(5 days, 3 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 1 in my name, I begin with an apology. I have not previously intervened in the debates on the Bill. Unfortunately, long-standing commitments, including professional commitments, prevented me from participating both at Second Reading and in Committee. That, in fact, is one of the disadvantages, albeit a minor one, of so-called emergency legislation introduced at short notice. More serious disadvantages are, of course, the curtailment of time for reflection and a reduction in the time for consultation. However, I have had the opportunity of studying the Hansard reports of what was said in this House on both occasions, and what was said in the House of Commons.
My main purpose today is to speak briefly to Amendment 1. I begin by commending the admirable speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, at col. 1614, to those of your Lordships who, like me, were not present at the Second Reading debate. His speech was a model of brevity and conciseness, and I agree with everything that the noble and learned Lord said. He said that he did not believe that the guidelines introduced two-tier justice. I agree with that view. He said that he did not believe that the introduction of the guidelines would severely damage confidence in our criminal justice system. I share that view.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, considered that there was no need for this Bill. I am of the same opinion. In my view, this legislation has been triggered by an unhappy combination of political point-scoring and political back-guarding—personal characteristics of an unwelcome kind, albeit not falling within the statutory definition in the Bill. The noble and learned Lord concluded by saying that we should reluctantly accept this Bill but seek to improve it by way of amendment, and that is what I seek to do.
My amendment is in substance a statement of principle—in fact, one that reflects policy, albeit, because of resource constraints, not the current practice. But given the fact that we have this Bill, I suggest that there is merit in framing the policy in explicit statutory and positive language.
I suspect that everyone who has experience in this field would agree that in the great majority of cases where an offender is facing the possibility of a custodial or a community sentence, it is highly desirable that the sentencer should have available a properly considered pre-sentence report—but not one which is the product of a few minutes of discussion in the cells. What is required is a considered and researched pre-sentence report by a qualified member of the Probation Service. That implies a Probation Service which is properly staffed and properly financed to address the required workload.
I deeply regret that, in recent years, there has been a serious decline in the number of pre-sentence reports, and I have in mind the decline of 42%, from 160,000 to 90,000, between 2015 and 2022, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in the Second Reading debate, and by others too. I acknowledge, with very great regret, that one of the immediate causes of this decline in the availability of proper reports was the policy of the Government whom I supported. I will add too, if I may, that the existence of a properly financed and staffed Probation Service is fundamental to the success of the sentencing reforms proposed by Mr David Gauke.
It should be self-evident that the pre-sentence report addresses all the relevant considerations that may help the sentencer to determine the appropriate sentence. That is what my amendment states explicitly. Such considerations may include the individual circumstances and the personal characteristics of an offender. I accept that, as became apparent in the debate, especially in Committee, there is a distinction between the two concepts, although there is a very high degree of overlap, so both criteria should be included. My amendment does that, with a definition to be found in Amendment 7. Guidelines are there to ensure uniformity in the practice of the courts.
Obviously, there is concern about the availability of resources: hence, the impossibility of making reports mandatory. It was the council’s concern about the inadequacy of resources that caused the guidelines to identify specific cohorts as having priority. But drafting the guidance in the positive language of my amendment meets the expressed concern of the critics of the guidelines. My amendment provides for the guidelines to be general in their application, and might encourage the Government to ensure that additional resources are made available to the Probation Service, so that pre-sentence reports become the norm in all appropriate cases. Amending the Bill in the modest way that I have proposed will, I hope, make a small contribution to the proper administration of criminal justice in this country. I beg to move.
My Lords, I agree very much with what the noble Viscount has said. His amendment, like others in this group, would give some helpful clarity to an extremely unclear piece of legislation. I think we are about to make bad law, because the Government have been unable or unwilling to define what “personal characteristics” are. We do not know what will fall within the range of prohibitions placed on the Sentencing Council. It will be left with an undefined scope and an undefined extent. Race, religion and belief, or cultural background, whatever that is, are listed, but after that it becomes a matter for speculation as to what might be included.
The Government insist that the list that appears in the Bill is non-exhaustive. In a letter sent to several of us, the Minister states, but without citing any authority, that “personal characteristics” include sex, gender identity, age, physical disability and pregnancy or “other similar conditions”. What is similar to pregnancy? I have been puzzling over that for some time and I am not quite sure.
The Minister did not mention autism, a background of local authority care or experience of sexual abuse, although in the latter case the Government said, in a different letter, that it is not a personal characteristic to have been a victim, perhaps a repeated victim, of sexual abuse. What is included in the list appears to be in the minds of Ministers, or whatever may appear in the minds of Ministers at some later date, leaving the Sentencing Council and, indirectly, judges and magistrates in some confusion as to what the Government intended.
I think and hope that, in making decisions about whether to call for a pre-sentence report, courts will not be influenced by this whole row—it would be very unfortunate if they were—but there is just a slight risk that this may become an area in which courts start to think, “This is a bit political, we’d better not go there”. That must not happen. The still-existing freedom of courts to decide to have a pre-sentence report is not directly affected by the Bill. My worry is that it might have an indirect effect.
Law can have consequences. I foresee the day when a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions will appear in some other Bill on some other subject. What will happen then? We will be told that non-exhaustive lists of prohibited actions are an established practice and appeared in the Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Act 2025. It will become a precedent that will certainly get used on some future occasion, and I think that is a dangerous thing to be happening.
My noble friend’s Amendment 2 restores the Sentencing Council’s freedom, if there is good cause, to issue guidelines that refer to personal characteristics. I urge support for it and, if he presses it to a vote, which I hope he will, he will certainly have my vote and, I hope, those of others who are concerned to protect the ability of the Sentencing Council, a body of some distinction, to do its job in the light of sensible judgment, following discussion with the Government wherever that is necessary or appropriate.
I turn finally to Amendment 9, which is in my name. The Minister has asserted that pregnancy is a personal characteristic, falling within the restrictions imposed by Section 2 of the Bill. But there is case law accepting pregnancy as a reason to order a pre-sentence report, in R v Thompson 2024. Modern slavery was similarly referred to as grounds for a pre-sentencing report in R v Kurmekaj 2024, and being a young offender is dealt with in R v Meanley 2022.
It is difficult to accept that the case law should be overridden by the Bill if it becomes an Act. The Minister has asserted that it is overridden, asserting in his letter that the Bill would make
“such direction about obtaining PSRs across existing guidelines unlawful”.
“Unlawful” is the word used in the Minister’s letter. Nevertheless, he claimed that
“it will not prevent guidelines from reminding sentencers in more general terms that PSRs will be necessary”
when
“an assessment of the offender’s personal circumstances would be beneficial”.
So where does that leave us? It leaves us in a tangle of legal uncertainty, and there is no excuse for that. I suggest that the Minister should accept my amendment, leaving the Sentencing Council free to issue guidelines that reflect and draw attention to well-established case law on the value and importance of pre-sentence reports in cases of the kinds I referred to.
These are different things and we do not want to link them. The Bill intentionally deals with the Sentencing Council, not the Court of Appeal. The Bill as drafted achieves its aims simply, and we do not want to overcomplicate things.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has indicated to your Lordships that he proposes to test the opinion of this House on Amendment 2. I am a pragmatist. I want to see the Bill improve to further the objective that I have explained to your Lordships. That being so, I am perfectly content to rally behind Amendment 2. I therefore beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I remind noble Lords that we are taking questions on this Urgent Question. We need short, sharp, succinct and to-the-point questions.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that, in general, a community sentence should be imposed rather than a custodial one? In that context, would he agree that, in general, and not confined to the cohorts referred to in the guidelines, there should be a pre-sentence report to assist the court in determining whether a defendant is likely to be compliant with a community sentence and also to benefit from one?
Our independent judiciary is best placed to decide whether a community or a custodial sentence is required. From my experience, pre-sentence reports can be very useful in supporting the judiciary in their decision-making. They are even more helpful when the pre-sentence report is written by someone who knows the offender well and has a lot of training and background information on that person.
(5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am happy to give my noble friend the assurances he is looking for. We would be happy to consult him and my noble friend Lord Touhig on the events which we will organise during the coming year for the anniversary of the signing of the ECHR. My noble friend may be interested to know that I was chairman of the celebration of the ECHR’s 50th anniversary, and it is something that I am very pleased that I did.
Does the Minister accept my concern that the court is becoming increasingly interventionist and is making decisions in areas which should properly be left to national Parliaments, and that where this is happening national Parliaments have very limited ability to modify or reverse those decisions?
The Government support the European convention, but we want to work constructively within the convention as laws develop within it. We want to have a constructive, long-term approach that we can properly celebrate in this anniversary year.
(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend for that question, and I agree with the sentiment behind it. The Government are committed to ensuring there is an effective, efficient and sustainable legal aid system and are working toward that end. Our response to the Crime Lower consultation was published on 14 November and confirmed that we will be uplifting the lowest police station fees, introducing a new youth court fee scheme and paying for travel time in certain circumstances. Together, these changes will provide a £24 million boost for criminal aid providers.
My Lords, on a related matter, may I suggest that, to reduce the backlog in criminal cases, the Government increase the number of judicial sitting hours? I also suggest that the Government give earnest consideration to the recent proposal by the former Justice Minister Mr Chalk that criminal cases of intermediate gravity should be dealt with by a Crown Court judge and two justices, rather than by a jury.
I thank the noble Viscount for that question. As he will be aware, the department is going through an allocation process as a result of the recent Budget. The question of sitting hours and days will be looked at as part of that allocation review. He raised the question of an intermediate court, which I think was in the Auld report. That is being looked at, but a number of questions arise from that suggestion, which was made more than 20 years ago. I can say to the noble Viscount that it is something that is being considered.
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Minister has a great deal of personal experience to give, and his presence is greatly to be welcomed. I support the policy that he has announced; it is sensible in the circumstances. But, if it is to be safe, there needs to be proper provision for the accommodation and employment of released prisoners. Can he be a little more specific about that?
Having somewhere to live when someone is released from prison is vital, and we are planning to continue with all the schemes that are currently in place, including the 84 nights that are scheduled for people who leave prison. One of my concerns is that recently, because capacity has been so constrained, hard-working prison and probation staff have not always been able to manage the transition from prison to the community as well as I would like to see in future.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a very good question. A strengthened action plan—a strengthened sentence plan for each IPP prisoner—is an essential part of the wider IPP action plan. That is currently being worked on so that each IPP prisoner still in custody will have a personalised, updated and—we hope—effective sentence plan eventually leading to their release if that is at all possible. The newly established IPP progression board dealing with this matter now includes stakeholder representatives, who met in September and just before Christmas and will meet again in March, when we will report a full update on how the action plan is progressing.
My Lords, I reinforce the suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Clarke. Has the time not come to provide a presumption that all IPP prisoners who have served the tariff should be released unless there is robust evidence tendered to the Parole Board that they are unsafe to be released?
My Lords, that is, in effect, the present position. The Government have no interest in holding these prisoners, especially given the pressure on the prison system generally. The Government’s fear, worry and concern is public protection, for the reasons I have given.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, does my noble and learned friend agree that in principle, an interim order should be made only after a hearing at which both parties are present and can make their case? If, in exceptional cases, an interim order is made on an ex parte basis, does he agree that the return date should be a swift one and that both parties should then be able to make their representations to the judge?
My Lords, I agree in principle with the comments made by my noble friend.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, one factor that may have contributed to the increase is the extended period in cells in custody due to the pandemic. If that is correct, does it not strongly argue that, if we are to reduce the number of suicides, it is important to increase the amount of meaningful out-of-cell activity for prisoners?
My Lords, my noble friend is right and we do want to do that. We also want to do two other things: to increase videoconferencing, so to speak, between prisoners and their families, as we found during the pandemic that it has been very successful; and to make sure that trials come on more quickly, so that people are on remand for a shorter time. That is why, next year, we are planning to hold 20% more jury trials than before the pandemic.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. On previous occasions, and indeed in Committee, I expressed my real anxiety about mandatory minimum sentences, particularly in the context of this group of amendments. I share the noble Lord’s view that a mandatory minimum sentence of this kind is capable of doing very considerable injustice.
I appreciate my noble friend the Minister’s view about exceptional circumstances, which he has explained before. I recognise that there is an ability on the part of the judge in exceptional circumstances to disapply the minimum sentence, but I share the noble Lord’s view that the concept of “exceptional circumstances” means something way out of the ordinary—exceptional. That means that the proviso, in my view, will be seldom applied.
The amendment moved by the noble Lord goes much further than that and, in my interpretation of it, imports the concept of fairness and justice. I agree with him. Because that is my interpretation of the amendment —namely, that we are introducing the concept of fairness and justice as a means of disapplying the minimum mandatory sentence—I shall support the amendment if the noble Lord seeks the opinion of this House.
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I agree with everything that he said and, indeed, what has been said by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. There is no doubt that there is a real difference, both in principle and in practice, between exceptional circumstances and what is required in the interests of justice. It seems to me that, whether or not the circumstances are exceptional, it is essential that the court has a power not to impose a sentence that the judge believes to be contrary in the circumstances of the particular case to the interests of justice.
I am surprised and disappointed to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that a Minister of Justice, particularly one as wise and fair as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, should resist an amendment that confers power on the courts to avoid imposing a sentence that the judge believes would be contrary to the interests of justice. How can that possibly be right? If we are to have more minimum sentences—and I share the concerns as to whether we should—it is absolutely essential that the judge has a discretion to impose a sentence that he or she thinks is in the interests of justice.
My Lords, I welcome this further opportunity to speak to Amendments 78C and 78D in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on the unduly lenient sentence scheme, to which I have added my name, and to Amendment 82B in my name on home detention curfews.
First, I thank the Minister for trying to set up a meeting. It was unfortunate that he had to cancel it and that, because of the emergency coronavirus legislation, I was not free to meet him either yesterday or today. Further, as an aside, it is good to see the Government finally publish their consultation on a victims law and I hope that, after the consultation, legislation will swiftly follow. We have been waiting a long time and today’s amendments are very definitely there to help victims.
Turning first to Amendments 78C and 78D, in Committee, speakers made clear how the ULS scheme plays an important role in our justice system, providing the right for individuals to apply to the Attorney-General’s Office where they believe a sentence to be unduly lenient. As the Minister clarified earlier, the unduly lenient sentence scheme does not provide a direct right to appeal, but instead provides an individual, including victims of crime and bereaved family members, with the opportunity to have their concerns considered by the courts.
On Amendment 78C, we hope that the Minister will acknowledge both the intent and practicalities of such a proposition. The Government’s own victims’ code of practice is clear that victims deserve the right to be told about this scheme and that the responsibility for informing victims of crime about it is assigned to the witness care units. The problem is that the witness care unit is the wrong authority to have this responsibility, because it interacts with only those who are witnesses in court, thus excluding many victims, including bereaved family members.
Amendment 78D seeks to allow flexibility in the 28-day time limit in exceptional circumstances, which would remain at the discretion of law officers when considering the application. If the Minister is concerned about the perceived risk this poses to the certainty for the offender, we believe that allowing a degree of flexibility in exceptional circumstances, as is given to the offender in this case, at the discretion of law officers, does not pose such a risk.
Part of the current problem, and its true risk to finality in sentencing, lies in the current backlogs facing our court system. One recent unduly lenient sentencing case has taken 10 months to reach the Court of Appeal. This does not resolve the fundamental problem that victims face, which is that the criminal justice system should ensure that victims are aware of their rights, have sufficient opportunity to exercise them and have the same rights of flexibility in truly exceptional circumstances. We believe that these amendments, rather than posing a risk to justice and its efficiency, seek to ensure that justice is truly served and that victims of crime have the right—as the Government have set out elsewhere—to a fundamental role in this process.
I turn now to Amendment 82B, which seeks to amend the policy framework governing the use of home detention curfews to exclude those who have previously breached protective orders and who have a history of stalking, harassment, domestic abuse and coercive control. During the debate in Committee, we discussed the fixated and obsessive nature of these offenders and the risk this poses to victims and the public. We gave worrying examples of cases where high-risk offenders were released on home detention curfew, only to appear outside their victim’s home or work, often despite court injunctions not to contact their victim.
After Committee, Victoria Atkins, Minister for Prisons and Probation, wrote to the Victims’ Commissioner for London, stating that the scheme provides a transition to the community for lower-risk offenders. If we are to believe that this Government take violence against women and girls seriously, can the Minister explain how they can consider those convicted of stalking and domestic abuse as lower-risk offenders? The Minister himself stated, in a recent event held by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, that domestic abuse is at the top of the Government’s agenda and reforming and reframing their response is their top priority.
Support for this amendment would present a small step in the right direction to give victims of such violence the trust and confidence that the justice system is committed to tackling violence against women and girls. I will not press Amendment 82B to a vote, but would welcome a meeting to see if we can make some progress on reducing the contradiction highlighted by Victoria Atkins for something that would provide real support for victims.
My Lords, I appreciate that the noble Baroness who moved the lead amendment in this group is concerned primarily with Amendment 78B, but perhaps I might be forgiven if I focus exclusively on Amendment 78A. This relates to the new clause, which would apply a minimum mandatory sentence of seven years to the offence of rape.
I am against this proposed new clause and think it profoundly wrong. I am against it for essentially two reasons. First, as one who has practised in the criminal courts for many years, I know that the offence of rape carries within it a very broad spectrum of culpability, from the most serious kinds of offence to ones significantly less serious. That should be reflected in the ability of the judge to impose the appropriate sentences.
Already a life sentence is the maximum that can be imposed. This takes me to my second point—that I really think the amendment is unnecessary. Anybody who goes to have a careful look at the guidelines published by the Sentencing Council as to how courts should approach sentencing for rape will come to the conclusion that public protection is already appropriately safeguarded. In fact, the spectrum of custodial sentences set out in the Sentencing Council guidelines is between four and 19 years. There is a whole host of considerations set out to assist the judge in determining what level of sentence should be imposed.
That takes me to the last point that I want to make. If you go to the Sentencing Council’s guidelines, as I am sure many of your Lordships have done, you will see a whole range of mitigating circumstances—as well, of course, as aggravating circumstances. Those mitigating circumstances are circumstances that a trial judge could take into account when imposing a determinate sentence of less than seven years. In the new clause proposed in Amendment 78A, nothing is said, for example, about what the consequences would be of remorse or contrition, nor about the making of an early plea, although that of course now attracts a mandatory reduction as a general proposition. Nothing is said about what happens if the defendant has been assisting the prosecution, nor about the time spent on bail. All those things are built into the sentencing guidelines of the council, but they do not appear in the proposed new clause.
If the amendment was to be accepted by your Lordships’ House, very considerable injustice would be done. I also happen to think that it is wholly unnecessary.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 78B, on the maximum sentence for disclosing the identity of sexual offences complainants. I understand the motivation for this amendment and agree with the sentiment underlying it. The current level is obviously inaccurate and inappropriate, but it should not be addressed in isolation. It is correct that the present provisions for dealing with disclosure need revision, as they were passed in 1992 and plainly directed at conventional print, radio and TV media, antedating the internet. For newspapers and TV stations, a fine is generally appropriate. Since 2015, a level 5 fine has meant an unlimited one, which could run to hundreds of thousands of pounds for a newspaper that does this either deliberately or inadvertently. But we all know that today a malicious individual can cause similar damage with a post on the internet, and imprisonment may well be appropriate.
These are serious sexual offences—I do not deny that at all—but there are other matters of great sensitivity that will not be covered by this; it could well cause offence and upset if they are not dealt with at the same time, and they should all be looked at as a whole. The ones that I pull out in particular are, for example, to be found in Section 71 of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. There is still only a fine if you disclose identity, when really it is a very sensitive matter—but, for historical reasons, it remains just a fine. So too if you disclose the name of someone involved in slavery—it is also only a fine—and so too with witnesses in the context of youth justice, which also results in only a fine. All those cases are dealt with in a magistrates’ court. Those things, which are all sensitive and difficult, would be better dealt with in the round. It might be that, for one category of offences, it was thought that the maximum sentence ought to be more than two years, and for others two years, but you want to look at them as a package and reach a considered decision.
This is a worthy amendment, in one sense, but it should not be pursued. Instead, I urge the Government to bring on the review with the Attorney-General that has been promised, really get cracking on it, and look at all offences of the unlawful disclosure of witnesses’ names. I am sure that, if the Government’s officials have time after Christmas, they could draw up a list of all those categories pretty swiftly and get on with it, so they are all dealt with as a whole. I call on the Minister to give appropriate assurances in that respect.
I am grateful to noble Lords, and particularly to the Minister for his comments in response to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby.
On Amendment 78A, clearly it is right that mitigating factors are taken into account and that remorse, guilty pleas and assistance with prosecution are considered; no one is arguing anything to the contrary. However, I put it gently to noble Lords that it is important that sentencing adapts as attitudes in society evolve. I suggest to those noble Lords who were so outraged that we might want to change the system with regard to rape that attitudes towards that crime have changed. That is a very good thing and we should welcome it. However, public confidence in how rape is handled is in crisis.
All rape is violent, often with life-changing consequences for the victim, and we will continue to press the Government on this. I am pleased that women are speaking up with confidence and demanding this kind of change. Speaking personally—although I know that is not something you can properly do from the Dispatch Box—I find the frequent emphasis in this discussion on the idea that there are different degrees of rape, that “There’s rape and then there’s rape”, troubling. As I say, though, we will return to this in future because the women of this country will demand that of us.
On the question of a spectrum of culpability, does the noble Baroness not realise that the sentencing guidelines take that as their premise? That is why the spectrum in custodial sentences is between four and 19 years, because the sentencing guidelines recognise that there is a broad spectrum in culpability and that, as well as aggravating circumstances, there can be mitigating circumstances.
Of course I realise that; I have read the sentencing guidelines. All I am saying is that attitudes in the country outside this House have changed, and the view of a minimum sentence of four years, as opposed to a minimum of seven, is changing, and we are reflecting that in our amendment. That is the point that I am making. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I think the last point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, needs to be said often and loudly. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett—I praised him in Committee—was brave enough to admit that this form of sentence was wrong. My noble and learned friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham abolished it when he was Secretary of State for Justice, but we are left with what I may call the detritus of this admitted mistake. What we must do now is clear it up. We have got rid of the sentence. As the noble and learned Lord said, it is no longer available. We are left with, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, just pointed out in a highly effective speech—and in Committee —hundreds of people remaining in prison long beyond their punishment tariff and others, as my noble friend Lord Moylan pointed out, on licence well beyond any sensible period.
I am a signatory to my noble friend’s amendment but, as I said in Committee, I could have signed any of the amendments to do with reforming IPPs. I say, as both a Member of this House and as a fellow trustee of the Prison Reform Trust with the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, that we have got to the stage now where nobody who has sense of justice or common sense could defend what we now have. All we are looking for is a way in which the Government can complete the task that my noble and learned friend Lord Clarke began when he was Secretary of State for Justice and which for some reason has not been completed in the eight or so years since the sentence was abolished.
Now is the time. If we are to have a Bill as huge as this, let us make good use of it by adding into it just provisions that do justice and which prevent men and women being incarcerated or on licence still for no very good reason. If I may say so, let us also get rid of this provision that is not doing the victims of their crimes any good either. Victims of criminal activity want justice both for them and for the defendant, but this is not justice for either the defendant or the victim.
My Lords, I rise briefly to support all three of the proposed new clauses, most particularly those proposed by Amendments 79 and 80. Looking back on my time in Parliament—nearly 40 years now—I think this was the most unfortunate decision taken in the criminal system. I pay tribute the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for coming to this House and putting before us his proposed new clause. Indeed, I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, for his proposed new clause as well. A huge injustice has been done; as a parliamentarian, I view our contribution to it with a great sense of shame and embarrassment.
At the end of last week, a prisoner wrote to me to tell me that he had a tariff of two years imposed on him and has now served 14 years. I do not know the detail of his case but it is deeply troubling that that happened. In fact, I have referred his letter to the chairman of the Parole Board; I very much hope that she will look into it carefully. I can do no more. However, the truth is that the proposed new clauses before this House give us an opportunity to move forward. My belief is that they do not go anything like far enough, but we have to take the steps that are available.
I hope that my noble friend the Minister will respond sympathetically to the issues raised. I must say, if the opinion of the House is sought on any of these proposed new clauses, I will support them.
My Lords, I certainly want to hear what the Minister has to say because I will go home very uneasy indeed if I pass up the opportunity for a vote to make it clear that this House rejects the system that has developed into a gross distortion of both our justice system and our sense of values about the circumstances in which someone can be incarcerated and those in which they are entitled to recover their freedom. We cannot tolerate this continuing. There is a hope that the Minister will say things that will enable us to feel that we are making some progress, but some of us will not sleep well tonight if we leave this place without being sure that some progress will be made.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on the Report stage of this Bill. I stand to add the proposed new clause, after Clause 2, as printed on the Marshalled List.
This amendment, known as Harper’s law, will impose mandatory life terms on those who are convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, where the victim is an emergency worker who is acting in the exercise of their functions as such a worker. The amendment will apply to adult offenders, and to 16 and 17 year-olds. As the House will see, it contains a judicial discretion for the court to impose an alternative sentence in exceptional circumstances.
It may assist noble Lords if I provide a brief overview of manslaughter—I do not propose to turn this into a lecture—and the manner in which this amendment will work. The amendment applies to those convicted of manslaughter, but the proposed new Sections 258A(4), 274A(4) and 285A(4) of the Sentencing Code are provisions to explicitly exclude those convicted of gross negligence manslaughter, as well as those convicted of manslaughter following a successful partial defence to a charge of murder—for example, manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility, loss of control or in pursuance of a suicide pact. As a result and by process of statutory elimination, the provisions will apply only to those who have been convicted of manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, more commonly referred to as “unlawful act manslaughter”.
The Government are making this amendment following the death of PC Andrew Harper in August 2019. I am sure the House is familiar with the horrific facts of that case. PC Harper was responding to reports of the attempted theft of a quad bike. He suffered fatal injuries when he became caught in a strap trailing behind a getaway car and was dragged behind it. At their trial in July 2020, PC Harper’s three killers were acquitted of murder but were all convicted of unlawful act manslaughter.
The jury was therefore satisfied that the unlawful and dangerous actions of the defendants, namely the plan to steal the quad bike and then escape apprehension by whatever means possible, including driving dangerously along winding country roads, amounted to manslaughter. The court did not impose life sentences on any of the defendants. Each received sentences of between 13 and 19 years for the manslaughter of PC Harper, sentences that were subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. They will therefore all be incarcerated for a significant period. But the Government believe that, where a person is convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, and the person who has been killed is an emergency worker acting as such, that should be punished with life imprisonment.
The court will be able to impose a different sentence where there are exceptional circumstances. As covered in Committee, that term is already used in law and is deliberately undefined in legislation to allow for interpretation and application by the court. This will ensure that the court can apply a different sentence where justified, such as where there are exceptional circumstances relating either to the offence or the offender.
The successful campaign of PC Harper’s widow Lissie Harper and the Police Federation drew this issue to the Government’s attention, but this was not an isolated incident. While, thankfully, emergency workers are not often killed on duty, they are required to put themselves at particular risk when carrying out their duties and protecting the public. As is often said, they run towards the danger when others run away from it. I therefore beg to move Amendment 1.
I rise to express my grave concerns about this new clause, which I hope will not be enacted, although I am bound to say that I am rather pessimistic about that.
I will begin by saying something about procedure. I regret that this new clause is being brought forward on Report. The formal announcement of it was by way of a press release on 24 November this year. As the Minister has said, the new clause was triggered by the very distressing case of the killing of PC Harper. We need to keep in mind that the relevant trial took place in July 2020, and it came before the Court of Appeal for consideration in December that year. I suggest that it is hard to see why the new clause could not have been introduced in the House of Commons or, if that were not possible, in Committee in this House. In either event, there would have been a greater opportunity for discussion, both inside and outside Parliament.
All of us will have the greatest sympathy for PC Harper’s wife and family. However, we should be very cautious about legislating as a consequence of a single case or even a number of cases, however distressing they may be. I have referred to the trial in 2020 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in December that year. My noble friend referred specifically to them. In both those cases, very serious and detailed consideration was given to the appropriate sentence, and, as my noble friend has said, the Court of Appeal rejected the submission of the Attorney-General that, in the case of the defendant Long—the most culpable of them—the sentence should be increased to a life sentence.
I suggest that anyone who studies the judgments of the courts, together with the guidelines of the Sentencing Council—the relevant ones were published as recently as November 2018—will be satisfied that the existing law makes proper provision for the punishment of offenders convicted of serious offences of manslaughter and gives proper protection to emergency workers.
As your Lordships will know, manslaughter covers a very broad spectrum of culpability, extending from the very serious—the killing of PC Harper is an example of this—to many things that are very much less serious, such as a single blow that fells an individual, who strikes his head on the pavement and dies. In all conscience, that is an act of common assault, although the consequences are dreadful.
In the case of PC Harper, the trial judge stated that, had the defendant Long been a few years older— he was 19 at the time of the trial and 18 at the time of his offence—he would probably have been given a life sentence. So we need to be clear about this. A life sentence is already available for serious cases of manslaughter, where the trial judge, who has heard all the relevant facts, thinks that such a sentence is appropriate. Your Lordships are being asked to approve a mandatory life sentence in circumstances in which the trial judge might otherwise determine that one is not appropriate. I am deeply uncomfortable with that, especially when I consider the broad spectrum of culpability that arises in manslaughter cases.
Consider a police officer who intervenes in a street brawl, in or out of uniform—it might be a plain-clothes officer. The officer is struck by a single blow or trips in the course of a scuffle. He or she falls, hits their head on the pavement and dies. If the deceased person had been a civilian killed in such circumstances, the court would impose a relatively modest determinate sentence, but, in the case of the police officer and subject to the subsection (2) provisos, which I will shortly mention, the court would have to impose a life sentence. I do not believe that that can be right.
I said that I would speak briefly, if your Lordships would allow me, to proposed new subsection (2), which was briefly referred to my noble friend the Minister. Subsection (2) refers to the exceptional circumstances that relate to the offence or the offender and make it just not to impose a life sentence. The question that arises and must be considered is: what does that mean? Does that mean that, if the judge thinks that the offence falls at the lower level of culpability, a modest determinate sentence can properly be imposed? If that is the case, what is the purpose of the new clause? If such a discretion is not available to the trial judge, it is surely inevitable that injustice will happen on occasions.
At that point, we come to a related matter. We are talking here about not “whole life” cases but life-sentence cases in which a trial judge must impose a custodial tariff. Is the trial judge entitled under these provisions to set a modest determinate tariff in order to address a low level of culpability? If that is the case, what is the point of the new clause? If it is not the case and the trial judge may not impose a modest tariff, it is extremely unjust.
I have one final point, and I acknowledge that it is about drafting. Consider the following circumstances, which fall within proposed new subsection (3)—I will not read it out because it is on the Marshalled List and I do not want to detain your Lordships’ House. An off-duty officer in plain clothes, whose identity as a police officer is not apparent, intervenes in a street brawl or seeks to apprehend a fleeing thief. In the scuffle, he or she falls over, hits their head and dies. Is it right that, in those circumstances, such a defendant should automatically face a life sentence, unless the subsection (2) provisos apply?
I am profoundly uncomfortable with this new clause, and I would like to think that it will not pass.
My Lords, I share the serious concerns of the noble Viscount. Given the degree of pressure that the Government have been under, understandably, after the shocking death of the police officer, they may have strayed too far into imposing upon the judiciary something that is not necessary, in my view. If they remain concerned about the extent to which the Sentencing Council may not have properly reflected the seriousness of an emergency officer being killed, it is perfectly simple to ask it to reconsider this. I suspect that, in the light of PC Harper, it might well do so.
Following what the noble Viscount has just said, I am particularly concerned about the off-duty, plain-clothes police officer, fireman or anybody else who intervenes—very properly, feeling it is his or her duty—and suffers a fatal injury. The situation is as the noble Viscount said: it really does go too far. I understand very well why the Government think it needs to be done, but I wish they would reflect on this, and think again before it goes back to the House of Commons.
My Lords, with genuine respect, the noble Lord is wrong if he thinks that that is what I have said. Let me be clear: if there are exceptional circumstances, the judge is entitled to depart from the sentence. In other words, the judge does not have to impose the life sentence. The judge will then decide what sentence to impose. With the greatest respect, I was right to say that if there are exceptional circumstances, the life sentence does not apply. If there are no exceptional circumstances, the life sentence does apply, and the judge will then set a relevant tariff.
But does not all of this imply that we are really not serving any purpose by the new clause, partly because of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and also the point conceded very fairly by the Minister to the effect that the trial judge can impose in reality a very low tariff? So the question is, what is the point?
My Lords, I have explained that. There is a difference between being given a life sentence with a 10-year tariff and being given a sentence of 10 years. That is a point that we all accept in the case of murder.
That is true, too, but the case of murder arises from the original bargain made with Parliament and the country at the time when capital punishment was abolished. That does not apply as an argument to what we are doing now.
My noble friend is absolutely right to say that that is the origin of the life sentence for murder. It was a deal done, if I can put it in those respectful terms, but we have life sentences elsewhere in our legislation as well. The point that I was seeking to answer—and, with great respect, I think I have answered it—was, as I understood it when it was put against me: what is the difference if the trial judge is going to give a tariff of x years, why not just have a sentence of x years? However, there is a difference, as we all recognise, between a life sentence with a tariff of x years and a sentence of x years. We can have a debate—
In the last week, as is my wont, I have had discussions with a number of Members of this House on this matter. Any Member of the House knows that my door is always open to them, metaphorically and often literally. All the discussions that I have had on this amendment have been ones that I have reached out to others to have. Nobody has knocked on my door. In those circumstances, I cannot say that we will adjourn. If I am told differently, that will be for others to decide. At the moment, I will ask the House to vote on my amendment.
My Lords, I hate to intervene on my noble friend but I will formally move that the House be adjourned for one hour.
My Lords, I ask the House to vote on my amendment.
Motion