Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Ninth sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 5th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

We are moving to the business end of part 2. There are eerie echoes of the business end of the test match not so far over the road; we have two Yorkshiremen at the crease. I implore them to be perhaps less Illingworth and Boycott, as we have seen so far—immoveable objects—and perhaps more Bairstow and Root, with a bit more action and flexibility. I will offer them a few reverse sweeps, if they would not mind accepting one or two of them—although I think in this metaphor that makes me Virat Kohli, and I would not wish to wear that mantle.

This clause is important: it lays the basis for introducing an entire new tier of politicians in this country, in significant numbers, so it cannot pass without comment. I want to make a couple of points about clause 24 and schedule 2, and I hope that the Minister can address them when he responds to the debate. As discussed on Thursday, these provisions introduce combined county authorities on a mirrored basis with combined authorities. For many people in this country, the visible manifestation of combined authorities is the directly elected Mayors who lead some of them. On a mirroring basis, the clause provides the opportunity for a combined county authority to be led by a directly elected Mayor. In the months to come, I think there will be a great deal of interest in the individuals who stand for these offices and are elected, and in what they do.

There is much to be proud of in the record of those directly elected combined authority Mayors. In Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham has taken unprecedented action to end homelessness. Tracy Brabin is authoring a creative new deal to harness the power of creative industries in driving growth across West Yorkshire. Her evidence was important in informing our proceedings. Similarly, in our proceedings last week, we spoke in great detail about how essential transport is to levelling up. Perhaps that is why Steve Rotheram is leading efforts for bus franchising and leadership of essential local transport across the Liverpool city region. Dan Norris is leading admirable efforts in house retrofitting as part of the £50 million green recovery plan in the west of England. That is just the tip of the iceberg of exciting efforts that Mayors leading combined authorities are making in their communities.

Clearly, there are benefits that have been identified by those communities in selecting their model of leadership: direct accountability, ease of engagement with the private sector, and ease of engagement with central Government. Our position is that where it is what communities want, it can be an effective model. Where it is what local leaders and their communities have chosen, it can work very well for them. We support communities that want to have Mayors to be able to get them. We will discuss shortly how the reverse of that is true; where communities do not want them, we think they should have that option. We will discuss that when debating the following clause.

I want to press the Minister for clarity on schedule 2. It may well be my misunderstanding—I will be glad if it is—but I would like clarity particularly on paragraph 2(2) of schedule 2. Schedule 2 is inserted by clause 24(4), and sets the rules for the election of a Mayor. Paragraph 2(2) of schedule 2 governs the timings of elections. At the moment, it says:

“The first election for the return of a mayor is to take place on the first day of ordinary elections of councillors of a constituent council to take place after the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the regulations under section 24(1) come into force.”

As the process has been explained so far, the Bill will complete Committee stage at some point in the autumn. The remaining stages will be dealt with; it will then go to the Lords. There will then be a period of negotiation, as we understood from the Minister last week, between the Department and the 10 areas that have been called forward to pursue deals with the possibility of having a directly elected Mayor. We know that at least half of those areas have indicated an interest in that. There was a sense from the Minster that that would take a little bit of time. After that, regulations would be laid and debated in this place in the usual fashion, and then, according to paragraph 2(2) of schedule 2, six months after that there will be the next set of local elections. I am not sure if that is right; I wanted to probe that.

There are two reasons I am not sure about that. First, for some of the areas specified in the White Paper, at least one of the constituent councils—setting the districts aside—that signed up to the combined county authority will elect by thirds, whereas some, such as Nottingham and Nottinghamshire, will not because both local authorities only do all-outs. That would be distinct from, for example, Derby and Derbyshire, where Derbyshire does all-outs and Derby elects by thirds. There might be some eagerness, as we have seen, for that deal to be a collective one, but that is not necessarily the case. If there were two distinct and different deals between Derby and Derbyshire, and Nottingham and Nottinghamshire, that would currently mean different election dates. The first date for the election of constituent councillors in Derby would fall a year before, in 2024, than it would in Nottinghamshire, which would be in 2025. That does not seem right to me.

Secondly, perhaps peeling back the curtain on local negotiations in my community, I understood that 2024 was the target date for the first mayoral elections. The Minister said last week that 2023 would be too soon. That would mean that areas that were not electing by thirds would be waiting until 2025. I cannot believe that is the desire of the Government. That would be a longer wait than they would wish. I am sorry to put some politics into that, but that also would create a skewing effect in turnout. If combined authority elections were held on a county council day, where the implication is that they are some sort of combination of a country area and a more urban area, we know it will have a skewing effect in those elections if one set of electors have multiple elections and the other does not.

I think that that is likely to prove problematic in negotiations for the Minister. If the constituent authorities signing up think that it is the case that they will be at an unnatural disadvantage, I do not think that is very desirable. In general, that might not be very desirable. One of two things is true in this case: either I have misunderstood this, which is definitely possible; or the Minister intends to alter it in regulations later so that, notwithstanding paragraph 2(2) of schedule 2, we could still set the date at 2024. I hope that the Minister will either correct me, or at least assure me that the intention is as communicated to those whom he is negotiating with, otherwise we will have to divide on the schedule.

[Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)]

In the spirit of unity and collegiality, which has marked the tone of the debate in Committee over the past few weeks, as a Lancastrian I wish the Yorkshiremen at the crease in Edgbaston all the very best. I still dare to believe, although there are two wickets and it could all go horribly wrong, could it not? However, let us focus on the matter at hand.

This is an important area for all of us. The Government have clearly set their heart on having a Mayor at the head of CCAs around the country and that being their chosen model for delivering devolution. I want to press the Minister to understand that that must not be something that is forced on communities. We must not be in a situation in which elected Mayors are deemed to be an essential, otherwise devolution deals would not be permitted.

I worry for lots of reasons, some of which have been mentioned by the hon. Member for Nottingham North. Many Mayors of all political colours do a great job around the country, and it is a mode of local government leadership that can work—it sometimes does and sometimes does not. The people of Bristol have demonstrated to us that it might not work for everybody. There is still time to reflect and think, “That’s not the way we wish to go as a community.”

The fundamental thing that I would like the Minister to state, in response to the debate on this particular aspect of the Bill, is that the Government will not make an elected Mayor a mandatory, compulsory element of any kind of devolution deal in any part of the country. There are reasons why communities might reject or not wish to have—or not benefit specifically from having—a directly elected Mayor as their mode of local government leadership.

For example, many people feel, as I do, that the election of a single Mayor to lead a local government area can personalise and trivialise politics. It can undermine collegiality, in which people from different parties and communities reach common decisions. It makes consensual outcomes with all political and geographical views properly represented much less likely. It can also distance local government from the people it is meant to serve. It feels to me to be part of a movement that is making local government less local.

If a councillor representing 2,000 or 3,000 people has direct access to the cabinet or executive of a local authority, a local person is much more likely to see that councillor, who is more likely to be someone they bump into at a supermarket, in the pub, at church, in the street or what have you, and to be able to hold them to account. Such a councillor is much more likely to absorb that person’s views and perspectives than a Mayor who represents hundreds of thousands of people. A Mayor makes local government less local, and what is the point of local government if it is not local?

One of the problems with communities such as mine—we have just gone through unitary reorganisation in Cumbria, with the two new authorities of Cumberland and of Westmorland and Furness—is that, in both authorities, parties were elected to run them that were clearly opposed to the mayoral model. To use us as an example, it would be very peculiar and anti-democratic if the Government were to make any kind of devolution deal contingent on the people of those communities having to accept something that they had just rejected only a few weeks ago.

That is the fundamental thing. It is not that there should never be Mayors. As the Committee can tell, I have my views—on whether I think that on the whole directly elected Mayors are a good form of local government—but I can absolutely see the case for them in some communities, if those communities choose them. The fundamental point to make about the clause is that the Government must not seek to enforce something on—or, in effect, to bribe—a community, by saying, “Yes, you can have your devolution deal, but only if you accept this model of local government.” That is not devolution, and it would be unacceptable. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that in his response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Neil O'Brien)]

I concur with the hon. Member for Nottingham North that it is a pleasure to have an all-Yorkshire Front Bench on this third day of the test—sorry, I mean on line-by-line scrutiny. He will recall that some years ago, Yorkshire allowed people who were not born in Yorkshire to play for the team, and I should break to him the news that my colleague the Housing Minister was born in Wales—“Greater Yorkshire” would be the definition here. However, I agree with him on the pleasures of this wicket-by-wicket, single-by-single approach to going through the legislation. I have never been accused of being a flair player, but I hope I can answer his questions.

The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale made a typically sensible set of observations. I will answer a number of them. For the first time, through the framework in the White Paper, there is an option to have a devolution deal without a Mayor, so that option clearly is there; it is possible. We are clear about that, and that may well the right thing, as either a transitional or permanent step, for a number of different places. However, the Government have made it clear that they will go further for places that do have a Mayor because then there is that accountable leadership.

The hon. Gentleman made some important points about the importance of collegiality. In the best functioning mayoral combined authorities, that still very much does happen. We have a clearly accountable front person in the form of the directly elected Mayor, who is a wonderful face for the area on the world and national stage and someone who can be held to account by voters. Where these things work well, there is still a great deal of cross-party collegiality going on below the surface, as it were.

The hon. Gentleman argued that the decision making was a less local model. I would challenge that a little, in so far as decision making for many of the existing combined authorities was already happening at that city-regional basis. Most of these places, after the abolition of the previous elected governments in 1986, had quangos running transport, for example, across the city region. It is just that nobody was directly elected and accountable for the decisions of those quangos.

To take a controversial example, in West Yorkshire there were two failed attempts, led by Metro, to create a tram for Leeds. However, it was not obvious to any normal voter who they should hold to account for those two previous attempts, because no one was elected. It was a quango—the kind that the hon. Member quite rightly complained about in previous sittings.

On the Opposition Front Bench, I agree with much of what the hon. Member for Nottingham North said on the important role that Mayors are playing around the country. On the specific point that he raised about election days, the first election of the Mayor will take place

“on the first day of ordinary elections”

for the constituent councils, which is the first Thursday in May. That is how it is written in schedule 2. Areas do not have to wait until the next scheduled election. It is that date—the first Thursday in May is the day of ordinary election. I hope that that answers the hon. Member’s question on the meaning. I do not blame him at all for asking the question; there is a particular meaning in law for that day.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for that clarity. That will be enough for me not to labour the point. However, I hope the Minister might take that away and think about it, because the Bill refers to

“ordinary elections of councillors of a constituent council”.

I might have misunderstood, but that implies that it is not just ordinary elections, as in just “the first Thursday of May”, which might have been a better way to put it.

[Neil O'Brien]

I am very happy to look at that. I think it is to do with the language of the legislation sounding a particular way, but I am very happy to take that point on board and think further about it.

Question put and agreed to. 

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Schedule 2 agreed to. 

Clause 25

Requirements in connection with regulations under section 24

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 25, page 20, line 32, at end insert—

“(2A) But the Secretary of State must not make regulations under section 24(1) in relation to a CCA’s area if the constituent authorities of that area have requested that powers be conferred by the Secretary of State without the establishment of a mayor.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State providing for a CCA mayor without the consent of the constituent authorities of that CCA.

If the previous clause stand part debate was my love letter to Mayors, this is slightly the opposite. As I said, it is right that communities that wish to harness the value of an elected Mayor are able to do so. I have no doubt that many will choose that, and it is right that they are able to. However, it is not right that those that would choose not to do so are forced, compelled or coerced to have one when that is not their real wish. I fear that that is the effect of the White Paper.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend gets to the nub of the challenge. Although we as politicians can understand all this while sitting in this room, we need to construct a massive communication piece for our constituents across the country, so that they can understand the difference between the tiers of government and the powers that they can access. We are getting such a patchwork—I call it patchwork Britain—and our constituents are not able to grasp what is in, what is out, and where those powers and accountability lie. That could place us in a difficult situation, with a lot of work being duplicated as well. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need clarity not only on how this translates to people, but on the lines of accountability? I am thinking in particular of how people can give voice to what they want, because the proposals are even more confusing in that regard.

[Alex Norris]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. There is an inevitability about this ending up as a patchwork, not least because we have inherited a patchwork today. But there is strength in that, too. If local communities want to access the fullest powers, they should have that chance to do so, but if they do not, they should be able to make that choice as well. We will not always be able to move at the pace of the slowest, as the Minister mentioned frequently on Thursday. One of the best ways to work around that and to avoid the local confusions about accountability that my hon. Friend talks about is for it to be something that the local community really wants. There will be greater understanding if it is something it has asked for. There will be much less understanding when it is a process that has happened to them—police and crime commissioners are a good example of that—rather than with them. As a result, the thing exists in splendid isolation and engagement falls, which is not good.

The Minister made a really good point about the desire, which I think is universally shared, for local decision making. He used really good examples of things that would have previously been operated by quangos and unelected bodies, and said that they should be operated locally by people with a local connection, a local mandate and local accountability. I completely share his view. I do not understand, however, why that has to be part of a new tier. Why cannot it be part of the tier used to create a combined authority? That, by definition, is closer to people because it serves more localised electoral wards? Again, I would be interested to hear about that in the Minister’s summing up.

[Rachael Maskell]

This is not necessarily for legislation, but it will aid us in our formulation. We need clarity on the end point. We are talking about tiers 1, 2 and 3, but is it envisaged that everyone will eventually have fully devolved powers regardless of whether they have a Mayor or not? How long would that journey take? It could be five or 10 years. Alternatively, if tiers 1, 2 and 3 were to apply to separate authorities, what would that mean for this place, because we would be legislating on behalf of just a few authorities, which does not seem right either? Understanding the end point will be absolutely crucial for how we progress the legislation.

[Alex Norris]

I hope that the Minister will explain what the end point is, because it is an interesting question.

In Thursday’s debates, I got a sense that my affinity with the White Paper, certainly in relation to this issue, is closer than that of the Government, and that is because I want everybody to be able to access the fullest range of powers, but to also have the choice of stopping short of them if they wish. That will be a matter for local conversation, but I do not think that we heard during Thursday’s debates that that is quite what the Government want, because they still want to reserve for themselves the provision of negotiating directly and separately. That does not enhance the approach; it only creates greater confusion.

I want to probe the functional reason why a county combined authority has to stop at level 2, while the distinct and different level 3 powers mean that an area has to be led—it is unavoidable and axiomatic—by a directly elected Mayor. I do not understand that. The one explanation of substance, as the Minister mentioned last week, is that police and crime commissioners must be directly elected. I am willing to concede that and will address it shortly, but I am unsure about everything else that is in column 3, as distinct from columns 2 and 1. They include defining the key travel route network; prioritising rail relationships; multi-year transport settlements; the long-term investment fund, which is the real prize in all of this, and I will cover it shortly; designing employment programmes; establishing development corporations; devolution of brownfield funding; partnership with Homes England; public health responsibility where there is interest in it; a precept in council tax; and the supplementing of business rates.

I put it to the Minister and the Committee that those could all be delivered by a combined authority. There is nothing so specialised or individualised that the powers should be exercised by an individual rather than by geographical partners who have chosen to collaborate in the collective interest, with each having derived a mandate from the local ballot box. I will reflect shortly on the important points about acting in consensus and being collegial, as we heard in our evidence from Mayor Andy Street. The way in which he talked about that was admirable. Why does that require a super-person at the head of it to make it go, if it is not what communities want? My contention is that there is no functional reason for that; it is a matter of choice and taste for the Government. And I think that the matter of choice and taste for local communities is as important—frankly, more important—than central Government’s choice and taste.

We should not lose sight of the fact that local councils deliver, too. I was looking at the latest set of The Municipal Journal awards, because it is nomination season for this year. And there is Plymouth and its culture-led recovery; Lancashire delivering during the pandemic; Swansea delivering through its social housing programmes; and Bromley driving health and care integration. All around the country we see local authorities of all tiers delivering for their communities every day. We fail the public conversation and we certainly fail the political conversation if we laser in on individuals who are Mayors, who are doing brilliant work, as I have said, and create that as distinct from councils, because councils themselves are doing great work. It would be better to see council leaders more visibly represented, whether in the media or in the public debate more generally, because up and down the country those local authorities are delivering for communities every day. And they have done that in incredible circumstances. They have been starved of money for 12 years; the context is significant cuts set against increasing costs. But they have adapted and come through for their communities, and their reward seems to be a new tier of local government whether or not they really want it.

I also put this to the Minister. The major, compelling case in relation to tier 3 is the police and crime functions, because, for reasons of statute, that necessitates a Mayor—although there is something undesirable in bad legislation from previous years tying our hands in the future. But that should be a point of choice for communities. If the final tipping point between having only a combined county authority, with basically all the tier 3 powers, and having a mayoral combined county authority is whether or not to take on police and crime functions, I put it to the Minister that the majority, if not all, would stop short and would choose the combined county authority without a Mayor taking on police and crime functions.

Let us be frank about what is happening here: this is about finance. It is always about finance, but this is especially so. This is about line 11 of table 2.3 on page 140 of the White Paper. This is about a long-term investment fund with an agreed annual allocation. All our communities desperately need and deserve this. They have seen it taken away, year on year, for 12 years, and now they want it back. At the moment, they are having to dance for it, through this ridiculous stream of beauty parades to try to get just a little bit of it back. And as we have said in relation to previous clauses, even the winners in those contests are losers, really.

However, this is a chance for communities to try to get some of the money back, and get it on an agreed footing, over a number of years. For those who are making decisions locally, that is really the No. 1 thing—the ability to have a sense of what is coming, so that they can plan and use it most effectively. But there is an asterisk at the end: rather than it being given to them by right, even though clearly the money is there and the Government wish to give it, it is given only if they choose a model of leadership that suits central Government rather than necessarily local communities. That is apparently a negotiation, but it does not look like one to me.

[Rachael Maskell]

My hon. Friend is coming to the nub of the matter. If we look at the issue of the police and crime commissioner or, as in the case of North Yorkshire, the police, fire and crime commissioner, we know that the funding of that post is separate in the way in which that works out in the funding formula, so there is no need to aggregate those particular issues if finance is the driving force behind it. I appreciate my hon. Friend’s point about the piece of accountability, but Tracy Brabin told us in her evidence that taking a public health approach to policing is not necessarily a PCC function per se, but a wider function of local governance in all its tiers and variations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for that intervention. I thought that Mayor Tracy Brabin made a very compelling case. On the reverse of that, in the north-east, police and crime commissioner Kim McGuinness makes a very compelling case as to why it is important to her that PCCs are involved in both health and education as a way of prevention. My only interest in this is in local communities being able to make that choice. If they decide that it is best assembled in one place, that is fine by me; that is no problem whatever. But I do not think that it should be, essentially, foisted on them as part of a negotiation that I think is anything but that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

This is a really interesting debate, and it is good to be able to have it in public. Let me be blunt: nothing is hidden here. We are clear that the Government’s view is that we prefer the mayoral model. Although it is possible to get a lower-tier devolution deal without one, there is no secret that our preference is for the mayoral model. Let me explain why.

Clearly, we could devolve all these powers—do all these things—to an unelected committee. We could have said, “Let’s take the 10 local authorities in Greater Manchester—AGMA—give them all the powers that we have now given to the mayoral combined authority. You just sort it out among yourselves. You can have a committee of the 10 of you, and you can decide among yourselves—perhaps by a majority vote—and then make those decisions.” All those things are totally feasible, and we could do that. It is a perfectly viable model. However, it is not the model we prefer, for various reasons—this goes to the point made by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale. It is not for our convenience, but for the convenience of voters in these places. If we have just a committee, how is that committee held to account by a normal voter?

Let us take the Greater Manchester example, with 10 local authorities. We have got to choose where the new tramline is going to go. Is it going to go to place A or place B? The committee meets, there is no Mayor, and it decides the tramline is going to go to place A, not place B. I do not like that, as a voter; I wanted it to go to place B. What do I do, and who do I hold to account? Perhaps my local authority leader. I go to my local authority leader and she says, “I voted for place B, sorry, but I got outvoted.” What am I supposed to do now? Do I vote against her or for her at the next election? There is no one for me to hold to account if things are run by a committee.

I believe in steel-manning, not straw-manning, my opponent’s argument, so I could say, “No, what we want is not a committee. We want voters to have a say over what happens in these combined authorities, and what we actually want is to go back to the metropolitan county councils. We want to have an assembly.” It is perfectly viable, but let us be clear that that does mean quite a lot more politicians. It is a less sharp, less clear model for most voters than a mayoral system, which is why the mayoral system is the dominant model around the world: everyone around the world has city Mayors and knows that model. Inward investors know and understand that model. There is a phone number and people know who they are picking up to: is it Judith, is it one of the Andys? People know who they are supposed to speak to. We have clear accountability and clear leadership. Sometimes there are tough choices to be made. Consensus is a good thing—we always want maximum consensus—but in the end, we often have to choose between A and B. Having a directly elected mayor who knows that needs to be done, and to have programmatic government, not the lowest common denominator log-rolling and horse-trading, lets people make that decision and be accountable to the public. It gives visibility to the world.

One reason why Labour was right in 1998 to create a directly elected Mayor for Greater London was that in its absence we had a big committee—a big quango—with decisions made without anybody really being held to account. For the same reason that Labour created a directly elected Mayor for the capital, we have done it for the other cities that did not get one before 2010.

On a point made by the hon. Member for York Central, this is a long-term game. We want to do go further and further with devolution. One of the missions in the levelling-up White Paper is:

“By 2030, every part of England that wants one will have a devolution deal with powers at approaching the highest level of devolution and a simplified, long-term funding settlement.”

We want to keep going and going. The question I have about the unelected committee model of devolution is, once we start to do more and more high-powered things, more and more functions come out of Whitehall and more and more controversial decisions are taken—and take longer—at the local level. Is that a model that can really hack increasingly controversial decisions in the long term?

Evidence from the OECD finds that fragmented city governments—not having that tier at all—leads to worse economic outcomes. I think we are all agreed that a tier is needed to work together across local authorities and city regions. The only question is how the accountability then works. I wonder how many of the places that have now got Mayors would really want to go backwards. A lot of them resisted having a Mayor. They resisted very strongly. Even on the morning of the Greater Manchester devolution deal, one of the local authorities still had questions about it. Now that those cities have Mayors, who seriously thinks that it would be a good idea for them to go back to having just an unelected committee or a quango, and for them not to have either of the Andys or Ben Houchen providing inspirational leadership and working locally in a collegiate and cross-party way? Do people really think that would be an improvement? I wonder about that.

[Alex Norris]

We have had a really good discussion. I agree with the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale. I fear that neatness and tidiness for central Government, rather than for communities, is dominant, which raises the question, who is this for?

The hon. Gentleman asked what right Whitehall—or central Government, or however we might characterise it—has to make such distinctions, and I agree with him. We are talking about two different sets of profound powers that will shape places and—I think there is broad consensus on this—improve and enhance the lives of local people, but one community will have access while another will not, because the Government have made the election of a politician a sticking point. The Minister has made it clear that that is the Government’s preference, but it is a fundamentally distorted vision of devolution. If the powers are to be so impactful, all communities should have access to them.

[Neil O'Brien]

To be clear, is the Opposition’s preferred model an unelected committee or assembly-type model? What do they prefer to the mayoral model?

[Alex Norris]

The Minister has never heard me argue for the assembly model—a red herring that he introduced to the debate—and I think the characterisation of committees as “unelected” is unhelpful. He has heard me argue over a significant time for the powers set out on page 140 of the White Paper to be available to county combined authorities. If they choose to be led by an elected Mayor, that is their choice and I would absolutely support it.

I think that is where we will end up in Nottingham and Nottinghamshire, although, as I have made clear, it is not my preference—perhaps by repeating how against it I am at all stages, I am attempting desperately to ensure that I never end up a candidate. Nevertheless, that has been my view throughout. The difference between my position and the Minister’s is that I have no intention of foisting mine on other people, whereas the Minister clearly does.

The Minister started by saying that he prefers the mayoral model—that is wonderful—and he made a strong case for it. I advocate that he take that case to the people of Leicester and Leicestershire, and given how persuasive he is, maybe he will succeed in convincing them. That would be an example of the process working well, and I would support his efforts in principle, if not in substance. But let us address this point about unelected committees, which as I said, is a bizarre characterisation. Let me put it this way: the Minister has introduced 60 clauses to create county combined authorities, and that has been important for this Bill Committee, which, by his logic, is unelected. In reality, the constituent members of those committees have very much stood for election and they lead their local authorities. I do not have any problem with that democracy. If four elected leaders meet for a pint after work, do they suddenly form an unelected committee and their democratic mandate ceases? I think they are still elected, and if they misbehaved that night, they would be treated as if they were. The idea that such committees are unelected is for the birds, frankly.

The Minister said—I am not sure that I agree—that this is for the voters. That is excellent news. In that case, I do not think he has anything to fear about what is established as the local preference. Why do something for someone if they do not want it?

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is an inherent contradiction in the Minister’s argument? The Bill deliberately hands significant powers, particularly the spatial development strategies in schedule 7, to CCAs—or the unelected Assemblies—but denies them to mayoral combined authorities.

[Alex Norris]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. In fact, many of the arguments that the Committee has heard in the first few days will undoubtedly be used in reverse for the next few days. When it comes to planning, I do not think that is the Government’s intention. We will see those arguments again, but in reverse.

[Neil O'Brien]

The Opposition have spent several days complaining that our devolution model is too messy. This morning they are complaining that it too neat and tidy.

[Alex Norris]

At no point have I complained that this is too neat and tidy. I am saying that Ministers are seeking convenience; not that the settlement is too neat and tidy but that Ministers are pursuing a life that is neater and tidier than it is ever going to be.

I was hugely discomfited by the Minister’s final point about the M10 Mayors. As I have said, I have family in Manchester who love that model and it really works for them. That is great. Andy Burnham is doing a brilliant job, and that can be said throughout the M10. The Minister’s idea is that many of those communities resisted Mayors but, as it was better for them, we can now say, “Gosh, don’t they see our extraordinary wisdom and they wouldn’t change it.” If that is his preference for devolution—they will like it when they understand it—we are getting off on the wrong foot.

[Neil O'Brien]

In the communities that resisted it, the leaders of local authorities had lots of questions about it, because they were bringing into existence a new directly elected body across the city. That is no small thing. It was creating somebody who would be in the same space as them. Of course they had all kinds of questions about it. Does the hon. Gentleman seriously think it would now be better for them to get rid of those directly elected Mayors for those large cities? Does he really believe it would be better without them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

I have literally just said that I doubt that that would be the case, but it is for those communities to decide, not me, and I have no intention of doing so. This is about devolution and localism, which will have to take a local flavour and function. The Minister started by saying that the leaders of the communities had resisted, and now that they had questions. I would hope they would have questions. I am saying that there is no value in ramming these things through, or the idea that people later will really see the benefit. That is how we get progress but people do not feel better—because things are done to them. In many ways, that explains why community power is absent in the Bill.

On the place A to B tramline, there will always be a challenge with these things. The Minister talks about having to go back to constituents who want to hold us accountable for a decision we did not make, may have voted against or did not argue for. That is what Parliament is. I have been here five years and have barely ever won a vote. I have to go back to my constituents frequently and say, “Yes, I understand it is terrible that we have skyrocketing inflation, you do not have access to decent housing and the rise in violent crime is awful. I voted against things that caused that to be the case, but the majority voted for it.”

The idea that the existence of an individual suddenly creates that unanimity or direct ability to change is challenging, not least because voters’ decisions are multifactoral. There is an argument for a presidency in this place, which I certainly do not share, but we might wonder why we need so many Ministers if we could just consolidate them in one individual. I cannot agree with that. I have made my point and I will press the amendment to a Division, because there is a substantial difference between the two Benches.

The Minister started by saying that he prefers the mayoral model. That is absolutely fine. Every community that prefers that model should have access to one—I completely support that—but I do not think that every community that does not prefer that model should have to have it.

[Neil O'Brien]

I want to clarify that spatial development strategies are available to MCAs, and several are already doing them.

[Alex Norris]

We will have many days to consider that in great detail and at great length to establish those facts.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Deputy mayors etc

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 26, page 21, line 4, after “mayor’s” insert “statutory”.

This amendment would clarify that an appointed deputy is a statutory one rather than a sole one.

Clause 26 provides for deputy Mayors etc. It states that a Mayor of a county combined authority must appoint one of the members of the authority to be the Mayor’s deputy. The amendment seeks to make it clear that that is an in law deputy, and offers flexibility for other deputies, too. We agree that it is important that deputy mayors are part of the structure of a CCA, but I am probing whether that provision needs to be tightened, so that we are clear it is the statutory deputy, so that it is akin to a model that works elsewhere.

As we have seen already with the mayoral system in England, and the Bill provides for the practice to continue with CCAs, Mayors have the authority to delegate certain functions to a member or officer of a CCA. That has been alluded to frequently in the clauses we have discussed so far. That provision allows various mayors to delegate certain policy areas to chosen individuals, who may not have an electoral mandate, and may have been private citizens. I have no issue with that practice because it has allowed bright minds and very talented people to play a role in delivering good policy.

There are important executive functions that a deputy Mayor may have to exercise in the case of illness or incapacity, and possibly they should be viewed separately. The amendment inserts the word “statutory” after “mayor” and before “deputy” so that the Bill spells out that it is the Mayor’s statutory deputy. That elected person will exercise important functions of the Mayor—their duties and responsibilities in the case of illness or incapacitation. That creates a clear delineation in terms of the portfolio of the deputy Mayor and the precise executive role that that statutory deputy Mayor may be required to fill. Such a role exists in the Greater London Assembly, where alongside a range of deputy Mayors who cover various policy areas, there is a designated statutory deputy Mayor. They take on the executive role of the Mayor when that person is unable to fulfil their duties or there is a temporary vacancy.

It may well be that, in substance, the delineation is not necessary, but I want clarity from the Minister that the Government agree that, broadly, that is how the clause operates, and that is how the system is likely to operate in the future.

[Tim Farron]

I think this is a sensible amendment. If we are to have Mayors, I am not against their appointing deputies. That sounds a perfectly sensible thing to do. In the previous debate, the Minister made an interesting and well-presented point about why a mayor is better than an unelected committee—a committee of directly elected councillors, serving smaller areas, who are more likely to be in touch with those areas. Will the Minister contrast and compare his concern for there being a committee making decisions—all of them directly elected—and executive functions being given to a deputy mayor who has been appointed by somebody else? I see a clear equivalence, and a reminder that it is entirely democratic and appropriate for decisions to be taken in a more collegiate way, and not just by one person being elected and then appointing other people to serve executive functions under that person.

[Neil O'Brien]

The amendment has no effect on its own. As set out in clause 26, the role of deputy Mayor of a CCA is created by that provision. It is therefore already statutory. The clause mirrors the provisions for county combined authorities, creating consistency across the two models. The role of deputy mayor is critical in supporting the effective delivery of the Mayor’s responsibilities and a deputy Mayor would act instead of the Mayor if that person is unable to act or the office of the Mayor becomes vacant. There is no need to add the word “statutory” to what is already a statutory role. Therefore I hope that the hon. Member for Nottingham North agrees to withdraw the amendment, although he may want to talk more about the point when we discuss amendment 34.

[Alex Norris]

I agree with the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale that there is certainly an irony and a contrast between the two debates. Nevertheless, I think it is implied—frankly, it says it on the tin—that once we go for the mayoral model, that is what we choose with it. Again, if that is what a community wants, that is the right thing to do.

I will address the Minister’s points. To be fair, if it is in the statute book, it is probably statutory; I would be willing to concede that point. However, I have had the opportunity to make that clear. Nevertheless, the assurances from the Minister were plenty. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 26, page 21, line 4, at end insert—

“(1A) The mayor may appoint more than one person to be a deputy Mayor, in which case references in this section to “the deputy Mayor” should be read as “a deputy Mayor”.

(1B) The mayor may only appoint as a deputy Mayor a person who is qualified to be elected and to hold office as the mayor in accordance with paragraph 7 of Schedule 2.”

This amendment would allow mayors of CCAs to appoint as many qualified deputy Mayors as they wished.

Again, this amendment deals with deputy Mayors; as the Minister has perhaps divined, this amendment shows where I am going with this issue. I am interested to hear the Minister’s views on it and I will seek his reassurances in relation to it.

As we have seen with existing combined authorities, deputy Mayors can fulfil a really important role in overseeing the different policy areas that lie within the remit of a combined authority. With this amendment, I want to probe the Bill and any guidance that follows from it, perhaps as set out in regulations. The intention of the amendment is to provide for multiple deputies.

Amendment 34 would allow Mayors of county combined authorities to appoint as many qualified deputies as they wish to. I believe that this amendment would improve the Bill and the functions of such deputies, by making it clear at the outset that they should exist, and that the post of deputy Mayor is a proper and senior role, which might be helpful in future.

As democratically elected officials, it is entirely right and proper that Mayors should have the power to appoint individuals to the position of deputy Mayor, should they wish to do so; again, as I said, I think that that is on the tin when we sign up for this model. We ought to trust a Mayor’s judgment and indeed respect their mandate to allocate such positions appropriately, matching individuals to portfolios that will maximise the delivery of good policy and improve the overall functions of the CCA. Obviously, should those decisions prove not to be good ones, there will be accountability.

Making it clear that the Mayor has the power to appoint these individuals will perhaps help them to find those individuals who want to take on the job, because—again—they are real and enshrined roles. This might not need to be in statute, but I would be interested to hear from the Minister the history of combined authorities in this area and how he feels they have evolved, and how he thinks this system will work in practice, either in regulation or in guidance.

[Rachael Maskell]

I appreciate the opportunity to speak on amendment 34. There are a few points that I want to make, building on the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North.

First, the title of deputy means that the deputy Mayor will deputise for the Mayor and, as we heard in the previous debate, they will not have a democratic mandate behind them. As a result, we are missing an opportunity to have greater democracy built in at local level, because deputy Mayors will be appointed and the person appointed may never have been elected to any tier of government, yet will carry huge responsibilities and powers. If, for instance, the Mayor is not able to participate in an activity because of serious illness or something like that, clearly the functions of devolved government will continue and unelected deputy Mayors will fulfil those functions.

In particular, I want to pick up on the issue of the number of deputy Mayors that there could be. Of course, there will be a range of roles that they could assume, at the determination of the Mayor. However, there is one thing that I really want the Minister to consider and respond to. In an age where we absolutely and rightly need to think about equality of opportunity, it is about the diversity of the team around the Mayor and the people deputising for the Mayor. For instance, could there be a job share in the role? The legislation does not signify whether there could or could not be a job share, but I think we would want to see that opportunity open up.

That would be more inclusive and would perhaps allow more people to participate in or take on such a role, or there could be a number of senior functions, which somebody working part time—I think we all know what “part time” in politics means—could take one function and somebody else could take another function, with both of them accountable to the Mayor. That could broaden opportunity and the diversity of the team, so that it is more reflective of the local community.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

Clause 26 requires the Mayor of a combined county authority to appoint a deputy Mayor from among the constituent members of the CCA. The deputy Mayor would act in the stead of the Mayor should the Mayor be unable to act or should the office of the Mayor become vacant.

We consider the amendment unnecessary and inappropriate. It is unnecessary because, as we will see shortly, clause 27 enables the Mayor to delegate general mayoral functions to members of the CCA. Members of the CCA can be given subject portfolios—the responsibility for a particular area, such as transport—and would be held to account for it. Such members may have a title—for example, cabinet member for transport or skills portfolio holder—that reflects the terminology and practice in local government.

As the Mayor is required to appoint a deputy Mayor and is able to delegate functions to other members, there is no need for an additional role within a CCA or for any member of a CCA other than the statutory deputy Mayor to be titled deputy Mayor. The risk is that the amendment might result in all CCA members having the position of deputy, which could be confusing and could be a problem if it is necessary to be clear about who the deputy Mayor is so that they can stand in if the Mayor is incapacitated. We think the amendment is not necessary or appropriate.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way as he was about to conclude. Just to be clear, the Government’s intention is that deputy Mayors will be members of the county combined authority, and there will not be provision for a Mayor to appoint and give responsibilities to a deputy who is a private citizen.

[Neil O'Brien]

We discussed in previous sittings the role of the non-constituent and associate members of the authority, which is the way of getting in expertise from outside. Perhaps a transport specialist could come in through that route, but we need someone who is clearly the deputy in case the Mayor is suddenly not available any more. As part of collegiate working, which we have described previously, it is already very common for portfolio roles to be given to members of the combined authority.

[Alex Norris]

I am really grateful for that discussion. As my hon. Friend the Member for York Central said—this relates to amendment 35 in my name—we should seek to use these roles as a way of broadening the pool of those who have access to power for very good reasons relating to representation. We will probe that when we debate amendment 35. I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. There are bits of it that I still do not understand, which I will cover when we discuss the next amendment, but hopefully he will help me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 35, in clause 26, page 21, line 23, at end insert—

“(7A) The Secretary of State must produce and publish an annual report on the diversity of the deputies appointed under this section. This report must include—

(a) the age of all the deputy mayors,

(b) the gender of all the deputy mayors, and

(c) the ethnicity of all the deputy mayors.”

This is the final amendment proposed to clause 26. This discussion is similar—although not exactly the same—to those that we had on amendments 18 and 29 about how important broad representation is for our democracy and how important it is that our democratic institutions reflect the populations they represent. I think there is pretty broad consensus on that. We recognise the strength that proper representation brings to our democratic institutions, and the risk that unrepresentative institutions will make poorer decisions and decisions that lack legitimacy. It is important that we take every opportunity to promote positive representation in our democracy.

The amendment is relatively light touch, and adds to the provisions on deputy Mayors. It states:

“The Secretary of State must produce and publish an annual report on the diversity of the deputies appointed”.

It goes on to specify a number of protected characteristics. The Minister has previously considered taking that even further, and we would welcome any such discussion. The details would be updated annually and made public and accessible to all.

A similar provision on reporting on diversity is already on the statute book—it has been since the Equality Act 2010—but has yet to commence. That would enhance these measures. The Minister did not quite address in our earlier discussions whether he plans to persuade colleagues to commence that provision to try to augment the work on the Bill. Section 106 of the Equality Act requires political parties to publish diversity data on candidates standing for election to various bodies. It would be good for deputy Mayors to be included in that list, and I would be interested to know whether there are any plans to commence that provision.

That brings us to a point that emerged in our previous discussion. I may be being a little bit slow to pick up the thread, but I want to be sure about this. At the moment, we will have a statutory deputy who will be a constituent member of the combined authority, and if the Mayor is incapacitated or ill, the deputy Mayor will take over the role. I think I heard that they can also take on a portfolio. I would be grateful for clarity on that. Other constituent members of the combined authority can take on portfolios—we know that, and that is mirrored in the experience of the combined authority in Manchester, where all the leaders carry a portfolio. That seems a very good idea to me.

We have discussed private citizens, and the amendment is particularly pertinent to private citizens. Leaders of councils, as we discussed in relation to amendment 29, are what they are; the diversity there is possibly an issue for local authorities, rather than for the county combined authority in and of itself, although I am sure it would still have a view.

The Minister talked about non-constituent members and associate members. If a Mayor was seeking to add a Deputy Mayor for Transport who is a transport expert, could they be made an associate member, which would probably be more desirable—I am getting myself in a twist here—where that is their individual mandate rather than an organisational mandate, and then make that person the Deputy Mayor for Transport? Could they do the same for an air quality specialist and make that person the Deputy Mayor for Air Quality; or a skills specialist, and make them the Deputy Mayor for Skills?

This is a point of interest, not necessarily a point of political argument, and I would lean towards Mayors being able to choose what they wish to do, but that situation would create a tier of people, and it would be interesting to understand how well that tier reflects their communities and Britain. A reporting requirement does not seem terribly onerous, so I hope that the Minister will support the amendment. I would especially appreciate clarity on how he sees the system working.

[Tim Farron]

This is an important issue. As the Government move to make local government less local and larger, with fewer representatives, they seem to be motivated by two things. The first is convenience—neat-and-tidiness. The second is a belief that it is popular to say to the public, “Look, we have fewer politicians,” but it is not popular to say to the public, “Your councillors and elected representatives will be fewer in number and they will represent so many more of you that you will never see them—and, by the way, the chances are they will be from a far less diverse range of backgrounds.”

Who deputy Mayors are, what backgrounds they come from and how diverse the range of people in those positions are is important and, as we have said in previous discussions, it is important that we analyse and research in a deep and broad way the impact of changes in local government on diversity, not just those in this Bill, but those that have taken place over the past decade or so. Anecdotally, it is obvious that if we move from a situation where each councillor represents 3,000 or 4,000 people to a situation where they represent 10,000 or 15,000, or where Mayors or deputy Mayors represent hundreds of thousands of people, we massively narrow down the kind of people who have the time, the freedom and the space in their lives to carry out those roles.

Fundamentally, to put it bluntly, we will end up with blokes—mostly early-retirement blokes.. That is definitely the evidence of my eyes. It will squeeze out people with family or caring responsibilities, people who have to work for a living and so on. That is what is happening. The Government should be aware of it and should be seeking evidence to see the extent to which that is happening for these roles and more broadly in local government, because local government represents everybody. When they know the scale of the problem, they can take action to alleviate it.

[Neil O'Brien]

Clause 26 requires the Mayor of a combined county authority to appoint a deputy Mayor from the constituent members, so the Mayor of a CCA could not make—to answer the question directly—a non-constituent or associate member a deputy Mayor. Constituent members will be nominated by the constituent councils and are usually the council leaders, who have been elected at local authority level. It is only right that the membership of the CCA is decided locally by those who best know their areas. CCAs and their constituent members will be independent of central government.

Amendment 35 requires the Secretary of State to report annually regarding certain demographic information about the persons appointed to be deputy Mayors of a CCA. We think that the amendment is not appropriate or necessary. CCAs, their Mayors and their constituent members will be independent of central Government. The Government do not believe they should require CCAs to inform them of the specific make-up of their deputy Mayors.

The Mayor, with their democratic mandate, will appoint one of the constituent members as a deputy Mayor. As a public and statutory position, it will be totally transparent who has been appointed as the deputy. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I share the concern of the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale about this being a bit of a march of the blokes. That is a fear with individual elections, and it is what tends to happen. He made some very strong arguments about that.

My hon. Friend the Member for York Central is right in saying that appointments can go either way: they are either an opportunity to rectify gaps or they can end up, through unconscious biases, continuing to widen those gaps. I think the Minister’s answer has clarified the point and rendered my amendment moot. From what I understood, the deputies are going to be constituent members of the authority; that is a significant distinction from what happens in London and with the Mayor of London. In many ways, combined authorities and combined county authorities do have significant distinctions from the set-up in London, so that is not an inconsistency, but it is important to understand. My fear is that there will now be a march of the tsars. The Mayors are going to end up with lots of different tsars as a way of trying to get that extra talent in, as advisers and as additionality. I wonder about that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

Making some of the functions exercisable by the Mayor is at the heart of what we have been doing with devolution. If we are going to have the debate that we had earlier, I should say that the whole point of a Mayor is to have certain functions. If the hon. Lady is probing that, she is in a sense going back to the debate that we were having earlier today about why an area should have a Mayor.

The amendment is about a reporting requirement. As I have just set out, there are already substantial reporting requirements on why any powers are conferred on the Mayor. There is also reporting on progress on the devolution agenda, as part of clause 2 and the mission that we are pursuing, so there is already the kind of reporting that the amendment argues for. I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw it.

[Alex Norris]

I very much agree with the thrust of the amendment; the case that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central made was very strong. It makes us think that these missions should be a central theme running through the programme of work. That programme may, at times, look different in different parts of the country, in terms of how it is exercised, but those fundamental goals, challenges and missions are a collective endeavour. That brings me back to my fear, certainly regarding the earlier parts of the Bill, that the Government feel they have to take all this on themselves. That is, first, an unnecessary level of burden and, secondly, not likely to succeed.

We accept that government is a very difficult business, and at times a fine series of balances. I would argue that this Government make things look particularly hard, but that might be an issue for a different day. However, for Ministers in this Department—one might except the Minister for Housing; there is, after all, a reason why they change every year—[Laughter.] I do not wish that for the Minister who is here today; I hold him in high regard and he can stay until the next election.

However, the rest of the Minister’s ministerial colleagues really could have a slightly lighter time if they just equipped, in terms of both money and power, local authorities to deliver on their goals and then let them get on with it. They would look brilliant; they would look like sensational, revolutionary change-bringers and they could have their feet up for the entire time. That does not seem like such a bad deal to me.

Instead, what we get is this over-centralisation and this lack of trust; it is all to be commanded and controlled from the centre. I am afraid that that just does not quite get things done. The amendment would actually push us into making a further step towards what we hope Ministers want, which is to get the responsibility, the power and the opportunities out to communities, under that shared framework of goals. That would be a positive thing, and there is an awful lot to recommend the amendment.

What the Minister said about the explanatory memorandum is welcome, but I say again—this is a theme throughout all our debates—that the Government have not been able to produce an impact assessment for the Bill, and we sit here, day after day, talking about it. We are led to believe that the Minister has a strong belief in the impact of Mayors, but he cannot evidence that in a conventional way. We have heard a commitment from the Minister. When the decisions are being made on regulations for setting up combined county authorities, I hope that we will have the right information to explain and understand the impact of the decisions that we make.

[Rachael Maskell]

I want to make a couple of points in response to the Minister’s comments. From what is in the legislation and the Minister’s words, it feels as though central Government are just not willing to let go and are still trying to hold on to something without seeing the full devolution: “You can have those powers, but we are going to make determinations about them.” In time, I trust that that will settle and the Government will have more confidence and trust in the system of devolution that they are setting out, but it feels as though they are trying to hold the line and keep control.

More worryingly, as we move through the Bill clause by clause, it seems that the agenda around levelling up is unravelling rapidly. That is a deeper concern if we are going to address the real injustices that our constituents face. They desperately need the Government to step up to the plate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Procedure for direct conferral of general functions on mayor

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 28, page 23, line 40, at end insert—

“(2A) Where the Secretary of State makes regulations to which this section applies they must notify all other mayoral and non-mayoral CCAs of this.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to notify all CCAs if they make regulations directly conferring general functions on a Mayor.

This is a return to a common theme. We are desperately seeking to encourage the Government to stay true to the White Paper so that all communities have access to the fullest range of powers. The clause provides a process, via regulation, for powers to be directly conferred on the Mayor by the Secretary of State following agreement with that Mayor. When that happens and a Mayor suddenly gets a new and novel power, we want a requirement on the Secretary of State to notify all combined county authorities that that has been done. I will not repeat the arguments that I have made previously, but we want that so that other authorities might seek to take on similar powers, if that is what they would value for their community.

[Rachael Maskell]

My hon. Friend’s amendment is really important. We know that London holds the power and wealth of our nation, but we are talking about authorities around the country, the CCAs, that are more distant from London and where there is greater inequality, poverty and lack of opportunity. Not even to report on powers will mean more divergence rather than addressing the inequality, so we could be in a worse state when trying to address the disparities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

I completely understand my hon. Friend’s point. What I am seeking to put in place is a virtuous cycle of communities taking on powers that will be impactful. Others will see that that can be done, and that might be one of the missing pieces in their puzzle. They might take it on themselves, move forward and take on greater responsibilities. That would be a very positive thing. It is a relatively light touch obligation. It asks for nothing more than the circulation of information. It does not oblige a community to take on powers. However, I think it would certainly be to the improvement of devolution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

Opposition Members have argued that the process in which new powers are given to CCAs should be transparent and public, and it will be. The processes that lead to the conferring of powers on a Mayor of a CCA are transparent and public. The Mayor must consult the constituent councils of the CCA regarding any requests for additional powers and then report those views to the Secretary of State when submitting their request.

If the Secretary of State agrees to a Mayor’s request, the functions to be conferred will be set out in regulations and then debated here. They must then be approved before they can be made. In considering those regulations, Parliament will have an explanatory memorandum and various other reports explaining why various powers are being conferred. It will therefore already be a public and transparent process—nothing can be hidden—so we regard the amendment as unnecessary.

[Alex Norris]

I would argue that there is a difference between something not being hidden and its being shared. The points that colleagues have made were very good, and I would echo them. The point and thrust of the issue is to try to ensure that all areas know what is available to them and to give them the chance to reflect on and maybe ask for it themselves to improve their approaches to tackling all the challenges they face.

Of course, as the Bill says, the decisions will be made through a regulation and be taken by a Committee of Members in this place. However, I say gently to the Minister that I would not take that to be full publication. It will be published in a reasonable way—we have no doubt of that—but the idea that busy communities, county combined authorities or Mayors will instantly know that that has happened is not quite the same thing.

I hope that, at least, the Minister will reflect on the need for it to be understood what further powers that maybe even go beyond the White Paper might be available in future to county combined authorities. However, for the moment, I am happy to withdraw the amendment and not labour that point today. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Joint exercise of general functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Norris]

Clause 29 provides for the joint exercise of general functions. It allows the Secretary of State to make provision via regulations to be entered into in relation to general functions of a Mayor for the area of a combined county authority. Under subsection (2), that could include the Mayor being

“a party to the arrangements in place of, or jointly with, the CCA”.

It also talks about the membership of any joint committee, its chair, the appointment of its members and its voting powers. Could the Minister give us an example of how he sees that working in practice and what things the Government have in mind for the use of that power?

[Neil O’Brien]

I am not sure that I understand the hon. Member’s detailed question. I will try to understand it. Let me speak to what the clause does, and if that does not make things clear he can come in. We have talked about the flexibility of the CCA model, enabling the Mayor and the CCA to operate effectively and take decisions for the benefit of those who live and work in the area. Clause 29 continues that flexibility. It enables regulations to be made so that a CCA Mayor can jointly exercise any mayoral general function, such as on transport, with a neighbouring local authority if both parties agree. Such regulations may set out the detailed operational arrangements, such as membership, chairing, voting powers and political balance requirements for a joint committee. I hope that hon. Members will agree that enabling the Mayor of a combined authority to work collaboratively with neighbouring local authorities—something various Members have argued for in previous sittings—would be a positive measure, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Functions of mayors: policing

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Norris]

Clause 30 allows for the conferring of police and crime commissioner functions on the Mayor of a combined county authority. I think it is important that something as significant as this does not go through without debate. Again, this is the core aspect of tier 3 powers, which makes the case for a mayor in those cases. Again, we understand the need for the measure to be in the Bill, but we want to hear from the Minister how he thinks this will work in practice.

This is not without precedent. These clauses mirror combined authorities, and those combined authorities in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire have a Mayor with police powers, and of course the same is true in London. It can be done, and it can be done safely. I am less sure about whether there is widespread desire for it. As I say, if it were the determining factor in tier 3 between taking on a Mayor or not, there may be quite a range of decisions taken.

We heard in both oral and written evidence—I genuinely thought it was admirable—about the culture of collaboration and joint working across the West Midlands Combined Authority. It is clear that it has been able to build consensus on virtually everything, except this point. That was quite revealing in and of itself. Again, it is those sorts of powers that local communities often talk about, such as economic levers, transport levers, housing levers and issues relating to net zero, rather than policing. Again, where communities want this, we are happy for it to be an option where desired. The reality is that it is complicated because of the unavoidable point of footprints for police forces, which do not elegantly overlay with even natural geographies, but definitely not geographies of combined authorities. I cannot imagine a situation where they are likely to converge without a lot of pain and disruption.

There will be some places—the West Midlands ironically being quite a good example—where the footprint probably matches up quite nicely, and clearly that is the case in Greater Manchester too. I want clarity from the Minister. Is his intention to use these powers where there is strong demand and where the geographies are suitable? As I say, I think that is likely to prove challenging. What is the Minister minded to do in situations where there is enthusiasm to take these powers on but the natural communities do not work, or maybe there is a police force that covers a small part of a county combined authority? How would that work in practice?

[Tim Farron]

It is important to get clarification on this issue, and in particular on the extent to which a decision will be taken by default if we end up with CCAs that include more than one police authority area. There are good reasons why some police authorities are relatively small, in terms of population size, such as the vast rural nature of the area they serve, and it would seem wrong to go through a process of effectively deciding a police authority merger by default. I know there is more to it than that, but we need to be given clarity on how that might transpire, so I would be grateful for that clarification.

While I am on my feet, I wish to apologise to you, Mr Paisley, and to the rest of the Committee, because I am off to see a primary school from Kendal. I will leave the Committee for a moment or two, or perhaps longer. I apologise.

[Neil O'Brien]

Clause 30 enables the Mayor of a combined county authority to have the functions of the police and crime commissioner conferred on them if that Mayor requests it. The Mayors of the Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire combined authorities already exercise PCC functions in their areas. Committee members will remember the evidence session we held with Tracy Brabin, Mayor of West Yorkshire, in which she talked about the advantages of having those powers aligned with the other powers she was using—for example, using her powers over transport and her PCC powers concurrently to improve women’s safety.

Clause 30 and the linked schedule 3 offer that same option for CCA Mayors if the local authority and policing boundaries align, and if they feel that taking on those functions will help them deliver more effective policing for their area, where that is agreed between the area and Government. The clause and schedule mirror the combined authority provisions for the conferral of PCC functions to ensure that if a CCA Mayor takes on those functions, the process of conferral and the way they are exercised on a day-to-day basis is consistent with those too. As with all regulations on CCAs, these regulations will be subject to parliamentary approval. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Mayors for combined county authority Areas: PCC functions

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 37, in schedule 3, page 206, line 34, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c).

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from conferring only partial Police and Crime Commissioner functions on the mayor.

The fun is always in the schedules, is it not? I like to get into the detail and understand some of the reasons why certain approaches have been chosen. Schedule 3 introduces the arrangements that allow for Mayors of combined county authorities to take on police and crime commissioner functions in the way that the Minister has set out. As I said, this is a complex matter, particularly due to geography. I do not think the Minister quite addressed the complexity issue. Again, I would be interested in his thoughts about how that is likely to work in practice, certainly for footprints that clearly do not match up with police force footprints. That argument has been made already, so I will not repeat it.

The thrust of amendment 37 is to not make the devolution of those functions any more complicated than it already is. Paragraph 2(1) of schedule 3 allows the Secretary of State to

“by regulations provide that the mayor may exercise in the CCA area—

(a) all PCC functions,”

—that is all the functions, as the Minister has described. As I say, that has been done elsewhere, and it seems to be beyond debate. However, I want to probe sub-paragraphs (1)(b) and (1)(c), which provide for

“all PCC functions other than those specified or described in the regulations, or…only those PCC functions specified or described in the regulations”

to be devolved. Basically, the Secretary of State can by regulation devolve partial police and crime commissioner powers. First, that is unduly fiddly, and it might create an unwise divergence between Mayors. Either an individual has police and crime commissioner functions devolved to them, or they do not.

[Rachael Maskell]

I too am curious about the measures and the inclusion of paragraph 2(1)(b) and (c). My concern echoes the debate we had earlier: how there is an obligation under the Bill to have an elected Mayor, because they are taking on and subsuming the role of the police and crime commissioner. It feels as if here we see the role chopped up into little pieces and, as a result, only a partial role taken on. If so, why would there still be the obligation to have an elected Mayor?

[Alex Norris]

As my hon. Friend says, the taking on of the PCC seems to be that sort of totemic tipping moment, making this question all the more compelling. I am interested in a case in which sub-paragraph (1)(b) and (c) were used, in which only some police and crime functions were devolved. Does that mean that the pre-existing police and crime commissioner would continue to exist alongside the Mayor? Are we creating some confusion, if we have a PCC and a Mayor with some police and crime responsibilities? I am not sure that is desirable. Again, that might create variance between Mayors. I am not minded to support the provision, but I might be persuaded if we were clear what sort of circumstances it would apply to and what powers we might not want to give, and if we had clarity on the point about other PCCs.

[Neil O'Brien]

The schedule provides detail setting out the areas where the Secretary of State either may or has to make regulations to enable a transfer of PCC functions to a CCA Mayor, and provides the framework and arrangements for them to exercise those functions day to day. It is important that CCA Mayors can exercise PCC functions if the authority and policing boundaries align, and if they feel that taking on the functions will help them deliver more effective policing for the area.

[Alex Norris]

I apologise, but it is helpful that the Minister used the “boundaries align” phrase. Is that a complete alignment of boundaries?

[Neil O'Brien]

Yes, I think it is, implicitly. The levelling-up White Paper talks about how, if the boundaries did not quite align and there was a strong desire locally for that, we would look at the geographies over time and whether it was worth changing them in order to make them fit. I stress that that is probably a long-term function. Broadly speaking, this is keeping the mayoral combined authority and CCA models aligned, because the power already exists, although it is not being used in the MCA legislation.

Over time, the PCC role has expanded and evolved, and it continues to do so, and the Bill would allow the Home Office at a future date not to devolve all PCC functions, if that were not appropriate in future. At this point, I cannot specify in exactly what circumstances that might arise—it might be to do with edge cases where there is desire to do some policing-adjacent things through transport, of the kind that Tracy talked about—but so far those powers have not been used. At the moment, I do not think that there is an intention to use them. I am aware of no examples of active discussion of any such thing.

As I say, however, the PCC role is evolving over time, as is that of the different combined authorities. We are just holding open that possibility for the future. Were we to explore that future, the possibility of the processes that we have talked about so far in this sitting—things going through Parliament with explanatory memorandums and so on—would all apply. At the moment, this is just holding things open for a potential future, in case there is a desire to do things in this kind of space.

[Alex Norris]

The Minister knows that I do not give an awful lot of shrift to the argument that we need to do such things because that is how they are in combined authorities. The Minister has chosen to establish a separate class. If we merely had to adopt the same arrangements as combined authorities, basically we should have moved the 60 amendments and simply agreed them. The Minister has chosen to legislate differently, and therefore I believe that the amendment needs to be treated on its own merits.

Similarly, I do not give an awful lot of shrift to the idea of leaving the door open for things that have not been used before in mirroring powers, so that they might be used later for an unspecified purpose. That is not a strong reason to keep something in statute, so I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 6

Ayes: 4

---

Labour: 4

Noes: 9

---

Conservative: 9

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 38, in schedule 3, page 207, line 23, leave out paragraph (a)

This amendment would allow the person who is appointed deputy mayor under section 26 to be appointed as deputy mayor for policing and crime.

This is the dangerous bit. I am going to torture the cricket analogy one last time, even though it really does not stand up to it: we are just seeing out the final over before lunch, so I will try not to nick one here if possible.

Paragraph 3(1)(a) of schedule 3 states that the Secretary of State may

“appoint a deputy mayor in respect of PCC functions”

but that that person cannot be what I have called in previous debates “the statutory Mayor”. More than anything, I am keen to know why that measure, which amendment 38 would delete, was included. It may be that the statutory deputy could hold a role outside their normal duties that would mean they were not eligible to take police and crime functions, and could not stand for police and crime commissioner—just as a Member of Parliament cannot be a police and crime commissioner—but I am not clear what that role would be. Short of an unavoidable hurdle, I wonder why we are reducing the options rather than letting the Mayor choose which of their eligible candidates would be best for the role.

[Neil O'Brien]

The single-word answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is: workload. Clause 30 enables the Mayor of a combined county authority to have the functions of a police and crime commissioner conferred on them, subject to their consent. It includes provisions on the employment of a deputy Mayor for crime and policing, and the rules that govern who is eligible.

The role of the statutory deputy Mayor of the CCA is, as we have discussed, to step in should the Mayor become unable to act or if the office of Mayor is vacant. As we said earlier, the deputy Mayor, as any other member of the combined county authority, may assist the Mayor or be delegated a portfolio to lead for the CCA—that could be transport or all manner of different things. The deputy Mayor is also likely to be a leader or another senior member of the constituent council, so is likely to have plenty on their plate. The role of the deputy Mayor for crime and policing is to dedicate constant focus and attention to the vital areas of crime and policing.

Those are both clearly significant roles, and it is difficult to see how both could be delivered by one person without insufficient attention on policing or the responsibilities of deputy Mayor suffering.

[Alex Norris]

Is the intention for the role to go to a private citizen, not a constituent member of the authority?

[Neil O'Brien]

The CCA member also holds an elected position for a specific portion of the CCA area, so they are a constituent member. The Mayor’s PCC power covers the entirety of the police force in the CCA area. That could cause confusion about the democratic mandate that the CCA member has—when compared with the requirement of the deputy Mayor for crime and policing—to support the Mayor, who has been elected to represent constituents from across the whole police force area.

Let me encapsulate it. Why do we have to have a deputy Mayor for crime and policing? Because PCC is a full-time job, and in most of the country outside the MCAs, it is a stand-alone job. There are many advantages to bringing those two things together, as the Mayor of West Yorkshire told us, but it works best when there is a high degree of delegation to a deputy Mayor for crime and policing who can drive forward all that work so that the Mayor can provide strategic join-up between that and other functions. We would still have someone whose full-time job is to do all those things. If we tried to combine the two roles, however, it would be just too much workload for one person.

[Alex Norris]

The point about workload is well made. I understand now that the portfolio of deputy mayorships will be held by constituent members of the authority, but I am still now sure—maybe that is my fault—whether the deputy Mayor for crime and policing is a constituent member before their appointment by the Secretary of State.

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Tenth sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 5th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 31

Exercise of fire and rescue functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 32 to 37 stand part.

[Alex Norris]

It is a pleasure to resume proceedings with you in the Chair, Sir Mark.

These seven clauses deal with a significant change in policy, because they enable the fire and rescue functions and the footprint of the county combined authority to be transferred to the Mayor. I think that significant change deserves debate and recognition. Many of the arguments about clause 30 and the similar delegation of police and crime functions read across to fire and rescue functions, so I do not intend to duplicate them.

I am not sure that I have detected a huge demand for the transfer, nor a sense that fire authorities are not doing what they are supposed to be doing. If there is local enthusiasm to take on those functions and consensus can be built on that, it is for those communities to argue for that rather than me. I would be interested to learn from the Minister what the business case for such a change looks like. Part of the problem of the lack of an impact assessment is that we do not know the impact of the proposed change, nor the upsides that we can expect from it. What is the take-up?

My questions to the Minister are similar to those that I asked about clause 30, and I hope that I will receive similar answers. I take it that this is about local choice and that any change can only be made where there is local consensus. May I take it that the same proviso about geography applies in this case as did under clause 30? Generally, will the arrangement operate according to coterminosity, and work elegantly, rather than trying to make something fiddly work which is not likely to succeed?

Clause 31(2) refers to the involvement of the chief constable of the police. In recent years, it has been a Government policy decision to blur the distinction between fire and rescue and the police. I am keen to hear the Minister’s answer about that involvement. What safeguards will be in place to handle those two organisations, which have separate functions, so that there is at least some sort of distinction between them, certainly in the finances but also, in some senses, on the policy? A case needs to be made for any such involvement because I do not think it is automatically a good idea.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Neil O'Brien)]

Clause 31 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to allow the Mayor of a combined county authority to whom police and crime commissioner and fire and rescue functions have been conferred to delegate fire and rescue functions to the chief constable of the police force for the area. It further allows the chief constable to delegate those functions to both police and fire and rescue personnel, and through it enact what is known as the single employer model.

Those provisions are designed to provide the option for Mayors of CCAs to exercise fire and rescue service functions under the single employer model where they also exercise PCC functions, if they feel that allowing the chief constable to run both operational services will help them to have a stronger role in public safety and to deliver more effective emergency services for their local area. That is the rationale that the hon. Member for Nottingham North is seeking.

It is an equivalent provision to section 107EA of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, which made that option available to Mayors of combined authorities when Parliament approved its addition via the Policing and Crime Act 2017. The change is basically about enabling the benefits of blue light integration between the two services.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 32 to 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Mayors for CCA areas: financial matters

--- Later in debate ---

I ask the Minister to look carefully at the amendment and ensure that provisions can be made—it is only an enabling amendment, after all; it is not prescriptive. Where there is a threat to public safety and safety standards, and the safety of our firefighters, who put their lives on the line every day, it would enable sufficient funding to see them through this dangerous situation in North Yorkshire. I trust that the Minister can respond positively and help address our serious concerns.

[Alex Norris]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on her excellent amendment, which gives us the chance to have an interesting conversation about having a backstop to ensure that our fire and rescue services are funded and safe. The reality she has injected into the debate is helpful for our considerations.

Reducing fires is a tricky business. Over the past 20 years it has been a significant success story of Government. The incidence of fire that fire and rescue services attended peaked at 1 million in 2003-04. Within 10 years that figure had halved. That is set against an increasing population. The number has held about the same for the last eight years. It is a real success story for Governments of different persuasions.

There are a number of factors. First, there is the more effective and efficient operation of fire and rescue services and those who work for them—they have done a great job. Then there is the very virtuous circle that, as incidents that have to be visited have reduced, the firefighters have used their time for early intervention activities, such as fire safety checks for vulnerable people, which have been a really good way of reducing the incidence of fire. That is very good for public safety, for the individuals and for resources. It has created a virtuous circle.

Changing diets have also had an impact—there are not as many chip pan fires as there were 20 to 30 years ago. There is better regulation of products, which are less likely to catch fire these days. That is set against a significant growth in the technologies we use at home. There are lots more electric-intensive items, but the appliances are better and they are regulated better. A whole mixture of developments have resulted in a spectacular reduction in the incidence of fire.

[Rachael Maskell]

My hon. Friend makes a really good point. North Yorkshire fire service does household and wellbeing checks. There has been no reduction in the scale of rescue, including from road traffic accidents. I am sure that the Minister occasionally hears on the West Yorkshire airwaves about the challenges and regular accidents on the A64. York also experiences flooding, and the fire service is involved with our rescue boat. Tragically—more so at this time—the fire service also addresses issues of river safety and suicide, so its responsibilities are far more expansive than just dealing with fires. It was remiss of me to not refer to those matters earlier.

[Alex Norris]

I am glad that my hon. Friend has had the chance to do so; what she says is very much true. Of course, the traffic on our roads has only grown over that period, so as my hon. Friend says, those incidences are likely to be something that we will always need a service for, and we are lucky to have the ones that we do. However, given that this is so multifactorial, the challenge we face is to work out what we can safely afford to change, and certainly what we can afford to do from a financial perspective. Have we reduced fires to a new normal, or are we suppressing and dampening them through our activities? We would only know the answer if we pulled resources out, and the reality—and this is really important for the purpose of this amendment—is that there is not an awful lot of money to take out of the fire service.

The Minister talked about the possibility of chief constables taking on leadership of the service. All those points have been well made and, as he has said, are mirrored in the 2009 Act and on the face of the Bill. However, combining senior management achieves some savings, but not an awful lot in the grand scheme of things. It obviously creates the advantages of colocation, but it does not mean that the services sit on top of each other, so they still need the space, although they may get some aggregation benefits. Then we start looking at going back to retained firefighters, which suits some communities but will not suit others. Finally, we are left with the two areas where savings tend to come from, which are a reduction in appliances and short crewing.

On the appliances front, I live just near junction 26 of the M1, which is a very busy place for the rescue functions that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central talked about. We currently have two appliances there, which means that fire cover is a challenge for the rest of the community. Every five years or so, we have to fight off a proposal to reduce the number of our appliances from two to one. I expect that we are due another proposal soon. It is one of the earliest political campaigns I got involved in. Like the football World cup, it comes around every four years and we keep succeeding. Long may that be the case, because reductions create gaps in fire cover. Some of the gaps that my hon. Friend talked about are significant, and these are things that people feel very strongly about, in terms of the money they pay in taxes and the support they would like to have. That is a challenge.

There is only so far that services in distress can go with appliances. It is kind of possible to have half an appliance, but not really because it does not give services the same financial benefit. When a service is down to short crewing, firefighters are asked to deal with really dangerous situations that they have not been trained to deal with, and the best health and safety and work modelling does not suggest that that is the way to do it. We should be very careful about entering that space. There needs to be a backstop. As my hon. Friend the Member for York Central said, we would not want to use it routinely, but it would be helpful if the Bill made that provision available. The Minister may say that there are other ways to deal with this. If so, we will listen with interest, but my hon. Friend’s point is well made and I think that our constituents feel very strongly about it. She has made a strong case.

[Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)]

This is a very helpful amendment, and one that I hope the Minister will take seriously. As has been said, huge strides have been made over the past few years in reducing the numbers of horrific incidents. That has happened for a lot of reasons, including the fire and rescue services focusing on fire prevention work and on seeking proactively to educate homes and businesses on the need to avoiding risks, as well as all sorts of other structural factors that have already been mentioned.

In my part of the world, we are dependent on people who are not full-time firefighters. That is not just retained firefighters—I will come back to them in a moment—to whom we owe a particular debt of gratitude. The work of mountain rescue and bay rescue services, integrated with the fire and rescue service, provides a unique perspective and a reminder that we try to use all sorts of innovative ways—voluntary ways, often—to meet the need to protect the community, despite a lack of resource.

Among the reasons why the amendment is important is the fact that we need to understand that if we are considering a fire service that is predominantly retained—particularly in rural communities, in places such as Sedbergh, Staveley and many other communities that I represent elsewhere in Cumbria—it will only have a retained pump. That is all it has. With a declining workforce, the change in housing tenure over the past few years, which has become radically different in the past two, and a shrinkage of the working-age population, we are running the risk of having no one available to take on those roles. In those circumstances, it makes sense for the fire and rescue service, and Government working with services around the country, to look at ways of augmenting communities where it is simply not possible to find the people to staff a retained pump and, therefore, to keep the community safe.

I am proud to be a Cumbrian MP. I also represent Westmorland and old Lancashire. I am, however, Yorkshire’s secret MP, because I represent Sedbergh, the dales, Garsdale and Cowgill—we border North Yorkshire. There are huge distances between places out there, from the lakes to the dales. Yes, the incidence of fires that we now encounter is low, compared with a couple of decades ago. Lots of people should take credit for that, including Governments of different colours and, in particular, the fire service.

However, the distances that need to be covered to get from the fire station to the fire are vast. If a retained firefighter is on their farm and drops what they are doing to cover that distance to get to the pump, only to find that there are only two other people who have got there at the same time, they then have to make a call about whether it is safe to attend the fire. There are only three of them who managed to get away from work, and there are only five people on the list in the first place. They have to think: “What do we do? Do we scramble Kendal and get a full-time pump? That is another 10 miles away.”

The amendment would allow the flexibility to create and provide funding to ensure the provision of a full-time pump for communities that, under normal circumstances, might not qualify under the funding formula, so that we are not putting rural communities, in particular, at risk.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this is it will be convenient to discuss clause 40 stand part.

[Alex Norris]

I promised the Committee a debate on alternative mayoral titles when we were talking about changing the names of county combined authorities, and I would never knowingly not keep a promise of such magnitude. I will be honest: I am not very excited by alternative mayoral titles, whatever the right hon. Member for Pudsey might say—not least because I have a lot of confidence in the collective wisdom of the British people. Being a proud Nottinghamian, I know that if someone were to become the Mayor of Nottingham and Nottinghamshire and then pursue an alternative title that was too grand to befit their status, they would face significant judgment from some very straight-talking people. In the end, it would not work out well for them. I have confidence that title inflation is not something that the British people are likely to look at fondly.

I do not want to detain the Committee for long, but I have three questions for the Minister. Frist, will he indulge us by letting us know what demand there is for alternative mayoral titles and what conversations he has had with communities that wish to have them? I understand that some demand might result from having different geographies and make-ups, and I am interested to hear about that.

Secondly, we had the first part of this debate when we discussed clause 15, which relates to county combined authorities changing their names. Clause 15(2)(c) has a requirement for the CCA to vote by a two-thirds supermajority for a change of name. Under clause 39(3)(c), the resolution to have an alternative mayoral title needs to pass with a simple majority. I did not have a lot of interest in the first proposed usage of the supermajority. A supermajority does have it uses, but only by exception. I am not sure that clause 15 makes a compelling case for one, but that has been disposed with. Why, however, has the Minister chosen to diverge in this way?

Finally, clause 39(2) provides a list of alternative titles, including county commissioner, county governor, elected leader and governor. Clause 39(2)(e) then introduces the possibility of having

“a title that the CCA considers more appropriate than the alternative titles mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d), having regard to the title of other public office holders in the area of the CCA.”

I read that as meaning “any other title”, essentially, but I am keen to hear from the Minister that that is what is meant.

[Neil O'Brien]

The hon. Gentleman is correct to read it as “any other title” that is locally wished for, having respect for the fact that there may be other people with such job titles in the area. He asked about where there is demand. A number of places that we are talking to about devolution deals are thinking about using non-mayoral titles, particularly in non-urban areas and where people feel that “Mayor” may not be the correct term for them. They may prefer leader, governor, commissioner or some of the titles that we have discussed.

I was hoping that the hon. Gentleman would ask why a supermajority is required to change the name of the institution but not the title of the directly elected leader. The difference is that many people will have made legal contracts with a CCA, so changing it is a fundamental and non-trivial thing to do, because it would require lots of other consequential changes. We talked in a previous sitting about the need for the stability of the institution. This is a more novel and more experimental area. I do not expect that we would see lots of constant changing and chopping of the name of the directly elected leader, but we think that that is an important part of devolution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O’Brien]

I believe it to be a necessary step in the Bill. In previous sittings, I set out that our particularism, our respect of local circumstances and our bespoke nature are features, not bugs, of our devolution agenda. This clause is a further part of that, making the title of the directly elected leader reflect the desires of local people and the history of the local area, and to fit in with local circumstances. It is therefore of a piece with the nature of how we are conducting the devolution agenda.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41

Power to amend list of alternative titles

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Norris]

Bearing in mind the Minister’s answer that clause 39(2)(e) in essence allows any title to be chosen, if that is the will of the county combined authority, what is the necessity of this clause? It allows the Secretary of State by regulation to change the list of those potential titles. There is an argument to say that there is not much point to having them on the face of the Bill, if a CCA can just choose what they want anyway—but perhaps it is shaping the conversation, in which case I understand that. Given the powers for county combined authorities to choose any name they wish, I find it hard to understand any value in reserving the ability to change the list by regulation. That seems very much after the fact. I am surprised and wonder why the Minister is so keen on the clause.

[Neil O’Brien]

It is entirely to shape the conversation, as the hon. Gentleman says. It is to give a list of suggestions that may be appropriate, while also allowing others to go for different things if they consider that appropriate locally.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Proposal for new CCA

--- Later in debate ---

Amendments 54 and 56 refer to clauses 43 and 45, and would enable any announcements from the Secretary of State to be set out for public scrutiny. Again, they are important amendments that enable us to uphold our democracy and demonstrate that it is overt and transparency. To see the contents of such reports is an important democratic right, because the more information that is put in the public domain, the more scrutiny and accountability can be exercised and the more confidence built behind that. That ensures that if matters come to light, they can be addressed. That is all about good governance. I trust that Members can support the amendments.

[Alex Norris]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for York Central on her amendments. The importance of public interest, public consultation and engagement has been a theme of our recent discussions, because it is important to make sure that the proposed structures are introduced with the backing of the public, so that they have a stake in that and understand the role and responsibilities of those bodies. In turn, that means that the public can understand how those bodies are working in the public’s collective interests. That gets to the root of trying to do things with people rather than to people. I am anxious that the changes are likely to drop out of the sky on to people rather than being something in which they have been part of the conversation.

In an earlier answer, the Minister said that the purpose of the bodies was to serve voters. In that case, it is really important that those voters are brought along and that their views are listened to, whether on less significant matters such as what the Mayor should be called or really significant matters about what powers should be sought, how they are exercised and what the leadership should be. All those conversations should be bottom up rather than top down, but I am afraid that we have not reached that point in the Bill.

The amendments offer a good opportunity to add some of that consultation, so I hope that the Minister is listening.

[Tim Farron]

In looking forward to changes in the way in which local government will be organised in the future, we are bound to reflect on how things have been done in the past.

In Cumbria, we are working hard to ensure that the reorganisation to unitary authorities is a big success, and the early signs are positive. It is worth bearing in mind that there was a consultation, and that fewer than 1% of the public engaged with it. We can glean that the massive majority felt it was not necessary to reorganise local government in Cumbria. People in the southern part of Cumberland object to being lumped in with Westmorland and split from the rest of Cumberland, and people think we would be far better off with smaller units of local democracy. After all in Scotland, where it is an entirely unitary local government landscape, there are unitary authorities with as few as 17,000 people living in them. In England, there is no recognition of the similar rurality need for smaller authorities.

Many people also thought, “We are going through a pandemic, what a stupid time to be rearranging the deckchairs.” If there is a need for local government reorganisation they thought that surely now was not the time to do it. We are where we are, and we will make a success of it—we are determined to do. These are important amendments, because they remind us again that we need to scrutinise the motivation behind the Government’s proposals. Who are these proposals for? The Government are minded to reorganise local government to bring in new CCAs, Mayors and all the rest of it, but unless we are clear that the public want those changes and the Government are responding to that, it is yet more evidence that this approach to local government reorganisation is about fixing Whitehall’s desire for control and convenience, rather than about listening to local people anywhere in the country.

[Rachael Maskell]

I appreciate the contributions that have been made by hon. Members. The points about accountability were absolutely right. We have seen a reorganisation of local government in North Yorkshire, and the districts were not supportive of it and felt that it was very much imposed from the centre. Being able to see the rationale and the thinking is important, and that is what these simple amendments would allow. I am happy to withdraw the amendment for now, but I reserve the right to bring it back at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill

Clause 43

Requirements in connection with establishment of CCA

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 40, in clause 43, page 39, line 23, at end insert—

“(5A) When the Secretary of State makes regulations under this section they must publish an accompanying statement stating—

(a) whether or not the CCA has access to the fullest conferred powers, and

(b) if not, the reasons why not.”

I will be brief, because this is a counterpart conversation to discussions that we have had before. The amendment would enhance the clause by putting in a requirement to report on whether a combined county authority has access to the fullest conferred powers, and if not, an explanation for why. That would help the Government to maintain their stance in the White Paper, in which they seemed to want to offer such measures by 2030. It would perhaps be a positive step if we did that a little quicker.

[Neil O’Brien]

The amendment is not appropriate for two main reasons. First, it uses the term “fullest conferred powers”, which is undefinable and incalculable. Our devolution framework does not provide a minimum offer, and our local leadership mission and desire to deepen devolution mean there is no upper limit to the conferral of powers, nor should we seek to impose one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O’Brien]

Are some people finding this not thrilling? That is absolutely outrageous—we are getting to the really exciting bits. I will try to enunciate better. It is perfectly reasonable that the hon. Lady asks me to do so.

It will be appropriate for different CCAs to have different functions due to the different circumstances and priorities in their areas. We have had that same argument a number of times in Committee. Whatever functions are to be conferred will be done by regulations, which will be considered by Parliament and cannot be made without parliamentary approval. In considering the regulations, to rehearse some of the points already made, Parliament will have an explanatory memorandum and other explanatory documents explaining why the powers are conferred, the views of the consultees and how the conferral meets the statutory test of improving economic, social and environmental wellbeing.

I hope that given those explanations, the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister for that answer. I got a little more than I bargained for. I admire the Minister’s characterisation of the Government’s devolution agenda as “incalculable”. I have some doubts about that. I argue that the Minister has set out quite defined and calculable strata in the White Paper, so I am slightly surprised that it would be impossible to know whether a combined county authority had the maximum powers. That is possibly a point of difference. We are in the strange position that our alignment with the White Paper is greater than the Government’s, but I am sure that point will come up again. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 44 and 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

General power of CCA

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 47 stand part.

[Alex Norris]

I will not speak for long on the general powers of combined county authorities. The explanation is very well set out in the explanatory notes to the Bill, which is a handy read about how we have landed here in local government legislation.

I want to push the Minister on how he thinks this provision would work in practice. Will Royal Assent be the day the Government give a clear signal that, once we have conferred functional purposes on combined county authorities, they will be left to do those things? Will that be the case even if the outcomes might sometimes not be the ones the Government think are best, but the inputs and outputs are in pursuit of local goals as decided by local decision makers? At some point there will be a Minister who says that that is not the case; I wish to have it in my pocket that this Minister thinks that it is the case at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

In general, the hon. Gentleman’s question takes us a bit beyond the scope of the clause. However, the narrower part of it, which connects up with the good question put by the hon. Member for Nottingham North, gives me an opportunity to explain what the clause does and does not do.

The clause does not give a combined county authority unbridled power. It gives it the power necessary to do anything it considers appropriate for the purposes of carrying out any of its functions—its “functional purposes” in the law. That might include undertaking a feasibility study as a preliminary stage to an infrastructure project. The clause sets out boundaries and limitations for a combined county authority’s exercise of its powers.

These are therefore broad powers, but there is still a requirement in law that they are related to the carrying out of its actual functions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Power to make provision supplemental to section 46

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 48, page 43, line 11, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c).

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from conferring different general powers on different CCAs.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 42, in clause 49, page 43, line 37, at end insert—

“(4) Where the Secretary of State makes provision under subsection (1), the same powers must be offered to all other CCAs subject to the consent of the appropriate authorities under subsection (2).”

Where the Secretary of State has conferred a general power of competence to one CCA, this amendment would require them to offer all CCAs the same powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

My notes are as extensive as saying, “Same principle.” I might have to do a bit better in my explanation, but that is probably a sign not to speak for long on this clause either.

Clause 48 gives the Secretary of State the powers, essentially, to make clause 46 work—the ability to provide for the exercise of functional purposes. That argument was well made by the Minister and agreed with by all. What amendment 41 would do is leave out subsections (3)(b) and (c), as a way of saying to the Secretary of State that this power should not be conferred unequally. We should be conferring these powers as and when necessary to CCAs—I made that point earlier. As an alternative, under amendment 42 to clause 49, the Secretary of State must offer a general power to all if it has been offered to one. Again, that is in line with arguments that have already been made, which I will not repeat.

[Rachael Maskell]

I will be brief, because we have discussed these matters a number of times. The Committee has come to recognise that there will be asymmetry and that the powers will evolve at different times and in different authorities. That is the nature of devolution, and it is positive because it means local areas are in control of their own destiny. Capping those powers will have an impact on the economic ability and drivers of an area and will result in socioeconomic loss. Restraining local authorities in reaching their potential could mean that we do not see the growth and opportunity that a CCA could bring.

The amendments would enable more parity but also ensure that CCAs do not have different powers or descriptions. We want more symmetry in the ability to attain powers, and we will no doubt keep labouring the point at later stages of the Bill, because it is fundamental to devolution and who controls the process. The amendments very much go into the detail of that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell]

No, I think I have said enough.

[Alex Norris]

The Minister knows that the Opposition approach is neither one size fits all, nor slowest pace. I concede that amendment 41 probably does not serve in that regard because it would have a restrictive impact. I take the criticism of the amendment, but the same does not apply to amendment 42, although I am not inclined to press it to a vote.

The Minister used the characterisation “à la carte”. I thought that was the whole function of the White Paper. He instead talks about individual agreements, which I think is part of the reason we have the complicated set-up that we have now. I thought the whole purpose of the White Paper was the pursuit of the goal of everyone having the uppermost powers if they so wished. Individual agreements are clearly not going to be the most effective way to do that.

We are left in this curious situation where we seem to be more interested in and attached to what is in the White Paper than the Minister is. The point has been made, so I will not push the amendment to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Incidental etc provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 51 stand part.

[Alex Norris]

Again, I will not detain the Committee for long. Clause 51, certainly, is very much a standard clause. I wondered, however, for the sake of our understanding and perhaps with reference to combined authorities or what the Minister might foresee for combined county authorities, generally what the provisions look like. What sort of properties, rights and liabilities are transferred? I am interested in a real-world example.

[Neil O'Brien]

I will have to write to the hon. Gentleman. Clauses 50 to 54 are basically technical provisions needed to make the CCA model work. Clause 50 grants the Secretary of State the power to make incidental, consequential, transitional or supplementary provision in support of regulations made under this chapter. I am happy to set out some examples for him in slow time.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Guidance

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 52, page 45, line 16, leave out “may” and insert—

“must, within 6 months of the day on which this Act is passed,”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to produce guidance on the establishment and operation of CCAs within 6 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.

We are about to reach the end of chapter 1 of part 2, which relates to the formulation and mechanics of combined county authorities. Much of what will pass in the rest of part 2 is consequential and not much to debate, so this will be the last opportunity to make some points. I did not want to miss that opportunity, particularly on guidance.

The discussions we have had, and the mechanics of the organisations as laid out by the Minister, show that the CCAs are fiddly entities. There is much to be established, with Mayors, deputies, changing geographies, changing names, police functions, fire functions and much more. As detailed in the White Paper, at least 10 places are foreseen as potential partners for combined county authorities, so there is likely much to be understood in guidance.

I hope that my amendment is not necessary. It changes the provision allowing the Secretary of State to give guidance to one compelling them to give guidance. I hope that the Minister will tell us that the intention is to have guidance, because clearly there will be a need. I have suggested “within 6 months” of Royal Assent. That is not something to fall out over, but I am keen for a commitment that guidance will follow and to know when it might do so.

[Neil O'Brien]

The clause grants the Secretary of State the power to issue written guidance about anything that could be done under or by virtue of chapter 1 of the Bill by a combined county authority, combined authority, county council, district council or integrated transport authority. The relevant authority must have regard to any guidance given in exercising any function under this chapter.

The amendment, as we understand its intent, is misplaced. The reference to guidance in the clause relates to the requirement for an authority to have regard to the guidance in exercising a function conferred or imposed by virtue of chapter 1. I can undertake that areas wishing to establish a CCA will be made familiar with the processes required of them during their devolution deal negotiation. We will help them to do all those things. Officials will continue to work closely with area officials to ensure the successful implementation of deals and the establishment of CCAs.

The Secretary of State has no immediate plans to issue guidance. The ability to do so via this clause provides maximum flexibility should the issuing of such guidance ever be appropriate. I hope that reassures hon. Members.

[Alex Norris]

I am a little surprised that the intention is to provide guidance in a kind of ad hoc manner directly from officials to area officials. It would seem to me valuable for that to be a common and publicly shared thing, not least so that the public can understand it and get the sense that these processes are being done transparently, rather than in phone calls that they do not have access to. I am a bit surprised by that. I will not labour the point by pressing for a Division, but perhaps the Minister will reflect on it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clauses 54 to 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71

Capital finance risk management

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider amendment 45, in clause 195, page 196, line 33, at end insert

“but the Secretary of State must formally consult representatives of local government before making such regulations”

This amendment would delay the implementation of clause 71 until a formal consultation has taken place with local government representatives.

[Alex Norris]

Clause 71 proposes to give the Secretary of State significant powers to intervene in a local authority, including limiting borrowing and/or directing a local authority to sell specific assets. Such an intervention would follow a review that could be triggered by assessment against specific financial formulae, the thresholds for which are to be set by regulation after the Bill has received Royal Assent. It is slightly difficult for this Committee to understand the wisdom of that without knowing those thresholds. That goes with the lack of an impact assessment and, in this case, incomplete information, which makes the ability to judge quite difficult.

The local government family have expressed concern about this, including concerns voiced by their membership body, the Local Government Association. I understand that the measures relate to Government concerns about councils’ approach to capital and borrowing, and we need to set that in context. As the LGA highlighted in an intervention last week, rising energy prices, rising inflation and national minimum wage pressures are set to add £3.6 billion in unforeseen extra cost pressures on council budgets by 2024-25. That is on top of the £15 billion cut to council budgets by central Government over the previous decade. Councils are simultaneously managing significant spending reductions and growing demand for services, certainly in adult social care and child social care—both sectors are significant growth lines on local authority budgets.

The reductions in central Government grants since 2010 have understandably led councils to look for new ways to generate revenue in order to secure services in the long term and move towards greater self-sufficiency. Indeed, that was the direction, and the characterisation of the period between 2010 and 2015, and the Secretary of State at the time—now the noble Lord Pickles—was saying, “Commercialise, commercialise” so that councils could become financially self-sufficient, on the understanding that central grants would whittle away to nothing. They are well on that trajectory.

Councils have been pushed into that sort of commercialism and borrowing. There is also a case about place making. Councils have made investments to contribute to their local economy and their environment, such as building new houses, introducing energy efficiency improvements and providing necessary infrastructure such as schools and roads. There is a growing conversation about high streets and town centres—a significant part of this legislation. Again, councils would love to enter that space so that there is a public interest in how landlords are motivated on our high streets.

Councils have to follow strict rules and assessments, as required by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy’s prudential code for capital financing in local authorities also needs to be followed when making borrowing and investment decisions. Those rules have been reviewed and updated in just the past few months.

Given that framework and the new rules that councils already have to follow, I am keen to hear from the Minister a clarification on what the enhanced intervention process is likely to mean in practice. It is crucial that the proposed changes do not have unintended consequences, and there is a danger that a strict, hard-and-fast, formula-based approach, as hinted at in the Bill, could have wide and perhaps unintended implications, particularly if there are any problems with the thresholds and the metrics that the Government have not yet identified in terms of how they work in practice. They may not be proportionate to the scale of the issue that the Government are seeking to address.

I understand that the Government have said that the stated intention is only for a handful of councils to be affected, but if the levels are not set right or if the calculations are not done effectively, I dare say that the trigger point could tip an awful lot together at the same time, because there is generally quite a lot of herding in this sort of space.

The purpose of the amendment is therefore to ask the Government to undertake full engagement with local government, including full consultations with councils and their representative bodies before enacting the regulations. The advice from councils and the LGA would assist the Government in preserving that legitimate and important concept of prudential borrowing, which we would all support, while ensuring that the new arrangements genuinely address the Government’s concerns.

[Neil O'Brien]

The Government recognise the importance of prudential borrowing and local capital investment for economic growth, improved public services, and meeting local priorities such as housing delivery. That is why we need a robust system that supports the benefits of local decision making and allows for sensible investment, but also that safeguards taxpayers’ money and protects the local government finance system.

In recent years, a small minority of local authorities have taken excessive risks with taxpayers’ money: they have become too indebted, or have made investments that have proved too risky. To give some examples, local authorities have engaged in investment activities in markets they know nothing about, such as energy companies, and lost tens of millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money. Some have not had the governance structures in place that would enable them to make, or assure themselves of, investment and borrowing decisions. Some have borrowed up to £1 billion when they have only had a core spending power of just over £10 million, and others have not set aside funds to pay off their debt when it becomes due. The National Audit Office reported that 20.8% of local authorities’ property acquisitions in the period 2016-17 to 2018-19 were outside of their region. In summary, there have been a number of problematic activities, which clause 71 seeks to address. The Government have been consistent and clear in their messaging that they will take action to address such activities as needed.

The National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee have reported on the risks to the financial system, and the need for urgent action to address them. The Government are making changes to the capital system to support good decision making and constrain risk, but they must also have the powers to directly address excessive risk where necessary and appropriate. The changes will provide a flexible range of interventions for the Government to investigate and remediate issues where capital practices have placed financial sustainability at risk.

To be clear, the Government have no intention of restricting the activities of local authorities that operate responsibly. We are clear that measures must be as targeted and proportionate as possible to protect local services and taxpayers, while letting the Government mandate remedial actions where needed.

However, as the examples I have given show, the need for action is pretty clear. The metrics and thresholds that will underpin the new powers will be set in regulations, as the hon. Member for Nottingham North said, and we will of course engage with sector experts and local authorities and consult widely as we develop those regulations to ensure they are fit for purpose. That is exactly our intention, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, and it is why I hope the Committee will support the clause.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer, and for the oblique references he included in it—there was a well left Easter egg, which I was able to find very easily. In return, I might say—equally obliquely—that if such local authorities had not been more than £60 million worse off in real terms over the past four years, some of those decisions might not have been made. I also say that such concerns have not stopped Ministers in the Department, or indeed the Minister himself, from seeking to bestow more powers and resources on those local authorities, so there must be some limit to the concern that the Minister would have in such cases, were they to occur. I would also suggest that significant mechanisms are already in place, as the Minister has hinted at and as I know very well myself.

However, the Minister has given a generous assurance, one that will be welcomed by the sector, which will be very keen to take part in that process. On that basis, we are happy to support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 71 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 72

Long-term empty dwellings: England

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 72, page 81, line 4, at end insert—

“(za) in section 1(b), leave out “the relevant maximum” and insert “300”;

(zb) omit subsections (1A) to (1C);.”.

This amendment would raise the maximum level at which local authorities can set council tax on long-term empty dwellings.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 78, in clause 72, page 81, line 9, leave out “1 year” and insert “6 months”.

This amendment would reduce length of time before the Local Authority could charge the higher rate of Council Tax on long-term empty dwellings.

Amendment 62, in clause 73, page 81, line 28, leave out “100” and insert “300”.

This amendment would raise the maximum level at which local authorities can set council tax on dwellings occupied periodically

Amendment 63, in clause 73, page 81, line 31, at end insert—

“(c) the dwelling is available to let for less than 252 days and actually let for less than 182 days in any 12-month period”.

This amendment would increase the threshold at which properties are liable to be charged council tax.

Amendment 81, in clause 73, page 81, line 33, leave out “one year” and insert “six months”.

This amendment would reduce length of time before the Local Authority could charge the higher rate of Council Tax.

[Alex Norris]

The country is currently in the depths of a severe housing crisis, with a lack of supply of affordable homes and opportunities for young people and families to get on to the property ladder. Members across the House will know from our casework just what a profound challenge that is, and how damaging the lack of affordable homes is for younger generations. Its impact is felt all over the country and across all communities in some way, but I think the problem is particularly acute in our coastal towns and holiday hotspots. Steep price rises due to a considerable trend in people buying second homes are having a significant effect on local housing markets in such places. This trend has only been accelerated and exaggerated by the pandemic, as working patterns have changed.

Local residents in holiday towns, particularly those with families going back generations in their home town, are being squeezed out of the housing market and forced to look elsewhere, as property is bought for second homes, rather than to help locals get on to the property ladder and have somewhere to house their families. As fewer properties become available and local supply is reduced, house prices rise inexorably and local people are forced to contend with the vicious circle of a lack of supply and rising prices.

There is a significant problem. The housing crisis will be played out in days to come. There is a desire across the House to address it. At this point, I am particularly talking about holiday hotspots and coastal towns. Tight-knit communities are being hollowed out and left like ghost towns for significant parts of the year, outside of holiday seasons. We have heard stories of village pubs boarded up and the village shop on the brink, such is the lack of custom. Whole primary schools are closing, as there is a generation of lost children. Unfortunately, our local authorities do not have the right tools to really grip the situation and protect their local communities.

That is why it is welcome that clause 72 is in the Bill and that the Government are entering into this space and sees it is as their responsibility to allow local authorities to place a 100% council tax premium on long-term empty dwellings or dwellings occupied only periodically. However, the Opposition do not think that goes far enough to give local authorities real power to make the right decisions for their communities. Amendments 61 to 63 seek to improve the Bill in that way.

The offer in the amendments is for 300% as the premium, rather than 100%, as introduced in amendments 61 and 62. That applies to long-term empty dwellings and dwellings occupied only periodically. That means unused properties or second homes, frankly. We think that enhanced premium would be better. We have a recent comparable example in Wales. The Welsh Labour Government have been pioneers in this area. These amendments seek to introduce for England the recent changes we have seen in Wales.

Amendment 63 proposes that the threshold at which a point of dwelling is liable for business rates instead of council tax is raised substantially, so that those with second homes who seek to circumnavigate council tax by letting their property for just a short amount of time are no longer able to do so. At present, those who intend to let for 140 days and actually let for 70 can access a loophole whereby they will then qualify to pay rates instead of council tax.

Amendment 63 seeks to raise that threshold to 250 days and 182 days respectively. This would not only close the loophole for those seeking to avoid council tax; it would also provide—I think this would be beneficial for all concerned, including those who have holiday lets and want to operate them in the right way—a better delineation of what is a genuine holiday let, with lets provided all year round by a genuine business contributing significantly to the local economy and therefore legitimately qualifying for a business rate. As well as that being right for ordinary residents and people in general, it is also better for business that it is a level and fair playing field. A proper business with holiday lets would not be affected by an increase in the threshold.

I think we can deliver a win-win for coastal towns and holiday hotspots. By acting to close this loophole, we will get more empty homes back into productive use, while raising additional revenue to support local services, keeping council tax down and putting money into the local economy too. Indeed, that is pretty much verbatim what the Department website said when announcing the proposals for a 100% council tax premium. I think we are in the same place conceptually; it is more about the level. Again, these things would not be obligatory—they would be for local decision makers—but let us trust them, entrust in them the power to protect themselves from the scourge of empty and second homes, and empower them to fix their local markets for younger people, so that we can maintain our thriving coastal towns and villages for generations to come.

[Tim Farron]

Last week we covered the report from the Rural Services Network, which showed that if rural England was a separate region, it would be the most needy of all the geographical regions on the Government’s metrics, and this issue is one of the reasons why. We have a housing catastrophe in many parts of our country, especially in areas that we might call holiday hotspots. Although the problem does not affect rural areas only, it is principally found in rural or coastal areas, as well as in our historic towns and cities.

In the communities that I represent, before the pandemic 83% of homes in places such as Elterwater were not occupied, and well over 50% of homes in many other communities were not permanently occupied. Since the pandemic, estate agents in Cumbria estimate that between 50% and 80% of all house sales have been in the second home market. A crisis has become a catastrophe, and we do not have time to stroke our chins and issue calls for evidence when it is blindingly obvious what the problem is and what the solution is. One of the solutions has to be tax based.

When a community loses a permanent population, it simply dies, which is obviously tragic for the people who remain there. The census data released in the last few days shows that the retired section of our community in the south lakes has increased by 30% over the last 10 years, and that there has been a huge drop in the number of people in the younger age groups. That is miserable. It means that families are broken up, that communities that should be vibrant are not, and that areas soon lose their school, pub, church, bus service and shop. All those things cease to exist if there is not the footfall and the permanent population to underpin them, but a community also completely loses its workforce.

One of the huge problems across the country, but particularly in places such as my constituency, is that we have seen a decimation of the workforce as long-term rental properties become short-term—principally Airbnb—holiday lets. As houses that were family occupied or locally occupied become second-home boltholes, we see an evaporation of the working-age population. I have a couple of quick stats—I cannot remember whether I have mentioned them in Committee, because I mention them regularly in other places. A survey of its members by Cumbria Tourism showed that 63% of tourism businesses in the lakes last year had to operate below capacity because they could not find enough staff.

What does that mean for our economy? The £3.5 billion tourism economy in Cumbria could be an awful lot more, but we are not working at capacity because we cannot find the staff, and this is one of the reasons. People find themselves in a ridiculous situation whereby they might rent a holiday cottage in the lakes or the dales—a nice place—for a week or so, but they end up not being able to get a bite to eat. Why? Because the cottage that they are renting was the chef’s house last year. All these anecdotal issues lead to an overall picture of a serious problem that the Government surely know about, because many of us have raised it time and again, but are doing precious little to rectify.

We have the potential to use council tax as a mechanism to ensure that people do not use the loophole of renting out their second home for 70 days a year, then qualifying as a small business that does not pay any council tax or business rates. That is not acceptable. Thousands of people who own homes in my constituency use that loophole, but it should be closed and we should increase the number of nights that someone has to rent out their property before it counts as a business. We should even consider charging council tax on all holiday lets and be done with it. We are not saying that every council must do that; we are saying that authorities should have the power to do so. If the Bill is about empowering communities rather than telling them what they must or must not have, we should give councils that power, because it can make a huge difference. If we were to treble the council tax for Coniston alone, we would raise just over £1 million a year from that one village. What could it do with that money? It could pump-prime affordable housing projects. It could subsidise its primary school and secondary school so that they had the resources to match the number of kids that they should have in the first place. It could support the post office and rural bus services. All those things could be done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tim Farron]

I appreciate that the Minister is referring to planning, which I mentioned as another means of controlling, limiting and even reducing the number of second home owners and holiday lets, to create a higher proportion of permanently occupied dwellings in communities such as mine. We will deal with that later in the Bill. He said that there are a variety of mechanisms —yes there are, so let us use them, and he is one of them.

It could be argued that planning is a slightly blunt instrument, but there is nothing more blunt than an unregulated and failing market that is killing my communities. The Minister speaks as if that is something that we have only just discovered. It is not; it has been going on for decades, and has become catastrophic in the last couple of years. As geographers and geologists would tell us, erosion takes places over a long time, but one day, when there is some really bad weather, a whole piece of cliff falls into the sea.

That is what has happened to the housing market in communities such as mine in the last couple of years. The situation is already terrible: 83% of homes in Elterwater are second homes. I can name lots of other places with similarly high levels of homes that are empty all year round. People have the right to own and visit their second homes, but their right compromises the right of a much greater number of people to own even a first home. Sometimes, rights and liberties clash, and that is when we have to decide whose side we are on. Are we on the side of people who have plenty of rights already, or the side of those who have nothing? I am on the side of people who have nothing and who want to have a home and make their communities vibrant.

As the hon. Member for York Central mentioned, the tourism economy and its leaders are not in favour of the situation, and they want action. They will say, “Yes, holiday lets are a key part of our tourism economy, but if you get to the stage when there are so many of them that there is no community left for people to visit, and the workforce cannot afford a home anywhere near to where they work, so that the economy just suffers and ceases to function, that is problematic.”

I appreciate the Minister’s sympathy, but it is not enough. The Government say that they are looking at and investigating this, and that the Housing Minister has his roundtables. That is all very welcome, but we know what the problem is and what some of the solutions are. The frustrating thing is that the Bill is a golden opportunity to do something about the problem, rather than kicking it into the long grass and stroking our chins while our communities die.

[Alex Norris]

This has been an excellent debate. The contributions from my hon. Friend the Member for York Central and from the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, have offered excellent explanations of how the problem manifests itself in two different communities with similarly profound effects.

I apologise to the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, as I was absent for what I hope was an imperceptibly short part of his speech. I was startled to read in the notes that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central made for me that vacancy rates in his part of the world are 50% to 80%. That is extraordinary; what a profound impact it must have.

I was interested in the Minister’s response. We do not intend to press the amendment to a Division. I am glad that, through amendment 63, that is still an active process. If there is a better way than the one we have suggested, we would very much be up for doing a deal. The principle is settled and agreed; it is the level that is in dispute. The Government have settled on 100 days in the interests of balance. Perhaps that is a case of test and learn, which I think is something that will be littered through the next set of proceedings. There are circumstances in which that approach is a good one, but there are others in which it is used as a comfort instead of being brave. We will not always know which of those things apply; in this case, I wonder if it is the latter.

The Minister is right to say that they are non-trivial measures to bring in, and there will be a non-trivial impact on those who are affected, but as hon. Members have said, the impact is already non-trivial. The measures are definitely not an order of magnitude greater than the problem, because the problem is really significant. I will not press the amendment to a Division, because we will have opportunities to pursue the matter as the Bill progresses, and this exceptionally important problem will not go away. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Miss Dines.)

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Seventh sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 30th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch all electronic devices to silent mode. No food or drink, except for the water provided, is permitted during Committee sittings. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if hon. Members emailed their speaking notes to hansardnotes@ parliament.uk. It is a little muggy, so I am happy for hon. Gentlemen to remove their jackets, if they so wish.

Clause 7

Combined county authorities and their areas

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 7, page 7, line 5, at end insert—

“(3A) Condition C is that the public in the area have been consulted.”

This amendment would require public consultation to take place before the establishment of a CCA.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 48, in clause 22, page 18, line 33, at end insert—

“(c) the public have been consulted.”

This amendment would require public consultation to take place before the amendment of a CCA area.

Amendment 49, in clause 23, page 19, line 35, at end insert—

“(c) the public have been consulted.”

This amendment would require public consultation to take place before the dissolution of a CCA.

[Alex Norris]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mrs Murray. We had a very good first day of line-by-line consideration on Tuesday. We had interesting debates, held in good spirits, and where we differed, we were able to do so well. I am sure that we will do similarly today. I hope that we may have a little more luck moving the Minister, and even if we do not in substance, we may at least establish some agreements in principle.

Today we start our consideration of part 2, the final half of the levelling-up provisions in the levelling-up Bill. There is a certain oddness to the fact that we will be considering the Bill well into September but will finish the levelling-up bits shortly. That pushes me back to the point I made at the beginning on Tuesday: this is not wholly a levelling-up Bill anymore. Nevertheless, the bits that we have in front of us are very important.

Clauses 7 to 70 establish combined county authorities, which will be the essential building blocks of sub-regional devolution. If done well, they will be the foundations of local place-shaping architecture that will drive forward levelling-up across our nations and regions. We do not have an issue with the establishment of CCAs—indeed, we support their development—but we think there are various ways of improving them, and those are covered by these amendments and amendments to come.

Some basic principles govern the amendments. First, we want to see greater public involvement. Secondly, we want to see strengthened local leadership. Thirdly, we want to see access for all communities to the highest level of powers. Fourthly, we want the Government to be non-prescriptive on the governance model. I might add as an addendum that I hope to hear from the Minister that the Government really intend to let go; they do not want to devolve powers but then still keep their hand in to guide communities when they do not get from them the answers they want. Where the Government can meet those tests, we will support them, and when they do not, we will seek to enhance the provisions.

Clause 7 establishes new bodies corporate, the combined county authorities. I will say a little on the distinction between CCAs and their sister organisations, combined authorities—as established by part 6 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009—when we debate amendment 15. At this stage, it is important to understand our amendments by understanding what these new regional, or presumably sub-regional, structures will do. They will be at the heart of the levelling-up agenda when it comes to leadership. These bodies will receive power and money from the centre and use them to drive forward the development of their communities. If it turns out that levelling-up has succeeded, as we all hope it will, it will be because these bodies have succeeded. We have already seen the success of those rather similar, although in law distinct, bodies in parts of the country. Examples are the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and the West Midlands Combined Authority. We could list them all, but I will not do so. However, we can see that success across the country.

That said, we have to be clear that these bodies must be structures that work for communities. They are not conveniences for central Government or regional leaders. They must be bodies that drive collaboration across the public, private and voluntary sectors and, critically—this is the spirit of our amendments—that connect the public to the process of levelling up and improving their communities, getting the public involved in the decisions that shape their communities and lives. Amendments 46, 48 and 49 would start that process. If we fail to connect the public to the process then, despite the promises made in the White Paper on communities shaping their own futures, that just will not happen. We will be stuck in the progress paradox, whereby things get better but people feel worse, because change in their community happened to them rather than in partnership with them.

I put it to the Minister that one of the biggest risks of this entire programme is that, the Government having told local communities that levelling up will mean a shift of power from the centre to communities—from Whitehall to town hall—some power moves instead from the centre to the sub-region. That sub-region, which is currently an alien concept to most people, will be a new tier of politicians and public figures who are at a level even further away from people than their local council and who are harder for them to engage with, and certainly harder for them to remove. I do not think that will meet the public expectation test. It is really important that we demonstrate that the public are equal partners in the process and that it is done with their consent and commitment; otherwise, the new bodies will sit in isolation and will not deliver what they are supposed to deliver.

Amendment 46 makes a simple but important point. If the Minister wishes to secure for the Secretary of State, as in clause 7(1), the power to establish the new bodies, we really ought to establish whether the public want them, understand their value and understand their role in them. Currently, clause 7 allows for the formation of combined county authorities should two tests be met: condition A is that the area consists of

“the whole of the area of a two-tier county council”

combined with either

“a unitary county council, or…a unitary district council”;

and condition B is that the area is not already part of another CCA, an integrated transport area or a combined authority. The amendment would add condition C, which is that

“the public in the area have been consulted.”

That is a low bar—indeed, I have lightly prescribed it and would recommend then tightening the mechanisms in the guidance that follows the legislation—but it is nevertheless a crucial test to ensure that the body is set up in the public interest and is actually what people want.

My own local community is a pertinent example. It is no secret—it is in the White Paper—that the Minister and the Secretary of State hope to form county deals that lead to CCAs for Nottingham and Nottinghamshire and for Derby and Derbyshire. From all the coverage, I understand that those two deals are likely to come together. As a Nottinghamian I have doubts about that as a natural geography, but it is not necessarily about my views, or indeed the view of my constituency neighbour, the hon. Member for Broxtowe, who I am sure has his own views, or indeed the views of the Minister, as the initiator from the centre; it is about the views of the million-plus people who live in our community and whose future will be shaped by such deals. It is important that it happens with their consent and understanding, that the case is made for that geography, and that their views are properly and meaningfully tested and given due prominence in the discussion. That is a reasonable thing to ask and, if we are to get the bodies off on a good footing, a good idea and a good place to start.

Amendment 48 is a counterpart to amendment 46 and would amend clause 22, under which the area of a CCA might be amended in future. It mandates public consultation on a non-prescribed basis. It is even easier than the requirement for public consultation under amendment 46, because currently that would mean talking to people in the abstract: “You currently have a central Government, a local government, and you may have town and parish councils, a county council, two-tier local government or a unitary authority, as in the city of Nottingham. We are going to create this new body about which you do not know yet because you do not have a combined authority yet.” That will involve a certain amount of explanation and high-quality information. With amendment 48 it would be a bit easier, because at the relevant stage CCAs will already be established so it will be easier to ask the public whether they wish to enter or leave an established one.

Similarly, amendment 49 would amend clause 23, under which a CCA might be dissolved. Again, that is rather easy to explain to the public or for them to understand: “You have a CCA; do you wish to still have one? Here might be the reasons either way.” I have a lot of confidence that the public are more than capable of properly engaging in those decisions. In fact, I think there is significant public expectation of that engagement. As leaders in this place, we should look with some concern at the polling every couple of months on public trust and confidence in Parliament as a whole, and in our ability to enact the changes that they want. There is a high degree of scepticism. People are actually more confident in local government.

The strand that comes through all that polling is that people want to have a say. If we establish such important bodies, which will have a significant say on levelling up, we need to ensure that the public have been engaged at the earliest point.

[Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)]

It is great pleasure, Mrs Murray, to serve under your guidance. I will say a brief few words, broadly in support of what the hon. Gentleman said about consultation.

Devolution is not devolution if it is done on the terms of central Government, by definition; nor is it really devolution if it involves hoovering up the functions of lower-tier councils. It is not devolution if it is done for the convenience of people in Whitehall and does not involve listening to the people in the communities directly affected. Setting up combined council authorities may indeed be an important building block in delivering what the Government see as levelling up, and I can see the merits in it, but although consultation needs to happen—it is right that it is written into the Bill—it also needs to be meaningful.

Twelve months ago, the Government had not settled on any kind of reorganisation for Cumbria—I speak from not bitter, but rich, personal experience—and we are now two months into a new authority, which was elected at the beginning of May and on which, I am pleased to say, the Liberal Democrats have a majority. Westmorland and Furness Council was but a twinkle in the Secretary of State’s eye only a year ago, however. There was a consultation, but less than 1% of the population of Cumbria responded to it. Generally, most people were of the view that the proposals were meddling top-down reorganisation for national, rather than local, purposes.

Remember that Cumbria itself was established in the early 1970s, when the historic counties of Westmorland, Cumberland, Lancashire over the sands, and the West Riding of Yorkshire were put together. That county kind of worked, but someone who went to Sedbergh would have to talk about cricket in a very different way from if they went to Grange. The reality of local identity is hugely significant. A consultation in which a few engaged people fill in a form on the internet is not consultation. It is a consultation in name, but the majority of people are not actually listened to.

If consultation is to be formally included in the Bill, that is fine, but I want it to be deeply embedded so that communities actually get a say about the boundaries that may be formed by any new combined council authorities. I am fortunate that every single blade of grass in my constituency is parished, but not every part of the Westmorland and Furness Council area is parished. It is important that voices in each part of the new authorities are able to express the views of those communities.

Consultation is vital, but it should be more than just a word. Arguably, as a society, we have never been more consulted but less listened to. Let us make sure not just that consultation is included in the Bill, but that it is ingrained in the practice of developing the new authorities, so that communities’ cultural identities are reflected and the wishes of the people on the ground go towards building those authorities, which should be built not for the convenience of Whitehall, but for the empowerment of communities in Cumbria and across the rest of the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Neil O'Brien)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray. I echo the comments from those on the Opposition Front Bench about the quality of the debate on the first day of line-by-line scrutiny. I hope to continue that tenor and interesting dialogue.

We completely agree with much of what Opposition Members have said, which is why we have provided for exactly what they want in the Bill. Let me expand on that. In the levelling up White Paper, we announced a new institution that we believe can provide the strong leadership and effective and coherent collaboration needed for a strong devolution deal in certain circumstances. This new institution is the new combined county authority model, referred to in the Bill as a CCA.

As Opposition Members have said, the appropriate circumstances for that model is where a county deal covers an area with two or more upper tier local authorities. Those upper tier local authorities will be the constituent members of the CCA. Although we have not yet of course established any combined county authorities, because we are legislating for them here, we need to look to the future, as Opposition Members have said, and anticipate a scenario where an established CCA wishes to change its boundary. Since there is no benefit in a shell institution existing in perpetuity, it is only right that the legislation provides for such an institution to be abolished.

Wherever a CCA is planned to be established, its boundaries changed, or is to be abolished, we absolutely want to see the local public being consulted on the proposal, but the amendments are unnecessary, because the requirement for a consultation on a proposal to establish, amend or abolish a CCA is already provided for in clauses 42(4)(a) and (b), and 44(3)(a) and (b). Those provide an opportunity for local residents, businesses, organisations and other key stakeholders to have a say on the proposal, exactly as my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley pointed out. A summary of the consultation results must be submitted to the Secretary of State alongside the proposal and have regard taken of it.

There is a further safeguard in clauses 43 and 45, which provide that the Secretary of State has to undertake a consultation before creating, amending the boundary of, or abolishing a CCA, unless there has already been a consultation in the affected areas and further such consultation would be unnecessary. That will ensure that there has been sufficient public involvement in the consideration of whether it is appropriate to establish, change the area of or abolish a CCA. As such, I hope that I have given sufficient reassurance that the amendments would be purely duplicative for the hon. Members to withdraw them.

To touch on a specific point, the hon. Member for Nottingham North talked about initiators of devolution at the centre, we are the initiators of the devolution process in one sense. However, we are not the initiators of devolution deals for particular places. Ahead of the levelling-up White Paper, we called for expressions of interest, and we only move forward—we can only move forward—with a devolution deal if it has the support of locally elected leaders. In that sense, we are not the initiators; it takes two to tango, and that is the nature of devolution. In this Bill, it comes with what I hope for Opposition Members is sufficient requirement to engage in deep public consultation, and for that consultation to be listened to properly, as said by various people.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for colleagues’ contributions. They were good ones. Briefly, the example given by the spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats, the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, was a salutary tale. Again, there is the idea that something so significant might be engaged in by only 1% of the population; if that is where we end up with these structures in future, it would be really problematic and almost undermine their ability to perform from the outset.

On the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, I have not quite found the right moment in the debate to talk about integrated care systems, but that is a good example of another very significant body that will have to engage with the county combined authorities in some way. The footprints do not sit elegantly, and they do not in life—I understand that. It is easy in countries such as the US perhaps, where they have defined, existing state borders—okay, everything can fit elegantly around that, but it can still get confusing at the margins.

There is a challenge there, but I think that it gives greater strength to the case for public involvement, rather than saying we ought to sit here with a map and carve things up. The people who know that best and how the sensible natural geographies work are the general public. The answers lie there, and it happens naturally—people know at what point they start to look, say, northwards to the hospitals in the north of the county, rather than to the one in the south, as happens in Nottinghamshire. That is a strong case for greater public involvement.

I am, however, reassured by what the Minister said about the provisions in clause 42(4)(a) and so on—the hon. Member for Keighley mentioned them, too. The reason for the separate amendment was my concern for the process to be one that happened not as an ABC condition right at the beginning, but as a co-equivalent term of engagement. Clearly, from what the Minister said, the intent is not to come alongside a proposal: “Have you brought your consultation with you? Right, that is ticked, therefore it is done.” On that basis, I will not press my amendment to a Division.

I will finish on the point the Minister made about initiating devolution. I am not sure that I quite agree with what he said. First, of course the centre is the initiator, in the sense that we could not have these bodies if we did not have the Bill, and we could not have the Bill if a Minister of the Crown had not presented it—so the centre is the initiator in that sense.

Also, I love the idea that the Government’s view is that local communities of a natural geography would come together to ask for county combined authorities and, most importantly, the powers that come with that, and the Government would respond on the quality of that application, but the White Paper already tells us the 10 areas that the Government are prioritising. That is “initiating” in any sense of the word; those are the areas chosen and the geographies for those areas have been chosen. There is no sense that this is a “come one, come all” process, as the Prime Minister has previously said— come to him or the Minister with ideas and “We will give you the powers you need.” That is not what is in the White Paper—it is very clear who it is who is being called forward. So I challenge the Minister’s point on that, but I am grateful for the comfort he has given on the amendment and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 7, page 7, line 7, at end insert—

“(4A) “The Secretary of State must commission an independent evaluation of the merits of establishing CCAs as distinct from combined authorities and must lay the report of the evaluation before Parliament within 12 months of this Act coming into force.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to conduct an independent evaluation on the merits of the new Combined County Authorities established in Clause 7 and to report the findings to Parliament.

As we have discussed, the clause establishes county combined authorities if conditions A and B are met. The latter is the most pertinent. CCAs are different, though complementary, to combined authorities, which already exist under part 6 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. The clause essentially rolls out combined authorities so that all communities can have access to devolved powers, which is of course a very good thing.

That raises the question of why we need this clause, as we have the power on the statute book already. We need to be very clear, because this is a significant policy change. The Government feel that there is a need for CCAs alongside combined authorities. The decision to form such a combined authority can be decided at the upper tier, which essentially removes what the Minister termed, in the evidence session, the district council “veto”—we will get into that point more when we reach clause 16. This is a significant moment, a significant distinction and a significant divergence from current policy, which will have a significant impact for all those areas with two tiers of local government. I have no doubt that it will elicit strong feelings about whether district councils should be a formal partner in the process; the powers included here mean that, in the future, they will not be.

Amendment 15 is perhaps slightly less exciting. We will now have essentially two sets of organisations that basically do the same thing, or which will be used largely interchangeably in this place, the media and in public conversation. I expect that Ministers will engage with both types of organisation similarly—there is nothing in the White Paper to suggest otherwise. I understand the value in getting them going, but—I am leaning on the expertise that the Minister has access to—does he have no anxieties that that different legal status may lead to unintended consequences down the line in terms of what the organisations can and cannot do? We might end up with a divergence that we are not seeking. As far as I have had it explained, the only reason for divergence is for the ability and convenience of getting these things going.

The amendment asks that within a year of the Act coming into force, the Secretary of State commissions a report that establishes whether it is desirable to have this technical difference for things that are substantively the same.

[Rachael Maskell]

I can already hear what the Minister is going to say in response, because we rehearsed some of these arguments on Tuesday. The importance of the independence that the amendment points to should also be drawn out. If we are building confidence between communities and Government and establishing a new tier of power and of democracy, having rigour and independence is also important, to ensure that we can progress proposals on CCAs. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is a vital element of what the amendment proposes?

[Alex Norris]

Yes, that independence and transparency will be the theme of a lot of our discussions. I make no apology for that. In this case “independence” was carefully chosen because we need to be clear that the reason for setting up a new class of combined authorities as distinct from those cited in the 2009 Act is one of convenience, because it means that something will be done. The broad agenda has been stuck, spinning its wheels, and there are no more combined authorities in the works because those who were able to form consensus have done so and the rest, presumably, are unable to do so. The Government of the day have the right to bring forward proposals, as they have done, but the amendment is designed to provoke a clear response from the Minister that there is no danger of separate treatment for those bodies that is not intended at the outset.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

In my earlier comments, I set out the CCA model and talked about the rationale for it. Some areas that we are discussing a devolution deal with are considering adopting that CCA model. But even with those first areas, it is highly unlikely that the deals will be negotiated, announced and implemented via secondary legislation, and CCAs established and up and running within the 12-month period of this Bill receiving Royal Assent. That would render the report’s evaluation no different in 12 months’ time from today.

Opposition Members rightly want to have a debate in Committee about the CCA model. I have said a bit in our previous sessions about why we are doing it, but let us take the discussion a bit further. The purpose of the CCA model is to make devolution practically possible in two-tier areas without requiring unitarisation. The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale talked about districts coming under the aegis of a CCA, but that is not quite right. It could easily be that only top-tier authority powers are devolved to the top-tier authorities in a CCA. If they do not want to, the districts may choose not to take part. They are not having their powers or responsibilities changed, but the difference is that they are not able to veto their neighbours from getting devolution or making progress.

I am perfectly happy to stand here and make an argument about fairness, because I do not think it is fair that one district can veto progress for a large number of neighbouring districts and boroughs for top-tier authorities, particularly if it is not being forced to do anything, as is the case under the Bill. It is simply unfair for such a district to be able to stop their neighbours going ahead.

The Opposition sort of alluded to the practical reality in that although I would not rule further mayoral combined authorities in the future, in a lot of a country that currently does not have a devolution deal, the CCA model will be the practical way of delivering that. In practice, if we do not have that model, we will just not make progress. I can think of one area that we currently discussing that has a very, very large number of district councils, and it is exceedingly unlikely that we would be able to agree a sensible agreement if every single one of them were given a veto.

In a sense, the amendment is to push us, not unreasonably, to talk about the whether the CCA model is the right one. The proposed evaluation is in one sense called for so that we can now discuss whether this is the right thing or not. I think we have been clear. There is no back door. I am standing here telling Members why we are doing it right now and what it does and does not mean. We will discuss some of the nuances when we consider further clauses, and we absolutely have to get that right. However, the amendment and the evaluation proposed would essentially not add anything to our conversation this morning, whether one believes that the CCA model and the removal of that veto is right or not. That is why I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I share a lot of the views expressed by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale about districts, which we will have the opportunity to discuss further in the debates on future amendments. I also agree with what he said about parishes. I hope the Bill is the single biggest step forward for parish and town councils in terms of the community powers that they can exercise, closest to the lowest possible level, to give communities a real say in what happens in their area. The Bill does not currently say that but we will seek to add it in due course.

I have a number of points to make about what the Minister said. I appreciate his candour, which reflects well, as it would be easy for him to obfuscate. I take him at his word, but I am surprised that there is a sense that within a year of the Bill achieving Royal Assent, which itself is some months away and probably nearer to Christmas, we will not have had any future deals agreed under these provisions. That genuinely surprises me, and I suspect it will surprise quite a few people who are currently negotiating such deals. I understand that the Minister has May 2024 in mind for elections; that timescale does not give us an awful lot of time, which poses its own desirability problems.

I disagreed with the Minister’s point that rather than this being about circumventing districts it is about making combined authorities possible without requiring unitarisation; that is not quite right. Deals have been made that involved district councils and they did not require unitarisation; they required consensus and understanding. I do not think it follows that it is either what is in the Bill or unitarisation, which leads to the point about districts not losing power. We will test that later, but I am glad that the Minister has put that on the record because it is important.

The Minister made a point about fairness, which I understand. He alluded to an example in which a deal with perhaps 15, 18 or 20 partners could not go ahead because one partner was able to say no to the whole process; I agree with him that that is probably not a good thing. Possibly, that is a point about fairness, but there would be other ways around it, such as to allow districts to exit a process and others to carry on. Again, there are benefits and disbenefits to that. Rather than a single district being able to veto the whole process, it could be done by a super-majority, given the significant nature of the decision.

[Neil O’Brien]

The hon. Gentleman has touched on a really important point. He has encapsulated in a very neat way what we are trying to establish here, which is the ability of districts to participate if they want to and not to if they do not want to.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister, but I do not think that will be the effect of the legislation. The reality is that a combined authority area can be formed for the area that includes the district council, whether it wants that or not. Indeed, the district council will have limited say. I do not want to prejudge the discussion we will have when we come to clause 16. It is welcome that the Minister has nailed his colours to the mast, but the reality is other mechanisms could have been chosen. The Government have chosen this mechanism, so it is right that we probe it. We have been able to do that and, as I am at risk of moving ahead of the discussion, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Constitutional arrangements

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 8, page 7, line 24, after “about the” insert “initial”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 17 would give the power to vary the constitutional arrangements of a CCA to the CCA alongside any elected Mayor.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 17, in clause 8, page 7, line 25, at end insert—

“(1A) After regulations containing those initial arrangements have been made, the responsibility for varying the constitution lies with the CCA in conjunction with any elected Mayor.”

See explanatory statement for Amendment 16.

[Alex Norris]

The amendments would alter clause 8, which allows the Secretary of State to establish constitutional arrangements for a county combined authority, which are important and establish the terms of engagement. We Members know as well as anybody else that the basic rules by which a body corporate operates can have a significant impact on decisions and outcomes—although they might not be codified in one place, lots of significant rules and conventions guide our activity—so it is possibly not a surprise that we may be the type of people who get very interested in these sorts of things.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell]

My hon. Friend is making an important point about the autonomy of CCAs to control their destiny. We recognise that we are on a journey of devolution. In her evidence, the West Yorkshire Mayor, Tracy Brabin, spoke about how she sees the intersection between her role and that of overseeing the police and taking a public health approach, which shows how things can evolve. As she does that, other authorities will be looking on and looking to replicate such opportunities. Does my hon. Friend agree that CCAs have to be given latitude so that they can make determinations about their own evolution and, as time goes by, get more powers to fulfil the aspirations and opportunities that need to come to local communities, let alone do anything to address the inequalities?

[Alex Norris]

I share my hon. Friend’s view. That point was made very clearly in Tracy Brabin’s evidence. Having said that we in this place have an interest in constitutions and the rules of the game, my strong belief, as someone who wants to see change happen in my community and to see my community improve in a vast range of areas, is that form should follow function. What are we trying to get out of these bodies? The structures—the bodies and committees that need to be in place—should then flow from that. I strongly believe that the people best able to decide that will be those who operate locally in the combined authorities.

The Government have to set the broader parameters, but I am hoping to hear from the Minister that those are likely to be de minimis involvement and that, instead, they will positively cut the link and allow county combined authorities to drive action forward without worrying about that tap on the shoulder telling them that even though they said they wanted to do that, they cannot.

[Neil O’Brien]

In our response to this amendment, it is crucial that we hold in our minds the distinction between local standing orders for combined authorities on the one hand and the statutory instrument setting out things such as voting arrangements on the other. It is essential for the stability and the establishment of combined authorities that things such as voting rights can be set out in secondary legislation to ensure a stable institution. Of course, the CCA can set out its own local constitution by itself, but those two things are very different.

We have talked already about the county combined authority model; clause 8 is vital to permit the effective operation of a CCA. Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State needs the consent of the constituent councils and, where it already exists, the CCA. In other words, the arrangements cannot be imposed against the local area’s will.

To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Nottingham North, the clause closely mirrors the provision for combined authorities, which has supported the establishment of 10 combined authorities, each approved by Parliament. In this instance, “constitutional arrangements” means the fundamental working mechanisms of the CCA, including things such as its constituent membership and voting powers. It is vital that those things are set out in secondary legislation and approved by Parliament. That ensures that CCAs are stable institutions with good governance, in line with agreed devolution deals. It is only right that the core design and operating model of the CCA, such as the constituent membership and the voting arrangements on key decisions, remain in line with the devolution deal agreed by Government and local partners at the outset, with the secondary legislation establishing the CCA being approved by this Parliament.

A CCA can set out its own local constitution or standing orders with additional local working arrangements. It might, for example, set out meeting procedures, committees, sub-committees and joint committees of the CCA. That is done locally, at the right level consistent with our position on localism, and does not require secondary legislation. The Mayor of West Yorkshire pointed out that they were making changes to go from one to three scrutiny committees, which is quite right.

The amendment is really inappropriate and potentially quite dangerous to the devolution process. It is inappropriate because it would allow a CCA to change elements of its constitution that are rightly approved by Parliament and part of the initial devolution deal agreed by all parties locally. It is unnecessary because all the other elements of a constitution can already be changed by the CCA locally. I hope to have given sufficient explanation for why we will ask Members to withdraw amendments 16 and 17.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for that response. I take slight exception to the idea that the constitutions cannot be imposed without will. Yes, of course, all the members of the county combined authority will have had to have signed up to it—I understand that—but it will presumably be an indispensable part of the wider package, so we would be asking for local areas to turn down possibly many millions of pounds’ worth of funding, plus transport powers, extra housing powers and powers on skills, because they do not like the shape of the constitution. Of course they are not going to do that. I would not characterise that as them entering into it with the freest of free wills.

[Neil O’Brien]

Perhaps it would help if I were to expand a little. If I were a local government leader considering joining a CCA, I would want to know that the key arrangements for it, such as voting arrangements, would be stable over time and could not suddenly be changed by a potentially transient majority of local authority leaders who are members of it. To be honest, if I felt that that could happen to my local authority, I would be wary about signing up to a devolution deal on that basis. That is why certain core functions of these things are rightly set in secondary legislation, while other elements are rightly for local decisions so that they can make arrangements work for them and make things work locally.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister. I understand that, but I would like to know that local authorities will not fall victim to a one-size-fits-all arrangement. One could argue either way, which is fine.

The Minister’s point about local standing orders has addressed most of my concerns. He said that the arrangements remain in line with the original deal, but that cuts both ways. If he is saying no to local variation but yes to the idea of local standing orders, that must also mean that the Secretary of State will not make such changes. If we start to see variation between those deals, that becomes challenging, but I am getting ahead of the amendment before us. I am grateful for the clarification on local standing orders, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Non-constituent members of a CCA

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 9, page 9, line 30, at end insert—

“(7) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the non-constituent members appointed to each CCA. This report must include:

(a) the age of all non-constituent members,

(b) the gender of all non-constituent members, and

(c) the ethnicity of all non-constituent members.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make the age, gender and ethnicity of non-constituent members of CCAs publicly available.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 19, in clause 10, page 10, line 3, at end insert—

“(5) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the associate members appointed to each CCA. This report must include:

(a) the age of all associate members,

(b) the gender of all associate members, and

(c) the ethnicity of all associate members.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make the age, gender and ethnicity of associate members of CCAs publicly available.

[Alex Norris]

Clause 9 allows county combined authorities to designate non-constituent members—presumably other bodies such as integrated care boards, chambers of commerce and others—as nominating bodies. Clause 10 allows CCAs to designate associate members. I presume that those provisions are designed to enhance discussion and collaboration, which is a good thing for which we have argued throughout proceedings. CCAs ought to be partnerships between those sectors, and it is right that that is reflected in the Bill. Good examples abound throughout the country, and it is quite interesting to see the different approaches that combined authorities have taken.

Liverpool city region has a local economic partnership representative and a Merseytravel representative; West Yorkshire has a local economic partnership representative; and West Midlands has a tremendous range of observers or co-opted organisations, such as the Midlands Trades Union Congress, and representation from the young combined authority. In evidence, I asked the Mayor of the West Midlands about how that worked in practice, and it was clear that that combined authority had built an admirable cross-sector culture. I hope we will foster such a culture across the piece.

We are establishing a new tier or class of politician and public figure—especially when adding elected Mayors—and those people will make significant decisions that affect those they serve. They will have their own organisational mandates—elected or otherwise—and will come together to make significant decisions. However, they will be some way away from the public.

It is crucial—I hope there is general agreement among all parties on this—that our democratic organisations and public bodies strive to reflect the communities that they serve, and that we acknowledge the challenges and imbalances when they do not. Poor representation is a bad thing not just for those who are under-represented and suffer the consequences of a decision-making process that does not reflect their needs or interests, but for the institutions themselves. When they do not represent considerable parts of the population, they lose their legitimacy.

I do not think such problems could be amended at the stroke of a pen, but they can be understood, and an understanding of them is what we seek to achieve with amendments 18 and 19. Amendment 18 would add to clause 9 a requirement for an audit on the age, gender and ethnic composition of non-constituent members. Amendment 19 would amend clause 10 so that a similar audit happens for associate members. That information would be updated annually, would be produced by the Secretary of State and would be public and accessible to all.

There are examples of the positive role that legislation can play in empowering us to reveal inequalities and promote change. The Equality Act 2010, one of the final pieces of legislation of the previous Labour Government, is a case in point. It has been transformative, and building on elements of that Act would really enhance our work here. For example, section 106 of that Act requires the publication of diversity data on candidates, but the power has yet to be commenced by the Government, which is a real shame. That weakens our ability as a Parliament to represent the country we serve. Perhaps the Minister can tell us when that power might be turned on.

[Rachael Maskell]

I am conscious that the most recent census information, which is just coming out, shows a significant change in the demographics of our country. It is important that we not only look at the three protected characteristics mentioned in the amendment, but consider wider protected characteristics—for example, disabled people in positions of authority. As well as reflecting communities, seeing that leadership is often an encouragement.

[Alex Norris]

Yes, that is right. The suggestions in the amendments form a basis—I would be very keen to build that out across the protected characteristics.

That provision has worked with gender pay gap reporting and has driven a public conversation. I envisage the changes we are seeking to introduce working in a similar way; at the moment of publicity, the reports would create reasoned and informed public debate about how to change some of the inequalities that exist. Diversity data is a really good way of doing that. This is about being honest and having the conversation, so that we might change things. We should start this new class of bodies, which are going to be really important in our communities, on the best footing, with best practice.

Of the Mayors who have been elected so far, only one has been a woman and only one has been from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background. We would not want any new arrangements to exacerbate existing gaps in representation. Of course, ultimately it is up to voters to select who they wish to be their Mayor, but when CCAs have the power to choose associate and non-constituent members, I hope that we would say from the outset that we want to see a diversity of representation.

[Rachael Maskell]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the act of carrying out an equality assessment and looking at the diversity of the people who are appointed focuses the mind to consider who is being appointed to these posts?

[Alex Norris]

I think that is right. That has been the experience of the provisions of the Equality Act, and would be the experience here, too. We want these issues to be at the front of CCAs minds at the outset. We want them to speak and work with legitimacy for their communities. They do that by being representative of the communities they serve.

These changes are not onerous. I dare say the report could be done quite quickly. I hope the Government think this is important, that we will hear from the Minister that he thinks it is important and that he will therefore be minded to add them to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for taking the point, because I agree with the tenor of the argument, that we do not want to have major strategic decisions made by a quango. That is what we spent the past eight years fixing—starting in the coalition years, in fairness. We are on the case with his concerns.

Let me take a step back for a moment and set out what the clauses are doing. Clause 9 provides a flexible framework for combined county authorities to appoint non-constituent members, who are representatives of a local organisation or body, such as a district council, a local enterprise partnership or health body. Clause 10 provides for CCAs to appoint associate members, who are individual persons with expertise, such as a local business leader or an expert in a particular policy area.

Combined authorities have appointed commissioners with specific expertise to focus on a challenging local policy area and drive change—for example, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority appointed Dame Sarah Storey as a commissioner on active travel. It is a way of bringing in experts and other institutional stakeholders locally to complement the core of, ideally, directly elected local leadership so that everyone works together as well as possible.

It is only right that those nominations, or appointments, are the decisions of local leaders, who best know their areas. The clauses set out transparent processes for the nomination and appointment of both types of members. For a non-constituent member, the CCA designates the local organisation or body as the “nominating body”, which then selects a person to represent it at the CCA. It is for that nominating body to make that decision. For example, the CCA might designate the district council as a nominating body and then the district council selects its leader, for example, as its non-constituent member representative at CCA meetings—ex officio, as it were.

The clauses provide a way for local experts and key stakeholders to have a seat at the table of a CCA, bringing their local expertise and knowledge to facilitate better action to tackle local challenges. Those are vital public roles and transparency on them is equally vital. That is why clause 11 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations about the process of designating nominating bodies, the nomination of non-constituent members and the process of appointing associate members. We expect that all appointments of associate members will be undertaken through an open and transparent process, of course.

By their very nature those roles will be public roles—for example, a public body such as a district council nominating its leader to a role in another public body. In the Bill’s spirit of localism—a key word—this is a matter to be decided locally by the CCA and nominating bodies. They are independent of central Government and it is right that they make the decisions about how and with whom to collaborate.

The amendments seek annual reporting regarding the persons selected by the nominating bodies to be non-constituent and associate members. The Government do not believe that they should prescribe to CCAs that they should be informing Government of the specific make-up of their non-constituent and associate members. As with all good public bodies, a CCA should promote equality and diversity in the organisation. What is more, non-constituent and associate members are only one part of the membership of the CCA. The amendment calls for a report on one group of members of a CCA and does not reflect the CCA as a whole, including its constituent members, which is slightly odd. It is also slightly concerning that, as the hon. Member for York Central mentioned, the amendment mentions only some but not all of the protected characteristics. That would open up some potential legal questions that I am not really qualified to opine on.

The core point is that non-constituent and associate members of CCAs have an important role to play, but the amendment is unnecessary. It fails to consider the independence of CCAs and nominating bodies and does not reflect the fact that the positions of associate members and non-constituent members will, by their very nature, be public; these are not secret roles. I hope that the hon. Member for Nottingham North will agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions. I agree with the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, who expressed the hope that we are not establishing a quango. We are definitely establishing a new class of leadership, however, and it is less local and less directly accountable.

I am slightly disappointed by the Minister’s response, because I did not get a sense—

[Neil O'Brien]

I have to take issue with the hon. Gentleman’s comment about the process being less local. If I think about the devolution of powers over a number of things that are already done through combined authorities, such as the devolution of adult skills spending, if an authority is not in a CA, that decision is made in Whitehall. The decision is made here. In the combined authorities, such a decision is made more locally, for example by the West Midlands Combined Authority, which I visited the other day. Such authorities are making better decisions; because they are more local, they can create the co-ordination between local colleges. I take issue with the idea that decision making is less local as a result of what we are doing for devolution.

[Alex Norris]

The Minister is of course right that such decisions are more local than central Government, but that goes back to my argument on the first set of amendments. Having told people that communities will get the power to shape place, if what comes through the process is devolution to a new level of politics consisting of politicians and public figures who are further way from those people than their local councils, I do not think we will have passed the localism test. That may be a point of difference but that is certainly my view.

I had hoped to hear the Minister offer a slightly stronger commitment from the Government that the new bodies really ought to represent the communities they serve in terms of their make-up. I am surprised that was not said. We were left to believe that the make-up was for local decision making. Just as in the Health and Social Care Act 2014, I fear that we will end up with Schrödinger’s localism: when there is a difficult decision to be made, “That’s a local decision”; and when the decision is something that the Government want to reserve to themselves, “Of course we have to set the rules of the game, because otherwise it is dangerous”—as the Minister argued in response to the debate on the previous set of amendments. The Government are in danger of falling into some cakeism, but I hope that is not the case.

[Neil O'Brien]

This is an opportunity for me to repeat that, like all good public sector bodies, the CCA should promote equality and diversity within the organisation and it is for the CCA to do that locally. On the point about cakeism, these are two very different things. In the case of the voting arrangements for a combined authority, allowing them to be changed locally by a transient majority might cause a lot of local authorities to simply not join in the first place.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that; I would never want to misrepresent what he has said. On the second point, we are likely to test it considerably over the next however long.

I struggled with the Minister’s criticism that the amendments excluded the constituent members of the CCA. That would be a valid criticism had he put in a provision that included them, but he has chosen not to. Similarly, his criticism that I have not included all the protected characteristics would be valid had he put in a provision covering them all. I do not believe that he wants to do those things, so I think that was slightly unfair. On the question of legality, he has access to more lawyers than I do, but I spoke to the Equalities and Human Rights Commission and it did not have a problem with this, so I do not think legality would be an issue.

I am willing to accept the Minister’s point about non-constituent members, pertaining to amendment 18, in that, as he says, they are appointees of their own organisation. I remember chairing my health and wellbeing board and my discomfort at the fact that it fitted the characteristics the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale described more than it ought to have in a community that was very diverse, but when it came to trying to do something about that, the point was made to me that the board members were representatives of organisations, including the police, the council, the universities and so on, which themselves had diversity challenges that led to that common challenge, to which there was no elegant solution. On that basis, I will not press amendment 18, but amendment 19 involves choices—direct choices—whereby a county combined authority decides who to put on. I want to know whether we are trying to address inequities or just repeating the same failings. That is an important point of substance, so I will withdraw amendment 18 and press amendment 19 at the appropriate time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Associate members of a CCA

Amendment proposed: 19, in clause 10, page 10, line 3, at end insert—

“(5) “The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the associate members appointed to each CCA. This report must include:

(a) the age of all associate members,

(b) the gender of all associate members, and

(c) the ethnicity of all associate members.” —(Alex Norris.)

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make the age, gender and ethnicity of associate members of CCAs publicly available.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Regulations about members

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 11, page 10, line 37, at end insert—

“(2A) Where provisions made under subsection (2) vary between CCAs, the Secretary of State must publish the reasons for this variation.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to explain their reasoning for making regulations about CCA membership that differs between CCAs.

Clause 11 permits the Secretary of State to make regulations relating to constituent members of a CCA, a Mayor’s role in a CCA, the nominating bodies of a CCA, and non-constituent and associate members of a CCA. Furthermore, it allows the Secretary of State to decide all sorts of ways in which a CCA operates: votes, numbers and types of nominating bodies, the appointment and removal of members, maximum numbers of certain types of members, and so on.

That broad range of provisions might lead to a risk of micro-management. I have doubts about how desirable it is to be so involved in the detail; it feels a little as though central Government are not quite willing to let go. The Minister said that there is a risk of divergence, certainly at the outset. Although we have taken that interesting point on board, it seems a little odd that the Government are willing to devolve transport functions—and, presumably, no little sum of money—to a group of people, but are unwilling to let them choose whether to have substitute members in the place of associate members. I hope that amendment 20 will help in that regard.

The clauses we have debated so far have established county combined authorities, and given them constitutions, as a uniform class of organisation with a uniform set of rules to play by—or, at least, a uniform set of circumstances under which regulations will set those rules. I will probe the Minister on how he thinks that will work for individual CCAs. Ten new devolution deals were mooted in the White Paper—happily, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire were in one of them. Will those deals be set up with the same constitution? I cannot see why they would not be.

Amendment 20 would give the process some teeth, so that should the Nottingham and Nottinghamshire deal, for example, be different from the others, the Secretary of State would have to explain why those deals have been set up with different constitutional arrangements. That would not stop any differences, but it would be a recognition that the default position should be alignment and that any divergence should be explained.

The reasoning behind the amendment—I think this is a theme that we will cover in later amendments—lies in the history of combined authorities. I have a real personal discomfort with the idea of asymmetric devolution. I lived the first half of my life in Manchester, where my family still live, and I have lived the second half of my life in Nottingham. At some point during the last decade, a judgment was made in the Department that Greater Manchester could have a greater say over its future than Nottingham could over its own. Of course, that might have formally ended in proposals being submitted and deals being struck, but in reality, there were an awful lot of conversations about Nottingham’s readiness and Greater Manchester’s readiness. Ministers—not this Minister, but his predecessors—made the judgment that we in Nottingham would be unable to wield such powers. Of course, local circumstances can make that challenging, but I think our common personhood means that we ought all to have access to the same powers. We will pursue that theme in our amendments.

That is the basic principle, and although it can look different in different places, it holds firm. Instead, we have been left with a mishmash of different devolution settlements and deals. If we sought to explain to someone from outside the country our 10 current devolution deals—never mind the areas that do not have anything at all—we would struggle to explain them with any kind of criteria other than evolution over time. I do not think that CCAs should perpetuate that. The welcome direction of travel that the Minister and Secretary of State set out in the White Paper was that they did not want it to be that way in future, but that instead there were tiers of power to which everyone had access and that communities sought to take on, so that is a start.

The amendment would provide a check, so that if the governing document that drives the CCA—its constitution —does not start on the same basis, there must be really good reasons why not and a public account of those reasons, whereas what we have now is this rather inexplicable variance.

[Tim Farron]

I will be brief, given the time. Personally, I have no problem with asymmetrical devolution. A contrived central devolution is perhaps why Lord Prescott’s proposals in the ’90s and noughties did not work and were not popular. I have no problem with asymmetrical outcomes, but I have a serious problem with asymmetrical autonomy. Each community should have the same access to powers, even if gained in a different way. This is an important probing amendment, and I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say. For example, a rural community such as Cornwall, Northumberland or Cumbria should not have a Mayor forced on it if it does not want one, yet it should still have the same access to the same levels of power that the Government are offering through devolutions to those communities that do have a Mayor.

[Neil O’Brien]

The amendment brings us to a series of other amendments bound together by a particular philosophy encapsulated in the statement by the hon. Member for Nottingham North that the default should be alignment. The amendment is a particular and bleak way into this philosophical debate, and amendments to some later clauses—in particular amendment 26—make the Opposition’s position much clearer: that things should move in lockstep and that there should be more one-size-fits-all.

Fundamentally, we pretty profoundly disagree with that philosophy for a number of reasons. Devolution agreements should be different in multiple different ways, because there are different local wants. Simply, the point of devolution is that different people in different places want different things, and devolution makes that possible. Pragmatically, there are also different readiness levels. In some places, a process has been going on— for example, the Healthier Together work in Greater Manchester, which had been going on for a decade before health devolution in Greater Manchester. Also, different places are set up with various partners that they work with at different readiness levels.

On a pragmatic point, my great fear about adopting the one-size-fits-all, lockstep approach of the convoy moving at the speed of the slowest is that we will just not make significant progress. Were the hon. Gentleman to find himself in my place and I in his, he would discover that he could not make much progress in getting Whitehall to devolve powers. That is no small thing—to ask the elected Government of the day to give up control of the things for which they will be held accountable by the electorate to local politicians, who in many cases may be of a different political party. That is no small thing to agree. If it were said that a power could not be offered to a particular place unless it was offered to all—like the most-favoured-nation principle—I promise that devolution would grind to a halt extremely swiftly.

There is a framework. The basics are set out in the levelling-up White Paper, but variation is intended. Variation is a feature, not a bug of our devolution agenda. We believe in localism, in particularism, and in adapting things to the particular needs and particular local politics of different places—I agreed at least partly with what the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale said, which in some ways chimed with our view of this.

The hon. Member for Nottingham North asked us to explain why that might be so, in particular in relation to the amendment, which is about membership. Simply put, there might well be different numbers of members in different CCAs. We could have one with two members or one with a lot of members. Or we could have ones where the members were relatively similar authorities, or one where one member had radically different characteristics from the others—we might imagine a load of urban authorities and one that was more rural, or something like that. However, this amendment is the start of a series of amendments, so I will not labour the point at this stage.

Something else that the hon. Member for Nottingham North said that chimed with me and stuck out was that the centre should let go. That statement is very much our intention, in practice, with the desire for uniform devolution. We do have to let different places do different things because, fundamentally, they have different priorities. One place might care a lot about housing issues, but another might care about its innovation strategy. These things should be different, reflecting different wants.

To recap why we still want voting arrangements, for example, to be in secondary legislation, it is not primarily us in central Government that that arrangement is protecting; it is protecting local leadership from someone joining something only to find that they have been stitched up and then have their powers taken away due to a particular alignment of local leaders. Some things must be certain for local leaders and should be locked down and made safe for them in order for them to make progress, but in other ways there should be diversity, variation and localism.

This amendment represents just one aspect of that philosophy in practice, and we will talk about it again under other amendments, but the Opposition spokesman called on me to be direct, and I will be. There is just a difference in philosophy here about how we should approach devolution.

[Alex Norris]

There is a difference of philosophy, but the Minister slightly misrepresents the point I am trying to make, or perhaps I am not explaining it well. Our intention is not, as he characterises it, a lockstep, one-size-fits-all movement forward or, as he says, that the convoy must move at the same speed; it is that divergence, where it exists, should be the choice of the local community, not central Government. That is what we have today. The Minister is reserving for himself the ability to pick and choose who the Government feel is able and willing to exercise certain powers in certain ways in certain contexts. I do not agree with that, and that is the difference.

We are not saying that the settlement will be the same in every part of the country. The Minister says that this is a feature rather than a bug. I agree with that, and that is the point that we will be probing in subsequent amendments. We do not need to fight things out on constitutions at this stage. We will need to return to that, but on the principle that we are not saying that one size fits all, rather that the Government should not get to pick the winners. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Miss Dines.)

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Eighth sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 30th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, let me give the usual preliminary reminders. No food or drink is permitted in sittings, except for water, which is provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to them at the appropriate address.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Review of CCA’s constitutional arrangements

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 12, page 11, line 28, at end insert—

“(8) If an appropriate person carries out a review under subsection (2), they must make the report of its findings publicly available.”

This amendment would ensure that the findings of any review of a CCA is made available publicly.

It is a pleasure to reconvene with you in the Chair, Mr Paisley. Clause 12 allows a combined county authority to review its constitutional arrangements. That is a wise provision because, of course, there will be moments when CCAs will want to be sure of whether form fits function. There must clearly be local scope for review and understanding, with as much transparency as possible. It is with that in mind that I move this amendment.

Transparency is important, because it strengthens our democracy by opening up the decision-making process to the whole population. As we build new political institutions, such as the proposed CCAs, it is vital that we put transparency in them at the beginning. As we discussed previously, transparent and open government makes better policy, delivers better outcomes and is generally a good thing for our democracy.

This amendment proposes that if any review is conducted to investigate changing the constitutional arrangements of a CCA, it must be published publicly. That would improve the function of the Government’s proposed CCA. It will be part of the honest conversation about the work the body is doing and the work we want it to do, and it will ensure that it serves not its own members or vested interests but the whole population. That is really important. These debates are too important to take place behind closed doors.

That does not need to be a negative process. It can be an open process that gives the population, as well as all the constituent members that we have discussed under previous clauses, the chance to engage. Amendment 21 is a fair and reasonable requirement to be added to the review mechanism, and I hope the Minister is minded to agree.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Neil O'Brien)]

As we discussed during our consideration of previous clauses, the key constitutional arrangements—membership, voting and decision making—will be set out in the secondary legislation establishing the CCA. That legislation, which requires consent from both the relevant local authorities and Parliament, would also enable a combined county authority to set a local constitution specifying how detailed decisions are taken on aspects of how the CCA is to operate. It could cover, for example, meeting procedures, committees, sub-committees and joint committees of the CCA.

Clause 12 enables a CCA to review and amend its own local constitution in certain circumstances, and I hope it provides some of the flexibility that the Opposition have been arguing for. A review of the local constitution can be undertaken if proposed by constituent member or the mayor, if there is one, and if the proposal is supported by a simple majority of the constituent members. The local constitution can be amended if the amendments are supported by a simple majority of constituent members including the mayor, if there is one.

At each of these stages, the CCA’s decision must be made at a meeting of the CCA. CCA meetings, like those of all local authorities, are conducted with full transparency. That means that interested parties, including the public, can attend CCA meetings, and papers must be made available in advance. The CCA will also need to publish its constitution. Amendment 21 is therefore unnecessary. There is no need for a separate report of findings, which would place a disproportionate and unnecessary bureaucratic burden on the combined county authority, and distract it from the implementing the changes that it needs. I hope that, with those explanations, the hon. Gentleman is content to withdraw his amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for the Minister’s answer. In general, I think his response does suffice, but I would like to push back on two points. As he says, these will be public meetings and there ought to be full transparency. However, we know that is not universally the way things operate. At local authority level, for instance, I would expect rules to operate exempting certain parts of meetings for reasons of commercial confidentiality. We know that there are points of friction for local authorities up and down the country. There can be the sense that things are being hidden behind the exempt part of the meeting. I would not say it is inevitable and unavoidable that we will get full transparency, but I have heard the spirit of what the Minister said. I am not sure it would have been an administrative burden, not least because the thing will have been done anyway and will exist already. Someone would just have to upload it to the website. That would satisfy the requirement of the amendment as I wrote it. Nevertheless, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Overview and scrutiny committees

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 13, page 11, line 31, at end insert—

“(1A) The CCA must prepare a CCA-wide Equality Impact Assessment and must be produced to inform the work of any such committee.”

This amendment would oblige the CCA to produce an Equality impact Assessment to inform scrutiny work.

Clause 13 and schedule 1 are very important provisions. They provide for the involvement of overview and scrutiny for the activities of the county combined authorities being established. This is very important. These are new bodies established to make significant regional and sub-regional decisions. It is right that they are held accountable for their actions and that the healthy process of scrutiny and analysis takes place in live time so they can make the best possible decisions. I am glad to see in the Bill a clear push from the Government for overview and scrutiny committees to be part of the process, as I think they will do a valuable job. We want to make sure that this is done from the most secure base possible with regard to information.

Amendment 47 mandates that CCAs provide an equality impact assessment to inform the work of overview and scrutiny committees. Levelling up is fundamentally an exercise in tackling inequalities. That is the whole point of the Bill. It is implied in the name. It is about regional and local inequalities—often expressed as spatial inequalities—but it is about much more than that. In these debates we have heard that there are elements of levelling up that apply pretty much to the entire country in some way; they just manifest differently in different places. There is no doubt that we are a country of significant inequalities, and we really ought to be addressing those. We need to be skilling up and equipping our overview and scrutiny committees with the right information to make sure they can address those inequalities.

From 2017 to 2020, the north-east had the lowest median household income at £480 before housing costs, while London had the highest at £615. That is the sort of inequality we are talking about. Inequalities manifest in different ways. For households from a Pakistani ethnic group, median income before housing costs was £350, while households from an Indian ethnic group had the highest median income at £558—again, a significant disparity. Families with a disabled member had a median income of £467 before housing costs, compared to £577 for households where nobody was disabled.

Moving to gender, women are less likely to be in full-time employment, with a rate of 45% compared to 61% of men. Some 41% of women provide care for children, grandchildren, older people or people with a disability compared to 25% of men. Less than a third of Members of Parliament are women and some 35% of board members for publicly listed companies are women. Women make up 6% of chief executive officers of FTSE 100 companies and 35% of civil service permanent secretaries, and none of these women are from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background. Only 35% of our councillors are women. At the current rate, we will not achieve gender equality in local councils until 2077.

One disparity that touches every community is that disabled people are almost twice as likely to be unemployed as non-disabled people, and three times as likely to be economically inactive, with an employment rate of just 53%.

Taken in aggregate, those statistics reflect where Britain is today and where we have been over the last few years. They might make us think about where we go in the future and what we seek to address. There is a strand of thought that says, “Well, some of these inequalities are no one’s fault, or at least it is not the role of the Government to tackle them. If the Government does do that, they should be very careful because it is likely they will make things worse.”

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

Although it is essential to have an equality impact assessment to establish a baseline, it is also vital that all the work of the CCA puts everything through the prism of an equalities impact assessment too. If this amendment is not adopted, will it be appropriate to talk about having some form of equalities scrutiny within the body in order to ensure that all policy and decision making meets those equality objectives that we on the Opposition Benches share?

[Alex Norris]

Yes, absolutely. I remember one of the changes we made when I worked in local government. Remember, that was just one public body—one council—with many departments, just as national Government has many Departments, but in combined authorities we are talking about many organisations coming together to collaborate. We did not truly understand the cumulative impact budget decisions were having on individuals, particularly individuals with protected characteristics. It was likened by the individual who asked for the change as a sort of chopping away at a stool, with the legs all being chopped off on different sides by different departments. We did not understand that that was happening and that the cumulative impact was very significant for those individuals.

We need to find a way, whether through this amendment or through the thoughtful suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, to add this into the work of the combined county authorities so that they understand the collective impact their decisions will have. The levelling-up agenda gives me hope that the argument that it is not for Government to resolve these matters and that even if they did they probably would not do a good job no longer stands. Clearly, we no longer think that is true, which is a welcome change of tune. It shows that inequalities are not inevitable or unalterable, and that it is the role of the state to take the field and seek to do something about it.

These sorts of inequalities manifest all over the place. Even in the wealthiest communities, which we may be least likely to think are deserving of levelling-up funding, statistics regarding disability employment are still very challenging—I do not think there is any part of the country where they are not very challenging—but such communities are well placed to motor ahead on levelling up and perhaps do much better.

I hope that is the core on which these county combined authorities are operating. Happily, the Government are introducing overview and scrutiny arrangements in schedule 1. Now we must ensure they have the right information to work with. This amendment is one mechanism to do that. In the Minister’s response I hope to hear that if the amendment is not adopted, there are other ideas and other ways in which the Government think that can be done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

The public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010 ensures that public bodies play their part in making society fairer by tackling discrimination and providing equality of opportunity for all. As public bodies, CCAs must integrate equality considerations into decision-making processes from the outset, including in the development, implementation and review of policies. However, the equality duty does not require public bodies to follow a prescribed process and leaves it to their local discretion as to when it is appropriate to carry out an equality impact assessment to ensure compliance with the duty that binds them. The amendment would place an additional unnecessary duty on combined county authorities that does not apply to other public authorities, including existing combined authorities, which relates to the point made by Opposition Members about ensuring there is equal treatment and similar legal bases between MCAs and CCAs.

It is the Government’s intention that CCAs will be expressly subject to the public sector equality duty, which we will do by consequential amendments to the Equality Act, meaning that CCAs have to integrate equality considerations into their decision-making processes as soon as they are established. There is therefore no need to place a further burden on CCAs by requiring them to produce a separate equalities impact assessment. In fact, equalities considerations will already be at the very heart of what they do. With those assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Nottingham North will withdraw his amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, for his contribution. His points about rural poverty are well made and are grist for the mill because, as he said, in all CCAs there will be levelling-up features. Everyone will seek to take such measures. Rather than an individualised, exceptionalised programme, we are talking about a collective advance of CCAs. Slowly but surely we are making a fine socialist of the Minister, speaking for collectivism rather than individual exceptionalism. Any day now, I am sure that he will wear that badge with pride.

I was a little disappointed in the Minister’s reply. Yes, the public sector equality duty exists, but if the Government’s answer is to rely on that, we should remember that it has not removed all the inequalities that I spoke about. At some point, we must do something differently in this country, and I would have thought that this legislation was a really good place to start. I put it to the Minister that doing things the same way will only produce the same answers in the future, and I fear that that is what will happen unless we insert a firm commitment to tackle inequalities in all their forms into the DNA of the proposed new bodies. I am disappointed.

I was not happy with the answer about the divergence from combined authorities. If the Minister had such a problem with combined county authorities differing from combined authorities, he would not have introduced combined county authorities; he would have just relied on combined authorities. There then would have been no divergence between the two. The Minister has chosen to make that change, because it is more convenient for the Government so that they can work with the communities with which they have struggled to work over the past few years. In doing that, they have opened themselves to the divergence issue. That is not my problem, nor my fault, but that is of the Government’s choosing and it is baked into the Bill; otherwise, we would not need the legislation.

I will not press the amendments to a vote, because the suggestion from my hon. Friend the Member for York Central is better than my amendment. I am happy to withdraw it on the basis that it could be better, and perhaps we might seek elsewhere to improve it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Combined county authorities: overview and scrutiny committees and audit committee

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 22, in schedule 1, page 198, line 18, at end insert—

“(2A) The arrangements must ensure that the Chairs of the overview and scrutiny committees of the District Councils contained within the CCA’s boundaries are members of the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee.”

This amendment would require that the Chairs of overview and scrutiny committees of the District Councils within the CCA are represented on the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee.

Schedule 1, which is introduced by clause 13, relates to the overview and scrutiny functions of the CCAs, which are important. The amendment gives us the opportunity to add districts so that they are seen as a key part of the process that have an important say. If the Minister is not minded to accept the amendment, I hope that he acknowledges the key role of districts.

According to the District Councils Network, its members deliver 86 out of 137 essential local government services to 22 million people—40% of the population—covering 70% of the country by area. The Minister was perfectly candid—that is the best way to be—that part of the reason for having CCAs as distinct from the combined authorities created under the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 is to give Ministers the chance to work around district councils where those councils do not want to be involved in greater devolution.

I think we have to find a way to get the district councils into the proposed process more fully. We have seen combined authorities use non-constituent members to deliver, and that is a good way to operate, and I think that the amendment would enhance that opportunity. Amendment 22 seeks to do so by ensuring that among the members of the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee are the chairs of the overview and scrutiny committees of the district councils within the CCA. I hope that is a proportionate way of trying to get districts involved. They have so much expertise about the area they serve that it would be foolish to discount them. They have a track record of delivery, and they know what people want because of their really close engagement with their constituents.

When we debate clause 16, will talk a little more about the fundamental role of districts, but we know that they are not likely to be formal or founder members of CCAs. Instead, the amendment effectively says that we have a very skilled group of people who lead overview and scrutiny in their local authority, who have high levels of experience, training and ability. They do it day in and day out. They are familiar with the issues, they know how to scrutinise an executive, and they know what information to read and what questions to ask. To pull them together is almost like convening an international team from the best players in the league and I have no doubt that it would be a significant success.

Amendment 22 would be a really good way of enhancing the overview and scrutiny provision while getting better engagement with the district councils. In that sense, I hope it is a bit of a two-for-one for the Minister.

[Tim Farron]

This seems to be a really sensible and proportionate proposal. The Conservative leader of the District Councils Network talked to us in the evidence session on Tuesday 21 June. He speaks very clearly on behalf of members of all political parties who are on district councils: Liberal Democrat, Labour, independent, Green and, of course, the leading Conservative group among district council members.

There is a concern about district councils being slowly but surely erased—and they are. In Cumbria, we are living proof of that, because some good district councils are being dismantled this year, hopefully with very good unitary authorities taking over their responsibilities and being reflective of what the local communities desire. However, if we are to move forward in this direction and if CCAs are to be the building blocks by which these decisions and the delivery of levelling up will take place, it is surely right to demonstrate to district councils that we and the Government value them—not only that we value them as district councils but, as the hon. Member for Nottingham North rightly said, that we value their expertise.

In this amendment, the Government are being asked to consider picking the people who already do this job in their home patch, so to speak, and to bring the skills, expertise and experience that they have from providing scrutiny of their own councils’ business and the operation of democracy internally within their district councils to the sub-regional level.

The amendment seems to be not only a very effective and sensible practical proposal but one that would allow the Government to demonstrate to district councils that they are not being erased and that they are a very important part of our future. We talked earlier about whether symmetry mattered. If we believe that local communities are best at designing their own destiny and if they choose to maintain two-tier authorities, as many do, then reflecting that autonomy and its outcome—not begrudging it, but welcoming it—seems to me a wise thing to do. Let us have the chairs of the overview and scrutiny committees from the constituent district councils within a CCA on the overview and scrutiny committee of that CCA.

--- Later in debate ---

I completely understand the intention of the amendment. The Opposition want to make sure that district councils that are engaged in CCAs have representation on the scrutiny committees. That is extremely sensible, but the amendment does not quite do what we would want it to and does not give us that flexibility. I hope the Opposition will withdraw the amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for that answer from the Minister. I am glad to hear that we are in broad agreement. I would not necessarily say that a committee with 31 members was too large; that is smaller than many combined authorities. We heard in evidence from Mayor Andy Street that the West Midlands committee has much more than 31 members, and it seems to be functioning appropriately. Nevertheless, that should not be a sticking point.

I had not thought of the consequences of a district council choosing not to participate quite in the terms that the Minister has. I wonder whether he will reflect on this during the Bill’s passage. The act of a district choosing not to take part will be the act of the executive and, presumably, a majority on the council, but a minority of members may still have an interest. The community would definitely still have an interest, because the decisions will still impact them—they will not wish themselves out of the CCA; that is not allowed.

Is there a way that a council could opt out of engagement in the executive functions, but opt in to engagement in the scrutiny functions, because those things will still matter? I worry that areas might miss out. Of course, it is a local choice, and local leaders are accountable for the choice—perhaps that is just the decision they have to make. I am happy to withdraw the amendment on the basis of the reassurances that the Minister has offered, but perhaps, during the passage of the Bill, we could think a little more about how we might add the district voice in places where district councils have chosen not to take up a seat on the executive. On that note, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 14

Funding

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Norris]

I do not want the decision on clause stand part to go by without any discussion. I want some clarity from the Minister. The clause allows the Secretary of State to make regulations about how to pay for the combined county authority, with the understanding in subsection (2) that it has to be done with the consent of the constituent councils. I want to understand how the Minister thinks that will work in practice. Presumably, the Secretary of State will hope to receive a proposal from the constituent councils that they have all agreed to, rather than suggesting a model.

[Neil O’Brien]

Let me reassure the hon. Member by saying that clause 14 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out how an individual CCA is to be funded by contributions from constituent councils. Such regulations can be made only with the consent of the constituent councils and—where one already exists—the CCA. The CCA will decide how its activities are funded and how its funding is sourced, whether that is from investment funds and other devolved funding or from contributions from constituent councils.

Where constituent councils are providing contributions, regulations under clause 14 can set out how the CCA decides the proportion of contribution from each council. Similar regulations for combined authorities usually state that that is for agreement locally but provide a default split if agreement is not reached. That underpins the very nature of the collaborative approach we are trying to support through the new CCA model. The clause will be instrumental in ensuring that combined county authorities are strong institutions with sustainable funding to which to devolve functions and flexibilities, which is essential to achieving our ambitious local leadership levelling-up mission. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Change of name

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 23 in clause 15, page 12, line 14, leave out “not less than two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”.

This amendment would remove the need for a super-majority to change the name of a CCA.

In preparing amendments, we had the hundreds of pages of the Bill, and hundreds of pages of explanatory notes. The delegated powers memorandum is even longer—never mind the White Paper. As a result, one started to go deep in the weeds, and I am very deep into them here.

This significant clause makes provision for the process of changing the name of a combined county authority. Subsection (2) sets out the requirements, with paragraph (c) requiring a super-majority of no less than two-thirds of CCA members to vote in favour of the rule change. That is a high bar—far higher than for most decisions that we make in Parliament. I am interested in why there is such a high bar, so, to probe that, my amendment suggests reducing it to a simple majority.

I have a couple paragraphs here that I wrote last night about “What’s in a name?” I will spare the Committee those; I think we can establish what is in a name. I will say that I am not completely ignorant of the value of super-majorities. They can be very important to protect the rights of minorities, but they can also be used—the US Senate is a good example—by a concerted majority for a number of decades to protect special interests.

I am not sure why the clause requires a super-majority. We want to give these combined county authorities significant money—tens of millions of pounds, and I suspect those negotiating them want even more than that—and significant powers over things that shape our communities. If we cannot trust them to change their name on a simple majority, how can we trust them to do anything else on a simple majority basis? I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.

[The Chair]

What’s in a name? I call the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O’Brien]

We are honoured by the depth of the forensic scrutiny that the Opposition are offering us on these clauses. They are quite right to probe all these questions, which are important. Few things are more likely to arouse the passions than names of local authorities and county authorities, as we heard in the impassioned speech from the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale. We recognise the importance of people living in an area having a strong attachment to, and identity with, that place, which is something both he and the hon. Member for Nottingham North have alluded to.

When we establish a county combined authority by regulations, we will specify the legal name of that institution. Of course, it is only right that the name can be changed to adapt to local circumstances over time, and the clause allows a CCA to change the name it is known by, subject to various safeguards and conditions, one of which is a requirement that two thirds of members of the CCA consent to the change. The threshold was chosen quite deliberately to ensure that name changes are undertaken only where they will make a real impact, rather than where they are just a rebranding exercise. Names really matter to local communities, as we have heard, and it is important that a strong majority of a CCA supports any change.

The amendment is designed to reduce the consent threshold to a simple majority, which would mean that CCAs would have a lower threshold for such a change than existing combined authorities, for which the threshold is a minimum of two thirds. Two of our existing combined authorities, South Yorkshire and Liverpool city region, have already changed their names since their establishment. A lot of politics were involved in that, so clearly there is flexibility under the two-thirds arrangement to change the name when that is felt to be important. I remember that there was a lot of consideration of that choice during the run-up to the devolution deal with Sheffield city region—it is now called South Yorkshire—and likewise with Liverpool city region.

My officials are in regular contact with the mayoral combined authorities, and we have not heard of any difficulties with the existing legislative process. As we have discussed before, it is important to keep parity between the CCA and combined authority models as much as possible, including in respect of name changes. A further consideration—this is why we have the higher threshold—is that many organisations will have made legal contracts with a combined authority, and changing the name is a non-trivial thing to do, given that it will require many things to change.

Fundamentally, as Members have said, names really do matter. What’s in a name? We do not want them to be something that flips over from time to time. We could end up having a tit-for-tat war whereby the majority changes the name of an authority and then it changes again. We want the name of an authority to be stable and lasting. Opposition Members have quite rightly asked why that is so, and I hope that I have given sufficient assurance that they might be willing to withdraw the amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for those contributions. The debate has had a bit of lightness to it, but as the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale said, identity does matter to people. I think identity can be a big driver in levelling up, by providing that passion, commitment and love of place that makes people want to do better and tackle inequalities. That is a really positive thing and it does matter, but I do not think it is the be all and end all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell]

I am thinking about the work of the Electoral Commission in setting constituency boundaries and names, which goes through the adoption process without requiring a two thirds majority. Is the clause not an inconsistency, rather than a consistency, with what happens elsewhere?

[Alex Norris]

Yes, I think so. There is a role for supermajorities, but as an exception and with strong cases. I am not sure this provision has met that test. I have a version of my speech that included a number of paragraphs about my views on the boundary review, and the sad extension of constituency titles, which seems to be inexorably taking us to five-word constituency titles. I thought you would not thank me for including that, Mr Paisley, but at least I have now put it on the record, so I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.

I will not press the amendment to a Division because I do not think it is a totemic issue. However, I hope we can seek to use supermajorities as an exception rather than the norm. If nothing else, this has been the hors d’oeuvre for a later debate—the real substance—which is what to call a mayor when we do not want to call it a mayor. Colleagues have that excitement ahead of them. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Local authority functions

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 16, page 13, line 10, at end insert—

“(aa) affected local district councils”.

When I wrote my speech I thought that clause 16 was perhaps the most significant of the 60 or so clauses that establish CCAs. It was certainly the only one that had a particular debate on Second Reading, although largely among multiple members on the Minister’s side.

The clause allows for functions of a local authority to be exercisable at a CCA level. There will be points at which there will be a keenness to do that. It allows for functions to be exercisable by the CCA, rather than the county council or district council. It also allows for: functions to be exercisable concurrently with the county council or district council; for the function to be exercisable by the CCA and the county council or district council jointly; and for the function to be exercisable by the CCA jointly with the county council or distract council but also continue to be exercisable by the council alone. That essentially means that councils can collaborate and share in whichever way they choose to— subsection (5)(a) requires the constituent councils’ consent—with the CCA.

This has twitched my antennae a little. We have discussed some of this already. I believe that devolution as it forms part of the levelling-up agenda is about devolving power out from the centre—from the centre to sub-regions, and from local authorities to local communities. The latter, community power, is broadly absent from the Bill, and I hope we will get the opportunity to add it back later in these proceedings. On the former, the direction of travel is supposed to be towards communities—towards the lowest proper level—rather than away from them. Indeed, local authorities are already free to collaborate, and there are many good examples of that. I do not think the purpose of the new sub-regional bodies established by part 2 of the Bill is to draw powers upwards from local councils; rather, it is to draw them downwards from the centre.

I am willing to accept—if this is the case, perhaps the Minister could give us a little detail—that that might be desirable in order, perhaps from a finance point of view, to share budget arrangements, or to have lead council arrangements on spend and receipt in a certain policy area. Crucially, under subsection (5)(a), the regulations will be made only if the constituent councils of the CCA consent. Those local authorities essentially have a lock on that process: it can happen only with their consent. On that basis, who am I to stop them? I think that is fair enough.

The issue here is that all four of the scenarios under subsection (4) involve the CCA also taking on the power of district councils, which are not—this is certainly my understanding—“constituent councils” and therefore cannot consent. It looks to me—I will qualify this shortly —like district councils could have powers taken from them.

Several Members have raised concerns that this part of the Bill is about removing district councils from this sort of decision making, the argument being that current statute makes it too hard so we need to free ourselves of the district veto, which the Minister described in the evidence sessions as an

“unintended consequence of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009”.—[Official Report, Levelling-up and Regeneration Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2022; c. 57, Q87.]

I am not sure that is necessarily true, although I am happy to be wrong. I think that the expectation at that time was that communities would proceed by consensus. That is why it is a de facto veto. It may now be deemed impractical, but I do not think it was an unintended consequence.

That poses a problem: if these bodies get up and running, and particularly if they choose to have a mayor elected to lead them, and they get off the ground already with local opposition, that will be a shame. I think that will hold back their work, build cynicism and erode public confidence. Therefore, the approach of working around districts rather than with them is perhaps the wrong one. As I have said before, districts have a proven track record of delivery. The amendment is modest: it seeks to add a provision that affected district councils must have consented to having their powers taken away. That seems reasonable to me.

I have hedged my bets a little because I am really hoping that the Minister will say that this is a moot point. In the evidence sessions, Councillor Oliver from the County Councils Network said:

“I am grateful to the Minister for clarification on some confusion around clause 16.”––[Official Report, Levelling-up and Regeneration Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2022; c. 58, Q88.]

I confess that I did not know what he meant by that; it was not anything that was clarified on Second Reading or in the evidence sessions. I did a bit of digging and I understand—this is second hand, so I apologise to the Minister if it is not right—that the Minister may have written to the representative bodies of local government to clarify that the Government do not intend for the powers to be applied in this way. That would be a very good thing if it were true.

[Neil O’Brien]

indicated assent.

[Alex Norris]

I can see the Minister nodding, so that gives me hope. However, I have not had any such contact, so I can only go on what is written in the Bill. If that is the case, perhaps we should tidy up what is in the Bill so that there is no doubt. Clearly, it can be read the other way, which is why there has been so much interest in it, even if that interest is happily unnecessary.

[Neil O’Brien]

Although many of the things we have talked about today have been interesting and thought provoking, this is perhaps the most interesting and thought-provoking amendment so far.

Clause 16 gives the Secretary of State the power to confer any local authority functions—including those of a county council, unitary council and district council—on to a combined county authority by regulations, subject to local consent and parliamentary approval. Any existing function of a local authority could be given to a combined county authority; these could be modified or have limitations and conditions attached. Functions could be specified as exercisable by the CCA concurrently with the local authority, jointly with the local authority, or instead of the local authority.

Clause 16 will enable effective co-operation between CCAs and local authorities where it is desired by the local area. Clause 16 mirrors section 105 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 for the conferral of local authority functions on to combined authorities. It also mirrors section 16 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 for the conferral of public authority functions on to an individual local authority, in terms of both the mechanism and the consent mechanisms. These powers already exist. Consequently, the consent requirements for regulations under clause 16 relate to the constituent councils and, where a CCA already exists, the CCA.

Amendment 24 seeks to make affected district councils have a say on the conferral of local authority functions. The necessary irreducible core of a county deal is a county council and any associated unitary council. Many of the powers that have been devolved through devolution deals so far have tended to be upper-tier powers. These are agreements between the Government and the upper-tier local authorities. That is absolutely not to say that district councils have no part to play in such agreements. They do—I hope they will—and we expect the devolution deal with the upper-tier local authorities to include details of how the new CCA, the county council and the districts that wish to will work together to deliver the outcomes envisaged in the devolution deal agreement.

As for providing for districts to have a say on the conferral of local authority powers, within the context I have described, they will indeed have a say, if they wish. First, they will have had discussions and reached agreements with their upper tier councils about how they will be involved in implementing the devolution deal. Secondly, powers are conferred through regulations. Before regulations to establish the CCA and confer powers on it, there must be a public consultation on the proposal, as we discussed earlier. This is an opportunity over and above the devolution deal that district councils will have to make their input, in the context that we are clear the agreement is with the upper-tier local authorities.

There is a good reason why we have taken the approach of having an agreement with the upper-tier local authorities: to avoid past experiences where one or two district councils have frustrated the wish of many in the area to have an effective devolution deal. However, we are equally clear that the appropriate involvement of district councils that wish to be involved is important and, indeed, essential to the delivery of certain outcomes that the devolution deal is seeking to achieve. It is, in short, a question of balance. We believe we have struck the right balance between an agreement with the upper-tier local authorities to establish it and flexibility so that the involvement can reflect local wishes of both the districts and the upper-tier local authorities in the area.

I know concerns have been expressed about district councils’ functions being removed and transferred to a CCA. I want to put on record something I have said to local authority leaders and which we have repeatedly made clear over the years. The Government are clear that there is no intention to use this provision to reallocate functions between tiers of local authorities when there is no consent. From the start, the devolution agenda has been about power flowing down to local leaders to enable decisions closer to the public, not flowing up. To the best of my knowledge, I do not think the powers in the two Acts I mentioned earlier have been used to date.

Parliamentary scrutiny provides a very secure safeguard here. The Secretary of State cannot make any changes to the functions of an individual CCA without parliamentary approval. It has always been the case that Parliament decides where the responsibility for functions lies in local government. An individual CCA cannot exercise functions unless it has been given them in regulations by the Secretary of State following parliamentary approval. A CCA cannot take power from a district or any council. One tier of local government cannot legally usurp the powers of another.

I understand and hear the concerns being that are being expressed about issues relating to the clause. I wish to reassure the Committee that I will take these issues away and readily consider how we might reflect the role of district councils in devolution deals. I hope that gives sufficient reassurance for amendment 24 to be withdrawn. We will think further about this important issue.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for that full answer and happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis. The Minister was as explicit as possible about how he envisages things working. I hope that, in his reflections, he will consider whether what is in the Bill needs to catch up and is as clear as it might be. I hope he will continue to engage with us in such conversations and, if he has engaged with those bodies in writing, that he will make a copy of the letter available in Committee or in the Library, so that we have full information for continued consideration. On the basis of the response provided by the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Other public authority functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Norris]

Clause 16 dealt with the conferral of local authority functions on CCAs. Further clauses, such as the ones between 30 and 37, deal with the conferral of police and crime commissioner functions, and clauses 19 and 20 confer transport, highways and traffic functions. With clause 17, I wondered what the Minister’s understanding of “Other” might be. What ideas does he have in mind?

[Neil O'Brien]

I will have to come back to the hon. Member in slower time on that. To explain a little about the clause, it is in essence the devolution clause that will enable the CCA to take on the functions of public bodies, including Ministers in central Government, the Greater London Mayor and Assembly, and agencies such as Homes England. Broadly, the clause allows devolution to happen. On his specific point, I will have to write to him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Section 17 regulations: procedure

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 26, clause 18, page 14, line 35, at end insert—

“(1A) But notwithstanding subsection (1)(b), if a CCA prepares and submits a proposal for conferred powers under section 17(1) and the Secretary of State has already made provision for another CCA to be granted identical powers, the Secretary of State must consent to that proposal.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to accept an application for conferred powers from a CCA where they have already accepted an identical application from another CCA.

At the end of the previous sitting, the Minister started the debate on this issue, which is a point of distinction, so I think the amendment will be an interesting one to discuss. Notwithstanding the sorts of functions that the Minister has in mind, which he will follow up with, the clause sets the rules by which county combined authorities can receive more powers from central Government. We are supportive of that: we want to move powers from Whitehall to our town halls, but in doing so the Bill can be improved.

I touched a little on the asymmetry of the devolution of power in England, and it is worth covering something of that. Metro Mayors hold powers over spatial planning, regional transport, the provision of skills training, business support services and economic development. The detail of the powers and budgets devolved, however, varies massively between areas.

For example, in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire the powers of the police and crime commissioner have been merged into the mayoral role, but not in other mayoralties. The Greater Manchester Combined Authority oversees devolved health and welfare budgets, working in partnership with the lead Whitehall Departments, but other combined authorities do not have such powers. All Mayors can establish mayoral development corporations, except for the Mayor of Cambridgeshire and Peterborough. All Mayors can raise a council tax precept, except in the West of England.

That is an odd hotchpotch. If we were to sit down and plan a devolved settlement, which we are doing quite a bit of, we would never pick a model that is quite as uneven and such a mishmash. That is what happens when settlements are negotiated case by case behind closed doors, on the basis of what Ministers judge communities are ready to have. Furthermore—this is part of what we are addressing today—those disparities in power do not even account for the fact that vast swathes of the country do not even have combined authorities; they just have their council.

We are in the odd situation where Manchester gets to elect a Mayor with a PCC, but in Nottingham we cannot vote for a Mayor—we don’t have one; we do not have a combined authority in the county terms yet—but we vote for councils and a PCC. That gets very hard to explain to constituents, and means that different parts of the country get access to different powers. I think we should do better there.

The Minister characterised that position as being for either a one-size-fits-all model or moving at the pace of the slowest. I am not saying that. My dissatisfaction with asymmetry aside, I live in the real world; we have an asymmetric settlement and it would not be practical or desirable to change that. Where those combined authorities are motoring along, they must keep doing so; they are doing crucial and impressive work, and of course we would not want to change that. However, we have the power to ensure that the combined county authorities, which cover big parts of the country, and will hopefully bring devolution to the bulk of the country, have some sense of commonality in the powers that they are able to access, but not have to access—not a floor but a ceiling.

I do not think that I am actually asking the Minister to do anything more than has already been set out by the Government. The White Paper itself sets out those three tiers of powers. We will get to the point about the governance structures at a later date, and as the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale said earlier, I also completely dispute the point that we should have to accept a Mayor in order to get tier 3 powers.

Nevertheless, the Government have established a common framework—a common menu, as it were—from which to pick. This is the significant point of difference: I believe that should be a local choice. It should be the local leaders and local public deciding what powers they want. I must say that I think the bulk will want something towards the upper end, because they will understand that decisions will be made better locally and that they will have a better understanding than the centre about what they want for their communities and how to get it. The Government’s approach—the approach of the past 12 years—is to pick and choose, depending on the qualifications, or otherwise, they think the local leaders have. I think that is a significant mistake.

Amendment 26 seeks to improve that. Essentially, it would prevent the Secretary of State from doing a blizzard of different side deals with different communities, based on the powers they confer on a CCA by saying that, if they confer a certain power on the CCA, then an identical application from another CCA must also be accepted. That is saying that, if new ceilings are set, then everyone should have access to that. As I said, that will not result in perfect symmetry—anything but—that is not the intention of the amendment. However, it will mean that all communities have access to the same powers.

I am interested in what the Minister says to that and will listen carefully. If, in practice, the way in which the amendment is worded does not deliver that effect but, in the Minister’s view, there is a better way of doing it, then I would accept that heartily—it is the substance, rather than the amendment itself, that means something to me. However, it is a very important point.

This is the moment, on county combined authorities, to say that we are going to break free from this individual deal-by-deal way of devolution, and say that we just think the powers are better exercised locally—we should be explicit about that because it is a good thing to say—and that in doing so, everybody gets access to them, not just the ones that are deemed to be good enough. I think that would be a significant step forward for this legislation.

[Tim Farron]

I think this is where we get to find out who devolution is for. Is it for the benefit of Whitehall or communities? I have no desire to see—in fact, I have a revulsion to the idea—contrived symmetry from the centre. I am very happy for there to be asymmetrical devolution, so long as that is the choice of the people within those communities. This is where we get the opportunity to see whether this grassroots taking back control from the centre or the centre, in a rather patronising way, throwing a few crumbs to the local community.

People living in Cornwall, Northumberland, Devon and Cumbria have the same rights and the same expectations about the quality of services as people in Manchester, the west midlands and London—no more, but definitely no less. It would therefore seem very wrong if services and powers that are devolved to London and Greater Manchester are not devolved to Cumbria, or at least are not offered to it so that the community can choose whether to take them.

This is about not just the powers that should be devolved, but the preconditions that the Government choose to impose. Obviously, we are talking about Mayors, or Mayors by any other name. I have absolutely no problem with communities that want a Mayor having one as part of their devolution deal, but I have an enormous problem with the Government saying, “You can have these powers, but only if you have the form of local government that we tell you to have.” That is not devolution. It is certainly not what people in my part of the far north-west of England want, and I suspect it is not what people want in other parts of the country. This is an opportunity for the Government to declare that devolution is for the people and not for their own convenience.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O’Brien]

I think I have directly addressed that point. I reject the Opposition statement that “The default should be alignment.” I have taken on quite directly the point that it is about not just each area wanting different things but different places having different geographies that do or do not fit with different local partners. It is the case that different places do or do not have the agreement of local institutional partners and it is the case that some places are more or less ready and have further institutional maturity and, indeed, that we continue to add to that. I am not hiding or running away from the fact that part of this is about a view of what is achievable, along with, most importantly, what local places want. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving me the chance to take that on directly. I will not hide from the fact that that is one of the reasons for variation. My final point is that one reason why we are able to make progress is that we can move the convoy not at the speed of the slowest.

[Alex Norris]

This has been a really good discussion. As the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale said, the fundamental question is, “Who is this for?”—that is exactly the question posed by the amendment—and I would add, “Who decides?”. At the moment, we will have devolution as long as it is what Ministers want—that is disappointing. Sadly, it is why, as the hon. Gentleman said, preconditions will be put on access to powers that do not relate to the exercise of those powers,

My hon. Friend the Member for York Central made an important point about patchwork Britain. As I have said, we are willing to live with local choice provided that it is the local choice—that is perfectly legitimate. I actually think that most communities will turn to the highest levels of power. I was perhaps too bashful to say this at the outset, but we need only set the operation of the powers against the Government’s record over 12 years. I do not think many councils will be thinking, “Please let this Government keep doing more things for me because it is going so well”—those that do will be very limited in number.

Yes, there has been asymmetry. I am glad that the Minister accepts the brilliance and goodness of Tony Blair. I must correct the Minister, though: he keeps saying the “last Labour Government”, but it is only the previous Labour Government—there is nothing final about it! [Laughter.] In all seriousness, this has to be about what communities want, not what Ministers want. The Minister said that for some communities, it is not the right time. Okay, but if the common ground for decisions to be made locally is the alignment of public services—that point was well made—could geographies that do not match naturally be converged if that is what local people want? I would support that, but it would take time. Provision should be included to allow them to access the powers when they want to. They should not have to rely on further regulations.

[Neil O’Brien]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way at what is probably quite an annoying time for me to intervene, but I want to highlight mission 10 of the missions that we discussed earlier. It states:

“By 2030, every part of England that wants one will have a devolution deal with powers at or approaching the highest level of devolution and a simplified, long-term funding settlement.”

I think that makes it clear that our intention is for the powers and the scope of devolution to move upwards over time. That has been the direction of travel since 2014.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister for that intervention because he has made an excellent case for my amendment. That is what it would do: all communities would have access to the highest level of power. The Minister used the word “bespoke”, but how does that fit? Why would we have a series of bespoke arrangements if we wanted all local communities to have access to the highest powers? Those two things do not sit together naturally.

The point I made earlier about the default position being one of alignment was in relation to the constitution of CCAs. Let us say that ten deals are done and ten sets of regulations are made. The default should be that those regulations say the same thing, unless there is a really good reason for them not to. I am not saying that for the entire settlement. As I have said, things will move over time, but access should be to the highest level of power.

This is not about moving in lockstep; I am sure that there will be different paces. I dare say that although I do not have the Minister’s perspective—I do not work with local communities on this day to day—I have a lot more confidence in local communities to take the powers on more quickly. They only have to beat the Government of the day, and I have a lot of confidence in them in that respect.

Certainly, I do not disagree with what the Minister said about the White Paper, but I am not willing to rely on it in lieu of a better alternative in the Bill. I must rely on what is in the Bill, so I will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell]

I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 19, page 15, line 37, at end insert—

“(2A) Regulations under subsection (1) must require that all CCAs impacted by a transfer of functions under this section collaborate on all routes that cross relevant CCA boundaries, including—

(a) any changes to routes,

(b) any changes to fares, and

(c) the formation of new routes.”

This amendment would require Combined County Authorities with an Integrated Transport Authority to work collaboratively on fares and routes that cross CCA boundaries with other CCAs impacted.

There must be recognition in the legislation of the challenges relating to transport routes that cross CCA boundaries. Bus routes, for example—but this could also apply to trams—often go beyond the political boundaries that we are debating. Collaboration between authorities is crucial to achieve the inter-area connectivity that is required. Rather than having long-protracted negotiations, we should encourage collaboration; it could be transformative for bus routes, fares, services, infrastructure, and even ticketing arrangements. Certainly, devolved authorities are taking inspirational initiatives to develop their transport system. They could, however, be in proximity to a CCA that takes a different approach.

The office of the Mayor of London, which is trying to extend routes, has long pleaded on this subject. The radial routes from London do not stop at the boundary of Greater London; they cross into the suburbs. Of course, the transport systems in the suburbs can be very different. A lack of flexibility at the border could have a real impact on who is able to travel across the borders. Seamless travel will encourage more people to take public transport, and to engage in active travel.

We also need to think about where there can be smoothing across boundaries and jurisdictions on issues such as fares. There can be deals on fares. I think that we are all excited to see Andy Burnham’s step forward for Manchester in his new deal on transport, how that will achieve modal shift, and draw people out of cars and on to public transport, which is absolutely necessary if we are to address the climate challenges ahead of us. Clearly, though, there will be implications for anyone who lives just over the boundary.

When it comes to transport routes, is not just what happens when a person is on a piece of infrastructure or mode of transport that matters; it is how they get there. Seamless travel is important. There will be negotiation, but will negotiation with private bus companies will be protracted? That could be what ends up happening, because a private bus company has a profit motive. It may say, “We prefer not to run that route, because we are on a different system. We are looking at profitability, so we will not send a bus into the neighbouring CCA.” A devolved authority may have objectives—on issues such as air pollution, connectivity and economic opportunity —that the neighbouring CCA does not benefit from; also, a CCA may have a model that involves a private transport provider that does not have any interest whatever in those things. The amendment considers how we achieve sound integration between the different CCAs to make sure that there is no pain at the boundaries, which is often the case.

In terms of other modes of transport, we should consider the investment in trams. In the UK we have a small prevalence of tram use compared with other European countries, but their use can be transformative in modal shift. If we see trams as the arteries of a transport system, the capillary routes that feed on to that will determine how somebody travels. Better bus connectivity at the end of a tramline is an example. In a rural CCA adjacent to a more urban-based CCA, there could be a determination that buses stop at 6 o’clock at night, whereas people want a tramline to run into the evening, because that is of benefit to people on the route. The availability of connecting buses may well have an impact on the establishment of a tramline and determine whether it is viable and value for money. Such discussions will be very important.

Such connectivity is also important to active travel. As a keen cyclist, I am excited about the Beelines network that is being developed in Manchester. That is transformative, and I want to see active travel opportunities available right across the country. For that type of travel to truly have a benefit, however, one must have good infrastructure to feed cyclists into the Beeline. That could make the difference between people jumping into their cars or engaging on those active travel routes. That choice will have an impact on the environment of, say, Manchester, should people drive into the city centre, compared with the environment of a neighbouring CCA, perhaps more rural, where there may be cleaner air, but not necessarily the same transport benefits.

We must think of the end-to-end journey. The amendment highlights that consideration, and is designed to achieve that better connectivity. That is the big challenge across our transport system. Whether we are discussing routes, fares, or future infrastructure, making those wise choices can make a real difference to personal choices about which mode of transport people select. I hope that the Minister sees the value in the amendment.

[Alex Norris]

I support my hon. Friend’s excellent amendment. The clause could be described as a “people before boundaries” clause. My hon. Friend referred to pain at the boundaries, which is always going to be a challenge and we must draw a line somewhere. It is right that there should be an expectation that where such lines are drawn, however, there must be an understanding that they are administrative boundaries set by us, rather than the public. It is our duty to seek to do whatever we can—or in this case, the leaders of CCAs to do what they can—to ameliorate the impact of such boundaries. In this case integration would obviously be a good idea, for the very benefits that my hon. Friend has outlined. I am very keen to support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I think we have to recognise that we are on a journey around the devolution of our transport systems. What came across powerfully in the evidence sessions last week was how transport is the biggest issue the devolved areas are currently dealing with. Therefore, transport is the dominant economic opportunity for the future. My friend the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale made important points about integration being essential. Encouraging more services is at the heart of the issue. The more services we have, the more of a modal shift we will see.

My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North spoke of how this is about people before boundaries. These boundaries, which we will be debating more, do get in the way of conversations about natural people flows, which are crucial to ensuring that communities work in the most efficient and appropriate way. I am happy to withdraw my amendment, but I hope the Minister will reflect on the comments made in this debate and continue the conversation, not only through the devolution process but also with the Transport Secretary to ensure we get better connectivity across our transport system. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 19, page 16, line 2, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish an annual report setting out—

(a) any differences in integrated transport authority functions conferred on CCAs,

(b) the reasons for those differences, and

(c) the extent to which economic, social and environmental well-being factors were considered in coming to decisions to confer different powers.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report explaining any differences in integrated transport authority functions conferred on CCAs.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 28, in clause 20, page 17, line 17, at end insert—

“(9A) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report setting out—

(a) any differences in highway and traffic functions conferred on CCAs,

(b) the reasons for those differences, and

(c) the extent to which economic, social and environmental well-being factors were considered in coming to decisions to confer different powers.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report explaining any differences in highway and traffic functions conferred on CCAs.

[Alex Norris]

The amendments are about two shared interests. One is a belief that devolution and the exercise of integrated transport powers are crucial to the effective operation of county combined authorities. The second is a strong belief that all county combined authorities should have access to the same powers as those who have the greatest. Given that those points are the topics of the two previous debates, I do not think there is an awful lot to add.

The case for the importance of transport connectivity has been ably made by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. The debate has been had on access to powers, and I do not think it needs repeating. The only thing I would say is that the amendments put a limited obligation on the Secretary of State. If we are in a situation where—the Minister says this is likely, and I would concede that—some areas would be more ready, some geographies would be more natural or the leaders would be keener to receive these powers than others, there should be some account of that publicly.

Rather than saying, “These are just the two the Government have chosen and decided are good enough to receive these powers”, these amendments would mean the Secretary of State would provide another reason. That could be the geography or simply that the local leaders do not wish to receive the powers, in which case it would be a simple statement for the Secretary of State to make, but it would be an important statement and would demonstrate that the decision is being made public and is not happening behind closed doors.

[Tim Farron]

I will be brief. As the hon. Gentleman has said, these issues have been discussed previously. It is worth bearing in mind that some of the infrastructure—highways infrastructure in particular—might seem to be of local consideration only, but they are of national strategic importance. I am bound to pick on my own area.

Things that are under the aegis of Highways England, which are national roads, so to speak, and supported directly by the Department for Transport, are one matter. Some of the strategic road network, the layer down from that, which is looked after by local authorities, is clearly of national strategic significance. The A591 in my constituency links the motorway from junction 36 right up to Keswick and back to the north lakes. It is not part of the national strategic network belonging to the English highways agency.

That is absolutely fine, but we need to recognise that if a local authority or a collection of local authorities is going to have responsibility for such an important road—the main arterial route through the middle of the Lake district, which is the biggest visitor destination in the country after London—it needs to be adequately resourced. It may need to be resourced across more than one CCA, depending on what boundaries are considered. This is important because I want to make sure the Government are held to account for the resource that they do—or do not—provide CCAs, so that communities such as mine are not basically providing and maintaining a road for 20 million visitors on whose behalf the Government contribute nothing.

[Neil O’Brien]

These amendments would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report setting out any differences in transport, highway and traffic functions conferred on CCAs, the reasons for those differences and the extent to which economic, social and environmental wellbeing factors were considered in coming to decisions to confer different powers. The reports that the amendments seek are unnecessary as the information will already be available. The hon. Member for Nottingham North said that there should be an account, and I am happy to say that there will be.

Following a successful devolution deal negotiation, the devolution deal document and councils’ proposal will set out any transport and highways roles that the CCA will have, the intended outcome and the difference these will make to the area. Whatever functions to be conferred, including any on transport and highways, will be set out in regulations, which are considered by Parliament and must be approved by Parliament before they can be made. Parliament will have an explanatory memorandum explaining which transport powers are being conferred, and why, the views of the consultees and how the conferral meets the statutory test of improving economic, social and environmental wellbeing—the exact set of issues that the Opposition are keen to hear more about.

There will be differences, as I have said, to reflect the bespoke nature of devolution deals that address the needs of an individual area, seeking to maximise local opportunities to drive levelling up. At the moment, there are no integrated transport authorities in place, but the possibility of establishing one remains. Parliament will have all of this information available through other means; this amendment would create unnecessary bureaucracy.

[Alex Norris]

I am happy on the basis that this information will be available to Parliament. I hope that, if it is debated, Ministers will be as candid as the Minister has been throughout today’s proceedings and explain the precise reasons for any differences. That is an important part of effective scrutiny. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Directions relating to highways and traffic functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Norris]

These are significant powers. We have talked about the importance of devolving highway and traffic functions to CCAs. The clause allows those powers to revert and the Secretary of State to direct. I want an assurance from the Minister that those powers would be used only in very exceptional circumstances, because I cannot believe that that ministerial lock is that necessary if we are really intending to devolve these powers.

[Neil O’Brien]

I should reply to that, Mr Paisley. I cannot think of any instances where these powers have been used so far. Of course, there is a scenario in which a CCA was wound up. There are some issues in a particular case in the north-east at the moment about moving from a combined authority that covers part of the area to one that covers all of the metropolitan area. It might be that there are some legal powers one needs to make that happen, which is the will of the local authorities. However, in general, it is not our intention to suck powers upwards, but to devolve them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Contravention of regulations under section 20

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Norris]

The clause concerns contraventions of the directions in clause 20. I know these powers have not been used and they mirror powers in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. However, I wonder whether the Minister would understandably think that there would be some sort of arbitration before these powers were perhaps used to their fullest. Of course, finance is involved in this clause.

[Neil O’Brien]

I am sure there would be a lot of discussion before one came to these kind of steps, which are pretty dramatic. I am happy to discuss that further with the hon. Member for Nottingham North.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Changes to boundaries of a CCA’s area

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 22, page 19, line 15, at end insert—

“(14) Where the Secretary of State makes provision under subsection (1)(b) to remove a local government area from a CCA, they must publish a statement setting out how that local government area that will have access to the powers they have lost in the future.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to explain how a local government area will in future have access to the powers they have lost as a result of removal from a CCA.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 32, in clause 23, page 19, line 35, at end insert—

“(5) Where the Secretary of State makes provision under subsection (1) to dissolve a CCA’s area, they must then publish a statement setting out how the relevant local government area or areas will have access to the powers they have lost in the future.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to explain how a local government area will in future have access to the powers they have lost as a result of the dissolution or abolition of a CCA.

[Alex Norris]

The amendments alter clauses 22 and 23. Clause 22 allows the Secretary of State, with the consent of the relevant local authorities in the CCA, to change a CCA’s boundaries. I would not expect it to be a frequently used power or, certainly, to be used soon after Royal Assent, but given the Minister’s earlier example of north and south of Tyne, I can understand that there could be a context, perhaps for a combined county authority, where something similar could happen.

Similarly, clause 23 allows for dissolution. Again, there might be a context where a CCA does not leave the husk body—I think that was how the Minister characterised it earlier. What is important, and what I am probing with these amendments, is that there will be some sense that this is not about the end of the devolution settlement for those areas and that they will not lose powers, but rather there will be a confirmation that these communities still have access to the same powers. The amendments would require the Secretary of State to provide an explanation of how those communities will still get access to those powers.

[Neil O’Brien]

Although we have not yet established any combined county authorities, we need to look to the future and anticipate some scenario in which an established CCA wishes to change its boundary, or a CCA needs to be abolished. If that happens, Parliament will receive a statement and an explanatory memorandum explaining the boundary change or dissolution, any conferral of powers, the views of the consultees, and how it meets the statutory tests of improving economic, social and environmental wellbeing. It will then be considered in a debate. In addition, the Secretary of State may make regulations changing the area of a CCA only if that is something that the area consents to, and a CCA cannot be abolished without the consent of a majority of its members and of the Mayor, if there is one. It cannot be imposed.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for the Minister’s reply, which gives me some confidence that things will happen as we would have hoped. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Miss Dines.)

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Fifth sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I have a couple of reminders. Colleagues should switch off telephones, or at least switch them to silent. No food is allowed, although Members are allowed liquid refreshments. Our Hansard colleagues would be delighted if Members emailed their speaking notes to [e-mail].

We are about to begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, here in front of me. The selection list shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Grouped amendments are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments are taken not in the order in which the amendments are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper.

The selection list shows the order of debates. A decision on each amendment will be taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the existing clauses of the Bill. I hope that is clear.

Members wishing to press a grouped amendment or new clause to a Division should indicate when speaking that they wish to do so.

Clause 1

Statement of levelling-up missions

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 1, page 1, line 14, at end insert—

“(c) the independent body that Her Majesty’s Government proposes to use to evaluate progress in delivering those levelling-up missions (“the independent evaluating body”).”

This amendment would require the Government to commission an independent body to scrutinise their progress against levelling-up missions.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 2, line 37, at end insert—

“(aa) include the independent evaluating body’s assessment of the progress that has been made, in that period, by Her Majesty’s Government to deliver each of the levelling-up missions.”

This amendment would require annual reports on the delivery of levelling-up missions to include the evaluation that the independent evaluating body has made of the Government’s progress in delivering each of the missions.

Amendment 10, in clause 5, page 5, line 18, at end insert—

“(ca) state whether the independent evaluating body considers that pursuing the levelling-up missions in that statement is effectively contributing to the reduction of geographical disparities in the United Kingdom,”

This amendment would require the report on a review of statements of levelling-up missions to include the assessment of the independent evaluating body.

Amendment 12, in clause 5, page 5, line 31, at end insert—

“(iii) so that it includes the guidance from the independent evaluating body on this decision”

This amendment would require the Government to publish the guidance from the independent evaluating body on this decision.

New clause 1—Independent body to monitor levelling up missions—

“(1) The Secretary of State must assign an independent body to assess the Government’s progress on levelling-up missions and make recommendations for improvements to delivery of them.

(2) The body must prepare parallel independent reports for each period to which a report under section 2 applies.

(3) Each parallel independent report must—

(a) assess the progress that has been made in the relevant period in delivering each of the levelling-up missions in the current statement levelling-up missions, as it has effect at the end of the period, and

(b) make recommendations for what the Government should do to deliver each levelling-up mission in the following period.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay each report under this section before Parliament on the same day as the report under section 2 which applies to the relevant period.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish an independent body that can provide reports on the Government’s progress on levelling-up missions and outline recommendations for their future delivery.

[Alex Norris]

It is a pleasure to begin our line-by-line consideration with you in the Chair, Mr Paisley.

The first two parts of the Bill deal with levelling up. I think it is safe to say that levelling up is an area in which there is considerable public interest. It has been at the core of the Prime Minister’s agenda and was at the heart of the 2019 Conservative manifesto, but, many years on, there remains considerable interest in what it really means. In February, we received the White Paper, “Levelling Up the United Kingdom”, which has 297 glossy pages comprised of broad missions that all of us could support, such as addressing inequalities in health and life expectancy, and in pay and productivity, and boosting local pride and more. I think there would be broad political consensus on those things.

The White Paper was heavy on narrative—lots of history, although some of it seemed to be directly from Wikipedia—but there was little clarity on how those worthy goals would be met. That was set against the frequent negative briefing we have seen in the media by ever-present Government sources about levelling up, as well as a clear reduction in commitment from the Treasury with little or no new money being made available to power the programme. We meet at an important point at which there is a lot of public interest in what levelling up is going to mean, but no little cynicism about whether anything is really going to change.

The Bill was supposed to represent the moment when that cynicism would be arrested, and the Government would demonstrate beyond doubt that they really were committed to levelling up the United Kingdom and were going to deliver their promises. I fear that the Bill has not yet met that moment.

As I said on Second Reading, the levelling-up Bill is now the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill. Essentially, the Bill has been bulked out with a planning Bill, which is a sign of what we are going to be doing here over the next three months. If that point is contested, the doubt could be erased by considering how much time the Minister for Levelling Up and I, as his shadow, have spent talking compared with the Minister for Housing and his shadow. Today, tomorrow and next week, I am afraid that we might hear more from me. However, we have a duty—we also have lots and lots of time—to make the Bill better, so that it might serve this important agenda. With that in mind, I have tabled amendment 3, which I shall turn to now.

The amendment is about independent scrutiny of this important agenda. We on the Labour Benches are concerned that the Government will seek to demonstrate levelling up not as hard-and-fast, real and meaningful change that unlocks the potential of the United Kingdom, across all the nations and regions, but in a political sense. We are concerned that they will seek to write up whatever happens as a huge political success, but nothing will really get better. We see that as a stock in trade for this Government; every Prime Minister’s Question Time is an exercise in hearing how well our economy has done and is doing, but we know the reality. We see in our communities anaemic growth, real-terms wages stagnating and rampant inflation. We are constantly told how great things are, but the reality is anything but. That cannot happen with levelling up, and the Government should be keen from the outset to show that they do not intend for it to. Our amendments would help them considerably in that.

Clause 1(2) requires the Government to establish levelling-up missions through a statement from a Minister of the Crown. It says that the statement must include the Government’s objectives in tackling geographical disparities and the metrics they intend to use to measure progress. That leaves the Government to mark their own homework—they can say what they are trying to do and how well they are doing it. Amendment 3 would improve that by requiring the statement also to detail an independent body to evaluate whether the Government are achieving what they say they will.

Independent oversight is a cornerstone of good governance. Clear, trusted and impartial analysis makes better policy, delivers better outcomes and is a good thing for democracy. An independent body that can sit alongside the programme could be a real anchor for the development and progress of the agenda. Such a body is not a particularly unimaginable prospect, as we already have good examples of such independent oversight. I will draw briefly on two of those examples: the Office for Budget Responsibility; and the Select Committees in this place.

In different ways, but with similar impacts, the OBR and the Select Committee system have been vital in holding the Government of the day to account by providing analysis and reports on issues such as the state of public finances in the case of the OBR, and for various policy matters across every Government Department in the case of Select Committees. They can act without fear or favour, and since their introduction they have significantly improved debate on policy, the development of good policy and the proper implementation of good policy.

Governments, as is their wont, seek to drive their agenda forward each day with announcements of different policies or achievements, but Select Committees in particular have been important forums for us to step back, assess the evidence, evaluate what has worked, take evidence from around the world or from different systems to see what has worked, and to reach informed conclusions about how to improve outcomes. The Government, with their legislative mandate, can then choose whether to accept those conclusions.

I am sure that the recent Public Accounts Committee report into levelling up so far will come up during the proceedings. It was made clear by the Minister for Local Government, Faith and Communities, the hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Kemi Badenoch) in questions yesterday that the Government have no intention of taking that report on board. That is fine; there is independent scrutiny, and then the Government must make their decision, as they have a mandate to do. The scrutiny process also takes some of the partisanship out of situations, which is always a good thing.

During our final evidence session, Will Tanner, who on political matters would normally be closer to the Minister than to myself, said:

“The area where I think the Committee could make a real difference is around the levelling-up missions and the overarching framework around the Bill. I am not sure the Minister will necessarily thank me for saying this, but I think the reporting requirements and the architecture around the levelling-up missions could be strengthened considerably in two primary ways. First, we have seen through the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Climate Change Committee the importance and strength of an independent body to hold the Government to account for delivering against its own targets, and I think the levelling-up missions would benefit from that level of scrutiny and accountability. At the moment there is a bit of a risk of the Government setting out its own interpretation of progress rather than us having an independent view.”––[Official Report, Levelling-up and Regeneration Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2022; c. 144, Q179.]

That is the first of two points Will Tanner made; I will raise the second under the clause 2 stand part debate. That first point is right, and it is a view shared by the Local Government Association. We are keen to avoid the issue that Will Tanner finished with in that quotation: the risk of the Government setting out their own interpretation of progress. There is a risk of that in the Bill currently.

We know that the Government are in that space to an extent; they value external voices through the Levelling Up Advisory Council. I hope the Minister might make some references to its work and how he sees that following Royal Assent. The body brings together respected individuals from their fields to advise on levelling up. The Minister can tell us how useful that has been so far. I trust it has been very useful. The amendment gives the Government significant discretion. I have offered an OBR model and a Select Committee model. The advisory council itself could be a model, provided the Government could demonstrate suitable independence. I see no harm—only positives, in fact—in maximising the process of, say, the advisory council and building on its independence and distance from Government.

The timescale, size and importance of levelling up necessitates independent scrutiny. As we have heard from the various speeches from Ministers setting out to define levelling up, this is a vast project that cuts across various Departments. Policy in the White Paper concerned economy, crime, health, education, devolution, employment and much more. Indeed, the White Paper spoke of how Government decision making would have to be “fundamentally reoriented” and that wide-scale system change was required in Government for levelling up to succeed. It says:

“System change is not about a string of shiny, but ultimately short-lived, new policy initiatives. It is about root and branch reform of government and governance of the UK. It is about putting power in local hands, armed with the right information and embedded in strong civic institutions.”

That is a very noble pursuit—titanic, I might say. Clearly, purely in policy terms, it is going to be very big. Some independent support would be welcome. That quote from the White Paper recognises that levelling up is not a project for Government alone, neither in the execution nor the analysis. That is why we think the introduction of an independent voice would add to that.

It is not just about size. Levelling up will take some time to deliver. The Government’s levelling-up missions in the White Paper set targets for 2030. I do not want to open a political debate this morning—yet—but such a target is likely to outlive the Government. Having an independent and constant scrutineer, which would be part of the process, whether Ministers moved on and Governments changed, would help with the implementation of long-term policy objectives. It would provide a sustained focus, unencumbered by changes. We are well placed to do that, because the principles of levelling up happily enjoy cross-party support and are here to stay. Certainly, we will find much common ground in these sessions on the broad principles of what we are seeking to achieve. Why not embed those principles in an overarching independent body?

Amendment 5 mirrors amendment 3. We will have opportunities to debate clause 2 fully subsequently, but it requires annual statements on the Government’s progress towards the levelling-up missions. A Minister of the Crown has to make those statements each year. That is a very good thing. There is a danger with medium-term goals; I am always a bit sceptical about them. I remember that at the turn of the century, we always had to have 2020 visions. I was always quite sceptical of 20-year programmes. It is often the work that is done in the first years that is as important as the work done in the last years, and the last thing we want is to get to 2030 and realise we have not achieved what we have set out to do. Annual reporting is therefore a good thing to ensure that we are on track. If we are not, we can evaluate why and make some changes to get back on track. That will give us a good tool to hold Ministers to account.

Clause 2(2) says that the annual reports must include the Minister’s view of progress so far, description of actions taken so far and plans for the future. In short, the Government mark their own homework—getting the chance to trumpet the actions they have taken and herald the future actions they will take. If we judge the Government on their current standards, we are likely to see a cycle of subterfuge and self-congratulation. Amendment 5 would remove that risk by requiring annual reports on the delivery of levelling-up missions to include an independent evaluating body’s assessment of the Government’s progress. As I said, independent oversight is a really important factor in good governance, and clear and trusted analysis would lead to better policy and outcomes.

We should look to Budget day, and to the OBR, as a model. Why should a Minister’s annual reports on the progress of levelling up not be accompanied by a booklet featuring clear, factual information and independent analysis? That is what we get on Budget day from the OBR, so why not replicate it with levelling up? Levelling up is a transformative economic project that is supposedly at the centre of the Government’s domestic policy, so its profile could be seen as equal to that of major annual economic events. If we are to be transformative, let us try to raise the significance of levelling up.

We would all agree that debates on the Budget and financial events are enriched by the information provided by the OBR. In this case, the debate around levelling up—whether we are going in the right direction and whether we will get there in the time we have set for ourselves—would only be enriched by providing similar information. Again, it would give Members opportunities to scrutinise, to give real-time feedback on how things are feeling in their constituencies, and to create a conversation with the public. I think all hon. Members would agree that we do a better job—on making policies or scrutinising them—when we have a bit of independence supporting the system.

I dare say that a theme of these debates will be that levelling up will not be a success if it is something that central Government do to the nations and regions. There will have to be a partnership. Part 2 of the Bill seeks to establish sub-regional bodies. Again, that will be a partnership between the Government and the sub-regional bodies. Sub-regional bodies, their councils and communities—the whole family; all of us—all have a stake in things getting better. There therefore needs to be some impartial assessment in the Bill, certainly for the public—it is their money, after all—to be able to see the progress that is being made, so that there can be a conversation. Sometimes that conversation will be about holding central Government to account and saying, for example, “We don’t think you’re making the right resourcing decisions to drive changes in crime,” but it is also about saying to local communities, “What is your part in that?”

Impartial assessment is not just about having something with which to evaluate the Government, but about holding ourselves—mutually, in partnership—to account, but we cannot do that if the only assessment of progress and impact is made by the central player in the field. The Public Accounts Committee report commented on the wisdom or otherwise of, or the lack of criteria in, the way in which a significant sum of public money has been spent. Impartial analysis, including of the finances, would help us to build trust that levelling up is something that the Government want to do in and of itself, not for any other purposes.

I turn briefly to amendment 10. We are discomfited by clause 5, which allows Ministers to revise the levelling-up missions. If Ministers do not think the missions serve levelling up, they can be dispensed with. That offers a mechanism for the Government to dodge accountability when the reality of their lack of success fails to measure up to their press releases. That is a huge power for the Government to ask for. The White Paper is full of lofty rhetoric, and there is supposedly a stake in the ground about the centrality of the levelling-up missions, but we now see in the Bill that there is an asterisk saying that the Government might want to change the missions later. We are being asked to accept that, and we will probe that issue fully when we come to the clause 5 stand part debate.

The intention behind amendment 10 is to say that if the Government want to reserve a pretty significant power to diverge from what they have said they are planning to do—presumably, they built the missions based on the evidence, and on conversation and engagement with the public—an independent body should report on whether it thinks the Minister’s decision is sound.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell]

Will the Minister give way?

[Alex Norris]

Will the Minister give way one more time?

[Neil O'Brien]

We are going to have to make progress this morning, I am afraid, because we have a lot of clauses to get through. The Opposition amendments are well intentioned—given who the shadow Ministers are, it could not be otherwise—but they are unnecessary and that is why we must resist them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

indicated dissent.

[Alex Norris]

I start by saying—given that one of my Whips is in the room, I should not say this—that, for the reasons mentioned, I enjoy these Bill Committees. I am not sure whether I will enjoy them in a few weeks’ time, because we will have been at it for a long time.

[The Chair]

This is day one.

[Alex Norris]

Exactly, so I am very much enjoying it at the moment because we can fight these battles outside the rarefied atmosphere of the Chamber. However, one consequence of my liking these Committees is that I have frequently volunteered to take Bills on—something is not quite right with me, probably. The one thing I have learned from them, which is particularly interesting for a Bill with 200 clauses, is that a person can tell from the first amendment to the first clause how the rest of the discussions are going to go and how minded to take on change the Government are going to be. With that in mind, I am disappointed to hear that the Minister is not minded to accept the amendments.

Our discussion has been good. My hon. Friend the Member for York Central made excellent points about the impact of the Climate Change Committee and COP26. The points about arm’s length bodies and the broader partnership involved in levelling up are important. This legislation is not just about holding the Government to account, but holding to account all parties involved in levelling up, including all of us in this room, in whatever guise—be it as Members of Parliament, as volunteers in our communities, or in local government, as a number of us have been. We all have different stakes in and must hold each other to account on what is a shared endeavour rather than an endeavour of the Government of the day.

[Rachael Maskell]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. This is not just about Government, but about the whole of our society, across party lines, including mayoralties and local government. Does it not make sense therefore to have a framework that all partners can buy into and have confidence in when scrutinising their functions?

[Alex Norris]

That is very much the spirit in which I tabled the amendment, which is the first Opposition amendment to the Bill. That might be construed as the Opposition wanting to make life hard for the Government or wanting a stick with which to beat them, but far from it. The amendment would ensure that partners all have a mutual responsibility to each other, and that is partly about holding each other to account and having difficult and supportive conversations about why we have not been able to do things that we have sought to do.

The Minister made a point about unconscious bias being woven out with independence, and that is important. The listed regulators—Ofsted, Ofgem, Ofcom and so on—are good comparisons for this space. We have offered the Government a kind of menu of comparisons, and I am surprised that none of them is seen as the right one. My hon. Friend the Member for York Central finished her remarks by addressing the particularly pertinent point about inequalities. It is hard to understand why those inequalities are not considered to have same level of importance as the other agendas. That is disappointing.

The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale made an interesting point, which I hope will come up later in the debate. Part 1 of the Bill is a bit unusual. We have not yet had the clause 1 stand part debate, but I am not sure why those provisions have to be in the Bill. Usually, Ministers argue that things do not need to be in the Bill and the Opposition argue that they do. I will not argue against them, but it is unusual that the Government should have chosen to include the provisions.

I dare say that what is involved is the trick of planting a stake in the ground and saying, “We are going to deliver on these important things.” However, when we consider the point made by the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran, we see that there is an asterisk against this part of the Bill: the Government still want the flexibility to mark their own homework and change it if they want. Those two things are a little oddly juxtaposed. The Government want to put their head above the parapet and make the legislation central to what they want to do. That is quite a brave and risky thing to do, so I am surprised that they are not able to go a tiny bit further.

The Minister mentioned the Levelling Up Advisory Council and the esteemed people on it. We are lucky that they have chosen to take part in public life in that way, and we are grateful to them. I completely agree with all that has been said about their independent-mindedness and capability to speak for themselves, but I say gently to the Minister—this is not a point against him personally, but against the Government—that it is not those people who we do not trust. Of course we trust their independence, but how on earth can we know what they are saying and what their views are? That is the problem.

As we have seen before with various such advisory bodies, in reality the Government will sit on the difficult things and trumpet the good things. Perhaps there is an element of human nature in that—there is huge element of sadness in it—but that is what will happen. If the Government are really committed to delivering on this matter, why not go that little bit further?

I accept the point about the technical annex and, as the Minister put it, the unprecedented detail. This is a saddening thought in many ways, but I would probably go so far as to say that if I thought he was going to remain in his Department until 2030, a lot of my anxieties would disappear—although, I would have anxieties about how we had managed to lose another two elections. Putting that to one side, because I do not think it is likely to happen, I have no doubt about the Minister’s personal commitment to the agenda, his personal probity, and his willingness to have difficult conversations and to explain on the record where things have not gone as they ought to. However, I would argue strongly that that is not a characteristic that applies across Government—I do not think anybody could say that is really a feature of this Government. He says that I could go through and update each technical annex every year—I am surprised that I should have to do that on the Government’s behalf. The problem is that what we will see overtime is the booklet getting thinner, because the difficult ones will drop out or they will be replaced by another one—that is what we normally see. The Government will say, “We have got advanced metrics now that better understand the nature of life in the UK.”

[Matthew Pennycook]

Housing need.

[Alex Norris]

Housing need, as my hon. Friend says, is a good example. The metrics change to suit the outcome. The Minister knows that, which is why it needs to be in the Bill. He said that these sorts of things will accompany a statement from the Government, and that that will do in place of independent scrutiny. Those two things are not the same. There should not be the level of trust that means we would solely, on the word of Ministers, take what they say they have done as read. When our positions are swapped, I do not think the Minister would take that from us—and I do not think he should either. The need for a level of independence is obvious and clear.

I will not press the amendment to a Division, because I really want Ministers to think again about this. There will be other opportunities in this process to look for a proportionate level of independence. The Opposition have been non-prescriptive. I offered three different versions of independent scrutiny, and my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South offered a fourth—there may well be other versions. I hope that Ministers will reflect and come back, either at the next stage or in the other place, and put a provision in its place. The case for that is a very good one. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 13, clause 1, page 1, line 14, at end insert—

“(c) the resources made available by Her Majesty’s Government to nations, regions, sub regions and local areas in order to level-up.”

This amendment would place a responsibility on the Government to publish the resources made available to communities in order to level-up.

Clause 1 requires a Minister of the Crown to establish levelling-up missions for the Government. This amendment proposed a new paragraph that would require them to publish alongside those missions what resources are being made to the nations, regions, sub-regions and local areas in order for them to level up. The point that the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran made about the current trajectory of departmental resources, with those in 2025 being less that their 2010 levels, is a very good argument for the provision.

The work of levelling up will not be done alone—certainly not by central Government. From Whitehall, we cannot command and control our way to a more balanced country. Indeed, that model of development is a huge part of why we have such an imbalanced country. The proper allocation of money will have a large say—probably the largest say—on whether levelling up can be a success and be a truly transformative project for the whole country.

As the Government’s White Paper identified, the deep-rooted problems in the UK economy, which are holding back our regions, towns and villages, create greater imbalance than in most other comparable countries. Our country’s economic and social geography demonstrates that imbalance, and it can also be seen across multiple measures, whether pay, educational attainment or health—they light it up like a Christmas tree. As the White Paper outlines, our urban areas and coastal towns suffer disproportionately from crime, while former mining areas and areas with outlying urban estates, such as my constituency, are often communities of high deprivation, with poor opportunities for younger generations. The imbalances in our country are plain to see. The current economic settlement just does not work.

In order to rectify that, the devolution of power back to local communities will be vital, so that they have a proper say over decisions that affect their lives. In blunt terms, levelling up will have to be a targeted return of money, funding and resources back into the parts of the UK that need it. Without that investment, levelling up has no hope of succeeding. The stakes are really high. We need to get good jobs back into home towns, so that young people do not have to get out in order to get on. We need to have our high streets thriving, by kick-starting local economies with good local businesses and money back in people’s pockets. We need to better connect our towns and villages through good transport, digital infrastructure and affordable housing. All of that needs power to be taken out of Whitehall and put into the town hall, because local communities will make better decisions. All those things require significant resources alongside that hard, local graft.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O’Brien]

We are the Government who are creating—literally, through the Bill and the clauses we are debating this very morning—a mission to close the gap in healthy life expectancy between local areas, and between the highest and lowest areas, and to raise it by five years by 2035. These are the missions that the Bill will be getting us to report on every year to Parliament, so we are addressing the hon. Lady’s point. Through the health disparities White Paper and the other things the Government are doing, we are addressing as one of our central priorities the underlying causes of lower life expectancy and the inequalities she mentioned.

To summarise, while we are completely with the spirit of the Opposition’s amendments—we are trying to get better data and have processes in place that are generating better data, because we recognise its importance to the levelling-up agenda—there is, in truth, no hard and fast difference between levelling-up resources and the rest of Government resources. Indeed, philosophically, it is important to recognise that one should not think just about levelling-up funds. Much as one can rattle off an impressive list, one should think about how we reform the totality of Government spending.

That is one of the novel aspects of the White Paper’s approach. For a long time, people thought of science funding in a science policy silo, and thought that it should be allocated to science excellence, with no spatial dimension. We are the first Government to set regional targets for science spending, recognising its importance to potentially addressing some of the inequalities that the Opposition have mentioned this morning. We have changed the Treasury Green Book. We have started to allocate housing and regeneration spending differently so that we can get out of the cycles that Tom Forth and other regional economic policy experts have talked about: some bits of the country are overloaded and people cannot get on a train or buy a house, while other parts are crying out for investment and have lots of scope to take on growth.

I hope that I have given the Opposition at least an honest account of why we are resisting the amendment, even though we absolutely agree with its spirit.

[Alex Norris]

I am really grateful for the contributions to what has been a good debate. I will cover some of the points made by my Opposition colleagues and then move on to what the Minister said. Turning to my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, Great British Railways is a brilliant example of what we are talking about. We remember the press release on, I think, 5 February, which came shortly after the White Paper and was seen very much as an element of the levelling-up agenda—indeed, it says that on the Government’s website. The location of Great British Railways will be determined through an online public vote. It is like “Love Island”, Mr Paisley. Anyone watching this series knows that we badly need a vote to try to shake things up, but I do not think it is how we should determine the location of—

[The Chair]

The hon. Gentleman is going slightly off-piste here. [Laughter.]

[Alex Norris]

I apologise, Mr Paisley. I will get straight back to Great British Railways and levelling up. My hon. Friend the Member for York Central made a strong case for York and, if the hon. Member for Broxtowe promises not to tell my constituents, I might make a strong case for Derby. We are generally not allowed to do such things, but that is my one for the year—[Laughter.]

[Neil O’Brien]

There is some confusion on the Opposition Benches.

[Alex Norris]

Happily, it does not look like the hon. Member for Broxtowe is going to grass me up.

The whole process—we can already see this because people are being encouraged to use a hashtag—will involve TikTok videos and be nauseatingly modern. I know that the Minister does not like things as nauseatingly modern as that, so I cannot believe it for a second—he is sitting sphinx-like, which is of course fine. The constant beauty parade and artificial competition just take energy out of things. Of course, someone will win, and that will be wonderful news, and I will be very pleased for them, but multiple places will lose as a result. That cannot be the best way to level up. I know the Minister talked about a balanced diet, but I will cover that shortly.

My hon. Friend the Member for York Central spoke about where she sees the future for her community and her region, with an emphasis on biotech, rail and the creative sector, and that will be different in Nottingham, Leicestershire or West Yorkshire. That is a good thing. Part of levelling up will be about, as we understand it, sub-regions taking control of where they think their local economies are going to go and the skills they will need to ensure they get that. Getting the resources to make sure they can do that, which is what this amendment is about, is fundamental. This is about resource going to those communities so that they can make those decisions for themselves. I think that the people of York and the sub-region in which my hon. Friend works will have a better say about that than Ministers themselves.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O’Brien]

The PAC reported on the levelling-up fund. Are there any particular levelling-up fund bids that we are funding that the hon. Gentleman would like to say represent bad value for money and should be withdrawn?

[Alex Norris]

The Minister knows that is unkind. I am not going to stand here and pick at one. We could go down the entire list of 157 local authorities, virtually all of which are significantly worse off, by tens of millions of pounds; I am not going to turn around and say that one of their projects should not happen. Please—of course I am not going to say that. The Minister says that the Public Accounts Committee picked up on the levelling-up fund, but that is not true: it has reported on the towns fund, too. This is a long-running issue and there are more than three years-worth of reports.

[Rachael Maskell]

It is not just about money that is coming from the centre into individual projects. The Government need to take note of the point that it is surely about enabling and empowering local authorities and bodies to make their own determinations about where the money is best prioritised. Whether it is from the shared prosperity fund, the levelling-up fund or the future high streets fund, a local authority might be in the best position to determine how the pot is spent in its local economy to drive up and level up, as opposed to the Government making a central determination about the governance of that funding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

That is exactly the argument we have been making. We want that to be locally determined. I would be surprised if the Government in general really want to defend what they see from the Public Accounts Committee. We of course await the Government’s response, and if the Minister wants to debate it, we would be very keen to—if he makes a statement, we will all be there—but I suspect that will not happen. The reality is that the basic checks have to be passed, and I am not sure we are fully assured of that yet.

In the spirit of what the Minister said and of ongoing co-operation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Miss Dines.)

Oral Answers to Questions

Alex Norris Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

We now come to shadow Minister Alex Norris.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

The recent report from the Public Accounts Committee was a huge blow to the way in which the Government are seeking to level up and it exposed once again the debilitating impact of beauty parades and unclear allocation criteria. If the Secretary of State thinks that was praise, then goodness me! This can be resolved in future by the Government accepting our calls for proper, sustained funding that is targeted at need. Therefore, to make sure that we are never in this situation again, will the Minister commit to accepting amendment 13 to the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill, which will start this process?

[Kemi Badenoch]

No, I will not commit to that. While we hold the Public Accounts Committee in high esteem, we reject much of the criticism and we will publish our response to its report in the summer.

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. We will go straight to the Opposition. Shadow Minister.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q117 Thank you, Mr Bone, and thank you, Mayor Andy Street, for your time this afternoon. It is much appreciated.

I will start with a simple question: with the experience you now have of being Mayor of a huge part of the country, and of the powers you have been exercising, what do you see next for the powers of the West Midlands Mayor?

Andy Street: Thank you for the question. I think there are two ways of answering it. In some of the areas where we have been exercising powers already, we are looking for them to be deepened—so housing, transport and skills. Then, of course, in some policy areas, we have not had any powers and are looking for them, and we might talk about inward investment as an example of that.

The other way of answering the question is to talk about the fiscal deal. At the moment, we have really been applying to Government for funding and then allocating it using all our knowledge—the whole idea that decisions taken next to people are better—but we have not had our own fundraising power. There is a real moment as to whether this next trailblazer devolution deal is going to begin a process of fiscal devolution.

[Alex Norris]

Q Thank you, that is really helpful. I am hoping that you might pull back the curtain, in so far as you are willing to, on the operations of a combined authority. Your membership is very big, so how does that work in practice? How do you work with those who have democratic mandates and with others who have been selected, because they are involved with your local enterprise partnerships? I believe you also have a trade union representative—I would always suggest that people join trade unions, because it seems a good idea to me. I wondered how that works in practice, how you try to build consensus and how you work with your combined authority?

Andy Street: Yes, you are right—interesting question. The remarkable thing about this area of the country —I think what I am about to say is true, and it is in contrast to every other combined authority—is that we are completely balanced politically: 14 Conservative MPs, 14 Labour MPs, four Labour councils, three Conservative councils and a Tory Mayor. That means that there has to be a model of working across party and consensually.

The way the decision making works is that our board takes the decisions. That is the seven local authorities, obviously balanced. The executive will be responsible for all the preparation of all the policy areas, all the proposals, but it will be that board that formally takes the decisions. One thing that I often talk about and am very proud of is that every single major financial decision that we have taken over the past five years has been taken unanimously by that board, across party. So, actually, an enormous amount of work has to be done to find what we might call regional interest and that consensual point, rather than—dare I say it on this call—the more conventional Westminster approach, the partisan approach.

[Alex Norris]

Q Moving on, there has been some interest, in both oral and written evidence, in clause 140, on compulsory purchase orders. Do you think that the powers go far enough? If not, what more would you want to see, perhaps in a Government amendment? Would it be an opportunity to address the issue of hope value in the legacy of the Land Compensation Act 1961?

Andy Street: To be very honest, you are taking me beyond my level of knowledge with that last clause. I do not see it as a critical part of this Bill. I am quite comfortable with the CPO powers that we have at the moment. We use them infrequently, but when we have needed to use them, they have been powerful. We have also used them almost as a deterrent. I am not sitting here thinking that that is the thing that I must get out of this legislation. That is not a dodge of the question; it is my honest view. But I am not equipped to give you a detailed answer on that bit in your question.

[Alex Norris]

Q That is absolutely fine. I appreciate your candour. I have just one very quick one to finish, Mr Bone. The written evidence for this Bill is starting to trickle through. There seems to be more with particular reference to the West Midlands. Obviously, we had the chief executive of the combined authority here on Tuesday. We seem to have had more interest in police and fire functions in the West Midlands than on any other issue. Some of that evidence is contradictory. Can you express your definitive position, as Mayor of the West Midlands, as to what the future is in this area, what level of interest you have, and how that might be shared, or not shared, with other Mayors that you work with?

Andy Street: I think the reason you have had a lot of interest in this is that we are in a different position to the other very large combined authorities. It is interesting why that has come about. You thanked me for my candour earlier on; I will give you my candour again on this. The situation here, unlike in Manchester, London and Leeds, is that the Mayor does not have the police and crime commissioner responsibilities. It was obviously imposed—I shall use that word—on those three areas through their deals. When our deal was struck, it was subject to local agreement. Despite a public consultation that came out overwhelmingly in favour of a merger of the two roles, the board decided that that was not what was going to happen. I regret the fact that that board decision was split on party lines. I said earlier that we always try to find consensus, but this is the one issue where we did not find it. That is, I think, why you have had input, because it remains a contentious issue. My personal view is, as it has always been, that there is enormous advantage to the model of one single accountable person. There is clear evidence that that has worked in other areas, and where we have not yet achieved that, we are slightly weaker for it.

Having said that, we have done two things here. Both the police and crime commissioner and myself, although from different parties, have committed that we will work as effectively as we can together. The second thing is that I have always committed that, so long as the rules were the same, we would not reopen this issue. Of course, the Bill changes the rules, and therefore it will, potentially, give an opportunity for this issue to be reopened. Hence the correspondence you have received.

[The Chair]

For the Government side, I call the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I should have said to the witnesses at the beginning that you might be surprised that you are getting questioned by the Minister, but the advantage of these evidence sessions is that we can have a wider debate and get more information, which feeds into the process later on, so Ministers are taking the chance to get your evidence for that purpose. We are now going to go to the shadow Minister.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q Thank you, Mr Bone, and thank you to our witnesses this afternoon. Your time is much appreciated. I also want to turn to heritage. It is an area of the Bill about which there is a high degree of consensus on its importance. As you say Lizzie, it is important that it is seen as a levelling-up issue and a place issue, and I think that gives us exciting scope to build on. I will turn to clause 92, and I will go to you first, Lizzie, but I hope the other panellists might put their views in, too. I will just ask you to expand on your written evidence, in which you say that there is scope to go a little bit further. What sorts of things did you have in mind?

Lizzie Glithero-West: We are very pleased to see the list of assets. While this table does cover many of the key asset groups we would expect to see—it has been pointed out that the inclusion of registered battlefields could be a little clearer—it would be good to address a couple of gaps at this stage. To be clear, they are not major gaps, and we really welcome this clause being in the Bill.

One such gap would be around the setting of conservation areas. A number of my members are supportive of the idea of inserting a clause to allow the protection of a small number of nationally important archaeological sites that cannot now be designated because they lack structures. These are things that would have gone into other Bills. It is a very small number of sites, but they are very important. They cannot currently be designated but they could be designated, so there is a great opportunity to address that.

The point about setting is around conservation areas and the impacts of, for instance, tall buildings nearby and so on. Our briefing refers to that not currently being in the Bill. The other thing we would like to probe a bit for parliamentarians is how these designations will interact with other natural environment designations—for example, ancient trees, ancient woodlands, veteran trees and ancient hedgerows. There is such a symbiotic relationship between the natural and historic environment. Often, a few different designations will be in the same area, and it is important that there is clarity around that. It has also been noted that there should be consideration of maritime archaeology—perhaps looking at the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 in addition to what is already in this list.

One other point I want to make is about the clarification of some of the wording. If the wording has been chosen to align the Bill with the national planning policy framework, it should be noted that the NPPF talks about preserving and enhancing significance, which is subtly but importantly different from preserving and enhancing assets. A related amendment should replicate the intent of the NPPF, which would ensure that the process of undertaking archaeology, which, by its nature, can be destructive but enhance knowledge and significance, is covered by the duty and not inadvertently excluded. The concern from some in the sector is that unless enhancement of significance is properly defined, it could lead to unintended consequences. Those were the main points on my list. I hope that is helpful.

[Alex Norris]

That is very helpful. Do the other panellists have anything to add?

Nicholas Boys Smith: I will make a point very quickly; I will not comment on those detailed points. This does not actually need to come through primary legislation, but, building on what I was saying earlier, there is an important opportunity and need in the criteria for listing, as set out by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and Historic England, to put more focus on issues such as townscape quality, pride in place and local popularity as well as—not instead of—issues of architectural importance.

An architectural historian might say about a building, “Oh, there are 50 of those around the country” or “Well, that is the 15th of those, and there are earlier ones over there.” Actually, if that were a town hall, it would be very significant to the people living in that town. It comes back to the wider debate about levelling up and pride in place. There is an important need to gently weave those things more clearly into the guidance for listing, but as I say, that does not actually have to come through the Bill. I do not get invited to this kind of thing every day of the week, so I have taken the opportunity mention this today.

Adrian Dobson: I do not think I have anything to add on this particular point.

[Alex Norris]

Q Turning to clause 93 on the stop notices, are you confident that they are rigorous and strong enough to beat back unscrupulous developers? Lizzie, you mentioned your concerns about the period between now and Royal Assent; I think you were making a point about greater risk. Could you cover that in your answer? I am interested to hear the views of all the panellists on that.

Lizzie Glithero-West: It is a very short answer from me. Clause 93 is supported by our membership. Private owners of heritage will want to be sure that it is very clear, but the clause is welcome. My only point would be that in any transitional system between Bills, you want to ensure clarity and that there is no confusion.

Adrian Dobson: I have just a general point. One of the challenges for the planning system is that, inevitably, things get concentrated on development management and that can be, initially, at the expense of what you might call proactive planning and also enforcement activity. There is just a concern that the proactive planning and enforcement activity can become the Cinderella element of the planning system if you are not careful.

[The Chair]

Nicholas?

Nicholas Boys Smith: I think I am done on heritage.

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (First sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Neil O'Brien]

Q One of the missions takes forward the Government’s ambition to increase our public domestic R&D spending outside the greater south-east by a third over the spending review period. How do you feel about that mission? On the level of ambition, are there things you would change about it; is the balance right; should we be doing things in a different way; should we be locking it in more tightly? Given all those different sorts of questions, is that balance between that objective and other priorities for UKRI right? How do you feel about the mission broadly speaking?

Professor Dame Ottoline Leyser: It is good to have those kinds of clear targets and goals. That is helpful. I think it is a long-term ambition, and that is another critical element of both the Bill and the missions, having those clearly articulated long-term goals to steer towards. The SR element of it is obviously much more rapid, and made in the context of the rising R&D budget across the SR, so I think it is achievable.

From my point of view, it is important to stress that our spend distribution does not meet the target from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. There is the broader Government target for the whole of investment, of 30% and 40% set out in the missions, and then there is a specific BEIS target of 55% outside the greater south-east. Our spend does not meet that at the moment—we are only part of the BEIS spend—but the critical element from that point of view is that in our open competitions for funding, we have flat success rates across the country. The news that we are investing more in the greater south-east than outside that area is because we do not receive the applications.

A lot of what we need to do is capacity building. We need to think hard about how we support the excellent research and innovation that we see right across the country to galvanise and bid into our schemes, making sure that the schemes we put forward are equally open to everyone right across the country and that the targeted interventions that we put in place, of which there are some—they are only going to be a small proportion of our overall investment—are carefully considered in the context of the wider capacity-building activity to drive up opportunity for everyone right across the country.

There is excellence everywhere, however, and we can see that, for example, in parts of the recent research excellence framework. One hundred and fifty-seven universities across the UK made submissions to have their research assessed in that exercise. There is world-leading research in 99% of them, according to the assessment process, which can lead activity. Harnessing the benefit of that will be critical to the levelling-up agenda and to the wider economic recovery from the pandemic that we need to drive.

Getting back to your question—are those the right ambitions?—I suppose I am inherently more in favour of outcome and output ambitions than I am of input ambitions but, none the less, I think having those clear targets behind which we can align our activity in UKRI and more broadly across Government is very helpful in embedding this agenda right across everything that we do. That will be critical to success.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q Thank you, Professor Leyser, for your time this morning. In your role as a member of the Levelling Up Advisory Council, with respect to levelling up, do you think that at the moment things are getting better, or are they getting better quickly?

Professor Dame Ottoline Leyser: That is quite a difficult question to answer. At the moment, things are very challenging right across the country. We have the inflationary pressures caused by a combination of the tail of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. That has come on the back of the pandemic, which also caused a lot of economic and social shockwaves across the country. Both those things, if anything, amplify disparities for a whole variety of reasons. Because of those factors, it would be difficult to argue that things are getting better.



Having said that, and looping back to what I said at the beginning, I am very encouraged by the ambition—reflected in the Bill and the White Paper—to take on some of the really big, long-standing and multifaceted problems; to get to the root of them and tackle them through this concerted, aligned action. That is not typical, because we have tended to work in silos when dealing with particular aspects, which does not work as well as integrated, concerted actions. A lot of the important problems, such as health inequalities, are multifaceted, and we do not solve them by simply looking at, for example, the health system. I am encouraged by the new approaches that are being taken to try to address some of the problems, but I do not think they are yet biting.

[Alex Norris]

Q You mentioned the importance of the missions in your first answer. The missions themselves do not appear in the Bill in explicit form, as they do in the White Paper; rather, it is stated that there should be missions. You will have heard the concern from the Opposition, and indeed from others, that that approach will give Ministers a lot of freedom and perhaps the ability to mark their own homework. How do you think we could get some independence into the system?

Professor Dame Ottoline Leyser: I think that, because these are really long-term missions, writing them into the Bill has a lot of risk. As we have just discussed, maybe the missions are not ambitious enough in some contexts; as time moves on, that gap might widen and it may be important to increase the ambition in a mission. There need to be embedded mechanisms to keep under review the success of the missions and then to increase them, for example, if that is the appropriate response, or to respond to an entirely new opportunity that was not envisaged when the missions were set. So not writing the missions into the Bill is actually a sensible approach.

Having said that, I agree with you that the whole point about missions is that they have to be really clear, identifiable and quantifiable targets that we are driving towards through multiple, concerted actions, and there has to be continuous monitoring of the progress being made. That has to be a key element of how the missions are run. I would absolutely hope that there would be external scrutiny, as well as transparency in the publication of the progress towards these goals, and then at least parliamentary scrutiny, which I am sure will be rigorous, of that progress and of the actions that need to be taken if the progress is not as robust as one would like.

Should there be some completely independent external body? In the spirit of the missions, only if it has a really clear purpose and remit beyond what can be achieved through the transparent publication of progress towards the targets and the scrutiny that there will already be on those targets. I agree that what is happening needs to be really clear, as does what needs to be done if progress does not happen fast enough. There are many options for how that is achieved and I am sure the Committee will have the expertise to make choices about which of those options is preferable.

[Alex Norris]

Q Thank you. I have just one more question, turning to your work and your previous response on regional growth. You have been part of a really successive triangle of work in Cambridge that brings together business and academia and has had great development success—success that we are seeking to see elsewhere in the country. What are the features of a local economy that really motors like that? What do we need to have elsewhere in order to see that success?

Professor Dame Ottoline Leyser: This is a topic of tremendous interest in UKRI: how do you build clusters of activity that create self-sustaining positive feedback cycles that really grow things, anchored in a place? A lot of work has been done examining this over the years, in many places. As usual, it is a combination of factors. In many cases there is a lot of evidence that anchor institutions seed a lot of that activity, be that an excellent university, some kind of prime industrial presence or an excellent research institute—for example, a public sector research establishment or a catapult. Some kind of anchor activity fuels a critical element of the cycle, which could be on the research side or the innovation side, or hopefully a combination of the two. That is one of the key components.

The other absolutely critical element is about people—skills and people. A local environment anchors people there by providing the kind of living and working environment that attracts people to a region. Anchor institutions contribute to that, but so does the skills environment—the skills, training and opportunities that are available. For me, joining all those things up is particularly important. In the context of people, such an environment is one in which people go for a particular reason for a particular job, but the opportunities around that environment are such that there are other jobs that are also exciting.

It is about getting that dynamic mobility of people between, say, the university sector, the SME sector—small and medium-sized enterprises—and the more prime business sector, with people moving around and all the allied activities needed to fuel that, such as the local policy and the investment communities that go with that. Joining all that stuff up in the local ecosystem, through strong leadership locally—a critical element—and those key anchor institutions, provides exciting opportunities for people to build a whole variety of careers, working through that ecosystem.

Those are the key ingredients, and UKRI obviously has a role in supporting several of those, but they can only be successful in the context of that broader alignment between local leadership and the wider attractors needed in a local environment to bring people in and keep them there: transport networks, cultural institutions—those kinds of things.

[Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)]

Q You will be aware of the allegations—the suspicions in certain quarters—about how transparent and impartial the allocation of the towns fund awards were. Given that similar concerns have been expressed by the Public Accounts Committee about the potential for this with levelling-up funds, what measures do you think would be helpful to allay the fears that distribution of levelling-up awards might be open to similar charges of lack of transparency and of impartiality?

Professor Dame Ottoline Leyser: I am not sure exactly which funding you are referring to. From the point of view of the funds that are being allocated through UKRI, as I mentioned earlier, the funds that are explicitly placed—targeted—are not a very large proportion of our overall funds. For me, the key goal is to think about it in the context of the capacity-building element that I said is so important. There should be local empowerment and local consideration about what would be the best interventions in those places.

We have run the strength in places programme for a while, and it has run on a fully open competition. One of the advantages of fully open competitions is that they provide an equal opportunity for everybody to begin with, which is good. On the other hand, they are slower and more bureaucratic, in that you have to run the open competition. There is an interesting balance to be struck between that process and the ability more rapidly and fluidly to allocate money to places, so that they can use the money in a way that targets their local priorities.

We are in the process of working out how best to work to deliver the new funds that have come through the recent spending review, which are being targeted specifically at three regions. Those regions were selected based on evidence that that kind of injection of cash could really drive the capacity building that I described. There are very high-quality objective measures of how you can consider that capacity in different places and, therefore, the impact of the funding that goes in. I would absolutely agree with you that it is really important, in the context of a levelling-up agenda, that funding is seen to be allocated fairly with the opportunity for everyone to access the benefits of those funds.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Tracy Brabin, Mayor of West Yorkshire. Should I say welcome home, Tracy, or welcome back? The panel has until 10.50 am. For the record, will you please introduce yourself formally?

Tracy Brabin: Hello everybody. It is good to be back, even if it is virtually. I am Tracy Brabin, the Mayor of West Yorkshire, and I am joined by—

Ben Still: Hello everybody. I am Ben Still and I am managing director of West Yorkshire Combined Authority.

[Alex Norris]

Q It is lovely to see you again, Tracy. It is a little different with all the screens, but we are really grateful for your time this morning. My first question is quite an open one. You, as Mayor of West Yorkshire, have similar powers to lots of other Mayors, but different powers from some others. What more would you add to your role—whether that is powers that other Mayors currently have or other things done by central Government—that would mean you could do what you are seeking to do in West Yorkshire?

Tracy Brabin: Thank you so much, Alex. Let me open by saying how welcome the Bill is. Finally, we have got to a point where it feels like it is going to be a real thing. The mission statements are also very welcome. I chair the M10, which is the group of Mayors around the country, and we are very positive about this next step and the opportunities for us to work with Government to really understand what devolution is about. The idea of more Mayors across the country joining the M10 is incredibly welcome.

When it comes to more powers, I think there is a more fundamental question: where do we want to get to with this Bill, and what is the strategic relationship that we want to build with Mayors and with Government? If we are taking powers from Whitehall and giving them to regions and elected Mayors, what freedoms are we then giving to those Mayors to deliver? In the Bill, there seems to be a focus very much, and quite rightly, on the accountability of Government, but there does not seem to be that equivalence of the accountability of Mayors to deliver.

We have said all along, in every meeting we have been in with Ministers, “We can help you deliver on your missions.” For example, on climate change, we have met the Government and the M10 has met the Government to talk to them about more powers and how we could help hit the zero carbon target of 2050. In our region, our target is 2038, so we could be outliers for Government to help deliver. However, there is not that detail and that understanding of who is going to deliver these outcomes. I think the Committee will wrestle with that over the next few months. Whose responsibility to deliver the outcomes?

I have always said that the way to level up in West Yorkshire is to have that London-style transport system, which is one of the mission statements. Unfortunately, the integrated rail plan meant that we were not able to benefit from the billions of pounds of investment that would come with that strategic project. It is really important, as an attractive region to international investors and inward investment, that we have a skilled workforce. At the moment, we are a bit hamstrung on delivering the types of skills we need in an agile way in response to business, because we are being told by Westminster, “This is the project; this is what you have to deliver” without the understanding of the complexity of delivering skills training for those furthest away from going back to college.

On climate change, we have to get away from the beauty contests and the way we have to bid for funding for projects—for example, for electric vehicle charging points. We have to be given the autonomy to help the Government to deliver on their mission statements. There are a number of points there, Alex, but we will get into a little bit more detail as we go further into the session.

[Alex Norris]

Q I appreciate that, Tracy. Given the company that you have this morning, this is probably a pertinent question: can you talk to us—from your own personal experience and having talked to your colleagues in the M10—about what it is like to work with a combined authority and about the features of a good local collaboration?

Tracy Brabin: I have been pretty blessed in that the combined authority has been in existence since 2014. Although we took a wee while to get to the actual landscape and the footprint of a combined authority, we got there. It has been incredibly efficient, because I landed in a position where a lot of work had already been done to set up the mayoral combined authority. Now, that is not the same across the country. When our colleague Dan became Mayor of South Yorkshire, that infrastructure was not set up. We are, I would hope, one of the most efficient and progressive MCAs; that is my target—to be the most progressive MCA in the country.

Certainly, there is lots that we are already doing that is reflected in the Bill. For example, there is the extra scrutiny. We were determined to ensure that we had proper scrutiny in place, so we went from one scrutiny committee to three. We also pay our scrutiny members for their time. However, the Bill could go further and have that commonality across the regions—really investing in our scrutiny members and allowing them to meet remotely. The current expectation that people have to meet in a room means that quorum is sometimes challenging. During covid, we managed to make it secure—and look at us now, doing governmental business remotely. I would really hope that this Bill could ensure that we could have that scrutiny locally, and delivered in a more modern way.

Fundamentally, the idea, for us as a combined authority—we are five regions with Labour council leaders—is that we have a combined mission of delivering for the people we represent and who elected us, but there is a challenge in that when we come to the Government with our vision, there is this beauty contest and these funding streams. There is also a churn of Ministers and a churn of ideas from Ministers. It would be really empowering to have a direct relationship with the Treasury and could get the funding pot, with the delivery assessed on the outcomes. We could then have extra scrutiny from not just our own colleagues here in West Yorkshire but, potentially, the Public Accounts Committee and Committees like yourselves. We could be part of the outcome story, rather than just waiting for the Government to open up the floodgates on things we have to bid for, in which case it is all about the scrutiny of the process rather than the outcomes.

Ben Still: The partnership for an MCA to be successful must be deep, and there must be a strong sense of shared endeavour. As the Mayor has said, the five West Yorkshire leaders and the Mayor work very hard to develop that sense of shared endeavour. We can see that in the fact that the combined authority has specific sub-committees dealing with individual sectors, each of which is chaired by one of those local authority leaders.

We also have cross-party representation on the combined authority, so that—I think we will come back to this theme—ideas and policies that are developed through the CA can stand the test of time and be long term, as was discussed with the last witness. We completely agree that the long-term nature of these policies means that they have to be sustained over successive Parliaments and successive mayoralties.

Tracy Brabin: It is unusual to have cross-party membership of the combined authority. In parallel, we have our local enterprise partnership board, which is one of the most diverse in the country. We have a strong relationship with that LEP board too. As I say, the structures are here in West Yorkshire to deliver. The history of delivery is there from previous funding streams, where we have delivered and spent every penny—

[The Chair]

Tracy, I am going to have to cut you off, because we need slightly shorter answers. I will ask the Minister—who does not believe in “churn of Ministers”—to ask you a question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil O'Brien]

Q That is very helpful. In your earlier answer you drew attention to the lack of UK-wide indices of multiple deprivation. We know that in the first round of the levelling-up fund, the 50% of local authorities that had the lowest median pay got roughly three quarters of the investments—it is targeting poorer areas. Would it be attractive, as part of the data drive in the levelling-up White Paper, to create more UK-wide indices of deprivation and other things?

Mairi Spowage: Yes, I would be very supportive of that. We can see in the sorts of metrics that are used—not only those related to indices of multiple deprivation but educational outcomes or transport connectivity—that some of them are focused on England-only measures; sometimes they are GB only. We do not want to fall into the trap of, in some cases, using GB and UK inter-changeably here. It is really important that we think about the metrics that we are going to use to capture the reduction in regional inequalities across the UK. Wherever possible, we should invest in developing UK-wide measures.

In some cases I can see that there are data sources in the devolved nations that are very similar to those being used for England. I think there is work that could be done to develop more consistent measures right across the UK, for which, as I said earlier, there is a clear policy need for the UK Government’s programme.

[Alex Norris]

Q Thank you for your time this morning, Professor. Can you expand on an element of a previous answer you gave about the work that the Office for National Statistics, of which you are a fellow, is doing on developing a dataset in that area?

Mairi Spowage: I am not here to speak for the ONS, but I am a fellow, so they ask me and a group of other expert academics for advice on their work programme. They have published a subnational data strategy, which was worked up not just by the ONS but across the Government’s fiscal service, to think about how we can develop more sophisticated metrics across the UK to capture different levels of needs and progress. That would be to support not only the levelling-up agenda but things more broadly. In partnership with the Department for Levelling Up, the ONS is looking to develop more metrics across the UK. Some of that will be working closely with the devolved Administrations to develop data sources and think what might be comparable.

We have done a significant amount of work with the Economics Statistics Centre of Excellence. We published a paper recently on developing a suite of sub-national indicators across the UK. We made recommendations there, which included working closely with the devolved Administrations to develop data that was consistent across the UK, particularly on educational and environmental outcomes. A recent example would be something like fuel poverty, which is obviously a live discussion. It is measured differently in all four nations of the UK, so it is very hard to compare differential rates of fuel poverty in different parts of the UK at the moment.

[Alex Norris]

Q Do you feel that the outcome of that work might be a definitive set of statistics and measurements that we could use in this space, that we could perhaps seek to build consensus around? Is this particularly contested space in your community? It is in ours, as you may have noticed.

Mairi Spowage: It is always difficult to come up with a set of metrics that everybody is going to agree with. One of the most challenging things, particularly if you compile them in an index, is how you weight them together, which things you give most prominence to, because if you are weighting metrics that are more focused on, perhaps, income deprivation and you are focusing less on rurality, you will get quite a different allocation of resources from the one that you will get if you are giving more weight to lack of connectivity, or rurality, than income deprivation. That is just one example. Most of the indices of multiple deprivation have income and employment, education, health, crime, and access to services, as well as housing. The weights that you give to these things can be contentious and, depending on the weight that you give to things, there can be quite a different outcome in your allocation.

It is obviously possible to come up with a consensus on things like the indices of multiple deprivation. The different nations show that you can come up with something that broadly everybody agrees is sensible, but even with the indices of multiple deprivation, which are well established, policy makers in rural areas would say that they do not capture rural disadvantage very well at all, because the geographic areas that tend to be used for rural areas are very large and do not capture pockets of deprivation within rural areas. Even with those established metrics, people in rural areas have argued for many years that they do not serve them well. I think it is difficult to get a consensus, but there is a good basis to start from, in terms of the long-established 20 or 30-year discussions about indices of multiple deprivation and how to measure that across the UK.

[Alex Norris]

Q That is a very handy caution for us with regard to using these statistics for allocation purposes. When it comes to measuring progress, would it be a little easier if we were not seeking to aggregate and to weight them but instead to use them as some sort of dashboard such that we would be able to form some sort of consensus on what indicators would show whether we were levelling up across the UK? Would we be able to reach a kind of breadth there, certainly in your community?

Mairi Spowage: Yes, I think that is possible. In terms of the sorts of metrics that we could use, it will be important that the metrics used capture the outcomes of what we are trying to achieve and not just inputs or outputs, but I do think it will be possible, and I agree with you that it makes much more sense, when we are thinking about whether the interventions that we are pursuing are making progress on the outcomes that we are interested in, to look at those as a suite or a dashboard of indicators, rather than trying to come up with some index overall. Yes, absolutely, it should be possible to come up with a suite of indicators that are broadly agreed upon. However, there are things like the Scottish national performance framework, trying to measure the 11 national outcomes that the Scottish Government have set out through consultation with Scottish public life and communities about what is important. Just be aware: 81 indicators are used to capture that, and having 81 indicators makes it quite difficult to say overall whether we feel we are progressing to the sort of Scotland that we want to see. It can be difficult to come up with something that is comprehensive enough and that does not become unwieldy.

[Tim Farron]

Q Hi, Professor; good to see you with us. You mentioned earlier the situation regarding a tight labour market. Thinking about rural communities in Scotland and England in particular and elsewhere in the UK, to what extent you think an absence or a lack of workforce is hampering those economies. In the Lake district, 63% of hospitality businesses last year reported that they were working below capacity, because of the lack of workforce. To what extent do you think that workforce problems—or lack of workforce—are hampering economic growth in certain areas? What is the cause? Does the Bill do anything to solve those problems?

Mairi Spowage: It is a massive problem. For all the businesses we talk to on a regular basis right now, it is their No. 1 issue. They are very concerned about their energy, fuel and input costs going up hugely, but their biggest problem is sourcing staff, particularly businesses in rural areas. It means that they do not open as much in many cases, particularly when we talk to hospitality businesses—they are not serving non-residents for dinner, or they are not opening on all days of the week. That seems to be quite common across the Scottish businesses we talk to on a regular basis, so it is an absolutely huge problem.

What is causing it? Well, for many years, there has been a movement—within Scotland at least, which I am more familiar with—from rural to more urban areas. In Scotland, there has been movement from most areas to Edinburgh and its surrounds, to be honest. That is projected to continue. If it does, that has some pretty huge consequences for rural areas. Obviously, housing plays into it as well, with young people in an area being attracted away, perhaps to study, but also for employment, and not being able to afford to buy houses in the local area. Certain parts, particularly the highlands, have huge issues with second-home ownership dominating particular settlements.

Those are all issues. With some of the pressure valves that we used to use a lot in rural areas in Scotland around EU labour, it is not quite the same situation any more, so we are not seeing the same supply of labour from that sort of source that we did in the past. That definitely seems to be causing issues, particularly in hospitality and social care.

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Second sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I will move over to the Opposition. I call Alex Norris.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q Thank you, Sir Mark. I am grateful to the witnesses for being with us this afternoon. I will start with a basic question that is probably best answered by the chief executives of the combined authorities, but Joanne, please do contribute if you want to.

Your two combined authorities are seen as very much at the forefront of devolution to combined authorities and Mayors. Much of what we talk about in the context of the Bill is about how to push the rest of the country up to having similar levels of responsibility. What more do you want yourselves? What more do you want to build on your current settlement? Where might devolution go in the future for you?

Eamonn Boylan: We have significant ambition for further devolution and we are working to develop propositions that we will be discussing with officials over the coming weeks in response to the Government’s call for us to step forward with a trailblazer devolution deal, which was contained in the White Paper. The asks would be for greater power and influence in areas such as housing, transport, skills—you will be unsurprised to hear that—because we believe that there is a need for us to be able to shape local skills offers and opportunities to the local jobs market more effectively than currently happens.

The other major ask we have, consistent with a number of other places and some recent think-tank reports, would be for a greater degree of certainty over the funding framework and the outcomes framework that we agree with the Government over a period of time, whether that is a spending review period or some other period. At the moment, we are hampered by the number of separate and completely bespoke competitive processes that we go through to resource an awful lot of our activity. Having greater certainty over funding—not necessarily more funding, although that would be welcome—and greater flexibility over its deployment, for which we would be very willing to be held directly accountable to yourselves in Parliament, would be the real goal for us and a real step forward in terms of the current devolution journey.

[Alex Norris]

Q Laura, what is your response from the West Midlands perspective?

Laura Shoaf: In a lot of ways, our position is very similar. Again, there is a big focus on skills and a want to go further and faster to have more control over budgets and particularly to look more at employment support and careers. It is similar for transport and housing, but for us, it is very specifically housing retrofit, as we have some of the worst levels of fuel poverty in the country. Another area that is slightly more bespoke to the West Midlands is around digital inclusion, where we have some quite unique circumstances.

We are also interested in flexibility. I would reiterate all the points about funding simplification, funding certainty and funding flexibility and the willingness to be held accountable, and how important it will be through this process to have transparent and accessible local and regional data so that we know whether we are levelling up. That is something we are really keen to work with the Department on. In general, more certainty around funding, which is simplified, and, please, more accountability. Like Greater Manchester, our Mayor is keen to be accountable and held accountable for delivering.

Joanne Roney: The point I would make is that the devolution settlement needs to be alongside the multi-year local authority funding settlement and sustainable funding for the wider social infrastructure issues that we are trying to tackle, which Laura mentioned.

To pick up that point about fragmented funding, in 2020 the Local Government Association recognised that 448 different grants were paid to councils, with different initiatives and different timescales on them. When at a combined authority level we are trying to tackle delivery of some of those big, wider ambitions, as outlined in the 12 missions, I think that stability and flexibility of funding for local authorities and the wider public sector plays into the mix to make the effect of the devolution changes that we want. So, core funding for public services, alongside the devolution asks, is important.

[Alex Norris]

Q Thank you, Joanne. That leads me nicely into my next question, which is to you, perhaps with your Solace hat on, but obviously in your day-to-day leadership role in a local authority as well. How do your members feel about their current capacity to deliver what they need to as a council? How would they react to being asked to do more things?

Joanne Roney: Capacity is a huge challenge for local government and for my members, up and down the country. That is capacity in terms of not only workforce and expertise but stable funding. As Eamonn said, it is not necessarily more money, but an understanding of the long-term planning that we need, and multi-year settlements so that we can start to work collectively.

To answer the question about how my members feel about doing more, as Eamonn said, in Greater Manchester we have been at the forefront of working together, as 10 local authorities, with these wider ambitions, for a considerable amount of time. One of the key features of Greater Manchester’s original devolution deal was public sector reform. We were very mindful of the fact that we think we can do more collectively, in particular in that space around prevention, to start to make best use of public sector resources.

My members would say, “More power to devolution to Greater Manchester,” and that, importantly, the resources, reform agendas and public sector expenditure should be dealt with at the lowest possible level to get the changes we need to make the difference to coincide with the 12 missions. That is what they would say.

[Alex Norris]

Q I have one more brief question, if I may—a final point on compulsory purchase orders, to ensure that I understood what was said in the previous answer. Notwithstanding issues of cost and capacity, which link to what Joanne just said, given what is on the face of the Bill on CPO, would you like to see anything further in the Bill, or do you think anything needs to be added or subtracted? Eamonn, you mentioned permitted development. That question is to any or all of the panellists.

Eamonn Boylan: The measures contained in the Bill in respect of CPO are eminently sensible and supportable. There will always be issues—this goes back to Joanne’s point about certainty of funding—with the availability of funding and the ability to manage what is still a complex legal framework, but the reforms set out in the Bill are an essential prerequisite for making CPO more applicable and useful in delivering place-based regeneration.

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q To start, I have a question for Ms Roney. There are proposals to move from section 106 funding to a new infrastructure funding model. How will that be helpful in releasing funding to generate affordable and social housing? Where do you see the risks in that funding proposal?

Joanne Roney: We have gone around the loop on a number of these different measures for a considerable time. If the outcome is to deliver more affordable housing, I think the challenge is still the variances between different parts of the country and the ability to deliver affordable housing because of the value of the land and the cost of build. So I am not sure that that will necessarily fix it, but then I am not sure that section 106 fixed it either. I think we should be having a different conversation—about how we provide affordable housing in different areas.

I will call on my colleague Eamonn to help me here, because one of the successes of the combined authority has been the revolving housing investment fund that we have used and the different models we have created to try to get better value out of all our developments and translate that into affordable housing numbers. We have had a range of success, but some of that has come from the ability to use flexible funding that we already have to support some schemes.

Overall, I think we would support the proposal in the Bill, but we need to do more to look at affordable housing provision in different parts of the country, and different innovative and flexible ways to drive value in order to provide truly affordable homes.

Eamonn Boylan: I echo Joanne’s comments, but I will just make the point—I know a number of Committee members will be well aware of this—that section 106 is far less potent in northern parts of the country than in others because of the issues around viability, particularly where we are dealing with brownfield land. Most of my brownfield land has the periodic table underneath it, and therefore the costs of remediation are significant.

We really welcome the Government’s initiative on the brownfield land fund, which has really helped us to unlock development, but section 106 or a replacement levy will not provide us in the north with sufficient resource to deal with the challenge of affordable housing. We need to go beyond that. That is part of the devolution ask that we will be making around how we might work more effectively with Homes England in delivering programmes—particularly on affordable housing, and particularly on affordable low-carbon or zero-carbon housing, which is a very significant challenge.

Laura Shoaf: I mentioned earlier that one of the things we wanted to do in a trailblazer devolution deal was to look at how we can use the housing and brownfield funding that we have more flexibly, to address some of the wider regeneration challenges but also to help us to increase levels of affordable housing. The brownfield funding, as Eamonn said, has demonstrably made a difference in our ability to assemble sites, to remediate sites, to bridge the viability gap and then, ultimately, to do what we all want to do, which is to deliver more housing, affordable included.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I understand that Government Members started the questioning last time, so I ask Alex or Matthew to start.

[Alex Norris]

Q I will, if that is all right, Sir Mark. Good afternoon, panellists. I am really grateful for your time. I will direct my first question to Rich and Sacha. Your campaign is about community power. What do you think about what is in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill?

Rich Bell: Our basic sense is that there are positive individual measures in the Bill to strengthen the agency of local authorities and communities, but we have some worries about the way that local leadership is conceived of in the Bill. Andy Haldane, who led the Government’s levelling-up taskforce, said that if we are to make a reality of levelling up, local governance has to be a team sport involving local government, local finance, community organisations and local people, yet local leadership seems to be conceived of, both in the levelling-up White Paper and in the Bill, as being restricted to elected metro Mayors, potentially county mayors and governors. We do not think that that fulfils the need for meaningful control at community level. Giving people control of the services, spaces and spending decisions that shape our places will be absolutely pivotal to fulfilling levelling-up missions related to pride in place—as will local leadership, obviously.

[Alex Norris]

Q Sacha, did you want to expand on that?

Sacha Bedding: Teesside is well known for what our metro Mayor, Ben Houchen, is doing. If you were to ask people in my community what that means to them—the purchase of an airport; the decarbonisation of industry; carbon capture and storage—they would say that they are good things, and the macroeconomic circumstances arising out of them could be a positive, but it feels as though they are a million miles away from having an impact on their life. When we talk about local leadership, I would like us to move beyond the sub-regional. From a Westminster perspective, that is more local, but from a community perspective, to really feel for those people in left-behind neighbourhoods, of which ours is one, it needs to be most local leadership. Giving people agency and control over more decisions, more often, would be beneficial.

The Bill is a start, and a step in the right direction. As Rich says, there are elements that you can get behind, but probably more needs to be done, so that people can feel that they benefit from some of the levelling-up opportunities in the paper.

[Alex Norris]

Q This might be a good moment to go to you, Parth. In your research, you have looked at democracy and decision making. What does that tell you about who people are confident in, where they want to make decisions, and what involvement people in general want in decision making?

Dr Patel: At their simplest, questions of constitutional reform and devolution are questions about whose voice is heard, which we should not detach from the question of who has a voice in the first place. There is minimal engagement in Bill with local politicians at certain scales, or with community and civil society organisations and citizens. There are some allusions to public consultation, but without much detail about what it involves. That is a problem, because when you are implementing a tier of local governance without having come bottom up, there is a risk that the link between the citizenry and this new tier of state will be weak. Then you get low political engagement, of all sorts, and local opposition to certain new tiers of government, and it feels like a wasted opportunity.

At the same time, clauses 43 and 45 grant the Secretary of State new powers to impose a combined county authority, change the constitution in a CCA or impose a mayoralty unilaterally—with a public consultation, although that is not quite defined. That purely top-down approach to constitutional reform risks being at best a little bit of a waste and at worst democratically not very legitimate.

[Alex Norris]

Q Thank you. Graeme, we spoke a little in this morning’s sitting about the missions. As you know, whether the missions should be set out in the Bill, or whether the Bill should say instead that there should be some missions, is something of a politically contested space. We also talked a little about how we will understand progress. From your research in your unit at the university, how best can we as decision makers and legislators monitor levelling up and understand the impact of the various levelling-up missions and programmes?

Professor Atherton: One of the first things is that the missions differ significantly in precisely how they can be measured. For some missions, you see targets that one could see progress against in a quantitative way; for others, that is less so. Consistency across the missions would seem a good starting point. Then, if we are indeed to look for progress, there need to be quantitative and possibly other measures alongside each mission.

Inevitably, one of the challenges with levelling up is that the White Paper is so broad and encompasses so many different policy areas. We found over 120 different policy targets or policies mentioned in the White Paper, alongside £250 billion-worth of spend. Refining that down to a number of missions will be difficult. First, you need to make the missions consistent, and there needs to be a rationale for why certain things are included as missions and others are not. For instance, we consistently have things on skills, but not on other aspects of education—we have things for younger groups, at primary level, but not for those at a level between the two.

The important point is: what is and is not the mission? In defining it and looking for progress, we need to be as precise as we can be for each mission. We should possibly go beyond the time scale in the White Paper, and look at what happened prior to that, because although the medium term is good, you need to consider the short, medium and long-term progress you are looking to make on the missions.

[Tim Farron]

Q Thank you to all the panellists; it is brilliant to see you here. My first question is to Dr Patel. Rural communities face inequality in accessing health services, given the geographical distances that people need to travel to receive healthcare. Thinking about cancer treatment, A&E and GP access, what evidence can you call on to indicate whether those large geographical distances have an impact on health outcomes?

Dr Patel: It is an excellent question. I cannot call on a precise study that will give me an exact scientific answer to what you are asking. The thing about health outcomes is that they are a point of convergence for a whole array of economic, social, cultural and political factors, including access to public services of all kinds, not just health services. That is why health outcomes are quite a good thing to look at. Within the 12 missions, it is sort of the mission of the missions. The other 11 all basically feed into whether or not we achieve the health mission, so it is a good thing to look at. There are no two ways about it: public services are a key determinant of health distributions and health patterns, and they make a massive difference to cancer outcomes, for example. At the same time, they are not the be-all and end-all. The local economy matters, and things like pride in place and social relations also matter.

Zooming out a little bit, do I think this Bill and the proposed funding pots around it will achieve the health mission? The evidence tells me I should be sceptical. A really good example is if we look at east and west Germany in 1990, when there was a four-year life expectancy difference between east and west Germany. Two decades later, that had closed to three months. In those two decades, we saw radical constitutional reform, sweeping political change, €2 trillion of investment and a massive upgrade in public services and access to the services you described. In relation to that, what this Bill proposes is certainly more symbolic than substantial, and that is where my scepticism originates.

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Alex Norris Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 8th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to close this debate on behalf of the Opposition. When it comes to levelling up, we have had a few rounds of departmental questions, the White Paper, the Bill and, today, nearly six hours of very good debate. There is only one question left in front of us: when it comes to levelling up and the Government’s approach to levelling up, is this it? With our huge regional inequalities, is what is in the first third of this Bill really it? When it comes to the wasted potential of the nations and regions in our country, is this it? When it comes to the over-centralisation of this country, is this really it? The Minister for Housing seems to think that maybe it is, but I say gently to him: if this really was a comprehensive Bill aimed at tackling the regional inequalities that are holding us back, it would not have been necessary to bulk it out with a planning Bill as well. That is the reality: the first third of the Bill is levelling up, and two thirds are about planning. The reality, too, is that there are no answers in here either to the immediate cost of living challenges we face, or to the long-term structural questions that we as a country must address—more evidence that this Government are out of touch and out of ideas.

Hon. Members should not take my word for it: the Office for National Statistics report clearly shows that, far from levelling up, things are getting worse, and the excoriating report from the Public Accounts Committee shows that the approach so far has been a very poor one indeed. Is this really it?

This debate has been a good one. I know the Minister is a listener and will reflect on the contributions that have been made, but he will certainly have heard a lot that would improve the Bill. The Chair of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), should have been drafted in to help to write it because his speech was about two fundamental things: first, more money, ending the beauty parades of small pots of funding, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) and my hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Beth Winter) said, and properly funding our communities so they can build their futures; and secondly, new powers for existing Mayors and access to those powers for communities that do not currently have them. That was a really good starter for where we could go with the Bill.

Some reality was injected into the debate by my hon. Friends the Members for Denton and Reddish (Andrew Gwynne) and for Wansbeck (Ian Lavery), who talked movingly about just how hard things are for people right now and the struggle people are facing just to make the bills work, finding that there is too much week or too much month left at the end for their paycheques to cover. There is not enough in the Bill to address that. Again we see the promise of jam tomorrow, but there is no value in jam tomorrow when there is not bread today.

My hon. Friends the Members for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough (Gill Furniss) and for Wirral West (Margaret Greenwood) also injected some reality around cuts to local authorities. We talk about this on the Labour Benches a lot, but we used to see Government Back Benchers standing up to say how much they had been winning out of levelling up so far. The reality, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy) said in her opening speech, is that even those winners, through the levelling up fund, the towns fund or the future high streets fund, are losers because of the cuts to their local authorities. She made those points very well.

My hon. Friends the Members for York Central (Rachael Maskell), for Sheffield, Hallam (Olivia Blake) and for Birkenhead (Mick Whitley) also made moving points about decent housing. I hope that we can feature that in Committee, because it is impossible for people to build a life and to build communities, to have that solid foundation to reach their potential and to help their family to reach theirs, if they are worried about their housing, or if their housing is of poor quality or a detriment to their health. We must aspire to much better for our fellow citizens.

Finally on the Labour Benches, I must refer to the contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Marsha De Cordova), and the points she made about London. Hon. Members on the Government Benches also said this, but it is important to understand that across every community there are pockets of deprivation. Levelling up fails if it becomes a conversation of north versus south or the rest of the country versus London. That does not serve anybody, and my commitment to her is that she will never see us do that.

There were an awful lot of very good contributions from those on the Government Benches, particularly those that majored on planning—I counted 27, and I think I got them all—but there were also good contributions in interventions on the Secretary of State and the shadow Secretary of State. For the moment, I think there was contentment that, broadly, the Secretary of State largely seemed to think that he could accommodate all those significant and strongly felt views about local decision making. We want to see that too. I think it will get harder. I say to the Minister, and I know this is his instinct, that he will have to bring people with him on this. There is inevitably a trade-off at some point between reaching the volumes we need to address our housing crisis and having respect for communities and local decision making. Nobody thinks that is easy, and that ought to be dealt with. We will have plenty of time in Committee to do that. If we are not going to do levelling up, we might as well do that in its stead.

To make a few points of my own, four months ago, the Secretary of State presented the levelling up White Paper to this House. After all the big promises and slogans, before elections and after, it offered little other than the usual: governing by press release, with the reality never quite matching up. The one thing in there was that levelling up, which, as the Prime Minister has reiterated, was defined as the core mission of this Government, would have 12 missions. The hon. Member for Burnley (Antony Higginbotham) made an excellent case for them, although I would gently say to him that they also served to highlight the failings of this Government over the past 12 years on education, housing and crime— 12 admissions of failure to cover 12 years of wasted time in Government.

[Antony Higginbotham]

One of those missions relates to healthcare. It was the Labour Government before 2010 who closed Burnley’s A&E. It was the same Labour Government who forced our schools to have new PFI buildings, which has seen money taken away from educating children and instead paying for expensive contracts. So the hon. Gentleman might just want to think about whether a Labour Government have all the answers.

[Alex Norris]

I will always think carefully about the contributions the hon. Gentleman makes, but I am afraid that he will struggle to win an argument with Labour on NHS investment. [Interruption.] Conservative Members are all back then—nice to see you. I will take you all on if you want. [Interruption.] Even the Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Harborough (Neil O’Brien) —but I shall save him for Committee.

On the 12 new levelling-up missions, which are the centrepiece of the White Paper, and so important to the Government that they want to place a statutory duty on Ministers to report on their progress—what a big and bold claim that is—we now see that they come with a rather crucial addendum, which is that, if the Government decide that they do not like them any more, or perhaps think that they will not meet them, they can just do away with them altogether: when they fail, they can move the goalposts. Measured by actions, I am afraid that that is how important those missions actually are to the Government, who cannot even commit themselves to them. In that sense, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan said, they are not worth the paper they are written on.

We are told today that those missions are a core part of, and a key moment in, levelling up this country. I find that hard to believe, for the reasons that I have stated. But if they are going to be so impactful that they will create the change on which there is, I think, a universally held view across those on all Benches, why is there no impact assessment? Why is there no impact assessment on regions either? I hope that the Minister will give a commitment that before we enter Committee we will have the chance to see that so that we can debate the facts of the matter.

Levelling up was supposed to be about getting all parts of the country firing on all cylinders, but yet again we do not see that. Another key example: where is the community power in this? If the levelling-up portion of the Bill is really about saying to people, “We want you to have greater control over the state of your community and its future”, why does that stop at a sub-regional level? That is still a very long distance away from communities. We will certainly seek to add to that in Committee, and I hope Ministers will be in listening mode on it, because there is a great deal of expectation beyond this place that we are going to see more devolution to communities. We want to see powers and funds devolved from Whitehall to town hall, and beyond, so that communities are empowered to make these decisions for themselves.

One of the things in the levelling-up section of the Bill that we are pleased to see is further devolution of power and all communities having the chance to access those highest levels of power. However, I cannot quite understand why that comes with the caveat that they must accept the Government’s preferred model, which is a Mayor. The message from the Government seems to be that they are willing to devolve power but only on their own terms. That does not feel like proper devolution. The hon. Member for Mansfield (Ben Bradley) and I frequently talk about devolution of power to Nottingham and Nottinghamshire. I agreed with much of what he said but, in our access to tier 3 powers, which we both want and is wanted universally across Nottingham and Nottinghamshire, I do not see why we should have to take a Mayor as well. I do not see how those two propositions are linked, and I have not heard anything in the debate that has moved me further on that.

The Minister will also, whether in closing or in Committee, need to address the important points made by the hon. Members for Gloucester (Richard Graham) and for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott) about provisions in the Bill that allow powers currently held by district councils to be drawn up from them to combined authority level without their consent. That is a really challenging provision that will not hold for much longer.

As I say, this Bill is not enough, but it is what is now in front of us, and we will seek in Committee to make it better. We will also, I warn the Minister in advance, help the Government by adding back into the Bill some previous Government commitments that are missing from it. I hope greatly that they will want to take them on.

Let me turn to the planning side of the Bill. We welcome planning reform. We want to see the building of genuinely affordable housing. We want communities with good services and thriving town centres. We are glad to see the back of some of the worst excesses of previous policy. This is a much better version than what was publicly announced a year-plus ago. But the reforms could go further to change the system to provide greater support for planning authorities, and to deliver more say and power back to communities. Again, we will seek to do that in Committee. I hope that in his closing remarks, the Minister for Housing might do slightly better than the Secretary of State did on the infrastructure levy. It is an area of significant interest that has come up in a number of colleagues’ contributions, and when the Secretary of State was pressed on it, he was unable to say at what level he thought the levy would be set. That will not do. I understand that that is a complex calculation, but the Opposition ought at least to have heard an assurance that it would not be less than current section 106 moneys, because I do not think that anyone has argued for less money for infrastructure. This “We will tell you later” approach does not work. We do not want to have to get through the whole Bill process only to be told that the level will be set in regulation later.

[Mr Betts]

I want to raise with my hon. Friend an issue about local democracy and local plans, which the hon. Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) mentioned. A local plan must be consistent with national planning policies, and correctly so. However, if there is a conflict between a local plan and national development management policy, national policy holds sway and is given priority in any determination. How can it be that a local plan can be drawn up in full consultation with the local community, but if the Secretary of State later decides to change the national policy, it will override the consulted-upon local plan?

[Alex Norris]

I thank my hon. Friend for that important point. There are 200 clauses in this Bill, so if there are 20 words in each, that is 4,000 words, give or take. On the planning side, however, only three words really matter: “to any extent”. They mean that the national plan overrides the local plan under any circumstances if that is what the Secretary of State wishes. I hope the Minister will say in summing up that he does not think that that is the right thing to do, that it is not the Government’s intention and that it will be changed in the Bill. I do not think that that can hold.

We will not seek to stand in the way of the Bill at this stage, but significant changes and additions will be necessary if it is to deliver the change that communities up and down the country are waiting for. After the long wait, it is no great surprise that the Bill is so symptomatic of the Government’s whole approach to levelling up—high on rhetoric, low on delivery. The Government just cannot seem to follow through and deliver properly on levelling up. Perhaps that is because deep down, they are not sure whether everyone on their side really believes in it. They are hamstrung by the Treasury—that is a matter of record—riven by division and drifting towards no defined point. But the Opposition feel this in our bones. It is why we are here, and we will fight tooth and nail to make sure that the Government do not waste this opportunity to deliver power back to the people and communities that we all represent.