal aid system plays a crucial role in promoting access to justice at proportionate costs”?
Legal aid does play a very important part in access to justice, which the Government support. Lord Justice Jackson was looking at civil costs, and in that context he looked at legal aid. On that point, as in various other instances, we did not agree with his recommendations. What we will put forward in legislation is a total all-encompassing package. The shadow Minister will appreciate that we consulted on public and private funding at the same time so that those who wanted to respond could do so in the context of both.