Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting : House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

9: Clause 25, page 17, line 26, at end insert—
“( ) If the trustees receive an application under section 95 relating to money purchase benefits that are collective money purchase benefits, the trustees must check that the member or survivor has received appropriate independent advice before—(a) converting any of the benefits into different benefits that are flexible benefits under the scheme;(b) making a transfer payment in respect of any of the benefits with a view to acquiring a right or entitlement to flexible benefits for the member or survivor under another pension scheme;(c) paying a lump sum that would be an uncrystallised funds pension lump sum in respect of any of the benefits.( ) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) what the trustees or managers must do to check that a member or survivor has received appropriate independent advice for the purposes of this section, and(b) when the check must be carried out.”

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 9, which is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Altmann, seeks to give protection to beneficiaries of CDCs who want to transfer out. Basically, it extends the protection that already exists in statute for DB beneficiaries to beneficiaries of CDCs, which we are discussing this afternoon.

As the law stands, that protection does not apply to the beneficiaries of the schemes we are talking about, so I have done a cut-and-paste job, lifting a chunk of legislation and applying it to CDCs. I welcome the steps the Government are already taking to stop people being misled into giving up rights under pension schemes—they have banned cold calling for example—but there are still too many abuses out there and there is a risk of people being approached and encouraged to forgo the benefits they have accrued under a CDC scheme for something that may not be worth quite so much.

I found the meetings that the Minister held with officials and Members of your Lordships’ House enormously helpful. This issue was raised. If I remember correctly, two arguments were given for not doing what I propose now. One was that it will take time to build up a transfer value of £30,000, which is the trigger level at which you have to get independent financial advice. In other words, people who are subscribing to these schemes would not be able to build up £30,000-worth of assets very quickly so there would be time to introduce a scheme. The other argument was that we are talking about a new type of scheme and therefore independent financial advisers may need time to develop the relevant portfolio of skills to give relevant advice to those who are thinking of transferring.

I do not find either of those arguments convincing, particularly as it would be possible for people to transfer into, for example, the Royal Mail scheme. Like other noble Lords, I got a letter from Royal Mail:

“Dear Lord Young … If you have any questions or would like to discuss the issues raised during the debate at Second Reading, please do not hesitate to contact me.”


I contacted Royal Mail and asked whether it is envisaged that those who join Royal Mail after the scheme has started and have a pension pot from their earlier employment will be able to buy into the CDC scheme. The answer—it is now “Dear George” rather than “Dear Lord Young” as the relationship warms—was:

“In answer to your question, yes, the rules of our CDC scheme will allow members to transfer in (“buy in”) and provide themselves with additional benefits under the two parts of the scheme, (a CDC pension and a defined benefit lump sum on retirement).”


So it could be the case that quite soon after the Bill becomes an Act and Royal Mail goes ahead somebody who joins Royal Mail and after a few months or a year decides to transfer out may have a pot worth more than £30,000, but at the moment they will not have to seek any independent financial advice before taking that decision, putting them in a different category from other beneficiaries.

The other argument was that this is a different product and therefore different skills will be needed to give advice to a beneficiary about whether it is worthwhile transferring out. It is a different product, but I wonder whether it is so different that IFAs will not be able to give independent advice to an individual looking on the one hand at the advantages of remaining within a particular CDC scheme and on the other hand at the possible advantages of transferring out. Given that CDC schemes exist in other countries and that there has been a debate about CDCs for some time in this country, I would have thought it perfectly possible to require people to take that advice.

I was reading the briefing from the RSA, which drew my attention to the fact that:

“There is a provision in the Bill to allow the Regulator to temporarily ‘pause’ the transfer option, which mitigates the risk of large-scale transfers out of the system due to misinformation.”


There is indeed a provision in the Bill. It is tucked away in Clause 44 under a pause order. It seems very cumbersome. This clause enables the Pensions Regulator to pause certain activities once a collective money purchase scheme has experienced a triggering event, and one of the things that a pause order can then do is stop a scheme making transfers out of the scheme. I am not sure that is what we want. It involves the Pensions Regulator and is essentially reactive, whereas we need something proactive, which happens automatically and in advance. I did not find that provision in Clause 44 an adequate response to a problem that may affect just one or two individuals in a CDC scheme, and will therefore not engage the attention of the Pensions Regulator, because there is nothing systemically wrong with the way the CDC scheme is being run.

There is an issue here. It may arise slightly more quickly than was originally envisaged. The solution I have may not be perfect, but it is a little better than the pause order, the triggering events and the provision in Clause 44. I beg to move.

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[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, we are inching towards the solution that I was after. I think I heard my noble friend say that she did not rule out legislation in due course, once the necessary skills had been acquired.

I would like to pick up one or two points. At one point, I think my noble friend said it might not be cost effective to have advice for smaller amounts. The amount that I envisaged was exactly the same amount that is already required to get independent financial advice for a defined-benefit scheme, so if it is cost effective for a defined-benefit scheme beneficiary to get advice for an amount over £30,000 then I would argue that it is the same for someone with collective contributions.

I heard what my noble friend said about safeguarding the interests of other scheme members but that is not actually the point I was making. I understand that the trustees will want to look at the impact on other scheme members if a large number withdraw, but that is not quite the same as making sure that those who withdraw have had access to the right advice. I think she also drew a distinction between benefits that are safeguarded because they are defined benefits and benefits under this scheme, which are not safeguarded. Legally she is of course perfectly correct, but in effect one hopes that there will not be that much difference between the level of benefits that you get from the scheme that we are discussing and the level that you get from a DB scheme.

I look forward to the regulations that my noble friend referred to. I was reassured by what my noble friends Lord Eccles and Lady Altmann said about the role of trustees. At the moment, under Clause 25(2), all they can do is hold things up for three weeks. However, if trustees take the advice of my noble friend Lord Eccles and take steps to ensure that people have taken the necessary advice before they transfer out, that is the way to go. As I said, I am grateful to my noble friend for her response. We are moving in the right direction and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Tuesday 28th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to make a brief contribution to this Second Reading debate and, like others, I welcome the provisions in the Bill. I wish my noble friend well in piloting it through your Lordships’ House and commend her and her department for the briefing with which they have provided us.

It may be my noble friend’s first pensions Bill but I hope she will not mind if I tell her that I first spoke on a pensions Bill on 18 March 1975. The Bill was Barbara Castle’s Social Security Pensions Bill and the Opposition spokesmen were the now noble Lord, Lord Fowler, and Mr Kenneth Clarke. I must have been the Whip on the Bill, and reading my Second Reading speech, I was clearly a pretty obnoxious young man, haranguing Barbara Castle as follows:

“As a generation we have the collective effrontery to insist that our children make sacrifices on our behalf, on a scale that we are not prepared to make on behalf of the elderly today.”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/1975; col. 1538.]


I went on:

“If the benefits which she has promised are forthcoming, it is not she whom we ought to thank but the future generations, as yet unborn, who have been committed by her to a level of contributions that we are not prepared to pay ourselves.”


My parting shot at Barbara Castle was:

“I leave the Minister with this thought. How sad it would be if, in order to meet the contributions that future generations will have to make, the retirement age had to be raised to generate the necessary income.”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/1975; col. 1540.]


That was an accurate prediction of what has in fact happened.

Forty-four years later, and a beneficiary of that Bill, I want to focus my remarks on Part 4, dealing with the pensions dashboard. Like other noble Lords, I welcome putting this on a statutory footing and placing a requirement for pension schemes to provide information for the dashboard. Most people make inadequate provision for their old age, despite the success of auto-enrolment, and this is particularly true of young people. The excellent briefing by Which? for this debate showed that half of those over 50 and still in employment are not sure of the value of their pension savings, one-third find it difficult to keep track of their pension pots and one-fifth have never checked. The dashboard will bring home to people at the flick of a mouse what their entitlement will be and perhaps cause them to think seriously about whether that will suffice. Perhaps the dashboard might have some options indicating what that individual’s contributions would need to be if they wanted to retire on today’s salary.

I have a few queries, which my noble friend might like to address in a letter if that is more convenient. Over the weekend, I logged on to the Pensions Dashboard Prototype Project, which I found informative, but right at the end it said:

“The industry and government hope to have Pensions Dashboard services ready by 2019.”


That sounds as if folk will already be able to access the service, but they cannot.

Reading the response to the consultation document, we are told:

“Once the supporting infrastructure and consumer protections are in place, and data standards and security are assured, most pension schemes should be ready to provide consumer’s information to them within three to four years.”


Even that rather long timescale is qualified by the words “most” and “should”. This project has been on the stocks for some time, and I wonder whether we really have to wait that long for this. If we do, perhaps somebody might amend the wording on the website as it is seriously misleading.

My second query is about the identity service referred to in Clause 119(3). The government response says:

“Before the pension search can take place, the identity service will authenticate the user to an accepted standard.”


The Explanatory Notes state:

“For example, the regulations may provide that ID verification must be completed before any information is provided”.


As I understand it, that means one has to register with a service such as Verify in order to get the digital key that unlocks access to this new service.

Last year, the NAO issued a very critical report on Verify:

“GDS reported a verification success rate of 48% at the beginning of February 2019, against a 2015 projection of 90%.”


GDS is the Government Digital Service. I tried to access Verify and was rejected by two before I succeeded with the third of the six private sector authenticators. Government support for Verify ends this March, with the hope that the private sector will take over. Is my noble friend satisfied that those who want to access the dashboard will not be deterred by the at times cumbersome and unreliable identity services?

My third query is about the many pension schemes where the widow, widower or partner has benefits when the principal beneficiary dies. Will those “secondary” beneficiaries be able to access their entitlement under the principal’s scheme both before and after the principal has died? If the objective is to give people a good idea of what their pension will be and whether they need to make additional provision, that information is essential if they are to get a complete picture. There may be data protection issues, but I think that this issue needs addressing and I hope that my noble friend will be able to say something about it.

It is not clear—this point was raised by my noble friend Lady Altmann—whether the information will include charges and income projection figures. To be meaningful, both should be included. Presumably, schemes will not be able to make their own heroic assumptions about projections. Can the Minister confirm that there will be a standardised methodology for projections?

Next, equity release is becoming an increasingly important component of retirement planning. A person’s equity might be worth far more than their pension pot and be capable of providing an income stream in retirement. I do not want to suggest anything that might slow down the rollout of the dashboard, but is it being configured in such a way that it will be possible downstream to incorporate the savings locked up in equity as well as the savings locked up in the pension pot, together with potential income streams?

My final query relates to the use of “pensions dashboards” in the plural—a point raised by other noble Lords. If I were mischievous, I would table an amendment to delete “dashboards” and insert “dashboard” in the singular in Clause 118. I assume, incidentally, that there will be no charge for access to any dashboard, and perhaps that might be made explicit in the Bill.

As a Conservative, I am in favour of competition and choice, but I asked myself why we need more than one dashboard, particularly as under Clause 122 the Money and Pensions Service will be obliged to provide one itself. Of course, the same information will be available to all dashboards, and designing and setting one up will involve providers in considerable expense, with no revenue. The excellent Library briefing refers to the industry’s concern about the costs of establishing a dashboard.

I see a parallel with the directory enquiry service. That was abolished in 2003 and replaced with a bewildering array of no less than 20 118 schemes. I am not convinced that competition and plurality has always been a worthwhile innovation. Any mischief on my part might be avoided if any dashboard had to be regulated by the FCA—as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake—to make sure that it was compliant.

As a postscript, can my noble friend shed some light on the recent support of the Pensions Minister for a new pensions commission, as suggested by the Fabian Society and Bright Blue?

Having said all that, I welcome the Bill and hope that it might reach the statute book before too long.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 31st October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, in the 19th century there were great battles over trying to insist that people properly labelled their products so that the public could make informed choices. I am afraid that our predecessors would put forward arguments that this was interference in one way or another, the time was not ripe and there was no suitable Bill. A series of reasons of that kind were given. When today we talk about physical things like tins of milk or packets of biscuits, we think it perfectly right that there is a framework of regulation which ensures that people are neither misled nor charged for things that are not what they claim to be. The difficulty is that, the moment we move into anything to do with financial matters, we find it hard to apply the same lessons we learnt to apply in the 19th century.

The reason why I beg my noble friend to take these points seriously is that the people now involved form a much larger group than had once been the case. In the past, this was the kind of issue which might have affected only people of substance, but the amendments brought forward by my noble friend would have a real effect on all those for whom this is a serious matter. I do not mean just those who are misled, but all the others who have to pay insurance premiums that have gone up because of those who were misled.

My noble friend knows how disappointed I was that she did not accept what I think was a reasonable amendment to insist that the cold calling which goes on in many of these areas should be made illegal. I know that she is hoping to find a way in which we might come back to the issue, and I hope she will, because the real truth is that these are popular measures. That is why I find it so difficult to understand why there is any pushback at all. It may be that the amendments are not quite right. Perhaps my noble friend Lord Hunt, brilliant though he is and being a lawyer of outstanding ability, has not quite got them right. However, the tenor or burden of the amendments is clearly right. It is important to put in place the Meccano which, although it may be a little out of date—my grandchildren are great putters-together of things, but they have moved on from Meccano—is an image that those of us of a certain age can recognise very clearly.

We should have in this Bill the ability to deal with these infringements of people’s decent rights, and above all, to deal with things that make people lie. The most unhappy aspect of the failure of this Bill to make these protections much more widespread is that they would guard against activities which, in the end, lead people to lie. We have accepted that on whiplash, but we know that the activities will move on. My noble friend has rightly said that we need to put in place something that can be used to stop yet another move by these unscrupulous people. This House has a duty to stop them because of the people who suffer. They are not only those who are led astray; they are the entire public who see prices increasing. There are going to be a lot of price increases because of the Government’s action on Brexit, so let us at least do something about the things that we can actually affect.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, the co-pilot is back in charge. Amendments 39A and 39B, moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, seek to include the arrangement of credit hire agreements and the commissioning of medical reports within the scope of claims management regulation. I am grateful to him for the powerful advocacy he put into moving his amendments and for the support he has received from the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, who underwrote—that may be the right expression to use—the amendment with a nostalgic reference to Meccano. I am also grateful to my noble friends Lord Flight and Lord Deben for their support. We will be coming to an amendment on cold calling in due course.

As I explained in Committee, I understand and sympathise with my noble friend’s concerns, and I can see how these issues link with claims management activity. However, I would maintain that credit hire organisations and medical reporting organisations are not claims management companies as such, and therefore it does not automatically follow that they should be regulated in the same way as claims management companies or, indeed, by the same regulator. When the independent review of claims management regulation reported and recommended the transfer of claims management regulation to the FCA, it did not consider an extension of scope to the credit hire and medical reporting organisations which we are debating at the moment.

However, I want to be clear with noble Lords that the Government understand how important these issues are. That is why we are considering what more can be done on credit hire. We have identified this as an area of concern and we have specifically sought the views of stakeholders in the call for evidence in the section of the whiplash reform consultation that closed in January this year. I can assure my noble friend that the Government are actively continuing to work on these issues, and as a result of this debate I will certainly speak to my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and ask that his department prioritise and publish the second part of its consultation response, which will set out the Government’s position on the issue raised in our debate today.

Similarly, and as I set out in Committee, good-quality medical evidence is central to the Government’s whiplash reform programme. MedCo is working well and is providing both the Government and the relevant regulators with invaluable data on a number of important areas. However, medical reporting is much wider than just the provision of whiplash reports. Reports can be sought from and provided directly by individual specialists as well as by medical reporting organisations, and any regulation of this sector would need to be applied fairly to all those involved in it, not just to one component.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, for moving the amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I ask the Minister whether we have considered the issue, supported by a number of consumer groups, that I raised in Committee requiring a company that has been found to need to pay out on a claim to pay the claims management fee, rather than taking it out of the compensation. That should perhaps be more acceptable with a cap, but also more effective for those who receive compensation, as well as encouraging companies that have mis-sold something or perpetrated harm to the consumer to voluntarily contact consumers who have been harmed, rather than waiting for a claims management firm to do so on their behalf, thus saving them the extra cost of the claims management fee.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, for moving the amendment in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. We are sorry that she had to leave for family reasons. I again pay tribute to the work she has put into this amendment. She has pursued it with diligence.

The amendment seeks to put in place a fee cap from two months after Royal Assent until the FCA implements its own cap. We debated this in Committee. I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to this debate for highlighting it again.

Clause 17 already makes great strides to secure fair and proportionate prices for consumers by giving the FCA a duty to cap fees charged for financial services claims. However, as a number of noble Lords pointed out in Committee, the implementation of a new regulatory regime and an effective, robust cap will necessarily take some time, during which consumers could continue to be charged disproportionate fees. In that debate, noble Lords expressed concerns that the FCA’s PPI claims deadline may have passed by the time its fee cap is in place. That point was made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. We already know that 90% of financial services claims relate to PPI and therefore we want to ensure that consumers are protected against excessive fees for PPI claims as soon as possible. That is why, as the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, anticipated with commendable foresight, the Government intend to table an amendment at Third Reading to introduce an interim fee cap in respect of PPI claims management services.

The amendment will set a fee cap at 20%, excluding VAT, of the claim value and will be enforced by relevant regulators on commencement two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent. The Claims Management Regulation Unit consulted on a 15% cap. The data that it collected on the costs to CMCs of processing claims and market analysis of profit margins resulted in proposals to introduce a 20% excluding VAT cap on claims management services. The amendment supports the Government’s aim of ensuring that the claims management sector works in the interests of consumers by protecting them from excessive fees.

The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, would go some way towards ensuring that consumers are protected during this interim period. However, the government amendment will go further in two key areas. First, it will have a wider application than the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness. The interim fee cap will apply to both CMCs and legal services providers that carry out claims management services in relation to PPI claims, to be enforced by the relevant regulators.

Secondly, it will include in primary legislation a prohibition against charging more than 20% of the claim value for PPI claims, which will enable the regulators to implement the cap quickly. As I said a moment ago, this level was reached using the helpful and comprehensive responses to the Ministry of Justice’s consultation on proposals to introduce a fee-capping regime for CMCs handling financial services claims.

On the procedure for claiming any excesses imposed over the cap, anyone in breach of the interim fee cap will be subject to regulatory enforcement, which could include fines. Furthermore, a contract to receive or pay a sum in excess of the fee cap would be unenforceable, thereby ensuring that firms cannot profit from their malpractice and that consumers are entitled to recover excessive fees.

My noble friend Lady Altmann raised a question about compensation. As we will revert to this issue at Third Reading, perhaps we could deal with it then.

I make it clear that the interim cap is intended to be a temporary measure and, as such, will apply only until the FCA has implemented its new rules under Clause 17. It will also apply only to PPI claims, whereas the FCA’s cap will apply to all claims relating to financial products and services. We remain of the view that the FCA, as the incoming regulator, will be well placed to develop its own cap, or caps, based on an assessment of the market. Given the Government’s undertaking to table an amendment on this matter at Third Reading, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope]

My Lords, I am very happy with that undertaking. I hope that the dialogue can continue and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Holmes on persisting with the amendment. I support the need to make sure that regulated firms have this duty of care, especially in circumstances such as the diagnosis of cancer and other illnesses, from which people can recover but for which they need particular care during that period. While the Bill is going through the House, it would be excellent for the market if we were able to introduce measures of this nature, but I also look forward to hearing from my noble friend and seeing the Government’s response before Third Reading.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes for moving the amendment. He mentioned that he was a member of my flock. He displays exactly the right independence of thought tempered by loyalty to the party that any Whip could wish for. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and my noble friend Lady Altmann for speaking to the amendment, which seeks to ensure that the FCA adheres to a set of regulatory principles in relation to acting in the best interest of consumers and managing conflicts of interest fairly. Noble Lords also raised the broader issue of duty of care, which is not mentioned specifically in the amendment but is obviously relevant. As noble Lords may remember, my noble friend tabled a similar amendment in Committee.

Aside from the provisions in general consumer law, the FCA already applies rules on firms conducting regulated activities in relation to their dealings with consumers. First, the FCA’s rules set out in Principles for Businesses require firms to conduct their business,

“with due skill, care and diligence”,

and to,

“pay due regard to the interests of … customers and treat them fairly”.

Principle 8 sets out:

“A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client”.


That accurately mirrors proposed new subsection 1(b) in the amendment, so there is a congruity of objective there.

Secondly, the rules on clients’ best interests require a firm to act in its client’s best interests across most regulated activities. The client’s best interests rule states:

“A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client”.


Again, those are exactly the words used in my noble friend’s amendment, so there is no disagreement over objective.

Thirdly and finally, a number of FCA rules contain an obligation on firms to take “reasonable care” for certain activities. For example, one of the Insurance: Conduct of Business rules states:

“A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment”.


Those rules in the FCA Handbook are supplemented by more specific rules in various FCA sourcebooks. The FCA will be able to apply its existing Principles for Businesses, which I have just quoted, to claims management companies and to make any other sector-specific rules that may be necessary, under its existing objectives. The FCA supervises against these rules and other provisions and, where necessary, can take enforcement action against firms to secure appropriate consumer protection.

The FCA is of the view that its current regulatory toolkit is sufficient to enable it to fulfil its consumer protection objective. The FCA will consider the precise rules that apply to claims management services and how they fit together as an overall regime. In doing this, the FCA will take into account its statutory operational objectives, including its objective of securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers. It will also consult publicly on its proposed rules.

Turning to the broader issue of duty of care, the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked whether there were any pearls. I think the oyster is still at work so the pearls are not available for display this evening. The words “duty of care” mean different things to different people and the precise scope and content of any proposed duty of care are uncertain. The impact of a duty of care obligation needs to be fully considered, as do the cost, complexity and time that might be involved in customers seeking to bring firms to court as a result of a duty of care obligation.

I was asked to say something about the timescale of the work on this. A duty of care could have an effect on many of the FCA’s provisions in its handbook, including the need to replace or remove some. The FCA intends to undertake a comprehensive review of the handbook post Brexit. The FCA believes that it would be best to include duty of care in that review, particularly as the FCA’s ability to change its rules in some areas will depend on the relationship between the EU and UK post withdrawal. Many of the FCA’s current rules are based on EU legislation. Once the relationship between the EU and the UK following withdrawal is clear, there will be more clarity around the degree of discretion that the FCA has to amend its rules.

In addition, the FCA is currently identifying the necessary changes to its rules to ensure that they continue to operate as a coherent set of rules following EU withdrawal. This work is being done in parallel with the work across government to review directly applicable EU legislation. It is a significant, complex and time-critical exercise that must be progressed immediately. If noble Lords have any concerns about the timing of the discussion paper, that is primarily a matter for the FCA.

Returning to the amendment, it is not necessary to include regulatory principles in the Bill because of the provisions the FCA already has. For that reason, I would request—or suggest—to my noble friend Lord Holmes that he withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond]

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this short debate, and my noble friend the Minister, from whom I am happy to take requests and suggestions in equal measure.

I imagine my noble friend has become far more familiar with the rulebook than he could have imagined or perhaps even desired. I agree with the rules he recited but there seems to be a slight contradiction in that the rules are clearly stated but simultaneously it is accepted by all concerned, not least the FCA, that there is at least a question worth asking and looking into around duty of care. I think we are in a positive place: there is an acceptance that there is at least a question that is worth looking into.

In financial services there is a lot of talk around the acronyms, as in any business or organisation. There is a lot of focus on KYC—“Know your customer”. May I suggest that, rather than promoting just KYC, all noble Lords involved in this debate and everybody outside the Chamber should also promote alongside it CFYC? That would take financial services into a very positive place for the future, as that “Care for your customer” is where banking originated centuries ago. It would be a thoroughly good thing for all financial services organisations to have a sense of CFYC.

On the amendment itself, I have heard my noble friend’s arguments and I understand the position. It would be helpful to have further discussions between now and Third Reading, to see what specifics it may be possible to set out in regard to this amendment. We may have had the answer on the general duty for this stage but it would be worth while having more discussions, not least because we are promised the response to the report of the Financial Exclusion Select Committee, of which I was fortunate enough to be a member. I would welcome further discussions and we could then decide what the route may be to Third Reading. But in thanking all noble Lords who have participated this evening, including my noble friend the Minister, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[The Earl of Kinnoull]

My Lords, we are on the home leg. In moving Amendment 43, I shall speak also to Amendment 46. I am reporting back the same two amendments that we discussed in Committee, and your Lordships will be delighted to hear that my remarks will be very short. Before I make them, I should say that the Minister is now a great hero of mine. I remarked that he was sending me emails at 7.21 am during Committee stage, but he takes a bit of a lie-in these days: his first email to me this morning was at 8.20 am. He has worked with terrific courtesy, particularly on this issue, which is a very difficult one given the poor state of relations between our Parliament and Holyrood. It will be very helpful, because working on this is greatly to the benefit of people both sides of the border.

Your Lordships will recall that I had two beefs with the law as it is. The first is my beef about arbitrage: companies can set up in unregulated Scotland and aim their activities at England. I felt that any form of arbitrage within the United Kingdom was against the general principle of having a single market in the United Kingdom and was wrong. The second beef I had was that as one looked at the statistics—we have drowned in really depressing statistics in this area—one saw that Scotland had it worse than England in terms of the activities of these very unpleasant companies. So I thought it was time for Scotland to do something about it. The Justice Committee at Holyrood has been studying the problem and feels the same—we had various quotes from various Scottish Ministers feeling that.

I should also say that this is another piece of Meccano, because the trigger in my mechanism would actually be held by Scottish Ministers. Tantalisingly, the good news is that last night a letter surfaced that was being sent by Annabelle Ewing, the relevant Scottish Minister, to the Justice Committee at Holyrood, saying that the Scottish Government were now keen to regulate CMCs in Scotland and that officials were in active discussions with equivalent officials down south to do that. Accordingly, I am hoping that in a minute we will hear some very good news from the Minister. I do not know what happened next, but he does. I beg to move Amendment 43.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, the end is in sight. I am very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, for his amendment and for the kind words he said about me. It has been a very constructive dialogue to seek to get this bit of the Bill right.

The amendments in his name seek to extend Part 2 of the Bill to Scotland. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government worked closely with the Scottish Government during the development of this policy to ensure that the FCA’s regulatory regime not only achieves the aim of strengthening claims management regulation but is proportionate to the needs of the sector and its consumers. Having sufficient evidence of malpractice by CMCs in Scotland is essential to justify extending regulation across the border. Our initial discussions with the Scottish Government revealed that they did not want regulation of CMCs to be extended to Scotland. Their view was that there was limited evidence of malpractice. We had powerful contributions in our debate in Committee which put forward a contrary view.

Because CMCs in Scotland have tended to be solicitor led, they are often regulated by the Law Society of Scotland. The decision was therefore made to replicate the current scope of claims management regulation to England and Wales only. However, following the very useful debate which we had on this issue in Committee, we have continued discussions with the Scottish Government, and their views are evolving.

The Scottish Government have not yet requested that claims management regulation is extended to Scotland, but I say to the noble Earl that, should we receive ministerial confirmation that the Scottish Government wish to extend claims management regulation to Scotland, we would be ready and willing to table a government amendment to that effect. So we will continue to engage with the Scottish Government and we will keep our position on claims management regulation in Scotland under review.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 24th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to add my strong support for the amendments. In so doing, I apologise to the House that I have been unable, for reasons of ill-health, to participate in earlier discussion of the Bill.

As chair of the former Lords Select Committee on Financial Exclusion, I was very pleased when I read the amendments. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and my noble friend Lady Kramer have set out their rationale very well, and I shall not go over that ground again, but if we are setting up a new single financial guidance body, promoting financial inclusion must be clearly set out as one of its key objectives.

On the point referred to by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, it would be nice to know when we will receive the government response to the Select Committee report. Correct me if I am wrong, but I think I recall that the noble Baroness, when asked back in July, said that the government response would be available “very soon”. We are now some way off the tail end of July. If the Minister could give any clarification of when the government response will be available, that would be extremely helpful.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, the co-pilot is in charge for this leg of the journey. I take this opportunity to address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the common theme of financial inclusion, and welcome the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and my noble friend Lord Trenchard, who anticipated in part some of my response.

Having listened to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, I would not disagree with what he said about the challenges that confront the Government in this area: the problems of financial numeracy and the serious issues, to use his words, that he identified as needing to be addressed. I will come to that in a moment.

As I said in Committee, we take the issue of financial exclusion very seriously and are grateful for the important work of the Financial Exclusion Select Committee in highlighting this important issue. We have considered the committee’s wide-reaching report, including its recommendations concerning government leadership and the welfare system.

In answer to the two questions about timing, the Government aim to respond to the committee’s report—here I use an option not mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie—before Third Reading. I understand noble Lords’ impatience that we did not have our response to the report available for Report, but I hope that there will be adequate time to consider it before Third Reading. I reassure noble Lords that the Government’s response will address the committee’s recommendations and will bring forward new proposals on how better to co-ordinate across government, the regulators and the wider sector on the key issue of tackling the significant issue of financial exclusion.

As was mentioned in our debate, this area has been given new prominence within the DWP ministerial team by the appointment of my honourable friend Guy Opperman. At the same time, it is important that this change is seen in the context of HM Treasury’s ongoing, government-wide policy responsibility for financial inclusion and exclusion. A key part of the Government’s approach to tackling these issues will be to require the relevant departments to work collaboratively, and the response may say something about that.

I stressed in Committee the Government’s understanding of the terms “financial inclusion” and “capability”, and I thought that we had established an element of agreement on this point. At the risk of reopening a theological discussion, financial inclusion refers to ensuring that members of the public have access to financial services. Financial capability is ensuring that the public are best able to make use of the financial services to which they have access. These terms are widely accepted by, for example, the World Bank. It is important that we build on this shared understanding of the terms so that there is clarity about the intentions for the body, which is to build financial capability among members of the public. To put this another way, the new body should not have a role to regulate the supply of financial services and products by the industry. It should, however, play a key role in helping people engage with or consume these products and services.

This does not mean that the supply of these products is not important. The point is that it is the role of the Financial Conduct Authority—not the SFGB—to ensure that appropriate action is taken when the market fails to supply useful and affordable services and products. So the omission of financial inclusion in the Bill is not an oversight; it is deliberately omitted from the body’s functions and objectives which refer to the supply of useful services such as savings, credit and insurance products. The proposed amendments would greatly expand the body’s statutory remit and are also likely to create confusion over the roles of the Treasury and the FCA, both of which have the relevant responsibilities and powers and are better placed to influence the supply of financial services and products.

In terms of financial exclusion, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, rightly observed in Committee, even more important than these definitions is the question: what will the Government do to act in a more co-ordinated way to tackle financial exclusion? I want to assure noble Lords that, following the Select Committee’s work in this area, the Government will propose, in their response, more appropriate and effective ways to address this issue than through the functions and objectives of the SFGB.

With regards to the particular issue of improving access to financial services for vulnerable people—which comes under Amendment 17—we consider that the FCA, and not the SFGB, is more appropriate to deliver that role. The FCA has already carried out a great deal of work in this area. Many Peers had a helpful meeting with the FCA last week. I hope it reassured noble Lords that the FCA takes its responsibility on consumer protection very seriously. The FCA published two pieces of in-depth research, carried out in 2015 and 2016, which supported the development of current initiatives to address access issues for vulnerable people. I came away from that meeting with a slightly different impression from that of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

As discussed in the meeting, issues regarding access and vulnerability are at the core of the FCA’s mission and business plan, published in April this year. To quote from the mission:

“Understanding vulnerability is central to how we make decisions. Consumers in vulnerable circumstances are more susceptible to harm and generally less able to advance their own interests”.

The FCA is due to undertake a number of further projects to understand better the concerns of vulnerable groups, not least through its forthcoming work to develop a consumer strategy by means of its consumer approach paper to be published in the next few weeks. This will provide a means for the FCA to measure outcomes for vulnerable consumers. It will work to develop vulnerability mapping so as to ensure that it has captured the needs of vulnerable consumers when finalising its business priorities.

In Committee, I mentioned the FCA’s TechSprints, so I do not need to do so again. It is also exploring issues for those living with cancer and the problems they face in gaining affordable access to travel insurance. In due course, the FCA will publish a feedback statement with its findings and the next steps in the light of responses to its call for input.

More recently, in September, the FCA published an occasional paper outlining the findings of its ageing population project. This paper reviews the policy implications of an ageing population and the resulting impact on financial services. The FCA highlights risks to older consumers who are more likely than other groups to be vulnerable—an issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. To try and minimise harm, it has suggested areas where financial services firms could give greater consideration to how they treat older consumers.

Finally, even more recently, the FCA published its inaugural, annual financial lives survey—its largest tracking survey of consumers and their use of financial services. This is a huge undertaking, drawing on responses from just under 13,000 UK consumers aged 18 and over. The report tells the financial story of six different age groups to show key themes at each life stage, from those aged 18 to 24 to those aged 60 and over. The survey shows that 50% of UK adults—25 million—display one or more characteristics that signal their potential vulnerability. The FCA will use the results of the survey to prioritise its work. I hope the description of some of what the FCA is doing reassures noble Lords that it takes seriously its responsibility towards those who are vulnerable.

As a result of the FCA's work and its engagement with firms, there have been tangible developments from the industry in this area. This includes work led by the Financial Services Vulnerability Taskforce. In addition, the FCA has also seen increasing evidence that firms identify and then improve outcomes for vulnerable consumers.

To reiterate, as my noble friend Lord Trenchard said, the current amendments would greatly expand the remit of the body and could cause confusion over the role of different public institutions. I hope that, having heard this explanation, the noble Lord might be willing to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply which does not surprise me in great detail. May I start by saying to the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, what a great pleasure it is to see you with us this afternoon? I hope we will have another occasion—perhaps before Third Reading—to acknowledge the role that she played in producing this important tome on financial exclusion.

The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, said it would be too much of a burden. Throughout our discussions, we have been told that this is a framework Bill. What use is made of this framework will depend on who ends up as the chief executive and the role that they have. From this point of view, these amendments are deliberately non-prescriptive. Are we seriously saying that this body would have no role in relation to a strategy to improve financial inclusion or combat financial exclusion; that this would be off limits and nothing to do with it? I accept entirely what was said about the role of the FCA and the importance of its remit in these circumstances. We may not agree with it in its entirety but are we to say that this new body, which has a range of functions relating to information guidance and the obligation to develop a strategy—particularly on this important issue of financial exclusion—must be silent on these matters; that it has no role at all? This does not seem right.

I have taken on board the debate we had in Committee about it being the role of the FCA to lead on this; or the FCA now and the new Minister across government. I accept that. Perhaps before we had formulated a lead role for the single body; I think we have moved back from that and accepted the points that were made. However, I have difficulty in accepting that it would have no role in the future. The Minister looks as though he is about to spring to his feet.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

Perhaps I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. Of course, the SFGB is going to work closely with the FCA and the Treasury on issues regarding financial inclusion. As I said, we envisage a partnership, with the FCA promoting access and the SFGB promoting capability; this is where the two meet. We do not see the SFGB leading on inclusion in the way in which it will be leading on financial capability. This is why we have difficulty with the particular amendment that the noble Lord has put forward.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I thank the noble Lord for that clarification. The amendment does not suggest that the single body would be leading on it. This is the change between the debate we had in Committee and the debate tonight. We recognise that it has a role to play in supporting but not in running the show. Perhaps we had better move on because I am not sure that we are going to reach agreement on this. The Minister’s notes may reflect our original position, but he seems to have acknowledged that there is a role for the SFGB in supporting the activities around financial inclusion and exclusion. At this late stage, I am not sure if there is anything that can be done to reflect this. If we are to get a report, feedback or the Government’s response to the report of the House of Lords Select Committee before Third Reading, I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that this issue will not necessarily be off bounds when we come to Third Reading, as that potential new information runs through a lot of the debate that we have had. I hope that before we conclude on this the Minister will give an assurance that we can raise these issues at Third Reading. If he wants to give that assurance now, that would be good.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord may be tempting me to say something beyond my pay grade about what is in order at Third Reading and what is not. However, I will reflect on what he said and about the impact of publishing the response. I would be rash to give a commitment at the Dispatch Box that this issue will definitely be addressed at Third Reading but I will do my best.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

Clearly, the Minister is a safe pair of hands in the cockpit. I thank him for that. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support. Her remarks mirrored our position. We are not saying that the FCA should not lead on some of this, but it cannot and will not do everything and there is a role for the body we are discussing. Having said that, I look forward to the amendment that will come up soon. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 8.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for his very important comments in introducing these amendments. He has covered some issues that I was going to cover in relation to my amendment, which is next. I wonder whether he feels my amendment covers some of the things he is concerned about, because care leavers are just one group in vulnerable circumstances—we all know that—but there are other groups as well. I have a slight concern that once we start to put lots of different lists in the Bill, somebody will be left out. I will explain why our amendment is worded as it is and I am very grateful for the support from his Benches, but I raise that as a question.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, in response to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, about the propulsion available to the co-pilot, it remains the same: the journey may be a little shorter and therefore the destination may be reached more quickly.

Amendments 9 and 10 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, would alter the strategic functional matters relating to financial education. I thank all those who have contributed to this debate for highlighting once again the important issue of financial education. We had a good debate on this issue in Committee and I believe we agreed on both sides that financial education is extremely important at all stages of life—a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. A key role of the new body will be to improve people’s financial capability and help them make better financial decisions, and to identify any gaps that there may be at the moment in the provision of such advice and guidance.

The financial education element of the strategic function is targeting a specific area of need, which is to ensure that children and young people are supported at an early age on how to manage their finances, for example, by learning the benefits of budgeting and saving. More specifically, the new body will have a co-ordinating role to match funders with providers of financial education projects and initiatives aimed at children, and will ensure that these are targeted where evidence has shown them to be more effective. This falls within the wider strategic financial capability work of the body and should form part of the national strategy, which we expect it to deliver.

As I explained in Committee, the Money Advice Service has been undertaking that role. It is one aspect that respondents to the Government’s consultations have overwhelmingly agreed it is important for the new body to continue working on. MAS’s work under the financial capability strategy focuses specifically on improving people’s capability, which they need to make key decisions, such as those presented in this amendment. We expect the new body will carry forward and improve the work under the umbrella of the new SFGB. I stress that this does not mean that the new body will not be providing financial education for adults. As I have explained, this is a key role of the body in improving financial capability, as it is for MAS now. For example, MAS currently runs a pilot on adult numeracy with National Numeracy through the What Works Fund. Also, through the work with the Financial Advice Working Group, it is creating a simple portal for employers linking to the MAS website and exploring partnerships for helping employees with money management. Finally, through the financial capability strategy, MAS works with the National Association of Student Money Advisers to test and improve the model for financial education for younger adults. We expect the body to continue and build on work in this space.

Moving to the specific amendments, Amendment 9 would alter this function so that a strategy for the provision of financial education is extended to care leavers. I thank the noble Lord for raising this point. It was also an issue raised by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in Committee. As I highlighted to the noble Earl at that point, the Government agree and we expect the new body to consider further initiatives to support care leavers as well as other young people from marginalised backgrounds—for example, those leaving youth detention or those with learning difficulties.

As we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, Amendment 11 refers to vulnerable people and I absolutely agree with her: care leavers are vulnerable people. I hope my noble friend will say a little more about how we plan to help vulnerable people, including care leavers, when we debate Amendment 11.

Amendment 10 would make provision specifically for adults contemplating difficult financial decisions, such as mortgages, pensions and vehicle finance plans. As I said in Committee in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, this is the role of the SFGB as a whole as it delivers money and pension guidance and debt advice. Also, the strategic function under Clause 2(7)(a) already gives the body a specific responsibility to work to improve the,

“financial capability of members of the public”,

including in these areas. To give the new body a requirement to advise the Secretary of State on explicit issues, worthy as these may be, is unwise. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said that one could either agree or disagree with the point I have just made. I happen to agree with it—he may disagree with it—but there are problems in focusing on specific issues. There are several topics that the body may wish to look into as part of its strategic function and choosing a few could risk limiting its ability to look more widely at the sector and have regard to emerging issues in the future. For those reasons, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 11th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I support my noble friend, who has drawn a strong parallel with the experience of Pension Wise, with which she was heavily involved. She made the point that it is not only those who might be termed traditionally vulnerable people who are at risk from the ingenuity of impersonators but those who might be more sophisticated.

I should like to make a brief reference to paragraph 17 of the memorandum that the DWP sent to the Delegated Powers Committee. It says:

“Deferring the announcement of the name will also help protect the new body’s brand and reduce the likelihood of the setting up of ‘imposter’ websites as a means of deceiving and defrauding the public. Imposter websites could put members of the public at risk”,


and,

“were an issue when the Pension Wise brand was launched”.

If they were at risk before the naming of the body, what will give strong protection once the body is named? That seems to be the thrust of my noble friend’s amendment, which I support.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, the co-pilot is back. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for tabling this amendment, which would make it a criminal offence to falsely claim to be giving pensions guidance, money guidance or debt advice on behalf of the single financial guidance body. She set out very clearly the devastating impact that misleading or criminal advice can have on people’s lives. Both she and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, identified the ingenuity and adaptability employed by scammers and fraudsters to con people.

I was very interested in this amendment and made inquiries to see who would be caught by it. Clearly, people who claimed to give advice on behalf of the SFGB, or whatever it is called, would be caught but, as it stands, I understand that it would not cover someone pretending to give advice on behalf of a delivery partner. The noble Baroness may like to think about that.

Protecting people from financial fraud and scams is important, and I say to my noble friend Lady Altmann that the Government take it very seriously. Anyone who has served in another place will have seen at first hand the devastating impact that this can have on people’s lives. We will come on to cold calling when we reach Clauses 16 and 17.

Ensuring that people have confidence in the financial guidance and debt advice provided by, or on behalf of, the SFGB will be central to its success and to the success of other government policies to improve people’s financial well-being. This is a matter that we have explored in depth with the existing service providers—the MAS, TPAS and Pension Wise. As the noble Baroness said when she moved her amendment, of those three, only guidance provided under the Pension Wise banner is covered by a specific measure making it an offence to falsely claim to give such guidance. The MAS and TPAS rely on existing criminal offences.

In response to the speeches made, we have considered very carefully whether to go down the Pension Wise route and create a new, bespoke offence to cover all the single guidance body’s guidance and advice services. We have weighed up whether there is evidence to suggest that a bespoke offence would have any greater effect than existing criminal offences, taking into account that the Pension Wise offence has never been used in a prosecution.

There are already criminal offences that would cover imitation of the new body; again, the noble Baroness referred to these. For example, if an individual was misled by someone dishonestly claiming to give guidance or advice on behalf of the body with the intention of causing financial loss, this would amount to an offence. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland a person could be prosecuted under Sections 1 and 2 of the Fraud Act, and in Scotland such conduct would likely amount to the common-law offence of fraud.

In addition, under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, Regulation 9 makes it an offence to advertise or market a service in a manner that deceives or is likely to deceive the average member of the public. If that advertising or marketing causes or is likely to cause an average person to take a decision they would not have taken otherwise, again, this is an offence. This would make it a criminal act, for example, for scammers to use the logo of the new body.

Offences under the Fraud Act are subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years and offences under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations carry a maximum term of imprisonment of two years. As a deterrent, both maximum terms are significantly greater than the maximum 12 months envisaged by the amendment.

For these reasons, and having listened to the arguments, our assessment is that there are already existing offences which will provide for the single financial guidance body to take action against people claiming fraudulently to be delivering its services or using the body’s brand and reputation to mislead members of the public. Where people seek to scam and defraud by falsely claiming to be acting on behalf of the body, they will be liable to prosecution under existing offences, leading to the possibility of a custodial sentence. We believe that the protections in existing offences are sufficient and I therefore urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Drake]

I thank the Minister for his response. I am not sure all my questions were answered, particularly on how to protect from the mimicking of existing bodies that go into the organisation, while they still have credibility, until the new body’s name becomes absorbed by the public. However, in responding to his points, I borrow the phrase of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer: the Bill needs to be belt-and-braces in terms of it being a criminal offence to mimic this body.

The new body’s guidance will influence people’s decision-making—that is why it is being set up. It recognises a market failure and many consumers who would use the guidance service could be at risk if they go in the wrong direction and to an organisation which is mimicking it. I note the Minister’s point that my amendment would not cover all the circumstances of the criminal offence, but the fact that my amendment could be improved is not a reason for not having explicitly in the Bill a provision that expressly says it is a criminal offence to mimic this body.

There are two strands to my argument: first, it should be expressly in the Bill that it is a criminal offence to mimic, impersonate or imitate the service of the single financial guidance body; and, secondly, there must be some reference to the legislation under which that would be an offence. A Bill would normally refer to the legislation or spell out specifically new legal provisions about the criminal offence. At the moment, however, the Bill is silent on the issue. That is a gap in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 65 and 66. They bear on the financing arrangements for the new single financial guidance body. We have talked about how the money is to be raised and the change from the current arrangements, with a move away from a straight levy system within the financial sector to an arrangement whereby money goes to the Government and into the Consolidated Fund before being paid out in grants.

The amendments are not meant to be taken word for word, but probe the way in which the case for this funding is built up. Amendment 64 would make sure that the single financial body did not underestimate the amount of money it would require by virtue of not having sufficient information to hand about the costs that it would be likely to have to meet given the aspirations for it. An earlier amendment referred to assessing this on the basis of the likely number of those in need of financial advice being the main element in building up the funding envelope. Obviously, there is difficulty in trying to assess that. This amendment adds a little more in terms of the consultation and guidance.

It would be to the advantage of the Bill if it provided for a little more accountability for the funding received. We set out in the amendments the specifics, which may well be covered by other points that the Minister may raise when she responds. At the moment, there is nothing very much in Bill about monitoring the use of the funding and making sure that the information gathered is published, particularly for Parliament, so that due scrutiny can take place.

Amendment 66 deals with how funding is to be established for the national regions. There is nothing exceptional in what is being said in terms of the mechanics—I am sure that the Bill is drafted with due concern for the proprieties involved. A number of the bodies that will be in partnership with the SFGB, or funded by it, already operate in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and offer direct services themselves. If the Treasury is to get information on that, as is specified in Clause 11(1), it will need information which it is not clear that it will be able to get—or, if it is, I have not spotted it—on the costs and expenses of the existing bodies operating existing services in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and how that matches what the devolved Parliaments think should be spent there. There is a lacuna there on which I look forward to hearing a response. I beg to move.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, it is the co-pilot again. I thank the noble Lord for tabling these amendments to Clauses 8 and 11. Clause 8 provides for the Secretary of State to give financial assistance to the single financial guidance body; Clauses 9 and 10 provide for those expenses to be recovered respectively from the levy on pension schemes and through the financial services levy.

At Second Reading and in earlier Committee debates, the noble Lord has questioned this funding framework and the money trail, suggesting that it represents a fundamental change in the way in which things are done currently and that it would radically alter the way in which people operate, particularly in respect of the services provided by MAS. I am not sure that the changes are that fundamental, but, in any case, we think that they are both necessary and beneficial.

One criticism of MAS made by the Farnish review was that it lacked accountability for the activities it delivered and the money spent. As the noble Lord suggested, we need to learn lessons from our experience with MAS. These funding clauses provide a basis for strong accountability and governance arrangements. We want the body to have a clear focus on undertaking its statutory functions. As happens now with the existing organisations, the body will prepare an annual business plan setting out its planned activities and the associated budget required to deliver its proposals. That plan will be discussed and agreed with the DWP.

--- Later in debate ---

Wales is different because there is no history of a funding operation for debt advice. It has always been done from an England and Wales perspective, and I hope that the sense of what the Minister is saying is that that will be allowed to continue under these arrangements and there will be an allocation of funding which matches up locations. But it is very hard to operate. I do not want to go into too much detail here and am happy to brief the Minister separately, but the StepChange team in Cardiff, for instance, operates a specialist service for the whole of the United Kingdom, dealing with vulnerable customers who are having everyday difficulties. When any of the advisers in StepChange comes across somebody with a particular physical or mental capacity problem, that case is often handled in Wales and paid for out of the Wales funding. It would be wrong if that was to be disturbed, and I hope that consultation can be at the heart of this. I am sure we will be able to get round that.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I have some in-flight refuelling. We are working with the devolved authorities on a final agreement and will write with more detail once discussions with the devolved authorities are completed.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

Gosh—that was worth waiting for! I look forward to any information that can be provided on a more direct basis, preferably soon, but I think we have covered enough ground there.

Finally, some good points were made about the need for flexible funding solutions when there are crises, and I would like to read those in Hansard. This is very recent history, so it will be in the forefront of the minds of the bodies concerned. When the FCA was going through an accreditation process regarding debt management companies, it became fairly clear that about 50% of them were going to go out of business, leaving many people with debt management plans paid for through these commercial companies, but which those companies were going to withdraw from. MAS was able to organise substantial additional funding to all the bodies concerned to cope with that. That would not neatly fit into an annual financial cycle, so it is important that we have flexibility at the edges. I am completely open to that being done by government grant or by the holding of reserves, but it is important that it be built into the systems. However, as long as that point has been taken, and I gather it has been, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th September 2017 Lords Chamber

Returning to where I came in with the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, I accept that things will become clearer when we get a debate and a government response to the ad hoc Financial Exclusion Committee. That cannot come fast enough for some of us, who are wondering where it has been and when we can access it, but in the meantime the Minister should take note of some of the ideas in these amendments. They may be ambitious but they are certainly worthy of the department’s careful consideration as the Bill progresses.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, the co-pilot is in charge of this leg of the legislative journey, and I apologise in advance for any turbulence. I thank the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for tabling these amendments and for the way he argued in support of them. As I listened to some of the contributions, it struck me that during this debate we have identified gaps in existing provision. One of the things we want the new body to do is to identify those gaps and then fill them. I will come back to this issue later on in dealing with some of the specific points that have been raised. I am grateful for the contributions that have been made and I will try so far as I can to address them.

Clause 2 sets out the functions and objectives of the new body, including the role of the strategic function. In designing these functions, we have set the parameters so that the body has a clear remit to focus its efforts while at the same time ensuring that the scope is sufficiently wide so that it can respond to changing needs and circumstances in meeting that remit.

I begin with Amendments 19 and 39, which seek to integrate financial inclusion within the new body’s strategic function and to set out in statute a definition of financial inclusion and exclusion, the case made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. As my noble friend mentioned at Second Reading, we take the issue of financial exclusion seriously. The Government are grateful for the work of the ad hoc Select Committee on Financial Exclusion in highlighting this important issue. I am all too aware of the appetite of noble Lords to read the Government’s response, and I recognise that the general election held this year and subsequent ministerial changes have, unfortunately, pushed back that response, which will be published shortly. None the less I am grateful for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, about the appointment of my honourable friend Guy Opperman as a Minister with responsibilities in his department.

I cannot anticipate the Government’s final response, but in the meantime I want to be as helpful as I can to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and others by outlining our understanding of the term “financial inclusion”. I begin by picking up the point identified by my noble friend Lord Trenchard in looking at issues of definition. To quote the World Bank:

“Financial inclusion means that individuals and businesses have access to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs—transactions, payments, savings, credit and insurance—delivered in a responsible and sustainable way”.


That is an internationally accepted definition of financial inclusion. When we consider that definition, it follows that the Government’s policy regarding financial inclusion must be focused on ensuring that there is an adequate and appropriate supply of useful and affordable financial services and products. The Government therefore work closely with the industry regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, to ensure that appropriate action is taken when the market fails to supply services and products. The noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, mentioned bank closures, which is an example of where the market has failed to supply what particular customers want. In passing, I note that in many parts of the country the Post Office is stepping up to the plate, and one should not underestimate its contribution.

On the matter of “financial capability”, the term refers to the ability of the public to manage their money well, including the ability of members of the public to engage with services and products made available by the financial services sector. So there are two different concepts—capability and, as I shall refer to in a moment, the supply of services. Of course there is little value in ensuring an appropriate supply of useful and affordable financial services and products if people do not have the ability to actually use them. That is where financial capability comes in. It is the role of the single financial guidance body to improve the ability of the public to manage their money so that they have the skills, knowledge, motivation and confidence to fully use the financial products and services on offer.

Against the background of those definitions, the concern that we have about these amendments is that the reference to “financial inclusion” would fundamentally change the nature of the new body from an information and guidance body to more of a regulator with specific powers to intervene in the financial services market. At the moment the Treasury and the FCA have responsibility and the relevant powers to intervene when the financial services market fails to supply affordable products and services. Against that background, the attempt in the amendments to give the body a remit over financial inclusion risks duplication and confusion.

I think noble Lords will be aware of the FCA’s work in the area of financial inclusion. It is of the utmost importance that this progress is not impeded by unnecessary confusion over the role of different public bodies. Indeed, the FCA’s competition objective states that it may have regard to,

“the ease with which consumers who may wish to use”,

financial,

“services, including consumers in areas affected by social or economic deprivation, can access them”.

The FCA takes those objectives very seriously and has undertaken a number of pieces of work in recent years—

[Baroness Kramer]

Perhaps there is a slight misunderstanding here. The FCA certainly sees its role as regulating appropriately those financial services that exist, but where a gap exists, it takes no responsibility for filling it. Many in this House have had a long dispute with both the Treasury and the FCA about that, because the gap never gets closed. I draw that to the Minister’s attention, because often those who are not close to this matter assume that it has that role.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My initial response is that if the gap is indeed not closed, it is one of the objectives of the FCA to address that. I was just quoting that it has to have regard to,

“the ease with which consumers who may wish to use”,

financial,

“services, including consumers in areas affected by social or economic deprivation, can access them”.

If it is not responding and ensuring access, that is a case not for giving that responsibility to another body but for holding the FCA to account to get it to discharge the responsibilities that we have given it.

The FCA takes its objectives very seriously, and has undertaken several pieces of work in recent years to increase access and protect consumers, including a report on consumer vulnerability in February 2015. To give one example, in June this year, the FCA published a call for input on access to insurance, following a broader report on access to financial services that it published in May last year. The call for input seeks views on the challenges that firms face in providing travel insurance for consumers who have or have had cancer and the reason for pricing differentiations in quoted premiums.

I look forward to seeing that work develop, and I encourage all relevant stakeholders to provide responses to the call for input. It is important work and, in response to the noble Baroness, is an example of the sort of project to promote financial inclusion that the FCA can conduct in its role as industry regulator.

Against that background, I urge the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, to withdraw Amendment 19 and not to press Amendment 39. I am grateful for the opportunity to address the important topic of financial inclusion, to which I am sure we shall return, but, as I said a moment ago, the Government are concerned that the amendment could create confusion between the roles of the FCA, on the one hand, and of the SFGB, on the other.

I turn to Amendment 25, which makes provision for the new body to advise the Secretary of State on the role of Ofsted and the primary school curriculum. I am aware that the Lords’ Select Committee on Financial Exclusion made a similar recommendation on the role of Ofsted and the primary school curriculum in its recent report. We will of course respond to each recommendation in due course and give them the close attention that they deserve but, for the time being, I just comment that the Government believe that this amendment could cause confusion about the remit of the new body with regard to the school curriculum.

As was stated earlier, the new body will have a role to help co-ordinate and support initiatives delivered by charities and other parties which are designed to improve the financial education of children and young people. It will be able to identify gaps in provision, identify best practice, and work with schools to understand how they are delivering financial education, in which lessons that is taking place, and explore further the barriers to school involvement. The Government are clear, however, that the school curriculum and monitoring of school performance is a matter for the Department for Education in England and those of the devolved nations.

In practice, this means that the body will be able to undertake activities to help schools to provide financial education. For example, the body will be able to undertake activities such as funding the project undertaken by the Money Advice Service and the Education Endowment Foundation to run a trial of Young Enterprise’s Maths in Context programme. Some 12,000 pupils in 130 English schools will take part in the trial, testing whether teaching maths in real-world contexts improves young people’s financial capability and attainment in GCSE maths exams.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, I will try to reflect the German work/life balance referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, by sitting down well before six o’clock. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for introducing her amendment, and as I do so often, I found myself in agreement with nearly all of her analysis of some of the challenges out there: the fall in the savings ratio and the need for a holistic approach to these challenges. I also agree with what the noble Earl said about the problems faced by young families. Where I parted company with the noble Baroness was when she sought to place this extensive new duty on the single financial guidance body. Basically, what her amendment does is to require the new body to produce a report within its first year advising the Secretary of State on how government departments might best assess the impacts of any changes in public expenditure, administration or policy on financial inclusion, financial capability and household debt.

I have a lot of sympathy with the intent behind the amendment. I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has just said about the need to stand back and take a holistic approach to the issue, and of course the Government do not want to do anything that would have an adverse impact on financial inclusion, financial capability or household debt through any of the policies that they pursue. However, I have real difficulty with the point that the noble Baroness is trying to make here, and I do not think that the amendment is either necessary or appropriate.

As I implied a moment ago, the scope of the report proposed in the amendment is very far reaching indeed. The definition of,

“public expenditure, administration or policy”,

is very broad. I have to ask the noble Baroness whether she will compel the body to produce a report for the Secretary of State which considers how to assess the impact if, for example, the Chancellor chooses to adjust expenditure on infrastructure, defence or healthcare. I am really worried that the amendment could overstretch this body’s resources in its first year and expand its remit far beyond that which was originally envisaged. In its first year the body is going to have to prioritise resources into bringing together three disparate bodies, identifying gaps in the market, as we heard earlier, and building on its primary task. If we start going down this road, I see a real risk of diverting resources away from the front line of providing services, bringing together and co-ordinating the functions of the three pre-existing bodies, and from front-line delivery.

The second point is one that has already been touched on. Ministers already review a range of issues when they assess new policies. The financial impacts on individuals and families are considered as a normal part of policy-making, and as noble Lords know, impact assessments are also produced to accompany legislation. I am not convinced that this broad requirement is in keeping with the body’s strategic function of working with others to support the co-ordination and development of strategies to improve people’s financial capability, their ability to manage debt, and the provision of financial education for children and young people. This function is about identifying the most important issues and possible interventions in financial capability, personal debt management and financial education for children and young people working through others.

In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, in winding up the last debate and in part response to the issues raised in this debate, a lot will become clearer as to where the Government are coming from on this when we publish our response to the ad hoc Select Committee. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked me where the Government are coming from, and given the number of recommendations made by the ad hoc Select Committee, I think that that is the right place to reply.

On government leadership, we take the issues of capability and inclusion very seriously, and perhaps I may reiterate my comments about government leadership. In addition, the Secretary of State can request guidance or advice from the new body under Clause 2(2), which will help co-ordination between the Government and the body. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving me the opportunity to put the Government’s view on this important issue on the record and to underline our concerns about the potential diversion of resources if we go down this particular route.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

May I receive a bit of clarification on the Government’s response to the House of Lords Select Committee? I think the Minister said that it would be soon, but can he give us an assurance that we will receive it before we get to Report? We are going to have a little gap after next week. I hope that that will be enough time for the Government to respond.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I would love to give a direct and helpful response to the noble Lord’s very reasonable question. It would be irresponsible of me so to do. There are a lot of government departments involved in this. I cannot give an exact timetable at the Dispatch Box today, but I will make some inquiries and see whether we can shed some light on a publication date perhaps later in our proceedings.

I think I was at the end my peroration, imploring the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Drake]

I thank the Minister for his reply. I totally disagree with most of what he said. I thoroughly agreed with the bit where he agreed with my analysis— it was just the bit about the amendment not being practical. This will be neither onerous nor expensive, which is really his only argument against it. This is not saying to map every problem that contributes to financial capability or financial exclusion, but to give a report that sets out in the methodology how best to make an impact assessment across government departments when they are pursuing their policy.

This is not novel; it is a methodology and a discipline that operates in a range of areas. A huge amount of work has already been done. A national strategy has already been created by the work of the Money Advice Service—there is already its capability survey. It has mapped the problem. I was rereading it over the weekend. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. A lot of that work exists and it is an organisation that is going into the new organisation. The Bill already gives to the new financial guidance body responsibility for co-ordinating and developing a national strategy. The Government have already given it the heavyweight bit, which is to co-ordinate and develop the national strategy, but ensuring that that strategy is effective and delivered—ensuring that the whole machinery of government is responsive to the challenge—is a methodological challenge in terms of what I am proposing on how you assess the impact so you can take it into account.

I do not accept that it is expensive or onerous. It is a challenge of how one guides departments to make those impact assessments. There is plenty of advice and guidance from the NAO, other government departments and other bodies that have given guidance to the Government on how to make impact assessments. If there is such a resistance to making impact assessments, how is the Prime Minister to meet her commitment? If she wants to make the Government function better she has to stand back, look at the problem and make an assessment. All I am saying here is that simply giving a budget to an NDPB and saying, “Get on with developing and co-ordinating a strategy; we as a Government have now discharged our function”, is not sufficient. The whole machinery of government has to be told that when it comes up with its actions or policies that it has to assess the impact it will have on capability and debt. The Government will go on to make their policies, but they have to put a discipline in. Just handing over the more labour-intensive bit to the NDPB, not the least labour-intensive bits that I am suggesting, will not get good outcomes for the country.

I reject the premise of the Minister’s argument that it will be very expensive and labour intensive to do. A lot of the groundwork has already been done by the MAS. None the less, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 19th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope (LD)]

My Lords, I strongly support the case made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. In my experience, in a defined benefit situation the trustee is rightly prescriptive with regard to the steps that need to be taken to satisfy a reasonable test of an engagement and communication strategy. It is blindingly obvious that it is different with master trusts, because they deal with a number of employers. Some of them might be very different in the work they do and the way they do it, so the extra link in the chain justifies this. No sensible person wants to litter primary legislation with a lot of detail. However, at the very least, the master trust needs to be constrained in law by satisfying itself in some way that it is taking steps, not just to ensure that the employers within the scheme are acting properly but so that the members of those individual schemes get the benefit of a flow of information and data which is appropriate to support the important provision of their pensions in the future. The case is well made. As I say, I am not in favour of adding things for the sake of it, but the cause is just. If, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, suggests, it is kept skeletal, as long as there is some duty in the primary legislation, the Committee would be much happier to consider the passage of this legislation.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by responding to the point that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, made in his introduction about whether, if one was dealing with a start-up, it would have to provide accounts. Of course, it does not, because it cannot, so that bit of Clause 4(2) would not apply.

A range of amendments relating to member engagement were put forward for consideration in Committee, and during that debate and at Second Reading I made it clear that I had sympathy with the principle behind them, as I have with the case that has just been made. Member engagement is important, and members should be encouraged to develop a strong sense of ownership of their pension saving. As the noble Lord, Lord Monks, noted when we last debated this issue, the money that the scheme is managing belongs to them. I also agree that it is important that schemes should keep their members well informed, especially—again, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, noted in Committee—as a member approaches retirement.

That earlier debate focused largely on member communications. Communications are not quite the same as engagement, which is a somewhat broader notion including the idea of a two-way exchange. Effective communications certainly contribute to good levels of engagement but they are not the only factor that determines whether a member develops a sense of ownership of their savings. Noble Lords may also have drawn this distinction, which is why the amendment requires that broader “engagement” strategy. In practice, however, I believe that that strategy would inevitably contain significant detail on communications from a master trust, which is why I would like briefly to revisit some of the arguments on communications which I set out in Committee.

The purpose of this part of the Bill is to introduce robust minimum requirements which ensure that the interests of master trust scheme members are protected from the risks that arise in these types of schemes; it is not a Bill that seeks to prescribe every facet of running an excellent scheme. Some of those aspects, including how required outcomes may best be achieved in relation to an individual scheme, are matters for the trustees. That is why the documents listed in Clause 4 relate to the key risks and documents directly required under the authorisation criteria, rather than to wider documentation that the scheme may have.

I also noted that there is already a series of legal requirements setting out the minimum standards for communications in occupational pension schemes, which the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, may have referred to. It is worth briefly recapping those requirements. Trustees must provide members with basic information about the pension scheme within two months of their joining, and they are required to update them if this information changes. They must provide most members with a member-specific projected pension and an annual benefits statement. They must also provide a wide range of information upon request, including the annual report, the scheme rules, information about the investment principles and information about benefits and transfer values.

I re-emphasise that those are only minimum standards. The Pensions Regulator publishes codes of practice and detailed guidance for trustees to help them run their scheme according to good practice. This includes guidance on member communications. Our view remains that, provided the statutory requirements are met, it should be for trustees to decide how best to manage member communications. This is one area where a good scheme has an opportunity to distinguish itself. Once the regime commences, our assurance regarding the calibre of trustees of master trust schemes will be further enhanced because they will all have passed the new fit and proper persons requirement.

I also take this opportunity to respond to a specific point that was raised in Committee. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, argued:

“The Pensions Regulator should have the opportunity to review the systems and processes related to communications just as much as the features and functionality of the proposed IT system”.—[Official Report, 21/11/16; col. 1754.]

I thank the noble Lord for that contribution, which I have considered further. Although I cannot go as far as he would like me to, I hope that I can go a little further than I did in Committee. I can confirm that the Bill as drafted allows the regulator to take into account the systems and processes relating to communications and engagement when assessing the adequacy of a scheme’s systems and processes more broadly. I can also confirm that the Government would intend—subject, of course, to consultation—to use the regulations under Clause 11 to ensure that the regulator specifically considers a scheme’s systems and processes in relation to these important communication matters when deciding whether the scheme is run effectively.

There is of course the wider point of the engagement of individuals with workplace pension savings, which we take seriously. As part of the review of automatic enrolment that we announced on 12 December, the Government specifically committed to consider member engagement. In a Written Statement, the Minster for Pensions confirmed that the review would include,

“how engagement with individuals can be improved so that savers have a stronger sense of personal ownership and are better enabled to maximise savings”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/12/16; col. 38WS.]

This review will be supported by an external advisory board, which will include pension provider representation, and we will ensure that we engage closely with the industry as part of that review.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 11 and 12 in my name seek broadly the same objective as that of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and would enable a funder to do other things but subject to the regulator having to approve them. The fundamental issue here for the insurance industry is that the funder being a separate entity does not really work. The Bill will introduce additional cost for master trusts offered by insurers, potentially to the detriment of existing scheme members, as these schemes already operate under stringent FCA and PRA regulation.

As noble Lords will know, a number of insurers offer master trusts to members in addition to group personal pensions and alongside other business lines. Insurers currently manage risks across a number of product lines and they all operate under stringent FCA and PRA regulation. It seems to me that members of master trust schemes used for automatic enrolment should meet high solvency and reporting standards but that the Bill should not introduce additional requirements on master trusts offered by insurers where suitable protections are already in place.

The key concern is the definition of a scheme funder as set out in Clause 10, which specifies that it,

“must be constituted as a separate legal entity”,

and must not carry on any other activities. The Government have stated that the purpose of this clause is to better enable the Pensions Regulator to assess the financial sustainability of the scheme by increasing transparency of the assets, liabilities, costs and income of the master trust. I do not really see that Clause 10, by itself, meets the policy intent of providing the transparency to assess the financial sustainability of a master trust, since as a “separate legal entity” it can still transfer risk to other entities.

A key benefit of a master trust being part of a wider and well-capitalised legal entity is that the scheme can, if necessary, draw upon this capital. Members of master trust schemes offered by insurers currently benefit from this additional security. Many of the ABI’s members view this as a key selling point to employers who have chosen their master trust schemes. It is fortunate that the Bill will be moving on to the other place because I would ask the Government to continue negotiations with the insurance industry on this point, either with a view to satisfying it that the Government are right or to accepting its views. It is not entirely satisfactory if the key provider industry is not comfortable with this issue. This does not go into territory which I would personally want to put to a vote, but it needs further discussion with the industry.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and to my noble friend Lord Flight for tabling amendments which are, in their objectives, all broadly supportive of the Government’s position: that there should be transparency about a master trust’s financial position, including the financial arrangements between it and the scheme funders and the strength of those funders, in order to support the Pensions Regulator’s financial supervision.

Amendments 9, 10 and 11 would all have a similar effect: to remove the requirement that the scheme funder,

“be constituted as a separate legal entity”,

that does not carry out any activities other than master trusts. Although they are well-intentioned, these amendments raise problems of their own. Amendments 9 and 10 would have the opposite effect to transparency, because scheme funders would be unclear as to whether the manner in which they carry out their activities and are constituted is sufficiently transparent to the regulator for the purpose of its financial supervision. This is partly because the arrangements between scheme funders and master trusts will vary enormously across schemes. Amendments 9 and 10 would, by removing much of the substance of the scheme funder requirement in Clause 10, make it more difficult for the regulator to assess compliance and make its financial supervision of the scheme more challenging.

Following the exchange in Committee, we have explored this issue further, but the Government and, more importantly, the Pensions Regulator believe that ensuring transparency about the status of the financial arrangements between the master trust funder and the master trust is essential to this new regime and to the regulator’s assessment of the financial sustainability of the scheme. The requirement to be a separate legal entity achieves this objective. I do not pretend that this is not without cost to some insurance companies—a point that was raised earlier—but the alternative provided by this amendment is not equipping the regulator to make a key decision that could impact on the security of thousands of scheme members.

Amendment 12 may be technically flawed because Clause 8 relates to the financial sustainability of the scheme, not of the scheme funder. It is worth noting that the regulator can assess the financial strength of the scheme funder through its accounts, required under Clause 14, in any event. The Government believe that the most clear and straightforward way to achieve the desired level of financial transparency is through the requirement in Clause 10 for the scheme funder to be set up as a separate legal entity whose only activities relate to the master trust. This will also protect the interests of master trust scheme members. However, this does not prevent scheme funders, such as insurance companies, operating other lines of business through another vehicle.

I was asked whether a scheme funder can support more than one master trust. A scheme funder can support more than one master trust by setting up separate legal entities for each scheme. On the question of whether there is anything in the Bill to inhibit the flow of dividends from the scheme funder outwards, the Bill does not impose any direct restrictions on the flow of dividends from or to a scheme funder, so long as the scheme is financially sustainable. The noble Lord also asked whether the provision of a guarantee by a scheme funder is an activity which the clause prohibits. A scheme funder can provide a guarantee in respect of the master trust to which it is the scheme funder.

It may be that the amendments are intended to address certain underlying concerns: first, about the cost of corporate restructuring to meet the requirement to be a separate legal entity; and secondly, about double regulation, an issue that was raised in Committee. The practical and legal requirements for setting up a business entity should not of themselves be burdensome. It is quick and easy to incorporate a company in the UK, and the Government make a company’s ongoing filing requirements as simple as possible to comply with. However, we recognise that, to meet this requirement, some companies offering master trusts among other lines of business would have to undergo corporate restructuring. To address this, we are working with key stakeholders to develop a proportionate approach to regulation that minimises the burden on business without undermining the Pensions Regulator’s ability financially to supervise schemes through transparent financial structures and reporting.

Noble Lords may recall from earlier debates that the financial sustainability requirements that master trusts have to meet in order to operate have been developed to address the specific risks faced by the members of master trusts. However, if we identify an overlap between our requirements and those of other regulatory regimes, the Secretary of State has a regulation-making power in Clause 8 that can require the regulator to take those regulatory requirements into account when assessing whether a scheme is financially sustainable. We believe that power to be sufficiently flexible to prescribe, for instance, that if the scheme funder has an enforceable guarantee from a financially sound parent company, such as one that meets the PRA’s capital requirements, the regulator must take that into account when assessing whether the scheme has sufficient resources to meet the specified costs. Let me re-emphasise our commitment to proportionate regulation, striking an appropriate balance between member protection and minimising the burdens on business. We are working with key stakeholders to ensure that we understand their concerns.

Noble Lords also expressed related concerns about how the requirement for a separate scheme funder in Clause 10 applies to master trust schemes that offer both money purchase and non-money purchase benefits, a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, a few moments ago. Noble Lords have highlighted the interaction of that requirement with the provision in Clause 1 that the provisions are to be taken to refer to the master trust,

“only to the extent that it provides money purchase benefits”.

My noble friend and I have had productive conversations with noble Lords opposite in the past week, although not as productive as they would have liked. I expect those to continue. The team at the DWP is looking at all options that are open to us, but at this stage I regret I cannot commit to a timetable, nor can I commit to returning to the issue before Third Reading. However, noble Lords should be reassured of our very firm intention to take further action during the passage of the Bill.

I hope that the points I have made are sufficient to explain why the Government are of the view that these amendments would not be appropriate, and that the noble Lord will feel sufficiently reassured not to press them.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Young, for his response to the amendments. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Flight, that we end up with the same objectives and the same analysis about what we want to achieve, if with a slightly different way of going about it. However, I am disappointed with the response from the noble Lord, Lord Young. I am not sure whether he specifically dealt with the point about whether Clause 39 could be used to carve out some of the schemes in some of the circumstances we have particular concerns about, and, if so, which of those schemes could be the subject of that carve-out. That might be one route to partially addressing some of the problems. I do not know whether the noble Lord wants to come in.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I am happy to give the noble Lord the assurance he has just asked for.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I was not asking for an assurance but for an answer.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The regulations in Clause 39 give the flexibility the noble Lord has just asked for.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, this small, probing amendment would reduce the application period from six months to three. It was conceived by seeking to deal with the question: for how long can an authorised master trust remain in operation unauthorised under these provisions? That is what sparked the thoughts. I acknowledge that the consequential amendment to paragraph 8(7), which should have followed, has not been made, so in effect we have just part of the amendment here.

The purpose of this probe is to test the rationale for the length of the period during which an existing master trust can continue to operate without authorisation. As it stands, a master trust must apply for authorisation by the end of the application period. The application period in the Bill is six months—three in our amendment—beginning with the commencement date. The commencement date is the date on which Clause 3—“Prohibition on operating a scheme unless authorised”—comes into force, which is to be fixed by the Secretary of State but is expected to be some two years away. The Pensions Regulator must make a decision on the application within six months and, if it is refused, can be referred by the trustees or others to the tribunal.

From today, absent an appeal, an existing master trust could remain in operation for two years before the commencement date; then there are six months before it applies, with a six-week extension, and six months during which the Pensions Regulator must give it consideration, assuming that there is no appeal. This is potentially a long time. It is accepted that the transitional provisions will be in place from the date the Act is passed, or 20 October, concerning triggering events, the prohibition on increasing charges and the scheme funder’s liability for the costs of winding up the scheme. Of course, all this is happening nearly two years after the commencement of auto-enrolment, which has been the spur to the growth of master trusts.

My plea is: should we not be making faster progress? Given the commitment to consult on regulations, the shape of the detail required for an application will surely be evolving long before the commencement date. Is there not a way we can make faster progress in this very important area, where billions of pounds of people’s investments are at risk? I beg to move.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, as we have just heard, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, would reduce the time period an existing master trust scheme will have in which to apply for authorisation from the commencement of the relevant provisions of the Bill from six to three months. While I have some sympathy with the amendment, for the reasons set out by the noble Lord, the Government’s view, which is informed in part by the Pensions Regulator, is that there is a compelling case for allowing a maximum of six months.

My expectation is that some schemes will have relatively little to do in order to align their businesses with the new requirements and, as a result, will be in a position to apply for authorisation early in the six-month application window. Others may face more of a challenge and may need time to consider the final legislation in full—including, of course, the regulations, which will come out next year—before they determine whether to apply for authorisation or withdraw from the market. We do not want to risk losing good schemes from the market because they have not had sufficient time to make the necessary changes to meet these new requirements. Having consulted the regulator, our view is that six months will give schemes the time they are likely to need.

I appreciate the noble Lord’s concern that members should be protected as quickly as possible but we must get the balance right between achieving that and placing demands on existing businesses. As I think the noble Lord recognised in his remarks, an additional key protection for members is set out in the Bill, which will apply from the beginning of the application window. This is in addition to the retrospective provisions in the Bill, which mean that a scheme that experiences a triggering event from 20 October this year will be unable to increase charges on members to pay for scheme wind-up. The additional protection is that if a scheme experiences a triggering event during this period, and the regulator has reason to believe that there is an immediate risk to the interests of scheme members, the regulator will have the ability to issue a pause order under Clause 31, which we have just been discussing, regardless of whether or not the scheme has submitted an application for authorisation.

Finally, on the overall length of time it will take, as the Bill stands, from the date on which regulations fully commence master trust schemes will have six months to submit an application for authorisation. The Pensions Regulator will then have six months from the point of receiving an application to decide whether to grant or refuse authorisation. This means that the vast majority of existing schemes will be either authorised or not authorised within one year of full commencement. Where trustees are unsuccessful, they can appeal to the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal. The master trust will be able to continue operating pending the outcome of that appeal.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

57: Schedule 2, page 38, line 9, at end insert—
“3A Existing Master Trust schemes: pause orders(1) This section applies where the trustees of an existing Master Trust scheme have applied for authorisation of the scheme under section 4 and the decision on the application has not yet become final (see section 35).(2) The Pensions Regulator may make a pause order in relation to the scheme if it is satisfied that—(a) there is, or is likely to be if a pause order is not made, an immediate risk to the interests of members under the scheme or the assets of the scheme, and(b) it is necessary to make a pause order to protect the interests of the generality of members of the scheme.(3) A pause order under this section is to be treated as if it is made under section 31.(4) But in its application to a pause order under this section, paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 is to be read as if sub-paragraph (3) were omitted.””

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, government Amendment 57 would allow the Pensions Regulator to issue a pause order to an existing master trust at any point between the scheme submitting an application for authorisation and the decision on the application becoming final, regardless of whether or not a triggering event has occurred in relation to that scheme. Once an existing scheme has submitted an application for authorisation, the Pensions Regulator will have access to a significant amount of new information about the scheme. That information may alert the regulator to members’ interests or assets being at risk in the scheme. Clearly, the regulator will not grant authorisation in such circumstances but it needs to be able to take immediate steps to protect the members.

A decision to refuse authorisation is one which must be taken by the determinations panel. It is right that this is so, but it means that there could be a period of time between the regulator recommending to the determinations panel that the scheme should not be authorised and the panel reaching its decision. During this time, the interests of scheme members need to be protected. The Government’s proposed amendment therefore provides that the Pensions Regulator may make a pause order in relation to a master trust scheme which has submitted an application for authorisation,

“if it is satisfied that—

(a) there is, or is likely to be if a pause order is not made, an immediate risk to the interests of members under the scheme or the assets of the scheme, and

(b) it is necessary to make a pause order to protect the interests of the generality of members of the scheme”.

These conditions mirror those we have just been discussing for making a pause order following a triggering event.

The proposed amendment would introduce an important protection for the members of existing master trust schemes during the period when such schemes are applying for authorisation. In the light of what my noble friend Lord Freud has just said, I too apologise for not making this provision in the Bill as introduced, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Drake]

My Lords, I intervene at least for the record. It is absolutely understandable why the Government seek to extend the pause-order powers to a master trust which has not yet received authorisation if the members’ interests are at risk. I will not repeat the arguments that I made when speaking to Amendments 46 and 50, but they remain valid here. During the period of the pause order which is applied in this circumstance, the issues of what happens to the contributions to which members would otherwise be entitled and how those vulnerable to loss of payments during a pause order are treated remain equally valid under this provision as under the previous one. However, I understand why one would want to extend the pause-order power to an unauthorised scheme.

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[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, it is quite right that we debate whether this clause should stand part of the Bill, because it is an important one. I hope to persuade noble Lords who have spoken that the powers we are taking are proportionate and indeed necessary in order to deliver the commitments that the Government have made to beneficiaries of pension schemes. As the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, said, we are seeking here to bring occupational pensions into line with the regime that already exists for other pensions.

In a nutshell, the clause amends existing legislation in Schedule 18 to the Pensions Act 2014 to allow regulations to be made that enable a term of a relevant contract to be overridden to the extent that it conflicts with a provision in those regulations. I emphasise that the power would allow a contract to be overridden only where there is a conflict with a provision in regulations. This ensures that relevant contracts are consistent with the regulations, and provides certainty to the parties involved. It may be helpful if I clarify that Clause 40 is distinct from the previous clauses in this Bill that referred to charges; those clauses all relate to the proposed master trust authorisation regime.

We intend to use Clause 40, alongside existing powers in the Pensions Act 2014, to make regulations to cap or ban early exit charges. Early exit charges are any administration charges that are paid by a member for leaving their pension scheme early when they are eligible to access the pension freedoms, which they would not face at their normal retirement date. The Financial Conduct Authority intends to make rules by April 2017 to cap or ban early exit charges in personal and workplace personal pension schemes. Parliament has already approved amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which broadly allows contracts to be overridden.

Together with the existing powers in relation to charges, Clause 40 will enable us to make regulations that introduce similar protection to members of occupational pension schemes. It will also be used to override contractual terms that conflict with the ban on member-borne commission arising under existing contracts in certain occupational pension schemes. By “commission contracts” we mean the contracts between trustees or managers and a person who provides administrative services to the scheme, which permits the person to impose the member-borne commission charge. Existing contracts are those that were entered into before 6 April 2016. This will complete the ban that already exists for commission arrangements entered into on or after 6 April 2016.

The consultations that we undertook on early exit charges and on member-borne commission showed us that these charges generally arise in contracts between trustees or managers of certain occupational pension schemes and those who provide administration services to the scheme. Our existing powers in Schedule 18 to the Pensions Act 2014 enable us to make regulations that override any provision of a relevant scheme where it conflicts with a provision in those regulations. For example, we have used that power in relation to the appointment of service providers in the scheme administration regulations. The reason why we are taking this power is that this does not extend to the contracts under which the charges arise. Clause 40 therefore extends the existing power in Schedule 18 to allow the overriding of a term of a relevant contract that conflicts with a provision of the regulations. The relevant contract is defined as those between a trustee or a manager of a pension scheme and someone providing services to the scheme. The regulations that we intend to make will apply to charges imposed from the date when the regulations come into force, even where they are charged under existing contracts. We expect them to come into force in October 2017.

As noble Lords may be aware, the pensions market is continually evolving and modernising, and this extends to charging practices. It may be necessary to alter the charges requirements to reflect any changes in the pensions market that may disadvantage members. We intend to consult on the draft regulations early next year. In addition, any potential further regulations made under the power in Clause 40 will be subject to public consultation. The requirement to do this is set out in paragraph 8 of Schedule 18 to the Pensions Act 2014.

Such regulations would also be subject to parliamentary scrutiny through the negative resolution procedure. I note that this House’s Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was content with this approach. This allows legislation to be amended reasonably quickly to provide the member protection that may be needed. Together with the consultation, we believe there is effective scrutiny and scope for challenge over the Government’s intended use of these powers.

I would be disappointed if any trustees felt that they had to resign over this. I regard these measures as benefiting scheme members, for whom trustees are acting to defend their interests. In response to the charge that we are interfering with contracts signed in good faith, we consulted on this. We made it clear that it is generally undesirable to interfere with existing contractual rights; it can be justified only in circumstances such as this, where it is necessary to achieve important public policy goals—we have given a commitment to do this—and where the action is proportionate in the public interest. We expect trustees and service providers to work together when renegotiating for amending contracts to reflect implementation of the charge cap, and our consultation and engagement with the pensions industry and other stakeholders on capping or banning early exit charges and spanning existing member-borne commission showed that, by and large, the Government’s intentions were widely welcomed. We continue to engage with industry and stakeholders on those two areas.

I hope that I have convinced the House that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate, especially my noble friend Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope. I am reassured by the Minister saying that it is undesirable generally to interfere with contractual rights, completely concur that we must have member protection and welcome the public consultation that will take place in the near future. I am also reassured by much else that the Minister said and am content for the clause to stand part of the Bill.

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[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, as we reach the last amendment in Committee, I point out that the Bill has been in the hands of two distinguished psychoanalysts—Freud and his disciple “Jung”. Between us, we have tried to look at the disorders in the Bill and prescribe appropriate remedies.

I thank the noble Baroness for raising this important issue. I understand the strong feelings that she expressed when she moved her amendment. In 2015, the Government introduced pension flexibilities, which gave people the freedom to choose how they use their pension savings. Over 300,000 people have chosen to flexibly access over £6 billion since they were introduced, and the Government are committed to keeping these freedoms in place.

In March 2015, the coalition Government announced proposals to remove the current restrictions on assigning existing annuities and to create the conditions for a secondary market to develop. The proposed reforms were in two main areas—removing the unauthorised payment tax that deters people from assigning their annuity, and working with the Financial Conduct Authority to establish a comprehensive consumer protection package. The Government engaged extensively with industry and consumer groups on how they could establish the conditions for an effective market to develop. It would not have been right to introduce measures before understanding the impact that they might have on consumers and ensuring that the necessary conditions for a successful market were in place. In the course of this engagement, it became increasingly clear that creating the conditions to allow a vibrant and competitive market to emerge, with multiple buyers and sellers of annuities, could not be balanced with sufficient consumer protection. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for setting out so clearly the problems that would have ensued had we proceeded.

On 19 October, Simon Kirby, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, made a Statement in the other place about the Government’s decision not to take this policy forward, which I repeated for your Lordships on the same day. Our investigations showed that many annuity providers were willing to allow consumers to assign their annuities. Of course, the market for annuities is itself undergoing change following the introduction of the pension freedoms. What became apparent is that, at this time, there would be insufficient purchasers to create a competitive market. Without a competitive market, consumers were likely to get poor value for their annuities and incur high costs for selling.

The Government are committed to the principle of giving people the freedom to make decisions about what to do with their money, which is why we have explored in detail how we could allow this market to emerge and protect consumers at the same time. But what has become clear is that the steps the Government would need to take to create demand in the market would undermine protections and increase the risk for consumers. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, cited Steve Webb, the Pensions Minister at the time, who said in the context of this decision:

“There did need to be a lot of potential buyers for this market to work”,

and that while the decision is,

“disappointing it is understandable”.

Rather than being to the benefit of British pensioners, this market would instead be to their detriment. It would clearly not be in consumers’ interests to continue with this policy. Only this afternoon, we have had a number of debates about the importance of protecting consumers, and this would be a step in the opposite direction.

I accept that some people will be disappointed, as the noble Baroness explained, although our analysis indicated that only 5% of annuitants would be interested in taking this option forward. While we accept the disappointment, I hope that noble Lords will agree that it would not be right at this time to allow a market to develop when it is likely to lead to poor consumer outcomes. With this in mind, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, which I obviously find extremely disappointing. This is a very serious issue. I understand that there were difficulties in producing a competitive market and that the Government support freedom of choice. However, pensioners will not have freedom of choice while they cannot access the secondary annuity market. I thank the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and the Minister for mentioning my colleague Steve Webb. His view is that the policy was abandoned because the Government did not put enough weight behind moving it forward. Had they done so, there might have been a different outcome.

At this time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment but reserve the right to return to it on Report.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 14 and 15. I shall be brief. Clause 7 deals with the fit and proper persons regime and sets out which persons the Pensions Regulator must assess. It provides that regulation should set out matters which must be taken into account.

Clause 7(2)(e) identifies as one of the persons who must be assessed as fit and proper,

“a person who (alone or with others) has power to vary the scheme (where the scheme is not established under a trust)”.

By way of a probe, Amendment 13 would delete the reference to a scheme not established under trust. We ask the Government to spell out the type of arrangement they envisage would not be established under a trust and, where responsibilities are placed on trustees in the Bill—for example, in Clauses 14 and 15—by whom they would be discharged. Amendment 14 would ensure that the Pensions Regulator was subject to an ongoing requirement to ensure that specified persons remained fit and proper. Can the Minister advise whether and how such a requirement is envisaged to be met? Amendment 15 would change the nature of the resolution from negative to affirmative. I trust that the amendments will receive the same favourable response as those raised previously. I beg to move.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his introduction to the amendments. I hope to be able to respond almost as briefly—and as eloquently.

Amendment 13 would amend the description of one of the people whom the Pensions Regulator must assess as fit and proper. It would change the description of a person who,

“(alone or with others) has power to vary the scheme (where the scheme is not established under a trust)”,

by removing the words,

“where the scheme is not established under a trust”.

The preceding paragraph refers to a person who has the power to vary the terms of the trust under which the scheme is established, and the paragraph in question here is a counterparty to that provision. The two paragraphs work together to ensure that any person who has the power to vary the terms of the trust or the scheme is subject to the fit and proper person test. Clause 7(2)(d) describes the persons who have this function under a trust-based scheme and Clause 7(2)(e) describes an equivalent for schemes which are not set up under trust. Clause 7(2)(e) is therefore specifically to cater for those relatively rare exceptions where a master trust may be set up outside the trust-based structure and to ensure that we do not create an avoidance loop hole.

Incidentally, we have maintained the term “master trust”, as that is how such schemes are known in the industry, even where they may be set up outside the trust-based structure. Clause 1 defines what the term means for the purpose of this part of the Bill, to ensure that there is clarity about who is in scope of the new regime, but it is not necessarily the case that it would be possible only ever to set up the sort of scheme captured under trust. It would be relatively rare, but we need to cater for such circumstances. We would want the regime to bite where schemes were not set up under trust, and this is one place in the Bill where something separate is needed to provide such cover. The two paragraphs provide that anyone who has power to vary the terms of the master trust must be subject to the fit and proper test.

I welcome the sentiment expressed in Amendment 14, which would require the regulator to ensure that the authorisation criteria had been met continuously and that it should not be a “once and done” affair. I agree that it would not be sufficient to require the scheme to satisfy the regulator on these matters only once at the point of application for authorisation. The intent of the Bill is that the standards must be maintained continuously.

Clauses 3, 4 and 5 together ensure that a scheme cannot operate unless it is authorised—with various modifications for existing schemes in Schedule 2, which we will come to later—and provide for a clear application process and decision by the regulator. Clause 19 also allows for the Pensions Regulator to withdraw that authorisation at a point at which it stops being satisfied that the criteria are met. To be clear: this does not mean that the scheme will be asked to reapply for authorisation regularly and that, if it fails, this is the only way to change its status. Nor does it mean that, once the test is passed, the scheme will always remain authorised; the criteria must continue to be met. It does mean that the regulator can withdraw authorisation if it is no longer satisfied that the criteria are met. The scheme must be able to show to the regulator’s satisfaction that it is meeting the criteria on an ongoing basis.

[Lord Hutton of Furness (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments, which have been very clear, but where I am struggling with his account of this part of the Bill is his saying that the regulator has almost an implied power to review, for example, whether a newly appointed trustee is a fit and proper person. There is nowhere in the Bill so far as I can see where that implied power is expressed. It is always better for such matters to be dealt with by giving the regulator an express power than to rely on some clever interpretation of words to get to the point where it is implied the regulator has a power to review when all it has is, in the words of the Minister, the power to withdraw authorisation, which is altogether different.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I take the point that the noble Lord has just made. I hope to be able to reassure him that other provisions in the Bill will satisfy him that the regulator will have the necessary information to withdraw authorisation if something happens that requires it. I will come to that shortly.

As a public body, the regulator must exercise its general functions reasonably and consistently with its duty to be satisfied that the scheme meets, and therefore continues to meet, the authorisation criteria. With respect, a specific regulation-making power to require the regulator to review fitness and propriety is not necessary.

I turn to other clauses, which I hope shed some light on the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. Clause 14, requiring the submission of annual accounts, Clause 15, requiring the submission of a supervisory return and, crucially, Clause 16, which creates a duty to notify the regulator of significant events, all serve to ensure that the Pensions Regulator can take an ongoing view of risk in relation to whether it remains satisfied that the scheme continues to meet the criteria.

Additionally, the regulator also has its information-gathering powers to bring to bear, so it can ask schemes for information to assist in assessing whether it remains satisfied that a scheme continues to meet the criteria and inquire for more information about reported events or information provided. The duty to notify the regulator of significant events, which is provided for in Clause 16, will be supplemented by regulations which specify the events which must be reported. Although we intend to consult on the regulations, our current thinking is that such events will include a change in status of anyone subject to a fit and proper test and any change in the personnel who are subject to the fit and proper test. The use of the significant events regime in Clause 16 to achieve this end is not set out in express terms in the Bill because of the detail which will follow in regulations, but I hope that my outlining of the intent above has helped to clarify this. I have no doubt that later we will return to Clause 16 for further debate.

Amendment 15 would change the regulation-making procedure in Clause 7 from the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure. I note that in an otherwise critical report, the Delegated Powers Committee acknowledged that this clause was one where the negative procedure might be appropriate. None the less, I refer to what my noble friend said in earlier debates about wanting to stand back and look at the totality of procedures, affirmative and negative, and then come to a conclusion at the end on whether we strike the right balance. On that basis, I hope the amendment might be withdrawn.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response to those amendments, and am certainly grateful to my noble friend Lord Hutton for that important point about how, in the circumstances, it is better to have an express provision than an implied one. I will work through the record of what the Minister said to see how close we got to that express provision, or whether it is still essentially an implied power. I understand what the noble Lord said about the nature of the regulations. That will run through this Bill.

I return briefly to this question of when master trusts are set up but not under a trust. I think the noble Lord said that would be a rare or unusual occasion. I do not know whether he can say a bit more about that. Particularly, the raft of the Bill focuses on the obligations for the trustee or trustees who set up master trusts, but where it is not set up under trust, does it evolve into something that becomes a trust and therefore you get trustees in the normal way or does it continue with some other existence? If the latter, what is the nature of the person who would be a trustee were it set up under trust? That puzzled me a little. If the noble Lord felt it would be better to write to me, I would be happy with that, but if we could deal with it now that would be helpful.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord is very generous in suggesting that this matter might be addressed better in a letter than in an exchange across the Dispatch Boxes. I made inquiries and it is indeed the case that some are established other than under trusts. Obviously, we do not want a loophole that people can use because they are not formally constituted as a trust. However, I accept the noble Lord’s generous offer and will write to him giving a more detailed response to the issues he raised.

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[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords, I echo the comments made by my noble friend Lord Flight. Why do the draftsmen of the Bill think that having a separate legal entity is definitely a good thing? What are the risks that this approach tries to close down? Perhaps if we could understand those risks better, we might be able to address the issue in a slightly different way. Is the aim somehow to ring-fence the DC covenant of the scheme funder and prevent them from having other financial obligations that might take away from the support for this master trust, or to minimise the burden on checking accounts? Obviously, it is easier to review the accounts of a stand-alone entity than of a much broader group. Hopefully, if we could better understand what the rationale is, it might be possible to address some of the very important concerns that have been expressed by some of our major insurance companies.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his amendment. I gently point out that there is a spelling mistake in it, but there are other reasons for resisting it.

Amendments 19 and 20, tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, deal with Clause 10, which sets out the requirements that a scheme funder must meet in order for a master trust to be authorised. I hope to explain to noble Lords, particularly my noble friend, the thinking behind insisting that there is a separate legal entity behind each scheme. A scheme funder by definition is key to the master trust’s financial sustainability. By “scheme funder” we mean a person who is liable to provide funds in relation to the scheme when the administration charges paid by and in respect of members are not sufficient to cover the scheme’s costs, or someone who is entitled to receive profits when the scheme’s charges exceed its costs.

Amendment 19 would remove the requirement for the scheme funder to be a separate legal entity that carries on business activities only directly related to the master trust, and would replace it with a requirement for the scheme funder to be approved by the Pensions Regulator. I listened with interest to the points that noble Lords made in respect of that amendment. Amendment 20 would similarly remove the requirement for a master trust’s scheme funder to be a separate legal entity that carries on only the master trust business. The effect of both amendments would be to allow the same legal entity that acts as scheme funder to engage in business activities not directly related to the master trust, making it more difficult for the Pensions Regulator to identify matters relevant to the master trust and therefore to assess the financial sustainability of the scheme.

To enable the regulator to assess the financial position of the scheme with certainty when deciding whether the master trust should be authorised or remain authorised, the scheme funder must be set up as a separate legal entity. This is defined in the Bill as meaning, in effect, a legal person whose only business activities are in relation to the master trust. Requiring scheme funders to be separate legal entities will make their financial position, and the financial arrangements between them and the master trust, more transparent to the regulator and provide greater clarity regarding the assets, liabilities, costs and income in relation to the master trust business. This will greatly assist the regulator in carrying out its assessment of schemes’ financial sustainability.

There will be greater transparency regarding any additional funding streams coming into the scheme funder entity, and the level of commitment of those funds for the purposes of running the master trust, should the scheme funder be in receipt of income generated from other lines of business carried on by connected entities. The amendments would remove that transparency by making it possible for the scheme funder to carry on business activities not related to the master trust under the same corporate entity. It would therefore be difficult for the regulator to identify the financial sustainability or otherwise of the master trust.

One of the other authorisation criteria of which the regulator needs to be satisfied is that the people involved in the master trust scheme are fit and proper. Clause 7 specifies people that the regulator must assess for this purpose, including the scheme funder. It is not clear to what extent Amendment 19, requiring the scheme funder to be approved by the regulator, would differ from the assessment that the regulator is already required to carry out under Clause 7. Requiring the regulator to approve the scheme funder in general terms, rather than setting out requirements in the primary legislation requiring the scheme funder to be set up as a separate legal entity, would not only potentially make the financial sustainability of the scheme less clear to the regulator but would also give master trusts and scheme funders less certainty about the conditions that must be met for authorisation.

To turn back to the requirement for the scheme funder to be set up as a separate legal entity, I am aware that a number of concerns have been raised about the impact that this will have on existing businesses, such as the removal of protection and cross-subsidy through diversified lines of business supporting the master trust, restrictions on the use of shared services and the disruption of existing business. I shall come to each of these in turn, but I reassure the House that this authorisation criterion is not designed to prevent funds from flowing from one business to another, nor is it our intention to disrupt existing arrangements unnecessarily. The overarching aim of the requirements is transparency in the cash flows to and from the master trust business, and the assets and liabilities related to it, so that the regulator can readily ascertain the financial position of the scheme funder and the financial arrangements between the funder and the scheme. I think that paragraph answers the question asked by my noble friend Lady Altmann.

The requirements in Clause 10 do not prevent the master trust benefiting from the support of other businesses. Support can be offered from the scheme funder’s wider group explicitly through the provision of a legally enforceable guarantee or other formal arrangement from another group company of sufficient financial strength. Where the scheme funder currently conducts other businesses, a degree of cross-subsidy may already take place, and there is no intention to prevent this.

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Finally, Amendment 27 in the group provides for regulations on systems and processes requirements—the key authorisation criteria in this Bill—to be subject to affirmative resolution. I accept that it is not unusual in pension legislation for detail to be delegated to regulation. I am not seeking to row against that. However, I believe the circumstances in this instance are different. These requirements go to the heart of how these master trusts are to be run. This is a new regime. There are no draft regulations before the House and policy matters are still to be resolved. This is a new regime of protection for what could be 6 or 7 million savers, or more. It is not a trivial matter. When the noble Lord is balancing whether they believe the Government have it right in terms of negative and affirmative resolution, I ask that the Minister focuses on these requirements and the regulations, certainly in the first instance.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken to this group of amendments to Clause 11, which sets out one of the authorisation criteria, namely,

“that the systems and processes used in running the scheme are sufficient to ensure that it is run effectively”.

Amendment 21, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord McKenzie and Lord Monks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, would amend Clause 11(4)(d) by making it clear that regulations on the matters that the regulator must take into account in deciding whether the schemes, systems and processes are sufficient to ensure that it is run effectively may include provisions about the processes that master trusts are required to follow in relation to environmental, social and governance risks. I think the intention behind the amendment is to do it in relation to the transactions and investment decisions of the scheme, rather than across the range of systems and processes that a scheme may operate on a day-to-day basis, such as staffing and travel. I see the noble Baroness nodding in assent.

Given that this amendment adds environmental, social and governance risks to subsection (4)(d), alongside processes relating to transactions and investment decisions, I am responding on the basis of that first interpretation. Clause 11 sets out specific areas that the Secretary of State may include in regulations and that the Pensions Regulator must take into account when deciding whether it is satisfied that the systems and processes adopted by schemes are sufficient to ensure that they are run effectively.

I have enormous sympathy with the case made by the noble Baroness that environmental, social and governance risks should feature in the way she described, but I remain to be persuaded that it needs to be included in the Bill. There are a number of reasons why. The current regulatory framework allows for ESG—environmental, social and governance—issues to be taken into account. TPR guidance makes it clear that trustees should take into account long-term financial sustainability in their investment strategies and new requirements can be inserted without primary legislation.

Environmental, social and governance issues are already, broadly, taken account of through the existing regulatory arrangements which apply to trustees of pension schemes with 100 or more members, including the statement of investment principles for their scheme, as set out in the investment regulations. The statement must include details of the extent to which the trustees take environmental, social and other factors into account in selecting, retaining and realising investments. These principles have been further supported by the Law Commission’s review of fiduciary duty, which confirmed that trustees should take these factors into account when they are financially material.

The Pensions Regulator has incorporated the Law Commission’s conclusions into its guidance for trustees and its code of practice on “Governance and administration of occupational trust-based schemes providing money purchase benefits”, which gives practical guidelines on how to comply with the legal requirements of pensions regulation. This guidance sets out the regulator’s expectation that when setting investment strategies, trustees will,

“take account of risks affecting the long-term financial sustainability of the investments”.

In addition, Regulation 4 of the investment regulations supplements trustees’ fiduciary duties under trust law by requiring that the assets of all pension schemes must be properly diversified in such a way as to avoid excessive reliance on any particular assets, and to avoid accumulations of risk in the portfolio as a whole. Should the Government subsequently decide to make regulations about the adequacy of the processes that master trusts are required to take into account in relation to environmental, social and governance risks in relation to investments, I can assure noble Lords and the noble Baroness that regulations would be able to cover this even if it was not specified in the Bill, as is done by the amendment. I hope I have said enough to explain why I am not of the view that the amendment should form part of the Bill.

Amendment 22 seeks to insert a new subsection into Clause 11 (4)(g) to make it clear that regulations about the processes used in running the scheme, which the regulator must judge are sufficient to ensure that the scheme is run effectively, may include provision about identifying, reporting, managing and minimising conflicts of interest relating to the work of trustees. The noble Baroness spoke about some of the risks involved here. The objective of Clause 11 is solely to ensure that the schemes are run effectively. It is not directly concerned about the conduct of the trustees undertaking their duties in relation to the pension scheme.

The Government recognised the potential for trustees’ conflicts of interest to arise in some multi-employer schemes and addressed this by introducing additional governance requirements for multi-employer schemes. These provisions were introduced in the Occupational Pension Scheme (Charges and Governance) Regulations 2015, which amended the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 to require, first, that there should be a minimum of three trustees, and that a majority of these three or more trustees, including the chair, must be independent of the scheme’s service providers. Furthermore, the trustees must be subject to fixed-term appointment and appointed via an open and transparent recruitment process. The trustees must make arrangements to encourage members to make their views known to trustees on matters concerning the scheme. When establishing whether a trustee is independent of the scheme’s service provider, various matters must be taken into account, which are set out at Regulation 28(3) of the scheme administration regulations 1996 as inserted by Regulation 22 of the charges and governance regulations. An example is whether the trustee is a director, partner, or employee of an undertaking which provides advisory, administration, investment or other services in respect of the scheme.

In addition to these requirements that are currently placed on trustees, Clause 7(2)(c) places a requirement on the Pensions Regulator to assess whether a trustee of a master trust scheme is a fit and proper person as part of the decision on the application to establish a master trust, as set out in Clause 5(3)(a). Clause 7(4)(b) provides for the Pensions Regulator to take into account any matters it considers appropriate that are not covered by regulation when assessing whether a person is a fit and proper person to act.

When the Pensions Regulator is no longer satisfied that an authorised master trust scheme meets the authorisation criteria, including whether a trustee of the scheme is a fit and proper person, Clause 19(1) allows for the authorisation to be withdrawn. Clause 19(2) and (3) provide the process that the Pensions Regulator must follow once a decision has been made to withdraw authorisation. So, in light of existing legislative requirements setting out the required propriety and conduct of trustees of pension funds, and the clear role of the Pensions Regulator set out in the Bill to ensure that trustees of master trust schemes are fit and proper persons, I believe that this amendment is not necessary.

Amendment 23 requires the Secretary of State to make regulations that set a minimum requirement for each of the processes listed in subsection (4)(a) to (g) of Clause 11. I agree in principle that the question of minimum standards is a key one, but I reassure noble Lords that the clause as drafted enables the Secretary of State to set out in regulations factors and standards to which the Pensions Regulator must have regard when deciding whether it is satisfied that a scheme’s systems and processes are sufficient. However, the key difference between the drafting of the Bill now, compared to how the amendment would alter its meaning, is that the amendment states that regulations “must” make minimum requirements.

There are two closely related reasons why I shall ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment. Both my points flow from the principle that the regime has been designed to ensure that we do not mistakenly apply a one-size-fits-all requirement to schemes. A minimum requirement, as something that necessarily has to be set out in regulations, may have some unintended consequences. First, were a minimum requirement to be applied, there is a risk that the one-size-fits-all approach could cause some schemes to fail to meet the criteria and therefore fail to achieve authorisation, despite having systems and processes which are sufficient to ensure that the scheme is run effectively.

Secondly, not all of the specified processes easily lend themselves to a minimum requirement. This brings a similar practical consequence to the point that I have just mentioned. Further, addition of the “must” in this amendment may result in finding the Secretary of State in a position where he cannot comply with his regulatory duties because there is no one-size-fits-all requirement in that case. An example for both these scenarios would be resource planning, where flexibility would be needed to cater for different scheme requirements. Another would be in relation to records management or administration, where flexibility would be needed to cater for different scheme requirements, sizes and structures.

For example, we would want to ensure that administrative systems must be adequate to support current operations; regularly monitored to ensure capacity; and adequate to support the anticipated growth of the scheme. This is more flexible than a minimum standard and tailored to a scheme’s own strategy for achieving sufficient scale. I hope that I have said enough for noble Lords to concur that the question of minimum standards is a key one, and that we will seek to use the regulation-making power in this way when appropriate, taking account of considerations to which I have just referred.

Finally, Amendment 20A stipulates that regulations about the processes must include provision about the areas listed under subsection (4) of the clause. As I have noted previously, we want to consult industry and other interested parties on the content of regulations made under Parts 1 and 2. The list provided at subsection (4) has been included in the Bill to provide clarity to industry now about the areas that the Government believe such regulations are likely to cover. However, the Government do not intend to stipulate the areas that must be included in the regulations made under this clause without consulting on those regulations. I hope that I have made the right assumption about what the amendment is aimed at and explained why the change would not be appropriate.

Finally, we have our old friends, negative and affirmative. I can only repeat what I have said on earlier occasions, and what my noble friend has said before—namely, that we would like to reflect on the balance of affirmative and negative in the Bill as a whole and come up with a balanced assessment of what we believe to be appropriate. On that basis, I hope that the amendments will not be pressed.

[Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope (LD)]

My Lords, I support the case that the noble Baroness made for Amendment 22. I am very worried about conflicts of interest. The Minister was very generous and set out a detailed explanation that will repay careful study by us all tomorrow. I will certainly do that. What happens to trust deeds in all this? My experience as a defined benefit trustee is that the trustees have control, responsibilities and duties and are able to effect measures through the trust deed. We seem to be leaving all that to one side in this legislation. There may well be a case for not including measures such as Amendment 22 in the Bill. However, fundamentally different conflicts of interest face trustees in a profit-making master trust situation when they have members on the one hand and providers on the other. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, who knows a lot more about this than I do, makes an important point here. I am willing to discuss how we resolve this issue and whether we include the relevant measure in the Bill, but I will be following it very carefully as this legislation goes through.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I take the noble Lord’s point. Under the authorisation criteria, the Pensions Regulator has to assess,

“whether each of the following is a fit and proper person”,

and one of them is a trustee. However, I take on board what the noble Lord says, which echoes what he said in an earlier debate—namely, that we should not lose sight of the responsibilities of trustees when we focus on the Pensions Regulator and everybody else. I should like to reflect on the point he has made and, indeed, the other point made about potential conflicts of interest and master trusts.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville]

I thank the Minister for his very full response on all the amendments in this group. I agree that long-term financial sustainability is very important. I noted that when he talked about the responsibilities of trustees, he said that they “must” do certain things, not “may”, yet the Bill says “may” and not “must”. I will look in detail at what the Minister has said and I will be looking for clarity in the Bill. However, given the hour, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.