(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have just defined that flexibility. Although we want to balance the structural current deficit by the end of the rolling five-year forecast period, we are, as I have said, on track to meet the mandate one year early. We are clearly ensuring that we will achieve our overall objectives. By the end of the current Parliament we will have completely eliminated the structural current deficit, and the debt ratio will be falling. That is our four-year plan for restoring order and stability to our nation’s finances, which has been praised by the international community and welcomed by the financial markets.
The Minister refers to praise from the international community. If she was referring to the International Monetary Fund, I welcome that praise. She will also be aware that the IMF’s independent evaluation office reported last week that it had felt intimidated and bullied by the Treasury in which the current shadow Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls), and the Leader of the Opposition played a key role between 2004 and 2006, and that it had been forced to water down its criticism of United Kingdom fiscal policy. Will she reassure the House that, as the IMF has praised this Government’s plans for the OBR, it seems that we did not intimidate it as the last Government did?
I hope that we will have an altogether more constructive relationship with the IMF. In fact, it has already commented on the background to the need for this Bill. In November last year, it stated that the recent crisis led the UK to suspend its two national fiscal rules—the golden rule and the sustainable investment rule—at the end of 2008, and that the credibility of the national rules as effective constraints of policy action was weakened well before the crisis. It went on to say that the rules failed to prevent a worsening of the fiscal balance in the years leading up to the crisis, leaving insufficient buffers as the economy entered the downturn, and that while in place the golden rule was often criticised becauseit provided insufficient monitoring, transparency and accountability of fiscal policy. That was the IMF’s assessment of the previous fiscal mandate, and I think that it demonstrates clearly why it was so ineffective in tackling the problems that our country experienced. In many respects, it provided the ground on which those problems were able to prosper and grow.
It is important to see what the forecasts are and what they mean at this stage of economic recovery. Of course I want to see the economy recover and grow, unemployment coming down and inflation being controlled. Unfortunately, that is not what the signs that we have been picking up since the Government’s decision to cut so deep and so fast tell us about the real economy. We will see as time goes on how the OBR adjusts its forecasts to take account of the monthly and quarterly statistics from the Office for National Statistics.
The shock GDP figures before Christmas strongly imply that the Chancellor will suffer the embarrassment of his growth forecasts being downgraded by the OBR in his self-proclaimed Budget for growth, which is due to be unveiled next month. We will wait and see.
We on the Labour Benches support a genuinely independent OBR but, as I said, we will explore in Committee the practical extent of that independence and suggest amendments to the Bill to shore it up a little more. We will need to explore the viability of the arrangements to produce, rather than comment on, the fiscal forecasts, as many other fiscal councils do. We will need to explore the extent of the OBR’s remit and whether the close co-operation with civil servants required to produce the forecast will lead to behind-the-scenes negotiations that will compromise at least the perception of independence.
Let us be under no illusion that the existence of the OBR, which we support in principle, can in any way protect us from the misjudgments of the present Chancellor or any other. The OBR must assume, as the Minister said, that the Government’s plans are a given. It cannot comment on the fiscal mandate or on wider fiscal policy in general. It is prevented from doing so. All it can do is calculate the probability of the Government being able to achieve their stated plans. The OBR therefore cannot protect the country from the mistakes that the Chancellor makes, or from the mistakes that he has made already. It is no panacea and it should not be regarded as one. Our dispute—
My hon. Friend will note that in her closing remarks the hon. Member for Wallasey (Ms Eagle) told the House not to see the OBR as a panacea. Did he notice the irony of that statement, because it was the previous Government who passed the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010 and presented that as a panacea to the nation, pretending that it is possible to legislate and bring down the deficit without taking any tough decisions?
I do not want to go too far into the past, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right. We now recognise the hubristic foolishness of the notion of ending boom and bust and that the economic cycle had somehow been put to one side. We have all now learned that lesson, and this generation of Members will be much more sceptical about any such panacea that is proposed in future.
As I have said, no organisation, not even those without links to the Government, forecast the scale of the economic crisis. Ultimately, economic forecasts are just that, and if we place blind faith in the independent projections, potential risks might also be ignored. Therefore, part of the OBR’s continuing role must be constantly to remind us all of its own fallibility and advise on a range of possible outcomes, pointing out not only to politicians, but to financial markets, the longer-term threats to our economy in the event that the markets, in particular, prove too forgiving.
Putting aside those concerns, which are relatively minor in comparison with the entirety of what we are trying to achieve, there is a great deal to welcome, particularly with regard to transparency and accountability. Furthermore, if the OBR works as it should, it is likely that any unofficial tinkering by the Treasury will be flagged up early and properly scrutinised by Parliament, returning some long-lost gravitas to the Treasury Committee and to Parliament itself.
As I have said in this House before, the restoration of confidence to our economy was always going to depend largely on rebuilding trust. The establishment of the OBR marks an important milestone in encouraging us to place our faith once again in the financial and political systems of our nation. We must of course be alert to the potential pitfalls in its operation, but it also represents an important check against a hitherto unchecked Treasury, and as such the OBR must now be treated as a credible new fixture in this fresh financial landscape.
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate. In giving the Bill’s proposals qualified support, Opposition Members view the creation of the OBR as part of the direction of reform started by the previous Government, with the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England to decide on monetary policy and the establishment of the Office for National Statistics. The International Monetary Fund has said that the OBR’s proposed mandate is
“broadly consistent with established best practice for independent fiscal councils.”
Placing the Office for Budget Responsibility on a statutory basis is an important stage both in its development and in securing its greater independence from the Treasury, but Opposition Members will continue to scrutinise the Bill’s provisions closely to ensure that the OBR is as genuinely independent from the Government as it can be, and sufficiently accountable to the House.
It would be unacceptable if the OBR’s independence were compromised by insufficient access to its own resources, or if it were subject to excessive intervention by the Treasury. The OBR is due to receive £1.75 million per year in funding until the end of the current spending review period, but higher than expected CPI inflation might see that financial support fall in real terms. The Institute for Fiscal Studies recommends, on page 56 of its green budget, that
“the OBR should be as transparent as possible about what meetings have been held, and when and how all key assumptions made in its forecasts were decided upon”.
Internationally, it has been established that fiscal councils can undertake four main roles in connection with economic policy: first, provide objective macro-economic forecasts on which Government budget proposals can be based, as carried out by the Centraal Planbureau—CPB—in the Netherlands and by the Economic Council in Denmark; secondly, cost various Government policy initiatives, as performed by the Congressional Budget Office in the United States, the CPB in the Netherlands and the Parliamentary Budget Office in Canada; thirdly, evaluate whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its medium-term targets, as the Fiscal Council does in Hungary; and fourthly, analyse the long-term sustainability of fiscal policy, with examples being the CPB in the Netherlands, the CBO in the US, the Government Debt Committee in Austria, the Fiscal Council in Hungary and the Fiscal Policy Council in Sweden.
Of those functions, the OBR appears to cover only the first and third. Fiscal councils are less likely to engage in normative analysis of economic policy; only the Austrian Government Debt Committee, the Danish Economic Council and the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council appear to carry out that role.
The OBR’s role includes responsibility for preparing the Government’s economic and fiscal forecasts and issuing them alongside fiscal forecasts with the Budget. That is clearly helpful to the Government, but it means that Ministers are able to prepare in detail for any consequences of a Budget before the OBR makes its assessments public. Without safeguards, that could lead to concerns about the extent of private consultations between Ministers and the OBR prior to publication—the perceived problem during the release of unemployment data last summer.
As Lars Calmfors, chair of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, wrote in The Guardian on 28 July last year:
“It might be better if the OBR provided a post-evaluation of the budget as an input into the work of parliament (in addition to a forecast before the budget).”
The IFS also concludes in its green budget that there is a case for the OBR
“to take as much advantage as possible of the required end-of-year fiscal report to conduct and communicate detailed analysis of how and why outcomes deviated from the forecast.”
As my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Ms Eagle) said, there are also questions about the use of different forecasts by the Treasury, the OBR and the Bank of England. The Bank already produces macro-economic forecasts. As the IFS again concludes:
“Those produced by the OBR will be used when deciding fiscal policy, while those produced by the Bank of England will be used by the MPC”—
the Monetary Policy Committee—
“when deciding on monetary policy.”
That might lead to a situation in which fiscal and monetary policy is not sufficiently well co-ordinated.
On fiscal forecasts, progress has been made to underline the OBR’s independence in reaching its conclusions, but it needs to make as much data as possible, as well as the details of its financial models, available to the public. In evidence to the Treasury Committee recently, Professor Tim Besley recommended that the OBR should be able to communicate with key international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the EU and the OECD.
The OBR’s mandate will not in itself generate higher growth, and that brings us to the proposed charter of fiscal responsibility to be created through clause 1. The aim of the charter as stated is to create
“objectives in relation to fiscal policy and policy for the management of the National Debt,”
and to establish the Government’s “fiscal mandate”. Opposition Members have no problems with that concept; indeed this House legislated for similar goals in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, but the real difficulty is with the Government’s proposed fiscal mandate of attempting to eliminate the deficit over a four-year period—and the effects that that is already having, as the country can see, on growth.
The OBR has already revised down its growth forecast for 2011, from 2.6% when the Government took office last May to 2.3% after the emergency Budget in June; and it did so once more, to 2.1%, after the comprehensive spending review in November. We will see on 23 March whether those figures have to be downgraded again in the light of growing evidence that the Government’s decisions on the economy have seen it take a turn for the worse this winter.
When Labour left office, the recovery was picking up, with growth of 1.1% in the second quarter of 2010, and, according the OBR’s own analysis, the deficit for 2009-10 came in more than £20 billion lower than forecast. The Office for National Statistics was clear that, even once the effects of December’s inclement weather were taken into account, there would have been no growth at all in the last quarter of 2010.
The Government should adopt a fiscal mandate in the Bill to put jobs and growth first in order to ensure that cutting the deficit does not harm the productive capacity of the economy, and they should end their complacent argument that the economy is “out of the danger zone”. With the country facing 20% youth unemployment, rising prices and stagnant growth, that is not a claim that either the Prime Minister or the Chancellor can credibly make.
The hon. Gentleman will know that Government debt stands at £1 trillion. According to a recent ONS report, if we add on the bank debt that the country inherited from the previous Government’s policies, we find that the figure is about £2.3 trillion—equal to 160% of GDP. Does he consider that to be a good legacy with which to engender growth?
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is absolutely right. The price is hugely inflationary in rural areas. It is also a problem in some of the poorer parts of our cities, where car ownership is remarkably low. It means that some people with modest means do not even have the ability to travel to a supermarket, where there may be discounted goods. Instead, they are forced to pay higher prices in certain urban centres. That should not happen.
The hon. Gentleman is right to raise this issue and to talk about the impact of high fuel prices on hard-pressed families, but he will know that fuel duty raises about £30 billion for the Exchequer, and that a 1p increase in duty raises about £500 million. His case would be far more powerful if he could outline the public spending he wants to cut so that fuel duty can be cut, because that money must be made up somehow.
The hon. Gentleman makes the same point that the Labour party used to make—something must be cut to fund the Scottish National party proposal. However, the SNP argues that when the price at the pump increases, there is a VAT windfall. In any circumstances, we know that there is likely to be a windfall in excess of £1 billion from the North sea. We believe that that should be used to temper duty increases and to lower the duty level, so that the yield anticipated by the Government does not decrease, and to smooth the effects of the spiking at the pumps.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
As I said, we are looking for greater disclosure. We are also seeking agreement at European level, because this is an international industry. These are perfectly sensible steps to take, and we have introduced in this country the toughest financial code on bonuses of any financial centre of any size anywhere in the world.
The UK financial industry will pay £54 billion in taxes this year—more than any other industry—and its 1 million employees will pay a further £25 billion in income tax. Does the Chancellor agree that those tax revenues will help to pay for our schools and hospitals, and to cut the record budget deficit left by the Labour party?
It is, of course, important—I said this in my statement—that we have a successful but properly regulated financial services industry, which employs hundreds of thousands of people, including thousands of people in many constituencies represented in the Chamber. It used to be the case—although perhaps it is not the case any more—that senior Labour politicians would at least acknowledge that. That is why I would much rather reach a settlement with the banks, and that is what we are seeking to do. We want a successful industry that pays a proper contribution to the Exchequer and lends more to British business, and that is my objective.
(14 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe Prime Minister of Luxembourg recently proposed that the EU should start issuing common EU bonds, jointly and severally guaranteed by all member states. Although the eurozone countries can do what they want on bond issuance, will the Chancellor reassure the House that Britain will play no role in an EU common bond?
I can indeed give my hon. Friend that assurance. This is an issue that the eurozone is publicly considering, as well as other potential routes forward for the eurozone. My efforts are concentrated on getting our gilt auctions away, and I can reassure him that, thanks to the measures we have taken, that is going well at the moment.
(14 years ago)
Commons ChamberI have no doubt that the Government are listening to my hon. Friend and others, who will put pressure on them to resist the pressure from other quarters. I agree with his point.
It seems to me that very little work is being done on the possibility of the euro crisis leading to more general examples of the no bail-out clause’s bluff being called. I would be surprised if there had been any such work. I cannot be sure, but it strikes me as highly unlikely. It is the Ark of the Covenant that the eurozone will continue indefinitely.
When the Chancellor came before the Treasury Committee, he assured us that eurozone members were
“having a discussion about the permanent eurozone bail-out mechanism.”
I will not, because I am about to conclude.
Any new bail-out mechanism, however, may itself lack credibility in the absence of a common European fiscal policy. That is why the discovery that the no bail-out clause is a paper tiger will remain an enduring problem for the eurozone’s stability, a problem from whose consequences the UK will certainly not be immune.
The shadow Chancellor made the rather incredible statement in his opening remarks that he believes that Ireland’s euro membership has absolutely nothing to do with the predicament in which it finds itself. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree?
The circumstances in which Ireland finds itself are complex, but there is no doubt that one problem is that a common interest rate right across Europe is perhaps inappropriate for an economy that is rapidly investing in an asset bubble. However, I do not have the same phobia about the euro that many Conservative Members still have, 20 years on.
It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds). He made many powerful points, especially his last one. I note that the Bill is called the Loans to Ireland Bill, not the Loans to the Irish Republic Bill. I wonder whether the Government have had some foresight, and whether some of the loans will actually be provided to Northern Ireland, to help to reduce corporation tax there. Perhaps there is some hope in that regard.
I want to start by saying that we have an excellent Chancellor of the Exchequer and a first-class Treasury team, including my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary, who has the misfortune to be at the Dispatch Box to listen to my remarks. On this particular issue, however, I think that they have got it wrong for a number of reasons. Everyone in the House wants to see the Irish Republic prosper, but the question is: which is the best way to help it? Its problem is that it is part of the euro. Government Members have always argued that the United Kingdom should not be part of the euro, because it cannot possibly work. It is not possible to have one fixed interest rate and one fixed currency covering a number of different countries. What we are witnessing is a crisis in which that problem has come to light.
If Ireland were not part of the eurozone—if it had its own currency—it could change its interest rate, but more importantly, its currency could depreciate, which would make it more expensive for exports to come into Ireland and cheaper for exports to go out. It is a market mechanism for self-righting an economic collapse, and because Ireland is part of the eurozone, it cannot do that.
I take the view that in the next few months the euro will collapse. It will not just be Ireland and Greece; it will be Spain, Portugal and possibly Italy. At that stage, it will be necessary to abandon the euro entirely or have two eurozones. If I am right in that assumption, it is a mistake to give £3.25 billion to the Irish at a time when it will do no good at all and that money will never be repaid. If we were paving the way for the Irish to have their own currency again, which would be part of the sterling area, we would be more of a help to Ireland. My argument is that we are sending the money in the wrong direction.
The second issue we have—to be fair to the shadow Chancellor, I think he was on to it—is that we do not know how the figure has been arrived at. Nobody has explained—at least, I have not heard anyone do so—why we have settled on £3.25 billion, but I think the Chancellor was arguing that that is the sort of amount we would have had to provide through the European financial stability facility if we had been part of the eurozone. Well, we are not part of the eurozone, so why should we be contributing to something that eurozone countries should be providing on their own?
Is my hon. Friend aware that recently the Prime Minister of Luxembourg made a proposal that the EU should issue EU-wide bonds, and does he agree that Britain should have nothing to do with such a proposal?
Of course; I thank my hon. Friend for raising that.
I disagreed with the shadow Chancellor when he said that there were two extremes. One was to have a unified eurozone with central controls over taxation and spending. It is one option, and I accept that such a model would work, but I reject it completely. However, no one can pretend that the current system will ever work. We would just end up putting billions and billions more pounds into a system that will eventually collapse, and, in my view, that will happen earlier rather than later.
Let me return to how the €85 billion package is made up. We have €17.7 billion from the facility and €22.5 billion from the mechanism. The mechanism was designed for natural emergencies; it was never designed for this purpose, and yet we are taking more out of the mechanism, which has a total pot of €60 billion, than out of the one that has €440 billion. Why? The simple answer is that the United Kingdom has to contribute to the mechanism, but we do not contribute to the facility because it is all eurozone money. In my view we do not need to make this £3.25 billion loan; it should come entirely from the €440 billion that is available for exactly this reason. That is why the facility was set up.
I also did not follow the Chancellor’s argument when he said that because of qualified majority voting, we would not have voted against the use of the mechanism because we would have been overruled. I have to say to him that on a number of occasions I have voted on measures on which I know I will not win, but it does not mean that one should not vote that way; one should vote as one sees fit. I think on that small point the Chancellor has also made a mistake.
Many hon. Members will refer to the man on the Clapham omnibus, but in my case it is the man on the Wellingborough 46 bus, and such people make the following very simple point. My county council has announced that it will fire all its lollipop ladies and close a number of libraries, and those people say to me, “If we’re having to do that because we’re not allowed to increase the national debt, how on earth can you provide £3.25 billion to a country that is in the eurozone?” It is very difficult for me to give an answer. In fact, the answer I give is, “We shouldn’t be doing it.”
If the House divides on the Government’s proposal, I will, reluctantly, have to vote against it, not because I think the Government’s aim is wrong—because, yes, we want to have a prosperous Ireland—but because of the way this is being done and the way it is being funded. Nobody is suggesting that because we trade a lot with the United States of America, if there were a crisis there, we would suddenly lend it money. Ireland is a grown-up country. It decided to become part of the euro. The problem lies in the eurozone, and it should sort this out, not us.
(14 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI mentioned light-touch regulation in the City of London, which we have had since the Thatcher era and through the Blair era. I believe that that needs to end. We want not excessive but adequate and proper regulation, and for the past three decades, in the so-called neo-liberal era, we have not had it.
Derivatives should be approved by the regulatory authority before they can be issued. At that stage, they can be either prohibited or accepted, perhaps with certain conditions attached. The key point is that transparency is essential. It is worth noting that the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act seeks to achieve that by requiring that all derivatives are traded on public exchanges.
Linked to that is the role—or perhaps the scandal—of the credit rating agencies in allocating a spurious status to some highly dubious securities. Light-touch regulation in this country has evaporated into virtual deregulation. Credit rating agencies were paid by the very institutions whose credit worthiness they were supposed to be assessing. By granting the highest rating, as they so often did, they made it easier for the banks that were securitising and further repackaging debt to create the greatest possible number of securities with the lowest possible regulatory cost. That practice should never have happened, and I believe that it should always be prohibited where there is a serious conflict of interest, as there was in that case.
I know of the hon. Gentleman’s expertise in this matter, and I will give way to him, but I will not give way subsequently because I want to speak for only about a quarter of an hour.
Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the price of credit derivatives over the past three or four years has been far more accurate as a predictor of default risk than the credit ratings given by rating agencies?
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point of which we need to take account, but I still think that the credit rating agencies potentially have an important role. They are listened to in the market, are the basis on which financial transactions take place, and should be trusted, but in the present circumstances they are certainly not. However, I am grateful for his question.
On bonuses, there is outrage among not just Opposition Members but, for example, right-wing Governments in Germany, France and Sweden, that a banking system that owes its continued existence to massive Government intervention should pay itself mega salaries and bonuses entirely out of line with the top of business, let alone ordinary taxpayers. There is outrage especially because those gigantic bonuses often drove the recklessness in the first place. The overweening power of the banks attracts almost universal hostility, especially given that 90% of investment bank profits, in an era of austerity, are directed not at strengthening balance sheets, at shareholders through dividends, at customers through lower fees or at taxpayers, but at bonuses.
France, among several others, has demanded a mandatory cap and that there should be no guaranteeing of bonuses, but Whitehall, as usual of course, argues that it would not be practical. However, if the G20 Governments insisted on limits and made continued liquidity provisions dependent on compliance, no bank could refuse. I believe that Her Majesty’s Government should now be taking the lead in the G20 not in succumbing to lobbying from the City of London and the British Bankers Association, but in reining back bonuses on a much greater scale than we have so far seen, and to much lower levels, and in ensuring that they be paid only in exceptional circumstances.
On the broader question of averting future financial crises, attention has so far largely focused on enhancing capital control, but that does not actually have a good record in this regard. At the outset of this latest crisis, virtually all financial institutions across the globe had capital adequacy of between one and two times the minimum Basel regulatory requirements—at least at that level, and in some cases twice as much. Basel III, which has just reached its provisional conclusions, is scarcely any improvement. The core top-tier capital requirement is only 4.5%, and the contingency capital requirement is only 2.5%. Of the EU’s top-50 banks, 45 already meet that standard, and Basel III is actually proposing that the requirement not be introduced until 2019. This is simply nowhere near good enough. A much better possibility might be counter-cyclical capital controls, enforcing different levels of bank capital at different stages in the economic cycle. I can see the point of that, but I suspect that it would leave open the problem of the degree of ratchet and the timing of it. I suspect that that would be far too problematic.
An alternative approach—many have talked about this—is the introduction in Britain of something like the Volcker rule, restricting banks from undertaking certain kinds of speculative trading, notably proprietary trading. Of course that would certainly stop banks doing what they are doing at the moment, which is trading on their own books with the money of depositors. The key point, however, is that it would not overcome the too big to fail problem when applied to investment banks. For example, I do not think it would prevent a repetition of the collapse of Lehman Brothers; neither would it address the interconnectedness—the Chancellor was speaking about this a few moments ago—of today’s banks, with counter-party relationships and exposure between commercial and investment banks, and insurance companies. That is the problem. I say this with regret, but any rule-based reform is almost certain to face the risk of regulatory arbitrage, because financial institutions invent ever more sophisticated products that are simply aimed at getting around regulatory controls. I therefore do not think that what I have described is an adequate answer. For all those reasons, the force of argument and the balance of advantage point strongly towards separating retail from investment banks, in establishing distinct, narrow banks that are conservative, transparent institutions with no financial instruments or incomprehensible balance sheets.
I thank the right hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) for securing this debate, which is a valuable one to be having in the House. I draw the attention of hon. Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interest, which is a legacy of my spending 18 years in the banking industry. Before Labour Members get a bit too excited by that revelation, as many have unfortunately done in the past, I should say that for the past three or four years I felt that the profession of banker was possibly the worst to have in the eyes of the public, but that was before I became a Member of this illustrious House.
The motion states that we want to
“prevent a recurrence of the financial crash”.
Obviously we are all united on that, but it is important that we examine the causes of the crash, which we could debate for a long time and go round in circles. I am sure that many rational people will disagree on the responsibilities of banks and bankers. I may have misunderstood the motion, but it seems to suggest that banks are entirely responsible for the financial crash. That is wrong and it does not do justice to Members of this House or to our constituents in preventing something like this from happening again.
The financial crash happened because too much money was chasing too few assets—financial assets or real assets such as real estate. There are three principal reasons for that, the first of which was that world financial reserves, particularly in the east, were growing at a substantial rate. Indeed, they continue to do so, as more people in the west consume goods from the east. To give just one illustration, China’s financial reserves in 1990 were $165 billion but today they are $2.65 trillion. Those reserves needed to find a home.
The second reason is that commodity prices have grown substantially, partly as a result of the growth of the east and other emerging markets, and that has led to a substantial increase in sovereign wealth funds, both in the middle east and in other markets. Those funds also needed to find a home, and they created a colossal wall of money when combined with the financial reserves.
The third reason is something that bankers have called the “Greenspan put”. Alan Greenspan became chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1987, just before the Wall street crash, and one of the first things he did when he found a problem in the financial markets and a potential crisis brewing was to lower interest rates as quickly and as substantially as he could. That happened again when the US Federal Reserve led the way after the dotcom bubble burst in 1991, again when Russia had problems and there were problems in Asia, and it has just happened again. Bankers have got used to that approach and it results in what the markets call a “put”, whereby they feel they can sell assets if things go wrong. That has encouraged bad behaviour and a moral hazard: the idea among many bankers of “heads we win, tails the taxpayers lose.”
In addressing these issues, we must not forget those key facts about what caused the crisis. However, bankers did play a significant role and there are things about banks that we need to examine. Although there are issues to address in respect of financial derivatives, I would not make that the key priority. The first thing to examine is the idea of retail banks and commercial investment banks acting as one entity, because that seriously needs to be looked at.
I started working in the banking industry in New York in 1992. Under the Glass-Steagall Act, which was in place at the time, the bank I worked for had to have a completely arm’s length relationship with its retail banking division. That made a big difference to the risks the bank took or even contemplated taking. That situation changed in the late 1980s in Britain, when the big bang took place and the implied Glass-Steagall arrangement disappeared, and it formally changed in the United States in 1999 when that Act was removed. It is vital to examine that. The second thing to look at is, as has been mentioned, banking capital itself.
Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared to share his thoughts on whether we should return to a Glass-Steagall model, which I understand the Clinton Administration did away with when in office?
There are some considerable merits in that model and given what has happened we should consider it seriously. I hope that the Vickers commission does that.
Secondly, we should consider the banks’ capital requirements. It is right that under Basel III capital requirements should be lifted. The core tier 1 capital requirement will be lifted from about 2% for banks to about 7%. Some points are still missed, however. The focus is far too narrowly on the default risk of assets and we have strange incidences even with default risk—for example, under the new proposals industrialised sovereigns are still considered to be risk free. As we speak, Ireland’s 10-year Government bonds are trading at more than 11%, Spain’s 10-year bonds are trading at more than 6% and Germany’s are trading at more than 2.5%, but they are all treated as zero-risk weighted and no risk capital will be set aside. No account is taken of liquidity, either. One of the largest problems for banks over the past three or four years was lack of liquidity, but the capital requirements do not take full account of that.
One of the biggest mistakes that made Britain’s situation far worse than that of other countries was the change in regulation when Tony Blair’s Government first took office. The jobs of people at the Bank of England, who knew what they were doing, were taken over by people at the Financial Services Authority, who did not know what they were doing. I remember an FSA audit where the chief auditor of my credit derivatives book, which had a market value of more than €100 billion, was a 27-year-old with a degree in biology. It is no wonder that problems started to happen. We do not necessarily need more regulation, just smarter regulation.
There are many issues to consider that we could debate for a long time. Banking regulation is one such issue, but we do no service to our constituents if we merely focus narrowly on it when we consider the lessons of the financial crisis.
(14 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI believe that we need a system of asset freezing. It would be idiotic for anyone to argue that that is not necessary in this day and age, given the link between organised crime and terrorism. It occurs not just in Northern Ireland but, I am sure, throughout the United Kingdom. I take it as read that every Member in the Chamber believes in the principle of asset freezing. The next issue that arises is how we arrive at that position and ensure that it is compatible with people’s civil rights. That is important. I am not a bleeding-heart leftie as such, but I do believe that we have basic human rights and that we need to observe them. Indeed, we are obliged to do so by international law, and by domestic law too now.
I referred in my discussion with the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) to the apparent unanimity between the two Front-Bench teams, and I mentioned the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. It was introduced following some terrible incidents involving Staffordshire bull terriers maiming people and, in one instance, killing a child. The rush to legislate was understandable, but the measures were not properly scrutinised and, to this day, the Act is unworkable.
Another such Act has passed through the House during my tenure and that of the right hon. Gentleman, namely the gun control legislation following the Dunblane massacre. Everybody was appalled by that massacre, but we rushed to legislate without adequately scrutinising the measures we were putting in place, and I am afraid that the resulting Act did nothing to control the use of illegal firearms. My point is that scrutiny is vital, and that unanimity of purpose between both the Front-Bench teams, and, indeed, all Members, does not matter, because at the end of the day every one of us has a duty to ensure that our constituents live in a safe environment and that we can deal with the terrorism that might threaten them.
There is clearly a terrorist threat; only a fool would deny that. Having said that however, let us examine the Bill. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury referred in his opening speech to United Nations Security Council resolution 1373. It includes a requirement that UN member states must prevent the financing of acts of terrorism, including by the freezing of funds and economic resources
“of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts”,
and that they must prohibit
“their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources”
available to such persons. I submit that there is a world of difference between that requirement and what is being proposed in the Bill.
Initially, the Bill stated that its powers could be used if there was a suspicion that a person might be involved in some form of terrorism. That has now been strengthened somewhat: there must now be a reasonable belief that they are involved. That is quite different from what the UN is calling for, however, and in my view it does not strike the appropriate balance between protecting national security and preserving civil liberties. It is vital that we do that, and this is precisely why so many pieces of anti-terrorism legislation have been struck down by the courts. That has happened not because there is all-out war between the courts and Parliament, but quite simply because we have not been getting that essential balance right.
I believe that if we subject the Bill to proper scrutiny, we can work towards ensuring that we get the balance right. I do not want us to have to argue the same points again in a few months, after the Supreme Court has knocked some of the Bill’s measures on the head a second or a third time because of a perceived lack of respect for human rights.
As the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) mentioned, this Bill gives powers to the Executive, not the judiciary, and those powers are potentially harsh and punitive. As has been said, it is a form of punishment for someone to have all their assets frozen—one might argue that it is almost as bad as dealing with the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, but perhaps we should not go there, folks. There is a right of appeal, which is welcome, but these measures deal with persons about whom it has not been established that they have ever been involved in terrorism, but when there is just a reasonable belief that they could be, or might at some stage have been, involved in some act of terrorism.
I have concerns about the Bill, therefore, and I know that Justice and Liberty also have grave concerns. Let me repeat that I want a proper framework set up. I am not arguing an empty case—I am not saying that I oppose just for the sake of opposing. I want the legislation to be workable and to be seen to be acceptable, and for it to be tested by the courts and to be found acceptable to them. If we ensure that that is the case, we will have done our duty as parliamentarians in that we will have introduced good law.
Allowing the Executive to designate individuals as suspected terrorists is unacceptable. As the deputy president of the Supreme Court has said, these people are
“effectively prisoners of the state.”
Those are strong words from a Supreme Court judge, and I do not think he would have said them unless he felt strongly about the issue.
The Bill goes much further than is required by UN Security Council resolution 1373, a resolution that the UN’s own special rapporteur on terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights has said
“cannot be seen as a proper response to a specific threat to international peace and security”.
I also believe the Bill fails to address the UK’s asset-freezing obligations under UN Security Council resolution 1267, recently criticised by the General Court of the European Union as “particularly draconian”.
The hon. Gentleman is making some fine points, but does he accept that global co-operation is required to combat global terrorism and the financing it utilises, and that that is the intent behind the UN’s actions on this, following the terrible events of 11 September 2001? Does he also agree that for that reason global organisations, such as the committee the UN has set up, must issue orders internationally to all countries to freeze assets? The UK is absolutely key in implementing such orders given the role we play in international finance, and bringing courts into this would make any orders terribly difficult to implement.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberOutlandish predictions by politicians were the prerogative of the previous Government. We have established an independent Office for Budget Responsibility to make forecasts. We do not make the forecasts, and I am merely quoting what the OBR had to say.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the biggest risk to our economy is the record deficit of 10% of GDP, the highest in the G20? Had we not taken action, that would have posed a big risk and we would have lost more than 490,000 jobs. Opposition Members should think about the jobs that we would have lost had the Government not taken decisive action.
I agree wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend. If we had not tackled the deficit, the poor in this country would have suffered most.
The hon. Lady is fond of saying, “Let’s have a grown-up, sensible debate”, so it would be useful if she followed her own rules. Why is she refusing to give way to my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Matthew Hancock)?
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberWhat I would say to the hon. Gentleman is that, again, we have to take a realistic decision about investment in our railways. We are going to invest £14 billion in them and we also want to invest in new rolling stock, on which I was asked a question by the hon. Member for Sedgefield (Phil Wilson), who has now left his place. That has required a tough decision on rail fares, but I hope that passengers will at least understand that if we want investment in rail stock we have to be able to afford it, and the people who use the rail stock should make a contribution to that.
I welcome the bold and powerful statement that my right hon. Friend has made today and, in particular, the efforts to protect the most vulnerable. Does he agree that the biggest risk to our economy would have been to have done nothing at all, as advocated by most Labour Members, and that the action that he has taken today will do the most to restore economic confidence to our economy?
I agree with my hon. Friend. Whoever won the general election—whoever formed the Government—was going to have to come to the House of Commons to set out a plan for reducing the highest budget deficit in our peacetime history; the deficit is considerably higher than it was when Denis Healey had to go to the International Monetary Fund. We have set out those proposals, and I believe that they will deliver certainty and stability going forward. The market interest rates for British businesses and British families are already lower as a result of the decisions that we have taken since coming into office. As for the decisions that we have announced today, I have noted that not a single Labour Member has asked me about the increase in the child tax credit, which will help 4 million families.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate the hon. Lady on her new position. The emergency Budget to which she referred was absolutely necessary considering the train wreck of an economy that we inherited. The country’s debts were spiralling out of control. That Budget calmed the debt markets and allowed the country to look at its finances and to bring economic competence back into the Treasury.
The hon. Gentleman is even more melodramatic in his rewriting of history—his historical revisionism of what was going on in the UK economy—than the Chancellor. I had thought, having watched that performance, that that was impossible, but perhaps the hon. Gentleman should try out pantomime this year as Christmas approaches.
I was about to say before I was so rudely interrupted that, rather than encumber himself with the tedious technical detail in this Budget, the Chancellor decided to start behaving like the Liberal Democrat student activists we all come across at university and to take it in parts. This is part two. As a result, we have in today’s Bill what can best be described as the technical innards of a Budget; I think that the Exchequer Secretary used other words. In fact, most of the clauses, as he pointed out, are the technical innards of the last Labour Budget, which was presented in March 2010. However, it is the duty of the Opposition to scrutinise the detail of all Budgets, and we certainly intend to fulfil that obligation tonight.
Measures included in the Bill are important to the workings of the taxation system—the Minister did the House a service by going through them in great detail—but they have failed to inspire much interest or controversy in the outside world, perhaps because they have been signalled for a long time. The measures were subject to consultation under the previous Government as well as the current one when they were in development. Some might even say that they were prototype proposals, because that is the way that things tend to be done in the Treasury. That is attested to by the lack of much comment on or reaction to the proposals even among the taxation professionals who usually pore over the technical details of Finance Bills with fine-toothed combs. In respect of this Finance Bill, those professionals have been strangely unmoved—I might even say indifferent.
My hon. Friend is right on both points, but he also raises an important issue about what Keynes called “animal spirits”. It is fair to say that all the signals are that the animal spirits are somewhat more depressed now than they were a few months ago and that the things that have depressed them are the decisions that were announced in the June Budget.
Ominous noises are coming out of the recent International Monetary Fund meeting about currency wars and competitive devaluations, and they offer worrying echoes of conditions that led to the great depression in the 1930s. Dominique Strauss-Kahn was not joking or exaggerating when he warned the IMF meeting about the dangers that the huge increases in unemployment will pose for our democratic institutions. Yet none of this is referenced in the measures before us today.
I have given way to the hon. Gentleman before and I want to get on, because I know that other people wish to speak.
In many ways, we find ourselves in a kind of pre-spending review phoney war. We know that something truly awful is coming but it has not arrived yet, so we are whistling to keep up our spirits as the winter approaches and the long nights draw in. The Prime Minister himself has taken to using wartime phraseology. For some strange reason, in his conference speech he was moved to invoke the spirit of Lord Kitchener and his famous “Your country needs you” first world war Army recruitment slogan, not once but twice. Quite why he did that is beyond me, since Lord Kitchener was the general who created the world’s first concentration camps in the aftermath of the Boer war. They inflicted appalling suffering on innocent women and children in order to quell any Boer resistance. As Secretary of State for War, he supported the disastrous Dardanelles operation and was widely blamed for the shortage of shells in 1915, which, incidentally, precipitated the formation of a Tory-Liberal Government.
Of course, Kitchener has become best known for the famous Army recruitment campaign and its memorable slogan, which our Prime Minister saw fit to borrow the other day. In 1914, that plea resulted in the creation of what became known as “Kitchener’s Army”, and I suppose we should refer to the attempts to create a “big society army” to fill in the gaps that the cuts will create. Unfortunately, however, that Army was destined to go into action in the Somme, where 60,000 of them were slaughtered on the first day of the offensive. By its end, 600,000 had been lost to gain just 6 miles of territory, and overall casualties in the offensive as a whole reached an almost unbelievable 1.2 million men—