Pension Schemes Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th January 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

1: Before Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Purpose of the Act(1) The purpose of this Act is to—(a) deliver higher and more sustainable returns for pension savers;(b) address fragmentation across the pensions sector;(c) improve transparency and comparability in value for money;(d) enable clearer and fairer communication with members;(e) support greater consistency across pension provision;(f) support innovative and flexible approaches to saving;(g) provide employers with greater clarity to support their employees’ pension provision;(h) enable responsible and innovative use of pension scheme surplus;(i) improve understanding of pension liabilities and costs for local authorities;(j) strengthen actuarial transparency and routes to challenge contribution rates in the LGPS.(2) The Secretary of State, and any other persons taking actions under the provisions of this Act, must have regard to the purpose specified in subsection (1).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment sets out the overarching purposes of the Act, including improving returns for pension savers, addressing fragmentation, strengthening value for money and transparency, supporting innovation and flexibility in pension provision, and improving outcomes for members, employers, and local authorities.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to open today’s debate and to begin what I am sure will be five engaging and constructive days of scrutiny on this Bill in Committee. The proposed new purpose clause, in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is not an attempt to rehearse the arguments advanced at Second Reading. Rather, it is intended to address a specific issue arising from the way in which the Bill has been framed and from the legislative approach that the Government have chosen to adopt.

The debate I seek to initiate is a principled one about legislative clarity and certainty, particularly in the context of what is, by any reasonable definition, a framework Bill. We believe that the Bill, as currently drafted, is light on detail and relies heavily on delegated powers. This has inevitably left your Lordships debating intentions, aspirations and hypothetical outcomes, rather than the Government’s settled policy. In those circumstances, is it not all the more important that Parliament is clear on the face of the legislation about what it actually intends to achieve?

The purpose clause amendment therefore intends to establish an overarching statement of intent, setting out the objectives against which the Bill and the regulations made under it should be understood and scrutinised. Where detailed provision is deferred to secondary legislation, such a statement provides Parliament, regulators and stakeholders with a clear point of reference. Without it, how are we to assess whether the powers being taken are exercised consistently with the will of Parliament, rather than merely within the scope of ministerial discretion?

More broadly, the amendment invites the House to reflect on whether Parliament is being asked to confer wide-ranging powers without sufficient clarity as to how they are intended to be used. At what point does flexibility begin to shade into uncertainty? How can proper legislative certainty be maintained when substantive policy choices are deferred, potentially amended repeatedly and then removed from direct parliamentary scrutiny? If there were an alternative procedural route that allowed the House to engage meaningfully with these questions, we would of course be willing to consider it. However, in the absence of such a mechanism, is it not reasonable to seek to debate these matters through a proposed new purpose clause, which would allow the House to test the Government’s intent within the normal amending stages of the Bill?

This concern is particularly acute in relation to value for money. Much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will ultimately stand or fall on the effectiveness of the value-for-money framework. Yet the provisions before us are thin and largely skeletal, despite the central role that the framework is expected to play. How can Parliament properly assess the merits of this approach when so much turns on detail that has yet to be set out?

I say at the outset that we are supportive of the value-for-money framework in principle, but its success will depend almost entirely on the detail of its design, the consistency of its application across schemes and the robustness of its enforcement. Without greater clarity on these points, how are trustees, regulators and members to understand the standards against which they will be judged?

That leads me to a wider question about the long-term purpose of the Bill. How do the Government envisage the pensions landscape to look like in 10, 15 or even 20 years’ time? Is the objective consolidation, greater scale, improved outcomes for savers or some combination of all three? How will we know whether this legislation has succeeded in delivering that vision?

We wish to engage not only with the immediate legislative mechanisms but with the broader strategic direction that underpins them. We fully accept that legislation must allow Ministers a degree of flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, but flexibility without a clear, articulated destination risks leaving Parliament and the industry uncertain about the direction of travel. Is it unreasonable to ask for the House to be told not only what powers are being taken but to what end they are intended to be used? It is in that spirit that this purpose clause has been tabled and I very much look forward to the debate that I hope it will provoke.

I wish to return briefly to the question of mandation, which, although I have not directly mentioned it, is an underlying issue in the Bill. It illustrates precisely why questions of purpose, process and limitation matter so greatly in the context of a framework Bill of this kind. We will of course turn to this in greater detail later in Committee but, as we are discussing the purpose of the Bill in this clause, it would be remiss of me not to mention it here at the outset as one of the most contentious provisions in the Bill—as we heard, broadly around the House, at Second Reading.

As drafted, the Bill establishes a broad enabling framework but leaves a great deal of substantive policy to be determined later through regulation. That approach inevitably creates uncertainty. It also places a heightened responsibility on Parliament to ensure that any powers taken are clearly bounded, carefully justified and firmly anchored to a stated purpose. In that context, we do not consider there to be a compelling case that asset allocation mandates are necessary to increase productive investment in the United Kingdom. Indeed, mandation risks cutting across the fundamental principle that investment decisions should be taken in the best interests of savers by trustees and providers who are properly accountable for the outcomes. I am sure that we will hear more about these arguments in Committee.

When the Bill itself provides only a skeletal framework, the absence of clarity around how such powers might be used becomes all the more concerning. If any future Government were ever minded to pursue mandation, it is essential that any such power be tightly limited, that savers’ outcomes are clearly protected and that asset allocation decisions are insulated as far as possible from political cycles and short-term pressures. Investment decisions should remain with those charged with fiduciary responsibility and not be directed by Ministers, however well intentioned. Those safeguards cannot simply be assumed; in a framework Bill, they must be explicit.

Moreover, the case for mandation is further weakened by the existence of credible and constructive alternative routes to unlocking greater levels of UK investment. Industry participants, including Phoenix Group, have identified a number of areas where policy reform could make a meaningful difference without recourse to compulsion. Government institutions such as the National Wealth Fund and Great British Energy could play a significant role by aligning guarantee products with insurers’ matching adjustment requirements, by engaging institutional investors earlier so that projects are structured to meet long-term investment needs and by continuing collaboration with the ABI Investment Delivery Forum to deliver investable infrastructure pipelines.

Similarly, the Mansion House Accord, building on the 2023 compact, has already driven tangible industry action. In our view, the priority now should be delivery, rather than the creation of new and potentially far-reaching powers. That includes implementing a robust value-for-money framework with standardised metrics; introducing minimum default fund size requirements, whether £25 billion or £10 billion, with a credible growth plan; and aligning the defined contribution charge cap with the Pensions Regulator’s approach by excluding performance fees where appropriate.

More broadly still, stronger capital markets are essential if the United Kingdom is to attract both domestic and international investment. This includes supporting the work of the Capital Markets Industry Taskforce, exploring measures to foster a stronger home bias in UK equities, considering whether stamp duty on share transactions is acting as a drag on competitiveness, and examining targeted tax incentives for pension fund investment in UK infrastructure. Ultimately, rather than mandating investment, policy should focus on understanding why UK investment has lagged. That requires serious engagement with questions of market structure, regulatory design, the quality of investment pipelines and the underlying risk-return characteristics of UK assets. Mandation risks treating the symptoms rather than addressing the causes.

I look forward to the Minister’s response. I make no apology for laying out certain aspects that I believe fit with the purpose of the Bill. However, as I said at the outset, I hope that we have a productive and interesting Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to be here. Although for a while I was feeling a bit lonely, I very much welcome my noble friends; what we do not make up in numbers, I am sure my friends will more than make up for in the quality of their contributions. I declare an interest as a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries.

It is worth at this stage spelling out that I have spent a lifetime advising people about pensions. I was the TUC’s pensions officer for a number of years. I was also a partner in a leading firm of consulting actuaries, and I worked for a number of years with a scheme actuaries certificate undertaking scheme valuations. In terms of sheer experience, I can fairly say that this is unique to noble Members of this House. I will not go on at length on future occasions, except when it is directly relevant.

The noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, declared his intention to avoid repeating a Second Reading speech—it is arguable as to whether he achieved that intention—but, in a sense, I welcome the opportunity to look at the Bill as a whole. While I support the Bill and I support my noble friends—there are some really good measures in here—the text underlying the opposition amendment suggests that we have a pensions system in chronically bad condition.

It suggests that returns are inadequate, that the system is fragmented and that it lacks transparency, with people unable to assess what they are getting. It provides inadequate communications. It is inconsistent across the different forms of provision. It prevents, or makes hard, innovative and flexible solutions to the problems that are faced. It needs to provide greater clarity for employers. It currently does not achieve responsible and innovative use of pension surpluses. To me, this suggests a system at risk of chronic failure.

To be honest, I accept those criticisms because underlying this system is the personal pension revolution introduced by the Conservative Government 40 years ago, which has proved to be unfit for purpose. We are having to make all these changes because of the failure of the system that the Conservative Government introduced. We need these changes because personal pensions did not work out. Collective provision is the answer to decent pension provision, and the Bill supports and develops collective provision and moves across this idea that everyone can have their own pot which they look after for themselves. I oppose the amendment and look forward to further discussions on the individual issues as they arise.

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[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for introducing his amendment, and all noble Lords who have spoken. It is a particular delight to hear from so many colleagues so early in Committee.

I should begin by saying two things. First, I am a member of the parliamentary pension scheme, so I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for his service and urge him to give the scheme even greater attentiveness in future; I would be very grateful for that. Secondly, I am about to disappoint most Members of the Committee, but I may as well start as I mean to go on. Many of the points made and questions asked will come up in subsequent Committee days—that is what Committee is for—so I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not go into the detail of how surplus operates, how value for money operates or how asset allocation will work; I will come back to all of those. I should probably apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, because I cannot promise to go back to Star Wars figurines, but I will try to pick up most of the rest of the points at some stage.

The Bill delivers vital reforms to strengthen the UK pensions system, safeguarding the financial future of around 20 million savers while driving long-term economic growth. The Bill focuses on improving value and efficiency for workers’ pension savings, with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement. These measures will accelerate the shift towards a pensions landscape with fewer, larger and better-governed schemes that deliver for both members and the wider economy.

To support market consolidation, the Bill introduces superfunds, megafunds and Local Government Pension Scheme pools, creating scale and resilience. The value-for-money framework will ensure that schemes provide the best outcomes for savers, while guided retirement provisions will help members when accessing their savings. Other measures in the Bill will enable pension schemes to operate more effectively by streamlining governance, improving transparency and reducing unnecessary complexity. The reforms delivered through the Bill will create a more efficient, resilient pension landscape; they will also lay the foundation for the Pensions Commission to examine outcomes for pensioners and set out how to develop a fair and sustainable system, ultimately benefiting both individual savers and the UK economy.

To achieve these ambitions, the Bill makes a number of essential changes to the framework of law relating to private pension schemes and the LGPS, rather than pursuing a single overarching objective. To insert a purpose clause could cause legal uncertainty as a court could assume that a provision included in a Bill was intended to have some additional operative effect. The practical effect of the requirement to have regard to the purpose of the Bill, as expressed in this proposed new clause, is unclear.

The purposes of individual provisions are instead made clear through their drafting and the accompanying explanatory material, including the Explanatory Notes and the impact assessment. There is no need for an additional new clause at the start of the Bill setting out the purposes, as this is covered elsewhere more appropriately. This approach is in keeping with established practice; for example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was twice the size of the Pension Schemes Bill. Like the Bill, it deals with a complex legal landscape and made a number of separate and necessary changes to the law relating to financial services and markets. There is no purpose provision in that Act, just as no overarching purpose clause has been included in the Pension Schemes Bill. We will return to matters related to secondary legislation in the debate on a subsequent group of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.

I will pick up the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, about this being a framework Bill; he used that as an argument for a purpose clause. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that, if he has not seen a purpose clause debate, he has not been in many debates in the Chamber recently, because they have appeared; unfortunately and inadvertently, they mostly resulted in long Second Reading debates at the start of many other pieces of legislation. I stress that that was neither the purpose nor the result here, but many of those debates have happened.

We do not consider this to be a framework Bill. The noble Viscount mentioned the idea of setting legislation now and setting policy later. Manifestly, that is not what is happening. The Bill clearly sets out the policy decisions and the parameters within which delegated powers must operate. It brings together a broad package of reforms in pensions into a single piece of legislation. Many of those reforms build on long-established statutory regimes, where Parliament has historically set the policy in primary legislation and provided for detailed measures that will apply to schemes to be set out in regulations. The policy direction is clearly set out here.

As we all know, the successful implementation of pensions depends heavily on trustees, schemes, providers and regulators, which makes engagement and operational detail essential rather than optional. There has been extensive consultation and there will be further extensive consultation. I do not think that this matter will be solved any further by adding a purpose clause.

Finally, the Long Title of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was also described in neutral terms—

“to make provision about the regulation of financial services and markets”—

rather than providing a practically unworkable narrative explanation of the purpose of that legislation. The same applies here.

While I welcome the comments and look forward to returning to many of them in our debates, I hope that I have made the case not only for the Bill as a whole but as to why it is unnecessary and unhelpful to add a purpose clause. I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this relatively short debate. Many of the points raised strongly reinforce the view that my noble friend and I are seeking to advance: that this is indeed a framework Bill, which in its current form would benefit from greater explanation, greater articulation of purpose and more fully developed safeguards. I believe that the debate has drawn out views on some of those listed purposes and that it has been helpful at the outset of Committee.

As my noble friend Lord Trenchard said, it is complicated—that adds to my argument. I was very grateful to have the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I am grateful to the Minister for her response and for beginning to provide some additional context around the Government’s intentions. It has been helpful up to a point, but I am not quite sure why she thinks a purpose clause would provide some uncertainty.

I remain of the view that a broader and more holistic articulation of where the Government would like the pensions system to be in five, 10 and 15 years’ time is still lacking. In fairness, that is likely to extend beyond what the Minister can reasonably be expected to provide today; I understand that. I accept her valid point that Committee is for delving into the detail of these matters, which we will be doing.

I will pick up just a few points from the debate. First, my noble friend Lord Fuller is absolutely right that we need a purpose clause to inspire people, particularly young people, to save for the future. That is a very valid point; it levels us, or brings us down to base, in terms of what we are trying to do here with this complicated Bill.

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Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, leave out subsections (2) to (8)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe why the Secretary of State requires the power in subsection (2) to direct scheme managers to participate in, or withdraw from, particular asset pool companies, given the need to preserve their independence and fiduciary duty to act in members’ best interests.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group begin a series of groups related to the Local Government Pension Scheme. We start with amendments that seek to improve what is already in the Bill. However, as later groups will demonstrate, the Bill remains light on the LGPS.

I am sure that the Minister and other noble Lords will have noticed that we have de-grouped a number of our amendments ahead of today, where they are most relevant to this group. I shall briefly explain our reasoning at the outset. We have no intention of frustrating the passage of the Bill. Rather, we have de-grouped those amendments where we felt it would facilitate a clearer and more focused discussion, enabling noble Lords to put more targeted questions to the Minister without requiring her, or indeed other noble Lords in Committee, to traverse an undue amount of technical detail in a single debate. I hope that our intentions on this point have been made clear.

I do not accept the characterisation that this is simply a private pensions Bill—the Local Government Pension Scheme is clearly included within its scope—nor do I accept the argument that addressing the problems of the LGPS is either too complicated or not a priority. If we are legislating on pensions, we must be prepared to deal properly with the LGPS. I will refrain at this stage from going into the specifics, but later we will bring forward six additional proposed new clauses about the LGPS aimed at making the scheme operate in a more coherent, transparent and practical way. We very much hope that the Minister will engage seriously with these proposals. They go to the root causes of the problems facing the LGPS: how contribution rates are set; how these rates can be challenged; why transparency matters; how opacity undermines confidence in the system; why valuations and methodologies are so important; and, crucially, why many employers are currently getting a bad deal.

However, let us begin with what is already before us in the Bill and why it must be properly probed. These amendments give rise to specific and important questions that we wish to put to the Minister. They concern not only the intent of the provisions but how they will operate in practice, how they will interact with existing LGPS governance and funding arrangements, and whether they genuinely address the problems that they are purported to solve. Clarity on these points is essential if we are to ensure that the Bill strengthens, rather than inadvertently weakens, confidence in the Local Government Pension Scheme.

The first amendment in this group, Amendment 2, would remove subsections (2) to (8) of Clause 1 in order to probe the breadth and necessity of the powers being taken by the Secretary of State. As drafted, Clause 1 goes far beyond enabling regulation. It gives the Secretary of State the power to direct individual scheme managers to participate in or withdraw from specific asset pool companies and to issue binding directions not only to those scheme managers but to the asset pool companies themselves. Trustees have clear and well-established fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of their members and beneficiaries. Decisions about investment structure, risk, performance and value for money are central to those duties. The question this amendment seeks to pose is therefore simple: why does the Secretary of State require the power to override those fiduciary judgments by direction?

The Government have already made clear their policy objective of encouraging greater pooling. What is not yet clear is why compulsion, backed by direction-making powers of this breadth, is considered necessary. I am also concerned about the precedent this sets. Once Ministers have the power to dictate where pension assets must be pooled, it is not difficult to imagine future pressure, real or perceived, for an overinvestment strategy, asset allocation or wider policy objectives, even where these may conflict with members’ best interests.

The amendment therefore invites the Minister to explain, first, what safeguards will exist to ensure that any direction does not conflict with the fiduciary duty of scheme managers to their members. Secondly, over what timeframe will a scheme manager be expected to comply with a direction to enter or leave an asset pool? How will this align with long-term investment strategies? Thirdly, have the Government consulted the Border To Coast Pensions Partnership and other LGPS pools about the potential impact of this power? Fourthly, does the Minister recognise that forced entry or exit from asset pools could disrupt investment strategy, reduce stability and deter private sector partnerships? Have the Government considered this risk?

I am afraid there are a lot of questions, but they are worth putting. How do the Government propose to deal with the risks of cross-subsidisation of employers with very different funding positions that are merged into the same asset pool by direction of the Secretary of State? What safeguards will be put in place to ensure that deficit management remains fair and proportionate across employers after such a merger? Will administering authorities be given the ability to ring-fence liabilities or negotiate separate funding arrangements if they are compelled to merge? Have the Government undertaken any modelling of the financial consequences of merging employers with very different funding positions? If so, will this analysis be published? Can the Minister set out what these prescribed circumstances might be?

I appreciate the letter the Minister sent to noble Lords last week, in which she set out the Government’s recognition of the importance of fiduciary duty. I recognise that and I am sure the whole Committee would therefore welcome some clarity on this question and how these powers can operate while satisfying that duty.

I appreciate that I have asked a lot of questions of the Minister. I do not expect a reply to them all now, but will she write to me to address any points she is unable to speak to today, copying in those who are in Committee today? As she will be aware, these questions are being asked by the industry as well as by noble Lords in Committee, and it is important that we get proper responses to them. This is a probing amendment, intended to elicit reassurance and clarity. Asset pooling can and should be done well, but it must be done in a way that respects trustee independence and preserves confidence in the governance of the Local Government Pension Scheme.

The second amendment in this group, Amendment 4, would remove Clause 2(2)(b), not because we are necessarily opposed to asset pooling but to probe why the Bill places a clear and binding destination in primary legislation while saying almost nothing about the journey required to get there. As drafted, Clause 2 requires the vast majority of Local Government Pension Scheme assets to be held and managed by asset pool companies, with the only acknowledgment of the practical complexities of that transition being a brief reference to

“transitional arrangements permitted by the regulations”.

We are talking about the transfer of very substantial sums across multiple funds with differing asset mixes, contractual arrangements and liquidity profiles. The question that this amendment poses is straightforward: why are transitional arrangements not set out in the Bill, even at a high level? Parliament is being asked to approve a mandatory structure without being shown how legacy assets, illiquid investments, existing mandates and contractual obligations will be unwound or migrated, and over what timescale. That is a significant delegation of policy detail to secondary legislation, particularly given the scale of assets involved.

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how the Government envisage this transition being managed in practice, what safeguards will be in place to prevent forced or value-destructive transfers and how scheme managers can be confident that they will not be required to move assets in a way that conflicts with their fiduciary duties. The approach set out in our amendment would avoid ambiguity, provide greater clarity for scheme members and reassure taxpayers that pension funds are being managed in a consistent and accountable manner.

Local government pension schemes vary significantly in size, resources and operational approach and without clear statutory provision, there is a risk that practice could diverge across schemes. Given that pension funds involve very substantial sums of public money, it is appropriate that the most fundamental rules governing their management are set out in primary legislation rather than left solely to regulations. Doing so would ensure a higher level of parliamentary scrutiny and durability and help guard against the risk of standards being diluted in future through ministerial discretion.

This is also a probing amendment intended to elicit reassurance. We are clear, and I know the Minister appreciates, that confidence in the system depends on clarity about the transition, not simply an end state written into primary legislation. I hope she will take this opportunity to address that point today.

My Amendment 5 would remove Clause 2(2)(c). To be clear, this is not because we are opposed to local or place-based investment. Rather, it is a probing amendment designed to explore how the Government envisage the relationship between scheme managers and so-called strategic authorities operating in practice. Clause 2 introduces a new statutory duty requiring scheme managers to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. However, the Bill does not define what is meant by “appropriate” or set out the process by which this co-operation is to occur, the weight to be given to the priorities of strategic authorities or how disagreements are to be resolved. This vagueness will create a degree of ambiguity which could prove problematic in practice, particularly where different actors may have very different interpretations of what constitutes an appropriate investment.

One obvious question, therefore, is whether such opportunities are intended to be those defined by a fund’s investment strategy statement. As the Minister will know, the investment strategy statement sets out the fund’s objectives, asset allocation, risk management framework, ESG considerations and approach to pooling. If “appropriate” is not clearly anchored to that framework, there is a risk that scheme managers, strategic authorities and Ministers could each apply the term in rather different ways. This matters because scheme managers are trustees, bound by fiduciary duties to act in the best financial interests of scheme members. Strategic authorities, by contrast, have mandates to pursue local growth, regeneration and wider place-based objectives. Those aims may often align, but they will not always do so. Without clarity, there is a risk of politicisation, however unintended, whereby investments that are politically attractive or locally popular, such as particular infrastructure projects, are promoted despite not meeting the risk and return criteria appropriate for pension funds.

This amendment therefore seeks to probe how the Government will ensure that the statutory duty to co-operate does not place scheme managers under implicit pressure to prioritise wider government or regional objectives over their core fiduciary obligations. Is this duty intended to be advisory or directive? Will scheme managers be expected to justify decisions not to invest in opportunities advanced by strategic authorities? What safeguards will exist to ensure that pension investment strategies remain firmly anchored in members’ best financial interests?

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is very helpful. When I write to the noble Baroness, I will certainly make sure that we address the point around independent advisers. I appreciate the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asking for that kind of clarification, so my written remarks will address that point.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his responses; I am also grateful for the debate we have had on this group of amendments.

I am grateful to all noble Lords beyond me who have asked further questions, particularly in the latter stage of this short debate. It is fair to say—I am saying this against myself—that, with so many questions having been directed originally to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, but applying to both Ministers, it would be extremely helpful to have a full letter with the answers. This has been an important debate; some clear issues have been spoken to, and answers are required.

I will start by picking up some points made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. He gave the impression—indeed, he said this; I cannot remember his expression—that I was being negative about the Local Government Pension Scheme. I reiterate the point made by my noble friend Lord Fuller: the Local Government Pension Scheme is efficient and is very much a British success story. In addition to that, my noble friend Lord Fuller set out—very eloquently, I thought—the concerns around both the complexities in the Bill and the unintended consequences. There are two clear sides to this. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on the success aspect; I want to be quite clear that he knows my position on this.

What unites the amendments in this group is not opposition to reform, nor hostility to pooling local investment or good governance. Rather, it is a concern about how far the Bill reaches into areas that have traditionally, and rightly, been the responsibility of trustees exercising fiduciary judgment. The noble Lord, Lord Katz, said that intervention by government is very much a last resort. I accept what he says but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked—very tellingly—are the Government best placed to direct? Further, she made an interesting point on whether the £400 billion should be part of a sovereign wealth fund. That just shows that it is worth having this sort of debate on this important area of the Bill.

Across these clauses, the Bill moves from setting a framework to conferring powers of direction, compulsion and prescription; direction over participation in asset pools; compulsion towards a particular end state without a clear transition; duties to co-operate with strategic authorities without defined boundaries; and regulation-making powers that reach into advisory pathways and the content of investment strategies themselves. I feel from the debate that each of these elements raises the same underlying question: how will these powers be exercised in a way that is genuinely compatible with fiduciary duty, rather than merely being stated to be so?

With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I also acknowledge that there is much work to be done in this area.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I will speak simply to support the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. It seems to me that there is an extraordinarily wide use of delegated powers in the Bill and, for all the reasons that he set out, we should look at that again. If the Government do not feel able to make a change to respond to his very persuasive points, we should at least have a full list of every delegated power that will be used, what the plans are in each case, and perhaps some specimen regulations of the kind that we have seen in some of the Department for Business and Trade legislation.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments focuses on scrutiny, clarity and responsibility, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for setting out the merits of the super-affirmative procedures and their historical context. It was interesting to hear what he had to say.

As the Committee will have seen, the provisions to which these super-affirmative procedures would pertain allow Ministers, through secondary legislation, to impose requirements and prohibitions on scheme managers, to direct participation in asset pool companies, to require withdrawal from them and to impose obligations on those companies themselves. These are significant powers, exercised in an area that is highly technical, operationally sensitive and financially consequential.

This is precisely the sort of context in which unintended consequences can arise, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. These clauses are dense, complex and interconnected. They interact with fiduciary duties, local accountability, financial regulation and long-term investment strategy. Small changes in drafting or approach could have material effects on risk, returns, governance or market behaviour.

That is why I am glad that the amendment places particular emphasis on representations. The ability for Parliament, and expert stakeholders, to examine draft regulations, to make these representations, and for those representations to be meaningfully considered before regulations are finalised, is essential to the responsible exercise of these powers.

The super-affirmative procedure would ensure that Parliament is not simply asked to approve a finished product but is given the opportunity to understand the Government’s intent, to hear from those with deep expertise in pensions, asset management and regulation, and to see how concerns raised have been addressed. That is especially important where the primary legislation quite deliberately leaves so much to be filled in by regulation, as I explained earlier in Committee.

I hope the Minister will engage constructively with this point and explain why the Government believe the ordinary affirmative procedure provides sufficient scrutiny in this case, given the scale, complexity and potential impact of the powers being taken. I appreciate the short debate on this matter.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for introducing his amendments, and to all noble Lords who have spoken. This gives us an opportunity to talk about how best to balance the way we structure matters between primary and secondary legislation. However, the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would significantly expand the way Parliament scrutinises regulations made under the Bill. I understand why he would want to do that, but his proposals would introduce a level of rigidity into the process that is not only unusual in this area but obviously would be markedly more elaborate than the Bill currently provides for.

The super-affirmative procedure is generally reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as legislative reform orders or remedial orders under the Human Rights Act. I am not aware of any examples of it being applied to pensions regulations, but I am very open to being advised on that. In our view, it would be disproportionate to the nature of the powers conferred by the Bill, and I will explain why.

I will look first at Clause 1. The coalition Government introduced the Public Service Pensions Act 2013. Through that, Parliament established the way it would go about governing the making of scheme regulations. It was a comprehensive and well-tested scrutiny framework. It still operates today, including where new powers were created, for example, by the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022. The framework created by that Act provides extensive safeguards, including mandatory consultation, enhanced consultation if changes have or might have retrospective effect, and Treasury consent. Introducing a substantially more onerous procedure for regulations under Clause 1, as proposed by Amendment 3, would sit uneasily alongside that established approach.

There are also practical considerations. Administering authorities and asset pool companies are preparing for regulations to be introduced shortly after the Bill has passed its parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have already published draft regulations on the LGPS measure. They were open to public consultation, which has recently closed. Adding a 30-day pre-scrutiny stage through the super-affirmative procedure would clearly extend that timetable and risk creating more uncertainty at a critical moment for those involved in implementing this.

Amendment 221 would allow either House to require that any affirmative regulations made under this Bill be subject to the super-affirmative process. That would already represent a significant expansion of parliamentary involvement compared with the long-standing approach to pensions.

Amendment 222 would go further still. It does not simply describe how the super-affirmative procedure would operate in this context; it would create a new statutory scrutiny process, more prescriptive and more inflexible than the mechanisms Parliament has used to date for pension regulations—or indeed most regulations. It would require a fixed 30-day scrutiny period in any case where either House decided to impose the new procedure. It would mandate a committee report, even for minor or technical regulations, and would prevent regulations being laid until Ministers had responded formally to all representations. The result would be a significant departure from the flexible way Parliament normally manages delegated legislation.

I hear the concerns the noble Lord has expressed about the way Parliament deals with secondary legislation, but scrutiny procedures are normally determined by the House through its practices and Standing Orders. Replacing those arrangements with a rigid statutory framework of this kind for this Bill would set a far-reaching precedent for delegated legislation more broadly, extending well beyond the requirements of this Bill.

I would submit that such a process would also make it harder for Parliament to focus scrutiny on the most significant instruments and would slow down the making of regulations in areas where timely and predictable implementation is crucial for funds, administering authorities and scheme members.

A certain amount of this comes down to whether the Committee accepts that the level of delegated powers is appropriate. I fully understand that the noble Lord does not. I disagree and I will tell him why. In answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, in the previous group I said that the Government do not regard this as a framework or skeleton Bill, because it sets out clearly the policy decisions and parameters within which the delegated powers must operate. The Bill brings together a broad package of reforms. Many of those reforms build on long-established statutory regimes set out by previous Governments—Governments of all persuasions, as well as previous Labour Governments—in which Parliament has historically set the policy in primary legislation and provided for the detailed measures that will apply to schemes to be set out in regulations.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked for a full list of delegated powers. My department produced a very detailed delegated powers memorandum, which went through all the delegated powers at some length and in some detail, explaining what they meant. I would be very happy to direct the noble Baroness to that if that would be helpful.

One of the key questions the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked was: why are there so many delegated powers? Our view is that this is not out of kilter with other similar transformative pension Bills. We counted 119 delegated powers covering 11 major topics plus some smaller topics. For example, in the Pension Schemes Act 2021, there were almost 100 delegated powers covering three major topics. In the Pensions Act 1995, which was a transformative Bill, there were approximately 150 delegated powers.

This Bill brings together a number of distinct pensions measures in a single legislative vehicle, many of which amend or build on existing regimes that are already heavily reliant on secondary legislation for their detailed operation. In many areas, we are simply reflecting a similar framework to previous pensions legislation or amending it, so there is continuity rather than a step change.

A crucial point I want to lodge is that pensions policy is not delivered directly by government. Implementation depends on trustees, pension schemes, pension providers, administrators and regulators who have to design systems, processes and administration that work in practice. That level of detailed operational design can begin only once there is sufficient certainty that legislation will proceed. As noble Lords who have worked in or with industry will recognise, before there is sufficient certainty, industry cannot reasonably commit the significant time and resources needed to work through complex delivery arrangements where the legal basis may still change or not materialise. Delegated powers therefore allow the Government to set the policy framework in primary legislation and then work with those responsible for delivery to ensure that the technical detail is workable in practice, rather than attempting to prescribe detailed operational rules in primary legislation. That reflects established pensions practice and good lawmaking in a complex and fast-moving regulatory environment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This is an important, basic matter. Directing investment by asset types raises difficulties. If pension funds or individuals knew which assets were going to go up, there would be no problem, but there is no guarantee of that, so, my question to the Minister is: are pension funds primarily long-term investors acting for members or instruments of policy delivery? The answer matters a lot for confidence in Local Government Pension Scheme governance. I am all for productive investment, but it can be a slippery slope if you get it wrong. I wonder whether the Minister can give us some guidance on that.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for her two amendments in this group, for the remarkably brief discussion that has been prompted and for the opportunity that they provided for her and us to probe the Minister on these important issues. Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will not rehearse the arguments at length, as I touched on them in some detail earlier. However, I wish briefly to reiterate what I regard as a central and non-negotiable principle: the Local Government Pension Scheme exists first and foremost as a fiduciary vehicle. Scheme managers are under a clear legal duty to act in the best financial interests of members and beneficiaries, and that duty must remain paramount.

Against that background, Amendment 13 raises a particularly important question, one that has been put to us repeatedly by industry representatives from a wide range of backgrounds; namely, what type of assets do the Government have in mind in which funds should be directed to invest? I think this is the essential argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. Is the intention to focus on infrastructure, debt servicing or supporting new towns and similar developments? The noble Baroness also raised the point of what percentage should be invested in UK assets. As she pointed out, perhaps 25% should be invested in UK growth assets, and, therefore, what is the definition of growth? Lots of questions arise from the noble Baroness’s amendments.

I recognise, and I think the noble Baroness alluded to this, that we will return to this issue in greater detail when we come to consider the reserve power, but like the noble Baroness, I wish to flag this matter at this stage as it has been a theme this afternoon on this first day of Committee and a live and pressing question not only for us but, I reiterate, for the many third-party stakeholders with whom we have engaged.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for tabling these amendments. I cannot speak on behalf of the whole Committee, but I would say that it is most people’s intention to encourage greater investment in UK assets. Growth is certainly the number one mission of this Government. If you did not realise that, you have probably been hiding under a rock these past few months and years.

These amendments would direct LGPS funds to make investments in certain UK asset classes. Supporting UK growth by making investments in such assets, in tandem with seeking appropriate returns, is a valuable function of the scheme and the noble Baroness is right to be interested in this important topic. As I have mentioned, the LGPS already invests around 30% of assets in the UK. Greater consolidation will build on this success story, as the pools will have greater capacity and expertise to invest domestically.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, now I am really worried—every time I have followed the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, I have tried to amplify the points he has made.

I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on her masterful exposition of a technical piece of detail; she brought it down to the ground and made it alive. She put her finger on it when many of us have not been able to put our finger on what makes us so uncomfortable about the Bill. We know that it is not right. When you get meddlesome Ministers fiddling around in stuff where they do not really know what they are doing, there is not just co-operation but—as the noble Baroness exposed—a connivance and a cartel. She explained how those two things have led to conflicts of interest; there will be a lot of Cs in the words I am about to use. It is anti-competitive, and it has restricted choice.

The noble Baroness has wedged open the door because, later on in the Bill, there are provisions—I will not defer to them too much now—for the existing operators to lock out new entrants. I was instinctively uncomfortable with that but, now, I am worried because there seems to be a guiding hand here to reduce choice, stifle innovation and damage the reputation of the City. I do not think that that was purposeful, but this is what happens when you get a Bill that is so overly complicated and takes people away from saving for their long-term retirement.

I nearly feel sorry for the noble Lord, Lord Katz, because I have never seen such an evisceration. I am sure he is going to defend it and do the best he can. But what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has shown is that it is rather like the Chancellor, who now says she had no idea what was really happening when she put the rates on the pubs. It was a mistake, and she did not have all the information to hand. While I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said we will come back to this on another day, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, because she has given an opportunity—a breathing space or an air gap—for the Government to now go back to look at this in more detail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, also laid out the import of this amendment when she said that one-third of all the FTSE 350 is engaged in this. I expect the Minister in winding to say, for a third time, that growth is the number one priority of this Government. Let us hope he does say that because, if he does, he will either accept this amendment here and now, or give an undertaking that, at some stage before we get to this in the main part of the debate, it will be accepted and we can move on.

It is not just casting a shadow over the LGPS and the parts of Yorkshire which are disinvesting; it is accidentally casting a shadow over the City of London, which is the world’s second or third largest financial centre. It must be stopped. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has done the Committee and our nation a great service in the last half an hour, and she is to be congratulated for it.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I was due to give a very short speech. It is still short, but it has got slightly longer in terms of the content of this debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, for tabling Amendment 10, which we welcome and which I understand to be a sensible and proportionate safeguarding measure. I want to go a bit further because there were two particularly powerful speeches, in particular that from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

As we read it, the amendment seeks to ensure that investment strategies cannot be used to favour particular investment vehicles over comparable or competing alternatives. In doing so, it would help to guard against strategies becoming a back-door means of directing capital, rather than serving their proper purpose as high-level statements of investment policy.

That distinction matters. Investment strategies should guide objectives, risk appetite and approach and not hardwire specific vehicles or delivery mechanisms into statute or regulation. Preventing the embedding of such preferences also reduces the risk of political or regulatory pressure or—I will use the word—interference, being reflected in investment strategy documents and helps to preserve trustee independence and proper decision-making. Although it is a serious subject, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, gave us a succinct, well-argued speech with her bucket wrapper analogy. She gave a hard-hitting speech with some important questions which I hope the Minister will be able to answer.

One issue that has been made clear today, which has arisen in a number of debates, and was encapsulated in this short debate, is the opaqueness of “government direction”. I was very taken by the equally hard-hitting speech from my noble friend Lord Fuller. The confusion—by the way, the C is for confusion, just to add that in—is over the responsibility with the grey areas, notably in respect to the understandings, or not, from the Mansion House Accord and those who were the signatories.

One question to ask is whether those signatories now realise what they have got themselves into, or what their understanding was then and what it is now. I ask that as an open question, particularly in relation to the inclusion or exclusion of different types of investment. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, focused particularly on open-ended or close-ended. There is a lot of emphasis here. Most unusually, I was in total agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I am not sure that that has happened with me in the past.

To conclude, we therefore welcome the intent of Amendment 10. It would be very helpful if the Minister could indicate whether—and if so, how—the Bill as currently drafted already guards against this risk. It is a crucial question and relates to all the questions that have been asked. What assurances can be given that investment strategies will not be used to prescribe or favour particular investment vehicles in practice?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, for this amendment. I agree with them that funds in the LGPS should not be specifying preferences between similar investment vehicles in their investment strategies. I fear that the rest of my response may well disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and—though perhaps not to such a great extent—the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I say in passing to the Committee that it is always good to hear consensus breaking out, even if it rather gets to the horseshoe theory of politics when it is my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. But let us try to end today’s Committee session on a positive note.

I will now go into the detail. Under our reforms, decisions on implementation of strategies, including selection of appropriate vehicles and managers, will be made by the LGPS pools, which will have the capacity and expertise to deliver the benefits of scale that we have discussed. It is the Government’s view that the draft regulations are already clear in that respect. This will be supported by guidance, setting out that investment manager selection is solely the responsibility of the pool. LGPS pools will make the decision on whether to invest through external managers and which managers to use, and there is nothing whatever to prevent them using investment trusts should they consider it beneficial.

This is where the space for disappointment potentially arises. I am aware of the concerns expressed in relation to the treatment of listed investment funds, notably investment companies and trusts, under the reserve asset allocation powers, which are relevant to DC pension schemes. That was set out very powerfully by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. The Committee will have the chance to debate these concerns when we reach Clause 40 and discuss Chapter 3, which deals with asset allocation for DC schemes.

To get to the heart of it, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked about the impact on the LGPS. To give reassurance, we are not excluding closed-ended investment funds from the LGPS. I can be absolutely clear that that is the case. We are not excluding them, and neither will local authorities be directed to exclude them. I hope that provides clarity as we discuss the LGPS elements of the Bill.

Having said that, we have had comments around investment and asset types, particularly from my noble friend Lord Davies, as well as others, on this group of amendments. We will take what has been said and consider it in time for the debate on this issue when we get to it in greater detail. In anticipation of that day—which we are all looking forward to, particularly at two minutes to Committee rising—I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to withdraw her amendment.

Pension Schemes Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, who, like me, has become a regular on the pensions circuit here. As this debate draws to a close, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed with such seriousness and expertise this afternoon. For my part, I will try to touch on the key themes raised but, before I do, I would like to pay my own tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, because she gave an assured, charming and exceptional speech. She comes with a distinguished career record and I have no doubt that we will be hearing much from her here in future.

The seriousness of this debate was exemplified by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, who set out with great clarity our central concerns raised by this Bill. Those concerns, however, point to a wider issue with the legislation itself. This is a framework Bill, light on detail and heavy on intention, which has left your Lordships debating concepts and hypotheticals rather than the Government’s concrete plans. That is not only unsatisfactory but disappointing. These points were made by my noble friend Lady Coffey. Certainty in legislation comes from detail on the face of the Bill. When that detail is repeatedly altered, deferred and subject to numerous government amendments—by the way, there are over 50—even the limited certainty we believed we had is further diminished. I look forward to the Minister’s response, not just on the preparation of the Bill, or perhaps lack of it, but, as has been raised, on the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

Nowhere is the lack of certainty more evident than in the proposed value-for-money framework. This was one of the first themes raised, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and my noble friend Lady Penn. This element of the Bill is thin, almost skeletal, yet it is pivotal—again, my noble friend Lady Coffey spoke about this. In practice, much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will stand or fall on how the value-for-money framework is designed and applied. If it is to drive genuine improvement rather than box-ticking, its methodology must be transparent, robust and genuinely comparable across schemes. Cost alone cannot be allowed to dominate decision-making at the expense of outcomes. A scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently poor returns is not offering value to savers, however attractive its headline fees may appear.

Against that background, I have two specific questions for the Minister. First, do the Government envisage the value-for-money framework operating as a standardised pro forma, with clearly defined and comparable metrics covering costs, net investment performance, and cost-to-return ratios applied consistently across schemes? Secondly, how will the Government ensure meaningful comparability between very different types of schemes? In particular, what steps will be taken where schemes meet fee thresholds but nevertheless deliver consistently weak investment outcomes? My noble friend Lord Trenchard touched on this.

This feeds into a wider concern about the order of priorities in the Bill. Rather than committing to the notion of the reserve power—so-called mandation, which I will touch on later—the Government should have concentrated first on getting value for money right. That should have been the central driver of this legislation. If value for money is properly defined, transparently measured and rigorously applied, it can strengthen outcomes for savers without trampling on the fiduciary duties of trustees. We have heard quite a bit about that this afternoon.

As the Minister for Pensions himself has said, trustees must remain free, and indeed obliged, to act in the best financial interests of their members, but I say that this should be guided by evidence and judgment rather than direction by mandate. We should be confident enough to demonstrate the benefits and drawbacks of widely used default strategies, such as global passive equities, which underpinned many DC schemes’ investment approaches. That case should be made openly and empirically, yet the Government have underplayed the extent to which a robust value-for-money framework could drive improvement without compulsion. If value is genuinely improved and transparently measured, much else should follow.

My noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott has already clearly set out the Opposition’s wider concerns about mandation. I will not repeat them at length, but the subject was raised by my noble friends Lord Ashcombe and Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and a number of noble Lords. However, I wish to raise one further point that reflects a broader theme running through today’s debate: the need to strike the right balance between flexibility and discipline. My noble friend Lord Ashcombe spoke on this.

Beyond the constitutional and fiduciary issues already raised, there is also a practical market risk that should not be overlooked. This matter was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, about market distorting effects, as the noble Lord put it. Mandation risks inflating asset prices if multiple funds are required to allocate to the same asset classes at the same time. I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, raised this matter too. Markets may also interpret Government direction as an implicit signal of future price support, potentially amplifying distortions rather than improving capital allocation.

Against that background, I have two specific questions for the Minister. First, have the Government assessed the risk that mandated investment could lead to asset price inflation or wider market distortion? If so, what conclusions have they reached? Secondly, how do the Government intend to ensure that mandated allocations remain aligned with changing economic conditions, particularly in cases where schemes may reach a mandated threshold only after the relevant asset class is no longer aligned with economic need or the Treasury’s broader objectives?

There are a few further questions on this important subject. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked this as well. If, after mandation, or, in the case of mandation, if investments underperform or indeed fail, who takes responsibility, the Government or trustees? My noble friend Lady Penn asked how the qualifying assets will be defined. I think other Peers may also have asked that. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked some important questions in this sphere, so I am looking forward to the response from the Minister.

I should say also that I noted the constructive advice and ideas from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on how the Government could better encourage pension funds to invest in the UK, short of introducing the reserved power. There were also some suggestions from my noble friend Lord Trenchard.

Next, let me touch on the treatment of surpluses in defined benefit schemes. I agree that surpluses can present opportunities, but they are not windfalls: they exist to absorb future shocks, manage demographic risk and ensure that promises made to members are kept. Flexibility in how surpluses are treated is sensible, but only if it is underpinned by robust safeguards. None of us wishes to see surpluses eroded by ill-judged extraction or quietly diverted into activities that weaken long-term scheme resilience. In that context, the forthcoming guidance from the Pensions Regulator will be pivotal. Can the Minister confirm when that guidance will be published, whether it will be subject to consultation and how Parliament will be able to scrutinise the balance it strikes between prudence, flexibility and long-term security?

Much of today’s debate has also rightly returned to auto-enrolment. The question of paucity of pensions adequacy has been highlighted by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton, and my noble friend Lady Penn. Introduced by a Conservative Government, auto-enrolment has been one of the quiet successes of the past decade. I would like to remind the House that the operational aspects of this were progressed and tested going back as far as 2012. Participation among eligible employees now stands at around 88%. I would argue that this is a remarkable achievement. But success should not breed complacency, because upwards of 8.5 million people remain undersavers, and the question of adequacy remains unresolved. There is still work to be done, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said.

Crucially, auto-enrolment is highly sensitive to labour market conditions. Every percentage point increase in unemployment pushes more people out of workplace pension saving altogether. Against that backdrop, the recent “benefits Budget” is concerning. Unemployment is rising and, with it, the number of people falling out of pension saving. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Government have undertaken updated modelling on the impact of higher employment on future pension adequacy, whether those projections differ from earlier assumptions and whether they will be published so that Parliament can properly understand the long-term consequences of the Government’s policy choices.

As many noble Lords have noted, pension engagement remains the missing leg of the stool. Millions are saving, but fewer than half have checked the value of their pension in the past year. This is not simply apathy; it reflects a system that has become increasingly complex and opaque to ordinary savers. The pensions dashboard, which has been mentioned this afternoon, is therefore not a technical adjunct. It is central to enabling informed decision-making, and various questions have been raised about that. Can the Minister confirm when the revised staging timeline will be published, whether clear delivery milestones will be set out and how Parliament will be able to track progress so that savers can have confidence that this long-delayed reform will finally be realised?

Engagement, however, is also constrained by the current regulatory environment. In consultation with industry, we heard compelling evidence that FCA and the TPR regulation makes genuine member education extraordinarily difficult to design. The boundary between advice and marketing has become so blurred that most communications fall into a grey area, leaving schemes with very few compliant touch points for meaningful engagement. If we are serious about improving outcomes, the Government must enable better education and clearer communication. Perhaps the Minister could comment on this and what work is under way to review these constraints and how the Bill supports rather than frustrates the goal of informing saving.

I turn to salary sacrifice, because this decision strikes at the heart of pensions adequacy, individual engagement and, ultimately, trust in the system itself. The recent disappointing Budget has taken a sledgehammer to a mechanism that has for many years made pension saving both affordable for workers and sustainable for employers. For millions of people saving at or near the minimum auto-enrolment rate, salary sacrifice is not a perk but the difference between saving and not saving at all. Removing this relief will mean lower take-home pay, lower pension contributions and, over time, materially smaller pension pots. This is a short-sighted political choice—one that appears designed to plug immediate fiscal pressures while storing up greater dependency on the state in retirement.

The impact on employers is equally concerning. By reimposing employer national insurance on previously sacrificed earnings, the Government are increasing the cost of labour at precisely the wrong moment. For many medium-sized firms, this will translate into tens of thousands of pounds in additional annual costs—money that could otherwise have supported wages, investment or workforce expansion. The decision to charge both employer and employee national insurance on salary-sacrifice contributions above £2,000 introduces a sharp and, I believe, irrational cliff edge. The OBR estimates that 76% of the burden will fall on employees. Once again, private sector workers bear the cost, while public sector employees in defined benefit schemes remain largely insulated.

The figures are stark. An employee earning £45,000 and saving 5% through salary sacrifice will be £58 worse off in the first year and more than £15,000 worse off over the course of a working lifetime. In the light of this, can the Minister confirm whether the Government have undertaken a sector-by-sector distributional analysis of these changes, whether they will publish an assessment of the long-term impact on pension adequacy and future welfare expenditure and whether she accepts that this measure operates in effect as a tax on work and on responsible long-term saving?

Some noble Lords have rightly raised the broader macroeconomic implications of pension reform. UK pension funds and insurers together hold around 30% of the gilt market—this point was made earlier. If mature defined benefit schemes are nudged away from gilts into equities, the consequences for debt management, interest rates and mortgage markets could be profound. It would therefore be reassuring to hear from the Minister whether the Debt Management Office and the Bank of England have been consulted on these potential effects and whether their views will be made available to Parliament.

I realise that time is marching on. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on all the concerns raised across your Lordships’ House today and respond with the assurances that savers and schemes alike are entitled to expect—we owe them nothing less. However, in the spirit of Christmas, and as this is the season of good will—I am feeling more Christmassy now than I did before the Question this afternoon—I say to the Minister that, despite everything I have said, and in a rare outbreak of festive generosity, there are parts of the Bill that we agree with, such as the PPF changes and the terminal illness time extension. As others have said, we will work constructively with the Government in the weeks and months ahead. I look forward to the Minister’s response and wish Peers and staff in the House a very happy Christmas.

Jobs Market: Wider Economic Implications

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The noble Earl makes an excellent point. He is a fine ambassador for the creative sectors, for which I commend him. The Government are looking sector by sector at how we can support the development of skills. I am aware that we have had to work quite hard to protect some quite specialist skills, because if we lose them we will not get them back, certainly in the heritage sector. I am happy to look at how our sector work can do that, but what we are trying to do in DWP is to work with a wide range of employers to make sure that we know what they want, what skills they need and how we can support them. One thing that has made the biggest difference—I slightly bang on about it—is my noble friend Lady Smith’s welcome joining up of adult skills and the DWP. That can make a real difference, so I will make sure that we look carefully into that.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that I am not yet in the Christmas spirit because, as the Minister herself said, there are huge challenges in the deteriorating jobs market. It is of great concern that jobs in the all-important retail sector have fallen by 74,000, and the chief executive of the BRC has stated that the number of people in work in that sector is at a record low, namely 2.82 million jobs. What are the Government going to do to change the situation, as a matter of urgency, in that sector?

Universal Credit: Two-child Limit

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Wednesday 10th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a really important point, which is that we need as a country to make sure that we prioritise the cost of living and enabling people to earn enough. It should be possible to go out to work and earn enough to support your family, but that is one reason why we think it is important to invest in appropriate levels of social security. Crucially, we have to help people to develop skills. We want people to get into work, but we do not want them stuck on the lowest-paid work. We have increased the national minimum wage and invested in childcare and free school meals—we are doing all the things to make it possible to do the right thing. However, we need to go further. We need to see people in this country in higher-skilled, higher-paid jobs that will help them, grow our economy, and create opportunities for their children in due course.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, can I bring the House back to the original intention behind the two-child limit? It was to make the benefits system fairer to taxpayers who support themselves and their families solely through work. It encouraged parents on benefit to make the same financial choices about family size as those not on benefits. With the Government’s poverty argument in mind, the IFS has said that reversing the two-child limit is “not a silver bullet”. It said that the benefit cap will

“wipe out the gains for some children in the … poorest families”,

as 70,000 more households are affected by the cap. Surely supporting parents into work and into quality jobs is much more important for reducing child poverty. Finally, the IFS says that raising the employment rate to 80% from the current 75% would lift up to 350,000 children out of poverty.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, that is why the Government have set that as their target. I say to the noble Viscount that the whole point about this is that it is not a choice. It is not a question of either supporting children or helping parents to go into work. Supporting families makes work possible. Most parents want to work. Our job is to make that possible, so we have done that. We have invested in expanding free school meals to everyone on universal credit, including those in work; we have raised the national living wage, and we have put in more help for childcare—30 hours a week for parents of preschoolers—and more help for childcare in universal credit. Children deserve the best possible start in life and their parents deserve the best chance to have a decent life. We want to do both.

Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) (Extension to Unconnected Multiple Employer Schemes and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2025

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

We have here the interaction of a number of different pieces of legislation. Of course, we are all looking forward to the Second Reading of the Pension Schemes Bill next week. We have before us the Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) (Extension to Unconnected Multiple Employer Schemes and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2025. We also have the 2022 regulations that first set out the regulatory requirements for CDC schemes. In parallel, we have the Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) Regulations. As the Minister and the Front Bench well know, that sets out another of the Government’s initiatives: to provide CDC schemes that can offer retirement pensions, rather than people having to buy annuities. All these different pieces of legislation interact in ways, I think it is fair to say, that are sometimes difficult to grasp.

What worries me about these regulations is that it is a bit like when you have extensive building work in your house, and the architect asks you where you want the light switches. Of course, you do not know where you want the light switches until you have lived in that house for two or three years, but you have to decide in advance. This is my concern about these regulations: we do not know how these schemes will work in practice. We are all agreed that they are a good thing, we want to see them supported and developed and we have to start somewhere, but certain aspects of what is before us today cause me some concern—or, to tone it down, some level of interest.

First, is it clear that the provisions in the Pension Schemes Bill dealing with value for money, guided retirement and particularly scale will apply to these schemes? They are closer to these schemes than they are to defined benefit. It is quite clear in the legislation that the scale requirement applies to DC arrangements. To what extent will the scale requirement directly, or indirectly through the supervision requirements, end up requiring schemes of a particular scale? My fear is that, if there is a scale requirement, it will just be another barrier to establishing these schemes that, in practice, we all want.

An associated point that has been raised is that we are now effectively getting separate CDC regimes. The existing one with the Post Office scheme is the only live example, and that is very scheme specific. We do not know how far the legislation can cover other sorts of single-employer CDC schemes. Then we have the multi-employer scheme regime and the retirement pension CDC regime. Are these regimes completely separate? To what extent is there going to be scope to make transfers from one regime to another? Are these regimes overlapping or are they distinct?

One problem is always raised. I am a strong supporter of CDC arrangements. It should be the future of private sector pension provision and we want to encourage it as much as possible, but there are problems with the way it works in practice. Ultimately, however deep it is hidden down in the workings and however many formulae you adopt to ensure fair treatment, there is always the risk of some form of cross-subsidy between members. There will be winners and losers.

With multiple employer CDCs, there is also the possibility of cross-subsidy between employers. It is inherent in the approach, in my view. I know supporters of CDC argue that it is not the case, but I think you should always be concerned about the fear of that. We do not know, because so many of the supervisory powers are given to the regulator, the detail of how they are going to be applied. Will it be made clear that this will not be an impediment to developing these sorts of arrangements? The important point is communication. We need to be clear in the regulations about the need for full and adequate communication so that potential members are fully aware of the nature of the arrangement they are entering.

My final concern is that we are heading towards a retailisation of this sort of provision. It will become a retail product, and that is not how I and many other people envisaged CDC operating. It should be a collective endeavour. I must admit that I have an instinctive reaction against the use of the word “proprietor” for the sponsor of these arrangements. I would prefer the word “sponsor”, because “proprietor” implies that it is not a collective arrangement but a commercial one.

Clearly, it will cost money to set up these arrangements and, to a certain extent, the complexity introduced by these regulations means that even more money will be required to do so. But my fear is that we will ultimately end up with underregulated insurance companies, rather than the collective and co-operative arrangement that I think is the true way forward for CDC arrangements. My fears are that it is all too complicated. We need to be clear about the overlap between these different areas of legislation and the different types of CDC arrangement. A system in which people have the right to transfer their money out of a scheme at the same time as the Government are encouraging schemes to invest in non-market based investments, means that there is a contradiction, which could be the Achilles heel of this type of arrangement.

I am taking this opportunity to express my concerns and raise them formally with the Minister. The specific questions are about multiple CDC arrangements, information communication requirements and an approach which enables people to understand what they are getting here—it is better than pure DC.

My final complaint is that the regulations persist with the business of calling these schemes “collective money purchase”. I have made the point before in these discussions that they are not collective money purchases. They are called money purchase schemes because you purchase an annuity, and these schemes are being set up specifically with the introduction of retirement-only CDCs so that you do not have to buy an annuity. I am really sorry that the department has persisted in using the term “money purchase” in these regulations when they are clearly not money purchase arrangements.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak in this debate on the regulations extending collective defined contribution schemes to unconnected multiple employer arrangements. I say at the outset that I accept the apology given by the Minister for the changes needed in Schedule 2. I hope that when she responds she will confirm that these are minor changes, as I assume they are; that would be helpful.

By any measure, this is a highly technical statutory instrument that even seasoned pensions professionals would concede is difficult to absorb on first reading. Yet precisely because of that complexity, and the potentially far-reaching implications for the architecture of our pensions system, it is essential that this Committee scrutinises it with particular care. Collective defined contribution schemes—CDCs—are an important and promising innovation. They offer the potential for better outcomes than pure defined contribution schemes for risk-sharing across generations and smoothing investment volatility in retirement. They could and should play a larger role in the future of pension provision in the United Kingdom.

We also recognise that this SI is an enabling vehicle. It is a mechanism to broaden the CDC framework so that unconnected employers may participate. We raise no objection to that direction of travel. I am surprised that this debate will not have more contributions from other Peers. I am very pleased that we have the welcome and regular presence of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I am quite surprised that we have no representation from the Liberal Democrats. I am not sure why that is.

--- Later in debate ---

The Government remain committed to launching dashboards as soon as possible. In line with the commitments the noble Viscount made when he was doing my job, I am happy to carry on giving regular updates to the House at appropriate points on the development of pensions dashboards. I think one of those points may come up soon. I can see the noble Viscount is twitching to stand up again, so I am going to sit down and allow him to clarify.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for spelling out the code of practice; we look forward to seeing that. I remain quite surprised that the Pensions Commission will finally report as late as spring 2027. I cannot believe it is going to take that long, despite the fact that pensions are generally known to be quite technical and detailed. I am not expecting the noble Baroness to comment on that, but I just wanted to put it on record. The noble Baroness did not answer my question about surpluses, and I am very happy to be written to about that. Perhaps the main question I wanted to ask, which the noble Baroness also did not answer, is about membership take-up at Royal Mail. What was the rate of take-up for the Royal Mail scheme?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

On the question of surpluses, the regulators will ensure that a scheme has sufficient financial resources through a range of key mechanisms centred around the role of a scheme proprietor, robust planning and ongoing regulatory oversight. The Pensions Regulator must be satisfied that the scheme is financially sustainable before it can be authorised. That would obviously involve a rigorous assessment of its expected costs, income and the strategy for recovering any shortfalls. The schemes accounts have to be submitted to the regulator on an ongoing basis to give transparency. I am not sure that that does answer his question on surpluses, but if I have an answer, I will write to him.

On the membership take-up of the Royal Mail scheme, 110,000 people have joined and around 700 have opted out. I hope that answers that question, and that I have answered all the other questions. I thank both noble Lords for their helpful contributions to this debate. This instrument will allow CDC schemes to play an integral role in the future of pensions in this country, affording potentially millions of savers access to the benefits they offer. With that, I commend this instrument to the Committee, and I beg to move.

Carer’s Allowance: Overpayments Review

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, the care route admitted more than 150,000 workers in three years. There have been changes to the Immigration Rules, but that will not prevent those who want to from building a career in the sector, because there is a transition period until July 2028, which allows, for example, in-country applications from people who came in by other visa routes. This means that care providers could recruit graduates, for example, or people who come in other ways.

My noble friend is absolutely right that, on 1 July, we laid changes to the Immigration Rules, which included closing the social care visa route to overseas recruitment. That said, there remain significant numbers of international care workers who are looking for work in the UK who have not had the chance to support the system as they wanted. New measures have already come into effect which require care providers in England to prioritise recruiting international care workers who are already in the UK and require new employment.

More generally, DWP is doing a lot to try and encourage people into social care. We are working with adult social care bodies in developing recruitment events for the sector to encourage people into it. We want people who are committed professionals and who want to work in the sector, and we will do what we can to encourage them.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pretty sobering statistic that 150,000 children provide more than 50 hours of care a week. What is being done in schools to understand who these pupils are and to give them the optimum support as they undertake their studies?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The noble Viscount raises a very important point. Certainly, I have met with organisations over the years that work with young carers. Schools are becoming increasingly aware of these pressures. Good schools with good pastoral care systems are identifying them and making sure both that these young carers get the support they need and that they themselves are aware of broader issues in the home of which other authorities might need to know. The noble Viscount will know that this does not stop at 18, and there are issues for young adult carers who want to carry on and complete their studies. Fortunately, if somebody is doing less than 21 hours a week of supervised study, they can still claim carer’s allowance, but we are looking at how we can best identify and support young carers to enable them to combine their study with their caring. We want to make sure that their childhood is not ruined and that young adults have a chance to make a life for themselves as well as caring for those whom they love.

People with Disabilities: Employment

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

We have indeed. Despite being a Minister, I have not yet completely calibrated the scale that runs from, at one end, “in due course”, to, at the other end, “very soon”, but it is very much not at the “in due course” end. Watch this space; it will be out very soon.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to the work of my noble friend Lady Monckton. In November 2017, my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead set the UK Government a target to get 1 million more disabled people into work by 2027. In 2022, the Conservative Government hit that target five years early, giving 1 million more disabled people the opportunity of fulfilling employment. The noble Baroness spoke about giving opportunity and offering support, which is fair enough, but perhaps she could go further and say what practical steps Ministers are taking to support small and medium-sized businesses, especially those rooted in local communities, such as cafés and pubs, to accommodate these additional needs?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for that really good question. We have a service called “support with employee health and disability”. We are not great at names in DWP, but it does what it says on the tin. That was developed directly with input from smaller businesses and disability organisations. The idea is that it gives employers step-by-step guidance on how they can support employees in common workplace scenarios involving health and disability. For example, employers using the resource may be asked, “Have you got somebody you are working with now?”, and if they say yes then it will ask them what the challenge is. It can support them in understanding what the law says and how to have difficult conversations.

Most people who either are working or want to work, and who have a health condition or a disability, are happy to have conversations to help the employer know how to go about moving them into a job. One of the reasons that the Connect to Work programme I mentioned works so well is that the specialist advisers will work with the employer to help answer all those questions; they will also work with the person who is trying to move into work and can help bring the two together. A person I was talking to recently, who is a lead in one of these programmes, said that small businesses especially just do not have the resources—they have not got a huge HR department and so might not know how to do it—but they are really up for hiring people in the local community, and just want to be supported in doing so. I am really looking forward to seeing how that works out.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 23rd October 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been a privilege for my noble friend Lady Anderson and me to take this important Bill through the House. This Government are committed to safeguarding public money and tackling fraud and waste. Public sector fraud is not a victimless crime; it damages our public services and, ultimately, it is taxpayers who suffer when they pick up the bill. Tens of billions of pounds are being lost to public sector fraud—money desperately needed by our public services. This Bill delivers on that commitment to safeguard public money and reduce fraud and overpayments resulting from errors across the public sector. It will enable the Public Sector Fraud Authority to support public sector bodies in investigating and dealing with fraud, and it will help the DWP better identify, prevent and deter fraud and error in the social security system. In doing so, this Bill will protect the public purse and deliver £1.5 billion of benefits over the next five years.

I thank all noble Lords who have given so generously of their time and wisdom in scrutinising this important legislation. Although we have not always agreed with them, my noble friend Lady Anderson and I have been grateful for the very many thoughtful and considered contributions that have prompted us at various points to improve the Bill or to clarify its provisions. This is what the House of Lords is for, and I am grateful for it.

Before I conclude, I offer some words of thanks, first, to the Opposition Front Bench. The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, have given robust but constructive challenge throughout the passage of the Bill. I am grateful for their time, both inside the Chamber and beyond. Similarly, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, from the Liberal Democrat Benches, who have been passionate advocates on issues such as whistleblowing and carers. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lady Lister for their careful engagement, both in and beyond the Chamber. I am grateful for the constructive challenge from around House, including from my noble friends Lord Sikka and Lord Davies of Brixton, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Fox, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester.

Thanks must go to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who has maintained a keen interest in both parts of the Bill throughout its passage. The noble Lord has advocated for a number of different issues. We thank him for his constructive engagement and hope he welcomes the progress that has been made.

My noble friend Lady Anderson and I thank our Whips, especially our noble friend Lord Katz for his support throughout the Bill, and put on record our appreciation of all the officials and public servants who provided such dedicated support throughout this legislative process. I thank Georgia, Oliver, Alana and Ewan from our brilliant private offices, Matt, Louise and Tanya from the fabulous Bill team, and all the policy colleagues who stood behind them. Noble Lords who have met them will have been as impressed as I am with their professionalism and knowledge.

Finally, unusually, I thank my noble friend Lady Anderson’s husband for sharing her with us so extensively in the run-up to not just her wedding but her honeymoon. It is a sign of her dedication that she has given so much time to this Bill. She is the only person I know who can, while taking the content incredibly seriously, bring quite so many laughs to the subject of public sector fraud. I am grateful to so many noble Lords, and I beg to move.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her remarks. I will make a short reflection on our discussions on Report and in Committee. I speak for my noble friend Lady Finn in so doing. Despite the technical title, this is an important Bill, as the noble Baroness said. It addresses one of the most serious problems that public authorities face. Based on the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s methodology, fraud and error cost the taxpayer £55 billion to £81 billion in 2023-24. The Bill has sought to address this problem, at least in part, through the provision of extensive powers to officials in the DWP and the Cabinet Office. It is largely these that we have discussed over the past few months.

I am proud of the work that this House has done in scrutinising the Bill, identifying issues and problems, and working in the genuine spirit of collaboration to make it better, fairer and more effective. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent and Lady Sherlock, for the way they have engaged with Members from across the House. They have listened to concerns, shown genuine willingness to make improvements and demonstrated what responsible government should look like. I firmly believe that the Bill before us is stronger and more balanced than the one first introduced to this House. There is more to be done and areas for further improvement, but we have reflected this in our amendments. The changes that have been made are indeed welcome, and we look forward to ping-pong when it comes. I am also grateful to the noble Baronesses for following up on commitments swiftly, not least for providing the now famous flow charts, which have been genuinely useful to us and, I hope, their departments.

I thank other noble Lords for their engagement with this Bill and their support of our amendments both in Committee and on Report. We have sought to address what we see to be serious shortcomings in the Bill on questions of oversight, accountability, proportionality and fairness. I am thankful to noble Lords who supported us in the Divisions that we called. The amendments we have passed in this place advocate for greater oversight, clearer lines of accountability and a PSFA that can actively pursue fraud. I believe that these are important changes that make the Bill more effective and fairer.

I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for their support of our amendments, and I certainly do not forget the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I thank them for their support on some of our proposals. I look forward with interest to seeing how the arrangement with the PSFA, the DWP and the banks evolves and becomes effective. We accept that it is test and learn. It is vital that the legislation to seal the agreement becomes effective in combating fraud.

Finally, I thank the officials who have worked so hard from the government side to enable this process to happen. I know from my time as a Minister that we rely on our officials for a great deal; indeed, it is often to them who we turn for advice and support. I also know that their work is often not credited because they are not visible in the way that we are during debates. I therefore thank officials from the DWP, the Cabinet Office, the PSFA and the Ministers’ private offices who have worked hard to support them and, indirectly, all of us in the discussions we have had on the Bill. Noble Lords from across the House should recognise them and their work. I pay particular tribute to and thank my assistant, Oliver Bramley, for his sterling work during this period.

I urge the Government to meet this House on the amendments that it has added to the Bill, given the extensive discussions and strong cross-party support that they command from across the House. The Bill that we return to the Commons is a better one and I urge the Government to use this opportunity to make these changes permanent.

Finally, we all leave the Bill with certain expressions ringing in our ears, such as “test and learn”, which I alluded to earlier, but particularly the tongue-twister “eligibility verification measure”. I think I can just still say that.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this Bill is important, creating a wide range of powers for the Cabinet Office and DWP to deal with fraud and error. Until recently, it received very little attention in this House, being in Grand Committee. A small group of noble Lords have worked on it as it has gone through the stages in this House and it has been a great pleasure to work with all of them, across all parties.

I want to repeat what I said before: first, that the Bill as introduced was a much better Bill than its previous incarnation under the last Government. I am extremely grateful to both Ministers for that; they listened and acted on the concerns raised at that time and reflected many of them in the Bill as it was tabled originally. The same is true of the opposition team; I think they also heard those concerns, and it has been a pleasure that they have been so supportive of many of the changes made to strengthen the safeguards around the powers.

Equally, the engagement from the Ministers and their officials has been exemplary throughout the passage of the Bill. It has been a very good example of how this House works best and I am very grateful to all of them. They have been not only extremely generous with their time but very constructive in their engagement. Documents, such as the draft code of practice, have been published in good time, which I think most noble Lords would agree is not always the case. The detailed document that showed how the Bill would work alongside other legislation was a lot of work for somebody but incredibly helpful in enabling all of us to understand this better. As the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, just said, special mention is merited for whoever produced the famous flowcharts.

I am also grateful to all those who supported me in my efforts to strengthen the safeguards around these new powers, in particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and others. Having said that, we were not able to find agreement on everything, as we saw on Tuesday. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, that I remain keen to see whether we can find a constructive solution to those remaining issues that would work for us all. I stand ready to work with her and her team to that end before we get into ping-pong. I am not trying to thwart the intent of the Bill and have tried throughout to reflect as closely as possible what the Government say they really need. I really hope that we can find something mutually agreeable during the next stages.

Jobcentres: Staffing Levels

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Thursday 23rd October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the noble Earl—that is a really interesting idea. There are people who are happy to go into a jobcentre, and there are people for whom that would be really difficult. We have a number of jobcentres around the country, but we also have a number of different services operating out of different places, including libraries, but also youth hubs. We are also testing vans: we have mobile vans going out into communities where people will not come out to us. For example, in Burnley jobcentre there are family community work coaches based at a community grocer, where they can reach out to people. We also have people working out of city councils and all kinds of different areas, but there are specifically groups working in libraries. I will go and find out whether there is any more of that we can do, but I have been assured that they can work really well. Also, I am concerned about the future of libraries, and if that is a way to make sure that there are lots of reasons to go to a place, it can be a win-win.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, further to the questions raised by the right reverend Prelate, more than half of jobcentres are reportedly reducing support for people claiming universal credit due to a shortage of work coaches, not so much to do with shortened appointment times—although I take the right reverend Prelate’s point. Recent data obtained through a freedom of information request shows that just 16,640 work coaches were employed by the DWP in August, the lowest number since March last year. But, given this, and the department’s plans to place job advisers in GP surgeries and mental health services, how do the Government intend to ensure that there are enough work coaches to deliver effective employment support across all settings?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, that is the question. We have an increasingly sophisticated model for mapping demand and the number that the noble Viscount gave pretty much matches the demand we are predicting. But, if demand rises significantly, we will have to prioritise. As I said at the beginning, at the moment, standard processes are that, when somebody first comes into a jobcentre, we will want to see them weekly for the first 13 weeks, but there is no point in treating everybody the same. It is not necessarily a shortage of work coaches that is driving this; we have some turnover but, actually, we are looking at faster ways to recruit them and we are happy that we have the right numbers at the moment. The challenge is to make sure that the support is in the right place, for the right people. If all the work coaches spent all their time checking and ticking everybody’s boxes, they would not be out there doing the things that only they can do, which is to get people into jobs. That is what we want them to do.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches, we welcome the agreement reached with the devolved Administrations—may this be a lesson to people around the world on how to deal with them, at least in this case.

The amendments in this group relate to how the powers in the Bill refer to Scotland specifically. Amendment 41, together with related amendments to Clause 74, and the replacement of Clause 101 and others, reverses—I stress that—the changes made in the House of Commons. I gather that this follows confirmation from Scottish Ministers that they wish the changes to the Secretary of State’s functions regarding information notices to apply to them as well. This seems to me a positive movement of Administrations working together—long may it continue.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, as it is my first appearance at the opposition Dispatch Box on Report, I echo remarks made by my noble friend Lady Finn on the first day of Report, because I also appreciate the constructive approach that the Government have taken following Committee.

It is perhaps appropriate that, as a Scot, my first brief contribution relates to matters north of the border. It is our understanding that this amendment has been brought forward by the Government in order to apply to Scotland those provisions of the Bill which we have already debated in earlier clauses, in particular those concerning the new powers to issue information notices under the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and to clarify that the new methods of recovery introduced under the Bill will not apply to devolved benefits.

In that sense, these amendments are essentially technical in nature, as the Minister said, ensuring consistency across the United Kingdom and confirming that the devolved benefits system in Scotland remains outside the scope of the new recovery powers. We appreciate and support the clarification. However, while the amendments themselves are straightforward, they raise some wider questions about the relationship between the UK and the devolved Administrations in this area.

It is somewhat surprising that these changes have had to come forward as government amendments at this relatively late stage of the Bill, when one might have expected such matters to have been settled at the drafting stage through earlier consultation and agreement with Scottish Ministers. The Government have placed great store over the past year in stating that they seek to improve communications and trust between the UK Government and the devolved nations, so can the Minister give us an update on how they view progress on these changes and what has changed in the past year?

While we do not oppose these amendments—indeed, we welcome the fact that the necessary legislative consent has now been secured—they prompt reflection on the importance of ensuring that such engagement happens promptly and systematically in future. The relationship between the UK and the devolved Governments works best when issues of competence and application are identified and agreed well in advance, rather than being corrected through amendments on Report.

That said, I would be grateful if the Minister could take this opportunity to update the House on the Government’s current assessment of the risk of fraud in relation to devolved benefits and on what engagement has taken place with the devolved Administrations to address that risk. Can she tell us what steps she is aware of in those authorities to tackle fraud within their systems and how information sharing and co-ordination between the UK Government and the devolved Governments is being managed to ensure that fraud risks are tackled effectively across all jurisdictions?

We are content to support these amendments that bring Scotland into line with the rest of the UK where appropriate while respecting the devolution settlement and maintaining clarity over responsibilities in the fight against fraud.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his kind words. I, too, have enjoyed the engagement we have had across the House. It shows how the Lords can make a constructive contribution to the scrutiny of legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is quite right that we have a developed and developing devolution situation in the UK, and are showing that it is possible for different jurisdictions to make different judgments and to find ways of coexisting peacefully. We are very glad to be able to do that, and I thank him for flagging that up.

On the timing, I am advised that it is routine for these matters to be resolved at this point in the process. I reassure the House that our officials have engaged with their Scottish counterparts throughout the policy development stage and the passage of the Bill. It was during Lords Committee that we received formal confirmation from the Scottish Government that they wished the updates to the information gathering powers in the Bill to apply to them too, hence we have brought forward appropriate amendments.

In response to the questions from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, fundamentally—this stems from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer—tackling fraud and error in devolved benefits must be the responsibility of the relevant devolved Government. That is the nature of devolution. However, we have engaged extensively with the devolved Governments throughout the passage of the Bill, and these amendments reflect that engagement. I reassure him that we routinely work closely with the Scottish Government to share information and good practice to support each other’s efforts to tackle fraud and error. That includes data-sharing agreements so that we can share information where necessary, which I suspect is the kind of assurance that he was hoping for.

I am grateful for those questions, and I hope that with those assurances noble Lords can accept these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, there are a number of amendments in this group, each touching on different principles relating to the operation of and limits to the eligibility verification measure. I will address them all briefly. I appreciate the Minister’s full reminder of the intent of this and of some of the operational details behind the EVM, which was very helpful.

I am afraid that we cannot support Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as she may expect. As the noble Baroness herself iterated, these amendments would in practice remove one of the Bill’s core operational mechanisms: the framework that enables the detection and investigation of fraud and error in the welfare system. Taking out Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3 would not simply adjust how the powers are used; it would dismantle the machinery that allows the system to function. We on these Benches support the principles behind the Bill and, broadly speaking, how it seeks to counter fraud and deter wrongdoing. As the Minister reminded us, it was a Conservative Government, up until the general election last year, who initiated the approach for the DWP to ask banks and financial institutions for their help in tackling welfare fraud. I also acknowledge that some improvements have been made in the past year.

Removing these clauses would, in effect, as the noble Baroness has admitted, be a wrecking amendment, denying the Department for Work and Pensions the tools it needs to identify and evidence cases of fraud. The real debate, which this House has been having constructively throughout Committee and again on Report, is about how those powers are exercised—proportionately, cost-effectively and with due regard to rights, safeguards and well-being. That is the discussion we should be having, not one that seeks to strike out the core of the Bill.

We broadly welcome the government amendments, which make sensible, constructive improvements to the operation of EVNs. The first, set out in Amendment 48, is the insertion of the “necessary and proportionate” test, which is a welcome safeguard that raises the standard for how these powers are applied. The second clarification, that EVNs may be used only for assisting in identifying incorrect payments, provides welcome precision and helps prevent any risk of mission creep.

Talking of precision, I thank the Minister and her team for producing a series of flow charts. As she knows, I was pressing for these in Committee because there is considerable complexity, including work in progress—I am not quite sure whether we now call it “test and learn” instead of proof of concept—for all those involved in understanding the processes and operations between the banks and the DWP, with the checks, balances and timeframes set out. I hope the Minister acknowledges that this is a help for the department and that it will be continuously updated and improved as the system evolves.

We believe, however, that there remains scope for further clarification, which is why I was glad to add my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. This additional clarification through the language of his amendment is important. It would make it explicit that the exercise of this power is anchored to the purposes of the Bill rather than to any broader or more flexible administrative interpretation that might develop over time. In practical terms, it would ensure that the Secretary of State’s use of these powers cannot be varied or expanded except by returning to Parliament to amend the primary legislation; for example, were the Government at some future point to seek to extend these powers to cover other forms of welfare support.

We believe that this is an important safeguard. It ties the scope of the eligibility verification regime firmly to the text of the Bill, providing Parliament and the public with confidence that its use will remain confined to the limited, proportionate purposes that we have debated. For that reason, we consider this a sensible and necessary amendment and we are glad to support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in bringing it forward.

We are sorry to say that we cannot support Amendment 50, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, although we entirely appreciate her engagement with us on this point and the spirit in which it was brought forward. The aim of improving transparency is understandable but requiring banks to inform account holders that they have been flagged following an eligibility verification notice risks undermining the integrity of ongoing investigations.

I listened carefully to the noble Baroness’s speech, and despite her explanation and the safeguard that she outlined, we remain worried that notifying a potentially liable person too early could allow them to conceal or move funds, frustrating the process. While the intention is fair, it could cause or create a serious loophole. Therefore, I am afraid we cannot support it.

However, one of the points on which I agree with the Government is that some of those seeking to defraud the state—after all, it is taxpayers’ money we are talking about—will stop at nothing to get their way to make money for themselves. There is a line to be drawn to ensure that transparency does not provide an open goal for fraudsters.

It appears that the drafting of Amendment 60, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, may not achieve what is intended. As it stands, it would seem, having read it, to place a duty on banks or institutions, rather than individuals, to receive legal advice before complying with a notice. The DWP, in any case, has access to legal advice intradepartmental, so it would be up to the department’s discretion to use this on a case-by-case basis and should not be statutory.

If, however, the noble Lord’s intent, which became clearer in his remarks, is to ensure that individuals affected by DWP actions can access advice or support, that is a broader and legitimate issue. However, this amendment does not appear to address it; therefore, we do not and cannot support it. Individuals might choose to consult a lawyer, but this would be up to them. Can the Minister confirm that no taxpayers’ funds would be used to fund this, if this was indeed the intention?

We welcome the Government’s change in Amendment 61 to extend the review period from seven to 14 days. This responds directly to concerns raised by these Benches and by other noble Lords in Committee that the original timeframe was too short for financial institutions to act upon. It is a practical and welcome step that reflects the realities of compliance, and we are glad that the Government have listened.

Finally, we have some sympathy with Amendment 62, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I remember that the noble Baroness spoke to this in Committee. It is right that individuals should be able to understand, at least in part, the role of algorithms used in decisions that affect them, and being able to have sight of this as part of a review makes sense. However, transparency must not come at the cost of investigatory integrity. As I stated earlier, there is a delicate balance between fairness to individuals and protecting methods that could be exploited if disclosed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, asked many questions, which I will certainly not repeat. I simply ask the Minister to clarify how these concerns might be addressed in practice, perhaps through the review or the appeal mechanism, while maintaining that balance.

Finally, we welcome that the amendments in this group provide us with an opportunity to have a further discussion on this important part of the Bill, the essence of its prime aim. We are grateful to the Government for listening to the concerns that were raised in Committee, as well as to other noble Lords for identifying areas about which they are concerned and offering the Government the chance to comment. We shall be listening with interest to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions today and, indeed, throughout Committee. We have a better Bill as a result, and I am grateful for that. I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for his support for the principle we are discussing here and for his gracious acknowledgement of the improvements to the Bill. I thank him for that; it was a kind and gracious comment, and I appreciate it.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I will not dwell on this matter, but I am grateful to him for accepting that, even if he came at the issue from a slightly different angle, he is happy with where we have ended up. I thank him again for pushing us, throughout the stages of the Bill, in various ways, and I am grateful that he has accepted where we have ended up with our amendment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is absolutely right that her amendment is not nuanced; it lands firmly in the court of whatever the opposite of nuance is. In a sense, it is straightforward: her party does not support these measures at all. I have no doubt that, were her party to form a Government, it would locate another place to find £1 billion to make up for this. However, our party is determined that, if we are to spend money on social security, it should go to the people who are entitled to it and the people who need it—it should not go to other people. We will take the necessary measures to make sure that that happens, and we are doing that in this Bill. We also want to make sure that it is done appropriately and with enough safeguards, and I hope that I have shown to the House my willingness to bend over backwards to provide those safeguards. The principle is that people should not get money to which they are not entitled; it should go to those who are entitled to it and who need it—and that is what we are doing here.

The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, is right that my noble friend Lord Sikka’s Amendment 60 applies to the section that covers penalties that may be issued to financial institutions that fail to comply with an EVN. Therefore, the effect of the amendment would be that the DWP would be required to ensure financial institutions had taken legal advice before issuing a penalty for failing to comply with an EVN. I think we would all agree that, if they need legal advice, they could probably afford it—and so we are okay on that front. However, I fully understand that it is very hard to table amendments outside government, so I take it that the intention of the amendment is as my noble friend made clear: that the DWP is required to ensure that claimants receive legal advice before the DWP can make any adjustments to a person’s claim. However, we do not regard that as either practical or necessary.

There are already existing protections for claimants whenever an overpayment is calculated, including the ability to request a mandatory reconsideration and/or appeal to tribunal. Where an individual is investigated on a suspicion of fraud, they may be interviewed under caution. In that situation, they will always be notified of their right to seek legal advice and provided information about applying for financial assistance with legal costs through legal aid. In response to the question from the noble Viscount, legal aid is funded from the public purse, so if somebody were to qualify for legal aid, it would be funded by the taxpayer in the appropriate way. I confess that that is about as much as I can offer on that front.

My noble friend Lord Sikka mentioned a range of difficult circumstances. A lot of the debate here tends to mix up fraud, error and all the other reasons for overpayments. There are different reasons why somebody may have been overpaid: it may have been a genuine error; they may have been careless; they may have forgotten or deliberately failed to tell us about some change to their circumstance that affects their entitlement; it may be fraud; or there may have been an error on the part of the state. Gathering data early minimises the extent of the build-up of any overpayment, whatever the reason. That has to be a good thing; it is what we found out elsewhere. I hope that my noble friend appreciates that that is at least part of our approach.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. As she said, Amendment 50 would require account holders to be informed. Even though I know that she does not intend the amendment to do this, the reality is that it could compromise the DWP’s ability to tackle fraud. In most cases where it is just an error that has been made, the DWP will contact claimants to give them the opportunity to explain potential incorrect payments, in which case the amendment would not be needed. However, in the cases where there is a suspicion of fraud, it would clearly undermine any criminal investigation to inform potential fraudsters that their information had been identified using an EVM or what the financial institution had identified. It might also cause unnecessary distress for those who are not guilty of fraud, such as account holders and claimants who, for example, may have a disregarded compensation payment and who otherwise would have been quite rightly left alone because they had not done anything wrong—there is no need to try to scare people into thinking that an issue will be coming down track. It would also impose further burdens on financial institutions, which would have to inform their customers about this.

Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, seeks scrutiny of the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts. At the risk of boring the House, I note that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where criteria, set out in the Bill, have been met. Financial institutions operate in many ways, and it is for each individual financial institution to work out how it identifies relevant accounts, rather than for the Government to set out potentially cumbersome processes.

Just to pick up on a couple of things that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, I want to make this really clear: we will not be asking banks, for example, to work out whether somebody is entitled to a health benefit, such as ESA. We may ask them to identify an account into which ESA is being paid. Health data will be special data and will therefore be expressly prohibited from being returned. The intention is very simple: to ask them to identify the kind of things I described earlier. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I was giving an example. There are many examples, but that was the one I chose.

To sum up, I have set out a clear case for the EVM and how our government amendments today and other changes that have been made address many of the areas of concern. I recognise that I have not persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, but I hope other noble Lords can see the point of this measure, can see the difference it would make and can understand that with the safeguards around, it is the right thing to do. The EVM will save an estimated £940 million by 2029-30. It will be a vital tool to help the DWP spot and detect errors quickly, while also assisting us in identifying fraud. I urge noble Lords to support this measure.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, very much for that. The point I would like to make is that there are people who will perpetuate fraud but, if you try to close up every single channel, you will catch people who are innocent. I believe that all laws should allow for people to get away with fraud, perhaps, if it means that you are not accusing people unintentionally. These amendments are appropriate because, as has been said, who knows what Government will come along and what people will be in charge? If there is fraud, it has to be proved pretty conclusively, rather than, because we suspect fraud, us making it impossible for people who would otherwise be found innocent. We found that with the Horizon scandal: it looked all right but AI said that they were all guilty, though they were not guilty. When even speeches made in this House probably come from AI, we have to be increasingly careful about what we do. These amendments protect people; if they are pressed, we on these Benches will support them.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of these amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and I am pleased to have added my name to them, because both amendments make valuable and necessary clarifications to the operation and oversight of the eligibility verification mechanism—EVM—and they do so in a way that strengthens, rather than weakens, the Government’s objectives under this Bill.

Amendment 52 makes a particularly important clarification. As the Government have repeatedly described their approach to the EVM as a test and learn process, it is vital that we make clear in the Bill that the mere existence of an eligibility indicator does not in itself constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion. That may sound like a technical point, but it has real-world implications. When a system is still developing, when its data sources are still being refined and when human understanding of how it operates is still evolving, there is a very real risk of false positives and unintended consequences.

The Government have said that there is some clarification within the process of an investigation that would help to clarify that persons subject to an EVM are not guilty, and that there are not, therefore, necessarily reasonable grounds for suspicion. However, putting this clarification in the Bill would be a really valuable step in making this absolutely clear, in black and white, to everyone involved. This amendment removes ambiguity and ensures that this point is not in question.

We have already discussed throughout this Bill the importance of safeguards and clarity when new investigative systems are created, particularly where multiple third parties are involved in data sharing and enforcement, which is paramount. This amendment provides exactly that and sets out this lack of reasonable suspicion in the Bill so that we avoid the potentially harmful ambiguity.

Moreover, this amendment ensures that, before any intrusive action is taken—in other words, before any benefit is amended, suspended or investigated—a person of appropriate seniority and experience must review the information and confirm that there are genuine reasonable grounds for suspicion. This aspect of the amendment places human oversight where it belongs: between the algorithm and the citizen. This matters all the more because, as many noble Lords will have seen, the Government themselves are moving rapidly to expand the use of AI in fraud detection and enforcement. Only a couple of weeks ago, civil servants across Whitehall received an internal update about the significant expansion of AI use within the Public Sector Fraud Authority in an article titled:

“Behind the Scenes: Building the AI Tool that is Revolutionising Fraud Prevention”.


I listened very carefully to the passionate speech from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, added to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We believe that this makes these safeguards an urgent necessity. As we rightly modernise our defences against fraud, we must also modernise our protections against error, bias and overreach. Ensuring human involvement in that process in the way it has been set out in this Bill is fundamentally important, and this amendment provides that assurance.

Amendment 67 complements the first one by broadening the remit of the independent review of the EVM powers. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, eloquently laid out his reasoning here. It makes sure that the reviewer looks at not just operational effectiveness but proportionality, costs, unintended consequences and how these powers affect vulnerable people and those interacting with the banking system. These are precisely the areas where well-intentioned powers can have unintended harm if they are not closely monitored.

We on these Benches raised these concerns in Committee and do so again on Report. There is the potential for disproportionate costs on financial institutions, the potential chilling effect on access to basic banking services for those already on the margins and, above all, the potential for harm to vulnerable people who find themselves caught up in complex enforcement processes. It is right that the independent reviewer should have these matters placed explicitly within their remit. I am therefore glad that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has framed his amendment to achieve exactly that. We need to recover public money which has been overpaid—we are in no doubt on that point—but doing so in a way that causes more harm than good benefits no one. The reviewer must have regard to this, not as a suggested area of review but as a statutory duty.

These are measured, practical amendments that I believe carry broad support across the House. They are not about blocking the Bill or frustrating its purpose: they are about ensuring that the new systems it creates are used wisely, fairly and proportionately. We therefore hope that the Government will listen and take these proposals seriously, recognise their constructive intent and accept them as a genuine improvement to the Bill. If the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, decides to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches will be supporting him.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. My response to these amendments builds on the arguments I made at greater length in the last group.

Amendment 52, from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, states that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for the suspicion of fraud under Section 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act. I have sought to assure noble Lords already today that a conclusion will never be drawn from EVM information. At the point the information is shared, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong and therefore, by definition, no action could be taken to correct the thing that could have been done wrong because no one is suspected of having done anything wrong. I could not be clearer on that.

I think it is worth reminding the House that there are two different things happening here. This measure allows DWP to ask banks to flag up accounts that may on the face of it have received a benefit to which someone is not entitled. That is a piece of information that comes into the department. Along with other pieces of information, it will be sifted and examined, and decisions will be made through the usual processes. DWP does this all the time, with all kinds of information. Those decisions are made. Pursuing fraud is something that is done day to day. Whenever DWP receives data in response to an EVM, the data will be matched with information that DWP holds, so it can identify the claimant and any inconsistencies between the information received from the financial institution and the information provided by the claimant over the life of their claim. It will also look at any possible disregards and any other relevant information, as I explained on the last group.

It is only then, as with our current practice, when a possible inconsistency is identified, that steps will be taken to determine how or even whether a claim needs to be reviewed. In some cases, it will be clear that no further action is required and the data from the EVM will be used no further. In cases of potential error, DWP may contact the customer to discuss the claim or ask for further information. In cases where potential fraud is then suspected, the case may be passed to an authorised officer, who will consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a passionate speech, and he is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect. If what he suspected was happening, his passion would be justified, but I want to persuade him that it is misplaced. The decision to judge that someone has been guilty of fraud and to take action is not an automatic process. It is also not a determination that can be made by just anyone. It can be made only by an authorised officer in the DWP. If there are no reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed, the case is passed back to the relevant benefit team or compliance team. At all times during that process, as is the case now, DWP will ensure that any next steps are reasonable and proportionate. There are no immediate suspensions of benefits during the process and, where appropriate, DWP will always endeavour to work with the customer to establish the facts around a benefit claim and identify any possible vulnerabilities. I hope that my position on that is clear and is made even clearer by the government amendments—

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I support this amendment because any exercise of physical powers must surely rest with the police. Are we going to train a new breed of DWP officers who have to be tough and able to act as police? It is quite nonsensical.

The one thing that worries me about this amendment is that it is quite easy on violent filing cabinets. You can attack a filing cabinet, apparently, because that is all right. I think this division between property and individuals is a very strange line to draw. Do you hide in a filing cabinet because you think that would be safer? No, you must not hide in a filing cabinet because, under this legislation, even under the amendment, you can attack a filing cabinet because it might hit back. I think the whole thing, when you read it carefully, is quite nonsensical. We have to get back to the crux of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which is that if there is going to be physical restraint, it has to be from the police and from no one else.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am very glad to have added my name to this series of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. They go to the heart of one of the most serious concerns that we have raised repeatedly with the Government, both inside this Chamber and beyond. I am very pleased that my noble friend Lord Harper spoke from his personal experiences where the state has found itself having to use force, and I will revert to that in a moment.

We are deeply concerned by the powers being granted to DWP investigators under this Bill, particularly the authorisation to use reasonable force against both property and people when exercising powers of entry, search or seizure under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—I believe that my noble friend Lord Harper referenced 2017, but I will need to check my facts on that. These are, in both name and substance, police powers. The idea that civil servants—officials who are not police officers—should be able, in law, to use physical force against members of the public is one that should give this House real pause. It raises profound questions about the limits of state power and the safeguards that ought to accompany it.

The Government have said that they cannot carve out these powers from PACE because it is separate Home Office legislation, but that simply does not stand up to scrutiny. We will hear later from the Minister, but they have already carved out the power of arrest for both the DWP and the Cabinet Office and they have explicitly carved out the use of reasonable force from the Cabinet Office’s own PACE powers under this Bill. It is, therefore, perfectly possible to do so; the Bill itself provides the precedent.

Given that, we struggle to understand why the Government are unwilling to make a simple, sensible and proportionate distinction that reasonable force may be used only against property and not against people. As it stands, the provision creates an unnecessary and troubling loophole, and one that we doubt will withstand the realities of operational use. On that basis, I had formed my own questions and, funnily enough, they chime with many of the points raised by my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, so there is support around the House.

Let us kick off. First, assuming that the DWP visits a property with a view to seizing property only and people there threaten violence or are violent but the police are not there, what are DWP officials expected to do there and then? Secondly, what training would DWP officials be given to deal with any potential violence? How far would this training go? This point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. Is it clear what is expected of them? What are the limits? What might be given to these officials for defence against physical force? Thirdly, what equipment would DWP officials be provided with to assist with restraining individuals if this arose in a scenario where only assets were being seized? Fourthly, and perhaps the biggest question of all, what happens if matters get out of hand, the police are not there, or they have been called but they are not there yet, and an individual is injured? The individual could be a DWP official or an individual within whose house the property is being seized. The police can be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, but what redress or investigations are in place for DWP officials, given this scenario? I am referring to legal protections.

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Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

86: Clause 89, page 54, leave out lines 18 to 20
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that the Secretary of State did not have the power to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 86, 87 and 88 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Finn concern the independence and effectiveness of the independent reviewer established under Clause 89. They are what we might call bite- size amendments, but they go to the heart of what independence and accountability mean in practice.

Amendment 86 would remove the power of the Secretary of State to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes. Amendment 87 would change the wording of Clause 89 so that the Secretary of State “must”, rather than “may”, provide information to that independent person for the purposes of their review.

We bring these amendments forward in the spirit of consistency and fairness. We welcome the Government’s amendments to Clauses 66 and 76, both of which change the wording from “may” to “must” when referring to the Minister’s duty to provide information to independent reviewers. Those are important and positive changes.

The Government have rightly recognised that independent scrutiny cannot be meaningful unless reviewers have the information they need, and that Ministers must therefore be under an obligation and not merely a discretion to provide it. We entirely agree with that principle, one we championed consistently throughout Committee, and which garnered the support of many noble Lords present. However, we are concerned that, having been adopted in Clauses 66 and 76, it has not been applied consistently across the Bill.

Clause 89, which deals with the independent review of powers exercised under Sections 109A to 109H of the Social Security Administration Act 1992—including, among other things, the power to enter and inspect premises under Section 109C—still uses the weaker “may” formulation. This means that the Secretary of State is not required to share information with the independent reviewer and can determine which periods or activities the reviewer is permitted to examine. When we are talking about an independent review mechanism, we do not believe that this is good enough.

If the Government accept, as they now have, that independent reviewers examining the Cabinet Office’s functions under Clause 65 and the DWP eligibility verification mechanism set out in Clause 76 should have an enforceable right to the information they need, then surely the same must apply to those reviewing the DWP’s use of these further powers under the Social Security Administration Act 1992. There is no justification for having one standard of transparency for one and not the other.

The Government amendments on their own subject the PSFA and the Minister for the Cabinet Office to different standards to the DWP, which surely cannot be right. Based on the Government’s amendments, the Minister for the Cabinet Office must provide information to the independent reviewer for the purposes of an investigation into the exercise of the Minister’s functions under this part. However, it is different for the DWP, which must provide this information to the independent reviewer only when it comes to the EVM. For other independent reviews under this part, the Secretary of State still “may” only provide this information.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for explaining his amendment. I will start by gently reminding him of something. He said that we should not avoid oversight because it is inconvenient. Does he remember that when his Government, led and represented by him, introduced equivalent powers to many of these in the DPDI Bill, there was literally no independent oversight at all anywhere in that Bill? So, I am very happy to respond on the way we are putting it in, but I hope the House will give us credit for having actually put in significant independent oversight, and I would encourage him to remember that.

Having said that, while I understand the rationale for Amendments 86 to 88, we do not believe that they are appropriate or necessary. DWP’s intention for Clause 89 is to appoint an independent, external inspectorate body to inspect DWP’s end-to-end criminal investigations. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has provided this function for public services for over 160 years. DWP has committed to commissioning HMICFRS as the body best placed to provide an independent inspection role in England and Wales and, similarly, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland, for Scotland. I can assure the House that DWP are committed to ensuring the right level of scrutiny for these powers and will follow existing HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland’s processes and guidance, which requires transparency and accountability.

These inspectorate bodies bring huge experience of working in this area, providing robust inspections to other similar bodies. That is why DWP will work with them to agree mutually that each inspection takes place over a suitable period, so that they are assessing and reporting on a period which realistically reflects DWP’s use of search and seizure powers. DWP has worked closely with both HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland, and we understand that sharing information is an integral part of the inspection process. That is why the department is committed to providing all relevant information, so that meaningful inspections can be carried out.

It is important to highlight the unnecessary risk Amendments 86 and 87 create. These amendments could result in sharing information with the inspectorate that could then become disclosable material in a live investigation, potentially jeopardising the outcome. Because of the range of investigatory techniques used during DWP criminal investigations, it is important that the Secretary of State retains discretion not to provide information when the consequences of sharing that information outweigh the benefit to an inspection—for instance, to protect customers or prevent compromising future prosecutions. Depending on the circumstances, examples of such sensitive material not suitable for sharing might include material given in confidence, details about witnesses or other persons who may be in danger if their identities are revealed, material revealing the location of any premises or other place used for surveillance, and material relating to the private life of a witness. I hope that explains why I cannot accept these amendments.

Amendment 88 seeks to extend the remit and scope of an independent person appointed under Clause 89. We have already confirmed that this will be HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland. They will provide an additional safeguard to ensure that the DWP is using these powers proportionally and in line with their intended purpose. However, although the inspectorates are very impressive in their fields, it is clearly not within their remit to assess expenditure or amounts recovered and conduct cost-benefit assessments of the various measures in the Bill. But the Office for Budget Responsibility has certified the estimated £1.5 billion of benefits contained in this Bill and, separately, our impact assessment clearly outlines the estimated costs and how we will scale up our rollout to deliver the savings and commits to monitoring and evaluation of Part 2 of the Bill.

I also remind the House of the existing reporting mechanisms for the DWP’s fraud and error activities that make this amendment unnecessary. In the DWP’s annual report and accounts, the department reports on the savings made from our fraud and error activities, including savings made from activity across our counterfraud and targeted case review teams. In addition, we also report on our debt recovery totals and debt stock. The departmental annual report and accounts are reviewed and scrutinised by the National Audit Office, which publishes a report on the accounts and provides independent assurance to Parliament on the proper use of public funds.

Finally, a question was asked about what is different between the DWP and the PSFA. The type and nature of DWP and PSFA criminal investigations are likely to be very different. That means the risks and decisions involved in disclosing sensitive material are different for each organisation. Due to the function it plays, the DWP is likely to have significantly more individuals who may be vulnerable, and it considers that disclosing sensitive material relating to those persons is not an appropriate approach for it to adopt. For that reason, the DWP must be able to withhold material in such cases to ensure that there is no detriment or risk to vulnerable persons who may be placed at risk.

To conclude, the DWP is committed to transparency and to delivering this Bill and its savings, but I do not think it is helpful or necessary to ask the inspectorates to step outside their existing remit given the routes already in place. I therefore urge the noble Viscount not to press his amendments.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response, but I am afraid we are still not persuaded on the point we raised around the powers of the independent reviewer to be provided with information. I certainly do not want to repeat what I said in opening but, in response to her earlier remarks, I want her to be clear that we recognise that some progress has been made on the Bill after a year. Without further ado, I have listened very carefully and heard her responses to Amendments 86 to 88, and I will test the opinion of the House on Amendment 87. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 86 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

87: Clause 89, page 54, line 23, leave out “may” and insert “must”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would compel the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent person for the purposes of a review.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I beg to move.