Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsMonday 26th January 2026
(1 week, 1 day ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-V(a) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (23 Jan 2026)
Baroness Noakes (Con)
If the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, had listened, she would know that I said I thought what the Government were doing had gone too far, because there were instances where there was a necessary flow between the raising of funds and that flowing into new investment.
A number of noble Lords on this side of the Room have been talking as though this Bill stops pension schemes investing in listed assets or investment companies. It certainly does not; it merely says that they do not qualify if asset mandation is introduced. We ought to be concentrating on whether this is a valid policy objective—the Minister knows that I do not subscribe to that—to get money out of pension funds and into the real economy. We then ought to concentrate on which flows achieve that; certainly not all flows of buying investment trusts or other listed vehicles will achieve that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak in strong support of a number of carefully drafted amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and once again ably supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I will also speak to my Amendment 127.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, briefly, it is not appropriate for legislation to tell the trustees of pension funds, in any case, that they can make investments in some types of structure but not in others. It should be entirely up to the trustees, in exercising their fiduciary duties, to determine what investments they make and the structures through which they make them to deliver a maximum level of risk that they are happy to accept.
The Government will succeed in realising their target of increasing pension fund investment in UK infrastructure by adopting fiscal and economic policies that encourage growth. We will then see a natural return to the much higher levels of UK equity investment by pension funds that used to obtain many years ago. If the Government require, nevertheless, some potential or possible mandation, it is right that there should be a cap. But, as my noble friend Lord Remnant said, it is inconceivable that any pension fund manager would be likely to invest more than 10%—I would say considerably less than that—in asset classes traditionally defined as alternative assets.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, briefly, this group again underlines a central point that we have been making: mandation should not be in the Bill. Time and again, we have heard concerns about the risks of picking winners and the unintended consequences that inevitably follow. I raised these issues on the previous group, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, have today and previously put those concerns firmly on record.
However, I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful efforts to limit or mitigate the impact of the mandation power. I thank my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, supported by my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lady Penn in particular, for their remarks on these issues. However, our view remains unchanged and, for reasons already rehearsed at length, asset allocation mandates have no place in this legislation. There is no compelling evidence that they are either necessary or effective in increasing productive investment in the UK.
If we are serious about addressing the barriers to UK investment, we must be honest about where those barriers lie. They include governance and regulatory burdens; risk-weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints and scheme-specific funding; and maturity considerations. None of these challenges is addressed, let alone solved, by mandation. If, notwithstanding these concerns, the reserve power is to be retained, significantly stronger safeguards are essential: a clear cap on the proportion of assets that may be mandated; more robust reporting and evidential requirements before regulations are made; explicit conditions for access to any transition pathway relief; a strengthened savers’ interest test; and rigorous post-implementation review. The question of when and on what basis the power should be sunsetted is one that we will return to on the next group, but the fundamental point must be clear: mandation is the wrong tool and the Bill risks embedding unjustified and anti-competitive discrimination between equivalent investment vehicles, driven not by evidence or public interest but by a narrow and self-interested approach. I will address those issues in more detail in a later group but, for now, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the specific amendments raised.
However—before she gets up—I wish to turn to Amendment 118 in my name. It probes the power that allows regulations made under new Section 28C to include assets of various classes under the broad heading of private assets and to permit the future inclusion of additional asset classes. I appreciate the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on this part.
I touched on this matter in some detail in the previous groups, so I will not repeat those arguments here. However, this amendment once again draws attention to our concern about the specific types of asset that the Government have chosen to list on page 46 of the Bill. It remains an issue about which we are deeply concerned, and one on which we will continue to work closely with other noble Lords though to Report.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Viscount for jumping up prematurely. These amendments relate to the level of any asset allocation requirements and the potential treatment of investments in private equity and private debt as qualifying assets for the purpose of any asset allocation requirement.
I will start with the with the level of any asset allocation requirement, a question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh in her Amendment 114 and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, in Amendment 112. Both would cap the percentage of default fund assets that could be required to be invested in qualifying assets. I understand why noble Lords were keen to table these amendments and to look for a cap. I have to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that I am shocked by such cynicism in one so young. I will explain the—perfectly rational—reason the Government have not done this; I hope that she will find it very satisfying and feel suitably chastened at that point. We do not expect to need to exercise the power, but to do so would be a significant step and, as noble Lords may have picked up by now, the Government’s general approach has been to design the power so that it can be used as a backstop to the commitments used in the Mansion House Accord. I underscore that point.
The aim has been to create a backstop to that rather than to fix a numerical cap in primary legislation. That is what it is designed to do. The accord is not a legal document, and its terms and definitions are not of a kind that could simply be lifted into statute. If the Government were ever to exercise these powers, we would need to define key terms precisely, and it is at least possible that those definitions might have some bearing on the precise percentage levels that are appropriate. We have therefore not taken the step of hard-wiring a fixed cap, although I underline that we have included various other safeguards, which I have repeated more than once, so will not repeat again in the interests of time.
In relation to Amendment 113 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the Mansion House Accord commitment has informed the design of these powers, including the ability for government to require a proportion of assets to be invested in specified qualifying assets. I understand the point that she was making, but our approach has been deliberately limited, going no further than necessary to support the commitments already made. That caution is important, given that this is a novel—and, I discern, a not entirely uncontroversial—part of the Bill. Although we are aligned on the objectives, I would not want to suggest a change in policy direction where none is intended. Our aim is to give the DC pensions industry reasonable clarity about our expectations.
Amendment 119, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, interrogates the inclusion of private equity as an example of a qualifying asset. Its effect would be to remove private equity from the illustrative list in new Section 28C(5). Amendment 120 from my noble friend Lord Sikka would do the same, as well as removing private debt.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the reasons behind the provision allowing the Secretary of State until 2035 to exercise the mandation power.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open what I hope and assume will be another interesting debate. Once again, I hope it will shine a light on the flaws of mandation from new and specific angles that merit discussion.
Amendment 115 in my name is a probing amendment, which goes to the architecture of the power itself. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to exercise the mandation power up until 2035. Why has 2035 been chosen for sunset? Why is it that particular year? Was that date chosen because it aligns with some evidenced policy rationale, a defined market transition or a known obstacle that is expected to have fallen away by then? A sunset date sets the constitutional balance between Parliament, Ministers and the pensions industry. A sunset clause extending to 2035 runs beyond the life of this Parliament and would allow very broad discretion for a Secretary of State, not merely to encourage investment but to direct it, in effect, by setting targets and conditions. That is an extraordinary proposition when we are dealing with the retirement savings of millions of people.
I put a simple set of questions to the Minister. What analysis underpins the choice of 2035? Was it recommended by the department’s own evidence base? If the concern is a temporary set of barriers, for instance, a collective action problem, why is the power not time-limited to a shorter period, with a requirement for Parliament to renew it if, and only if, the evidence remains compelling? If the Government believe the power is genuinely a reserved power, why does it need such a long reserve? If the Minister cannot explain the logic of the date, it becomes harder to accept that the scope of the power has been calibrated with care.
Amendment 152 relates to the review process following the exercise of powers under Section 28C—the mandation power. This is another probing amendment intended to test why the Government consider a five-year period an appropriate timeline for regulations to be reviewed and why an earlier review has not been proposed. Five years is a long time in pensions and financial markets. It is a very long time in the life of a saver, because compounding does not wait politely while Whitehall decides whether its intervention has worked. If an allocation has been distorted, returns have been impaired, costs have risen or liquidity has been compromised, five years is long enough for the damage to become embedded in outcomes. It is also long enough for market conditions to have changed so significantly that any review risks becoming a rear-view mirror exercise rather than a real safeguard.
I ask the Minister directly, why five years? What is the justification? Is there evidence that a shorter review period will be impractical? Why are the Government not willing to commit to a more immediate post-implementation assessment, perhaps—let me be helpful to the Minister—within 12 months or two years, to ensure that any harm to savers is identified early? If Ministers believe the power is low risk, surely a quicker review should not trouble them.
There is a further point. The Bill speaks of not only assessing the effect on the financial interests of members of master trusts and savers in group personal pension schemes, but of such other matters as the Secretary of State may consider appropriate. What precisely do the Government envisage falling within those other matters? Does it include costs to schemes, liquidity, operational complexity, market impact and whether compliance has forced schemes away from diversified strategies that would otherwise have been in members’ best interests? Does it include, as many fear, political metrics dressed up as economic analysis, such as whether a mandated allocation has supported a preferred sector or class of domestic asset?
Most importantly, what happens if the review reveals that the financial interests of members have been harmed? What is the mechanism for redress and the practical remedy? Do the Government anticipate compensating schemes or savers? As the Committee will appreciate, we will return to the question of redress later in our proceedings.
I now return to the subject of market risk through Amendment 115, which is intended to ensure that any review explicitly considers two linked dangers. The first is that mandated investment requirements may become misaligned with economic conditions. The second is that directing multiple schemes into the same assets could cause market distortion or asset price inflation.
Mandation can distort markets in ways that are entirely foreseeable. If multiple large schemes are required, either explicitly or implicitly, to invest in the same asset class, the demand shock can inflate prices. If market participants interpret government direction as a signal of future price support, price movements can be amplified further; these arguments have been rehearsed not only in Committee but at Second Reading. Artificial price inflation then risks reducing long-term returns for pension savers because you are requiring schemes to buy after prices have been driven up, rather than allowing them to invest on value and fundamentals. It is picking winners and losers, not through the discipline of markets but through the blunt force of regulation.
So I have further questions for the Minister, I am afraid. Has the department modelled the potential for asset price inflation in any asset class that might be subject to a mandated allocation? Has the department assessed the risk of crowded trades in which schemes find themselves paying more for the same exposure because the Government have forced them to compete with one another? Has the department consulted the Bank of England or the FPC on the risk that mandated flows could contribute to procyclicality or instability, particularly in less liquid markets? What is the Government’s plan if mandated allocations coincide with an already elevated valuation environment?
There is a second risk: that of regulation falling behind economic reality. Mandated asset allocations risk becoming misaligned with economic conditions because compliance takes time. Requirements to hold a specified percentage in a particular UK asset class within a fixed timeframe may no longer be appropriate by the time schemes comply. Economic conditions, market valuations and government priorities can change far more quickly than regulatory mandates. This creates a real risk of locking savers into allocations that are no longer in their best financial interests.
So, again, what mechanism will ensure that mandated requirements remain compatible with changing economic conditions? Will there be a duty to pause or suspend requirements when market conditions deteriorate? Will there be an explicit test that requires Ministers to show why a mandated allocation is consistent with the fiduciary duty at the point when it is imposed, not merely when it is first conceived? If Ministers insist that their fiduciary duties remain paramount, how do they reconcile that with a policy that, by design, substitutes government preference for trustee judgment? I am reverting back to that argument.
Amendment 209 would require the Government to review the barriers that may prevent pension and investment funds investing in the UK, including regulatory, tax and fiduciary constraints; and to report their findings to Parliament. Instead of beginning with mandation then asking later whether it has caused harm, the Government should have started here. If Ministers genuinely wish to increase productive investment in the UK, their first duty is to diagnose the barriers properly. Stakeholders have emphasised repeatedly to us that limited UK investment by pension schemes is not a failure of willingness but reflects real constraints: government and regulatory burdens; risk weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints; scheme-specific funding and maturity considerations; fixed fees; and the economics of administering more complex, perhaps even less liquid, investments at scale. Many of those may be solvable issues but they require the hard work of reform, not the easy headline of compulsion. Addressing these barriers is far more likely to increase investment sustainably than imposing mandation, and care should be taken to avoid adding further unintended obstacles through legislation.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief in closing this debate; I am conscious that I spoke at some length when opening this group.
First, the point raised by my noble friend Lady Noakes was a sound one. Amendment 130 probes the extent to which it is appropriate for regulations to override the trust deed or rules of a pension scheme. I listened carefully to the response from the Minister but I think—my noble friend may agree with me—that this is a fundamental issue that goes to the heart of scheme governance and trustee responsibility. I know it is an issue that she feels strongly about, and we do too, because it is vital that trustees retain clear and accountable responsibility for investment decisions made in members’ best interests. I will reflect on Hansard, as I am sure my noble friend will too.
I also just touch briefly on Amendment 153, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. As she highlighted, this amendment seeks to ensure that a review of the asset allocation mandation powers takes place within at least two years, as well as within five, and of course it reflects the same concern that I raised. I also listened when the Minister said that it was a matter of judgment by the Government. I take note of what she said—I will not give a view on that but, again, we will reflect carefully on it. Despite the best efforts of the Minister, I remain with the feeling that there is not a clear rationale or sufficient assurance, but we will reflect.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, raised a number of technical and specific points. Taken together, this group once again demonstrates the complexity of this particular area, the necessary safeguards and the prior steps required, and the degree of intervention that the Government risk embarking upon through this mandation power. Once mandation is introduced, it inevitably draws policymakers into ever more detailed interventions, and with that comes a cascade of unintended consequences, as I said before. We will therefore reflect on the Minister’s responses but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsThursday 22nd January 2026
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-IV(a) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (22 Jan 2026)
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would replace the 12-month dormancy period with an 18-month period in order to test the rationale for the Government’s chosen timeframe.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, supported by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, I am glad to be leading off in another group of amendments, largely designed to probe the Government and clarify their thinking, plans and rationale on the small pots regulations in the Bill. Indeed, I know that many industry bodies are watching our proceedings with interest and will be taking note of what the Minister says. This is after we had a series of meetings with those at the sharp end in the industry, as she will probably guess.
I will speak briefly to the other amendments in this group before turning to my own. First, I speak to the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. Ensuring that a qualifying dashboard service has been available for a period before small pots can be consolidated seems an entirely sensible and proportionate measure. If we are to move pension savings automatically, often without an active decision by the member, it is surely right that individuals should first have a practical opportunity to see and trace their pots in one place and to engage with them themselves.
I also welcome Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which, as I understand it, would ensure that a pot is not treated as dormant where contributions have ceased for a legitimate and expected reason, such as a temporary break from employment with an intention to return. This strikes me as a pragmatic refinement that would better reflect real-world working patterns and help to ensure that consolidation targets genuine dormancy rather than planned inactivity. I have no doubt the Minister will explain that in more elegant terms than me.
Amendment 88, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, addresses the definitions set out in Clause 34, which itself gives the Secretary of State a broad power to alter the definition of a “small” pension pot, including increasing the threshold, with no upper limit set in the Bill. The amendment would retain flexibility but place a clear ceiling on how far that power could be used. I look forward to my noble friend’s remarks. I know that my noble friend will expand on that point, but I would be grateful if the Minister could also explain why an upper limit is not currently included and how the Government envisage safeguarding against this power being used to capture significantly larger costs in the future. That is an important question that I hope will be raised.
I turn to my first amendment in this group, Amendment 79, which would replace the 12-month dormancy period in Clause 22 with an 18-month period. This is a probing amendment intended to test the rationale for the Government’s choice of a 12-month timeframe. The definition of “dormant” is critical, because once a pot meets that definition it may become eligible for automatic consolidation with no active decision by the member. Many savers engage with their pensions only intermittently, often on an annual basis, and employment patterns do not always follow neat or predictable cycles. Therefore, extending the period to 18 months would allow the Committee to explore whether a full year of inactivity is genuinely sufficient to infer disengagement, or whether it risks capturing individuals who are simply between roles or engaging on a longer cycle.
I want to be clear that this amendment does not seek to undermine the policy of small pots consolidation, which, as the Minister knows, we broadly support. Rather, it is intended to probe how the Government have balanced administrative efficiency with member protection, and what evidence has informed the choice of a 12-month period rather than a longer one. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s explanation of how this timeframe was determined, and whether alternative periods were considered.
Amendment 80 would leave out Clause 22(3)(b). This too is a probing amendment; it is intended to explore what the Government mean by the reference to “prescribed exceptions” in the definition of a dormant pension pot. As drafted, Clause 22(3)(b) assumes that a pot may be treated as dormant not only by reference to contribution inactivity but by whether a member has taken steps to confirm or alter how their pot is invested, subject to exceptions that are left entirely to regulations. Many savers remain in default investment arrangements by choice and engage with their pensions only intermittently, often in ways that are not easily captured by scheme records. Therefore, it is not clear what types of member action the Government intend should prevent a pot being treated as dormant, nor what kinds of behaviour might be carved out as exceptions.
This amendment is intended to prove whether investment-related actions are an appropriate proxy for engagement, how prescribed exceptions will operate in practice and whether the approach adequately reflects real-world member behaviour. I would welcome the Minister’s clarification on how these exceptions are envisaged and why this test has been included in the definition of dormancy.
Finally, my Amendment 82 concerns the level of parliamentary scrutiny applied to regulations made under Clause 22. As drafted, the Bill applies the affirmative procedure to only the first set of small pots regulations or regulations that meet certain specific triggers. Thereafter, changes to the consolidation regime may be made under the negative procedure. This amendment is probing and is not dissimilar to one raised previously in Committee. It is intended to test whether that approach provides sufficient ongoing parliamentary oversight. The regulations made under Clause 22 will govern when and how small dormant pension pots may be consolidated, often without an active decision by the member, and they therefore go to the heart of member protection and confidence in the system itself.
The amendment would require all such regulations to be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring that Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise and approve changes to this framework wherever they are made, not just at first use. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government consider the negative procedure appropriate for subsequent regulations in this area, and whether there are safeguards to prevent significant policy changes being made without fuller parliamentary scrutiny. I thank in advance the Minister for her comments and answers and all other noble Lords for their contributions on this group, which I feel concerns an important matter. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 81 is very small; I hardly need to say anything about it. It came from one of those occasions when you are going through the Bill and you write a little query which you then convert into an amendment. It concerns Clause 22(3)(b), which says that a pension pot can be moved into a consolidator if
“the individual has, subject to any prescribed exceptions, taken no step to confirm or alter the way in which the pension pot is invested”.
There are instances in which a person may want to stay attached to a pension fund they have in a workplace, particularly if they do not necessarily have a long relationship with an employer or have done some intermittent work and then gone off to have a family, because they may have an informal agreement to go back. How do you cater for that? I realise that it might just fall under “any prescribed exceptions”, which you write in a note to deal with, but that is the basis of the amendment. I am sure it will be very simple for the Minister to say, “Yes, that is covered”.
While I am on my feet, I support Amendment 83. I also support Amendment 88 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, because it is worth having some guardrails for things that are doing very well.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will conclude fairly briefly. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and the Minister for her reply. I thank in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I see, as the Minister pointed out, that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is in his place, which has, if I may put it this way, hitherto been dormant.
As we have discussed, the amendments in this group are designed to test how the framework will operate in practice and whether the balance struck is the right one. In particular, they probe how dormancy is defined; how member behaviour is interpreted; and how far Parliament will continue to have oversight as the regime evolves.
I have a few points to make in winding up. First, it would be helpful to hear from the Minister more details about how members can be reunited with their dormant pots—or, indeed, find their missing pots. I particularly look forward to hearing an update about the dashboard. May I make a request? It would be helpful to have more granular detail on how it would work and the different aspects of an individual’s experience in using the dashboard service. I remember that, when I was in the department, I was thoroughly briefed on it; it is a very big, important and interesting project. I am sure that the Committee would appreciate that particular type of update.
My second point was made by my noble friend Lady Noakes when she said that Clause 22 gives significant powers. She was right in saying that there is no real underlying purpose and that there are concerns around the constraints. More granular detail on the definition of small pots is required; as my noble friend said, bearing in mind their value and growth in future, more clarity needs to be given.
Finally, I want to make two points about the 12-month dormancy period that the Minister raised. We will consider what she said about 12 months being the right balance rather than extending, as we proposed. I will also read Hansard concerning her points about the affirmative procedure versus the negative one; I carefully noted what she said.
To conclude, the powers in this chapter are substantial. The point we are making—and, indeed, the points that other noble Lords have made—is that clarity around definitions, proportionality in timeframes, transparency, and how exceptions and future changes will be handled will be essential if members are to feel secure, rather than sidelined by the process. With that summary, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“(6) Transfer notices must be clear, concise, and accessible to all members, including those with low financial literacy or limited digital access.(7) Transfer notices must also be provided in prescribed alternative formats for digitally-excluded, visually-impaired, or otherwise vulnerable members.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures transfer notices are easy to understand and available in alternative formats so that all members, including vulnerable or digitally-excluded individuals, can engage meaningfully with transfer decisions.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I shall address each amendment in this group briefly in turn to provide some of the context and rationale for why we have introduced them. First, Amendments 84 and 85 relate to Clause 24. These amendments are concerned with how this policy will operate in practice and whether it does so in a way that is fair, comprehensible and properly accountable. Clause 24 places significant weight on the transfer notice. It is the principal mechanism by which an individual is informed that their pension pot may be transferred automatically if they do not respond. In many cases, silence will result in action, which makes the quality and accessibility of that notice critical.
Amendment 84 therefore seeks to ensure that transfer notices are clear, concise and accessible to all members, including those with low financial literacy or limited digital access. It also requires that notices be available in prescribed alternative formats for members who are digitally excluded, visually impaired or otherwise vulnerable. I took note of the Minister’s remarks about definitions that may need to be properly defined—better defined than I can define them—in legally recognisable terms, and I recognise that.
As we discussed earlier today, we are all aware that pensions communications can be complex and intimidating, even for those who are relatively engaged. We need only to remind ourselves of the challenges experienced in recent years over pension credit communications. I think my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady Stedman-Scott have had some experience of that. I will leave it at that.
For individuals with small dormant pots, often lower earners, those with fragmented work histories or those disengaged from pensions altogether, the risk is that they simply do not understand what is being proposed or do not realise that inaction has consequences. Often, it is fair to say that pension communications, when received, are by default put in the too-difficult box or the another-day box or in a convenient receptacle placed on the floor—I will leave it at that. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, made a similar point in her remarks on an earlier group, but it is a serious point. If the policy depends on member engagement, it is only reasonable that the communication is genuinely capable of being understood. Amendment 84 would simply put that principle in the Bill.
Amendment 85 addresses a different but related concern about oversight and accountability. As drafted, the clause requires transfer notices to be issued, but does not require anyone to monitor how many notices are sent, how members respond or what outcomes are produced. Amendment 85 would place a duty on the Secretary of State through regulations to record and report annually on the number of transfer notices issued and the outcomes arising from them. This matters for two reasons. First, it allows Parliament to assess whether the policy is working as intended. Are members actively choosing options or are transfers overwhelmingly occurring by default? Are certain cohorts disproportionately disengaged? Without data, we simply cannot know. Secondly, it ensures that responsibility for this policy does not rest solely with schemes and regulators but remains subject to ministerial oversight and parliamentary scrutiny, which is particularly important where automatic processes affect individual savers. I hope the Minister will see these amendments as seeking to address important points that will make this part of the Bill work more effectively, and I look forward eventually to hearing her response. I listened very carefully to her remarks on communications and customer service in an earlier group.
Let me now address our Clause 31 stand part notice; noble Lords will be aware that, as set out in its explanatory statement, this is intended as probing. This clause contains a wide enabling provision that allows Ministers, through regulations on small pots, to confer functions; create appeal rights; require extensive data processing; amend primary legislation; and, most notably, authorise the Pensions Regulator to charge prescribed fees in connection with authorisation under the regime. My concern is not that these powers exist at all but that the clause gives us little indication of how they will be constrained in practice. In particular, can the Minister explain how the fee-charging power for the Pensions Regulator will operate? Will fees be strictly limited to cost recovery? How will their level be set? What parliamentary scrutiny will apply?
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be pretty brief in closing. Across this group, the common theme is not opposition to the direction of travel—I give further reassurance to the Minister on this point and I appreciate her remarks—but a desire for clarity, proportionality and accountability as these powers are taken and exercised. I am very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and indeed for her extra questions on this group. The small pots regime will rely heavily on automatic processes, regulatory discretion and secondary legislation, which makes it especially important that Parliament understands how these measures will work in practice and where the guardrails sit.
The amendments that we have brought forward are deliberately probing, as I said at the outset. They seek reassurance that members will be able to engage meaningfully with decisions that affect their savings, that Ministers will retain visibility and responsibility for how the system operates once it has gone live, and that the regulators’ powers, whether in relation to fees, enforcement or penalties, will be used in a way that is targeted, proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight. I respect the fact that the noble Baroness has given much time to addressing the amendments, and indeed those particular points, for which I am very grateful. It has been a short debate, and I hope a helpful one, and we will consider the responses given. But, for the moment I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to scrutinise the scale of the Secretary of State’s powers to exempt schemes from Conditions 1 and 2 set out in subsection (4), and to probe whether these exemption powers are intended to apply to Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) schemes.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, this is a busy group and I shall not detain the Committee by speaking to all the amendments therein, but I do want to welcome the amendments that have been tabled by other noble Lords, which will allow us to have a detailed and, I hope, fruitful debate and discussion on these important matters.
Amendment 89 is a probing amendment. It would leave out new subsection (1B), which allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to exempt descriptions of relevant master trusts from the approval requirements in conditions 1 and 2, covering both the scale default arrangement and the asset allocation approvals. The purpose here is to understand the intended scope of this power and the safeguards that will govern its use. As drafted, new subsection (1B) is very broad: it permits exemptions for
“any description of relevant Master Trusts”
and gives examples, including schemes designed to meet the needs of those with protected characteristics and hybrid schemes.
I have three straightforward questions for the Minister at the outset. First, why is it necessary to take such wide exemption powers in the Bill, rather than tightly defining the circumstances in which exemptions may be granted? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that exemptions do not create a route by which schemes can avoid the central policy intent of this chapter: namely, improving outcomes through scale and an appropriate approach to asset allocation?
Thirdly, can the Minister clarify whether these exemption powers are intended, in whole or in part, to apply to collective defined contribution schemes, or other non-standard money purchase arrangements? If so, what is the rationale; and if not, will she put that clearly on the record? I am mindful of the recent debate that we had in this Room on the CDCs. I hope the Minister can respond to those points.
I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will set out her reasoning for Amendment 92, so I do not wish to pre-empt or emulate what I know will be a very well-reasoned and informative set of remarks. But, as I have added my name to the amendment, I will briefly say that I welcome this proposal. It would put in the Bill a clear signal that a trust which provides “exceptional” value for money—as assessed by the regulator under its VFM framework—could be a legitimate basis for exemption from the new approval requirements. It seems sensible that trusts that already provide exceptional value for money should be trusted to carry on their good work under the established framework in which they are already operating.
Amendment 100, in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to whom I am grateful, seeks to provide helpful clarity, not to weaken regulation, by making clear that schemes offering genuinely specialist or innovative services can demonstrate that they meet the exemption. This is important because innovation in pensions does not always mean novel technology alone; it can include specialist provision for particular workforces, new approaches to member engagement or delivery models that better serve groups who might otherwise be poorly catered for. Without clarity, there is a risk that worthwhile innovation is discouraged simply because schemes are uncertain about how the exemption will be interpreted.
The amendment also gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define “specialist or innovative services”. That provides appropriate flexibility, allowing the definition to evolve over time, while ensuring proper scrutiny and regulatory oversight. The amendment supports innovation without undermining member protection, and it gives both trustees and regulators greater certainty about how the exemption is intended to operate. I therefore hope the Minister will look favourably on it and speak to the point that is raises.
Amendments 105 and 107 are intended to ensure that group personal pension schemes are treated fairly and proportionately under the new scale requirements in Clause 40. We are clear that scale alone is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value. There are group personal pension schemes that are smaller by design yet provide highly specialist or innovative services, for example, to particular sectors, workforces or member needs, and that deliver good outcomes despite not meeting a blunt asset threshold. Amendment 105 creates an additional route for relevant GPPs to meet the quality requirement, by allowing those that satisfy an innovation exemption not to be automatically required to meet the scale requirement.
Amendment 107 provides the necessary framework for that exemption. It allows a GPP to demonstrate that it offers specialist or innovative services, and gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define what those terms mean. That ensures flexibility as the market evolves, while retaining appropriate regulatory and parliamentary oversight. I hope the Minister will see these amendments as a constructive way of balancing scale with innovation, competition and member outcomes, and I look forward to her response.
Amendment 135 would revert the eligibility test for new entrant pathway relief under Clause 40 to the simpler principle-based formulation contained in the Bill as introduced. The purpose of the new entrant pathway is clear: to ensure that credible, innovative schemes are not locked out of the market simply because they are new and have not yet had the opportunity to build scale. As the Bill is currently drafted, that test has become more prescriptive, with a risk that genuinely innovative entrants could struggle to qualify despite having strong growth potential. By refocusing the test on whether a scheme can demonstrate strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, this amendment would restore the original balance between safeguarding member outcomes and allowing healthy competition and innovation in the market. This amendment would simply ensure that the pathway for new entrants remains realistic and proportionate and is aligned with the policy intent.
Finally, Amendments 165 and 166 are probing amendments about parliamentary scrutiny—back to that subject. Clause 41 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations setting out how the Pensions Regulator will assess whether master trusts meet the scale requirement and have sufficient investment capability. These assessments will have a direct bearing on which schemes can operate, which must consolidate and how the market develops over time. As drafted, the Bill provides that the first set of regulations is subject to the affirmative procedure, but all subsequent regulations may be made under the negative procedure. I think we have heard this before. Amendments 165 and 166 would remove that distinction, so that any regulations in this area would require affirmative approval.
The question that these amendments pose is simple: if the initial framework is considered significant enough to warrant full parliamentary scrutiny, why should later changes, potentially just as consequential, receive a lower level of oversight? These regulations are not mere technical updates; they go to the heart of how scale and capability are judged, and therefore to the structure of the pensions market itself. It therefore seems reasonable that Parliament should retain the guaranteed opportunity to debate and approve changes of that kind whenever they are made. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of why the negative procedure is considered sufficient for subsequent regulations and whether there is scope to strengthen ongoing parliamentary scrutiny in this area. I look forward to contributions from other Members of the Committee and particularly to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 92 because it is a “what it says on the tin” amendment. It arose during a conversation. Somebody asked me what happens if a scheme is doing very well but is forced into consolidation because it does not meet the scale requirements. Would there be any legal consequences if it did not do quite so well under consolidation? On whom would those legal consequences fall if, as a result, somebody received a worse pension? Is there any comeback on the scheme because it was not big enough and so got consolidated? Is there any indemnity? Is there any making up? Let us take a theoretical situation in which the consolidator it goes into ends up doing very badly—I would hope that would never happen, but this is just to probe the safeguards around such circumstances. I could not answer the questions. It may be that there is something in the vast number of papers I have not read and the Minister can advise me. There is nothing terribly special or secretive behind it, it is just something that could happen, and can I obtain clarity about what comeback there may or may not be?
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief in closing as I suspect that the Committee is keen to get on to the next group.
Across this group, with the focus on scale—looking at both the merits and the demerits—the consistent theme has been a desire to ensure that the framework we are putting in place is proportionate, intelligible and capable of accommodating diversity in the pensions market. There has also been the theme of “big is not necessarily beautiful” in the course of this debate. My noble friend Lady Noakes was supported in particular by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann; they were assiduous in their questions on scale.
I should just remind the Committee that the Minister for Pensions has stated that return on investment is paramount, so this has been a very interesting debate. What if suboptimal scale produces better returns than merely big scale? That was one of the themes in this debate. Is there not a tension here? I would say that there clearly is.
From the remarks made by a number of Peers in this Committee, I think that more thought needs to be put into the threshold, including the criteria for reaching the threshold and whether the threshold level is right in itself. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, a question on legal dangers has been posed.
A number of issues here absolutely need to be explored further. I have no doubt that this will be done prior to Report—indeed, we will look at what we might bring back on Report. Several of these amendments seek reassurance that sensible exemptions will be exercised narrowly and transparently without undermining the policy intent; others are concerned with ensuring that innovation, specialisation and strong value for money are not inadvertently crowded out by rigid thresholds.
Finally, there is an understandable concern that, where regulations will shape market structure and regulatory judgment over time, Parliament should retain meaningful oversight in how these powers are exercised.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions on this group. I thank the Minister for her attempts to answer the questions covering the CDCs on exemptions criteria and on innovation. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. When I came to draft my own amendments, I discovered that this area of mandation was a rather crowded marketplace, so I decided not to enter it. I will not speak at length on the subject, but I endorse everything that has been said so far and wish to commit my almost undying belief that mandation must not remain in the Bill.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and I have only one amendment in this group: Amendment 109, which would remove the Government’s broad mandation power. That has been very much the theme of this debate, of course. I want to be absolutely clear at the outset that we are also seriously and fundamentally opposed to investment mandation in the Bill, which I sure will come as no surprise to the Minister.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I have a couple of points to raise. The Minister mentioned that the reserved power was designed to be a signal, and I would argue that it is a pretty strong signal to put in the Bill. Will she strongly consider whether there are other ways to encourage investments in the UK other than using this, and what might they be? This is one of the things that we will want to press.
Secondly, she did not answer my question about the dangers of a future Government taking up these powers, even though she mentioned the sunset clause of 2035, which is, frankly, some time off.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am sorry I did not namecheck the noble Viscount in responding to the second point. I intended to respond by pointing to the safeguards and the guardrails that have been built in. That was the nature of the response to that.
In response to the first question, I thought I said that the Government accept that this is not the only issue and that we are addressing the other ways. We have been looking at the other barriers and investment opportunities. We also mentioned that the FCA has looked at examples. It is not the only thing; we are looking at the other things as well. We think there is already significant progress, but we think this reserve power is a way of ensuring that progress goes forward and not backwards on this issue.
Parental Leave and Pay Review
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that and pay tribute to all the wonderful work she did on the Employment Rights Bill. The whole country has good reason to be grateful to her. I am sure she still bears the occasional scar, which she may polish occasionally. That is a great idea; we would be happy to have a meeting. I want to manage expectations. We are going to listen to all the evidence and a wide range of voices, but it would be helpful for those voices to come from inside this House as well as outside. I would be very pleased to do that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is anticipated that there will be a chilling factor, with businesses thinking twice about hiring mothers-to-be and fathers-to-be if there are parental rights from day one. Is there not a danger that businesses will find ways of pre-emptively rejecting candidates whom they believe will be in a position to take parental leave immediately or soon after taking up their new roles?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, leave from day one is about the ability to give notice. For statutory maternity and paternity pay, there is already a significant period of qualification of working for the employer. If the noble Viscount is seriously suggesting that businesses would reject all potential mothers and fathers, that is going to leave them with quite a small pool to choose from when they are selecting. The reality is that many businesses already recognise that there are genuine benefits to be had in enabling people to be productive. If people are worrying about what is happening at home, then they are not able to do that. However, we have to get the balance right, so the review will carefully weigh up the benefits for families against the impact on employers and the Exchequer before Ministers decide on any reforms. On that point he is absolutely right.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsMonday 19th January 2026
(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-III(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (19 Jan 2026)
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
I thank the noble Lord; it is just that impartial pension advice for members is not always available to everybody. Many savers struggle to navigate pension choices, whether around a consolidation investment strategy or retirement income. Without proper advice, members risk making poor financial decisions that could damage their long-term security. If you are in the business, you have to take the good with the bad, but we would like to give members a bit of advice if the money is available. Free impartial advice is essential to levelling the playing field.
Surpluses in pension schemes should not sit idle or be seen simply as windfall funds. Redirecting a small—I stress “small”—proportion to fund member advice would ensure that surpluses are used in a way that benefits members directly. Amendment 32 would not mandate a fixed share; it would simply give the Secretary of State powers to determine what proportion may be used. This would, I hope, create flexibility and safeguards so that the balance between scheme health and member benefit can be properly managed. Further advice from surpluses reduces the need for members to pay out of pocket and it builds trust that schemes are actively supporting member outcomes beyond the pension pot itself.
Amendment 44, to which my noble friend Lord Thurso referred, would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to publish
“within 12 months … a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows”.
It aims to explore options for improving outcomes for members of older pension schemes. I maintain that this amendment is needed because many pre-1997 schemes were established before modern indexation rules. Trustees’ current fiduciary duties may limit their ability to avoid discretionary increases, which is what this amendment is about. Members of these schemes may be missing out on pension increases that could be sustainable and beneficial. I will not go on about what the report would do, but there would be many benefits to this new clause. It would provide an evidence-based assessment of whether discretionary indexation can be applied safely; support trustees in making informed decisions for pre-1997 scheme members; and balance members’ interests with financial prudence and regulatory safeguards.
The amendments in this group are clearly going to progress on to Report in some way. Sometime between now and then, we are going to have to try to amalgamate these schemes and take the best bits out of them in order to get, on Report, a final amendment that might have a chance of persuading the Government to take action on these points. Many of the amendments in this group—indeed, all of them—follow the same line, but there needs to be some discipline in trying to get the best out of them all into a final amendment on Report.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for their amendments in this group. I also thank other noble Lords for all their other contributions in Committee so far this afternoon. Our debate on this group has stimulated a most valuable discussion. Of course, I look forward to the Minister’s responses to the points that have been raised.
I wish to start off by saying that I thought it was helpful that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, steered the Committee—my words, not hers—towards a focus on scheme members. The debate went a lot beyond that, but I just wanted to make that point at the outset. I wish also to take this opportunity to set out our stance on indexation, as well as some of the related questions that we for the Opposition have for the Government on this point.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, these amendments raise understandable concerns about fairness, inflation and the use of defined benefit surpluses. But our core line is simple: mandating how trustees and employers use DB surpluses would be overly prescriptive and risks being actively anti-business. Many employers are already using surpluses constructively, improving DC provision for younger workers, supporting intergenerational fairness, strengthening scheme security through contingent assets, SPVs or insurance-backed arrangements, or reducing long-term risk in ways that benefit members as well as sponsors. Employers have also borne DB deficit risk for many years, as we have heard a bit about this afternoon. If they carried the risk in the bad times, it is reasonable that they can share in the benefits in the good times, provided that decisions are taken jointly with trustees.
I will explain this through a simple analogy—I say at the outset that it will not be up to the standard of the buckets analogy utilised previously in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, but here we are. The employer and members walk into the casino together. The bets are placed and the investment strategy, funding assumptions and longevity risk are collective decisions overseen by trustees. If the bet goes wrong, the employer must cover the losses, often over many years, through additional contributions and balance sheet strain. If the bet goes right, however, some argue that the employer should be excluded from any upside and that all gains must automatically be distributed to members.
That is not, we believe, how risk sharing works. In any rational system, the party that underwrites the losses must surely be allowed to share in the gains—I know there are other arguments, but I believe this was the one posed by my noble friend Lady Noakes—otherwise, incentives are distorted, future participation is discouraged and employers become less willing to sponsor schemes at all. The fair outcome is that neither the employer nor the members take everything and that surplus is discussed and allocated jointly by trustees and employers in a way that balances member security, scheme sustainability and the long-term health of the sponsoring employer. I think this was the central argument of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and, in a different way, my noble friend Lord Fuller. Legislation should support that partnership, not override it.
My noble friend Lord Willets made an interesting point. He asked whether it is fair that, in DB schemes, current employees often contribute to enhancing or rescuing the surplus position of pension schemes, making up for past mistakes—or deficits, perhaps—and the potential consequence of that linking to lower remuneration for those current employees. I add one more thing, which is probably a bit unfair because it is slightly hypothetical: if that current employee, having perhaps been paid less, is then made redundant, that is a double whammy for them. The question is whether the surplus should be used for helping current employees or giving them a better deal, as well as, or instead of, looking to help the pre-1997 members. That is the way I look at it.
Against that backdrop, amendments that would make benefit uplifts—whether pre-1997 indexation or lump sum enhancements—a statutory condition of surplus extraction raise real concerns. Automatic uplift would ignore wider economic impacts, including higher employer costs; increased insolvency risk, ultimately borne by the PPF; knock-on effects on wages, investment and employment; and potentially higher PPF levies.
For PPF schemes, mandatory uplift is manageable because the employer covenant has gone and Parliament controls the compensation framework. Imposing similar requirements on live schemes risks destabilising otherwise healthy employers. Uplift should therefore be an option and not an obligation. That said, focusing on choice does not mean ignoring power imbalances. In some schemes, there is genuine deadlock. Trustees may be reluctant to deploy surplus for fear of sponsor reaction or member backlash, so instead sit on it and de-risk further. That may be a rational defensive response, but it is also a deeply inefficient outcome. The Government should be looking at how to enable better use of surplus by agreement, rather than mandating outcomes.
My questions to the Minister are as follows. How do the Government intend to preserve flexibility while avoiding blunt compulsion? How will they support trustee-employer partnership rather than hardwiring outcomes into legislation? What consideration has been given to mechanisms for breaking deadlock—including overprudence, if that is a term that can be used—so that surplus can be used productively rather than simply locked away?
To conclude, these amendments raise important issues. Our concern is not with the objectives but with the method. Choice, partnership and proportionality should remain the guiding principles. I look forward to the responses from the Minister.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment which seeks to determine why the Secretary of State is permitted to change the conditions for paying surplus using the negative procedure after the initial conditions are first set using the affirmative procedure and to question the extent and scope of the Secretary of State’s regulatory power in setting the conditions for surplus release.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, we come to another busy group, in which the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and I have amendments. I will speak only to our amendments so that other noble Lords have time to set out their reasoning and questions to the Minister. I look forward to hearing them. Essentially, this group covers surplus release, how it will operate and precisely who will oversee the rules of this. We are also concerned about the very wide delegated powers within this area.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Committee for the discussion on this group, which goes to the heart of how Clause 10 is intended to operate in practice. I have a few closing remarks, but I just say at the outset that I think we all realise that it was for the Minister to answer the very concise questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and my noble friend Lady Noakes. Across these amendments and our stand-part notice, our concern has been a consistent one, which is that Clause 10 confers wide powers on the Secretary of State to determine the conditions under which surplus may be paid to an employer and to alter those conditions over time, largely through regulations. That is a significant delegation of authority in an area both technically complex and deeply sensitive for scheme members.
Although we recognise the case for flexibility, that flexibility must be balanced with proper safeguards. When changes to the surplus regime could materially affect member protections or the balance of interests between employers and members, it is not unreasonable for Parliament to expect a meaningful and continuing role in scrutinising those changes, not merely at the point when the framework is first established.
I listened very carefully to the Minister in her responses in terms of the legislative process, and I take note of the fact that she says that the measures are in line with existing legislation. I will reflect on that and read Hansard, and I will look more deeply at her points about the negative procedures having been used in the past, and the fact that she says that this is different and the Government are bringing forward an affirmative procedure before the negative procedure, if your Lordships see what I mean. I shall look at that.
As I said at the outset, our amendments have been probing in nature. They are intended to test the rationale for the proposed approach to parliamentary procedure and seek reassurances that the level of scrutiny will remain commensurate with the importance of the decisions being taken.
Finally, given the nature of the Bill as a framework Bill—a theme that we have been promulgating on the first two days in Committee, and which the Minister herself explained on Monday—I hope that the Minister will anticipate that we and other noble Lords will be bearing these questions in mind on many other parts of the Bill. I hope that in raising this and flagging it, she can continue to respond to these issues in the round, explaining why this structure was adopted in the first place throughout the Bill, what constraints the Government envisage placing on the use of these powers, and how Parliament will be able to satisfy itself that future changes to the surplus regime remain appropriate and proportionate. With that rounding off, I withdraw my amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, we understand that these amendments are doing something that is really quite straightforward and, in our view, sensible. The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would ensure that, before any surplus is extracted, the relevant actuary has confirmed that the work required under the Financial Reporting Council’s technical actuarial standards of risk transfer has been completed. In other words, they would ensure that trustees and sponsors have properly considered the scheme’s credible endgame options, whether that is bulk transfer, run-on or another long-term strategy, rather than looking at surplus in isolation.
I was pleased to listen to this interesting debate, commenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, with her strong reference to the TAS 300 exercise and the link to insurance. She mentioned the reinsurance market and the subsequent debate, as well as the amount of money potentially in play—£200 million, I think. Surplus extraction ought to sit within a wider assessment of the scheme’s long-term direction, the securities of members’ benefits and the financial implications for both the scheme and the sponsor. Requiring confirmation that this work has been done would help anchor surplus decisions in that broader context.
This has been a very brief speech from me. We see these amendments as a proportionate safeguard, reinforcing good governance and ensuring that surplus payments are considered alongside—not divorced from—the scheme’s long-term endgame strategy. I look forward to the response from the Minister.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for setting out her amendments. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I must admit that I have learned more about actuaries in the past week than I ever knew hitherto, but it is a blessing.
Three different issues have come up. I would like to try to go through them before I come back to what I have to say on this group. In essence, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has us looking at, first, actuaries: what is their role, what are the standards and how do they do the job? Secondly, what are the right endgame choices—that is, what is out there at the moment? Finally, what should be in the surplus extraction regime? We have ended up with all three issues, although the amendments only really deal with the last of those; they deal with the others by implication. Let me say a few words on each of them, then say why I do not think that they are the right way forward.
We have just finished hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. Obviously, we are talking about the position now. DB schemes are maturing and, as such, are now prioritising payments to members. Given this context, they are naturally more risk-averse, as they are now seeking funding to match their liabilities. Since the increases in interest rates over the past five years, scheme funding positions have—the noble Lord knows this all too well—improved significantly in line with their corresponding reductions and liabilities.
However, when setting an investment strategy, trustees must consider among other things the suitability of different asset classes to meet future liabilities, the risks involved in different types of investment and the possible returns that may be achieved. The 2024 funding code is scheme-specific and flexible. Even at significant maturity, schemes can still invest in a significant proportion of return-seeking assets, provided that the risk can be supported.
On actuaries, actuarial work is clearly an important part of the process. It helps set out the picture, as well as highlighting the risks, the assumptions and the available options, but it does not determine the outcome. My noble friend Lord Davies is absolutely right on this point. Decisions on how a scheme uses the funds are, and will remain, matters of trustee judgment. The role of the actuary is to support the judgment, not replace it. Trustees are the decision-makers, and they remain accountable for the choices that they make on behalf of their members.
Of course, in providing any certification, actuaries will continue to comply with the TAS standards set by the Financial Reporting Council. I am not going to get into the weeds of exactly how the standards work but, on the broader points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, we agree that the requirements and the regulations must work together. As my noble friend said, after the funding regime code was laid, the FRC consulted on revisions to TAS 300 covering developments; it has now published the revised TAS. These are complex decisions. Regulators need to work together. We will come back to this issue later on in the Bill, following an amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey.
In terms of the endgame choices, the independent Pensions Regulator has responsibility for making sure that employers and those running pension schemes comply with their legal duties. Obviously, the Government are aware of the recent transaction that resulted in Aberdeen Asset Management taking over responsibility for the Stagecoach scheme; we are monitoring market developments closely. Although we support innovation, we also need to ensure that members are protected. Following the introduction of TPR’s interim superfund regime and the measures in this Pension Schemes Bill, we understand that new and innovative endgame solutions are looking to enter the DB market and offer employers new ways to manage their DB liabilities. I assure the noble Baroness that we continue to keep the regulatory framework under review to ensure that member benefits are appropriately safeguarded.
Then, the question is: what is the right thing to be in the surplus extraction regime? I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, is concerned that, following these additional flexibilities to trustees around surplus release, trustees continue to consider surplus release in the context of the wider suite of options available to their scheme, including buyout, transfer to a superfund or other options beyond those. Following these changes, trustees will remain subject to their duty to act in the interests of beneficiaries. As such, we are confident that trustees will continue both to think carefully about the most appropriate endgame solution for their scheme and to act accordingly. For many, that will be buyout or transferring to a superfund, rather than running on.
Let me turn to what would happen with these amendments specifically. Amendment 33 would link the operation of the surplus framework to existing standards on risk transfer conditions in TAS. In essence, it seeks to ensure the scheme trustees have considered a potential buyout or other risk transfer solution before surplus can be released. Amendment 33A has a similar purpose; again, it aims for trustees, before they can release surplus, receiving a report from the scheme actuary assessing endgame options and confirming compliance with TAS.
Although I appreciate the noble Baroness’s intention to ensure that trustees select the right endgame for their scheme, these amendments are not needed because trustees are already required, under the funding and investment regulations, to set a long-term strategy for their scheme and review it at least every three years; that strategy might include a risk transfer arrangement. Furthermore, although I know the noble Baroness has tried to minimise this, hardwiring any current provisional standards into the statutory framework could have unintended consequences, including reducing flexibility for trustees and requiring further legislative or regulatory changes to maintain alignment as these standards evolve over time.
We are back to the fact that, in the end, trustees remain in the driving seat with regard to surplus release. As a matter of course, TPR would expect trustees to take professional advice from their actuarial and legal advisers; to assess the sponsor covenant impact when considering surplus release; and to take into account relevant factors and disregard irrelevant factors, in line with their duties. We are working with the Pensions Regulator regarding how schemes are supported in the consideration of surplus-sharing decisions. The new guidance already considers schemes as part of good governance to develop a policy on surplus. TPR will issue further guidance on surplus sharing following the coming into force of the regulations flowing from the Bill, which will describe how trustees may approach surplus release and can be readily updated as required. Alongside the Pensions Regulator, we will work with the FRC to ensure that TAS stays aligned.
I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s contribution and the wider debate, but I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsMonday 12th January 2026
(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-I(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (12 Jan 2026)
“Purpose of the Act(1) The purpose of this Act is to—(a) deliver higher and more sustainable returns for pension savers;(b) address fragmentation across the pensions sector;(c) improve transparency and comparability in value for money;(d) enable clearer and fairer communication with members;(e) support greater consistency across pension provision;(f) support innovative and flexible approaches to saving;(g) provide employers with greater clarity to support their employees’ pension provision;(h) enable responsible and innovative use of pension scheme surplus;(i) improve understanding of pension liabilities and costs for local authorities;(j) strengthen actuarial transparency and routes to challenge contribution rates in the LGPS.(2) The Secretary of State, and any other persons taking actions under the provisions of this Act, must have regard to the purpose specified in subsection (1).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment sets out the overarching purposes of the Act, including improving returns for pension savers, addressing fragmentation, strengthening value for money and transparency, supporting innovation and flexibility in pension provision, and improving outcomes for members, employers, and local authorities.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a privilege to open today’s debate and to begin what I am sure will be five engaging and constructive days of scrutiny on this Bill in Committee. The proposed new purpose clause, in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is not an attempt to rehearse the arguments advanced at Second Reading. Rather, it is intended to address a specific issue arising from the way in which the Bill has been framed and from the legislative approach that the Government have chosen to adopt.
The debate I seek to initiate is a principled one about legislative clarity and certainty, particularly in the context of what is, by any reasonable definition, a framework Bill. We believe that the Bill, as currently drafted, is light on detail and relies heavily on delegated powers. This has inevitably left your Lordships debating intentions, aspirations and hypothetical outcomes, rather than the Government’s settled policy. In those circumstances, is it not all the more important that Parliament is clear on the face of the legislation about what it actually intends to achieve?
The purpose clause amendment therefore intends to establish an overarching statement of intent, setting out the objectives against which the Bill and the regulations made under it should be understood and scrutinised. Where detailed provision is deferred to secondary legislation, such a statement provides Parliament, regulators and stakeholders with a clear point of reference. Without it, how are we to assess whether the powers being taken are exercised consistently with the will of Parliament, rather than merely within the scope of ministerial discretion?
More broadly, the amendment invites the House to reflect on whether Parliament is being asked to confer wide-ranging powers without sufficient clarity as to how they are intended to be used. At what point does flexibility begin to shade into uncertainty? How can proper legislative certainty be maintained when substantive policy choices are deferred, potentially amended repeatedly and then removed from direct parliamentary scrutiny? If there were an alternative procedural route that allowed the House to engage meaningfully with these questions, we would of course be willing to consider it. However, in the absence of such a mechanism, is it not reasonable to seek to debate these matters through a proposed new purpose clause, which would allow the House to test the Government’s intent within the normal amending stages of the Bill?
This concern is particularly acute in relation to value for money. Much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will ultimately stand or fall on the effectiveness of the value-for-money framework. Yet the provisions before us are thin and largely skeletal, despite the central role that the framework is expected to play. How can Parliament properly assess the merits of this approach when so much turns on detail that has yet to be set out?
I say at the outset that we are supportive of the value-for-money framework in principle, but its success will depend almost entirely on the detail of its design, the consistency of its application across schemes and the robustness of its enforcement. Without greater clarity on these points, how are trustees, regulators and members to understand the standards against which they will be judged?
That leads me to a wider question about the long-term purpose of the Bill. How do the Government envisage the pensions landscape to look like in 10, 15 or even 20 years’ time? Is the objective consolidation, greater scale, improved outcomes for savers or some combination of all three? How will we know whether this legislation has succeeded in delivering that vision?
We wish to engage not only with the immediate legislative mechanisms but with the broader strategic direction that underpins them. We fully accept that legislation must allow Ministers a degree of flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, but flexibility without a clear, articulated destination risks leaving Parliament and the industry uncertain about the direction of travel. Is it unreasonable to ask for the House to be told not only what powers are being taken but to what end they are intended to be used? It is in that spirit that this purpose clause has been tabled and I very much look forward to the debate that I hope it will provoke.
I wish to return briefly to the question of mandation, which, although I have not directly mentioned it, is an underlying issue in the Bill. It illustrates precisely why questions of purpose, process and limitation matter so greatly in the context of a framework Bill of this kind. We will of course turn to this in greater detail later in Committee but, as we are discussing the purpose of the Bill in this clause, it would be remiss of me not to mention it here at the outset as one of the most contentious provisions in the Bill—as we heard, broadly around the House, at Second Reading.
As drafted, the Bill establishes a broad enabling framework but leaves a great deal of substantive policy to be determined later through regulation. That approach inevitably creates uncertainty. It also places a heightened responsibility on Parliament to ensure that any powers taken are clearly bounded, carefully justified and firmly anchored to a stated purpose. In that context, we do not consider there to be a compelling case that asset allocation mandates are necessary to increase productive investment in the United Kingdom. Indeed, mandation risks cutting across the fundamental principle that investment decisions should be taken in the best interests of savers by trustees and providers who are properly accountable for the outcomes. I am sure that we will hear more about these arguments in Committee.
When the Bill itself provides only a skeletal framework, the absence of clarity around how such powers might be used becomes all the more concerning. If any future Government were ever minded to pursue mandation, it is essential that any such power be tightly limited, that savers’ outcomes are clearly protected and that asset allocation decisions are insulated as far as possible from political cycles and short-term pressures. Investment decisions should remain with those charged with fiduciary responsibility and not be directed by Ministers, however well intentioned. Those safeguards cannot simply be assumed; in a framework Bill, they must be explicit.
Moreover, the case for mandation is further weakened by the existence of credible and constructive alternative routes to unlocking greater levels of UK investment. Industry participants, including Phoenix Group, have identified a number of areas where policy reform could make a meaningful difference without recourse to compulsion. Government institutions such as the National Wealth Fund and Great British Energy could play a significant role by aligning guarantee products with insurers’ matching adjustment requirements, by engaging institutional investors earlier so that projects are structured to meet long-term investment needs and by continuing collaboration with the ABI Investment Delivery Forum to deliver investable infrastructure pipelines.
Similarly, the Mansion House Accord, building on the 2023 compact, has already driven tangible industry action. In our view, the priority now should be delivery, rather than the creation of new and potentially far-reaching powers. That includes implementing a robust value-for-money framework with standardised metrics; introducing minimum default fund size requirements, whether £25 billion or £10 billion, with a credible growth plan; and aligning the defined contribution charge cap with the Pensions Regulator’s approach by excluding performance fees where appropriate.
More broadly still, stronger capital markets are essential if the United Kingdom is to attract both domestic and international investment. This includes supporting the work of the Capital Markets Industry Taskforce, exploring measures to foster a stronger home bias in UK equities, considering whether stamp duty on share transactions is acting as a drag on competitiveness, and examining targeted tax incentives for pension fund investment in UK infrastructure. Ultimately, rather than mandating investment, policy should focus on understanding why UK investment has lagged. That requires serious engagement with questions of market structure, regulatory design, the quality of investment pipelines and the underlying risk-return characteristics of UK assets. Mandation risks treating the symptoms rather than addressing the causes.
I look forward to the Minister’s response. I make no apology for laying out certain aspects that I believe fit with the purpose of the Bill. However, as I said at the outset, I hope that we have a productive and interesting Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
It is a pleasure to be here. Although for a while I was feeling a bit lonely, I very much welcome my noble friends; what we do not make up in numbers, I am sure my friends will more than make up for in the quality of their contributions. I declare an interest as a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries.
It is worth at this stage spelling out that I have spent a lifetime advising people about pensions. I was the TUC’s pensions officer for a number of years. I was also a partner in a leading firm of consulting actuaries, and I worked for a number of years with a scheme actuaries certificate undertaking scheme valuations. In terms of sheer experience, I can fairly say that this is unique to noble Members of this House. I will not go on at length on future occasions, except when it is directly relevant.
The noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, declared his intention to avoid repeating a Second Reading speech—it is arguable as to whether he achieved that intention—but, in a sense, I welcome the opportunity to look at the Bill as a whole. While I support the Bill and I support my noble friends—there are some really good measures in here—the text underlying the opposition amendment suggests that we have a pensions system in chronically bad condition.
It suggests that returns are inadequate, that the system is fragmented and that it lacks transparency, with people unable to assess what they are getting. It provides inadequate communications. It is inconsistent across the different forms of provision. It prevents, or makes hard, innovative and flexible solutions to the problems that are faced. It needs to provide greater clarity for employers. It currently does not achieve responsible and innovative use of pension surpluses. To me, this suggests a system at risk of chronic failure.
To be honest, I accept those criticisms because underlying this system is the personal pension revolution introduced by the Conservative Government 40 years ago, which has proved to be unfit for purpose. We are having to make all these changes because of the failure of the system that the Conservative Government introduced. We need these changes because personal pensions did not work out. Collective provision is the answer to decent pension provision, and the Bill supports and develops collective provision and moves across this idea that everyone can have their own pot which they look after for themselves. I oppose the amendment and look forward to further discussions on the individual issues as they arise.
The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for introducing his amendment, and all noble Lords who have spoken. It is a particular delight to hear from so many colleagues so early in Committee.
I should begin by saying two things. First, I am a member of the parliamentary pension scheme, so I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for his service and urge him to give the scheme even greater attentiveness in future; I would be very grateful for that. Secondly, I am about to disappoint most Members of the Committee, but I may as well start as I mean to go on. Many of the points made and questions asked will come up in subsequent Committee days—that is what Committee is for—so I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not go into the detail of how surplus operates, how value for money operates or how asset allocation will work; I will come back to all of those. I should probably apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, because I cannot promise to go back to Star Wars figurines, but I will try to pick up most of the rest of the points at some stage.
The Bill delivers vital reforms to strengthen the UK pensions system, safeguarding the financial future of around 20 million savers while driving long-term economic growth. The Bill focuses on improving value and efficiency for workers’ pension savings, with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement. These measures will accelerate the shift towards a pensions landscape with fewer, larger and better-governed schemes that deliver for both members and the wider economy.
To support market consolidation, the Bill introduces superfunds, megafunds and Local Government Pension Scheme pools, creating scale and resilience. The value-for-money framework will ensure that schemes provide the best outcomes for savers, while guided retirement provisions will help members when accessing their savings. Other measures in the Bill will enable pension schemes to operate more effectively by streamlining governance, improving transparency and reducing unnecessary complexity. The reforms delivered through the Bill will create a more efficient, resilient pension landscape; they will also lay the foundation for the Pensions Commission to examine outcomes for pensioners and set out how to develop a fair and sustainable system, ultimately benefiting both individual savers and the UK economy.
To achieve these ambitions, the Bill makes a number of essential changes to the framework of law relating to private pension schemes and the LGPS, rather than pursuing a single overarching objective. To insert a purpose clause could cause legal uncertainty as a court could assume that a provision included in a Bill was intended to have some additional operative effect. The practical effect of the requirement to have regard to the purpose of the Bill, as expressed in this proposed new clause, is unclear.
The purposes of individual provisions are instead made clear through their drafting and the accompanying explanatory material, including the Explanatory Notes and the impact assessment. There is no need for an additional new clause at the start of the Bill setting out the purposes, as this is covered elsewhere more appropriately. This approach is in keeping with established practice; for example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was twice the size of the Pension Schemes Bill. Like the Bill, it deals with a complex legal landscape and made a number of separate and necessary changes to the law relating to financial services and markets. There is no purpose provision in that Act, just as no overarching purpose clause has been included in the Pension Schemes Bill. We will return to matters related to secondary legislation in the debate on a subsequent group of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.
I will pick up the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, about this being a framework Bill; he used that as an argument for a purpose clause. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that, if he has not seen a purpose clause debate, he has not been in many debates in the Chamber recently, because they have appeared; unfortunately and inadvertently, they mostly resulted in long Second Reading debates at the start of many other pieces of legislation. I stress that that was neither the purpose nor the result here, but many of those debates have happened.
We do not consider this to be a framework Bill. The noble Viscount mentioned the idea of setting legislation now and setting policy later. Manifestly, that is not what is happening. The Bill clearly sets out the policy decisions and the parameters within which delegated powers must operate. It brings together a broad package of reforms in pensions into a single piece of legislation. Many of those reforms build on long-established statutory regimes, where Parliament has historically set the policy in primary legislation and provided for detailed measures that will apply to schemes to be set out in regulations. The policy direction is clearly set out here.
As we all know, the successful implementation of pensions depends heavily on trustees, schemes, providers and regulators, which makes engagement and operational detail essential rather than optional. There has been extensive consultation and there will be further extensive consultation. I do not think that this matter will be solved any further by adding a purpose clause.
Finally, the Long Title of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was also described in neutral terms—
“to make provision about the regulation of financial services and markets”—
rather than providing a practically unworkable narrative explanation of the purpose of that legislation. The same applies here.
While I welcome the comments and look forward to returning to many of them in our debates, I hope that I have made the case not only for the Bill as a whole but as to why it is unnecessary and unhelpful to add a purpose clause. I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this relatively short debate. Many of the points raised strongly reinforce the view that my noble friend and I are seeking to advance: that this is indeed a framework Bill, which in its current form would benefit from greater explanation, greater articulation of purpose and more fully developed safeguards. I believe that the debate has drawn out views on some of those listed purposes and that it has been helpful at the outset of Committee.
As my noble friend Lord Trenchard said, it is complicated—that adds to my argument. I was very grateful to have the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I am grateful to the Minister for her response and for beginning to provide some additional context around the Government’s intentions. It has been helpful up to a point, but I am not quite sure why she thinks a purpose clause would provide some uncertainty.
I remain of the view that a broader and more holistic articulation of where the Government would like the pensions system to be in five, 10 and 15 years’ time is still lacking. In fairness, that is likely to extend beyond what the Minister can reasonably be expected to provide today; I understand that. I accept her valid point that Committee is for delving into the detail of these matters, which we will be doing.
I will pick up just a few points from the debate. First, my noble friend Lord Fuller is absolutely right that we need a purpose clause to inspire people, particularly young people, to save for the future. That is a very valid point; it levels us, or brings us down to base, in terms of what we are trying to do here with this complicated Bill.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe why the Secretary of State requires the power in subsection (2) to direct scheme managers to participate in, or withdraw from, particular asset pool companies, given the need to preserve their independence and fiduciary duty to act in members’ best interests.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group begin a series of groups related to the Local Government Pension Scheme. We start with amendments that seek to improve what is already in the Bill. However, as later groups will demonstrate, the Bill remains light on the LGPS.
I am sure that the Minister and other noble Lords will have noticed that we have de-grouped a number of our amendments ahead of today, where they are most relevant to this group. I shall briefly explain our reasoning at the outset. We have no intention of frustrating the passage of the Bill. Rather, we have de-grouped those amendments where we felt it would facilitate a clearer and more focused discussion, enabling noble Lords to put more targeted questions to the Minister without requiring her, or indeed other noble Lords in Committee, to traverse an undue amount of technical detail in a single debate. I hope that our intentions on this point have been made clear.
I do not accept the characterisation that this is simply a private pensions Bill—the Local Government Pension Scheme is clearly included within its scope—nor do I accept the argument that addressing the problems of the LGPS is either too complicated or not a priority. If we are legislating on pensions, we must be prepared to deal properly with the LGPS. I will refrain at this stage from going into the specifics, but later we will bring forward six additional proposed new clauses about the LGPS aimed at making the scheme operate in a more coherent, transparent and practical way. We very much hope that the Minister will engage seriously with these proposals. They go to the root causes of the problems facing the LGPS: how contribution rates are set; how these rates can be challenged; why transparency matters; how opacity undermines confidence in the system; why valuations and methodologies are so important; and, crucially, why many employers are currently getting a bad deal.
However, let us begin with what is already before us in the Bill and why it must be properly probed. These amendments give rise to specific and important questions that we wish to put to the Minister. They concern not only the intent of the provisions but how they will operate in practice, how they will interact with existing LGPS governance and funding arrangements, and whether they genuinely address the problems that they are purported to solve. Clarity on these points is essential if we are to ensure that the Bill strengthens, rather than inadvertently weakens, confidence in the Local Government Pension Scheme.
The first amendment in this group, Amendment 2, would remove subsections (2) to (8) of Clause 1 in order to probe the breadth and necessity of the powers being taken by the Secretary of State. As drafted, Clause 1 goes far beyond enabling regulation. It gives the Secretary of State the power to direct individual scheme managers to participate in or withdraw from specific asset pool companies and to issue binding directions not only to those scheme managers but to the asset pool companies themselves. Trustees have clear and well-established fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of their members and beneficiaries. Decisions about investment structure, risk, performance and value for money are central to those duties. The question this amendment seeks to pose is therefore simple: why does the Secretary of State require the power to override those fiduciary judgments by direction?
The Government have already made clear their policy objective of encouraging greater pooling. What is not yet clear is why compulsion, backed by direction-making powers of this breadth, is considered necessary. I am also concerned about the precedent this sets. Once Ministers have the power to dictate where pension assets must be pooled, it is not difficult to imagine future pressure, real or perceived, for an overinvestment strategy, asset allocation or wider policy objectives, even where these may conflict with members’ best interests.
The amendment therefore invites the Minister to explain, first, what safeguards will exist to ensure that any direction does not conflict with the fiduciary duty of scheme managers to their members. Secondly, over what timeframe will a scheme manager be expected to comply with a direction to enter or leave an asset pool? How will this align with long-term investment strategies? Thirdly, have the Government consulted the Border To Coast Pensions Partnership and other LGPS pools about the potential impact of this power? Fourthly, does the Minister recognise that forced entry or exit from asset pools could disrupt investment strategy, reduce stability and deter private sector partnerships? Have the Government considered this risk?
I am afraid there are a lot of questions, but they are worth putting. How do the Government propose to deal with the risks of cross-subsidisation of employers with very different funding positions that are merged into the same asset pool by direction of the Secretary of State? What safeguards will be put in place to ensure that deficit management remains fair and proportionate across employers after such a merger? Will administering authorities be given the ability to ring-fence liabilities or negotiate separate funding arrangements if they are compelled to merge? Have the Government undertaken any modelling of the financial consequences of merging employers with very different funding positions? If so, will this analysis be published? Can the Minister set out what these prescribed circumstances might be?
I appreciate the letter the Minister sent to noble Lords last week, in which she set out the Government’s recognition of the importance of fiduciary duty. I recognise that and I am sure the whole Committee would therefore welcome some clarity on this question and how these powers can operate while satisfying that duty.
I appreciate that I have asked a lot of questions of the Minister. I do not expect a reply to them all now, but will she write to me to address any points she is unable to speak to today, copying in those who are in Committee today? As she will be aware, these questions are being asked by the industry as well as by noble Lords in Committee, and it is important that we get proper responses to them. This is a probing amendment, intended to elicit reassurance and clarity. Asset pooling can and should be done well, but it must be done in a way that respects trustee independence and preserves confidence in the governance of the Local Government Pension Scheme.
The second amendment in this group, Amendment 4, would remove Clause 2(2)(b), not because we are necessarily opposed to asset pooling but to probe why the Bill places a clear and binding destination in primary legislation while saying almost nothing about the journey required to get there. As drafted, Clause 2 requires the vast majority of Local Government Pension Scheme assets to be held and managed by asset pool companies, with the only acknowledgment of the practical complexities of that transition being a brief reference to
“transitional arrangements permitted by the regulations”.
We are talking about the transfer of very substantial sums across multiple funds with differing asset mixes, contractual arrangements and liquidity profiles. The question that this amendment poses is straightforward: why are transitional arrangements not set out in the Bill, even at a high level? Parliament is being asked to approve a mandatory structure without being shown how legacy assets, illiquid investments, existing mandates and contractual obligations will be unwound or migrated, and over what timescale. That is a significant delegation of policy detail to secondary legislation, particularly given the scale of assets involved.
I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how the Government envisage this transition being managed in practice, what safeguards will be in place to prevent forced or value-destructive transfers and how scheme managers can be confident that they will not be required to move assets in a way that conflicts with their fiduciary duties. The approach set out in our amendment would avoid ambiguity, provide greater clarity for scheme members and reassure taxpayers that pension funds are being managed in a consistent and accountable manner.
Local government pension schemes vary significantly in size, resources and operational approach and without clear statutory provision, there is a risk that practice could diverge across schemes. Given that pension funds involve very substantial sums of public money, it is appropriate that the most fundamental rules governing their management are set out in primary legislation rather than left solely to regulations. Doing so would ensure a higher level of parliamentary scrutiny and durability and help guard against the risk of standards being diluted in future through ministerial discretion.
This is also a probing amendment intended to elicit reassurance. We are clear, and I know the Minister appreciates, that confidence in the system depends on clarity about the transition, not simply an end state written into primary legislation. I hope she will take this opportunity to address that point today.
My Amendment 5 would remove Clause 2(2)(c). To be clear, this is not because we are opposed to local or place-based investment. Rather, it is a probing amendment designed to explore how the Government envisage the relationship between scheme managers and so-called strategic authorities operating in practice. Clause 2 introduces a new statutory duty requiring scheme managers to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. However, the Bill does not define what is meant by “appropriate” or set out the process by which this co-operation is to occur, the weight to be given to the priorities of strategic authorities or how disagreements are to be resolved. This vagueness will create a degree of ambiguity which could prove problematic in practice, particularly where different actors may have very different interpretations of what constitutes an appropriate investment.
One obvious question, therefore, is whether such opportunities are intended to be those defined by a fund’s investment strategy statement. As the Minister will know, the investment strategy statement sets out the fund’s objectives, asset allocation, risk management framework, ESG considerations and approach to pooling. If “appropriate” is not clearly anchored to that framework, there is a risk that scheme managers, strategic authorities and Ministers could each apply the term in rather different ways. This matters because scheme managers are trustees, bound by fiduciary duties to act in the best financial interests of scheme members. Strategic authorities, by contrast, have mandates to pursue local growth, regeneration and wider place-based objectives. Those aims may often align, but they will not always do so. Without clarity, there is a risk of politicisation, however unintended, whereby investments that are politically attractive or locally popular, such as particular infrastructure projects, are promoted despite not meeting the risk and return criteria appropriate for pension funds.
This amendment therefore seeks to probe how the Government will ensure that the statutory duty to co-operate does not place scheme managers under implicit pressure to prioritise wider government or regional objectives over their core fiduciary obligations. Is this duty intended to be advisory or directive? Will scheme managers be expected to justify decisions not to invest in opportunities advanced by strategic authorities? What safeguards will exist to ensure that pension investment strategies remain firmly anchored in members’ best financial interests?
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is very helpful. When I write to the noble Baroness, I will certainly make sure that we address the point around independent advisers. I appreciate the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asking for that kind of clarification, so my written remarks will address that point.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his responses; I am also grateful for the debate we have had on this group of amendments.
I am grateful to all noble Lords beyond me who have asked further questions, particularly in the latter stage of this short debate. It is fair to say—I am saying this against myself—that, with so many questions having been directed originally to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, but applying to both Ministers, it would be extremely helpful to have a full letter with the answers. This has been an important debate; some clear issues have been spoken to, and answers are required.
I will start by picking up some points made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. He gave the impression—indeed, he said this; I cannot remember his expression—that I was being negative about the Local Government Pension Scheme. I reiterate the point made by my noble friend Lord Fuller: the Local Government Pension Scheme is efficient and is very much a British success story. In addition to that, my noble friend Lord Fuller set out—very eloquently, I thought—the concerns around both the complexities in the Bill and the unintended consequences. There are two clear sides to this. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on the success aspect; I want to be quite clear that he knows my position on this.
What unites the amendments in this group is not opposition to reform, nor hostility to pooling local investment or good governance. Rather, it is a concern about how far the Bill reaches into areas that have traditionally, and rightly, been the responsibility of trustees exercising fiduciary judgment. The noble Lord, Lord Katz, said that intervention by government is very much a last resort. I accept what he says but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked—very tellingly—are the Government best placed to direct? Further, she made an interesting point on whether the £400 billion should be part of a sovereign wealth fund. That just shows that it is worth having this sort of debate on this important area of the Bill.
Across these clauses, the Bill moves from setting a framework to conferring powers of direction, compulsion and prescription; direction over participation in asset pools; compulsion towards a particular end state without a clear transition; duties to co-operate with strategic authorities without defined boundaries; and regulation-making powers that reach into advisory pathways and the content of investment strategies themselves. I feel from the debate that each of these elements raises the same underlying question: how will these powers be exercised in a way that is genuinely compatible with fiduciary duty, rather than merely being stated to be so?
With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I also acknowledge that there is much work to be done in this area.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I will speak simply to support the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. It seems to me that there is an extraordinarily wide use of delegated powers in the Bill and, for all the reasons that he set out, we should look at that again. If the Government do not feel able to make a change to respond to his very persuasive points, we should at least have a full list of every delegated power that will be used, what the plans are in each case, and perhaps some specimen regulations of the kind that we have seen in some of the Department for Business and Trade legislation.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments focuses on scrutiny, clarity and responsibility, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for setting out the merits of the super-affirmative procedures and their historical context. It was interesting to hear what he had to say.
As the Committee will have seen, the provisions to which these super-affirmative procedures would pertain allow Ministers, through secondary legislation, to impose requirements and prohibitions on scheme managers, to direct participation in asset pool companies, to require withdrawal from them and to impose obligations on those companies themselves. These are significant powers, exercised in an area that is highly technical, operationally sensitive and financially consequential.
This is precisely the sort of context in which unintended consequences can arise, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. These clauses are dense, complex and interconnected. They interact with fiduciary duties, local accountability, financial regulation and long-term investment strategy. Small changes in drafting or approach could have material effects on risk, returns, governance or market behaviour.
That is why I am glad that the amendment places particular emphasis on representations. The ability for Parliament, and expert stakeholders, to examine draft regulations, to make these representations, and for those representations to be meaningfully considered before regulations are finalised, is essential to the responsible exercise of these powers.
The super-affirmative procedure would ensure that Parliament is not simply asked to approve a finished product but is given the opportunity to understand the Government’s intent, to hear from those with deep expertise in pensions, asset management and regulation, and to see how concerns raised have been addressed. That is especially important where the primary legislation quite deliberately leaves so much to be filled in by regulation, as I explained earlier in Committee.
I hope the Minister will engage constructively with this point and explain why the Government believe the ordinary affirmative procedure provides sufficient scrutiny in this case, given the scale, complexity and potential impact of the powers being taken. I appreciate the short debate on this matter.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for introducing his amendments, and to all noble Lords who have spoken. This gives us an opportunity to talk about how best to balance the way we structure matters between primary and secondary legislation. However, the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would significantly expand the way Parliament scrutinises regulations made under the Bill. I understand why he would want to do that, but his proposals would introduce a level of rigidity into the process that is not only unusual in this area but obviously would be markedly more elaborate than the Bill currently provides for.
The super-affirmative procedure is generally reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as legislative reform orders or remedial orders under the Human Rights Act. I am not aware of any examples of it being applied to pensions regulations, but I am very open to being advised on that. In our view, it would be disproportionate to the nature of the powers conferred by the Bill, and I will explain why.
I will look first at Clause 1. The coalition Government introduced the Public Service Pensions Act 2013. Through that, Parliament established the way it would go about governing the making of scheme regulations. It was a comprehensive and well-tested scrutiny framework. It still operates today, including where new powers were created, for example, by the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022. The framework created by that Act provides extensive safeguards, including mandatory consultation, enhanced consultation if changes have or might have retrospective effect, and Treasury consent. Introducing a substantially more onerous procedure for regulations under Clause 1, as proposed by Amendment 3, would sit uneasily alongside that established approach.
There are also practical considerations. Administering authorities and asset pool companies are preparing for regulations to be introduced shortly after the Bill has passed its parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have already published draft regulations on the LGPS measure. They were open to public consultation, which has recently closed. Adding a 30-day pre-scrutiny stage through the super-affirmative procedure would clearly extend that timetable and risk creating more uncertainty at a critical moment for those involved in implementing this.
Amendment 221 would allow either House to require that any affirmative regulations made under this Bill be subject to the super-affirmative process. That would already represent a significant expansion of parliamentary involvement compared with the long-standing approach to pensions.
Amendment 222 would go further still. It does not simply describe how the super-affirmative procedure would operate in this context; it would create a new statutory scrutiny process, more prescriptive and more inflexible than the mechanisms Parliament has used to date for pension regulations—or indeed most regulations. It would require a fixed 30-day scrutiny period in any case where either House decided to impose the new procedure. It would mandate a committee report, even for minor or technical regulations, and would prevent regulations being laid until Ministers had responded formally to all representations. The result would be a significant departure from the flexible way Parliament normally manages delegated legislation.
I hear the concerns the noble Lord has expressed about the way Parliament deals with secondary legislation, but scrutiny procedures are normally determined by the House through its practices and Standing Orders. Replacing those arrangements with a rigid statutory framework of this kind for this Bill would set a far-reaching precedent for delegated legislation more broadly, extending well beyond the requirements of this Bill.
I would submit that such a process would also make it harder for Parliament to focus scrutiny on the most significant instruments and would slow down the making of regulations in areas where timely and predictable implementation is crucial for funds, administering authorities and scheme members.
A certain amount of this comes down to whether the Committee accepts that the level of delegated powers is appropriate. I fully understand that the noble Lord does not. I disagree and I will tell him why. In answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, in the previous group I said that the Government do not regard this as a framework or skeleton Bill, because it sets out clearly the policy decisions and parameters within which the delegated powers must operate. The Bill brings together a broad package of reforms. Many of those reforms build on long-established statutory regimes set out by previous Governments—Governments of all persuasions, as well as previous Labour Governments—in which Parliament has historically set the policy in primary legislation and provided for the detailed measures that will apply to schemes to be set out in regulations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked for a full list of delegated powers. My department produced a very detailed delegated powers memorandum, which went through all the delegated powers at some length and in some detail, explaining what they meant. I would be very happy to direct the noble Baroness to that if that would be helpful.
One of the key questions the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked was: why are there so many delegated powers? Our view is that this is not out of kilter with other similar transformative pension Bills. We counted 119 delegated powers covering 11 major topics plus some smaller topics. For example, in the Pension Schemes Act 2021, there were almost 100 delegated powers covering three major topics. In the Pensions Act 1995, which was a transformative Bill, there were approximately 150 delegated powers.
This Bill brings together a number of distinct pensions measures in a single legislative vehicle, many of which amend or build on existing regimes that are already heavily reliant on secondary legislation for their detailed operation. In many areas, we are simply reflecting a similar framework to previous pensions legislation or amending it, so there is continuity rather than a step change.
A crucial point I want to lodge is that pensions policy is not delivered directly by government. Implementation depends on trustees, pension schemes, pension providers, administrators and regulators who have to design systems, processes and administration that work in practice. That level of detailed operational design can begin only once there is sufficient certainty that legislation will proceed. As noble Lords who have worked in or with industry will recognise, before there is sufficient certainty, industry cannot reasonably commit the significant time and resources needed to work through complex delivery arrangements where the legal basis may still change or not materialise. Delegated powers therefore allow the Government to set the policy framework in primary legislation and then work with those responsible for delivery to ensure that the technical detail is workable in practice, rather than attempting to prescribe detailed operational rules in primary legislation. That reflects established pensions practice and good lawmaking in a complex and fast-moving regulatory environment.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
This is an important, basic matter. Directing investment by asset types raises difficulties. If pension funds or individuals knew which assets were going to go up, there would be no problem, but there is no guarantee of that, so, my question to the Minister is: are pension funds primarily long-term investors acting for members or instruments of policy delivery? The answer matters a lot for confidence in Local Government Pension Scheme governance. I am all for productive investment, but it can be a slippery slope if you get it wrong. I wonder whether the Minister can give us some guidance on that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for her two amendments in this group, for the remarkably brief discussion that has been prompted and for the opportunity that they provided for her and us to probe the Minister on these important issues. Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will not rehearse the arguments at length, as I touched on them in some detail earlier. However, I wish briefly to reiterate what I regard as a central and non-negotiable principle: the Local Government Pension Scheme exists first and foremost as a fiduciary vehicle. Scheme managers are under a clear legal duty to act in the best financial interests of members and beneficiaries, and that duty must remain paramount.
Against that background, Amendment 13 raises a particularly important question, one that has been put to us repeatedly by industry representatives from a wide range of backgrounds; namely, what type of assets do the Government have in mind in which funds should be directed to invest? I think this is the essential argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. Is the intention to focus on infrastructure, debt servicing or supporting new towns and similar developments? The noble Baroness also raised the point of what percentage should be invested in UK assets. As she pointed out, perhaps 25% should be invested in UK growth assets, and, therefore, what is the definition of growth? Lots of questions arise from the noble Baroness’s amendments.
I recognise, and I think the noble Baroness alluded to this, that we will return to this issue in greater detail when we come to consider the reserve power, but like the noble Baroness, I wish to flag this matter at this stage as it has been a theme this afternoon on this first day of Committee and a live and pressing question not only for us but, I reiterate, for the many third-party stakeholders with whom we have engaged.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for tabling these amendments. I cannot speak on behalf of the whole Committee, but I would say that it is most people’s intention to encourage greater investment in UK assets. Growth is certainly the number one mission of this Government. If you did not realise that, you have probably been hiding under a rock these past few months and years.
These amendments would direct LGPS funds to make investments in certain UK asset classes. Supporting UK growth by making investments in such assets, in tandem with seeking appropriate returns, is a valuable function of the scheme and the noble Baroness is right to be interested in this important topic. As I have mentioned, the LGPS already invests around 30% of assets in the UK. Greater consolidation will build on this success story, as the pools will have greater capacity and expertise to invest domestically.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, now I am really worried—every time I have followed the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, I have tried to amplify the points he has made.
I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on her masterful exposition of a technical piece of detail; she brought it down to the ground and made it alive. She put her finger on it when many of us have not been able to put our finger on what makes us so uncomfortable about the Bill. We know that it is not right. When you get meddlesome Ministers fiddling around in stuff where they do not really know what they are doing, there is not just co-operation but—as the noble Baroness exposed—a connivance and a cartel. She explained how those two things have led to conflicts of interest; there will be a lot of Cs in the words I am about to use. It is anti-competitive, and it has restricted choice.
The noble Baroness has wedged open the door because, later on in the Bill, there are provisions—I will not defer to them too much now—for the existing operators to lock out new entrants. I was instinctively uncomfortable with that but, now, I am worried because there seems to be a guiding hand here to reduce choice, stifle innovation and damage the reputation of the City. I do not think that that was purposeful, but this is what happens when you get a Bill that is so overly complicated and takes people away from saving for their long-term retirement.
I nearly feel sorry for the noble Lord, Lord Katz, because I have never seen such an evisceration. I am sure he is going to defend it and do the best he can. But what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has shown is that it is rather like the Chancellor, who now says she had no idea what was really happening when she put the rates on the pubs. It was a mistake, and she did not have all the information to hand. While I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said we will come back to this on another day, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, because she has given an opportunity—a breathing space or an air gap—for the Government to now go back to look at this in more detail.
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, also laid out the import of this amendment when she said that one-third of all the FTSE 350 is engaged in this. I expect the Minister in winding to say, for a third time, that growth is the number one priority of this Government. Let us hope he does say that because, if he does, he will either accept this amendment here and now, or give an undertaking that, at some stage before we get to this in the main part of the debate, it will be accepted and we can move on.
It is not just casting a shadow over the LGPS and the parts of Yorkshire which are disinvesting; it is accidentally casting a shadow over the City of London, which is the world’s second or third largest financial centre. It must be stopped. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has done the Committee and our nation a great service in the last half an hour, and she is to be congratulated for it.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I was due to give a very short speech. It is still short, but it has got slightly longer in terms of the content of this debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, for tabling Amendment 10, which we welcome and which I understand to be a sensible and proportionate safeguarding measure. I want to go a bit further because there were two particularly powerful speeches, in particular that from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.
As we read it, the amendment seeks to ensure that investment strategies cannot be used to favour particular investment vehicles over comparable or competing alternatives. In doing so, it would help to guard against strategies becoming a back-door means of directing capital, rather than serving their proper purpose as high-level statements of investment policy.
That distinction matters. Investment strategies should guide objectives, risk appetite and approach and not hardwire specific vehicles or delivery mechanisms into statute or regulation. Preventing the embedding of such preferences also reduces the risk of political or regulatory pressure or—I will use the word—interference, being reflected in investment strategy documents and helps to preserve trustee independence and proper decision-making. Although it is a serious subject, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, gave us a succinct, well-argued speech with her bucket wrapper analogy. She gave a hard-hitting speech with some important questions which I hope the Minister will be able to answer.
One issue that has been made clear today, which has arisen in a number of debates, and was encapsulated in this short debate, is the opaqueness of “government direction”. I was very taken by the equally hard-hitting speech from my noble friend Lord Fuller. The confusion—by the way, the C is for confusion, just to add that in—is over the responsibility with the grey areas, notably in respect to the understandings, or not, from the Mansion House Accord and those who were the signatories.
One question to ask is whether those signatories now realise what they have got themselves into, or what their understanding was then and what it is now. I ask that as an open question, particularly in relation to the inclusion or exclusion of different types of investment. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, focused particularly on open-ended or close-ended. There is a lot of emphasis here. Most unusually, I was in total agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I am not sure that that has happened with me in the past.
To conclude, we therefore welcome the intent of Amendment 10. It would be very helpful if the Minister could indicate whether—and if so, how—the Bill as currently drafted already guards against this risk. It is a crucial question and relates to all the questions that have been asked. What assurances can be given that investment strategies will not be used to prescribe or favour particular investment vehicles in practice?
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, for this amendment. I agree with them that funds in the LGPS should not be specifying preferences between similar investment vehicles in their investment strategies. I fear that the rest of my response may well disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and—though perhaps not to such a great extent—the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I say in passing to the Committee that it is always good to hear consensus breaking out, even if it rather gets to the horseshoe theory of politics when it is my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. But let us try to end today’s Committee session on a positive note.
I will now go into the detail. Under our reforms, decisions on implementation of strategies, including selection of appropriate vehicles and managers, will be made by the LGPS pools, which will have the capacity and expertise to deliver the benefits of scale that we have discussed. It is the Government’s view that the draft regulations are already clear in that respect. This will be supported by guidance, setting out that investment manager selection is solely the responsibility of the pool. LGPS pools will make the decision on whether to invest through external managers and which managers to use, and there is nothing whatever to prevent them using investment trusts should they consider it beneficial.
This is where the space for disappointment potentially arises. I am aware of the concerns expressed in relation to the treatment of listed investment funds, notably investment companies and trusts, under the reserve asset allocation powers, which are relevant to DC pension schemes. That was set out very powerfully by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. The Committee will have the chance to debate these concerns when we reach Clause 40 and discuss Chapter 3, which deals with asset allocation for DC schemes.
To get to the heart of it, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked about the impact on the LGPS. To give reassurance, we are not excluding closed-ended investment funds from the LGPS. I can be absolutely clear that that is the case. We are not excluding them, and neither will local authorities be directed to exclude them. I hope that provides clarity as we discuss the LGPS elements of the Bill.
Having said that, we have had comments around investment and asset types, particularly from my noble friend Lord Davies, as well as others, on this group of amendments. We will take what has been said and consider it in time for the debate on this issue when we get to it in greater detail. In anticipation of that day—which we are all looking forward to, particularly at two minutes to Committee rising—I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to withdraw her amendment.
Pension Schemes Bill
Viscount Younger of Leckie ExcerptsThursday 18th December 2025
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, who, like me, has become a regular on the pensions circuit here. As this debate draws to a close, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed with such seriousness and expertise this afternoon. For my part, I will try to touch on the key themes raised but, before I do, I would like to pay my own tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, because she gave an assured, charming and exceptional speech. She comes with a distinguished career record and I have no doubt that we will be hearing much from her here in future.
The seriousness of this debate was exemplified by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, who set out with great clarity our central concerns raised by this Bill. Those concerns, however, point to a wider issue with the legislation itself. This is a framework Bill, light on detail and heavy on intention, which has left your Lordships debating concepts and hypotheticals rather than the Government’s concrete plans. That is not only unsatisfactory but disappointing. These points were made by my noble friend Lady Coffey. Certainty in legislation comes from detail on the face of the Bill. When that detail is repeatedly altered, deferred and subject to numerous government amendments—by the way, there are over 50—even the limited certainty we believed we had is further diminished. I look forward to the Minister’s response, not just on the preparation of the Bill, or perhaps lack of it, but, as has been raised, on the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Nowhere is the lack of certainty more evident than in the proposed value-for-money framework. This was one of the first themes raised, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and my noble friend Lady Penn. This element of the Bill is thin, almost skeletal, yet it is pivotal—again, my noble friend Lady Coffey spoke about this. In practice, much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will stand or fall on how the value-for-money framework is designed and applied. If it is to drive genuine improvement rather than box-ticking, its methodology must be transparent, robust and genuinely comparable across schemes. Cost alone cannot be allowed to dominate decision-making at the expense of outcomes. A scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently poor returns is not offering value to savers, however attractive its headline fees may appear.
Against that background, I have two specific questions for the Minister. First, do the Government envisage the value-for-money framework operating as a standardised pro forma, with clearly defined and comparable metrics covering costs, net investment performance, and cost-to-return ratios applied consistently across schemes? Secondly, how will the Government ensure meaningful comparability between very different types of schemes? In particular, what steps will be taken where schemes meet fee thresholds but nevertheless deliver consistently weak investment outcomes? My noble friend Lord Trenchard touched on this.
This feeds into a wider concern about the order of priorities in the Bill. Rather than committing to the notion of the reserve power—so-called mandation, which I will touch on later—the Government should have concentrated first on getting value for money right. That should have been the central driver of this legislation. If value for money is properly defined, transparently measured and rigorously applied, it can strengthen outcomes for savers without trampling on the fiduciary duties of trustees. We have heard quite a bit about that this afternoon.
As the Minister for Pensions himself has said, trustees must remain free, and indeed obliged, to act in the best financial interests of their members, but I say that this should be guided by evidence and judgment rather than direction by mandate. We should be confident enough to demonstrate the benefits and drawbacks of widely used default strategies, such as global passive equities, which underpinned many DC schemes’ investment approaches. That case should be made openly and empirically, yet the Government have underplayed the extent to which a robust value-for-money framework could drive improvement without compulsion. If value is genuinely improved and transparently measured, much else should follow.
My noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott has already clearly set out the Opposition’s wider concerns about mandation. I will not repeat them at length, but the subject was raised by my noble friends Lord Ashcombe and Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and a number of noble Lords. However, I wish to raise one further point that reflects a broader theme running through today’s debate: the need to strike the right balance between flexibility and discipline. My noble friend Lord Ashcombe spoke on this.
Beyond the constitutional and fiduciary issues already raised, there is also a practical market risk that should not be overlooked. This matter was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, about market distorting effects, as the noble Lord put it. Mandation risks inflating asset prices if multiple funds are required to allocate to the same asset classes at the same time. I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, raised this matter too. Markets may also interpret Government direction as an implicit signal of future price support, potentially amplifying distortions rather than improving capital allocation.
Against that background, I have two specific questions for the Minister. First, have the Government assessed the risk that mandated investment could lead to asset price inflation or wider market distortion? If so, what conclusions have they reached? Secondly, how do the Government intend to ensure that mandated allocations remain aligned with changing economic conditions, particularly in cases where schemes may reach a mandated threshold only after the relevant asset class is no longer aligned with economic need or the Treasury’s broader objectives?
There are a few further questions on this important subject. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked this as well. If, after mandation, or, in the case of mandation, if investments underperform or indeed fail, who takes responsibility, the Government or trustees? My noble friend Lady Penn asked how the qualifying assets will be defined. I think other Peers may also have asked that. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked some important questions in this sphere, so I am looking forward to the response from the Minister.
I should say also that I noted the constructive advice and ideas from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on how the Government could better encourage pension funds to invest in the UK, short of introducing the reserved power. There were also some suggestions from my noble friend Lord Trenchard.
Next, let me touch on the treatment of surpluses in defined benefit schemes. I agree that surpluses can present opportunities, but they are not windfalls: they exist to absorb future shocks, manage demographic risk and ensure that promises made to members are kept. Flexibility in how surpluses are treated is sensible, but only if it is underpinned by robust safeguards. None of us wishes to see surpluses eroded by ill-judged extraction or quietly diverted into activities that weaken long-term scheme resilience. In that context, the forthcoming guidance from the Pensions Regulator will be pivotal. Can the Minister confirm when that guidance will be published, whether it will be subject to consultation and how Parliament will be able to scrutinise the balance it strikes between prudence, flexibility and long-term security?
Much of today’s debate has also rightly returned to auto-enrolment. The question of paucity of pensions adequacy has been highlighted by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton, and my noble friend Lady Penn. Introduced by a Conservative Government, auto-enrolment has been one of the quiet successes of the past decade. I would like to remind the House that the operational aspects of this were progressed and tested going back as far as 2012. Participation among eligible employees now stands at around 88%. I would argue that this is a remarkable achievement. But success should not breed complacency, because upwards of 8.5 million people remain undersavers, and the question of adequacy remains unresolved. There is still work to be done, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said.
Crucially, auto-enrolment is highly sensitive to labour market conditions. Every percentage point increase in unemployment pushes more people out of workplace pension saving altogether. Against that backdrop, the recent “benefits Budget” is concerning. Unemployment is rising and, with it, the number of people falling out of pension saving. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Government have undertaken updated modelling on the impact of higher employment on future pension adequacy, whether those projections differ from earlier assumptions and whether they will be published so that Parliament can properly understand the long-term consequences of the Government’s policy choices.
As many noble Lords have noted, pension engagement remains the missing leg of the stool. Millions are saving, but fewer than half have checked the value of their pension in the past year. This is not simply apathy; it reflects a system that has become increasingly complex and opaque to ordinary savers. The pensions dashboard, which has been mentioned this afternoon, is therefore not a technical adjunct. It is central to enabling informed decision-making, and various questions have been raised about that. Can the Minister confirm when the revised staging timeline will be published, whether clear delivery milestones will be set out and how Parliament will be able to track progress so that savers can have confidence that this long-delayed reform will finally be realised?
Engagement, however, is also constrained by the current regulatory environment. In consultation with industry, we heard compelling evidence that FCA and the TPR regulation makes genuine member education extraordinarily difficult to design. The boundary between advice and marketing has become so blurred that most communications fall into a grey area, leaving schemes with very few compliant touch points for meaningful engagement. If we are serious about improving outcomes, the Government must enable better education and clearer communication. Perhaps the Minister could comment on this and what work is under way to review these constraints and how the Bill supports rather than frustrates the goal of informing saving.
I turn to salary sacrifice, because this decision strikes at the heart of pensions adequacy, individual engagement and, ultimately, trust in the system itself. The recent disappointing Budget has taken a sledgehammer to a mechanism that has for many years made pension saving both affordable for workers and sustainable for employers. For millions of people saving at or near the minimum auto-enrolment rate, salary sacrifice is not a perk but the difference between saving and not saving at all. Removing this relief will mean lower take-home pay, lower pension contributions and, over time, materially smaller pension pots. This is a short-sighted political choice—one that appears designed to plug immediate fiscal pressures while storing up greater dependency on the state in retirement.
The impact on employers is equally concerning. By reimposing employer national insurance on previously sacrificed earnings, the Government are increasing the cost of labour at precisely the wrong moment. For many medium-sized firms, this will translate into tens of thousands of pounds in additional annual costs—money that could otherwise have supported wages, investment or workforce expansion. The decision to charge both employer and employee national insurance on salary-sacrifice contributions above £2,000 introduces a sharp and, I believe, irrational cliff edge. The OBR estimates that 76% of the burden will fall on employees. Once again, private sector workers bear the cost, while public sector employees in defined benefit schemes remain largely insulated.
The figures are stark. An employee earning £45,000 and saving 5% through salary sacrifice will be £58 worse off in the first year and more than £15,000 worse off over the course of a working lifetime. In the light of this, can the Minister confirm whether the Government have undertaken a sector-by-sector distributional analysis of these changes, whether they will publish an assessment of the long-term impact on pension adequacy and future welfare expenditure and whether she accepts that this measure operates in effect as a tax on work and on responsible long-term saving?
Some noble Lords have rightly raised the broader macroeconomic implications of pension reform. UK pension funds and insurers together hold around 30% of the gilt market—this point was made earlier. If mature defined benefit schemes are nudged away from gilts into equities, the consequences for debt management, interest rates and mortgage markets could be profound. It would therefore be reassuring to hear from the Minister whether the Debt Management Office and the Bank of England have been consulted on these potential effects and whether their views will be made available to Parliament.
I realise that time is marching on. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on all the concerns raised across your Lordships’ House today and respond with the assurances that savers and schemes alike are entitled to expect—we owe them nothing less. However, in the spirit of Christmas, and as this is the season of good will—I am feeling more Christmassy now than I did before the Question this afternoon—I say to the Minister that, despite everything I have said, and in a rare outbreak of festive generosity, there are parts of the Bill that we agree with, such as the PPF changes and the terminal illness time extension. As others have said, we will work constructively with the Government in the weeks and months ahead. I look forward to the Minister’s response and wish Peers and staff in the House a very happy Christmas.
Jobs Market: Wider Economic Implications
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
The noble Earl makes an excellent point. He is a fine ambassador for the creative sectors, for which I commend him. The Government are looking sector by sector at how we can support the development of skills. I am aware that we have had to work quite hard to protect some quite specialist skills, because if we lose them we will not get them back, certainly in the heritage sector. I am happy to look at how our sector work can do that, but what we are trying to do in DWP is to work with a wide range of employers to make sure that we know what they want, what skills they need and how we can support them. One thing that has made the biggest difference—I slightly bang on about it—is my noble friend Lady Smith’s welcome joining up of adult skills and the DWP. That can make a real difference, so I will make sure that we look carefully into that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am afraid that I am not yet in the Christmas spirit because, as the Minister herself said, there are huge challenges in the deteriorating jobs market. It is of great concern that jobs in the all-important retail sector have fallen by 74,000, and the chief executive of the BRC has stated that the number of people in work in that sector is at a record low, namely 2.82 million jobs. What are the Government going to do to change the situation, as a matter of urgency, in that sector?
Universal Credit: Two-child Limit
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord makes a really important point, which is that we need as a country to make sure that we prioritise the cost of living and enabling people to earn enough. It should be possible to go out to work and earn enough to support your family, but that is one reason why we think it is important to invest in appropriate levels of social security. Crucially, we have to help people to develop skills. We want people to get into work, but we do not want them stuck on the lowest-paid work. We have increased the national minimum wage and invested in childcare and free school meals—we are doing all the things to make it possible to do the right thing. However, we need to go further. We need to see people in this country in higher-skilled, higher-paid jobs that will help them, grow our economy, and create opportunities for their children in due course.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, can I bring the House back to the original intention behind the two-child limit? It was to make the benefits system fairer to taxpayers who support themselves and their families solely through work. It encouraged parents on benefit to make the same financial choices about family size as those not on benefits. With the Government’s poverty argument in mind, the IFS has said that reversing the two-child limit is “not a silver bullet”. It said that the benefit cap will
“wipe out the gains for some children in the … poorest families”,
as 70,000 more households are affected by the cap. Surely supporting parents into work and into quality jobs is much more important for reducing child poverty. Finally, the IFS says that raising the employment rate to 80% from the current 75% would lift up to 350,000 children out of poverty.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, that is why the Government have set that as their target. I say to the noble Viscount that the whole point about this is that it is not a choice. It is not a question of either supporting children or helping parents to go into work. Supporting families makes work possible. Most parents want to work. Our job is to make that possible, so we have done that. We have invested in expanding free school meals to everyone on universal credit, including those in work; we have raised the national living wage, and we have put in more help for childcare—30 hours a week for parents of preschoolers—and more help for childcare in universal credit. Children deserve the best possible start in life and their parents deserve the best chance to have a decent life. We want to do both.
Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) (Extension to Unconnected Multiple Employer Schemes and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2025
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
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Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
We have here the interaction of a number of different pieces of legislation. Of course, we are all looking forward to the Second Reading of the Pension Schemes Bill next week. We have before us the Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) (Extension to Unconnected Multiple Employer Schemes and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2025. We also have the 2022 regulations that first set out the regulatory requirements for CDC schemes. In parallel, we have the Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) Regulations. As the Minister and the Front Bench well know, that sets out another of the Government’s initiatives: to provide CDC schemes that can offer retirement pensions, rather than people having to buy annuities. All these different pieces of legislation interact in ways, I think it is fair to say, that are sometimes difficult to grasp.
What worries me about these regulations is that it is a bit like when you have extensive building work in your house, and the architect asks you where you want the light switches. Of course, you do not know where you want the light switches until you have lived in that house for two or three years, but you have to decide in advance. This is my concern about these regulations: we do not know how these schemes will work in practice. We are all agreed that they are a good thing, we want to see them supported and developed and we have to start somewhere, but certain aspects of what is before us today cause me some concern—or, to tone it down, some level of interest.
First, is it clear that the provisions in the Pension Schemes Bill dealing with value for money, guided retirement and particularly scale will apply to these schemes? They are closer to these schemes than they are to defined benefit. It is quite clear in the legislation that the scale requirement applies to DC arrangements. To what extent will the scale requirement directly, or indirectly through the supervision requirements, end up requiring schemes of a particular scale? My fear is that, if there is a scale requirement, it will just be another barrier to establishing these schemes that, in practice, we all want.
An associated point that has been raised is that we are now effectively getting separate CDC regimes. The existing one with the Post Office scheme is the only live example, and that is very scheme specific. We do not know how far the legislation can cover other sorts of single-employer CDC schemes. Then we have the multi-employer scheme regime and the retirement pension CDC regime. Are these regimes completely separate? To what extent is there going to be scope to make transfers from one regime to another? Are these regimes overlapping or are they distinct?
One problem is always raised. I am a strong supporter of CDC arrangements. It should be the future of private sector pension provision and we want to encourage it as much as possible, but there are problems with the way it works in practice. Ultimately, however deep it is hidden down in the workings and however many formulae you adopt to ensure fair treatment, there is always the risk of some form of cross-subsidy between members. There will be winners and losers.
With multiple employer CDCs, there is also the possibility of cross-subsidy between employers. It is inherent in the approach, in my view. I know supporters of CDC argue that it is not the case, but I think you should always be concerned about the fear of that. We do not know, because so many of the supervisory powers are given to the regulator, the detail of how they are going to be applied. Will it be made clear that this will not be an impediment to developing these sorts of arrangements? The important point is communication. We need to be clear in the regulations about the need for full and adequate communication so that potential members are fully aware of the nature of the arrangement they are entering.
My final concern is that we are heading towards a retailisation of this sort of provision. It will become a retail product, and that is not how I and many other people envisaged CDC operating. It should be a collective endeavour. I must admit that I have an instinctive reaction against the use of the word “proprietor” for the sponsor of these arrangements. I would prefer the word “sponsor”, because “proprietor” implies that it is not a collective arrangement but a commercial one.
Clearly, it will cost money to set up these arrangements and, to a certain extent, the complexity introduced by these regulations means that even more money will be required to do so. But my fear is that we will ultimately end up with underregulated insurance companies, rather than the collective and co-operative arrangement that I think is the true way forward for CDC arrangements. My fears are that it is all too complicated. We need to be clear about the overlap between these different areas of legislation and the different types of CDC arrangement. A system in which people have the right to transfer their money out of a scheme at the same time as the Government are encouraging schemes to invest in non-market based investments, means that there is a contradiction, which could be the Achilles heel of this type of arrangement.
I am taking this opportunity to express my concerns and raise them formally with the Minister. The specific questions are about multiple CDC arrangements, information communication requirements and an approach which enables people to understand what they are getting here—it is better than pure DC.
My final complaint is that the regulations persist with the business of calling these schemes “collective money purchase”. I have made the point before in these discussions that they are not collective money purchases. They are called money purchase schemes because you purchase an annuity, and these schemes are being set up specifically with the introduction of retirement-only CDCs so that you do not have to buy an annuity. I am really sorry that the department has persisted in using the term “money purchase” in these regulations when they are clearly not money purchase arrangements.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to speak in this debate on the regulations extending collective defined contribution schemes to unconnected multiple employer arrangements. I say at the outset that I accept the apology given by the Minister for the changes needed in Schedule 2. I hope that when she responds she will confirm that these are minor changes, as I assume they are; that would be helpful.
By any measure, this is a highly technical statutory instrument that even seasoned pensions professionals would concede is difficult to absorb on first reading. Yet precisely because of that complexity, and the potentially far-reaching implications for the architecture of our pensions system, it is essential that this Committee scrutinises it with particular care. Collective defined contribution schemes—CDCs—are an important and promising innovation. They offer the potential for better outcomes than pure defined contribution schemes for risk-sharing across generations and smoothing investment volatility in retirement. They could and should play a larger role in the future of pension provision in the United Kingdom.
We also recognise that this SI is an enabling vehicle. It is a mechanism to broaden the CDC framework so that unconnected employers may participate. We raise no objection to that direction of travel. I am surprised that this debate will not have more contributions from other Peers. I am very pleased that we have the welcome and regular presence of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I am quite surprised that we have no representation from the Liberal Democrats. I am not sure why that is.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for spelling out the code of practice; we look forward to seeing that. I remain quite surprised that the Pensions Commission will finally report as late as spring 2027. I cannot believe it is going to take that long, despite the fact that pensions are generally known to be quite technical and detailed. I am not expecting the noble Baroness to comment on that, but I just wanted to put it on record. The noble Baroness did not answer my question about surpluses, and I am very happy to be written to about that. Perhaps the main question I wanted to ask, which the noble Baroness also did not answer, is about membership take-up at Royal Mail. What was the rate of take-up for the Royal Mail scheme?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
On the question of surpluses, the regulators will ensure that a scheme has sufficient financial resources through a range of key mechanisms centred around the role of a scheme proprietor, robust planning and ongoing regulatory oversight. The Pensions Regulator must be satisfied that the scheme is financially sustainable before it can be authorised. That would obviously involve a rigorous assessment of its expected costs, income and the strategy for recovering any shortfalls. The schemes accounts have to be submitted to the regulator on an ongoing basis to give transparency. I am not sure that that does answer his question on surpluses, but if I have an answer, I will write to him.
On the membership take-up of the Royal Mail scheme, 110,000 people have joined and around 700 have opted out. I hope that answers that question, and that I have answered all the other questions. I thank both noble Lords for their helpful contributions to this debate. This instrument will allow CDC schemes to play an integral role in the future of pensions in this country, affording potentially millions of savers access to the benefits they offer. With that, I commend this instrument to the Committee, and I beg to move.
Carer’s Allowance: Overpayments Review
Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, the care route admitted more than 150,000 workers in three years. There have been changes to the Immigration Rules, but that will not prevent those who want to from building a career in the sector, because there is a transition period until July 2028, which allows, for example, in-country applications from people who came in by other visa routes. This means that care providers could recruit graduates, for example, or people who come in other ways.
My noble friend is absolutely right that, on 1 July, we laid changes to the Immigration Rules, which included closing the social care visa route to overseas recruitment. That said, there remain significant numbers of international care workers who are looking for work in the UK who have not had the chance to support the system as they wanted. New measures have already come into effect which require care providers in England to prioritise recruiting international care workers who are already in the UK and require new employment.
More generally, DWP is doing a lot to try and encourage people into social care. We are working with adult social care bodies in developing recruitment events for the sector to encourage people into it. We want people who are committed professionals and who want to work in the sector, and we will do what we can to encourage them.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a pretty sobering statistic that 150,000 children provide more than 50 hours of care a week. What is being done in schools to understand who these pupils are and to give them the optimum support as they undertake their studies?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
The noble Viscount raises a very important point. Certainly, I have met with organisations over the years that work with young carers. Schools are becoming increasingly aware of these pressures. Good schools with good pastoral care systems are identifying them and making sure both that these young carers get the support they need and that they themselves are aware of broader issues in the home of which other authorities might need to know. The noble Viscount will know that this does not stop at 18, and there are issues for young adult carers who want to carry on and complete their studies. Fortunately, if somebody is doing less than 21 hours a week of supervised study, they can still claim carer’s allowance, but we are looking at how we can best identify and support young carers to enable them to combine their study with their caring. We want to make sure that their childhood is not ruined and that young adults have a chance to make a life for themselves as well as caring for those whom they love.