Humanist Marriage

Andrew Cooper Excerpts

Thursday 12th June 2025 Westminster Hall

[Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I congratulate my hon. Friends the Members for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) and for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Lizzi Collinge), as well as the hon. Member for Henley and Thame (Freddie van Mierlo), on securing the debate. Before I begin in earnest, I am proud to declare my interest as a member of Humanists UK and of the all-party parliamentary humanist group.

I would like to make a proposal to the Minister—one that does not need a ring, flowers or a dramatic moment on bended knee. My simple proposal is that we finally say yes to legalising humanist marriage in England and Wales. I understand the Government’s arguments, and I will focus my remarks on them, but before I get into the detail, I want to say that the fact that this was resolved in Scotland two decades ago, and could be, but has not been, resolved in England and Wales by way of a simple order, is indefensible. It demands urgent action.

I have heard the Government’s argument that they want to consider marriage law in the round, and they should certainly do that, but, thanks to the previous Government, humanist couples have already been waiting for 12 years and that has not happened. Why should they have to continue to wait, and why can they not have legal recognition of their marriages in the meantime?

While humanist couples have been waiting, many other piecemeal reforms have taken place. In 2021, the law was changed to allow civil marriages outdoors. The system of registering marriages became electronic. Mothers’ names have been added to marriage certificates. Opposite-sex civil partnerships have been introduced, along with new possibilities for conversions between marriage and civil partnership. No-fault divorce was introduced in 2022. The marriage age was raised to 18 in 2023. Weddings for whole-life prisoners were banned by this Government just last year.

While all that was taking place, more and more religious groups have been happily registering themselves to do marriages for the first time. Scientologists got the power to conduct marriage in 2014 following a Supreme Court case. The Order of St Leonard, a religious group founded in just 2009, has registered. The Goddess People of Avalon and the He Lives Bible Church, formed in 2000 and 1998, respectively, both registered. In other words, whole religions have come into existence and got the power to conduct marriage in almost the same time that humanist marriages have been under review.

Similarly, more religious groups have decided to perform same-sex marriages, most notably the Methodists in 2021. All the while, humanist celebrants have wanted to be able to perform legal same-sex marriages, but have been denied the right to do so. The previous Government argued that other religious and non-religious belief groups are arguing for legal marriage recognition, so it would be unfair to recognise humanists. However, that argument seems to be that two wrongs make a right. It is not clear who those groups even are. Muslims, for example, can already marry in mosques, and hundreds do so every year. Independent celebrants are an entirely different proposition, as we have heard, being profit-making alternatives to state registrars. It is also not clear how other religious or non-religious belief groups would be disadvantaged by humanists gaining recognition.

In the interest of time, I will wrap up. Scotland has already said, “I do.” Thousands of couples have legally married in beautiful, meaningful humanist ceremonies. England and Wales are still standing at the altar, checking their watch and waiting for the doors to open. I am not asking for sweeping reform. I am not asking the Minister to rethink everything. I am just asking for a simple answer to a simple question: will the Minister, at long last, do me the honour of making that order and recognising humanist marriages? There is no lawful impediment, just the chance to say, finally and unequivocally, “I do.”

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I start by thanking my hon. Friends the Members for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) and for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Lizzi Collinge), and the hon. Member for Henley and Thame (Freddie van Mierlo), for securing this important—and, may I say, really lovely —debate.

I should stress that the strength of feeling and frustration around legally recognising humanist weddings is very clear to me from this debate. It is important for me to acknowledge at the outset that the Government fully understand and recognise the significance of the issue to hon. Members and to humanists more widely. I am aware that a number of hon. Member from both Houses are campaigning on the issue, including those Members who secured the debate. I thank all hon. Members for taking part and expressing their deeply personal experiences and views. It has really contributed to this positive debate.

Andrew Copson, chief executive of Humanists UK, has been at the forefront of this campaign. He has met officials from my Department on a number of occasions, and it has been very helpful to understand his views on the issue as we take forward any potential reform. It is also only right that I acknowledge the frustrations that humanists have felt while campaigning for a change to the law. I appreciate that this change has been ongoing on for a long time. For many humanists, the inclusion of the order-making power within the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 was hard fought for, and I know that it has been disappointing to them that this power has not been used to date.

I also do not think it would be right to have this debate without recognising the important contribution that humanists make to society. Humanists have often been at the forefront of the fight for social justice, campaigning for fairness, respect and equality for all. I join in celebrating the celebrants mentioned today for all the work they do to conduct weddings, funerals and important life events. The Government hugely acknowledge the tireless work of humanists, whether that is campaigning to abolish blasphemy laws, or Humanists UK raising the profile of illegal independent schools within Government.

I know that my noble Friend Lord Khan was very pleased to attend the World Humanists Day reception last year as the Minister for Faith, Communities and Resettlement. When the Prime Minister was Leader of the Opposition, he spoke in 2021 to mark Humanists UK’s 125th anniversary, saying:

“Ever since its foundation as an ethical movement, humanists have contributed enormously to our party’s and our nation’s achievements…Humanists and Humanists UK have been at the forefront of the fight for social change: to decriminalise homosexuality, to end corporal punishment in schools, and to introduce free school meals.”

I could not have put it better myself. That quote captures the profound and lasting impact of Humanists UK.

We are having this debate because marriage is one of our most important institutions. At its best, it is a celebration of love, a symbol of enduring partnership and a deeply personal commitment. Marriage can provide many benefits, including emotional support, financial stability and legal protections. For those who choose to marry, it is a significant and meaningful decision—one that this Government are proud to promote and protect. Although the state rightly has a responsibility to ensure that marriage laws provide clarity and certainty around the legal status of marriage, we believe the conversation can and should go further. Our weddings law should always reflect the importance and meaning of marriage as an institution.

It is important to acknowledge the shape of our current law around weddings and explain how we have got to where we are, so let me begin by reflecting on the history of marriage law in England and Wales—unlike some wedding speeches, I promise to keep it brief and free of groan-inducing jokes.

Our weddings law has evolved gradually over centuries, with its core structure rooted in the 18th and 19th centuries. The foundations of weddings law were laid by the Clandestine Marriages Act 1753. The Act was designed to prevent secret or hasty marriages by requiring weddings to be undertaken by Anglican clergy in a parish church or public chapel. While the Act permitted Anglican weddings only, it explicitly exempted Jewish and Quaker marriage ceremonies. The Marriage Act 1836 marked a significant turning point, introducing civil marriage for the first time and allowing weddings to take place in registry offices and non-Anglican places of worship. It also brought in civil preliminaries, acknowledging the state’s interest in there being legal certainty about who is married.

The fundamental structure established in 1836 remains largely in place today, consolidated within the Marriage Act 1949. The model on which our law is based is broadly a buildings-based model, which means that most marriages are regulated according to the building in which they take place. There are exceptions to the system, because Jews and Quakers are not bound by this restriction and may marry in any location.

There is discrepancy in the law, because couples must choose between a civil or a religious wedding. If they opt for a religious wedding, the rules that apply will vary depending which religion the ceremony is conducted according to. Civil weddings, by contrast, must be held at a register office or at premises that have been officially approved for that purpose. Therefore, it is for historical reasons that humanists are currently unable to conduct legally binding weddings. There is no provision in our legislative framework for non-religious belief ceremonies to be legally binding, as a wedding must either be religious or civil.

As others have said, the Law Commission published a report in 2022 reviewing weddings law and concluded that it is

“inconsistent and complicated, inefficient, unfair, and needlessly restrictive”.

It found that the law does not work for couples of many different religions and beliefs, including humanists. The report was the result of extensive research and stakeholder engagement; the Law Commission received more than 1,500 responses to its consultation and engaging with more than 50 key stakeholders. It provided a number of instances where the law does not work for many couples, and one prominent example is that humanist couples are unable to have legally recognised humanist weddings in England and Wales.

The Law Commission also highlighted discrepancies affecting different religious groups. For instance, Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists and Hindus are required to marry in a registered place of worship, regardless of whether that place of worship is meaningful in a marriage context, and must use a prescribed form of words. In contrast, Jew and Quaker couples are permitted to marry in any location and without any prescribed wording. Another example identified was the challenges faced by mixed-faith couples, who are currently unable to have ceremonies that might reflect two different faiths.

To address the wide range of problems identified with the current law, the Law Commission made 57 recommendations for reform, underpinned by the proposal that current weddings law should be overhauled and a new legislative framework should be put in place. The Law Commission proposed a new framework to ensure that all groups are treated with fairness and consistency on how they get married.

I am keenly aware that humanists have expressed the view that the Law Commission’s recommendations do not provide the solution they are seeking. One of the main reasons for that is their preference for the Government to act quickly and use the order-making power, as several hon. Members have mentioned, which would allow for humanist weddings to take place within the current legislative framework.

[Andrew Cooper]

I understand the Minister’s point, but that does not accurately characterise my position. I am very happy for the Government to do a broader set of reforms, but I and others are arguing that we do not necessarily need to wait for that before acting on humanist marriage. The two things could happen in parallel. Would the Minister agree with that?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is important to ensure we do this properly. I am against any piecemeal reform here. If we are to do this, we need to do it properly and together, so that it is succinct. There are ways that that can be done, as I am about to come on to.

I acknowledge the calls made during this debate for the Government to take that step, and to take it quickly, and I will address them directly. Although it is true that using the order-making power would allow non-religious belief organisations to marry within the current framework of weddings law, it is important for us to take into account what the Law Commission has said about doing that. The Law Commission highlighted the complexities of the law in this area and concluded that exercising the order-making power is not, in its view, a viable option. As a responsible Government, we must take that view into account when considering the issue of weddings reform.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Cooper Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sarah Sackman]

The Ministry of Justice currently provides free sentencing remarks for victims of murder and manslaughter. As of last month, we have made permanent our pilot to provide those sentencing remarks to victims of rape. The hon. Lady will understand that providing full transcriptions is a costly exercise, which is why we are undertaking testing of artificial intelligence to make transcripts available in future in a lower-cost and timely manner.

[Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)]

At just 12 years old, my constituent was subjected to horrific abuse by a family member who was ultimately convicted of nine offences, including four counts of rape. The offender was sentenced in youth court to just a three-year referral order and a two-year restraining order. My constituent cannot appeal this sentence under the unduly lenient sentence scheme simply because of the court in which the case was heard. Will the Minister review this deeply troubling case and consider extending the unduly lenient sentence scheme to include youth court rape convictions?

[Shabana Mahmood]

I hope that my hon. Friend heard the earlier answer on the unduly lenient sentence scheme and the review by the Law Commission, but if he writes to me with the specifics of that case, I will make sure that we look into it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Cooper Excerpts

Tuesday 28th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Shabana Mahmood]

I agree that we need to do everything we can to remove foreign national offenders from our prisons. Between 5 July 2024 and 4 January 2025, 2,580 foreign national offenders were returned—a 23% increase on the same period in the previous year—and we are currently on track to remove more foreign national offenders this year than at any time in recent years.

[Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)]

Humanist marriage has been legal in Scotland for 20 years but continues to wait to be legalised in England and Wales. The Law Commission made recommendations two years ago on clarifying the law, but when asked to set out a timetable for action, the Minister in the other place could only respond, “in the fullness of time.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 December 2024; Vol. 841, c. 910.]

Can the Minister set out the timetable or, alternatively, say when the Government will make an order to end the long wait for humanist marriage?

[Sarah Sackman]

I understand that humanists have been campaigning for legally binding humanist weddings. The Government are committed to strengthening the rights and protections available, particularly for women in cohabiting couples. We will look at the Law Commission’s work and publish our response in due course.

Trial of Lucy Letby

Andrew Cooper Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[David Davis (Goole and Pocklington) (Con)]

I am not in the habit of issuing trigger warnings, but I must warn the House that this speech will cover deeply distressing events. I will discuss infant deaths, failures in care and allegations of a grave miscarriage of justice.

Lucy Letby was convicted of murdering seven infants and attempting to murder seven more. She received multiple concurrent full-life sentences. The case horrified the nation. It seemed clear: a nurse had turned into a serial killer. I initially accepted the tabloid characterisation of Letby as an evil monster, but then I was approached by many experts, including leading statisticians, neonatal specialists, forensic scientists, legal experts, and those who had served at the Chester hospital and are afraid to come forward. The experts included a past president of the Royal Statistical Society and a past president of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health—people who were more knowledgeable than the purported experts whose evidence convicted Lucy Letby. They were all concerned by what they perceived as the false analyses and diagnoses used to persuade a lay jury to convict Letby.

Sadly, none of us is a stranger to miscarriages of justice; there have simply been too many. The Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four and the Stockwell Six are the famous ones, but the Exeter University miscarriage database lists nearly 500 people who have been wrongfully imprisoned. Astonishingly, wrong forensic evidence is responsible for 81 cases leading to over 500 years of unjust imprisonment. Many of those cases involve caregivers convicted by medical expert testimony asserting deliberate harm where causes of death were in fact natural. Those people were all exonerated, but those who doubted their guilt were initially met with the same fierce public pushback that now faces those who question Letby’s guilt.

So what has happened here? The Countess of Chester hospital neonatal unit suffered a sharp increase in deaths, from a typical two to four a year to 17 in one 13-month period. When hospital senior management became aware of the elevated mortality in June 2016, they were alarmed and commissioned some investigations. The most notable was carried out in November 2016 by the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, whose report noted many failings on the unit, all of which—at least in part, if not in total—could have been the cause of the deaths. The report highlighted inadequate staffing levels, delayed escalation of concerns to tertiary units and

“disconnection between the neonatal leadership and the trust’s government and risk management processes.”

In essence, because of a mixture of inadequate resources and poor medical management, the hospital was not capable of keeping those very fragile babies alive. That fact was recognised by the hospital when the neonatal unit was downgraded in July 2016 and stopped taking babies of less than 32 weeks’ gestation. The report, offering completely different reasons for the deaths, was never shown to the jury.

Some consultants had attempted to blame Letby for the deaths. A redacted section of the report states:

“The consultants explained that their allegation was based on Nurse L being on shift on each occasion an infant died (although not necessarily caring for the infant) combined with ‘gut feeling’. There was no other evidence or history to link Nurse L to the deaths, and her colleagues had expressed no concerns about her practice.”

[Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[David Davis]

No, I am afraid I will not—I am short of time.

Again, that section of the report was never shown to the jury. Those consultants then persuaded management to call the police in April 2017. There was no hard evidence against Letby. Nobody saw her do anything untoward. The doctors’ “gut feeling” was based on a coincidence: she was on shift for a number of the deaths, but—and this is important—far from all of them. The case was built on a poor understanding of probabilities that was to translate later into an influential but spectacularly flawed piece of evidence.

Around that time, the hospital was struggling with another problem—and possibly a more sensible explanation for this sudden increase in deaths. Leaked reports show that the hospital, and specifically the neonatal unit, battled a Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection for months. That antibiotic-resistant bug posed a serious risk to the babies. The child mortality rate for Pseudomonas aeruginosa ranges from 14.5% to 50%, and stands at over 55% for infants of extremely low birth weight, such as those in this case. It is hard to see how we can eliminate that as the cause of death or collapse for at least some of those babies. Again, the jury never knew about that contamination.

From the start of the case, Cheshire police picked up on the doctors’ statistical arguments supposedly pointing to Letby. In April 2018, an officer on the investigation approached a leading statistician, Professor Jane Hutton, and asked her to put a figure on the likelihood of a nurse being on duty “during all the deaths/collapses” in the unit. Of course, that is a false proposition, as Letby was not on duty for anything like all the deaths—as we will see later—but that was glossed over at the trial. Notwithstanding that, Professor Hutton informed the police that any proper statistical inquiry should not concentrate on one staff member from the outset. Instead, it would require full, proper research into all possible explanations for any increase in babies collapsing, including their medical conditions and prematurity, as well as the broader performance of the unit. One would think that would be common sense.

Cheshire police then signed a consultancy agreement with Professor Hutton, but in 2021, after Letby had been charged, the police wrote an email to Professor Hutton, stating:

“We have had a further meeting this afternoon where we have informed the prosecutors that we were looking at the validity of statistical evidence again in the case… The prosecutor…has instructed us not to pursue this avenue any further at present.”

This appears to be in direct contravention of part 3.3 of the code for Crown prosecutors, which states:

“Prosecutors cannot direct the police or other investigators.”

Again, the jury was never informed of Professor Hutton’s explicit advice to the police that their statistical approach was flawed. This matters enormously, because the most powerfully influential piece of evidence in the case was the prosecution King’s counsel showing a table with Letby listed as the only nurse on duty for all of the alleged murders and inflicted injuries. Professor Hutton, who has reviewed the case extensively, believes that deeply flawed statistical evidence was used, and has said that the statistical errors are “similar to those…in the Sally Clark case but worse.” Sally Clark was convicted and then acquitted of the murder of her two sons based on flawed statistical evidence.

In May 2017, Dewi Evans, a retired doctor who runs a business that provides highly paid medical “expert evidence” in court cases, approached the National Crime Agency to volunteer his services. Evans’s opinion that Letby injected air either into the babies’ veins, causing air embolism, or down the nasogastric tube into the stomach, stopping the babies’ breathing, was one of the foundations—indeed, probably the major foundation—of the prosecution case. This supposed evidence is hugely controversial. Three months into the murder trial, Letby’s defence team applied for evidence from Dewi Evans to be excluded due to an adverse judgment from a judge in a previous case, who said that a report by Dr Evans was “worthless” and

“makes no effort to provide a balanced opinion”.

In an extraordinary and—as far as I can see—unprecedented intervention, that very judge, Lord Justice Jackson, actually wrote to the trial judge with his judgment on Dr Evans attached, clearly indicating how unsuitable Evans was as an expert witness.

Evans’s assertion of murder by air embolism was entirely based on a research paper from 1989, and its relevance in these cases has been robustly challenged by the actual author of that paper. Evans changed his opinion on several key issues during the trial, and is now accused by Letby’s lawyer of changing his opinion again since the end of the appeal process. Evans disputes this, but if Members are interested, I suggest that they compare his evidence recorded in the trial transcript of 1 November 2022 with his signed statement to Channel 5 on 3 August 2024 and decide for themselves. It is also the case that Evans has submitted a new report to the police. What is extraordinary, however, is that the Crown Prosecution Service has refused to provide a copy of that report to Letby’s current defence counsel.

Questions have also been raised about the second expert witness for the prosecution, Dr Sandie Bohin. Eight families are currently filing formal complaints against her over their children’s care, which are being considered by the General Medical Council.

That brings us to the actual cases and causes of the deaths. Two expert neonatologists—consultant working neonatologists—are working through the cases to establish the actual causes of the babies’ deterioration and deaths. They are doing so thoroughly, so this is taking time. So far, they have completed two detailed case reviews for babies O and C. There are five more that will be completed in the near future.

In the case of Baby O, the prosecution claimed the baby was attacked with blunt trauma to the liver and had air injected into the nasogastric tube. The case notes tell a different story, showing how the doctors used excessive ventilation pressure during resuscitation, which overinflated the baby’s lungs and prevented blood from flowing back to the lungs. This caused the baby to desaturate his blood oxygen level repeatedly. The medical team responded by increasing the pressures even more, initiating a downward spiral in the baby’s condition. The overinflation of the baby’s lungs forced the diaphragm downwards, pushing the liver into the baby’s abdominal cavity.

The consultant in charge took a decision to insert a needle into the abdomen to release what they thought was gas pressure in the abdomen. However, this was wrongly inserted into the right side of the baby’s abdomen. As a result of this error, the needle penetrated the liver, causing serious internal bleeding. This was undoubtedly a significant contributory factor in the baby’s death, if not the outright cause. The report states that the

“deterioration was predictable, and his death was avoidable and resulted from suboptimal care.”

The author of that sub-optimal care, the doctor who inserted the needle into the liver, was one of the principal accusers of Lucy Letby at the trial. This directly contradicts the prosecution’s portrayal of events. The trauma to the liver was caused by a serious error by one of the consultants who led the accusations against Letby. The experts also stated that there was no air in the gut in excess of what would be expected for a baby in these circumstances. None of this was made clear to the jury. The prosecution’s evidence was again predicated on Dewi Evans’s diagnosis, which in this specific case alone changed multiple times.

In the case of Baby C, the prosecution claimed this was a healthy baby killed by air being injected into his stomach. The case notes for Baby C demonstrate that this baby was actually profoundly unwell before birth. The baby suffered from severe foetal growth restriction. This meant the baby had to be delivered by caesarean section at an extraordinarily low birth weight, even for that gestation, of 800 grams or about 1.75 lb. Within an hour of birth, he developed respiratory distress. To treat the respiratory problems, they tried to deliver surfactant, a mixture that helps babies’ lungs to expand better—open up—down an endotracheal tube.

The case notes, however, show that the doctor pushed the tube too far in, pushing it into one lung, meaning that the other lung was left collapsed. In the days after the baby’s birth, he showed several signs of abdominal obstruction, including the vomiting of bile, and he never opened his bowels since birth, which the doctor in charge did not recognise or diagnose. The report concludes by stating that this baby died of natural causes compounded by sub-optimal medical care. This again directly contradicts the prosecution’s narrative of deliberate harm. Dewi Evans’s diagnosis claimed the baby had air injected into the stomach, so he could no longer breathe. This was predicated on an X-ray showing an unusual amount of air on the stomach. It has become clear that Letby was not even at the hospital when the X-ray was taken, nor had she been at any point till then since Baby C’s birth two days earlier. While the baby died from natural causes, there is evidence of sub-optimal care, including

“the administration of surfactant and the lack of recognition and appropriate management of signs of abdominal obstruction”.

Again, the doctor responsible for these errors was another one of those who made accusations against Lucy Letby and, again, none of this was made clear to the jury.

There is a great deal of evidence demonstrating that there are much more likely alternative causes of these tragic deaths than those put up by the prosecuting team. The most likely is that the hospital’s neonatal unit was not up to caring for these fragile children, in terms of either resource or skill, and this shortcoming might have been compounded by other factors such as the Pseudomonas infection.

Victims of Sexual Violence: Court Delays

Andrew Cooper Excerpts

Monday 16th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mary Glindon (Newcastle upon Tyne East and Wallsend) (Lab)]

I thank Mr Speaker for granting time for a debate on court delays and victims of sexual violence.

I do not underestimate the challenges that the Minister faces. As I will hopefully draw attention to this evening, the task at hand is considerable, but overturning this situation is owed to survivors. This topic is emotive and cuts deep. Justice is a British value that so many in our country live their lives by—a strong sense of what is right and what is wrong. But justice is also a principle that we should all be able to fall back on. When we fall victim to crime and seek redress, a timely and supported road to justice should be expected. That is a fundamental element of our social contract in Britain.

The situation that thousands of women and girls find themselves in today is far from that. The road to justice for so many victims of rape and serious sexual offences is long and falls desperately short of what is owed to them.

[Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that too many victims of domestic abuse face years of court delays? It is an issue that constituents have raised with me. Those delays have consequences. One told me that her life is on hold, while her abuser is free to go on with his. She feels afraid to go out in her home town in case she is seen by him. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is essential that we not only address court delays but implement fast-track processes for these cases, to ensure that justice is served promptly?

[Mary Glindon]

My hon. Friend could not have put it better. That is the basis of this whole debate.

According to the quarterly statistics published last week, the number of sexual offence cases waiting to go to Crown court stands at 11,574—up 44.5% on the same time in 2022. Just two weeks ago, the Director of Public Prosecutions said that the delays are as bad as or probably worse than he has ever known them to be.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Cooper Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)]

T7. As has been said today, justice delayed is justice denied. I am sure that the Minister will agree that victims of domestic violence are being forced to wait years for their cases to be heard in court. A constituent of mine has told me that the delays in her case have left her feeling trapped, scared and let down by the criminal justice system, while, she feels, her abuser is free to move on with his life. What steps can my hon. Friend take to expedite domestic violence cases, so that victims are not left waiting for years?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The Government inherited a record and rising court backlog, which has seen far too many victims and survivors waiting too long for justice. Decisions on case listing are a matter for the independent judiciary, who, when possible, look to prioritise cases involving vulnerable victims and witnesses. We are committed to bearing down on the caseload to speed up the delivery of justice for all victims.