Alistair Carmichael
Main Page: Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat - Orkney and Shetland)Department Debates - View all Alistair Carmichael's debates with the Scotland Office
(9 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 16, page 1, line 7, leave out first “A” and insert “The”
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 37, page 1, line 7, leave out “is recognised as” and insert “shall be”.
Amendment 17, page 1, line 7, leave out “recognised as”.
Amendment 58, page 1, leave out lines 7 and 8 and insert—
‘(1A) The Scottish Parliament is a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitution.
(1B) Subsection (1) or (1A) may be repealed only if—
(a) the Scottish Parliament has consented to the proposed repeal, and
(b) a referendum has been held in Scotland on the proposed repeal and a majority of those voting at the referendum have consented to it.”
This amendment is to ensure that the Scottish Parliament can only be abolished with the consent of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish people after a referendum.
Amendment 38, page 1, line 8, at end insert
“and may not be abolished without the consent of the Scottish people given effect by an Act of the Scottish Parliament”.
Amendment 18, page 1, line 12, leave out “recognised as”.
Amendment 59, page 1, leave out lines 12 and 13 and insert—
‘(1A) The Scottish Government is a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitution.
(1B) Subsection (1) or (1A) may be repealed only if—
(a) the Scottish Parliament has consented to the proposed repeal, and
(b) a referendum has been held in Scotland on the proposed repeal and a majority of those voting at the referendum have consented to it.”
This amendment is to ensure that the Scottish Parliament can only be abolished with the consent of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish people after a referendum.
Clause 1 stand part.
Amendment 89, in clause 11, page 13, line 42, at end insert—
‘(2A) In paragraph 4 of Schedule 4 (protection of Scotland Act 1998 from modification), insert new sub-paragraph—
“(5A) This paragraph does not apply to amendments to Schedule 5, Part II, Head A, Section A1 insofar as they relate to:
(a) taxes and excise in Scotland,
(b) government borrowing and lending in Scotland, and
(c) control over public expenditure in Scotland.”
This amendment would enable the Scottish Parliament to amend the Scotland Act 1998 to remove the reservation on taxation, borrowing and public expenditure in Scotland, with the effect that the Scottish Parliament could then legislate in these areas to provide for full fiscal autonomy in Scotland.
New clause 2—Constitutional convention—
‘(1) The Prime Minister shall establish a Constitutional Convention within one month of the day on which this act is passed.
(2) The Chair and Members of the Constitutional Convention shall be appointed in accordance with a process to be laid before, and approved by, resolution in each House of Parliament.
(3) The Chair of the Constitutional Convention is not permitted to be a Member of Parliament or a member of a political party.
(4) Members of the Constitutional must include, but not be limited to, the following—
(a) members of the public, chosen by lot through the jury system, who shall comprise the majority of those participating in the convention;
(b) elected representatives at all levels;
(c) representatives of civil society organisations and, in an advisory role, academia.
(5) The Constitutional Convention shall review and make recommendations in relation to future governance arrangements for the United Kingdom, including but not limited to the following—
(a) the role and voting rights of Members of the House of Commons;
(b) democratic reform of the House of Lords;
(c) further sub-national devolution within England;
(d) codification of the constitution.
(6) The Constitutional Convention shall engage in widespread consultation across the nations and regions of the UK, and must provide a report to both Houses of Parliament by 31 March 2016.
(7) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a formal response to each recommendation of the Constitutional Convention within four months of the publication of the final report from the Constitutional Convention.’
This New Clause provides an outline for a Constitutional Convention selected from the widest possible number of groups in society to analyse and design future governance arrangements for the United Kingdom, and to report by 31 March 2016.
New clause 3—Transfer of reserved matters—
‘(1) Schedule 5 (which defines reserved matters) to the Scotland Act 1998, has effect with the following modifications.
(2) In Part I (general reservations) omit paragraph 6 (political parties).
(3) Part II (specific reservations) is omitted.
(4) Insert Part IIA (UK pensions liability) as follows—
Part IIA
UK Pensions liability
The consent of the Treasury is required before the enactment of any provision passed by the Scottish Parliament which would affect the liabilities of the National Insurance Fund in respect of old age pensions.”
(5) In Part III (general provisions) the following provisions referring to Part II of the Schedule are omitted—
(a) paragraph 3(2);
(b) paragraph 4(2)(c).’
This Amendment would allow the Scottish Parliament to make provision for the registration and funding of political parties, but would otherwise retain the Part I reserved matters covering the constitution, foreign affairs, public service, defence and treason. It would entirely remove the remaining reservations over financial and economic matters, home affairs, trade and industry, energy, transport, social security, regulation of the professions, employment, health and medicines, media and culture and other miscellaneous matters. The consent of the Treasury would be needed for any changes in old age pensions which would affect the liabilities of the National Insurance Fund.
New clause 6—Constitution of Scotland—
‘(1) The 1998 Scotland Act shall be cited as The Written Constitution of Scotland.
(2) A standing Scottish Constitutional Convention shall be convened jointly by the Secretary of State and the Scottish Ministers to conduct reviews and to make recommendations to the Scottish Parliament and the Parliament of the United Kingdom.’
The New Clause renames the Scotland Act 1998 and introduces a standing Scottish Constitutional Convention.
New clause 7—Application of the Parliament Acts to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government—
‘(1) The Parliament Act 1911 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection 2(1), after “other than a Money Bill”, insert “or a Bill amending sections 1 or 2 of the Scotland Act 2015.’
The New Clause entrenches the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government by ensuring that changing Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill once enacted would be possible only with the consent of both Houses of Parliament.
New clause 8—Scottish Parliament nomination of members of the House of Lords—
‘(1) The Scottish Parliament shall nominate members for appointment to the House of Lords, in a method to be determined wholly by the Scottish Parliament.
(2) The number of members of the House of Lords appointed in accordance with this section shall at any time be in broadly the same proportion to the total membership of the House of Lords as the population of Scotland is to the total population of the United Kingdom.’
The New Clause would require the Scottish Parliament to nominate members to sit in the House of Lords in proportion to Scotland’s share of the United Kingdom population.
New clause 9—Constitutional convention—
‘(1) Within one month of the day on which this Act is passed, a constitutional convention is to be held to consider and make recommendations on the constitution of the United Kingdom.
(2) The Secretary of State must make regulations to—
(a) appoint a day on which the convention must commence its operations,
(b) make fair and transparent rules about how the convention is to operate and how evidence is to be adduced,
(c) make further provision about the terms of reference prescribed under section 2, and
(d) specify how those who are to be part of the convention are to be chosen in accordance with subsection (8).
(3) The date appointed under subsection (2)(a) must not be later than 31 December 2016.
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (2), if made without a draft having been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(5) The convention shall have the following terms of reference—
(a) the devolution of legislative and fiscal competence to and within Scotland and the rest of the UK,
(b) the devolution of legislative and fiscal competence to local authorities within the United Kingdom,
(c) electoral reform,
(d) constitutional matters to be considered in further conventions, and
(e) procedures to govern the consideration and implementation of any future constitutional reforms.
(6) The convention must publish recommendations within the period of one year beginning with the day appointed under subsection (2)(a).
(7) The Secretary of State must lay responses to each of the recommendations from the convention before each House of Parliament within six months beginning with the day on which the recommendations are published.
(8) The convention must be composed of representatives of the following—
(a) all registered political parties within the United Kingdom,
(b) civic society and local authorities of the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.’
The New Clause would require the appointment of a convention to review the operation of the Act resulting from the Scotland Bill in the wider context of the Union.
Amendment 1, in clause 63, page 67, line 24, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment provides that section 1 will not come into force on the day on which the Act is passed, in order to link the commencement of Part 1 of the Act (Constitutional arrangements) with the work of the Constitutional Convention, outlined in New Clause NC2, which would be required to report by 31 March 2016.
Amendment 2, page 67, line 26, at end insert—
‘(1A) Part 1 comes into force within one month of the publication of the report of the Constitutional Convention appointed under section (Constitutional Convention).”
This amendment provides that Part 1 of the Act (Constitutional arrangements) comes into force after publication of the report of the Constitutional Convention, as outlined in New Clause NC2, which would be required to report by 31 March 2016.
Mr Carmichael
Amendments 16, 17 and 18 are essentially probing amendments, authored by the Law Society of Scotland. Subject to the response that we hear from Ministers and from those in other parts of the House, it is not my intention to seek to press them to a Division.
The amendments change the nature of clause 1 from one that recognises the permanence of the Scottish Parliament to one that declares it. The genesis of the clause was the Smith commission report, which required that there should be a statement in the legislation to follow it that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government were permanent institutions. The form of words in clause 1 was inserted by the draft clauses published at the end of January, which recognised that permanence. The permanence of the Scottish Parliament is to be found not in any amendment or statutory enactment, but in the will of the Scottish people. It is a permanent institution because, frankly, it is unthinkable that it would be repealed at this point. For that reason, and given the comments of the Scottish Parliament’s Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, it is right that we should revisit the issue.
At the heart of this debate is the issue and the definition of sovereignty. The context is a classic Diceyan definition of sovereignty, which says that Parliament here is sovereign. Although matters have moved on somewhat over the years and although it remains the case that Parliament cannot bind its successors, it is undoubtedly the case that since the European Communities Act 1972 we have taken a different view of parliamentary sovereignty, one in which sovereignty is shared with the European Union, as it now is, in Brussels, the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly and even the London Assembly. It was the subject of considerable debate during the constitutional convention back in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The view that was taken then, which as I recall was contained in the claim of right, was that in Scotland the Diceyan version of sovereignty—that Parliament is sovereign—has never been the case, and that sovereignty has always been vested in and remained with the people of Scotland. From that point of view, I see considerable merit in amendment 58 in the name of the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) and his colleagues in the Scottish National party, requiring that if there were ever to be a repeal of the Scotland Act 1998 it could be done only with the consent of a majority voting in a referendum. That honours and respects the view that sovereignty lies with the people in Scotland.
However, even that clause could be got around by a simple repeal, a consequence of the doctrine that Parliament cannot bind its successors. As long as we try to do these things by way of primary legislation, we will keep tying ourselves up in knots and any solution that we bring forward will lack permanence and will be unsatisfactory.
Mr Graham Allen (Nottingham North) (Lab)
Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that the former Member for Monklands East and leader of the Labour party, John Smith, said that the British constitution, which embraces the Scottish constitution, should not be a matter of judicial archaeology—that was the phrase he used—but should be put down plainly as a written constitution for all to see? Is that where his argument is going? I hope it is.
Mr Carmichael
I have long held that view. I cannot remember a time in my conscious political being that I have held a view other than that. It is never going to be easy to get to that point, of course, and it will require a fundamental change in the way we do things. The reference to judicial archaeology is interesting, because it would render some of the things that were done in this place reviewable in the courts. As long as there is a proper separation of powers, I am quite happy with that.
Mike Weir (Angus) (SNP)
I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says about amendment 58, and he is correct that Parliament cannot bind its successors, but if we put it into the Bill that there has to be a referendum of the Scottish people before there can be a change, that is a very powerful moral argument against this place, and the strongest we can make under the current constitutional settlement.
Mr Carmichael
Indeed, and it is for that reason that I said that I saw some merit in the proposal. The hon. Gentleman would have to accept, though, that the point I have already made—that even that could be repealed by a simple vote in this Chamber and the other place—will always be a problem for any Government seeking to do that by way of primary legislation.
Mr Carmichael
I actually agree with the right hon. Gentleman on that point. Indeed, I see the Bill as the start of a process that must continue, because we risk putting an intolerable strain on the Union if we proceed with constitutional change that relates only to Scotland and not to the rest of the United Kingdom, particularly in relation to the different parts of England. As far as the future of the English constitution is concerned, the only point on which I am clear is that there is absolutely no consensus on the shape that it ought to take. I stood at the Dispatch Box often enough during the previous Parliament, answering questions from both sides of the House, and being told, “This is what we need”, and I rarely heard the same proposition twice. It is for that reason that, if we are to have a written constitution, we must first have a constitutional convention, because we will never build the necessary consensus for this sort of constitutional change merely within Parliament. That was the experience with Scotland’s constitutional convention in the 1990s, and it was then the lesson of the Smith commission and, before it, the Calman commission.
Frank Field
While the right hon. Gentleman opposes those doubts, does he not accept that, given that we are now in the process of changing our constitution and meeting the wishes of the Scottish people, we in England will probably not have to wait as long for opinion to come together on what England needs as the pioneers had to wait to get justice for Scotland?
Mr Carmichael
I am heartened by the right hon. Gentleman’s optimism in that regard; I always think that achieving consensus in these matters is much easier to talk about than to get. Frankly, that is a debate that England now needs to have for herself. It is certainly not for us to intervene in it, any more than we would have welcomed the intervention of the English, Welsh or Northern Irish in the constitutional convention discussions of the 1990s. I wish the English every bit as much joy with it as we have had in Scotland with our constitutional debate over the years.
The hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) has tabled a new clause proposing a constitutional convention, and there is a great deal in it that I find worthy of support, particularly the requirement that it be convened within a month of the Bill becoming an Act, because I do not think that these matters become any easier by being left. I am also impressed by the fact that it has a reporting date, which I suggest would serve to concentrate minds.
Speaking as a Scottish Member, I think that the hon. Gentleman’s proposal has the further benefit of allowing a constitutional convention to go ahead; we would be saying today that it is something that is going to happen, but it would not in fact delay the passing of the Bill. In order to hold faith with the 55% of the people of Scotland who voted no last September, I think that we should proceed with the Bill with all due dispatch. I do not think that it would be acceptable for the passing of the Bill to be somehow contingent on constitutional arrangements being refined elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
I would have preferred—inevitably so—to see included in the remit of the proposed constitutional convention the question of electoral reform, for which I think there is now greater support in the Labour party, but I would not let that omission stand between me and supporting the Bill today.
Ian Austin (Dudley North) (Lab)
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the case he is making in his usual eloquent and persuasive way. Many Members on both sides of the Committee will welcome the fact that he is here and will want to express our support for him and tell him how much we hope that he is successful in standing up to the Scottish National party Members sitting in front of him, who clearly want to create a one-party state in Scotland and whose supporters engage in the most disreputable bullying tactics in order to silent any dissent in that country.
Mr Carmichael
I will take support anywhere I can find it, but I am not entirely sure that the hon. Gentleman’s remarks are germane to the matter that is before the Committee.
Amendment 89, which was tabled by the Scottish National Party, will facilitate a debate on the concept of full fiscal autonomy. I shall listen with interest to the hon. Member for Moray and others in their exposition of that, and I shall reserve my remarks on it until the end of this string of amendments, when I know I will be able to catch your eye, Mr Hoyle.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
New clause 3, which stands in my name, would deliver full fiscal autonomy, real home rule and a Scottish Parliament in control of everything save defence and foreign affairs. I am only a Back Bencher and I do not have the assistance of Government officials, so if the new clause is defective in technical detail, I apologise. If it were voted for tonight, however, it would establish a clear principle and a way forward.
The contention is clear: the new clause would deliver full fiscal autonomy. The Scottish Parliament would have full freedom to raise all taxes as it liked. It would not be restricted to fiddling around with bands; it would control all thresholds and all VAT dividends, and it would have full freedom to spend that money as it liked. That is what real Parliaments do, and that is why they are responsible.
The Scottish Parliament is constructed in a manner that is inherently conducive to the culture of grievance, and that would still be true even if the Smith commission proposals were adopted. The Scottish Parliament will raise only 50% of what it spends. Worse, under the 30-year-old, discredited Barnett formula, which even its conceiver condemned towards the end of his life, Scotland’s block grant will be based not on needs but on English levels of spending. No matter which tartan is chosen to clad the Scottish purse, the purse strings will still be controlled by England. That, I believe, has to change.
Following reports by the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Institute for Fiscal Studies, it has been said that Scotland faces a £7 billion black hole. Presumably, however, the SNP wanted independence in the next year. We cannot have an independent Parliament that does not have full fiscal autonomy, so let us have a real, informed debate about the figures.
Pete Wishart
My hon. Friend always gets right to the heart of the matter. We know that everything in this Bill that we have been trying to secure is supported by the Scottish people. It is also supported by the massed ranks of SNP Members here, and by the 60% of the Scottish people who want everything devolved to the Scottish Parliament other than foreign affairs, defence and treason. The hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) forgot to mention treason in his list of powers that would remain reserved. An opinion poll last week showed not only that we won more than 50% of the vote but that we are now on course to win 60% of the Holyrood vote next year. It showed that there is a clear desire to ensure that we move forward progressively.
I shall turn to the central issues in the Bill, starting with the permanence of the Scottish Parliament. That was about the most useful thing to emerge from the Smith commission’s report. It followed the vow that was reported in the Daily Record as stating that the permanence of the Parliament should be a predominant issue. We were disappointed that the draft Scotland Bill could not find an appropriate form of words to encapsulate that proposal. The thing that has struck me is the Scottish people’s surprise that this House could actually do away with the Scottish Parliament. I do not think that people really believed that that was the case. We have to resolve this issue.
The Scottish Parliament is now the key focus of the national debate on our nation and our political culture in Scotland. As we have continued to secure more and new powers for the Scottish Parliament, it has become an intrinsic feature of what we are about as a nation. The fact that this House can simply decide, perhaps on a whim, to abolish the Scottish Parliament is totally unacceptable to the Scottish people and has now to be put right. We have this one opportunity to address it by getting our amendment through this evening—we could sort this out.
I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) because he recognised that situation when he was Secretary of State for Scotland. He said—I paraphrase him and I will let him intervene if I have this wrong—that something must be done about it. It was then thrown over to the new Secretary of State to pick up; it now falls in his lap, and he has to address it and ensure that we get what we want, which is the permanence—
Mr Alistair Carmichael
Does the hon. Gentleman accept, however, that by doing this through primary legislation any solution—any form of words—is always going to be imperfect, and that the only way we will genuinely recognise the political reality that is the permanence of the Scottish Parliament is through a written constitution, and for that we need a constitutional convention?
Pete Wishart
There is very little I would disagree with the right hon. Gentleman about on these things, and I agree that there is a real requirement for a written constitution in this country. But let me suggest another way we can get the permanence for the Scottish Parliament, as set out in our amendment 59: by putting this to the Scottish people in a referendum. The only way then that the Scottish Parliament would ever be abolished or done away with would be on the say-so of the Scottish people, as a directly expressed desire through a referendum. I hope the right hon. Gentleman supports us in that amendment this evening, because it is the way to go forward.
That deals with the permanence issue. We have not heard much about another matter, despite several of my friends from south of the border having spoken in this debate. I refer to new clause 2 on the constitutional convention, which I believe the hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) is still to speak to. That has been a long-standing policy of the Labour party and it was central to its manifesto at the last election—I have to say that Labour did not have a great deal of success when it was put to the people of England. My problem with this idea that Scottish devolution and our constitutional journey should be mashed together with a UK-wide look at the constitution is that it would slow down our very clear progress and our clear statement of where we want to go. The cause of English devolution moves at an almost glacial pace, and any suggestion that we have to be slowed down, as England rightly works out what it wants to do, has to be rejected this evening. Just piggy-backing Labour’s concerns about a constitutional convention and about English devolution on to a Bill about Scotland, and the things we were promised in the vow and that were progressed with the Smith commission is totally unacceptable. I say to the Labour party: do the work yourselves. There is no need to bring it to a Scotland Bill in order to progress this agenda. Bring in your own piece of legislation. Bring it in however you like and we will play a part in that. There are interesting things to be discussed on the further progress of constitutional change all over the UK.
David Mundell
I said that I would reflect on a number of the issues raised by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) relating to proposals by the Law Society of Scotland. Among those is the debate on the wording currently in part 1, and we will certainly look at that.
I do not accept amendments 58 and 59 because they refer to the term “constitution” whereas clause 1 refers to the term “constitutional arrangements”. The term “constitutional arrangements” is used to reflect the fact that the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. That is a well-established constitutional arrangement of which a Scottish Parliament is a crucial and enduring part.
In new clause 2, the hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) proposes a constitutional convention. I have said at this Dispatch Box previously that I, and this Government, do not support a constitutional convention for reasons that have been well rehearsed, not least because—on this one matter I am in agreement with the Scottish National party—it would slow down the progress of this Bill, which I am committed to taking through Parliament as quickly as possible.
Other matters have been raised and we have debated them fully but they do not fully relate to the Bill. On that basis, I propose that we move to vote on the amendments.
Mr Alistair Carmichael
I am mindful of the fact that we have spent a considerable amount of time on this group of amendments, so I will not detain the Committee for long at this stage.
We have had a very good debate; in fact, two very good debates. On the first, there is among the three Opposition parties a broad measure of consensus that the Bill is capable of improvement. I will hold the Secretary of State to his word when he says that he will take that away and look at it. I remind him that while he might win a majority quite easily in this House, the Bill will also be scrutinised in the other place. I urge on him further consideration and suggest that the proposals brought forward by me and others tonight—I do not intend to press mine to a vote, but others who choose to do so will have my support—are reasonable.
I was very disappointed by the Secretary of State’s response on the constitutional convention. Ultimately, if we are to continue with this Union, a federal structure is inevitable. That will have to be grasped sooner or later, and the way in which that will be done is through the calling of a constitutional convention.
There has not been the same level of consensus on our other debate about the proposals for full fiscal autonomy. It has not been a particularly good debate: it has been characterised more by the heat it has generated than the light. Like the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard), I favour the idea of evidence-based policy. I am not without sympathy for those on the SNP Front Bench when they say that they could do things differently with the extra powers that would be given to them. However, to simply say that it could all be done by generating extra economic growth is not good enough.
Mr Carmichael
No, I am just winding up.
They voted for a family of nations whereby we all put in and all take out at different times, with different measures and in different ways, with a single market, offering a single system of regulation and of business taxation. That is what my constituents voted for, both in this election and in last year’s referendum. For that reason, I will certainly not vote with the Scottish nationalists or, indeed, with the English nationalists on the Conservative Back Benches if they are minded to press their proposals to a vote. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 58, in clause 1, page 1, leave out lines 7 and 8 and insert—
“(1A) The Scottish Parliament is a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitution.
(1B) Subsection (1) or (1A) may be repealed only if—
(a) the Scottish Parliament has consented to the proposed repeal, and
(b) a referendum has been held in Scotland on the proposed repeal and a majority of those voting at the referendum have consented to it.”—(Angus Robertson.)
This amendment is to ensure that the Scottish Parliament can only be abolished with the consent of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish people after a referendum.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Angus Robertson
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Crausby, and to follow the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen). I can give him the assurance that my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Scottish National party Benches will be resolute in our support of the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights.
I would like to speak to new clause 10. Paragraph 22 of the Smith report, entitled “Scottish Parliament consent to the UK Parliament making law in devolved areas”, recommended, simply and with no room for ambiguity, that
“The Sewel Convention will be put on a statutory footing.”
The details of clause 2 are therefore really important. The Scotland Bill, as drafted, seeks to implement this recommendation by adding a new subsection (8) to section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998. The positioning of this new provision is significant because the provision before it, section 28(7), makes an unambiguous assertion of Westminster’s parliamentary sovereignty and the legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament. Section 28(7) declares:
“This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.”
This is therefore a clear statement that Westminster continues to have the legal power to legislate for Scotland across devolved, as well as reserved, areas of public policy. Clause 2 inserts section 28(8), which states:
“But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.”
In paragraph 61 of its report, the Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers) Committee considered that the draft clause placed
“the purpose of the Sewel Convention in statute”—
but—
“does not incorporate in legislation the process for consultation and consent where Westminster plans to legislate in a devolved area.”
In addition, the Committee recommended that the words “but it is recognised” and “normally” in the draft clause should be removed because they weaken the intention of the Smith recommendations. We agree with the all-party Committee’s analysis.
The current clause fails to implement the Smith recommendation in three respects. First, on amendments to the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, the Sewel convention, as set out in devolution guidance note 10, also requires the consent of the Scottish Parliament to Westminster legislation that alters the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament or the Executive competence of Scottish Ministers. The clause does not refer to either of those categories. This is a significant omission. As the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee noted, and as the hon. Member for Nottingham North no doubt remembers:
“We heard in oral evidence from Professor McHarg and in written evidence from Dr Adam Tucker and Dr Adam Perry that the draft clause failed to acknowledge the full scope of the Sewel Convention as it is currently applied in practice. The clause refers only to the Convention’s applicability in respect of devolved matters: it was pointed out to us that the Convention is also applied to legislation affecting the competences of the devolved institutions.”
This is reflected in the UK Government’s devolution guidance note 10, which states that a Bill requiring Scottish parliamentary consent under the Sewel convention is one which
“contains provisions applying to Scotland and which are for devolved purposes, or which alter the legislative competence of the Parliament or the executive competence of the Scottish Ministers.”
DGN 10 is referred to in the Command Paper, containing the draft clauses, as follows: “It is expected that the practice developed under Devolution Guidance Note 10 will continue.”
DGN 10 has no legal effect, but sets out how the UK Government Departments legislating in Scotland will meet the terms of the convention. This practice is not reflected in the drafting of clause 2.
Secondly, on statute as a convention, the clause puts the Sewel convention into legislation as a convention, rather than putting the convention on a statutory footing. As the Scottish Government have pointed out to the Scottish Parliament Committee, this is very different from precedents where the UK has placed other conventions on a statutory footing, such as the Ponsonby convention relating to treaty ratification. Again, as the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee noted:
“We consider that draft clause 2 does not give the Sewel Convention the force of statute, but may strengthen the Convention politically. We believe it fails to acknowledge that the Convention extends to legislation affecting the competences of the devolved institutions. We recommend that the presence of the word ‘normally’ in the Sewel Convention, and the applicability of the Convention to legislation affecting the competences of the devolved institutions, be addressed in any redrafting of draft clause 2.”
Thirdly, on the consultation requirement, as has been widely noted and as set out in DGN 10, the effective operation of the Sewel convention depends on consultation between the Scottish and UK Governments, which the Secretary of State for Scotland made play of earlier. The clause, however, fails to include any consultation requirements.
The Scottish Government’s alternative clause, which we have tabled as a new clause, addresses those deficiencies and properly places the Sewel convention on a statutory footing. The opening subsection of the alternative adds to section 28 of the Scotland Act by providing a clear statement of the Sewel convention that the UK Parliament must not pass Acts applying to Scotland about a devolved matter without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. It then defines “about a devolved matter” to encompass all three categories covered by DGN 10: legislation in a devolved area; changing the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament; and adjusting the Executive competence of the Scottish Government.
The alternative clause then provides for a new section 28A to be inserted into the Scotland Act. This is a straightforward consultation provision requiring the UK Government to consult the Scottish Government before introducing to Westminster Bills that apply to Scotland. Where the Westminster Bill would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament under section 28, as amended, the UK Government should share a copy of the provisions of the Bill that apply to Scotland with the Scottish Government 21 days before introduction at Westminster. However, there is an understanding that, on occasion, it is necessary to expedite the legislative process, and therefore the alternative clause is pragmatic and flexible in allowing the consultation requirement to be curtailed in certain circumstances.
The Scottish Parliament has of course looked at the clauses proposed by the Government, and its Devolution (Further Powers) Committee considered
“that the current draft clause, whilst placing the purpose of the Sewel Convention in statute, does not incorporate in legislation the process for consultation and consent where Westminster plans to legislate in a devolved area. The Committee considers that it should do so. Moreover, the Committee considers that the use of the words ‘but it is recognised’ and ‘normally’ has the potential to weaken the intention of the Smith Commission‘s recommendation in this area and recommends that these words be removed from the draft clause.
For those reasons, I urge Members on both sides of the Committee to support the measure we are promoting. In response to the published Bill, the Committee called for the specified words to be removed from the clause, but there has been no change: clause 2 is identical to the draft clause 2 we saw those many months ago.
Given everything we hear about reflecting, improvements, co-operation and the UK Government listening to the Scottish Government, the SNP and other parties, I would love to hear from the Secretary of State, whose ear I am hoping to catch, at what stage the Government intend to accept and implement these improvements. As drafted, the clause does not implement the Smith recommendation. As I have said, that critique was agreed by all parties in the Scottish Parliament, and I hope the UK Government will take that on board.
The clause puts the Sewel convention into statute, rather than putting it on a statutory footing, as required by paragraph 22 of the Smith report. In our view, the intention of the Smith recommendations was that key aspects of DGN 10 would be codified in statute. As it stands, the clause sets out the basic principle, but provides no statutory process for consultation and consent where Westminster plans to legislate for Scotland in devolved areas. As things stand, the Bill has not been drafted to take account of the shortcomings; does not put the Sewel convention on a meaningful statutory basis; does not adequately implement the Smith commission recommendations; and does not apply to changes to the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament or Executive competence of Scottish Ministers. That is why we will be pressing for these changes.
Mr Alistair Carmichael
Amendments 19 and 20 have their genesis in the efforts of the Law Society of Scotland and seek to achieve much the same ends as those already outlined by the hon. Members for Caerphilly (Wayne David) and for Moray (Angus Robertson). On a very literal basis, clause 2 does implement the Sewel convention, which is why the word “normally” is in there. When Lord Sewel, during consideration of the Scotland Act 1998 in the other place, gave his undertaking, the word “normally” was used. However, as has become apparent from the comments of the hon. Member for Moray and others, the operation of the convention over the years has been very different—we now have DGN 10—and on reflection, with the benefit of pre-legislative scrutiny, it should be revisited in the terms before the House. I do not necessarily expect the Secretary of State to accept the amendments, but I hope he will acknowledge that this is a legitimate point that it would cost the Government nothing to adopt. It would be an indication that they are listening and of their good will.
New clause 5 is in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen). I enjoyed the trailer for his Second Reading speech to the Human Rights Act abolition Bill—if we are ever to see it; it is notable, of course, that it was not in the Queen’s Speech. I hope that, having looked into the abyss and seen the myriad complications that would come from their proposal, the Government might find extensive and mature consideration necessary and that we might, in fact, never see that Second Reading.
Mr Graham Allen
Incidentally, the draft of a written constitution done by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee included the Bill of Rights.
The abolition of the Human Rights Act—or changes to it—was in the manifesto of the governing party, so it might feel that it ought to do it. Will the right hon. Gentleman reinforce the point, however, that, as we are proving this evening, good pre-legislative scrutiny on something so technical and detailed would prove an immense bonus to the Government in getting their proposals through?
Mr Carmichael
Indeed, that is the case. For all sorts of reasons, pre-legislative scrutiny is not always possible, but it ought to be the default in any sensible legislature.
The Secretary of State may intervene if I am wrong, but I understand that the Government have said they will not change the integration of the Human Rights Act in the 1998 Act and that it will continue to underpin the Scottish Parliament. Inevitably, then, any such change would not apply to Scotland. It is conceivable, however, that we might be left with a messy situation in Scotland where the Human Rights Act applied to some matters and not to others. I was practising in the Scottish courts as a solicitor when the Scotland Act came into force but before the Human Rights Act came into force across the whole of the UK. It meant we had to use a device known as a “devolution note” if we wanted to raise human rights matters in court. It was messy. It was necessary to get us through the year, but I do not want to go back to those days. Having a single regime of human rights protections that applies across the whole of the UK is absolutely necessary, and we tamper with it at our peril.
David Mundell
I am happy to respond to the points made and to restate, as I did on the previous group, that I will be meeting the Scottish Parliament’s Devolution (Further Powers) Committee next week, which will be an opportunity to explore some of the issues it raised in its report.
The Government’s starting point is that the Smith commission’s intention was not that the current constitutional position should be changed. Instead, the commission’s intention was that legislation should accurately reflect the political understanding of the convention, and that is exactly what I see the clause as doing.
Currently, the Government do not normally legislate in devolved areas without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. Clause 2 sets out that practice. In doing so, it puts on a statutory footing a convention that has been consistently adhered to by successive United Kingdom Governments. I understand the desire to put beyond doubt that we will seek the consent of the Scottish Parliament when legislating on devolved matters. However, in effect, amendment 56 seeks to limit the sovereignty of this Parliament by removing the word “normally” to state that the Parliament of the United Kingdom cannot legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.
In reality, the amendment would directly contradict section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, which states that the section, which relates to Acts of the Scottish Parliament,
“does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.”
The amendment would radically alter the way in which the practice was intended to operate as envisaged by Lord Sewel.
Mr Alistair Carmichael
The Secretary of State is making a compelling case for codification. On a number of occasions and in different ways, the House has limited its sovereignty, particularly in relation to the European Communities Act 1972. As I recall, there is judicial authority on that from the Factortame case. Surely he accepts that the mere act of putting a convention on a statutory footing is a change. For that reason, the adherence to the word “normally” is not appropriate.
David Mundell
It is not a change to how things are normally done, but a change to how they are set out on the face of legislation. As part of the Smith process, it was clear that people wanted the convention set out in the Bill, but I do not accept that they want a change to the convention as envisaged by Lord Sewel.
Joanna Cherry
I rise to speak in favour of amendments 62 and 67. Amendment 67 would introduce to clause 11 a subsection that would remove the Human Rights Act from the list of protected provisions in schedule 4 to the Scotland Act 1998.
In the debate on the Gracious Speech, the Home Secretary confirmed that a Bill will be brought forward during this Parliament to introduce a Bill of Rights and to repeal the Human Rights Act. The Scottish National party has consistently opposed repeal of the Human Rights Act. We won the election in Scotland and therefore there is no mandate from the Scottish people for repeal of the Act. None the less, the Secretary of State for Scotland has confirmed, albeit on Radio Scotland, that repeal of the Human Rights Act will apply equally in Scotland as in England. At present, the Human Rights Act is listed as a protected provision in schedule 4 to the Scotland Act, which means that the Scottish Parliament cannot modify the Human Rights Act. Amendment 67 would change that.
The UK Government have not been clear on how potential changes to the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European convention on human rights and the abolition of the Human Rights Act could impact on the place of the ECHR in Scotland’s constitutional settlement. That is important because the ECHR is entrenched in the Scotland Act. For example, section 29(2)(d) provides that a provision that is incompatible with the ECHR is outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, and section 57(2) provides that a member of the Scottish Government has no power to make any subordinate legislation or to do any act in so far as that would be incompatible with the ECHR.
Neither of those sections would be changed by simple repeal of the Human Rights Act alone. It is clear, therefore, that human rights are not specifically a reserved matter; they are partially devolved. Scottish National party Members therefore argue that any repeal of the Human Rights Act without first consulting the Scottish Parliament would violate the Sewel convention, whereby the Westminster Government will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.
Matters are further complicated by the fact that the Smith commission and the draft clauses proposed putting the Sewel convention on a legislative footing. There is therefore the prospect of a very real clash between the United Kingdom Government commitment to revise and reduce the role of the ECHR in United Kingdom law and their commitment to the Scottish electorate to implement the vow. There is a real possibility of a clash between the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments.
It is worth pausing to look at the realities of human rights in the United Kingdom and why they matter. As I said in my maiden speech, the United Kingdom in fact loses very few of the cases brought against it in Strasbourg. The United Kingdom once had a proud tradition of leading in Europe on human rights. It was elected to membership of the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2014 on a prospectus claiming that it was
“a passionate, committed and effective defender of human rights”.
Repealing the Human Rights Act would not really live up to that claim and would send out all the wrong signals. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) said in 2014 that the proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act represented a
“failure of ambition…on the global promotion of human rights”.
Human rights matter to ordinary people in this country. Those who have benefited from the Human Rights Act include victims of domestic violence, who have been able to get better protection, and victims of rape, who have used the Act to ensure that the police properly investigate offences. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people have used human rights to overcome discrimination in this country. The families of military personnel killed on active service because the Ministry of Defence supplied them with outdated equipment have also benefited under the Human Rights Act. These rights are very real for ordinary United Kingdom citizens.
In Scotland, we have a national action plan for human rights, which has been co-produced in partnership with wider civil society. We have a United Nations- accredited Scottish Human Rights Commission, which is internationally acknowledged as one of the world’s best. As I said in my maiden speech, our commitment to human rights in Scotland extends not just to the ECHR, but beyond that to social and economic rights. Through our work on social justice and challenges such as that on fair work, we are intent on ensuring that people in Scotland can enjoy their economic, social and cultural human rights. Scotland is also a world leader in its work to give full effect to the rights of children. We are very proud of that record in Scotland and we wish to protect it—hence amendment 67.
As I have said, the amendment would have the effect of removing the Human Rights Act from the list of enactments that cannot be modified by the Scottish Parliament. If the Scottish Parliament was able to modify the Human Rights Act, that would allow the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament to establish a human rights regime in Scotland regardless of whether the Act was repealed by the UK Parliament.
I hasten to add that, as our First Minister has said, the SNP is committed to opposing the repeal of the Human Rights Act for the whole of the UK, not just for Scotland. However, in the unfortunate event that it is repealed for the whole of the UK, amendment 67 would enable us to do something about it, at least in Scotland. That position has the overwhelming support of the Scottish electorate, as evidenced by the 56 out of 59 MPs sitting beside and behind me.
Mr Alistair Carmichael
I will not detain the Committee because time is pressing.
I tabled amendments 21 and 22, which were authored by the Law Society of Scotland. The two issues that they deal with are fairly short in their compass and I do not intend to press them to a Division. However, I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to them and to have it on the record.
Amendment 21 would include the parliamentary term of the Scottish Parliament within the provisions that can be altered only by way of a super-majority. Under amendment 22, the same would be true of boundaries. It is the wish of the Law Society of Scotland that it should not be possible to influence those matters by a simple majority merely for political advantage.
The Deputy Leader of the House of Commons (Dr Thérèse Coffey)
I thank the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) for their contributions. A number of significant points have been raised and, in responding to them, I will set out the Government’s approach.
I will start by speaking to a number of minor and technical Government amendments. Government amendments 108 to 110 will give Scottish Ministers the power to modify additional sections of the Scotland Act 1998 within their devolved competence and will clarify the extent to which those and other sections can be modified.
Amendment 108 will allow the Scottish Parliament to modify subsections (1) and (3) to (5) of section 112 of the 1998 Act to the extent that they apply to any power exercisable within devolved competence to make subordinate legislation. Amendment 109 will ensure that the Scottish Parliament can modify subsections (1) and (3) to (5) of section 112, section 113, section 115 and schedule 7 to the 1998 Act so far as those provisions apply to making subordinate legislation, including Orders in Council made by Her Majesty in areas of devolved competence. Amendment 110 will give the Scottish Parliament the power to modify section 124 of the 1998 Act, in so far as it applies to making subordinate legislation in areas of devolved competence. Those amendments will ensure that the Scottish Parliament can modify how the relevant sections apply to subordinate legislation made by Scottish Ministers and to Orders in Council made by Her Majesty that fall within devolved competence.
Amendments 62 to 66 and amendments 21 and 22 seek to amend clause 10, which fulfils the Smith commission agreement to require certain types of electoral legislation to be passed by a two-thirds majority of the Scottish Parliament. I thank the hon. and learned Lady and the right hon. Gentleman for those amendments. The Government believe that our approach to clause 10 delivers on paragraph 27 of the Smith commission agreement, which identified that there are certain types of electoral legislation on which a broad consensus is important. The commission agreed that such a procedure should apply to legislation that changes the franchise, the electoral system or the number of constituencies and regional Members of the Scottish Parliament.
Although the Government will reflect on the points that were made, we do not support those amendments, because we believe that at least two thirds of the Members of the Scottish Parliament should vote in favour of legislation that comes under clause 10 at the final stage. We recognise that that means there will have to be a vote, rather than a Bill passed by consensus, but we believe that the clause implements the intention behind the Smith commission agreement. As the Smith commission recognised, the super-majority requirement is an important safeguard of legislative powers. It is for this reason that I urge hon. Members not to press the amendments.
Amendments 21 and 22, in the name of the right hon. Gentleman, go beyond the Smith commission agreement, which did not propose that legislation relating to the term length of the Scottish Parliament, or the date of any Scottish Parliament ordinary general election, should be subject to that two thirds majority; neither did the agreement state that the Bills concerning the alteration of boundaries of constituencies, regions or any other equivalent electoral area for the Scottish Parliament should be covered by this requirement. For that reason, I ask the right hon. Gentleman not to press his amendments.
Mr Alistair Carmichael
In principle, why would the parliamentary term length be different from the other functions the Minister listed?