Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Monday 14th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

The Bill makes changes to the responsibilities exercised by the Treasury in fiscal policy making, establishes the interim Office for Budget Responsibility on a permanent statutory footing and modernises the governance arrangements of the National Audit Office. I wish to make it clear at the outset that we support the sensible changes to the governance of the NAO which, as the Minister pointed out, are proposed in parts 2 and 3 of the Bill. We do so not least because they were our reforms. As she was good enough to observe, we set them out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill towards the end of the previous Parliament. As someone who has served three times as a member of the Public Accounts Committee—once in opposition, once in government and once as a Treasury Minister—I am glad to see the reforms getting on to the statute book, despite the extra obstacle presented by the intervention of a general election. I also wish to thank the Minister and the Government for the open mind that they showed to Labour amendments during the passage of the Bill in the Lords. I hope that she will show a similar approach to the amendments that we will table in Committee.

The creation of the OBR seeks to apply to one narrow part of the UK’s fiscal institutions some of the autonomy that Labour brought to monetary policy when we made the Bank of England independent—of course, we took steps to make the Office for National Statistics independent too. As the House of Commons Library has pointed out, there are examples of similar bodies in other countries. Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Holland, Slovenia, Sweden and the USA all have some arrangements for independence in forecasting and analysis of the national fiscal situation.

The reform was initially sold by the Chancellor, with much fanfare, as one that would take the politics out of economic forecasting. In doing that, he gave the entirely false implication that previous Ministers had somehow been instructing hapless officials in the Treasury to produce incorrect but politically convenient forecasts. The reality is that the previous Government published a range for gross domestic product growth, and in all the years before the crash on only two occasions did growth fall below the range that the Treasury published. In the other years, the figure fell either within the range or above it, thus showing that we were exercising caution. We were not fiddling the figures. That level of accuracy is about all that any of us can expect from economic forecasting, which is a notoriously unreliable art rather than an objective science. Let me share a quote with the House:

“Economic forecasting, by its very nature, is subject to uncertainty. Our judgement is that, at this stage of the economic cycle, the outlook is even more uncertain than usual.”

That was the OBR’s comment on its forecasts in June 2010.

However, I have found evidence of one occasion when a Chancellor overruled the Government’s forecasters, and the House may be interested to hear about it. In 1996, the then Chancellor, who is now the Secretary of State for Justice, was reported to have increased the growth forecast from 2.5% to 3% in order to make way for pre-election tax cuts. The chief forecaster he overruled was, by some odd coincidence, Sir Alan Budd, the curiously short-lived first head of the interim OBR.

[Matthew Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

I am sure that the hon. Lady was not about to move on from talking about forecasts having spoken only about growth forecasts, not about the previous Government’s dreadful record on fiscal and deficit forecasts.

[Ms Eagle]

The important thing to note about forecasts, particularly those on the tax take, is that it is difficult to be accurate with them. When I served on the Treasury Committee prior to becoming a Treasury Minister, there was comment on how accurately the Treasury was able to forecast the tax take. Clearly, it is more art than science, so the House would be mistaken to believe that because something has been forecast, it is automatically an objective certainty. Those of us who deal with these issues, on both sides of the House, know that forecasting the economy can be as uncertain as forecasting the weather—Michael Fish found out how uncertain that can be one night. Forecasts are what they are; they can sometimes be wrong and sometimes they can be accurate. I honestly think that, in general—I am not making a party political point—the Treasury has a reasonably good record on forecasting.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I entirely agree with the hon. Lady on the difficulty of forecasting, as even the best economic forecasters get it wrong, but I wonder whether she was as shocked as I was to read in the Financial Times about the bullying of the International Monetary Fund by the Treasury and the Financial Services Authority. Was that not a pretty disgraceful way to behave?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are in danger of going off into past subjects. The hon. Lady may be tempted to answer, but we have to deal with the Bill before us and not with speculation in a newspaper about bullying. I think that we will stick to the Bill.

[Ms Eagle]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Let me be the first to say that the Opposition support an independent OBR, so long as it is indeed independent. In that respect, the OBR has some ground to make up and some points to prove after its very difficult start in life. Initially it was located a few doors down from the Chancellor in the Treasury and consisted entirely of Treasury civil servants. Its much vaunted “independence” was utterly compromised in June last year when it was unwisely bounced into the politically convenient early publication of employment forecasts, suspiciously just ahead of Prime Minister’s Question Time—the Minister did not refer to that incident. The forecasts themselves turned out to be controversial and the OBR ended up looking more like an offshoot of the propaganda machine inside Conservative central office than an independent and trusted forecasting organisation. Sir Alan Budd, the interim head of the OBR, announced his shock departure shortly afterwards. We may well have to wait until he writes his memoirs to find out exactly what really happened.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Ms Eagle]

I will give way in due course.

The OBR must work hard to establish a reputation for independence after that extremely shaky start, and I look forward to its new head, Robert Chote, demonstrating major improvements in that respect.

[Andrea Leadsom]

The hon. Lady may be aware from reading the Treasury Committee’s report on the original independence of the interim OBR that colleagues on her own side quizzed Sir Alan Budd and others very closely on that point. The Committee’s report makes it very clear that there was nothing to answer, that the OBR had indeed acted independently and that it had not been in hock to the Government.

[Ms Eagle]

Nevertheless, independence has to be perceived to be there too. No matter what individuals behind the scenes know, part of consistency and the whole point of such independence is that it is accepted across the political spectrum and in the country as a whole. If that is not the case, the organisation does not have the credibility that the reform creating it sought to establish. That is why I look to Robert Chote, who has moved out lock, stock and barrel from the Treasury, to begin to establish that reputation.

[Justine Greening]

It is only right that I should put on record the comments of Sir Alan Budd, in his report on the progress of the interim OBR, on the issues that the hon. Lady has raised—budget forecasts and interference. On the fact that some Treasury officials perform both roles of giving advice to the Chancellor and helping the OBR to produce the forecasts, he clearly said in paragraph 31:

“We do not believe that this involved any conflict of interest.”

In relation to how the OBR should operate and the issuing of forecasts, he said in paragraph 44:

“We are also able to state, without reservation, that there was no ministerial involvement in the forecasts at any stage.”

The hon. Lady uses Alan Budd as an example of someone who was somehow manipulated, but does she accept that his comments do not bear that out? Perhaps she would like to withdraw her comments.

[Ms Eagle]

This concerns those who allowed the bringing forward of estimates of job losses caused by the Government’s decisions on fiscal consolidation, which happened to be published just ahead of a Prime Minister’s Question Time at which that was to be a point at issue. Clearly, the relevant people should have realised the effect that that coincidence would have on the OBR’s reputation for independence when it had only just been set up.

On the Minister’s point about whether the OBR should use Treasury forecasters, Lars Calmfors, the chair of the Swedish fiscal policy council, has contrasted the arrangements in the Bill with those in Sweden. He said that it is very difficult when the OBR is working very closely with Treasury civil servants and other forecasters:

“one cannot have it both ways—the OBR cannot be both an independent watchdog and an in-house provider of input into the Treasury’s work.”

We shall certainly want to explore in greater depth in Committee that aspect of the arrangements for our OBR, which differs from the Swedish arrangements.

In addition to concerns about independence, we want to raise in Committee issues of the OBR’s accountability to Parliament. We wish to explore how independent the OBR will really be, given that close co-operation with the Treasury will be needed to access the information to generate the forecast in the first place. There is also the issue of its budget—I accept the comments that the Minister made about the transparent five-year budgeting process, but there are examples of similar bodies in other countries having had their budget cut as a result of displeasing the Government with whom they were working. The governance arrangements will need further scrutiny, as will issues of accountability, not just in relation to the Treasury Committee veto on appointments, but regarding the OBR’s accountability to Parliament.

Although the Bill is about who makes forecasts, the reality is that independent forecasting is no substitute for sound Budget judgements. The Government will not be judged on the accuracy of their forecasts, but they will be held to account for the consequences of the choices they have made in the circumstances they were confronted with and the forecast that the OBR had given them. Our dispute is with the Government’s plans and choices, not with the independence of their forecasting machinery.

When we left office, unemployment was falling, growth was forecast to be 2.3% this year, inflation was lower than it is now and was falling and, according to the OBR, borrowing had come in at £20 billion lower than had been forecast in 2009. When the previous Government delivered their last Budget in March 2010, UK growth was faster than in Germany, Italy and the eurozone as a whole, but the current Chancellor has chosen to prioritise rapid deficit reduction over any other policy goal and he has slammed the brakes on growth. Without an electoral mandate, the Government have chosen to launch a risky experiment with our economy and our prosperity.

[Justine Greening]

I completely disagree with much of what the hon. Lady says, not least given that her Government left unemployment 400,000 higher. She mentions electoral mandate, but surely she does not think that the previous Prime Minister had one, because he was never voted in as Prime Minister.

[Ms Eagle]

We do not have a presidential system: we have a prime ministerial system and the leader of the governing party tends to be asked by Her Majesty the Queen to form the Government. That is what has always happened, and if the Minister wishes to change that, perhaps we need to take an even wider look at our constitutional arrangements than that planned by the Deputy Prime Minister.

[Mr Mark Field]

Although the hon. Lady makes a fair point about explicit mandates, it is surely also the case that there was absolutely no explicit mandate for any of the actions taken by the erstwhile Government after 2008, given the situation that we found ourselves in.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are getting tempted once again. If Members stick to the Bill, that will be helpful.

[Ms Eagle]

There is a difference between having an economic policy that is put into place directly after a general election, when manifestos said one thing and the Government did another, and responding to a crisis that very few people saw coming and that threatened the entire infrastructure of the global banking system. There are obviously differences between those situations, but I respect the hon. Gentleman’s expertise in financial matters, particularly regarding the City.

The Government have chosen to cut public expenditure faster and deeper than any other country in the industrialised world except Iceland and Ireland. They have chosen to announce the deepest cuts in public spending in the UK since the second world war. Nine months into the life of this Government there is still no sign of any plan for jobs and growth, but sensible people know that without a plan for jobs and growth it will not be possible to get the deficit down as the OBR predicts it should come down. Meanwhile, the cuts are beginning to bite and the OBR has forecast that more than 330,000 public sector jobs will be lost. Some 10,000 police jobs have been announced as going so far, and there are reports that 250 Sure Start centres will close. Unemployment, which had begun to fall, is now rising again and inflation, which was low and falling when we left office, is now rising. All that is before the effects of the Government’s ill-advised decision to increase VAT. Growth has stalled.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. Hon. Members have been tempting us away from the Bill, but I am sure that the hon. Lady wants to stick to it. We do not want to be tempted through further interventions, so if she will keep to the Bill, that will be helpful.

[Ms Eagle]

The important issue is how the independent forecasts interact with what happens in the economy and how that can change and be affected by the Government’s economic decisions.

[Matthew Hancock]

I enjoy debating with the hon. Lady, so I am extremely grateful to her for giving way. She has just prayed in aid the OBR, saying that it had forecast that the deficit would fall, but she has also said that under the Government’s plan the deficit will not fall. The OBR’s forecast is based on the Government’s plan, so does she agree with herself or not?

[Ms Eagle]

This is how we can get into difficulty with forecasts, which are static when they are made but apply to a dynamic situation. The hon. Gentleman knows, for example, that our debates in the House are, in part, about the effects on growth of a drastic fiscal consolidation. Our contention has always been that cutting too far too fast will suppress growth to such an extent that the deficit reductions that were hoped for will not come about. That is an essential part of the economic debate that, as far as I can see, we have been having since the Budget in June last year.

Forecasts can be affected by subsequent events and by Government policies. That demonstrates that what matters most is not forecasting for its own sake, but the judgment of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government, and the extreme fiscal choices that they have made.

[Alison McGovern (Wirral South) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that we have another independent forecaster, the Bank of England, which was made independent in 1997? What lessons from the interaction between the Treasury and that independent forecaster ought to be applied to the relationship between the Treasury and the OBR?

[Ms Eagle]

In order to fulfil its duties, the Bank of England produces its own forecasts, which do not always agree with what were previously Treasury forecasts and will now be OBR forecasts. There are also a number of independent forecasters out there with their own view of the situation. Forecasts range from optimistic to pessimistic, and those of us who watch these things learn to take account of that. Regarding OBR forecasts or forecasts of the Bank of England as statements of the unvarnished truth will quickly get us into difficulty.

[Andrea Leadsom]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way again. On a point of clarification, the issue of multiple forecasts came up in the Treasury Committee review, and it was made clear that the OBR takes the Bank of England’s monetary forecasts on interest rates and uses them as its own for its fiscal forecast, so there is no duplication or overlap. One is forecasting the state of interest rates and the other is stating the fiscal forecast.

[Ms Eagle]

Yes, but the Bank of England will also forecast for its own use growth and other aspects which it needs to assess in formulating monetary policy.

OBR forecasts predict that by the end of this Parliament, 110,000 more people will be on the dole under the Government’s plans, compared with our previous plans. Under Labour, the economy was forecast to grow by 2.6%, compared with only 2.1% under the current Government’s plans. The consumer prices index would have been at 1.6%, rather than 2.8%. So the OBR has decided that there would have been higher growth, more jobs and lower inflation under Labour.

[Justine Greening]

May I ask the hon. Lady a straightforward question? The Office for Budget Responsibility assesses that we have a greater than 50% likelihood of hitting our fiscal mandate, which is to eliminate the structural deficit by 2014-15 and achieve our broader fiscal mandate on debt ratio. Does she welcome that or not?

[Ms Eagle]

It is important to see what the forecasts are and what they mean at this stage of economic recovery. Of course I want to see the economy recover and grow, unemployment coming down and inflation being controlled. Unfortunately, that is not what the signs that we have been picking up since the Government’s decision to cut so deep and so fast tell us about the real economy. We will see as time goes on how the OBR adjusts its forecasts to take account of the monthly and quarterly statistics from the Office for National Statistics.

The shock GDP figures before Christmas strongly imply that the Chancellor will suffer the embarrassment of his growth forecasts being downgraded by the OBR in his self-proclaimed Budget for growth, which is due to be unveiled next month. We will wait and see.

We on the Labour Benches support a genuinely independent OBR but, as I said, we will explore in Committee the practical extent of that independence and suggest amendments to the Bill to shore it up a little more. We will need to explore the viability of the arrangements to produce, rather than comment on, the fiscal forecasts, as many other fiscal councils do. We will need to explore the extent of the OBR’s remit and whether the close co-operation with civil servants required to produce the forecast will lead to behind-the-scenes negotiations that will compromise at least the perception of independence.

Let us be under no illusion that the existence of the OBR, which we support in principle, can in any way protect us from the misjudgments of the present Chancellor or any other. The OBR must assume, as the Minister said, that the Government’s plans are a given. It cannot comment on the fiscal mandate or on wider fiscal policy in general. It is prevented from doing so. All it can do is calculate the probability of the Government being able to achieve their stated plans. The OBR therefore cannot protect the country from the mistakes that the Chancellor makes, or from the mistakes that he has made already. It is no panacea and it should not be regarded as one. Our dispute—

[Sajid Javid]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Ms Eagle]

No, because I am about to finish. Our dispute is with the Government’s plans, not with the OBR’s forecasting. We look forward to closer examination of the Bill in Committee. We will subject it to detailed scrutiny.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Field]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely good point. In the one case in which the hon. Member for Wallasey (Ms Eagle) tried to argue that there had somehow been untoward behaviour by the last Conservative Government, events have proven, if anything, that they surpassed what had been expected.

[Ms Angela Eagle]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Field]

I fear that we are going to go over old ground, but let us do it.

[Ms Eagle]

Having conceded that point, the hon. Gentleman now seems to be saying that the best solution is to have the Chancellor make the forecasts personally, which does not seem to be the point of the Bill.

[Mr Field]

As I recall it, the point was conceded by Opposition Members, not by those on this side.

The relevance of all this to our current economic woes should not be underestimated. With global investors buying into the fiscal assurances made by the erstwhile Government, the rosy forecasts played their part in making it easy for Britain to borrow money during the past decade, and borrow we did, even in the good times. We all now know the disastrous consequences that came to pass.

This salutary experience provided the genesis of the idea for an office for budget responsibility. I must confess that when the Chancellor first mooted the idea in late 2008, when shadow Chancellor, I was sceptical and thought that it sounded like the ideal proposition to be made in opposition and then quietly forgotten. I believe that it is to his great credit that the notion saw the light of day so soon after my party reached government.

My other fear was that it might be an overly inflexible straitjacket to constrain freedom of manoeuvre. Again, the Chancellor has addressed this point up front, as has the Economic Secretary. The Chancellor desires and even relishes such a restriction on himself—and, I suspect, on his successors. Although it might not prove to be quite as revolutionary as the Treasury would have us believe, I accept that it is still an important step towards transparency and accountability in forecasting budgetary numbers.

My only reservations are relatively small and relate to issues of practice, rather than of principle. I fear that the real strains and potential limitations of any office for budget responsibility will unfortunately come at the point in the economic cycle when we most need prescient and instinctive judgment. At such times of crisis or near crisis in any economic phase, we require a robust willingness to stand up against the conventional wisdom of the day.

In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, for example, no forecasting organisation saw the crash coming. No one in this House, not even the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, despite all that is now said on his behalf, really foresaw precisely what would happen. That includes all the independent bodies, such as the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Let us wonder how the OBR, had it been established, might have acted only three or four years ago. Had it not shared the outlook of other forecasters, would it have had the mettle or the strength in 2007 to tell the previous Government that they were living far beyond their means? How would it have been viewed if it alone had advised the Government at that stage to hold back on their spending plans or, indeed, increase the tax burden? I believe that the true test of its effectiveness will come only when it is required to deliver such unpalatable news in future.

Similarly, what if the OBR had concurred with the forecasts of other organisations at the time but a more responsible Chancellor had been in place who instinctively viewed the economically clement weather as only a mirage? Might the perceived infallibility of an OBR forecast have restricted his or her ability to take measures that went against the common wisdom? To that extent, I have some sympathy with what has been said by those on both Front Benches, because we do not know how forecasts will pan out. Even as recently as the emergency Budget on 20 June 2010, many predictions for growth; and certainly for unemployment were made at the time that even I thought were slightly too optimistic. The OBR’s notion was that unemployment would reach a peak during the current tax year. We hope that that will be the case, but that will not be down just to Government policy, by any stretch of the imagination. I think that the way the economic cycle has worked out globally means that unemployment is likely to be somewhat higher during 2011-12 and perhaps even higher still the following year.

I believe that there are some unavoidable conflicts in the OBR’s operation. Organisational independence is absolutely vital to its working and credibility, as the Economic Secretary noted in her contribution. However, it must necessarily rely on a close relationship with the Treasury in order to understand its methods and have access to its data. Members have already mentioned the blurring of those boundaries between the Treasury and its new independent conscience that led to the first hiccup last summer—the argument that spilled over from the release of the OBR’s unemployment forecast, which happened to bolster the Prime Minister’s argument when he was under fire later that day at Prime Minister’s questions.

One must accept that there will almost inevitably be an ongoing tension and an inherent potential for a conflict of interest, but I hope that that has been eased now that the OBR has been able to move out of its Treasury offices and acquire an important physical independence. Without the trust that stems from such autonomy, the OBR is absolutely nothing. Nevertheless, there is also a danger that it will be seen as perhaps too credible and as a panacea in its own right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)]

This has been an interesting, if somewhat truncated debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) is probably right that the relatively few number of people in the Chamber and the fact that the debate will finish a couple of hours early is not evidence of a lack of interest in the subject under discussion, but proof that romantic hearts beat beneath our tough and cynical exteriors. [Interruption.] I mean some of our tough and cynical exteriors.

We support much that is in the Bill, but I will turn first to the contributions of hon. Members. My hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern) said that the establishment of the Office for Budget Responsibility was an attempt to separate politics from economics. I suspect that that will be difficult to achieve, but as she said, it is important that we at least try. She also talked about rules-based economic policies, how they were introduced under the previous Government, and how the establishment of the OBR entrenches that approach. She also spoke at the end of her speech about something that I know is a great passion of hers: the problem of youth unemployment and what we can do to tackle it. I am sure that she will return to it on many other occasions in the Chamber.

As ever, my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) made an excellent speech and talked about how it is important that, when discussing such issues that are technical and very much about structures, we focus not just on the numbers, but on the outcomes that we want to achieve. This is not just a dry discussion about the fiscal mandate and the mechanisms that we put in place to monitor it or to forecast the future trajectory of Government economic policy; it is about the underlying policies brought in to achieve that mandate. She spoke passionately about intergenerational fairness and the importance of considering how we can better model imputed behaviour, and she suggested that departmental evidence was very thin on behavioural change and that the OBR might have a role in fleshing that out. That was a valid point.

My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East talked about how the OBR, if it does not totally instil caution in the actions of Ministers, will at least act as a brake on Governments’ over-optimism and the wishful thinking that leads them to think that things are rosy, or will be rosier than the evidence suggests. She made the point that we cannot divorce the question of reducing the deficit from the question of how we go about doing it and the policies we implement to achieve that end. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Bain) warned of the dangers of complacency, and of thinking that the recovery is secure, that we are out of recession and that the country is out of the danger zone. He also talked about the fiscal mandate for eliminating the deficit and warned of the dangers of pursuing that in too rapid a fashion.

The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr Field) has had to leave to go to a black-tie event. I suspect that he has rather more black-tie events than most of us in the House. The sorts of events I attend usually involve the St George Labour club and beer at 99p a pint. However, he obviously leads a more exalted existence than many of us. Both he and the hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke) were fairly political—dare I say it—in their comments. They made references to the previous Government living beyond their means. The hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell denied that the banks were responsible for the recession and again mentioned the country living beyond its means. At this time of night, and perhaps with better things to do, we do not want to rehearse those arguments. However, it is important that rather than trying to score political points, we look at the details of the Bill and the seriousness of what it is trying to achieve in introducing a more evidence-based approach to economic forecasting.

The hon. Member for Macclesfield (David Rutley) made a very good and thoughtful speech. He quoted J. K. Galbraith, which I suspect my hon. Friend the Member for—

[Ms Angela Eagle]

Wallasey.

[Kerry McCarthy]

I knew it began with a W. Anyway, she is probably very familiar with this quote:

“The only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable.”

The hon. Member for Macclesfield said that he was not a great fan of J. K. Galbraith. I happen to be a great fan, although I had not heard that quote before. His “A Short History of Financial Euphoria” ought to be required reading for anyone who takes up a job in the City these days. The hon. Gentleman resisted the temptation to resort to political point scoring. His point that the OBR can in time become a respected and trusted reference point is valid—I certainly hope it will be achieved.

What the hon. Member for Macclesfield said about greater powers being given to the Treasury Committee was interesting. I was a member of the Committee for a couple of years when first elected to Parliament in 2005, and I remember spending many sittings seeking assurances from the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England about regulation, the risks that derivatives trading imposed, and so on. I remember receiving blithe assurances that it was difficult for Committee members— with their limited resources—to challenge on an ongoing basis. If increased powers are given to the Treasury Committee to vet appointments, to scrutinise the work of the OBR, particularly its funding, and to ensure that it has the necessary resources to do its job, thought needs to be given to whether the Committee has the resources necessary to do that job.

The hon. Member for Bristol West (Stephen Williams) slightly lost me at the beginning with his talk about Disraeli and fridge magnets, but then moved on to talk about Bank of England independence, which he claimed was a Liberal Democrat manifesto—