Rent Officers (Housing Benefit and Universal Credit Functions) (Modification) Order 2026
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Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for opening this short debate. Let me say at the start that His Majesty’s Opposition support the principle behind the instrument before us. It reflects a careful exercise of the Government’s statutory powers. The order will ensure that local housing allowance rates, which determine the housing support paid to universal credit and housing benefit claimants, remain at the level set on 31 January 2024 for the 2026-27 period.
While we believe that the decision behind the order is sensible—and I would argue, the only way—we also recognise that concerns have been raised, including by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, about the impact of freezing rates in a context of rising rents. Both noble Baronesses put that case very eloquently. According to figures from the DWP, rents have increased by 14% since the LHA was last increased in April 2024, and over 50% of people in receipt of either housing benefit or universal credit see a shortfall between the cost of their rent and housing support. I say again that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, eloquently set out her case and the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, added her own facts and interesting anecdotes. She went on to say that we cannot carry on spending as much as we are, with which we all agree.
The question that we all come back to is what to do about this. I will refer later to the two-child limit, which is perhaps a black cloud hanging over us all, but can the Minister set out what other measures of help are available for households facing squeezed budgets? Can she explain, particularly for me, the thinking and the policy behind the crisis and resilience fund—the so-called CRF—which will, as I understand it, incorporate the old discretionary housing payments, though not in Wales? I would like to understand the difference here between the CRF and the DHPs, or how they interrelate. By what mechanism will those who are most in need be targeted from now on? What role is there for local authorities?
In her speech, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, referred to houses and homes. She is quite right, because lowering rental levels is surely a priority to help with this particular issue. The Government have said that homes, and building more homes, are a priority. They have stated publicly and clearly that they need and wish to build 1.5 million homes by 2030. If that were the case, it would increase supply, which would, in turn, decrease rents. With that, comes decreased demand, and I suppose the theory is that each house will therefore demand less rent. Where are these new homes? We are more than 18 months into this Government. What progress is being made? This strikes me as being a vital element of this order. The evidence shows that fewer homes are being delivered per year now than the maximum that the last Government managed in a year, which I happen to know was 240,000. I look forward to the Minister’s response to these and other points outlined by the Committee.
This order must be seen in a wider context. We must bear in mind public spending and the welfare policy under this Labour Government. Since 2010, successive Conservative Governments have sought to reform and target welfare so that it acts as a genuine safety net and encourages people into work. With the introduction of universal credit, the central focus was ensuring that the welfare bill was affordable to the taxpayer. We have now set out a plan to deliver £47 billion-worth of savings over the next Parliament; around £23 billion of that will be from non-pensioner welfare reforms, reducing waste and tackling the rising debt. I must make it clear that we will and we must continue to protect those who are genuinely and most in need.
This Government’s approach has been rather different. They have dramatically increased welfare spending, including the breaking of fiscal promises and presiding over higher public debt and taxes. More worryingly, their decisions seem to have been shaped by short-term political pressures, rather than by clear and disciplined fiscal frameworks.
The most notable example of this is the Government’s decision to remove the two-child benefit cap—a policy against which they previously whipped their own MPs. As the Committee will be well aware, this cap was introduced by the previous Conservative Government in 2015 as part of a broader effort to ensure fairness in the welfare system. Indeed, Labour’s own leader initially refused to scrap it, even withdrawing the Whip from MPs who voted to end it and treating it at the time as a tough but necessary choice. Yet in an abrupt reversal, the current Chancellor and Prime Minister abolished the two-child limit in the 2025 Budget at an estimated cost of more than £3 billion, stating:
“We on the Labour Benches do not believe that the solution to a broken welfare system is to punish the most vulnerable”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/11/25; col. 397.]
children. Those are well-meaning words, but that is a stark departure from Labour’s earlier position and one that flies in the face of its own fiscal constraints.
The U-turn came at a time when the Prime Minister’s net favourability happened to be at its lowest. This is irresponsible decision-making. The Government’s expansion of welfare spending has led to higher taxes and long-term pressures on the public finances, with the UK continuing to borrow well over £100 billion per year to fund day-to-day spending. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, might bear this figure in mind because reducing it is surely a massive challenge and a must do to make a real difference through massive savings, which will, ultimately, feed through into alleviating local pressures to help the least well-off. Surely this is one thing that must be looked at with more urgency.
To be clear, we do not believe it is fair to raise the two-child limit. This is because many families in work make the decision to live within their means, including making decisions about the size of their families. These same families lose out when additional funding is provided to those out of work who decide to have more than two children. I am aware that the Bill will soon come before the House and that we will have the opportunity to debate this matter all too soon—it might even be next week—and we will continue to press the Government to ensure that housing support, and welfare more broadly, are sustainable and fair. We must make every effort to support individuals and families into well-paid work and not increase dependence on benefits.
The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for introducing her Motion. If that was the first time she has done so, I commend her on how clearly she set out her case. I thank her for giving us the opportunity to debate the incredibly important subject of housing support. I also thank the other noble Lords who have contributed. For clarity, the order sets local housing allowance rates from April for 2026-27. In his Written Ministerial Statement on 26 November last year, the Secretary of State confirmed that LHA rates would not increase for 2026-27 but would be maintained at their current levels.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, have come at this from the perspective of fiscal inheritance. The fiscal inheritance is not a defence, but it is a reality. I remind the noble Viscount that this Government, when they arrived, were not immediately able to make choices to tackle many of the problems that had been left. Frankly, this was a target-rich environment; there were challenges right across the environment. Our public services were falling apart, our roads and houses had not been supported, and benefits had been frozen or put below inflation for many years, from the coalition Government all the way through until this Government took over. So there are some really significant challenges. That is at the heart of what the Government had to do: we had to make some very difficult choices across the piece on spending, and I will try to explain why.
A key driver of high rents is the lack of housing supply, which is an issue for the whole country, not just for those who get help for their housing from the social security system. The noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, set out the challenge that we are all facing: a significant amount of money is being spent. The Government are prioritising action in the longer term; if we focus only on the short term, we will never be able to address this issue. I will come back later to some of the specifics that have been asked about.
We have therefore committed to build 1.5 million homes in England this Parliament, which includes the biggest increase in social and affordable housebuilding in a generation. We aim to build 300,000 social and affordable homes, and the whole programme is backed by a record £39 billion investment. We know that in many cases it takes a long time to build the homes we need, so we are committed to a whole-system approach to unblock the barriers to building and to address productivity in the housebuilding sector. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, is right: people need housing support now.
To illustrate the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, the DWP continues to spend around £37 billion a year on housing support, and over £13 billion of that is support in the private rented sector. She is right that these are huge sums, even in the context of the social security budget. The Committee may be aware that the last LHA increase in April 2024 cost £7 billion over five years. These are significant sums, so when the Government have to make choices, they have to look very carefully at each individual element of the choices in front of them.
LHA rates are reviewed every year by the Secretary of State, and a range of factors were considered before he decided not to increase rates. He looked at the rental markets across Great Britain. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, is right that rental inflation is slowing: it was over 9% in November 2024 and, by last January, it was down to 3.5%. But the fact is that there are still housing affordability challenges, which are particularly acute in some areas of the country.
Given the challenging fiscal context, the Secretary of State also considered broader social security and wider cross-government priorities, including on homelessness, ahead of Budget decisions. He chose—and he was right—to prioritise certain measures that had a key impact on poverty and living standards. Reducing child poverty is a core manifesto pledge for this Government, and we intend to deliver on it. Removing the two-child limit—we will debate this in more detail next week, and I look forward to debating it with the noble Viscount—will lift 450,000 children out of poverty in the final year of this Parliament. That will rise to around 550,000 alongside other measures set out in the child poverty strategy, such as the expansion of free school meals.
I take the points made by both noble Baronesses about the challenges. If people have gaps in their rent, something else has to go. However, people’s incomes have to be seen in the round. Their incomes are formed not just by the amount of money being given for housing but the amount of money being given to support their children and whether they have to pay for all meals or can get free school meals. Therefore, the Government are making choices, and all these things have to be seen in the round.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
The 300,000 target is for both social and affordable housing. I would be very happy to share the noble Baroness’s views with my colleagues at MHCLG to make sure that they reflect on them, if that is okay with her, as that policy is probably above my pay grade.
On the question asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, the real challenge is that, if we do not get a whole-system approach on this, we are never going to unblock the barriers to building and addressing the productivity issues in the housebuilding sector. We are, therefore, working really closely with industry—including developers, housing associations and local authorities—to try to get a step change in this area. We have already taken some significant steps to address the planning issues that were holding back the supply of housing. Within months of coming into government, we published our revised National Planning Policy Framework, and, in December, we launched a consultation on further reforms to the framework to unlock additional housing supply.
The noble Viscount also asked about what will happen to vulnerable people. Let me explain what is happening there. At the moment, there is something called the household support fund, and, separately, there are discretionary housing payments. Both of these are short-term funds; the DWP gives the money to local authorities to pay them out. The household support fund was only ever done for six months at a time, and it was never clear that it would be done again for the following six months. DHPs, however, were set for a year at a time. There were, therefore, two separate, short-term discretionary schemes with different purposes and different sets of rules. Just to complicate things, they also often went to different tiers of local government.
Instead, we are creating the crisis and resilience fund, which is a single, multi-year, streamlined fund. It will eventually replace both the household support fund and DHPs in England from 1 April 2026. The key is that people can plan for crisis and resilience support longer down the line. To ensure that there is a transition from where we are now to where we are going, discretionary housing payments will be replaced by the housing payment strand of the crisis and resilience fund, which will, for the first two years, simply mimic what discretionary housing payments do now; it will carry on in the same way. In Wales, DHPs will continue to be maintained and delivered, while Scotland has developed its own alternative for that—as this is a devolved issue—which it launched in 2024. So our intention is that that is what will happen.
The £1 billion includes the element for the housing strand but we are working closely with local authorities so that, by the time we get to year 3, we can look at how that can be done. Also, they will be able to top this up if they want. I recognise, in the context of all the challenges they have faced, that some local authorities do this at the moment because they want to put more into housing.
I hope that that is helpful. I would be very happy to answer any other questions.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
Thank you; that was very helpful. May I have some further clarification? Will the CRF, therefore, combine the needs around housing with the needs around budget expenditure for those individuals who are targeted for help? I am thinking that local authorities—if it goes through them—will want to look at each case as it comes up. They will want to look at the housing issues and the expenditure issues and combine the two, which would make sense if that were the case.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
Of course, there are still issues about tiers and responsibility. One of the challenges is that local government reform is going on, which is one of the reasons why we need to make sure that we work with local authorities so that, by the time we get to that point, we have taken account of that. But this is the housing strand within the CRF—the CRF does other things too; it does not deal only with housing. The housing strand, however, is there to deal with support for those whose housing needs are supported through the social security system. I hope that is okay.
The noble Viscount also asked me who makes the decisions, and it is the local authorities. We believe they are best placed to make informed judgments about relative priorities and needs in their area, but we engage with them regularly through regular forums and we publish guidance on both schemes.
I hope that has picked up the questions that all noble Lords have asked. I am always very happy to be interrupted. If I have not, I will look through Hansard, and I will be happy to write if I have missed anything.
To conclude, we really must continue to provide support towards rent costs for those who need it, including the most vulnerable. However, we will have to balance that with challenges in other areas and with the needs of the taxpayer. In the current challenging fiscal environment, measures with the greatest impact on government goals in the area of poverty have been prioritised. That is why we are investing in social and affordable housing, as well as removing the two-child limit to lift children out of poverty—which, by the way, I do not regard as a cloud hanging over anyone; it is a wonderful opportunity to lift children out of poverty, and I am proud that the Government are doing it. That was a little parenthesis. We are also fixing the work disincentive for vulnerable people living in temporary accommodation and supported housing.
Once again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for giving us the chance to discuss this important issue, and I hope that she and the Committee can understand the reasons for the choices we made.
Child Poverty Strategy
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(4 days, 3 hours ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am happy to raise that with colleagues in the DfE, but I reassure the right reverend Prelate that a lot of work has been and is going on in relation to free school meals for children on universal credit, making sure—whether it ends up being auto-enrolment or whether it is about communication or identification—that we get this out to all children. Free school meals are really important and are crucial to children: not only do they get to eat but hungry children struggle to learn, so it is a win-win all round. We think this is an incredibly important measure and we want to make sure that it works.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, no child should grow up in poverty, and we agree that reducing child poverty must be an absolute priority for any Government. The surest answer to helping reduce child poverty is to ensure that more families can access the security and dignity of work, which I do not believe the noble Baroness mentioned. There are many young parents among the current high level of youth unemployment—16.1%—so what steps are the Government taking to engage directly and urgently with this cohort to enable them to secure work and optimise the chances of giving their children a better future?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I absolutely agree with the noble Viscount, and I have said many times from this Dispatch Box that, for many families, work is the best route out of poverty. Of course there will always be those who cannot work, and they deserve a welfare state that supports them, but this Government have invested considerable sums and will invest considerably more in supporting families to work. We already know that parents are actually more likely than average to be in employment. They want to work—they want to support their kids, they want to be a good role model and they want to show them that that is what adult life looks like—but many of them will need extra help, so we are investing heavily in those who have barriers to work. The noble Viscount mentioned young people. The Government have done so much on young people. He will know that Alan Milburn is doing a report for the Government looking at why so many of our young people—one in eight—are not in employment, education or training. That figure is a disgrace and we have to tackle that.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsMonday 23rd February 2026
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-VIII Eighth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (19 Feb 2026)
“Review of impact of this Act on retirement incomes(1) The Secretary of State must, within five years of the passing of this Act, carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.(2) Further reviews must be carried out at intervals of not more than five years thereafter.(3) Each review must consider—(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and(b) whether additional measures are required to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.(4) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of each review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I hope noble Lords have had a restful recess. It is a pleasure to open the first debate on the final day in Committee on this Bill, and I look forward to hearing further and final contributions from noble Lords on this stage of the Bill.
Today, we continue to discuss important issues relating to pension schemes which of course ultimately matter greatly to the millions of individuals who are saving for, or who have saved for, their pensions, and who rely hugely if not wholly on these funds until the end of their lives. With that thought in mind, I turn first to Amendment 207, tabled in my name, which calls for a review of the impact of this legislation on retirement incomes.
When one reflects on the debates we have had in recent weeks, it is clear that they have been concerned not with procedure for its own sake but with the underlying architecture of the pensions system. The question before us has been whether the framework we are constructing will in practice enable schemes to deliver outcomes for their members. The provisions in this legislation are intended to change behaviour and outcomes: if they were not, there would be little purpose in legislating. The Government do not bring forward measures of this scale merely to rearrange, streamline or clarify administrative detail; they do so because they believe the system can and must function better.
So the objective, surely, should be clear: pension schemes should deliver stronger, more reliable outcomes for their members over the long term. Costs should be considered, but they must not become a proxy for value. The true measure of success is whether savers receive adequate and sustainable incomes—for example, the tax decisions by the Government of the time, or for inflation. Above all, schemes must operate with a single disciplined focus to act in the long-term interest of those whose savings they are entrusted to manage. If the Bill, on becoming an Act, succeeds in that ambition, it will deserve praise; if it falls short, as some noble Lords have cautioned it might, we must be able to say so clearly and respond accordingly. Amendment 207 would therefore simply ensure that we have the opportunity to assess whether the legislation has improved adequacy of income in retirement, and if not, to consider what further measures may be required.
I hope noble Lords will agree that this is a measured and sensible provision. It simply asks Ministers and departments to assess objectively what is working, to identify where improvement may be required, and to report their conclusions transparently to Parliament. In a policy area as long term, complex and consequential as pensions, that degree of accountability is essential.
I now turn to Amendment 211, which is more technical but no less important. It would require Ministers to undertake a full and transparent review of why employee and employer pension contributions are treated differently for the purposes of income tax and national insurance. If two forms of pension contributions are treated differently by the tax system, the Government should be able to explain why, clearly, publicly and with evidence. Tax design should be intentional, not simply the accumulated product of historical accident or, indeed, incremental drift.
The truth is that drift is not unique to any one Administration; it is often perceived as a feature or function of government itself. Complex systems evolve over decades; measures are introduced for sound reasons at the time, adjusted in response to fiscal pressure, amended again in the light of political compromise, and gradually layered one upon the other. In essence, “It seemed the right approach at the time” is a mantra, or even a cliché, which Governments in general find difficult to scrutinise as time marches on.
Reflection in government is not easy. Departments are occupied with immediate pressures, and many probably agree with me that those pressures have never been as great as they are at present. Chancellors face short-term fiscal constraints and Ministers must respond to events. In such circumstances, stepping back to ask first-principles questions can be difficult, yet it is precisely that discipline that Parliament should require.
In truth, we are all susceptible to accepting inherited structures without always interrogating whether the original rationale still holds. That is not a criticism; it is a recognition of institutional reality. But where differential tax treatment affects incentives, savings behaviour and long-term retirement outcomes, we have a responsibility to ask why the distinction exists and whether it remains justified. Amendment 211 offers a challenge to this Government: a transparent review would simply ensure that the current approach rests on deliberate policy choice.
At present, employer contributions receive more favourable treatment for national insurance purposes than employee contributions. That differential treatment shapes behaviour. It affects how remuneration is structured, how salary sacrifice operates and ultimately how pensions are accumulated. Pension saving is not a loophole; it is a public good. It reduces future dependency on the state, supports long-term investment and reflects the principle that income saved for retirement should not be taxed more heavily than income spent today. A structured review would require Ministers to demonstrate the behavioural impacts of the current system, its effect on savings rates and its interaction with automatic enrolment. It would ensure that we are not driven by short-term revenue considerations at the expense of long-term saving and fiscal sustainability.
This issue is especially relevant in light of the National Insurance Contributions (Employer Pensions Contributions) Bill, to which my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who is not in her place, and my noble friend Lord Altrincham have been responding on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition. Many of the arguments advanced in that debate bear directly on the substance of this amendment. Recent decisions to increase the tax burden associated with pension saving, including the reduction in the availability and attractiveness of salary sacrifice arrangements, will have consequences across this space. These measures do not operate in isolation: they alter incentives, shape behaviour and affect the very architecture of workplace saving.
It is immediately apparent to pension providers, employers and practitioners that such changes do not, in practice, fall solely on the highest earners. They bear down on those in the middle of the income distribution and, in some cases, below it. Those impacted include young professionals in high-cost cities and mid-career workers seeking to close gaps in their retirement provision, typically earning between £30,000 and £60,000 a year. Given that the average salary in the United Kingdom is just over £37,000, it is difficult to describe individuals within that range as high earners. They are lower-income and middle-income earners, doing precisely what successive Governments have encouraged them to do: to save consistently and prudently for their retirement.
If we reduce the incentives for employer pension contributions through national insurance changes, we must, at the very least, understand the wider implications for pension accumulation, automatic enrolment participation and long-term adequacy of retirement incomes. We should not allow pension policy to become a vehicle for short-term fiscal expediency, nor should we undermine confidence in long-term saving through uncertainty or opacity. Stability and clarity are essential if individuals are to commit a meaningful share of their income to retirement provision over decades.
So Amendment 211 does not seek to dictate an outcome; it seeks an explanation. It asks the Government to set out clearly the rationale for differential treatment within the pensions framework and to consider whether that treatment remains justified in light of our shared objectives: retirement adequacy, fairness between different earners, and sustainable economic growth.
A natural extension of that argument is my Amendment 213, which calls for a review of employment rates and pension adequacy. With the Pensions Commission, under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, reporting in 2027, we recognise that the Government have chosen then to opine and report on the structure of the pensions market before turning to questions of pensions adequacy as a stage two exercise. That is their sequencing decision. However, adequacy cannot remain a secondary consideration indefinitely. If the commission is to revisit the long-term sustainability of the system, it must also grapple with who the system is working for and who it is not. During previous discussions in Committee, the Minister pledged to write about the timeliness of stage two and adequacy. How is she getting on with that reply, and where are we on the timeline on adequacy?
Amendment 211 would specify that the review must consider the pension adequacy of workers who are in part-time or insecure work, the pension adequacy of those who take career breaks and parental leave, and the impact of regional labour market disparities on pension outcomes. If pension policy continues to assume linear, full-time, uninterrupted employment, it will systematically underserve large sections of the population.
In conclusion, adequacy matters. I will not rehearse the statistics relating to those who are not saving enough, but the figures are stark. I have spoken at length, as have others in this Committee, about the risks of drifting into a system that is technically sound in structure but insufficient in outcome. A pension system that does not deliver adequate retirement incomes will, in time, recreate the very pressures on the state that automatic enrolment was designed to reduce.
We believe that these amendments are modest. They ask for transparency, analysis and review, not prescription. They aim to ensure that fairness and adequacy sit alongside structural reform. For these reasons, I commend these amendments to the Committee and I beg to move.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
My Lords, I will intervene briefly in support of my noble friend’s amendment—not on the specifics but because, having read again the 42nd report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which refers directly to this legislation, it has become ever more obvious that this skeleton, which has taken up an enormous amount of time and is in itself highly complex, leaves an enormous number of question marks. It leaves an enormous number of doubts and concerns, most of which the Government are placing at their own disposal through secondary legislation, which is at this point equally uncertain.
Therefore, it seems absolutely essential that, when there are proposals such as those we have just heard from my noble friend—to review the commencement of the legislation, or to have reviews on a five-yearly basis, or indeed in any other ways, of some of the more complex areas—the Government should concede that that is appropriate in a Bill of this kind. I do not think I have ever read in my time here such a clear statement as that made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee about the nature of legislation. It would be serious enough if it were dealing with a Bill with very few clauses and of little import, but this is of such a substantial nature. The report we have read condemning the nature of the Bill for not having the flesh around those skeletal bones is notable and important. The Government should therefore be much more amenable to the sort of sensible proposals being made in the amendments of my noble friend.
I do not wish to speak further on this, but it seems terribly important that—whether it is dealt with now or at a later stage—there be an understanding that the Bill is entirely dependent upon future secondary legislation. Standing alone is, I am afraid, an unacceptable set of provisions.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am very conscious that I spoke at some length in my opening speech, so I will be brief in closing and do not intend to question the Minister too much on the points that she made. I will say only that, as my noble friend Lord Kirkhope rightly said, pensions are complex and need to be well thought through. This is a skeleton Bill, which we have pointed out in many of the debates, but I understand that, as the Minister said, it is important to look long term.
I have only one question. I may not be the only one who is confused about the timings of the commission. I think the Minister said that an interim report is being produced by the commission this spring and leading through to early 2027 pensions adequacy will be included in that report and the commission will set out options for the Government to comment on. I am putting words into the Minister’s mouth. I wonder whether she can confirm exactly where we stand on pensions adequacy. It may be that that will be in the letter that is being written, which might come my way.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
A letter is being prepared and will be sent after Committee. I want to put on record the timings and to be very clear about them. The interim report will be published this spring, and the aim is for the final report to be in early 2027. I will put any further detail in the letter to the noble Viscount.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I am sorry to labour this like a long-playing record, but will pensions adequacy be included in that report? Or are we looking for something further?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
The Pensions Commission is there to look at the adequacy and sustainability of the pension system; that is its job.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I would be grateful if the Minister would let me look at the letter, anyway; it is important to see that in detail.
To conclude, I want to pick up on Amendment 214 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, concerning a universal pension advice entitlement. The context for this amendment is certainly well understood. The structure of pension provision has altered fundamentally over recent decades, and most private sector workers are now members of defined contribution schemes rather than defined benefit schemes. As we know, defined benefit schemes provided a predictable income for life; by contrast, defined contribution schemes require individuals to determine contribution levels, investment choices, consolidation of pension pots and the manner and timing of drawing retirement income. The risks associated with investment performance and longevity now rest primarily with the saver rather than the sponsoring employer.
In that environment, the case for improved engagement is compelling. Without appropriate support, individuals might under-save, remain invested in default arrangements without appreciating the degree of risk involved or make irreversible decisions at retirement without a full understanding of the consequences. There are also wider public policy implications. Inadequate retirement provision can increase reliance on means-tested benefits, intensify pressure on the state pension and contribute to intergenerational fiscal strain. In that sense, the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, has identified a matter of genuine structural importance.
However—this chimes with the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Davies—there are practical considerations that cannot be ignored. The amendment refers to free and impartial pension advice. In regulatory terms, advice is distinct from guidance. Regulated advice requires authorisation by the FCA, entails suitability obligations and carries legal liability. To extend personalised regulated advice as a universal entitlement would require significant capacity, funding and oversight, and it would not be a modest undertaking. I reiterate that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and the Minister. The complexity of the system is real but so too are the operational and financial implications of delivering such an entitlement at scale, although I appreciate the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, bringing this up; it has been a valuable debate.
With that, I will dwell on what has been said in this debate in Hansard to work out what we might bring back on Report but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Review of pension communications and financial promotion rules(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review of all legislation and regulatory rules governing marketing, financial promotion and member communications in relation to occupational and personal pension schemes.(2) The review must consider whether existing rules unduly restrict pension providers from—(a) communicating risks, warnings, and comparative information to scheme members;(b) providing guidance on fund choice, consolidation, and value for money;(c) supporting informed member decision-making without constituting regulated financial advice.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before both Houses of Parliament.”
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in this group, Amendments 208 and 210, tabled in my name. The proposed new clause in Amendment 208 would create a permissive power for Ministers to help employers to understand and navigate the different pension options available to them, including the choice between salary sacrifice and ordinary contributions.
Since the introduction of automatic enrolment, employers must provide workplace pensions as a default. This comes with an opt-out for employees, although opt-out rates are very low, happily. This reform has rightly been regarded as a success: participation has increased dramatically and millions more people are now saving for retirement. But although participation has improved, the structure through which those pensions are delivered remains complex. Employers may offer standard employee and employer contributions; operate salary sacrifice arrangements, whereby pension contributions are made before tax and national insurance; choose between different occupational schemes; use master trusts; or establish single-employer schemes. Each of those options carries different financial implications, administrative consequences and regulatory requirements.
For large firms with human resources departments and access to professional advisers, navigating these choices is manageable. However, for small and medium-sized enterprises, often it is not. This amendment simply gives Ministers the power to publish comparative guidance, provide decision-making tools, issue best practice principles and clarify regulatory compliance requirements. It does not mandate a particular scheme, it does not impose a new burden; it equips employers with information, and in short, reduces confusion.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his remarks and support, and to the Minister for the details she provided in her response, which I appreciate. While I am of course disappointed that the Government are not able to accept these amendments today, I recognise that this is a matter of balance and practical implementation, rather than fundamental disagreement.
On Amendment 210 in particular, I appreciate that there is already a careful line between acting in members’ best interests and avoiding what might be construed as advertising or product steering. The noble Baroness made that distinction too. This is precisely why I believe that a structured review would be valuable, to ensure that we are getting that balance right as the system evolves. Picking up on an offer—I think it was an offer—from the Minister, I would be happy to work with her and the Government between now and Report to consider how this might be framed in a constructive and proportionate way, but I acknowledge what she said in her closing remarks.
More broadly, on helping employers, particularly smaller firms—the Minister also mentioned this—to navigate pension arrangements with greater clarity, I accept that work is under way through regulators and guidance bodies, but as the system grows more sophisticated, there is merit in ensuring that political focus and strategic direction remain strong. If employers are central to delivering retirement security, then supporting them effectively is surely not optional but integral to the success of the framework. However, with that, and in the spirit of continued engagement, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I urge the Minister in her reply to stress the need for caution in this area. I am afraid I understand what the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, is saying: we do seem to have been waiting a long time for the dashboard. However, I have always had questions about the private sector dashboard, and I think they can be answered only as and when the MaPS dashboard is up and running. The problem at heart—and it may be a caricature—is about the point of a private sector dashboard. It could all too easily be a way of getting hold of data. It is the old saying that you are not the customer, you are the product. That is the fear with the private sector dashboard, which is why we have to get the public sector dashboard up and working. We know what the issues are. It may be necessary to have private sector dashboards, but I am still not totally convinced.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in broad support of Amendment 218D, tabled by my noble friend Lady Coffey.
Let me start by recording my thanks to the Minister, the Pensions Dashboards Programme team and MaPS for the recent briefing session afforded to noble Lords, which was thorough; I felt that it was constructive, and, if I may say so, reassuring in so many respects. We heard that some three-quarters of workplace and personal pension memberships—that is, around 60 million people—are now connected to the ecosystem. This is no small achievement; we should acknowledge that. We were told that the October 2026 connection deadline remains on track, which is of course welcome.
Connecting schemes to the system is one stage, while ensuring that the dashboard operates effectively for consumers is another. Delivering the money helper dashboard, important though that is, is not the same as establishing a fully functioning marketplace that includes private sector dashboards. These are separate phases of the programme and ought to be treated as such.
In that context, we were taken through the money helper dashboard and its intended customer journey. It is a significant and necessary first step—no one disputes that—but it is explicitly designed to be the foundation, not the finished structure. The question that therefore arises is a straightforward one: what is the clearly defined pathway from that foundation to the wider ecosystem that Parliament was originally invited to envisage?
As my noble friend Lady Coffey said, the Government have confirmed, most recently in October 2024, that the money helper dashboard will be made available to the public before any private sector dashboards are permitted to launch. I understand this sequencing to some extent. It is sensible to test the system, assess customer behaviour and ensure that it is secure and reliable. To that extent, I understand the approach that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has taken; he used the word “caution”. However, mine is a slightly different point—it chimes with those from the noble Baroness and my noble friend Lady Coffey—which is that there should be at least a plan and a timetable.
The Government have stated their commitment to private sector dashboards in principle. A commitment in principle must now be matched by clarity in practice, which is why I think that my noble friend’s amendment is very much necessary. When do the Government expect private dashboards to be authorised? If a firm date cannot yet be provided, can the Minister at least set out the framework within which that decision will be taken? What are the stages? What are the criteria? What is the intended sequence of regulatory approvals? Over what period do the Government expect those steps to be completed?
We are told that private dashboards will proceed only once the service is judged to be reliable, safe and secure, and once, of course, it has satisfied the FCA, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Pensions Regulator and MaPS. This is entirely proper, but does that mean that no indicative timetable can be offered until every test has been passed? Surely not. Is there no internal planning assumption or projected window? How are industry participants expected to prepare if there is no sense of when authorisation might realistically occur? Is there not a risk that the programme becomes defined solely by the October 2026 connection deadline? What sits beyond that date? What is the Government’s intended next milestone? Without a clear forward plan—this is my point—how can Parliament assess progress?
My noble friend’s amendment does not seek to override safeguards. It simply seeks clarity and discipline. The proposal that the FCA should open the gateway to private dashboard operators within six months of the public dashboard going live would establish a reasonable and clear expectation. If the Government disagree with that period, what alternative do they propose? What is their preferred timetable?
There is also a practical issue, which cannot be ignored, because the successful introduction of private dashboards will depend heavily on data quality; that has been mentioned. What is the Government’s current assessment of the accuracy and completeness of data across connected schemes? Where are the known weaknesses, and what remedial action is under way? How frequently is data quality being tested and reported?
I know that this is a familiar question that has been asked as we have been taken through the progress on the dashboards programme—I have been very grateful for the updates—but what engagement is taking place with schemes and providers to ensure that preparation extends beyond technical connection and moves towards operational readiness? Are the communications with industry focused only on meeting connection deadlines, or do they also address the standards required for a competitive, consumer-facing environment?
In conclusion, this programme has significant potential, but potential must be matched by a structured plan. Parliament is entitled to understand not only where the programme stands today but where it is going and on what timetable. My noble friend Lady Coffey is right to press for that clarity and, unapologetically, I have asked a lot of questions that chime with her. I await the Minister’s response with interest.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsThursday 5th February 2026
(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-VII(a) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Seventh Marshalled List) - (4 Feb 2026)
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I wish only to say that I agree with the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the lengthy exposition from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I give them my support.
This group deals with technical amendments in the main, but they go to a question of basic fairness for pensioners whose schemes have failed. There are eight amendments in the Minister’s name, which shows that Bills can be amended, because the Government are amending their own Bill. Their amendments are no less important than those proposed on this side of the Room or those proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on the other.
The Government have accepted the principle of restoring inflation protection for pre-1997 service in the PPF and the FAS. These amendments ensure that the policy operates as intended, covering cases where the schemes technically add indexation rules that did not apply to all pre-1997 service.
The concern here is consistency and completeness. As has been said by other speakers, without these clarifications, some pensions will fall through the cracks due to historic scheme design quirks, rather than any distinction of principle. Any schemes that were and will be proposed will have quirks that are going to be found out in due course. I ask the Minister to confirm that the Government’s intention is to deliver equal treatment for those with equivalent service histories and that no group will be excluded because of technical anomalies.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will mainly speak to and concentre on the government amendments in this group. I start by thanking the Minister for setting them out so clearly. We welcome the additional clarity that they provide.
In particular, these amendments ensure that the Financial Assistance Scheme and the PPF payments are treated consistently where a pension scheme formally required pre-1997 indexation but where that requirement did not in fact apply to the specific pre-1997 service for which financial assistance is being paid. Put simply, this is a technical clarification to ensure that indexation under the FAS reflects a member’s actual scheme entitlement, even where a scheme nominally provided for pre-1997 indexation but did not apply it to the service being compensated. We believe that this is a useful and sensible point of clarification—one that helps to ensure that the system operates as it should do.
However, I would be grateful if, when she closes, the Minister could confirm that it is now the Government’s view that these amendments are sufficient to close what may previously have been a gap in the original drafting. In particular, can she confirm that the Government are satisfied that these changes are enough to avoid confusion, to avoid the risk of legal challenge and to ensure that the Financial Assistance Scheme remains, in essence, what it should be—a safety net—rather than becoming an unintended upgrade?
I want also to make a broader process point, because these changes emerged relatively late in proceedings in the other place. I would welcome assurances from the Minister that the relevant stakeholders have been properly consulted and that the Government do not anticipate the need for further amendments on this issue in the Commons—or, indeed, as the Bill continues to go through Parliament. The Minister for Pensions, Torsten Bell, has previously stated that this change will affect around 250,000 members of the PPF, increasing their pension payments by an average of around £400 a year. The Minister cited that figure in her opening remarks, but is that still the Government’s firm and final assessment of the scale and impact of this measure? Perhaps the Minister could clarify that for us.
I also note the comments made by Sara Protheroe, the PPF’s chief customer officer, who said:
“While implementing this change will be no small task”—
that is probably an understatement—the PPF is
“fully committed to delivering this at the earliest opportunity if and when it becomes law”.
That welcome commitment raises an important practical question for the Government, does it not? What assessment has the Minister made of the extra resources that might be required? What support will be provided to the PPF to ensure that delivery can take place smoothly and without delay? Have the Government assessed whether additional resources, which could come via capacity or funding, will be required to implement this change effectively? If so, how do they intend to provide that support?
Regarding Amendment 203ZB, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I will have more to say in subsequent groups. As the noble Lord said, there are amendments on the FAS and PPF in three different groups today. I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I delay my brief comments. I also listened carefully to the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. It is best that I make comments in later groups.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I will briefly speak in support of the amendments. I emphasise that they look at how to do this by lump-sum payments, rather than by increasing pensions. That is important. It is what we in my profession used to call “creative accountancy”. It seeks to achieve a result by lump sums, more or less off the Government’s balance sheet. There has been some blending of the funds in the past. It is a way of doing it in a creative accountancy way, largely getting rid of the problem by lump-sum payments. I hope that the Government will look at this in a creative way in order to provide some justice without incurring an ongoing debt.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 187A, 188A, 189A and 203ZA tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. She has long been a formidable and principled advocate for pension savers and much of the Committee will be sympathetic to the underlying concerns that she raised in her remarks. In particular, her consistent focus on member protection, governance and long-term security has materially shaped the debate on pensions policy over many years—and rightly so.
However—the Committee might expect me to say this—while I share the noble Baroness’s objectives, I am not persuaded that the amendments, as drafted, strike the right balance in this instance. I listened carefully to her remarks and her constructive suggestions as to how such payments could be made in the form of lump sums, whether through several lump sums or another way. As ever, she is constructive and positive, and I accept that. These amendments would use the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make retrospective lump-sum payments to compensate for unpaid historical indexation. We think that that would represent a significant shift in principle.
I listened carefully, as I always do, to the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, who called retrospection a red herring. I was not absolutely sure what he meant by that. As I see it, retrospection is just that: retrospection. I think that it describes the payments in the way that it is meant to do. However, the PPF was designed as a forward-looking safety net, not as a mechanism for reopening past outcomes or making retrospective compensation payments. The Minister, to be fair to her, made this clear in her closing remarks in previous groups.
Such an approach would raise serious concerns about cost, complexity and consistency. Although we are somewhat clearer about costs from the helpful remarks from the Minister in the previous group, I am still uncertain—as, I think, other Members of the Committee are—about what the overall costs would be and what the impact would be on the levy and on other contributors. That uncertainty makes me cautious about supporting these amendments, which risk turning a clearly defined insurance mechanism into an open-ended compensation scheme. I suspect that the Minister—without wanting to steal her thunder—may take a similar view in her response, judging from her remarks in the previous group.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
The noble Lord just said that this would impact on the levy, but if there is a one-off payment, it would not affect the scheme going forward. Therefore, it should not impact the levy at all; it is a lump-sum payment rather than an increase in the base pension payable going forward.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
As ever, that is a very helpful clarification, but I will leave it up to the Minister to answer that. I stick with my view that we are not persuaded by these amendments. Perhaps there is more debate to be had. I have said all that I need to say; I am afraid that I am unable to support these amendments.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for introducing her amendment and all noble Lords who have spoken. I am afraid the noble Viscount has given a spoiler regarding my response, because I articulated many of the arguments on this in the previous group in response to my noble friend Lord Davies.
The Government recognise that pre-1997 indexation is an important issue for affected PPF and FAS members. That is why we listened and took the action that we did. The changes proposed by Amendments 186A, 187A, 188A and 189A would, essentially, award payments of arrears for PPF and FAS members who have missed out on pre-1997 increases up to now. As the noble Baroness described, that would mean a one-off lump-sum payment to be made from the PPF reserve. Amendment 203ZA would require the Secretary of State to determine how those additional payments would be funded in FAS.
I acknowledge the impact on members. This has been a long-running issue and, for reasons that noble Lords have clearly articulated, members will want to see their increases quickly now that we have made a decision to act. As I said, we expect that the first payments will be made to eligible PPF and FAS members in January 2027, which is the earliest possible opportunity to do so, and we are working closely with the PPF on implementing that. I recognise that prospective increases do not restore the erosion of the real-terms value of members’ retirement incomes. However, the Government’s reforms will make a meaningful difference to affected members while balancing the impact on levy payers who support the PPF, taxpayers who pay for FAS and affordability for the Government.
In response to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, any payment that comes out of the PPF reserve will reduce the size of that reserve and therefore, in our judgment, must make it more likely that there may be a need for a levy to be reintroduced at some point. I shall come back to the arguments in a moment, as I said to my noble friend, but I have noted the importance of responsible management of the PPF reserve following the introduction of our reforms. The noble Baroness’s proposal—creative though it is, and I acknowledge that—would clearly also reduce the reserve. Although the reserve is forecast to grow, without a really substantive PPF levy the PPF will depend on its reserves and its investment returns to manage the risks from existing liabilities and future claims across the £1 trillion DB system.
Historically, the PPF has supported nearly £10 billion in claims, funded in part by the amount collected through levies. Without future levies, the reserve has to cover upcoming claims. The reserve offers protection against future risks, such as new claims and longevity risks, and, as I have said, avoids the need for a significant levy reintroduction. I also noted the significant public finance implications of changes in my earlier remarks.
The Government have not made an assessment of the noble Baroness’s proposal because we considered carefully what we thought it was appropriate to do. We worked with the PPF and fully considered the broader context of introducing pre-1997 indexation in both the PPF and FAS. In the end, it is the responsibility of the Government to strike an affordable balance of interest between all parties. We believe our reform achieves that. This measure is a fundamental shift in the level of protection afforded by the PPF and FAS to their members, but we think that is right and the appropriate balance. In the light of that, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 203 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and I am grateful to him for his tour d’horizon on the history behind this issue with the uprating, going back through several parties and Parliaments. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, I fully understand why members find this proposal attractive. The idea that pensions should keep pace with inflation feels intuitively fair, of course, but we think that mandating inflation increases for all pre-1997 service in live defined benefit schemes would be a step too far.
This amendment would dictate in statute how trustees and employers must use scheme resources and any surplus. We believe that this is overly prescriptive and risks being actively anti-business. Many employers are already using DB surpluses constructively, and that includes improving DC contributions for younger workers, supporting intergenerational fairness, and strengthening scheme security through insurance-backed arrangements and special purpose vehicles. We think that these are sensible negotiated outcomes, reflecting the needs of both members and sponsors.
It is also important to remember that employers have carried DB risk for decades. When funding assumptions proved wrong, when markets fell or when longevity rose faster than expected, it was employers who stepped in, often for many years, through additional contributions and balance sheet strain—that might be an understatement. I choose to use a casino analogy, not to make light of a serious subject but to illustrate the basic logic of risk sharing. Here goes.
In a defined benefit scheme, the employer and members effectively walk into a casino together. Trustees place bets on behalf of the scheme on how much risk to take in the investment strategy, what funding assumptions to use, how quickly to de-risk, how to price longevity and inflation exposure. Members benefit if those bets perform well because the scheme is safer and more likely to deliver the promised pension in full. But, crucially, if those bets go wrong—that is, if markets fall, inflation spikes, people live longer than expected or the assumptions prove too optimistic—the bill lands not on members but on the employer. The sponsoring employer is legally on the hook to repair the damage, often through years of additional contributions, cash calls at the worst possible moment and significant strain on the balance sheet. That is what the employer covenant means in practice: it is the backstop when the world does not behave as forecast, which, as we know, it often does not.
So, if we accept that the employer is the party that must cover the losses when the scheme is underwater, surely it cannot be right to argue that, when the scheme comes in above water—when investment returns are strong, funding improves and a surplus emerges—the employer must be barred in principle from any share of that upside. That is not risk sharing; it is risk asymmetry. Heads, the members win; tails, the employer loses. In any rational system, if one party is compelled to underwrite the downside, that party must be permitted—subject, of course, to trustee oversight and member protection—to share in the upside. If we legislate for a system where the sponsor carries all the risk but is denied any benefit when outcomes are good, surely we distort incentives. We make sponsorship less attractive and encourage employers to close schemes faster, de-risk more aggressively or avoid offering good provision in the first place.
This is a crucial point. The fair outcome is not that employers take everything or that members do. It is that surplus is discussed and allocated jointly by trustees and employers, balancing member security, scheme sustainability and the long-term health of the sponsoring employer. That is partnership. Legislation should support that balance but not override it; that is a crucial point.
Mandating automatic inflation uplift would also have wider consequences: higher employer costs; increased insolvency risk, ultimately borne by the PPF; knock-on effects on wages, investment and employment; and, potentially, higher PPF levies. For PPF schemes, uplift is manageable because the employer covenant has gone and Parliament controls the compensation framework. Imposing similar requirements on live schemes, however, risks destabilising otherwise healthy employers. In short, uplift should be an option, not a statutory obligation. As I said earlier, decisions should rest with trustees and employers together and not be compelled by legislation.
That said, focusing on choice does not mean ignoring power imbalances, because in some schemes genuine deadlock leads trustees to sit on surplus and de-risk further. That may be understandable, but I think it is fair to say it is inefficient. Government should be looking at how to enable better use of surplus by agreement, not mandating outcomes. Much more needs to be done on breaking deadlocks, but we believe that Amendment 203 is not the right way to do it.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
May I just correct the record? I believe that the Goode committee may indeed have recommended limited price inflation up to 5%, and I apologise to the Committee.
“Review of pension awareness and saving among young people(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of this Act being passed, carry out a review into—(a) levels of pension awareness and understanding among young people, and(b) the effectiveness of existing measures to support young people to begin saving into a pension.(2) The review must consider—(a) barriers to pension saving faced by young people, including low earnings, insecure work, and gaps in financial education,(b) the impact of the automatic enrolment age and earnings thresholds, and(c) options to improve engagement, participation, and long-term retirement outcomes for younger savers.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to review pension awareness among young people and to consider how existing policy could better support earlier engagement and saving into pensions.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 205 in my name would require the Government to review levels of pension awareness among young people and to consider how existing policy might better support earlier engagement with pension saving. Members of the Committee will have noticed that I have included certain steers as to what the review should focus on; I hope that this brief debate will enable Members to agree largely with what we are trying to do here.
For many people in their 20s and 30s, pension saving is driven almost entirely by automatic enrolment. In one respect, this is a success story: it clearly illustrates the impact that automatic enrolment has had, with around 71% of young people in full-time employment now contributing to a pension and often benefiting from employer contributions, tax efficiency and the long-term advantages of compounding. Of course, there are opt-outs, but I am pleased to say—I hope that the Minister will confirm this—that opt-out rates remain relatively low.
Progress is, therefore, welcome. However, it still leaves nearly one-third of young people not saving at all. Starting to contribute at a younger age makes an enormous difference. Compound interest, where returns build, not only on contributions but on previous returns, means that early saving is particularly powerful. Small amounts saved early can matter more than much larger sums saved later.
Yet, the reality facing young people is difficult. Surveys consistently show that younger generations face an uphill financial struggle. For many, and I remember how I felt in my early 20s, retirement feels distant and abstract, something to worry about later, rather than now. Unsurprisingly, confidence among those aged 25 to 44 about their later life savings is among the lowest of any age.
We need to understand why this is the case. It is not enough for policy bodies to list familiar explanations, such as behavioural bias, lack of knowledge or low trust, and then publish discussion papers. The Government need to know in detail what is actually preventing young people engaging with pensions. If automatic enrolment is still leaving out around one-third of eligible workers, more work clearly needs to be done. As with most things in pensions policy, the answer will be complicated, but complexity is not an excuse for inaction.
We should be clear that automatic enrolment alone is not sufficient to deliver an adequate income in retirement. Of course, I am very aware that the pensions review will be looking at this as its stage 2 focus, and I will talk more about that later. Will the pensions review properly examine these barriers to saving among the young? If not, why not? I ask the Government to give a response on this.
Young people are often focused on more immediate priorities: for example, saving for a house deposit, building an emergency fund or paying off student loans understandably come first and spring to mind; pensions, as I said earlier, are seen as something for later life. But time does not pause and there are real benefits to saving early. Early contributions help smooth out market volatility and allow savers to benefit fully from compounding over decades. Most young people will be in defined contribution schemes, where these effects matter greatly.
There is also a deeper issue of confidence. Nearly half of Gen Z believe that the state pension will not exist by the time they retire. This is a generation shaped by repeated economic shocks, from the financial crisis to the pandemic and the cost of living crisis triggered by the war in Europe. For them, pensions can feel less like a promise and more like a relic. The question is, what do we do about it? I am disappointed, as I said earlier, that pension adequacy appears only in the second stage of the review. In my view, and many people’s views, this should be a priority. Your Lordships should be asking whether lowering the automatic enrolment age, removing the lower qualifying earnings band or increasing minimum contribution rates would deliver better outcomes.
We should be asking what more can be done to reduce the barriers that discourage young people from saving at all. This is why the amendment seeks to require the Government to move faster to review pension awareness among young people and how existing policy would better support early engagement—that is, to move now and not wait until stage 2.
Finally, reverting to the barriers that I alluded to, I will make one final point, which is on the question of compulsion—just to get my oar in on this before the end of today’s proceedings. Mandation, or even the threat of it, will fall most heavily on younger savers, a point made powerfully by my noble friend Lord Fuller earlier in the week. It risks burdening a generation who are 30 or 40 years away from retirement and who already face significant disadvantage within the system. There is already generational unfairness in pensions policy and we believe that mandation would only entrench this. It should have no place in the Bill, but we have rehearsed those arguments before. Without further ado, I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly but enthusiastically in support of Amendment 205. The case for a review was eloquently put by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and its merits are surely obvious. I hope the Minister will be able to agree with that.
In particular, I hope the review will take a close look at the situation that many Gen Z people find themselves in. Many work in the gig economy or are self-employed. The Gen Z average savings are small: 57% have pots smaller than £1,000 according to PPI data, and half of them cannot estimate their pots in any case. Perhaps alarmingly, 45% of Gen Z people rely heavily on social media for financial information—presumably delivered by animated cats. The proposed review could and should examine this in much more detail.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will make just a few rounding-up comments. I am very pleased to have the support for my amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe in particular, and from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. It was very helpful to hear from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe the information she received directly from the review that she undertook into retirement age.
The Minister referred to the importance of education; I took note of her very helpful answers on what is happening at the sharp end of schools. I also took note of the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the helpful suggestions that the regulators could perhaps play a more proactive role in this area.
I believe that Amendment 205 is modest but necessary. If we are serious about improving retirement outcomes, we must start by understanding why so many young people are disengaged and by shaping policy that meets them where they are, rather than where we wish they were.
I am delighted to see that the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, is in her place. We are all very keen to know what will come out from the Pensions Commission.
One question I put to the Minister now is about the timings. My understanding is that stage one will report in early 2027—one year’s time—but stage two, which is on this subject of pensions adequacy, will be at a later stage. Can the Minister clarify those timings, as they are still a bit unclear? I understand that she is undertaking a huge amount of very important work, but that would be very helpful.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I will simply say that there will be a report early next year. I am very happy to write to the noble Lord to confirm any future timings.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I appreciate the answer to that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsTuesday 3rd February 2026
(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-VI(a) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Sixth Marshalled List) - (3 Feb 2026)
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions. It might take 300 years to get it right, but we do not have 300 years; we are trying to get it right in the course of a few meetings, as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, pointed out. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, gave us the view from the coalface with regard to the decisions that trustees have to take and about trustees working on behalf of their members. The key concern, which is why I support these amendments, is that the default should be shaped around members’ needs and outcomes, not regulatory convenience or market consolidation by default.
The amendments in this group emphasise the importance of competition, innovation and transparency. They highlight the need for clear member communication before defaults are subject to mandation, for a value-for-money framework to be in place first and, I am afraid, for Ministers to justify why mandation is limited to automatic enrolment defaults. The amendments seek to put some meat on to what this Bill is meant to do. They are, I think, necessary to make sense of the precautions that are needed if this Bill goes forward.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I hope that the Committee will think that it makes sense if I begin with the four amendments in this group tabled in my name. I start with our probing stand-part question on Clause 45. This is a short clause, but an important one. It makes changes to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The purpose of the question is simply to understand the practical effect of those changes, particularly in the context of the wider programme of consolidation and reform of assimilated European Union law.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who I am pleased to say is in her place and has spoken so eloquently, may feel a certain sense of déjà vu, having spent a considerable time on the Front Bench examining precisely these issues. My questions to the Minister are therefore straightforward. What, in practical terms, does Clause 45 change in the operation of the Act?
I start with some fairly basic questions for clarification. Will further secondary legislation be required to give effect to these provisions? If so, do the Government have a timetable over which they envisage this process taking place? How does this clause interact with the statutory instruments recently considered by the Grand Committee as part of the wider reform programme? This is a live and important area. As assimilated European Union law becomes domestic law and increasingly interacts with our financial institutions, the FCA and other relevant regulators, it is essential that Parliament has clarity on how these changes fit together and where accountability lies.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I have just a short comment. The Minister needs to explain why existing protections are insufficient and how this power will be constrained in practice. The concern is that lowering the evidential bar for intervention risks undermining legal certainty, which we have before intervention, and then trust in the scheme governance. An override of contractual terms should be firmly evidence-based and used sparingly. When there is a contract and we are saying that the contract could be overridden, we need to know with some facts in what circumstances it can be overridden for some wider purpose which the Government think is needed. I do not think that is proven as yet.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I speak briefly to Amendment 175, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. This amendment relates to new Section 117D, the best interests test as set out in Clause 48. This new section establishes the test that must be satisfied before a unilateral change can be made. It requires a provider to reasonably conclude that such a change is reasonably likely to lead to
“a better outcome for the directly affected members … (taken as a whole)”
and to
“no worse an outcome for the other members of the scheme”,
also taken as a whole.
Many of the questions that my noble friend and the noble Baroness have raised reflect concerns that have been put to us during scrutiny of the Bill. In particular, there remains uncertainty about what, in practice, is meant by a better outcome, and how that judgment will be assessed, evidenced and challenged. I say again, as we have said on different parts of the Bill, that we believe we need definitions and clarity.
We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on this point. The clarity and robustness of the best interests test are critical, particularly where changes may occur without the explicit consent of individual members. If that clarity is not forthcoming, this may well be an issue to which we will need to return.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and others for their contributions. Clause 48 inserts new Part 7A, on
“Unilateral changes to pension schemes”,
referred to as “contractual override”, into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. As has been clear, that will enable providers of FCA-regulated DC workplace pension schemes to override the terms of a pension scheme without the consent of individual members. To be clear, that will mean that providers will be able to transfer members to a different pension scheme, to make a change that would otherwise require consent, or to vary the terms of members’ contracts. The Bill provides important protections around the use of such powers, which I will come on to.
The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, asked why we want to do this—why change anything? I will explain. Providers can have thousands of DC arrangements for different employers, which will include a large number of legacy schemes that predate the introduction of auto-enrolment. Some of those arrangements will be delivering poor value for members but, due to the challenges of engaging with members, there is often little that providers can do about it. That is because, currently, providers have to gain individual consent from each member of the scheme to enact the changes that will be allowed under this part. That is time-consuming, costly and often simply impractical. In many cases, members will not even have kept their contact details updated.
Contractual override aims to address that issue and, in doing so, it would establish broad equivalence with the trust-based market, where trustees already have the power to conduct bulk transfers. The measure is necessary to help drive better outcomes for members and help to establish fewer larger pension schemes that are delivering value for money, supporting the scale measures and value-for-money framework also implemented by the Bill.
We want to protect consumers, so the Bill introduces a number of important safeguards, including the best interests test, which must be met and certified by an independent person with sufficient expertise before a contractual override can occur. That test is the focus of the amendments. Amendment 175 from noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, probes the test to assess whether this should proceed. She asked about the relationship to the FCA’s consumer duty—I think she asked why we need it at all if we have the FCA consumer duty. The answer is to provide an additional and clear safeguard. We believe that that is necessary given the nature of what is being provided for here.
However, the Government are committed to making sure that this works well. We will continue to work closely with the FCA as it beds in the consumer duty, and to engage with stakeholders about their experience of the duty and its impact. The FCA will develop its rules for contractual override in its usual manner and will consult on that, so there will be an opportunity for people to respond to the way that engages and to identify any of the issues that have been raised.
Amendment 175A from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would alter the threshold for the best interests test from requiring that a change is “reasonably likely” to achieve a better outcome to requiring that “there is evidence” that the change will achieve a better outcome. I will explain why the Government believe that our test strikes the right balance between providing robust consumer protections and still making it practical for schemes to carry out a contractual override where it is the right thing to do. The test itself allows for a contractual override to take place only when the provider has reasonably concluded that the change is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for directly affected members and no worse an outcome for the other members of the scheme. I will break down some of the specific requirements that must be met for it to be satisfied. First, the provider must conclude that it is “reasonably likely” that the contractual override will lead to a better outcome for directly affected members, taken as a whole, and no worse an outcome for the other members taken as a whole.
The provision accounts for the fact that, although no provider can predict the future with certainty, they must conclude based on the information available, with a reasonable level of certainty, that the outcome is better for the directly affected members taken as a whole and no worse an outcome for the other members taken as a whole. That means that the provider must clearly evidence this assertion in order to proceed. We believe that changing the test from “reasonably likely” to “there is evidence”, as in the amendment, would lower the threshold of the test and reduce consumer protection, because the alternative wording provides no requirements about the strength of the evidence and leaves open the possibility that decisions could be taken on the basis of limited or poor evidence. By contrast, the existing wording requires providers to demonstrate that the outcome is a real prospect.
Secondly, a provider must reasonably conclude that the test is met. This requirement is deliberately included to address the risk of a provider reaching a conclusion that is not based on valid evidence or reasoning. The FCA, as the regulator responsible for contract-based workplace pensions, must make detailed rules regarding contractual override. That includes rules about the considerations and information that providers must take into account in determining whether the best interests test is met. As I have said, the FCA will develop those rules in its usual manner, which will include consultation.
Finally, new Section 117E requires that an independent person, with expertise to be defined in FCA rules, has to certify that the best interests test has been met, providing a further safeguard.
Overall, the contractual override policy establishes broad equivalence with the trust-based market and, in doing so, it delivers on a long-requested industry ask, promotes better member outcomes—which is key—and helps to achieve the wider goals for DC pensions that this Bill will deliver. We believe it strikes the right balance, and I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment which seeks to test the definition of “default pension benefit solution”.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Scott of Needham Market) (LD)
I should inform the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 177 for reasons of pre-emption.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments on guided retirement. Perhaps I should begin by saying that we welcome the direction of travel set out in the Bill in this area. The Minister will perhaps be pleased to hear that.
Poor outcomes at decumulation have long represented one of the most persistent weaknesses in the defined contribution system, and there is a strong and widely accepted case for providing better support to savers who do not or cannot make active and confident choices at the point of retirement. We will continue to engage constructively with the Government to ensure that these reforms succeed. However, their success will depend not on intent alone but on whether the framework is workable in practice, sufficiently clear in its operation and properly aligned across regulatory regimes. It is in this constructive and probing spirit that I have tabled Amendment 176, together with clause stand part notices on Clauses 49, 50, 51 and 57, which I will take together for the sake of brevity.
Amendment 176 seeks to probe the definition of a default pension benefit solution, and in particular how such defaults will be framed in practice. The Bill recognises, rightly, that default solutions will not be suitable for everyone, and it therefore requires trustees to consider members’ circumstances, needs, interests and characteristics when designing them, including the possibility of different defaults for different cohorts of members. That principle is sound, but it immediately raises an important practical question: how, in reality, are trustees expected to carry out these assessments in a consistent, proportionate and defensible way?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I do not know who we had in mind when we were designing this measure, but I am pretty confident that it was not the noble Baroness. If she were to ring up and say, “I want to take my pension pot”, and we said, “Here is a solution”, she would absolutely be able to say, “Do you know what? I don’t want to do that, thank you very much. I already know what I want to do with it”, or to have a conversation about the alternatives. This is really aimed at and concerned with those who would not be in a good position to make these complex decisions.
However, the consultation will explore these things. We have already talked about what kinds of thing trustees might have to take into account. There will be a range of things. If there is anything specific on which I can write to the noble Baroness, I will do so, but the intention is to consult on the nature of how this will work in practice and all of the design requirements. That is one of the reasons for keeping so much in regulations: to keep it flexible.
We are already finding, though, that providers are coming up with interesting, innovative solutions. Some schemes are offering flex then fix, which would give some flexibility in the years ahead. There are schemes that are doing different things, and we do not want to shut those down because we want there to be alternatives. I do not want to give the impression that we are forcing people into it, that they have to do only one thing before being allowed to take their pension or that their pension freedom has been taken away; none of that has happened because that is not what we are trying to do. I thank the noble Baroness for giving me the opportunity to clarify that.
Amendment 180 would remove regulation-making powers to enable the charging of fees for transfers to be prohibited or limited. The Government recognise that pension schemes rely on the charges they impose on members to operate the administration of the scheme effectively. There is an existing cap on charges, which can be placed on default funds under auto-enrolment, whose purpose is to shield individuals from high and unfair charges that could significantly erode their savings. The guided retirement measures were very conscious. They will introduce the concept of a default route and were, therefore, alive to the risk that individuals placed in a default plan may not scrutinise the costs involved. Therefore, we expect to consult on any detailed policy set out in regulations; we would test any assumptions about the impact of introducing a cap or a prohibition, including for transfers, as part of that consultation.
The Clause 51 and 57 stand part notices from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, seek confirmation that Clause 51 will provide members with clear and consistent information. I am very happy to provide that assurance. The Government understand the power of communications and the importance of members understanding the default pension plan provided by the scheme, alongside the other options. Through this clause, the Government have the power to specify the format and structure of communications. There is also a requirement that all communications issued by schemes are in clear and plain language to help members make better decisions regarding their retirement income when they wish to do so.
As the noble Viscount mentioned, Clause 53 requires the development of a “pensions benefit strategy” by relevant pension schemes, which will be expected to include details of how the scheme will communicate its default pension plans to its members. Schemes will have to make these strategies available to scheme members and to the regulator for effective scrutiny; the Bill includes corresponding arrangements in respect of FCA-regulated providers. As a minimum, we expect the strategy to present the evidence base for the chosen default or defaults to give the member the opportunity to compare their circumstances and those on which the default is based.
Clause 57 is the corresponding provision in relation to FCA-regulated schemes. This inserts into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 a new section that will deliver default pension benefit solutions to FCA-regulated pension schemes, ensuring that members on both sides of the market benefit from default solutions. Clause 57 requires the FCA to make rules, having regard to the rest of Chapter 6 of the Pension Schemes Bill, to make default plans available to members of FCA-regulated pension schemes. This helps ensure that regulatory frameworks are aligned and that members experience broadly equivalent outcomes; it also maintains fairness and consistency across the market. Clause 57 also requires the FCA to aim to ensure, as far as is possible, that the outcomes to be achieved by its rules in relation to this chapter achieve the same outcomes as the rest of this chapter achieves in relation to schemes regulated by TPR.
The noble Viscount asked how schemes will be supported rather than forced into defensive behaviour. The regulator will issue guidance for all trust schemes. DWP officials have been engaging, and will continue to engage, with industry ahead of introduction, including through formal consultation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked why the negative procedure and why the affirmative one. The affirmative procedure has been used for certain delegated powers where the power touches on a central aspect of the policy. For example, the power in Clause 49(4)(d) can be used to influence the defaults designed and offered by a scheme, so the affirmative procedure is used.
I have tried to answer all the questions that were asked. I hope that those explanations have been helpful and that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not press their amendments.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, before I conclude on this group, I thank in particular my noble friend Lady Noakes for her probing amendments, which ask a number of important questions.
I will make a few points and rounding-up comments but, before I do, I want to pick up on my noble friend Lord Trenchard’s remarks. I must admit that I was very surprised to hear the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on his view of the pensions landscape; they were fairly forceful. As he will expect, I entirely disagree with his comments. I just make the point that our party brought in improvements to auto-enrolment and introduced the dashboard system; I pay tribute to my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady Stedman-Scott. I have more to say but I will give way.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I just want to pick up the noble Viscount’s point about auto-enrolment. It was a Labour Government and a Labour Bill that introduced automatic enrolment. The only change that the coalition made was to delay it, thereby reducing people’s future pensions.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
We brought this into effect. Of course, that takes us back to the coalition in 2010-15, but so much has been done since then. I will not go on but, if the noble Lord feels so strongly about this, why does he not probe his own Government more on why there is nothing in the Bill about saving more for retirement? I have not even mentioned the points in the Budget on salary sacrifice. I just wanted to get that in, as the noble Lord has become quite political.
Moving on swiftly, Amendment 177 probes whether all default pension benefit solutions are required to provide a regular income and whether that income must necessarily be for life. Here, I pay some respect to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, because he rightly used the expression “pathways for people”, which are what this is all about. I am grateful to the Minister for providing some clarification on this point. She used a very good expression, “freedom to choose”, which is key in our discussion on this particular group.
However, given the significance of this issue for members’ retirement outcomes, it is vital that this clarity is communicated, not just within this Committee but clearly and consistently to those whom these reforms are intended to serve. My noble friend Lord Fuller spoke about the importance of personalisation, which I think is a very good expression.
Communication will be especially important in the context of guided retirement, where members may reasonably assume that a default implies a particular structure or guarantee unless told otherwise. The use of the word “default” is more than semantic, as I know the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has laid out in the past—I note she is not in her place. Ensuring that expectations are properly set will be central to building confidence and avoiding confusion at the point of retirement. Again, my noble friend Lord Fuller raised the importance of ensuring that certain cohorts must be particularly noticed and properly treated.
Two-child Benefit Cap: Foreign-born Children
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(1 month ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend. We have another question in a moment about the child poverty strategy, so I get to spend 20 minutes talking about child poverty. Tackling child poverty has to be done on so many fronts and our strategy looks at people’s incomes, the costs they are facing and how we can give them opportunities. I am so proud that the Government have decided to do things such as extending free school meals to those on universal credit. Children need to arrive at school ready to learn, and you cannot be ready to learn if you are hungry. It is also a way of tackling the cost of living for so many families who are struggling. I am proud that we are making childcare more available and getting more support to those who are on universal credit who want to do the right thing and work but face barriers in their way. And I am proud that we are rolling out Best Start family hubs and all kinds of measures. Our children are not just our present; they are the future of our country. If we invest in them, we invest in Britain. It is the right thing to do.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, let me highlight some more statistics. The Government’s own impact assessment states that the addition to the benefits bill will be £13.6 billion over five years. Families with five children will gain £10,900 per year and those with six children will gain £16,600 per year, and almost half the households involved have no one in work. This is extremely worrying. This policy is surely rewarding worklessness. How are the Government intending to prevent the lifting of the two-child limit weakening work incentives or increasing long-term benefit dependency among larger families?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am sure the noble Viscount knows that, although we are lifting the two-child limit, the Government are not lifting the benefit cap on the total amount that any household can get. The benefit cap encourages parents to take responsibility and work towards financial independence. There is, for example, an exemption from the benefit cap if somebody is in work and earning at least the minimum wage for the requisite number of hours. The challenge for us is to make sure that parents want to work, that we support them to work and that we take away the barriers that are in their way, for example on childcare or being able to get the jobs and the support they need. These things have to be separate. We should be supporting our children, but children benefit from their parents being in work wherever possible, so we should be doing both of these. If we were just doing one, the noble Viscount would have a point. This is part of our strategy to invest in support for parents, to invest in employment support, and to make sure that whole families benefit from our policies.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsMonday 26th January 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
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Baroness Noakes (Con)
If the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, had listened, she would know that I said I thought what the Government were doing had gone too far, because there were instances where there was a necessary flow between the raising of funds and that flowing into new investment.
A number of noble Lords on this side of the Room have been talking as though this Bill stops pension schemes investing in listed assets or investment companies. It certainly does not; it merely says that they do not qualify if asset mandation is introduced. We ought to be concentrating on whether this is a valid policy objective—the Minister knows that I do not subscribe to that—to get money out of pension funds and into the real economy. We then ought to concentrate on which flows achieve that; certainly not all flows of buying investment trusts or other listed vehicles will achieve that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak in strong support of a number of carefully drafted amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and once again ably supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I will also speak to my Amendment 127.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, briefly, it is not appropriate for legislation to tell the trustees of pension funds, in any case, that they can make investments in some types of structure but not in others. It should be entirely up to the trustees, in exercising their fiduciary duties, to determine what investments they make and the structures through which they make them to deliver a maximum level of risk that they are happy to accept.
The Government will succeed in realising their target of increasing pension fund investment in UK infrastructure by adopting fiscal and economic policies that encourage growth. We will then see a natural return to the much higher levels of UK equity investment by pension funds that used to obtain many years ago. If the Government require, nevertheless, some potential or possible mandation, it is right that there should be a cap. But, as my noble friend Lord Remnant said, it is inconceivable that any pension fund manager would be likely to invest more than 10%—I would say considerably less than that—in asset classes traditionally defined as alternative assets.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, briefly, this group again underlines a central point that we have been making: mandation should not be in the Bill. Time and again, we have heard concerns about the risks of picking winners and the unintended consequences that inevitably follow. I raised these issues on the previous group, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, have today and previously put those concerns firmly on record.
However, I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful efforts to limit or mitigate the impact of the mandation power. I thank my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, supported by my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lady Penn in particular, for their remarks on these issues. However, our view remains unchanged and, for reasons already rehearsed at length, asset allocation mandates have no place in this legislation. There is no compelling evidence that they are either necessary or effective in increasing productive investment in the UK.
If we are serious about addressing the barriers to UK investment, we must be honest about where those barriers lie. They include governance and regulatory burdens; risk-weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints and scheme-specific funding; and maturity considerations. None of these challenges is addressed, let alone solved, by mandation. If, notwithstanding these concerns, the reserve power is to be retained, significantly stronger safeguards are essential: a clear cap on the proportion of assets that may be mandated; more robust reporting and evidential requirements before regulations are made; explicit conditions for access to any transition pathway relief; a strengthened savers’ interest test; and rigorous post-implementation review. The question of when and on what basis the power should be sunsetted is one that we will return to on the next group, but the fundamental point must be clear: mandation is the wrong tool and the Bill risks embedding unjustified and anti-competitive discrimination between equivalent investment vehicles, driven not by evidence or public interest but by a narrow and self-interested approach. I will address those issues in more detail in a later group but, for now, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the specific amendments raised.
However—before she gets up—I wish to turn to Amendment 118 in my name. It probes the power that allows regulations made under new Section 28C to include assets of various classes under the broad heading of private assets and to permit the future inclusion of additional asset classes. I appreciate the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on this part.
I touched on this matter in some detail in the previous groups, so I will not repeat those arguments here. However, this amendment once again draws attention to our concern about the specific types of asset that the Government have chosen to list on page 46 of the Bill. It remains an issue about which we are deeply concerned, and one on which we will continue to work closely with other noble Lords though to Report.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Viscount for jumping up prematurely. These amendments relate to the level of any asset allocation requirements and the potential treatment of investments in private equity and private debt as qualifying assets for the purpose of any asset allocation requirement.
I will start with the with the level of any asset allocation requirement, a question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh in her Amendment 114 and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, in Amendment 112. Both would cap the percentage of default fund assets that could be required to be invested in qualifying assets. I understand why noble Lords were keen to table these amendments and to look for a cap. I have to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that I am shocked by such cynicism in one so young. I will explain the—perfectly rational—reason the Government have not done this; I hope that she will find it very satisfying and feel suitably chastened at that point. We do not expect to need to exercise the power, but to do so would be a significant step and, as noble Lords may have picked up by now, the Government’s general approach has been to design the power so that it can be used as a backstop to the commitments used in the Mansion House Accord. I underscore that point.
The aim has been to create a backstop to that rather than to fix a numerical cap in primary legislation. That is what it is designed to do. The accord is not a legal document, and its terms and definitions are not of a kind that could simply be lifted into statute. If the Government were ever to exercise these powers, we would need to define key terms precisely, and it is at least possible that those definitions might have some bearing on the precise percentage levels that are appropriate. We have therefore not taken the step of hard-wiring a fixed cap, although I underline that we have included various other safeguards, which I have repeated more than once, so will not repeat again in the interests of time.
In relation to Amendment 113 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the Mansion House Accord commitment has informed the design of these powers, including the ability for government to require a proportion of assets to be invested in specified qualifying assets. I understand the point that she was making, but our approach has been deliberately limited, going no further than necessary to support the commitments already made. That caution is important, given that this is a novel—and, I discern, a not entirely uncontroversial—part of the Bill. Although we are aligned on the objectives, I would not want to suggest a change in policy direction where none is intended. Our aim is to give the DC pensions industry reasonable clarity about our expectations.
Amendment 119, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, interrogates the inclusion of private equity as an example of a qualifying asset. Its effect would be to remove private equity from the illustrative list in new Section 28C(5). Amendment 120 from my noble friend Lord Sikka would do the same, as well as removing private debt.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the reasons behind the provision allowing the Secretary of State until 2035 to exercise the mandation power.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open what I hope and assume will be another interesting debate. Once again, I hope it will shine a light on the flaws of mandation from new and specific angles that merit discussion.
Amendment 115 in my name is a probing amendment, which goes to the architecture of the power itself. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to exercise the mandation power up until 2035. Why has 2035 been chosen for sunset? Why is it that particular year? Was that date chosen because it aligns with some evidenced policy rationale, a defined market transition or a known obstacle that is expected to have fallen away by then? A sunset date sets the constitutional balance between Parliament, Ministers and the pensions industry. A sunset clause extending to 2035 runs beyond the life of this Parliament and would allow very broad discretion for a Secretary of State, not merely to encourage investment but to direct it, in effect, by setting targets and conditions. That is an extraordinary proposition when we are dealing with the retirement savings of millions of people.
I put a simple set of questions to the Minister. What analysis underpins the choice of 2035? Was it recommended by the department’s own evidence base? If the concern is a temporary set of barriers, for instance, a collective action problem, why is the power not time-limited to a shorter period, with a requirement for Parliament to renew it if, and only if, the evidence remains compelling? If the Government believe the power is genuinely a reserved power, why does it need such a long reserve? If the Minister cannot explain the logic of the date, it becomes harder to accept that the scope of the power has been calibrated with care.
Amendment 152 relates to the review process following the exercise of powers under Section 28C—the mandation power. This is another probing amendment intended to test why the Government consider a five-year period an appropriate timeline for regulations to be reviewed and why an earlier review has not been proposed. Five years is a long time in pensions and financial markets. It is a very long time in the life of a saver, because compounding does not wait politely while Whitehall decides whether its intervention has worked. If an allocation has been distorted, returns have been impaired, costs have risen or liquidity has been compromised, five years is long enough for the damage to become embedded in outcomes. It is also long enough for market conditions to have changed so significantly that any review risks becoming a rear-view mirror exercise rather than a real safeguard.
I ask the Minister directly, why five years? What is the justification? Is there evidence that a shorter review period will be impractical? Why are the Government not willing to commit to a more immediate post-implementation assessment, perhaps—let me be helpful to the Minister—within 12 months or two years, to ensure that any harm to savers is identified early? If Ministers believe the power is low risk, surely a quicker review should not trouble them.
There is a further point. The Bill speaks of not only assessing the effect on the financial interests of members of master trusts and savers in group personal pension schemes, but of such other matters as the Secretary of State may consider appropriate. What precisely do the Government envisage falling within those other matters? Does it include costs to schemes, liquidity, operational complexity, market impact and whether compliance has forced schemes away from diversified strategies that would otherwise have been in members’ best interests? Does it include, as many fear, political metrics dressed up as economic analysis, such as whether a mandated allocation has supported a preferred sector or class of domestic asset?
Most importantly, what happens if the review reveals that the financial interests of members have been harmed? What is the mechanism for redress and the practical remedy? Do the Government anticipate compensating schemes or savers? As the Committee will appreciate, we will return to the question of redress later in our proceedings.
I now return to the subject of market risk through Amendment 115, which is intended to ensure that any review explicitly considers two linked dangers. The first is that mandated investment requirements may become misaligned with economic conditions. The second is that directing multiple schemes into the same assets could cause market distortion or asset price inflation.
Mandation can distort markets in ways that are entirely foreseeable. If multiple large schemes are required, either explicitly or implicitly, to invest in the same asset class, the demand shock can inflate prices. If market participants interpret government direction as a signal of future price support, price movements can be amplified further; these arguments have been rehearsed not only in Committee but at Second Reading. Artificial price inflation then risks reducing long-term returns for pension savers because you are requiring schemes to buy after prices have been driven up, rather than allowing them to invest on value and fundamentals. It is picking winners and losers, not through the discipline of markets but through the blunt force of regulation.
So I have further questions for the Minister, I am afraid. Has the department modelled the potential for asset price inflation in any asset class that might be subject to a mandated allocation? Has the department assessed the risk of crowded trades in which schemes find themselves paying more for the same exposure because the Government have forced them to compete with one another? Has the department consulted the Bank of England or the FPC on the risk that mandated flows could contribute to procyclicality or instability, particularly in less liquid markets? What is the Government’s plan if mandated allocations coincide with an already elevated valuation environment?
There is a second risk: that of regulation falling behind economic reality. Mandated asset allocations risk becoming misaligned with economic conditions because compliance takes time. Requirements to hold a specified percentage in a particular UK asset class within a fixed timeframe may no longer be appropriate by the time schemes comply. Economic conditions, market valuations and government priorities can change far more quickly than regulatory mandates. This creates a real risk of locking savers into allocations that are no longer in their best financial interests.
So, again, what mechanism will ensure that mandated requirements remain compatible with changing economic conditions? Will there be a duty to pause or suspend requirements when market conditions deteriorate? Will there be an explicit test that requires Ministers to show why a mandated allocation is consistent with the fiduciary duty at the point when it is imposed, not merely when it is first conceived? If Ministers insist that their fiduciary duties remain paramount, how do they reconcile that with a policy that, by design, substitutes government preference for trustee judgment? I am reverting back to that argument.
Amendment 209 would require the Government to review the barriers that may prevent pension and investment funds investing in the UK, including regulatory, tax and fiduciary constraints; and to report their findings to Parliament. Instead of beginning with mandation then asking later whether it has caused harm, the Government should have started here. If Ministers genuinely wish to increase productive investment in the UK, their first duty is to diagnose the barriers properly. Stakeholders have emphasised repeatedly to us that limited UK investment by pension schemes is not a failure of willingness but reflects real constraints: government and regulatory burdens; risk weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints; scheme-specific funding and maturity considerations; fixed fees; and the economics of administering more complex, perhaps even less liquid, investments at scale. Many of those may be solvable issues but they require the hard work of reform, not the easy headline of compulsion. Addressing these barriers is far more likely to increase investment sustainably than imposing mandation, and care should be taken to avoid adding further unintended obstacles through legislation.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief in closing this debate; I am conscious that I spoke at some length when opening this group.
First, the point raised by my noble friend Lady Noakes was a sound one. Amendment 130 probes the extent to which it is appropriate for regulations to override the trust deed or rules of a pension scheme. I listened carefully to the response from the Minister but I think—my noble friend may agree with me—that this is a fundamental issue that goes to the heart of scheme governance and trustee responsibility. I know it is an issue that she feels strongly about, and we do too, because it is vital that trustees retain clear and accountable responsibility for investment decisions made in members’ best interests. I will reflect on Hansard, as I am sure my noble friend will too.
I also just touch briefly on Amendment 153, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. As she highlighted, this amendment seeks to ensure that a review of the asset allocation mandation powers takes place within at least two years, as well as within five, and of course it reflects the same concern that I raised. I also listened when the Minister said that it was a matter of judgment by the Government. I take note of what she said—I will not give a view on that but, again, we will reflect carefully on it. Despite the best efforts of the Minister, I remain with the feeling that there is not a clear rationale or sufficient assurance, but we will reflect.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, raised a number of technical and specific points. Taken together, this group once again demonstrates the complexity of this particular area, the necessary safeguards and the prior steps required, and the degree of intervention that the Government risk embarking upon through this mandation power. Once mandation is introduced, it inevitably draws policymakers into ever more detailed interventions, and with that comes a cascade of unintended consequences, as I said before. We will therefore reflect on the Minister’s responses but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsThursday 22nd January 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-IV(a) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (22 Jan 2026)
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would replace the 12-month dormancy period with an 18-month period in order to test the rationale for the Government’s chosen timeframe.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, supported by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, I am glad to be leading off in another group of amendments, largely designed to probe the Government and clarify their thinking, plans and rationale on the small pots regulations in the Bill. Indeed, I know that many industry bodies are watching our proceedings with interest and will be taking note of what the Minister says. This is after we had a series of meetings with those at the sharp end in the industry, as she will probably guess.
I will speak briefly to the other amendments in this group before turning to my own. First, I speak to the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. Ensuring that a qualifying dashboard service has been available for a period before small pots can be consolidated seems an entirely sensible and proportionate measure. If we are to move pension savings automatically, often without an active decision by the member, it is surely right that individuals should first have a practical opportunity to see and trace their pots in one place and to engage with them themselves.
I also welcome Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which, as I understand it, would ensure that a pot is not treated as dormant where contributions have ceased for a legitimate and expected reason, such as a temporary break from employment with an intention to return. This strikes me as a pragmatic refinement that would better reflect real-world working patterns and help to ensure that consolidation targets genuine dormancy rather than planned inactivity. I have no doubt the Minister will explain that in more elegant terms than me.
Amendment 88, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, addresses the definitions set out in Clause 34, which itself gives the Secretary of State a broad power to alter the definition of a “small” pension pot, including increasing the threshold, with no upper limit set in the Bill. The amendment would retain flexibility but place a clear ceiling on how far that power could be used. I look forward to my noble friend’s remarks. I know that my noble friend will expand on that point, but I would be grateful if the Minister could also explain why an upper limit is not currently included and how the Government envisage safeguarding against this power being used to capture significantly larger costs in the future. That is an important question that I hope will be raised.
I turn to my first amendment in this group, Amendment 79, which would replace the 12-month dormancy period in Clause 22 with an 18-month period. This is a probing amendment intended to test the rationale for the Government’s choice of a 12-month timeframe. The definition of “dormant” is critical, because once a pot meets that definition it may become eligible for automatic consolidation with no active decision by the member. Many savers engage with their pensions only intermittently, often on an annual basis, and employment patterns do not always follow neat or predictable cycles. Therefore, extending the period to 18 months would allow the Committee to explore whether a full year of inactivity is genuinely sufficient to infer disengagement, or whether it risks capturing individuals who are simply between roles or engaging on a longer cycle.
I want to be clear that this amendment does not seek to undermine the policy of small pots consolidation, which, as the Minister knows, we broadly support. Rather, it is intended to probe how the Government have balanced administrative efficiency with member protection, and what evidence has informed the choice of a 12-month period rather than a longer one. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s explanation of how this timeframe was determined, and whether alternative periods were considered.
Amendment 80 would leave out Clause 22(3)(b). This too is a probing amendment; it is intended to explore what the Government mean by the reference to “prescribed exceptions” in the definition of a dormant pension pot. As drafted, Clause 22(3)(b) assumes that a pot may be treated as dormant not only by reference to contribution inactivity but by whether a member has taken steps to confirm or alter how their pot is invested, subject to exceptions that are left entirely to regulations. Many savers remain in default investment arrangements by choice and engage with their pensions only intermittently, often in ways that are not easily captured by scheme records. Therefore, it is not clear what types of member action the Government intend should prevent a pot being treated as dormant, nor what kinds of behaviour might be carved out as exceptions.
This amendment is intended to prove whether investment-related actions are an appropriate proxy for engagement, how prescribed exceptions will operate in practice and whether the approach adequately reflects real-world member behaviour. I would welcome the Minister’s clarification on how these exceptions are envisaged and why this test has been included in the definition of dormancy.
Finally, my Amendment 82 concerns the level of parliamentary scrutiny applied to regulations made under Clause 22. As drafted, the Bill applies the affirmative procedure to only the first set of small pots regulations or regulations that meet certain specific triggers. Thereafter, changes to the consolidation regime may be made under the negative procedure. This amendment is probing and is not dissimilar to one raised previously in Committee. It is intended to test whether that approach provides sufficient ongoing parliamentary oversight. The regulations made under Clause 22 will govern when and how small dormant pension pots may be consolidated, often without an active decision by the member, and they therefore go to the heart of member protection and confidence in the system itself.
The amendment would require all such regulations to be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring that Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise and approve changes to this framework wherever they are made, not just at first use. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government consider the negative procedure appropriate for subsequent regulations in this area, and whether there are safeguards to prevent significant policy changes being made without fuller parliamentary scrutiny. I thank in advance the Minister for her comments and answers and all other noble Lords for their contributions on this group, which I feel concerns an important matter. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 81 is very small; I hardly need to say anything about it. It came from one of those occasions when you are going through the Bill and you write a little query which you then convert into an amendment. It concerns Clause 22(3)(b), which says that a pension pot can be moved into a consolidator if
“the individual has, subject to any prescribed exceptions, taken no step to confirm or alter the way in which the pension pot is invested”.
There are instances in which a person may want to stay attached to a pension fund they have in a workplace, particularly if they do not necessarily have a long relationship with an employer or have done some intermittent work and then gone off to have a family, because they may have an informal agreement to go back. How do you cater for that? I realise that it might just fall under “any prescribed exceptions”, which you write in a note to deal with, but that is the basis of the amendment. I am sure it will be very simple for the Minister to say, “Yes, that is covered”.
While I am on my feet, I support Amendment 83. I also support Amendment 88 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, because it is worth having some guardrails for things that are doing very well.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will conclude fairly briefly. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and the Minister for her reply. I thank in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I see, as the Minister pointed out, that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is in his place, which has, if I may put it this way, hitherto been dormant.
As we have discussed, the amendments in this group are designed to test how the framework will operate in practice and whether the balance struck is the right one. In particular, they probe how dormancy is defined; how member behaviour is interpreted; and how far Parliament will continue to have oversight as the regime evolves.
I have a few points to make in winding up. First, it would be helpful to hear from the Minister more details about how members can be reunited with their dormant pots—or, indeed, find their missing pots. I particularly look forward to hearing an update about the dashboard. May I make a request? It would be helpful to have more granular detail on how it would work and the different aspects of an individual’s experience in using the dashboard service. I remember that, when I was in the department, I was thoroughly briefed on it; it is a very big, important and interesting project. I am sure that the Committee would appreciate that particular type of update.
My second point was made by my noble friend Lady Noakes when she said that Clause 22 gives significant powers. She was right in saying that there is no real underlying purpose and that there are concerns around the constraints. More granular detail on the definition of small pots is required; as my noble friend said, bearing in mind their value and growth in future, more clarity needs to be given.
Finally, I want to make two points about the 12-month dormancy period that the Minister raised. We will consider what she said about 12 months being the right balance rather than extending, as we proposed. I will also read Hansard concerning her points about the affirmative procedure versus the negative one; I carefully noted what she said.
To conclude, the powers in this chapter are substantial. The point we are making—and, indeed, the points that other noble Lords have made—is that clarity around definitions, proportionality in timeframes, transparency, and how exceptions and future changes will be handled will be essential if members are to feel secure, rather than sidelined by the process. With that summary, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“(6) Transfer notices must be clear, concise, and accessible to all members, including those with low financial literacy or limited digital access.(7) Transfer notices must also be provided in prescribed alternative formats for digitally-excluded, visually-impaired, or otherwise vulnerable members.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures transfer notices are easy to understand and available in alternative formats so that all members, including vulnerable or digitally-excluded individuals, can engage meaningfully with transfer decisions.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I shall address each amendment in this group briefly in turn to provide some of the context and rationale for why we have introduced them. First, Amendments 84 and 85 relate to Clause 24. These amendments are concerned with how this policy will operate in practice and whether it does so in a way that is fair, comprehensible and properly accountable. Clause 24 places significant weight on the transfer notice. It is the principal mechanism by which an individual is informed that their pension pot may be transferred automatically if they do not respond. In many cases, silence will result in action, which makes the quality and accessibility of that notice critical.
Amendment 84 therefore seeks to ensure that transfer notices are clear, concise and accessible to all members, including those with low financial literacy or limited digital access. It also requires that notices be available in prescribed alternative formats for members who are digitally excluded, visually impaired or otherwise vulnerable. I took note of the Minister’s remarks about definitions that may need to be properly defined—better defined than I can define them—in legally recognisable terms, and I recognise that.
As we discussed earlier today, we are all aware that pensions communications can be complex and intimidating, even for those who are relatively engaged. We need only to remind ourselves of the challenges experienced in recent years over pension credit communications. I think my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady Stedman-Scott have had some experience of that. I will leave it at that.
For individuals with small dormant pots, often lower earners, those with fragmented work histories or those disengaged from pensions altogether, the risk is that they simply do not understand what is being proposed or do not realise that inaction has consequences. Often, it is fair to say that pension communications, when received, are by default put in the too-difficult box or the another-day box or in a convenient receptacle placed on the floor—I will leave it at that. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, made a similar point in her remarks on an earlier group, but it is a serious point. If the policy depends on member engagement, it is only reasonable that the communication is genuinely capable of being understood. Amendment 84 would simply put that principle in the Bill.
Amendment 85 addresses a different but related concern about oversight and accountability. As drafted, the clause requires transfer notices to be issued, but does not require anyone to monitor how many notices are sent, how members respond or what outcomes are produced. Amendment 85 would place a duty on the Secretary of State through regulations to record and report annually on the number of transfer notices issued and the outcomes arising from them. This matters for two reasons. First, it allows Parliament to assess whether the policy is working as intended. Are members actively choosing options or are transfers overwhelmingly occurring by default? Are certain cohorts disproportionately disengaged? Without data, we simply cannot know. Secondly, it ensures that responsibility for this policy does not rest solely with schemes and regulators but remains subject to ministerial oversight and parliamentary scrutiny, which is particularly important where automatic processes affect individual savers. I hope the Minister will see these amendments as seeking to address important points that will make this part of the Bill work more effectively, and I look forward eventually to hearing her response. I listened very carefully to her remarks on communications and customer service in an earlier group.
Let me now address our Clause 31 stand part notice; noble Lords will be aware that, as set out in its explanatory statement, this is intended as probing. This clause contains a wide enabling provision that allows Ministers, through regulations on small pots, to confer functions; create appeal rights; require extensive data processing; amend primary legislation; and, most notably, authorise the Pensions Regulator to charge prescribed fees in connection with authorisation under the regime. My concern is not that these powers exist at all but that the clause gives us little indication of how they will be constrained in practice. In particular, can the Minister explain how the fee-charging power for the Pensions Regulator will operate? Will fees be strictly limited to cost recovery? How will their level be set? What parliamentary scrutiny will apply?
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be pretty brief in closing. Across this group, the common theme is not opposition to the direction of travel—I give further reassurance to the Minister on this point and I appreciate her remarks—but a desire for clarity, proportionality and accountability as these powers are taken and exercised. I am very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and indeed for her extra questions on this group. The small pots regime will rely heavily on automatic processes, regulatory discretion and secondary legislation, which makes it especially important that Parliament understands how these measures will work in practice and where the guardrails sit.
The amendments that we have brought forward are deliberately probing, as I said at the outset. They seek reassurance that members will be able to engage meaningfully with decisions that affect their savings, that Ministers will retain visibility and responsibility for how the system operates once it has gone live, and that the regulators’ powers, whether in relation to fees, enforcement or penalties, will be used in a way that is targeted, proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight. I respect the fact that the noble Baroness has given much time to addressing the amendments, and indeed those particular points, for which I am very grateful. It has been a short debate, and I hope a helpful one, and we will consider the responses given. But, for the moment I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to scrutinise the scale of the Secretary of State’s powers to exempt schemes from Conditions 1 and 2 set out in subsection (4), and to probe whether these exemption powers are intended to apply to Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) schemes.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, this is a busy group and I shall not detain the Committee by speaking to all the amendments therein, but I do want to welcome the amendments that have been tabled by other noble Lords, which will allow us to have a detailed and, I hope, fruitful debate and discussion on these important matters.
Amendment 89 is a probing amendment. It would leave out new subsection (1B), which allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to exempt descriptions of relevant master trusts from the approval requirements in conditions 1 and 2, covering both the scale default arrangement and the asset allocation approvals. The purpose here is to understand the intended scope of this power and the safeguards that will govern its use. As drafted, new subsection (1B) is very broad: it permits exemptions for
“any description of relevant Master Trusts”
and gives examples, including schemes designed to meet the needs of those with protected characteristics and hybrid schemes.
I have three straightforward questions for the Minister at the outset. First, why is it necessary to take such wide exemption powers in the Bill, rather than tightly defining the circumstances in which exemptions may be granted? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that exemptions do not create a route by which schemes can avoid the central policy intent of this chapter: namely, improving outcomes through scale and an appropriate approach to asset allocation?
Thirdly, can the Minister clarify whether these exemption powers are intended, in whole or in part, to apply to collective defined contribution schemes, or other non-standard money purchase arrangements? If so, what is the rationale; and if not, will she put that clearly on the record? I am mindful of the recent debate that we had in this Room on the CDCs. I hope the Minister can respond to those points.
I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will set out her reasoning for Amendment 92, so I do not wish to pre-empt or emulate what I know will be a very well-reasoned and informative set of remarks. But, as I have added my name to the amendment, I will briefly say that I welcome this proposal. It would put in the Bill a clear signal that a trust which provides “exceptional” value for money—as assessed by the regulator under its VFM framework—could be a legitimate basis for exemption from the new approval requirements. It seems sensible that trusts that already provide exceptional value for money should be trusted to carry on their good work under the established framework in which they are already operating.
Amendment 100, in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to whom I am grateful, seeks to provide helpful clarity, not to weaken regulation, by making clear that schemes offering genuinely specialist or innovative services can demonstrate that they meet the exemption. This is important because innovation in pensions does not always mean novel technology alone; it can include specialist provision for particular workforces, new approaches to member engagement or delivery models that better serve groups who might otherwise be poorly catered for. Without clarity, there is a risk that worthwhile innovation is discouraged simply because schemes are uncertain about how the exemption will be interpreted.
The amendment also gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define “specialist or innovative services”. That provides appropriate flexibility, allowing the definition to evolve over time, while ensuring proper scrutiny and regulatory oversight. The amendment supports innovation without undermining member protection, and it gives both trustees and regulators greater certainty about how the exemption is intended to operate. I therefore hope the Minister will look favourably on it and speak to the point that is raises.
Amendments 105 and 107 are intended to ensure that group personal pension schemes are treated fairly and proportionately under the new scale requirements in Clause 40. We are clear that scale alone is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value. There are group personal pension schemes that are smaller by design yet provide highly specialist or innovative services, for example, to particular sectors, workforces or member needs, and that deliver good outcomes despite not meeting a blunt asset threshold. Amendment 105 creates an additional route for relevant GPPs to meet the quality requirement, by allowing those that satisfy an innovation exemption not to be automatically required to meet the scale requirement.
Amendment 107 provides the necessary framework for that exemption. It allows a GPP to demonstrate that it offers specialist or innovative services, and gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define what those terms mean. That ensures flexibility as the market evolves, while retaining appropriate regulatory and parliamentary oversight. I hope the Minister will see these amendments as a constructive way of balancing scale with innovation, competition and member outcomes, and I look forward to her response.
Amendment 135 would revert the eligibility test for new entrant pathway relief under Clause 40 to the simpler principle-based formulation contained in the Bill as introduced. The purpose of the new entrant pathway is clear: to ensure that credible, innovative schemes are not locked out of the market simply because they are new and have not yet had the opportunity to build scale. As the Bill is currently drafted, that test has become more prescriptive, with a risk that genuinely innovative entrants could struggle to qualify despite having strong growth potential. By refocusing the test on whether a scheme can demonstrate strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, this amendment would restore the original balance between safeguarding member outcomes and allowing healthy competition and innovation in the market. This amendment would simply ensure that the pathway for new entrants remains realistic and proportionate and is aligned with the policy intent.
Finally, Amendments 165 and 166 are probing amendments about parliamentary scrutiny—back to that subject. Clause 41 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations setting out how the Pensions Regulator will assess whether master trusts meet the scale requirement and have sufficient investment capability. These assessments will have a direct bearing on which schemes can operate, which must consolidate and how the market develops over time. As drafted, the Bill provides that the first set of regulations is subject to the affirmative procedure, but all subsequent regulations may be made under the negative procedure. I think we have heard this before. Amendments 165 and 166 would remove that distinction, so that any regulations in this area would require affirmative approval.
The question that these amendments pose is simple: if the initial framework is considered significant enough to warrant full parliamentary scrutiny, why should later changes, potentially just as consequential, receive a lower level of oversight? These regulations are not mere technical updates; they go to the heart of how scale and capability are judged, and therefore to the structure of the pensions market itself. It therefore seems reasonable that Parliament should retain the guaranteed opportunity to debate and approve changes of that kind whenever they are made. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of why the negative procedure is considered sufficient for subsequent regulations and whether there is scope to strengthen ongoing parliamentary scrutiny in this area. I look forward to contributions from other Members of the Committee and particularly to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 92 because it is a “what it says on the tin” amendment. It arose during a conversation. Somebody asked me what happens if a scheme is doing very well but is forced into consolidation because it does not meet the scale requirements. Would there be any legal consequences if it did not do quite so well under consolidation? On whom would those legal consequences fall if, as a result, somebody received a worse pension? Is there any comeback on the scheme because it was not big enough and so got consolidated? Is there any indemnity? Is there any making up? Let us take a theoretical situation in which the consolidator it goes into ends up doing very badly—I would hope that would never happen, but this is just to probe the safeguards around such circumstances. I could not answer the questions. It may be that there is something in the vast number of papers I have not read and the Minister can advise me. There is nothing terribly special or secretive behind it, it is just something that could happen, and can I obtain clarity about what comeback there may or may not be?
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief in closing as I suspect that the Committee is keen to get on to the next group.
Across this group, with the focus on scale—looking at both the merits and the demerits—the consistent theme has been a desire to ensure that the framework we are putting in place is proportionate, intelligible and capable of accommodating diversity in the pensions market. There has also been the theme of “big is not necessarily beautiful” in the course of this debate. My noble friend Lady Noakes was supported in particular by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann; they were assiduous in their questions on scale.
I should just remind the Committee that the Minister for Pensions has stated that return on investment is paramount, so this has been a very interesting debate. What if suboptimal scale produces better returns than merely big scale? That was one of the themes in this debate. Is there not a tension here? I would say that there clearly is.
From the remarks made by a number of Peers in this Committee, I think that more thought needs to be put into the threshold, including the criteria for reaching the threshold and whether the threshold level is right in itself. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, a question on legal dangers has been posed.
A number of issues here absolutely need to be explored further. I have no doubt that this will be done prior to Report—indeed, we will look at what we might bring back on Report. Several of these amendments seek reassurance that sensible exemptions will be exercised narrowly and transparently without undermining the policy intent; others are concerned with ensuring that innovation, specialisation and strong value for money are not inadvertently crowded out by rigid thresholds.
Finally, there is an understandable concern that, where regulations will shape market structure and regulatory judgment over time, Parliament should retain meaningful oversight in how these powers are exercised.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions on this group. I thank the Minister for her attempts to answer the questions covering the CDCs on exemptions criteria and on innovation. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. When I came to draft my own amendments, I discovered that this area of mandation was a rather crowded marketplace, so I decided not to enter it. I will not speak at length on the subject, but I endorse everything that has been said so far and wish to commit my almost undying belief that mandation must not remain in the Bill.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and I have only one amendment in this group: Amendment 109, which would remove the Government’s broad mandation power. That has been very much the theme of this debate, of course. I want to be absolutely clear at the outset that we are also seriously and fundamentally opposed to investment mandation in the Bill, which I sure will come as no surprise to the Minister.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I have a couple of points to raise. The Minister mentioned that the reserved power was designed to be a signal, and I would argue that it is a pretty strong signal to put in the Bill. Will she strongly consider whether there are other ways to encourage investments in the UK other than using this, and what might they be? This is one of the things that we will want to press.
Secondly, she did not answer my question about the dangers of a future Government taking up these powers, even though she mentioned the sunset clause of 2035, which is, frankly, some time off.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am sorry I did not namecheck the noble Viscount in responding to the second point. I intended to respond by pointing to the safeguards and the guardrails that have been built in. That was the nature of the response to that.
In response to the first question, I thought I said that the Government accept that this is not the only issue and that we are addressing the other ways. We have been looking at the other barriers and investment opportunities. We also mentioned that the FCA has looked at examples. It is not the only thing; we are looking at the other things as well. We think there is already significant progress, but we think this reserve power is a way of ensuring that progress goes forward and not backwards on this issue.
Parental Leave and Pay Review
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that and pay tribute to all the wonderful work she did on the Employment Rights Bill. The whole country has good reason to be grateful to her. I am sure she still bears the occasional scar, which she may polish occasionally. That is a great idea; we would be happy to have a meeting. I want to manage expectations. We are going to listen to all the evidence and a wide range of voices, but it would be helpful for those voices to come from inside this House as well as outside. I would be very pleased to do that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is anticipated that there will be a chilling factor, with businesses thinking twice about hiring mothers-to-be and fathers-to-be if there are parental rights from day one. Is there not a danger that businesses will find ways of pre-emptively rejecting candidates whom they believe will be in a position to take parental leave immediately or soon after taking up their new roles?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, leave from day one is about the ability to give notice. For statutory maternity and paternity pay, there is already a significant period of qualification of working for the employer. If the noble Viscount is seriously suggesting that businesses would reject all potential mothers and fathers, that is going to leave them with quite a small pool to choose from when they are selecting. The reality is that many businesses already recognise that there are genuine benefits to be had in enabling people to be productive. If people are worrying about what is happening at home, then they are not able to do that. However, we have to get the balance right, so the review will carefully weigh up the benefits for families against the impact on employers and the Exchequer before Ministers decide on any reforms. On that point he is absolutely right.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsMonday 19th January 2026
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-III(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (19 Jan 2026)
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
I thank the noble Lord; it is just that impartial pension advice for members is not always available to everybody. Many savers struggle to navigate pension choices, whether around a consolidation investment strategy or retirement income. Without proper advice, members risk making poor financial decisions that could damage their long-term security. If you are in the business, you have to take the good with the bad, but we would like to give members a bit of advice if the money is available. Free impartial advice is essential to levelling the playing field.
Surpluses in pension schemes should not sit idle or be seen simply as windfall funds. Redirecting a small—I stress “small”—proportion to fund member advice would ensure that surpluses are used in a way that benefits members directly. Amendment 32 would not mandate a fixed share; it would simply give the Secretary of State powers to determine what proportion may be used. This would, I hope, create flexibility and safeguards so that the balance between scheme health and member benefit can be properly managed. Further advice from surpluses reduces the need for members to pay out of pocket and it builds trust that schemes are actively supporting member outcomes beyond the pension pot itself.
Amendment 44, to which my noble friend Lord Thurso referred, would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to publish
“within 12 months … a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows”.
It aims to explore options for improving outcomes for members of older pension schemes. I maintain that this amendment is needed because many pre-1997 schemes were established before modern indexation rules. Trustees’ current fiduciary duties may limit their ability to avoid discretionary increases, which is what this amendment is about. Members of these schemes may be missing out on pension increases that could be sustainable and beneficial. I will not go on about what the report would do, but there would be many benefits to this new clause. It would provide an evidence-based assessment of whether discretionary indexation can be applied safely; support trustees in making informed decisions for pre-1997 scheme members; and balance members’ interests with financial prudence and regulatory safeguards.
The amendments in this group are clearly going to progress on to Report in some way. Sometime between now and then, we are going to have to try to amalgamate these schemes and take the best bits out of them in order to get, on Report, a final amendment that might have a chance of persuading the Government to take action on these points. Many of the amendments in this group—indeed, all of them—follow the same line, but there needs to be some discipline in trying to get the best out of them all into a final amendment on Report.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for their amendments in this group. I also thank other noble Lords for all their other contributions in Committee so far this afternoon. Our debate on this group has stimulated a most valuable discussion. Of course, I look forward to the Minister’s responses to the points that have been raised.
I wish to start off by saying that I thought it was helpful that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, steered the Committee—my words, not hers—towards a focus on scheme members. The debate went a lot beyond that, but I just wanted to make that point at the outset. I wish also to take this opportunity to set out our stance on indexation, as well as some of the related questions that we for the Opposition have for the Government on this point.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, these amendments raise understandable concerns about fairness, inflation and the use of defined benefit surpluses. But our core line is simple: mandating how trustees and employers use DB surpluses would be overly prescriptive and risks being actively anti-business. Many employers are already using surpluses constructively, improving DC provision for younger workers, supporting intergenerational fairness, strengthening scheme security through contingent assets, SPVs or insurance-backed arrangements, or reducing long-term risk in ways that benefit members as well as sponsors. Employers have also borne DB deficit risk for many years, as we have heard a bit about this afternoon. If they carried the risk in the bad times, it is reasonable that they can share in the benefits in the good times, provided that decisions are taken jointly with trustees.
I will explain this through a simple analogy—I say at the outset that it will not be up to the standard of the buckets analogy utilised previously in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, but here we are. The employer and members walk into the casino together. The bets are placed and the investment strategy, funding assumptions and longevity risk are collective decisions overseen by trustees. If the bet goes wrong, the employer must cover the losses, often over many years, through additional contributions and balance sheet strain. If the bet goes right, however, some argue that the employer should be excluded from any upside and that all gains must automatically be distributed to members.
That is not, we believe, how risk sharing works. In any rational system, the party that underwrites the losses must surely be allowed to share in the gains—I know there are other arguments, but I believe this was the one posed by my noble friend Lady Noakes—otherwise, incentives are distorted, future participation is discouraged and employers become less willing to sponsor schemes at all. The fair outcome is that neither the employer nor the members take everything and that surplus is discussed and allocated jointly by trustees and employers in a way that balances member security, scheme sustainability and the long-term health of the sponsoring employer. I think this was the central argument of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and, in a different way, my noble friend Lord Fuller. Legislation should support that partnership, not override it.
My noble friend Lord Willets made an interesting point. He asked whether it is fair that, in DB schemes, current employees often contribute to enhancing or rescuing the surplus position of pension schemes, making up for past mistakes—or deficits, perhaps—and the potential consequence of that linking to lower remuneration for those current employees. I add one more thing, which is probably a bit unfair because it is slightly hypothetical: if that current employee, having perhaps been paid less, is then made redundant, that is a double whammy for them. The question is whether the surplus should be used for helping current employees or giving them a better deal, as well as, or instead of, looking to help the pre-1997 members. That is the way I look at it.
Against that backdrop, amendments that would make benefit uplifts—whether pre-1997 indexation or lump sum enhancements—a statutory condition of surplus extraction raise real concerns. Automatic uplift would ignore wider economic impacts, including higher employer costs; increased insolvency risk, ultimately borne by the PPF; knock-on effects on wages, investment and employment; and potentially higher PPF levies.
For PPF schemes, mandatory uplift is manageable because the employer covenant has gone and Parliament controls the compensation framework. Imposing similar requirements on live schemes risks destabilising otherwise healthy employers. Uplift should therefore be an option and not an obligation. That said, focusing on choice does not mean ignoring power imbalances. In some schemes, there is genuine deadlock. Trustees may be reluctant to deploy surplus for fear of sponsor reaction or member backlash, so instead sit on it and de-risk further. That may be a rational defensive response, but it is also a deeply inefficient outcome. The Government should be looking at how to enable better use of surplus by agreement, rather than mandating outcomes.
My questions to the Minister are as follows. How do the Government intend to preserve flexibility while avoiding blunt compulsion? How will they support trustee-employer partnership rather than hardwiring outcomes into legislation? What consideration has been given to mechanisms for breaking deadlock—including overprudence, if that is a term that can be used—so that surplus can be used productively rather than simply locked away?
To conclude, these amendments raise important issues. Our concern is not with the objectives but with the method. Choice, partnership and proportionality should remain the guiding principles. I look forward to the responses from the Minister.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment which seeks to determine why the Secretary of State is permitted to change the conditions for paying surplus using the negative procedure after the initial conditions are first set using the affirmative procedure and to question the extent and scope of the Secretary of State’s regulatory power in setting the conditions for surplus release.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, we come to another busy group, in which the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and I have amendments. I will speak only to our amendments so that other noble Lords have time to set out their reasoning and questions to the Minister. I look forward to hearing them. Essentially, this group covers surplus release, how it will operate and precisely who will oversee the rules of this. We are also concerned about the very wide delegated powers within this area.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Committee for the discussion on this group, which goes to the heart of how Clause 10 is intended to operate in practice. I have a few closing remarks, but I just say at the outset that I think we all realise that it was for the Minister to answer the very concise questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and my noble friend Lady Noakes. Across these amendments and our stand-part notice, our concern has been a consistent one, which is that Clause 10 confers wide powers on the Secretary of State to determine the conditions under which surplus may be paid to an employer and to alter those conditions over time, largely through regulations. That is a significant delegation of authority in an area both technically complex and deeply sensitive for scheme members.
Although we recognise the case for flexibility, that flexibility must be balanced with proper safeguards. When changes to the surplus regime could materially affect member protections or the balance of interests between employers and members, it is not unreasonable for Parliament to expect a meaningful and continuing role in scrutinising those changes, not merely at the point when the framework is first established.
I listened very carefully to the Minister in her responses in terms of the legislative process, and I take note of the fact that she says that the measures are in line with existing legislation. I will reflect on that and read Hansard, and I will look more deeply at her points about the negative procedures having been used in the past, and the fact that she says that this is different and the Government are bringing forward an affirmative procedure before the negative procedure, if your Lordships see what I mean. I shall look at that.
As I said at the outset, our amendments have been probing in nature. They are intended to test the rationale for the proposed approach to parliamentary procedure and seek reassurances that the level of scrutiny will remain commensurate with the importance of the decisions being taken.
Finally, given the nature of the Bill as a framework Bill—a theme that we have been promulgating on the first two days in Committee, and which the Minister herself explained on Monday—I hope that the Minister will anticipate that we and other noble Lords will be bearing these questions in mind on many other parts of the Bill. I hope that in raising this and flagging it, she can continue to respond to these issues in the round, explaining why this structure was adopted in the first place throughout the Bill, what constraints the Government envisage placing on the use of these powers, and how Parliament will be able to satisfy itself that future changes to the surplus regime remain appropriate and proportionate. With that rounding off, I withdraw my amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, we understand that these amendments are doing something that is really quite straightforward and, in our view, sensible. The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would ensure that, before any surplus is extracted, the relevant actuary has confirmed that the work required under the Financial Reporting Council’s technical actuarial standards of risk transfer has been completed. In other words, they would ensure that trustees and sponsors have properly considered the scheme’s credible endgame options, whether that is bulk transfer, run-on or another long-term strategy, rather than looking at surplus in isolation.
I was pleased to listen to this interesting debate, commenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, with her strong reference to the TAS 300 exercise and the link to insurance. She mentioned the reinsurance market and the subsequent debate, as well as the amount of money potentially in play—£200 million, I think. Surplus extraction ought to sit within a wider assessment of the scheme’s long-term direction, the securities of members’ benefits and the financial implications for both the scheme and the sponsor. Requiring confirmation that this work has been done would help anchor surplus decisions in that broader context.
This has been a very brief speech from me. We see these amendments as a proportionate safeguard, reinforcing good governance and ensuring that surplus payments are considered alongside—not divorced from—the scheme’s long-term endgame strategy. I look forward to the response from the Minister.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for setting out her amendments. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I must admit that I have learned more about actuaries in the past week than I ever knew hitherto, but it is a blessing.
Three different issues have come up. I would like to try to go through them before I come back to what I have to say on this group. In essence, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has us looking at, first, actuaries: what is their role, what are the standards and how do they do the job? Secondly, what are the right endgame choices—that is, what is out there at the moment? Finally, what should be in the surplus extraction regime? We have ended up with all three issues, although the amendments only really deal with the last of those; they deal with the others by implication. Let me say a few words on each of them, then say why I do not think that they are the right way forward.
We have just finished hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. Obviously, we are talking about the position now. DB schemes are maturing and, as such, are now prioritising payments to members. Given this context, they are naturally more risk-averse, as they are now seeking funding to match their liabilities. Since the increases in interest rates over the past five years, scheme funding positions have—the noble Lord knows this all too well—improved significantly in line with their corresponding reductions and liabilities.
However, when setting an investment strategy, trustees must consider among other things the suitability of different asset classes to meet future liabilities, the risks involved in different types of investment and the possible returns that may be achieved. The 2024 funding code is scheme-specific and flexible. Even at significant maturity, schemes can still invest in a significant proportion of return-seeking assets, provided that the risk can be supported.
On actuaries, actuarial work is clearly an important part of the process. It helps set out the picture, as well as highlighting the risks, the assumptions and the available options, but it does not determine the outcome. My noble friend Lord Davies is absolutely right on this point. Decisions on how a scheme uses the funds are, and will remain, matters of trustee judgment. The role of the actuary is to support the judgment, not replace it. Trustees are the decision-makers, and they remain accountable for the choices that they make on behalf of their members.
Of course, in providing any certification, actuaries will continue to comply with the TAS standards set by the Financial Reporting Council. I am not going to get into the weeds of exactly how the standards work but, on the broader points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, we agree that the requirements and the regulations must work together. As my noble friend said, after the funding regime code was laid, the FRC consulted on revisions to TAS 300 covering developments; it has now published the revised TAS. These are complex decisions. Regulators need to work together. We will come back to this issue later on in the Bill, following an amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey.
In terms of the endgame choices, the independent Pensions Regulator has responsibility for making sure that employers and those running pension schemes comply with their legal duties. Obviously, the Government are aware of the recent transaction that resulted in Aberdeen Asset Management taking over responsibility for the Stagecoach scheme; we are monitoring market developments closely. Although we support innovation, we also need to ensure that members are protected. Following the introduction of TPR’s interim superfund regime and the measures in this Pension Schemes Bill, we understand that new and innovative endgame solutions are looking to enter the DB market and offer employers new ways to manage their DB liabilities. I assure the noble Baroness that we continue to keep the regulatory framework under review to ensure that member benefits are appropriately safeguarded.
Then, the question is: what is the right thing to be in the surplus extraction regime? I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, is concerned that, following these additional flexibilities to trustees around surplus release, trustees continue to consider surplus release in the context of the wider suite of options available to their scheme, including buyout, transfer to a superfund or other options beyond those. Following these changes, trustees will remain subject to their duty to act in the interests of beneficiaries. As such, we are confident that trustees will continue both to think carefully about the most appropriate endgame solution for their scheme and to act accordingly. For many, that will be buyout or transferring to a superfund, rather than running on.
Let me turn to what would happen with these amendments specifically. Amendment 33 would link the operation of the surplus framework to existing standards on risk transfer conditions in TAS. In essence, it seeks to ensure the scheme trustees have considered a potential buyout or other risk transfer solution before surplus can be released. Amendment 33A has a similar purpose; again, it aims for trustees, before they can release surplus, receiving a report from the scheme actuary assessing endgame options and confirming compliance with TAS.
Although I appreciate the noble Baroness’s intention to ensure that trustees select the right endgame for their scheme, these amendments are not needed because trustees are already required, under the funding and investment regulations, to set a long-term strategy for their scheme and review it at least every three years; that strategy might include a risk transfer arrangement. Furthermore, although I know the noble Baroness has tried to minimise this, hardwiring any current provisional standards into the statutory framework could have unintended consequences, including reducing flexibility for trustees and requiring further legislative or regulatory changes to maintain alignment as these standards evolve over time.
We are back to the fact that, in the end, trustees remain in the driving seat with regard to surplus release. As a matter of course, TPR would expect trustees to take professional advice from their actuarial and legal advisers; to assess the sponsor covenant impact when considering surplus release; and to take into account relevant factors and disregard irrelevant factors, in line with their duties. We are working with the Pensions Regulator regarding how schemes are supported in the consideration of surplus-sharing decisions. The new guidance already considers schemes as part of good governance to develop a policy on surplus. TPR will issue further guidance on surplus sharing following the coming into force of the regulations flowing from the Bill, which will describe how trustees may approach surplus release and can be readily updated as required. Alongside the Pensions Regulator, we will work with the FRC to ensure that TAS stays aligned.
I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s contribution and the wider debate, but I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.