Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Campbell of Surbiton (CB)]

My Lords, I support Motion B1 in the name of my noble friend Lord Pannick. Noble Lords will know that I have expressed serious concerns about Part 4 at every stage of the Bill, and I remain deeply troubled. I know only too well how much vulnerable people, especially those who are disabled, rely on state services and how catastrophic it is when things go horribly wrong. I feel that in the other place the Lord Chancellor is still peddling the line that judicial review has been hijacked by pressure groups for political campaigning, citing again and again the example of Richard III. If political campaigning includes campaigning for justice and people’s access to justice, then I am very happy to plead guilty; I am one of those campaigners.

The Lord Chancellor also said in the other place that tough times mean tough decisions and tough love. I agree with that, but judicial review is even more critical in times of stress—in tough times—to ensure that the Government do not ride roughshod over their citizens. These reforms must be seen in the context of cuts to legal aid which already hinder access to justice for those at the margins of society, especially disabled people. This is not an issue about lawyers protecting their status or income. I am sorry, but it just is not. Where is the evidence? It is truly about weakening the ability of ordinary vulnerable people to hold public bodies to account and increasing the power of the state.

Clause 64, if not amended, would require judges to refuse judicial review if the outcome would be highly likely to be no different. It would remove their discretion. We need their discretion. The Government want to exclude judicial review for what they call “minor technicalities” —for example, the need for a bit more consultation. So much for due process. Removing judges’ current discretion would allow unlawful or dishonest decisions to go unchecked and public bodies to be let off the hook. It would also dramatically change the role of judges in second guessing what might have been. I cannot understand it. It cannot be right. The amendments made by this House to restore judicial discretion were rejected in the other place. I thank my noble friend Lord Pannick for his Motion and entirely support it. I seriously urge all Members of your Lordships’ House to think beyond the campaigning and those odd cases where it may have been quite ridiculous and to think about the hundreds of very vulnerable people who will need this over the coming years as, I have to tell the House, things are getting really tough for us.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, it is always important to listen to what is said by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton. She has an insight into these matters that Members of the House who come from a legal background, as I obviously do, do not have personal experience of. It is very apposite that she should have said what she just said. I hope that the House will heed her plea.

Knowing that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would have to go to Moscow, I am bound to say that I had prepared for him not to be here, and therefore had prepared a much longer speech than I am going to give. But I would like to add just one or two things. As I am sure your Lordships understand, this is a very important issue. If noble and learned Lords have any ability to assist and advise the House, then it was clear in the earlier stages of the Bill that this was something they thought was wrong. They gave their reasons, and I played a leading part in that. The reason we did so was that we thought it was going to be bad for justice, for the citizens of this country and for the reputation of this country as a leading adherent of the rule of law. Judicial review is all about the rule of law. Every application that has any prospect of succeeding initially has to prove that something happened which the Lord Chancellor and the judges would regard as being unlawful. So if you are refusing relief in this situation, you are doing it with regard to something which has been illegal, or is in a position where there could be illegality.

The second thing to remember is that the procedure for judicial review is an exceptional procedure, designed initially by the judges, but then enacted in what was the Supreme Court Act and is now the Senior Courts Act 1981, in Section 31, which sets out the position as to the jurisdiction of the courts. That section makes it clear that heavy responsibilities are placed upon the judiciary with regard to its operation. The safeguards are there, because they have a very heavy responsibility of holding the balance. The amendment we are now considering is a small one. It is in relation to the first amendment, which I am addressing. As required by the Government, the judge—the word in question is— “must”. As required by the amendment, the word is “may”. The difference between us is “must” and “may”. As you have already heard, in the House of Commons—and I am going to come back to this—the Lord Chancellor misled the House. I have to say that. I am sure the Minister will accept it. He said to it that each of the amendments—

[Lord Faulks]

I am only interrupting to agree absolutely with what the noble and learned Lord said. The Minister has in fact written to say he was in error. The letter has, I believe, been placed in both Houses of Parliament, but there was a mistake and the noble and learned Lord is quite right to draw attention to that.

[Lord Woolf]

I am grateful to the Minister for making that clear. I was not aware that the Lord Chancellor had done so, and I thought it was very regrettable that he should have failed to do so. It is extremely important that the one Member of the lower House who has a statutory responsibility of a particular nature with regard to the rule of law and the administration of justice should have made that mistake, because he dealt very summarily and quickly with the position which was before this House in some detail. We have heard the relevant passages of what he said.

I recall that on, I think, 5 December—I have the reference to it if it is required—the Minister took care to say that there was a convention that the courts, Parliament and Government each respected each other and therefore did not unnecessarily criticise each other. I was well aware of that convention but I would suggest that it is much wider than that. It is a convention that, in respecting the other arms of government, each of them—I include the judiciary here as an arm of government—will not trespass on the other’s area of territory or a different part of the arm unless there are particular reasons for doing so. One can see why that should be so. In the courts, we are very particular indeed not to trespass on the privileges of this House and the other place—and they should be equally sensitive.

Knowing what had been done by this House, which appeared to me at any rate to be so clearly necessary, I read with great care what was said in the lower House. I must say that I was very concerned that the Lord Chancellor in the lower House had indicated the three reasons that noble Lords were told about by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, when he read the speech, including one that clearly amounted to a reflection on the judiciary. I have heard many protestations that the Lord Chancellor greatly respects the independence of the judiciary. However, when he talked about its difficult task of administering judicial review, as it does, day in and day out—and the task of presiding over judicial review is allocated to earmarked judges, so we can be sure that the matter will be properly considered—he was concerned that it was never intended to put the courts above the elected Government in taking decisions over the essential interests of this country. That is one of the problems that the Chancellor was concerned about. I would gently suggest to the Lord Chancellor, if he is writing apologies, that that is another matter that certainly calls out for an apology. It is wholly inconsistent with his statutory responsibilities under the Constitutional Reform Act. That is something that, having been said, either persuades the House or does not. However, if the other place was misled as to the background, what is at first sight a very difficult decision to understand is explained. I suggest that, because the matter was not put fairly to the other place, that is another very good reason why the matter should be returned to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Horam]

That is precisely why, as I understand it, my noble friend is introducing in a later amendment a de minimis clause precisely designed to exempt small communities. When there is a project and neighbours perhaps contribute £100 or £150 each to object to it, that would be entirely legitimate and I would be wholly in favour of it. That would not be stopped by this precisely because the Government have recognised that point and in a later amendment are introducing a de minimis clause.

[Lord Woolf]

That is not correct on the first amendment. There is no qualification being introduced by the Government.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Monday 10th November 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Woolf]

1: Clause 8, page 8, line 13, at end insert—
“(4) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State shall lay a report before Parliament describing—
(a) the recruitment process for recall adjudicators;(b) the qualifications, experience and competences which will be required of recall adjudicators;(c) the training which will be provided for recall adjudicators; and(d) the anticipated costs of establishing a system of recall adjudicators in comparison with the costs of recruiting an increased number of Parole Board members and case managers.”

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I can be brief because I hope, and have reason to believe, that the Minister will indicate that he can give me the comfort I am seeking and which this amendment is designed to achieve. Noble Lords will recall that the Minister tabled a government amendment on Report that was designed to introduce a new figure into the criminal justice scene. He is to be the recall adjudicator and he will take over the responsibilities of the Parole Board in respect of reviewing those who have been released on licence but are being recalled for reasons such as their committing another offence. This could be of serious importance both to the public and, of course, to the offender who is being returned to prison. His liberty is at stake.

When the Minister introduced the amendment, he was not in a position to provide any details that would enable the quality of what was being proposed to be assessed. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who I am pleased to see in his seat, described it—I suggest accurately—as seeking a “blank cheque”. As we all know, it is never wise even to give Governments a blank cheque because you may find that it is not used in precisely the way that was intended. The noble Lord sought those details and, while giving the proposal a general welcome and hoping it would be successful, sought to impose both a sunrise clause and a sunset clause to cover the situation being created by the amendment.

The Government had acted on this so late in the day because of a decision of the Supreme Court in a case which was discussed on Report, and which indicated that it would be possible to have a body that was not necessarily created as a proper judicial body to perform this function—a sort of quasi-judicial body. The interpretation by the Supreme Court of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights indicated that what was determinative was the original court sentencing, not the body reviewing the recall.

The matter was left at that, but I suggested on Report that the position was unsatisfactory and expressed the hope that the Government would consider the situation further. However, in case they did not do so, I tabled the amendment in question. It sets out what I would suggest is the minimum amount of information that needs to be provided before the new body is created. It would give those who are concerned about saving money in the hard-pressed criminal justice system information about cost and would seek information about the quality of those who are to be the new adjudicators on recall applications.

Before the new system is introduced it is important that Parliament should be given information that would enable it to use its powers to scrutinise what is proposed. The Minister accepted that there was an obligation for fairness in that situation, notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in the Whiston case, 1914, UKSC39. That made it clear that he was thinking along the same lines as those who, like me, were concerned about what the quality of this new body would be.

If the Minister is prepared to give an undertaking that he would arrange for a report to be made to Parliament, setting out enough information to enable what was proposed to be evaluated, I need not detain the House further. In order to give the Minister an indication of whether what I have been told is correct, I propose to say no more, but at this stage formally to move my amendment.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand that the Minister may accept the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and in that case the noble and learned Lord will have entered the fold, but this time it is the ministerial sheep who will emerge wearing the Woolf’s clothing—and for that I am sure the House will be grateful.

The noble and learned Lord identified some of the potential problems that need clarifying and we look forward to receiving that clarification. I would like to add another issue that was raised in the debate on Report, and that is the possible availability of legal aid for such applications. I dare say that the Minister will confirm that that will at least be considered and that any reference to it will be contained in such a report in due course.

One other matter to touch on is no doubt encompassed within the terms of the amendment. There was an indication at an earlier stage that the Government would possibly be looking to the magistracy as a source of potential recruitment for those who would undertake this responsibility. The matter has aroused some concern. Obviously I am not asking the Minister to give an indication finally one way or the other, but I take it that he would confirm at least that that is not the only possibility that will be looked at—in which case we will await the Government’s response in due course with keen anticipation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Woolf]

I thank the Minister for giving those assurances, which meet my expectations as to what he would say. Perhaps I may be excused if I point out that the point he makes about the rules of procedure is helpful but by no means meets the concerns that I was indicating because, of course, the rules committee cannot—by rules—ensure that the right people are doing the job. What the Minister says should achieve that; the only possible caveat I would have is with regard to his comments about magistrates. I should disclose I was a former president of the Magistrates’ Association. I say former president because unfortunately I belong to a club which was not to the liking of the Magistrates’ Association because it has no female members, and in consequence they have suggested that I am no longer president. That is a view to which they are entitled but I fear may not necessarily influence the members of the club concerned to the extent that some would like. That is a fact I have to bear.

Despite that, magistrates concentrate on criminal cases of a rather different level than those which will come before this new body. Some of the persons who will have to be considered by this new body have serious criminal records, and it is important that the persons concerned should have the proper capacity to deal with that. I would not rule out magistrates but I think that that is something to borne in mind. Finally, I am conscious, having disclosed my position as a former president of the Magistrates’ Association, that I should have indicated—and I apologise for not doing so—that I am, as I declared on Report, chairman of the Prison Reform Trust. The submission I made at the time, and would have made in more detail but for the intimation kindly given to me by the Minister’s team, was based on help that I received from the Prison Reform Trust and Justice. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben]

Happily, I am able to say now what I was going to say earlier, which is that I am one of those people who want to cut the amount of money that we have spent on legal aid. I take a very clear view that it is out of line with the arrangements in any other country that you might like to compare it with and that it is perfectly right for the Government to take those measures. However, that is why the Government should be a little concerned that people who are on their side have found unacceptable the mechanisms by which we have extended the powers of Ministers without due parliamentary control. This is the problem. Ministers should recognise that this is where the difficulty comes.

What we are saying is that the purpose is wholly acceptable but that to give Ministers powers of this kind is unacceptable and, as far as I can see, there is no good reason for doing it. That is the problem for the supporters of the Government and of their stance, which is why it would be helpful if the Lord Chancellor were to understand that we think that Parliament should have control in these very important areas, that we should not leave it to supplementary legislation even if it is of an affirmative kind and that—I am sure that my noble friend the Minister is entirely straightforward in his view about the connections between this and what was promised—when there is a fear that what has been promised has not been carried through, we should err on the side of being careful that Parliament should understand, accept and vote on those matters.

It is a matter not only of morality but of courtesy. I feel that we have not been given the kind of service which it is proper to ask of Ministers on this occasion. As one who supports these measures to a large extent, I am sorry that I shall be put in a position of not being able to support them simply by the mechanisms that have been presented. I suspect that quite a large number of my colleagues on this side of the House who have supported the Government would have been much happier in their support had the presentation been fundamentally different.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to hark back to what I said earlier today, but when one comes to consider the powers given in Clause 79(1) and (2), it is important to bear in mind the special status of the matters which we have been dealing with in Part 4, to which I presume the final provisions in Part 5 are meant to relate. It is just a matter of discernment of the sensitivity of interfering with the basic means of the citizen to protect himself against excess of power by the Executive, among others. Where that is at stake, to give a power which allows supplementary provisions to be made by secondary legislation is wrong in principle. The Government, who I am sure are anxious to show that they are sensitive to the importance of judicial review and the independence of the judiciary—as they say so often—should feel uncomfortable with, at the same time, asking for a blank cheque with regard to the supplementary powers referred to in Clause 79(1) as well as those to amend, repeal or revoke legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Woolf]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Is he suggesting that Clause 79(1) would not as a matter of practice be applied in the case of Part 4?

[Lord Faulks]

No, I am simply saying that it is not exclusively directed at Part 4. It is to do with any provision in the Bill; it is a general provision for implementation. It would include it, but it would include anything else that came within the scope of Clause 79.

I explained in Committee the narrow construction given to such powers. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that this was an extraordinary provision. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, however, acknowledged that it found its way into other Acts of Parliament—apparently without demur from the Opposition, including the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which, as the noble Lord will appreciate, was before this Government came to power. The suggestion that it is somehow the Conservatives or this Conservative-led coalition who have form for introducing such provisions is simply not correct. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act and the Offender Rehabilitation Act contain powers to make supplementary as well as consequential and incidental provision. There are recent similar examples within the responsibility of other departments. Those cannot be levelled against the Lord Chancellor, who has been demonised in our debates. They include the Pensions Act, the Local Audit and Accountability Act and the Infrastructure Bill currently before Parliament.

Since Committee, we have considered carefully whether it would be sufficient to rely on that part of the power which is undisturbed by the amendment. Of course, the power is quite wide even without the supplementary provision. It is right to acknowledge, as I did in Committee, that there is a degree of overlap between the various concepts used and adjectives deployed. The fact that the existing powers agreed by Parliament included the power to make supplementary provision suggests that the overlap is not complete. For that reason, we think that the right course is not to amend the provision—with the reassurance as to the possible use of the power, which I mentioned. In other words, this will not be construed as giving any Minister the opportunity to make provisions which are not in the Bill—what he might have liked to have been in the Bill in retrospect—but construed very much in the way that such provisions are customarily construed.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I had prepared a speech of some length, but I realise, as did the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it is important to confine the argument at this stage of the Bill as far as possible. I detain your Lordships only because the Bill is extremely important so far as Part 4 is concerned. In deference to the eloquent speech we have just heard, I want to make a few submissions that are important for the context of why noble and learned Lords—who perhaps do not have interests of their own in raising this matter, which the noble Lord, Lord Horam, hinted at—are very concerned about the Bill.

The reason is that judicial review is the final resort available to the citizen to protect himself against unlawful action. It is a residual remedy and is not available in cases where a specific remedy is given, for example by statute. The only course it is then proper to take is the statutory route that has been laid down by Parliament. Having been a counsel for about five years who frequently was involved in the sort of planning and development matters to which the noble Lord referred, I can say that in most, although not all, of the areas we are concerned with there is specific legislation with specific provisions that explain the circumstances in which proceedings can be challenged before the court. The nature of those circumstances is carefully laid down and is now well known. I do not dispute that that may well need to be looked at again and taken through a critical examination.

However, I emphasise that what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was objecting to, and what I object to, is this limitation being placed on judicial review, which is part of the explanation of why in this country we have not needed an entrenched constitution that defines the responsibilities of the Executive and the judiciary and why in the United States they attach so much importance to the separation of powers, which is not part of our law.

We are dealing here with the residual remedy of citizens to deal with their fear of unlawful action by the Executive; that is what we are dealing with in most cases of judicial review. That being so, I suggest that the discretion of the judge to examine the position of the Government, the position of other public bodies and the position of the citizen, and then in accordance with the facts of each individual case decide whether it is appropriate to give relief and what relief should be given, is extremely important.

The amendments that bear my name, following that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are designed not to tackle what is proposed root and branch, but to tackle those parts which say that a judge “must” do something as opposed to “may”. We do so not because we think that judges will be offended if they are told that they “must” do something. We do so because it is critical, if judges are going to get the right answer and do their best to get a just result, that they have the discretion to tailor their response to the facts of a particular case. However carefully we legislate, it is dangerous to go down the line of telling the judges what they have got to do. Everybody accepts that the independence of our judiciary is important. I emphasise the importance of that independence not because it is some right of the judiciary; it is important because the citizens know that a matter in issue, particularly in these important areas, will be considered by a judge who is independent. If we protest that we do not want the judiciary’s discretion cut away, we do so for that reason.

I will say no more because the other matters will, I know, be canvassed by others. However, I hope that I have made it clear why I think that this is a worrying piece of legislation, why I think that Part 4 needs to be carefully considered, and why I share the regret of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that although an array of legal talent spoke at Second Reading and explained their worries, it has not been felt right to consult them and try to find better ways of doing this, as has happened in many other parts of the Bill.

Judicial review deals with the public’s rights. In those circumstances, I suggest that if we are not going to fall into the trap indentified by Lord Hailsham in his Dimbleby lecture of 1976 of having an elective dictatorship in this country, we have to safeguard judicial review.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I cannot support Part 4 of the Bill. I hope that the House will forgive me if I, too, make some general observations on the whole of Part 4, not limiting myself to Clause 70, to avoid taking up too much time later. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says, there is much work to be done.

At Second Reading, the Minister assured the House that this package of proposals amounted to no more than “proportionate and common-sense reform” of judicial review. My noble friend Lord Horam called it a “small adjustment”. I regret that I see Part 4 as a serious infringement of the right of the citizen to challenge unlawful action by the Executive before the courts and thus, frankly, as an assault on the rule of law. This was the point made so eloquently and forcefully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf.

This part of the Bill aims to choke off challenges to unlawful action by the Executive. I fear that, if enacted, it will achieve precisely that. The degree to which it is proposed that judicial discretion be curtailed by these proposals is consonant only with a determination that judges should be limited so far as is possible in the exercise of their power to overrule unlawful government action. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, the effect of Clause 70 would be to stifle any challenge right at the outset of permission stage, where the Executive may have acted unlawfully but where it appears highly likely that that unlawful action has not made any difference to the outcome for the applicant. Whatever superficial attraction there is for such a rule as between the parties to a particular application, the net effect on the public interest, in what are public law cases, would be that unlawful action by the Executive would go unchecked and unreversed.

Clauses 71 and 72 taken together would provide a code for ensuring that any person of means who is minded to support a challenge to an executive decision is to be obliged to provide information, again at the permission stage, about all his current resources and all his likely resources—full financial disclosure, in other words. The court is then to be told that it must consider making an order for costs against any such person based on that information. Many applications for judicial review are funded by public-spirited supporters seeking to have unlawful action by the Executive corrected. Frequently, such supporters have no financial stake in the litigation at all. No one can pretend that the provisions of these two clauses are not calculated to deter public-spirited individuals from lending financial support to judicial review applications.

Clause 73 on interveners provides for a draconian scheme of punishing those who intervene in costs. The general rule—subject to departure in only exceptional circumstances—would be that an intervener would be unable to recover costs from the losing party, win or lose, no matter how meritorious the intervention, how much the intervention is found by the judge to have assisted the court, and how far the intervener brought their broad experience in the field and new and telling arguments to the hearing of the application. Furthermore, and perhaps even more iniquitously, the court would have to order the intervener to pay all the costs of the other parties in the proceedings as occasioned by the intervention. Again, the court would be able to depart from this rule only in exceptional circumstances.

No one can fail to see that that code will deter interventions. It will make it very difficult for those many well known and thoroughly respected charities, and other campaigning organisations with relevant experience and a deep knowledge of their fields, to mount legitimate challenges to unlawful executive action. It will make it very difficult for those organisations to raise money in those circumstances.

At Second Reading, the Minister said in relation to interveners that the Government were,

“persuaded that there may be a case for some modification of the provisions”.—[Official Report, 30/6/14; col. 1542.]

and that he looked forward to “considering possible amendments”. As has been said, a number of amendments have been proposed by noble Lords, but none has been accepted for consideration by my noble friend and his colleagues in his department. The proposed rules on cost-capping in Clauses 74 and 75 again would severely restrict the ability of the courts to protect meritorious applicants in public interest cases from adverse orders for costs. Again, the effect would be to chill and to stifle such applications by the financial threat posed to those of limited means by the risk of an adverse costs order. The fact that a cost-capping order would be available only after permission was granted would only add to the overall effect.

I turn very briefly to my amendments to Clause 70, which are in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. All the amendments in my name should have my noble friend Lord Macdonald’s name to them as well, but for some reason his is not in the Marshalled List. He apologises that he is unable to be here at this stage but he will be here later. I should make clear at the outset that I support the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beecham, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and my noble friend Lord Carlile, which import a general judicial discretion in this area. However, our amendments are designed to ensure that, even where unlawful executive action may have made no difference to the particular applicant before the court or tribunal, the court or tribunal will still be entitled to consider the lawfulness or otherwise of the executive action concerned, to rule on it and to hold the Executive to account accordingly if the public interest so requires it. That principle should apply at the permission stage as well as at the stage of final hearing. We should not forget that these are public law applications designed to protect the citizen and to hold the Government to account. We should be astute, in this House in particular, to ensure that where government acts unlawfully the courts are not debarred or otherwise prevented from saying so.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Monday 20th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I disclose that I am the chairman of the Prison Reform Trust, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has already pointed out, has circulated a paper that expresses concerns which he has adopted, very admirably, in the submissions he has just made to the House. I urge the Minister to think about those submissions very carefully. Whereas I, of all people, would like to think that I am a supporter of any procedure that cuts the costs of the administration of justice, at this stage the matter has not been detailed enough. Perhaps it would be better to find another instrument to which this very late amendment can be attached, but some such machinery to deal with this is urgently required.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for their contributions to this short debate. I will take this opportunity to explain to the House in a little more detail the context and reasons for the Government’s amendment, which will enable the Secretary of State to appoint “recall adjudicators”, before going on to explain the nature and purpose of those amendments. I will then turn to the amendment the noble Lords have tabled to Clause 3, and to their Amendment 9A, which seeks to insert a new clause.

When your Lordships last debated the provisions in Part 1, concern was raised about the burden that some of the provisions would place upon the Parole Board, particularly given the increased demand for oral hearings following the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Osborn, Booth and Reilly. At the time I explained what the Parole Board and the Ministry of Justice were doing in response to that demand, and indicated that we were considering whether there may be other options to alleviate the pressure on the board.

I hope that these government amendments demonstrate to the House our commitment to supporting the board and will serve to alleviate some of the concerns that have been expressed. They will allow the board to focus its resources where they are most needed. It is only recently that it has become possible to contemplate amending the legislation in the way that we now propose, and I hope that this answers the criticisms made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, of the amendment and its lateness.

In July, a Supreme Court judgment was handed down in the case of Whiston v the Secretary of State for Justice. This dealt with the question of whether an offender who is subject to home detention curfew and is recalled to prison for breaching his licence conditions is entitled, under Article 5.4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to have his detention reviewed by a court-like body—the Parole Board. The Supreme Court found that there was no such entitlement and that for all determinate sentenced offenders further detention during the licence period was satisfied, in Article 5 terms, by the original sentence imposed by the court. Therefore this does not depend on any party-political interpretation of the European Convention but on the decision of the Supreme Court.

Last week I chaired an all-party meeting in which we discussed these changes—which, of course, I accept have come late in the day. I hope that I was able to explain during the meeting to those noble Lords present the reason behind this change and why it was late, in order to give Peers an opportunity to understand what we were doing. The Whiston case is a significant change to previously established domestic case law on which the current provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 are founded. Under the 2003 Act, determinate sentence recalled prisoners are entitled to have their cases referred to the Parole Board. This was to satisfy their Article 5 rights to a court-like review of their detention.

But the Whiston judgment means that the review of determinate sentence recall cases no longer has to be conducted by the board because Article 5 is not engaged. We are therefore seizing this opportunity to build into the statutory framework a new, flexible way of working which will provide for this category of case to be diverted away from the board. That is what these amendments are designed to do.

Amendment 9 inserts new Section 239A into the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This will create a power that enables the Secretary of State to appoint “recall adjudicators”. It is these adjudicators who will take on the functions relating to the release of recalled determinate sentence prisoners currently performed by the Parole Board. The Secretary of State will be able to appoint the Parole Board as a recall adjudicator to allow the board to continue to review these cases if necessary, but also to appoint other persons.

Much of the detail of how the recall adjudicator model will operate—including exactly who will be appointed and the nature of those appointments—will be the subject of further detailed development. As I indicated during the meeting, and do again in the House, the appointments will be filled by those with significant criminal justice experience. I apologise if at this stage I cannot provide noble Lords with the level of detail for which they might normally wish. I acknowledge, of course, that the as yet unknown detail about the precise operation, impact and cost of the new model is what lies behind the noble Lord’s amendment to insert a sunset or sunrise clause into these provisions. I will return to that when I respond to the amendments.

First, I shall explain to your Lordships the main features of the provisions as well as the safeguards that will make sure the system for reviewing the detention of recalled prisoners will remain fair, robust and efficient and—importantly—that risk assessment and public protection will continue to be of paramount importance in any release discussion. While the review of detention need not be undertaken independently by a court-like body or process, it will have to satisfy the common-law requirements of impartiality and procedural fairness in line with the Osborn judgment. This means that oral hearings will still be required if they are necessary in the interests of fairness to the prisoner in the particular case and it will be necessary to interpret that requirement consistent with the Osborn decision.

Your Lordships have already agreed that Clause 8 should stand part of the Bill. This introduces a new test for the release of determinate sentence recalled prisoners. The test requires consideration to be given to whether the offender needs to be detained for the protection of the public but also whether the offender would be highly likely to breach their licence again if released. Recall adjudicators will be required to apply that test—that is, they will be under a statutory duty to consider both public protection and the risk of further non-compliance in reaching their release decisions.

A consistent and robust process will be followed by recall adjudicators. To ensure that this is the case, these amendments provide a power for the Secretary of State to issue procedural rules. Of course—this is important—there will be an opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny, as these rules will be made by statutory instrument, subject to the negative procedure.

The Secretary of State will also have the power to appoint a chief recall adjudicator. The chief recall adjudicator, who must also be appointed as a recall adjudicator, will oversee the activities of these adjudicators and bring coherence and co-ordination to their work. To assist in this role, provision is also made for the chief adjudicator to issue guidance. Recall adjudicators will be required to carry out their functions in accordance with that guidance.

The Secretary of State will be responsible for making decisions on appointments and the termination of appointments, although the chief recall adjudicator will be able to make recommendations to the Secretary of State about the termination of appointments.

The other amendments that we have tabled in this group all flow from and are consequential to the provisions in Amendment 9 to allow for the appointment of recall adjudicators.

I hope that your Lordships will agree that these amendments will not only help to alleviate pressure on the Parole Board but will give us the opportunity to look afresh at an alternative model for reviewing the detention of determinate sentence prisoners when they are recalled to custody. In short, if these cases do not need to be dealt with by the board, we believe that they should not be. The recall adjudicator provisions will give us the flexibility that we need to put such a system in place. This is the package of government amendments that I commend to the House.

Before I sit down, I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Kennedy. The Government cannot support these amendments. Amendment 1 places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to consult the Parole Board and to lay a report before Parliament about the resources that the board requires before the provisions in Clause 3 are implemented.

The Government are committed to ensuring that the Parole Board is always adequately resourced to fulfil its important responsibilities. The amendments that I have spoken to, which are designed to alleviate pressure on the board and to free up its resources, underline that commitment. I assure your Lordships that any future pressures on the board arising from the implementation of other provisions in the Bill will be discussed with the board so as to ensure that the necessary arrangements and resources are in place. I can confirm to noble Lords that there have been discussions with the Parole Board, the Lord Chief Justice and the senior presiding judge about the appointment of recall adjudicators.

Clause 3 adds a small number of additional terrorist-related offences to Schedule 15B to the 2003 Act, and the impact of this on the board will be minimal. We do not believe that a duty to consult the board or to lay a report before Parliament is appropriate or necessary. With respect, and as I said in Committee, such a duty would not be a practicable approach to these provisions. Changes to the workload of an arm’s-length body are commonplace. There are governance structures in place to ensure that new pressures on the Parole Board are taken account of. As noble Lords will be aware, the Ministry of Justice is accountable to Parliament for the discharge of its responsibilities. Putting such an obligation on the face of the legislation would, I suggest, be an undue burden on Parliament.

That brings me to the other amendment tabled by the noble Lords, which would insert a sunset clause into the recall adjudicator provisions, suspending them two years after the date of commencement. Prior to this, within 18 months of commencement the Secretary of State would be required to lay before Parliament a report on the impact of these provisions. Having done so, the Secretary of State would be able to make regulations for the continuation of the provisions—those regulations to be made by statutory instrument and subject to affirmative resolution of both Houses. In effect, Parliament would have to review the impact and agree to the continuation of the provisions to avoid their suspension after two years.

I understand the concern of noble Lords that the introduction of recall adjudicators is a new and, as yet, untested concept. It is critical that we get this right, and I appreciate the recommendation by the noble Lords for greater scrutiny by this House and the other place. However, I do not believe that it would be either appropriate or helpful to have a sunset provision of this sort. I can assure your Lordships that we will continue to work closely with the board and others on the development of the recall adjudicator model, making sure that it delivers the efficiencies and benefits that we expect while we maintain, as we are obliged to do, a robust and fair process for recalled prisoners.

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[The Lord Bishop of Rochester]

My Lords, I stand here as someone who does not share the professional knowledge that some have shown very clearly in this debate; their arguments were clearly and well made. The simple argument from fairness as regards one cohort of prisoners against another has also been referred to, which is also a powerful argument. A very pragmatic argument has also been alluded to, which is that we have within the prison estate this group of prisoners who have good reason to feel unhappy with their lot. That cannot but make their management more difficult for those who are charged with managing them within the prison estate. Therefore, pragmatic arguments as well as what you might call moral and legal arguments are relevant to this case. I am one of those who would wish to support this amendment. Not only would it right a wrong, but it would lead to an easing of the burdens upon those who have responsibilities for the management of our prisons.

[Lord Woolf]

My Lords, I pay credit to the speeches that have already been made from all sides of the House, including, I am glad to say, from those Members of this House who are entitled to be known not only as “noble Lords” but as “noble and learned Lords”. I do not conceive that anyone would think that I was not in complete agreement with every one of their speeches. However, just in case that might not be the situation, I say most emphatically that I have never heard such an indictment of our justice system as I have listened to this afternoon.

[Lord Dear (CB)]

My Lords, coming from a background in policing many years ago, it might be thought by those who indulge in stereotypes that I would be a lone voice advocating that we should get involved in what is sometimes called “lock them up and lose the key”. I stand in your Lordships’ House today to say that I fully accord with everything that has been said. The case was admirably laid out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and other noble and learned Lords in this House. I, too, agree with everything that was said, and if the House is invited to divide, I shall vote with the amendment.

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Despite the force of the arguments, I hope that my response has persuaded the House that, well intentioned though the amendment is, it is not one that we should support. I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Woolf]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I wonder whether he can help me on one matter. Does he accept that a shortage of resources, either in the Parole Board or within the Prison Service, in providing courses for persons in the category that my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd has identified has caused an unintended consequence in that—possibly; one cannot say it with certainty—these prisoners have been detained for far longer than they should have been, and that, equally, there is going to be further delay before their cases can be fully considered?

[Lord Faulks]

I accept that there have been certain delays in providing all the courses that might have been provided. Indeed, that has been the subject of quite widespread litigation, when individual prisoners have received compensation. Sometimes the compensation has been a higher figure if the court has thought that it would have made a difference and sometimes a lower figure if the court has thought that it would have made no difference. However, the test remains the same, regardless of cases, as I said a little earlier. The Parole Board has of course had a number of pressures, as I described earlier, not least caused by the Osborn, Booth and Reilly case. As I also indicated, increased resources have been provided financially, and there is a general awareness in the Parole Board—an arm’s-length body but under the Ministry of Justice—of the need to provide hearings as soon as practicable. However, I have responded by pointing out the fact that all these prisoners have had their cases reviewed by the Parole Board, and we believe that the system is working satisfactorily.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have indicated my opposition to Clauses 65 and 66 standing part of the Bill and I agree with everything that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I do not understand why the Government are seeking to single out judicial review for such provisions, unlike any other form of civil litigation, unless the objective is to discourage judicial review claims. Where is the evidence of any mischief that these clauses are designed to remedy? Courts already have ample powers, which they exercise in appropriate cases, to require third parties to pay costs.

I am particularly concerned about the effect that these clauses will inevitably have because the reduction in legal aid already makes it extremely difficult for claimants to secure funding for judicial review on matters of public importance. If claimants are able to demonstrate that they have a properly arguable case on its merits, and if they satisfy other requirements such as standing and time limits, they should not be obstructed further by complex requirements—as these are—to disclose financial information.

In any event, Clause 65 is far too broadly drafted, referring as it does to financial resources “likely to be available” to the applicant. What does that mean? Does it cover the family and friends of the applicant, the law firm or law centre that is providing services pro bono and the charity that is supporting the claim? For all these reasons, I am concerned that Clauses 65 and 66 will impose a wholly unnecessary hurdle that will impede the delivery of justice in this important area of the law.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, first, I apologise to the House that I was a little late in arriving; I was giving evidence before the House’s Constitution Committee. I endorse what I heard of the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and I support my noble friend Lord Pannick in what he has said. The situation with regard to judicial review is that it is much more difficult for one to be funded in the way that ordinary civil actions are funded. In the case of ordinary civil actions, it is well established that the conditional fee arrangement, although it has been modified by recent amendments, is working reasonably well. Certainly as far as claimants are concerned, they are in a position to take on responsibilities which they could not otherwise take on.

However, in judicial review, it is very rare indeed that any damages or any form of financial benefit to the claimant are involved, so a claimant in that situation will have much greater difficulty in financing an application for judicial review than he would if he was bringing a claim for an injury in a motor accident, for example. This is just one more difficulty which is placed on the claimant, which makes it particularly important that the possible, very serious, unintended consequences of these provisions are looked at very carefully. It is very important that there should be access to justice, as that goes to the very heart of the rule of law. Access to justice should be easier in the case of judicial review than it is otherwise.

In India, for example, which is not somewhere you would normally look to for expeditious legal proceedings, the Supreme Court can respond to a postcard that is written to it. We have a much more complex process than that, but they thought it very important that the traditional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, which is based on the very same provisions in our system as judicial review, should be available for the widest audience. Therefore they allow that to happen.

As far as I am concerned, one of the most important decisions I gave as a judge of first instance was on an application by the Child Poverty Action Group. I stressed in my judgment—which anybody can refer to—how important it was to extend the rights of audience and to take a generous view of standing. Otherwise, matters that affected the whole of society would not be examined by the courts. Each person entitled to supplementary benefit at that time was going to get only a very small sum of money, but it was a sum of money that was extremely important to them and made the difference to the whole of their existence. However, they could not finance the case themselves. If you take away legal aid in that sort of situation, and then add to the problem as this legislation does, that is something to worry about.

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[Lord Woolf]

Is the Minister saying that the powers the court has now would not have enabled it to obtain information about who was behind the shell company to which he referred and if need be to make an exceptional order for costs against the persons supporting it?

[Lord Faulks]

These clauses will require the court to go through the processes described in them. It is true that a particularly inquisitive court might have been able to find out more than—

[Lord Woolf]

Could an application not have been made by the Crown saying it was seeking orders for costs and asking the court to make the appropriate orders?

[Lord Faulks]

The problem was that there was nobody to enforce an order for costs against, effectively. That was the disadvantage that accrued to the taxpayer. Clause 65, which was welcomed by the senior judiciary, provides for information about financial resources to be provided and for that information to be used. The problem was that that case proceeded and there was no way of recovering the costs when it concluded.

[Lord Faulks]

The court certainly has power to make orders against non-parties in appropriate circumstances under the existing law. It is not normally the case that that is happening. The purpose of these clauses is to provide a statutory framework in which the court can find the information and use it if it thinks appropriate while retaining the discretion.

[Lord Woolf]

I really must press the Minister. I know he will forgive me rising again. If we do not want to increase the costs of the ordinary application for judicial review, is it not very important that where you have a special case, such as the one to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, referred in his recent speech and the case we are looking at now with the particular circumstances relating to Richard’s burial, applications arise to deal with the particular case rather than putting matters on the general body of applicants for judicial review who receive assistance?

[Lord Faulks]

In many cases, this will be a fairly straightforward procedure, whereas in the Richard III case it would have been a rather unusual, more searching procedure. I am afraid that I cannot depart from the Government’s position that these clauses will put in statute an important process which has not always been adequately undertaken by judges, and which was welcomed by the senior judiciary, in order, in some circumstances—

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[Lord Faulks]

Quite so, but I thought that the inference was that some full disclosure of all financial circumstances was going to be required of third parties, and that is not what the rules suggest.

We suggest that these clauses are not making a radical change in the existing law. They are not, in fact, removing the capacity of those who should be able to bring claims for judicial review; they are simply placing on the statute book what some of the senior judiciary wanted, which was a degree of transparency to stop those rare cases where the taxpayer is having to pay for judicial reviews in circumstances where the true funders are managing to obscure the position in a way that no one in this Committee would like.

[Lord Woolf]

I am sorry once again to interrupt the Minister in his closing address, but does he agree that it is absolutely essential, if the purpose of these provisions is the limited one that he identified, that those who are preparing proceedings for an application for judicial review, who want to know what they have to do because of the provisions of Clause 65 on funding, need to be told that there will be no requirement in that sort of situation to provide particulars of the resources—to take the example we were given—of all the people in a small village who are making a contribution? Some of them may be wealthy and some may be poor, but someone who is wealthy may have a significant obligation.

[Lord Faulks]

The answer, I think, to the noble and learned Lord’s question is that Clause 65(1)(b) states that the information will be specified in the rules of court. The anxieties expressed in the Committee and by those who have provided briefings and written articles are clearly matters that will be taken into consideration, and we do not want to stifle proper judicial reviews or make people feel anxious about small contributions. These matters will be taken into account. However, for the reasons that have also been outlined in argument, we cannot specify in this statute every single, precise situation.

I hope that I have gone some way to reassure those who have sought—

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, Clause 67 proposes, first, that an intervener cannot get its costs except in exceptional circumstances; and, secondly, that an intervener must pay the costs of all the parties occasioned by its intervention except in exceptional circumstances. Both of these propositions—but particularly the second—are extraordinary. They are plainly designed to deter interventions by making them possible only if the intervener can fund all parties’ costs occasioned by the intervention.

If an intervener finds evidence, all the other parties’ evidence in reply will be at the cost of the intervener. If an intervener’s counsel speaks for half a day and the other parties’ counsel reply for a day and a half, they do so at the intervener’s cost. All that is on a win-or-lose basis, so even if the intervener is proved right and the government department or departments are proved wrong, and even if the judge has been greatly assisted by the interveners, the interveners will still pay all the parties’ costs occasioned by the intervention. This is against the background that, far more often than not, interveners do indeed help the court. After judgments, one frequently sees judges expressing their gratitude for the assistance of interveners, who, as has been said, often bring a broader experience to a particular judicial review application than an individual applicant can bring. The Committee was greatly assisted by the first- hand evidence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, as to how helpful interventions often are.

The arguments in favour of this clause appear to be based on the proposition that interveners are often campaigning organisations with an agenda that is—in the widest sense of the word, at least—political or quasi-political. So they are, but such campaigning organisations have considerable expertise in their fields, as noble Lords have pointed out, and noble Lords benefit regularly from briefings from such organisations. If those interventions lack merit, the courts already have discretion to make orders for costs accordingly. However, these provisions would threaten not only the right to intervene but also the ability of the organisations which currently intervene habitually in judicial review cases to raise funds for their activities. That is a threat, I suggest, to the functioning of civil society. I will not name particular organisations because a number have already been named in this debate. I believe that to inhibit the activities of those organisations would be profoundly wrong. I do not believe that any body of credible evidence has been advanced in support of this clause to support the proposition that interventions have caused a problem that needs correcting. Still less do I believe that the courts’ existing powers to make costs orders are inadequate.

Our Amendments 74A, 74C and 74D preserve the courts’ general discretion to order a party to pay an intervener’s costs if the courts consider it just to do so. Amendments 74H and 74K preserve the general discretion of the courts to order an intervener to pay another party’s costs. I can see no possible basis, in either justice or common sense, to interfere with the existing court process and to deter interventions in the way that Clause 67, as drafted, is bound to do.

[Lord Woolf]

My Lords, I was hesitant to add to this debate by yet another intervention, but perhaps I may draw attention particularly to subsection (6), which says:

“In determining whether there are exceptional circumstances that are relevant for the purposes of subsection (3) or (5), the court must have regard to criteria specified in rules of court”.

I would like the Minister’s help as to what matters can properly be said to be criteria, as opposed to matters that are not. “Exceptional circumstances” would not normally, for example, provide any protection—this is the important point—to the position of the charitable organisations which, at the present time, intervene.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I asked a number of practical questions that had been put by Justice. I want to save the Minister from jumping up and down and I do not want to come between your Lordships and lunch, so perhaps he could write to all those who have taken part in the debate with the answers.

[Lord Woolf]

Clause 67 has created a particular type of party, namely a “relevant party”. The relevant party is defined in subsection (8). I have no problem with that definition. However, in his closing remarks the Minister said that if, of course, a person is invited to intervene, as Justice could be invited to intervene, in effect this would not apply. The words are, of course, very specific, because of the presence of the word “must”. I draw attention to the fact that the court could invite people to intervene who are not a relevant party. Would he bear that in mind?

[Lord Faulks]

I shall deal with those interventions in reverse order, I am very grateful for what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said. I will bear that in mind and, rather than answer from the Dispatch Box, I will consider it carefully. Similarly, I will answer the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, in writing with details.

As to the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, I obviously would not comment on the appropriateness of particular interventions in particular cases. However, I am not sure that I would entirely agree with, or that I apprehend, her thrust, which was that litigation belongs to the parties, and there are disputes—whether civil disputes or judicial review, which involves public law—where interventions may be helpful in deciding between the parties. Where I may differ from her is the approach whereby an organisation of which all of us, I suspect, would approve should nevertheless use judicial review as part of a process. There are other processes available, whether it is lobbying Government or informal processes of campaigning, lobbying or taking part in inquiries: that may be a way to do it. Nevertheless, even though these bodies can have valuable contributions in certain cases, there should be some hesitation before simply saying that this is an issue where we might be able to help.

I conclude by saying that I will take into account all the observations that have been made and inviting the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, in my view there is a lot of mischief in this clause and the best solution would certainly be to leave it out of the Bill altogether. I want to touch on three particular pieces of mischief which lie within it.

Subsection (3) has already been dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in proposing his amendment to remove that subsection from the Bill. No one doubts the great importance and value of having a costs-limiting facility available in judicial review. The Government are not arguing that there should be no such scope for costs-limiting orders, and no one else has argued that there should not be such scope. I think no one would deny that if there were no possibility of getting costs-limiting orders, some very meritorious applications that were very much in the public interest would not be made. That would be a great loss to our legal system. As the Government have not argued against the principle of costs capping, I do not think that I need say more than that.

Equally, I do not think that anyone can deny that if the Bill is introduced in this form and subsection (3) proceeds on to the statute book, an awful lot of the value of costs capping will be negated because applicants will be exposed to very significant financial liabilities—almost certainly incalculable financial liabilities—before they get to the point when a costs-capping order can be considered by the court. Therefore the effect of the costs-capping order would itself have been negated and a large number of potentially meritorious applications will not be able to proceed at all and will not be started. That would be a great loss to the system. If the Government said that that was their intention, they would at least be straightforward about it. In actual fact, however, I think they are again in a state of contradiction, saying on the one hand, “Yes, we do want to have a costs-capping provision”, but, on the other, “We want to introduce a measure that will in practice negate very largely the benefit of that provision”.

My second problem with this clause concerns subsection (6), which states:

“The court may make a costs capping order only if it is satisfied that … (b) in the absence of the order, the applicant for judicial review would withdraw the application for judicial review or cease to participate in the proceedings”.

What exactly does that mean? Once again I ask for clarity because the law ought to be clear. This means that the court has to be satisfied that the applicant would actually withdraw the application if a costs-capping order is not provided. Is that based on the applicant saying that he or she would withdraw the application if no costs-capping order is given? If so, does that create an obligation for the applicant to withdraw if the costs-capping order is denied? It is perfectly possible that a costs-capping order might be asked for in very good faith by an organisation with very slender means or by an individual with very slender means who later finds that his or her cause is backed by a rather wealthier supporter. Therefore it is possible that the application could be saved after the denial of a costs-capping order, by some other party coming in to support the application, with all the liabilities attaching to that which we discussed this morning. Would that eventuality be denied by this provision in the Bill? We should be absolutely clear about that, because the word “satisfied” is a very strong word, it seems to me. How do you know that the applicant would withdraw in those circumstances? How can you possibly know such a thing unless the applicant has given such an undertaking? If the applicant has given such an undertaking, presumably that undertaking is enforceable. We are not told that in the Bill, but we ought to be told by the Minister whether that would be the effect that the Government seek.

Finally, I object very strongly to subsection (9), which has already been referred to as a Henry VIII clause. However, it is a Henry VIII clause of pretty extraordinary dimensions. One is used to Henry VIII clauses in legislation. There are far too many of them. There is one later on in the Bill under Clause 73. Clause 73(1) states:

“The Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State may by regulations make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision in relation to any provision of this Act”.

That is the sort of role that we associate with Henry VIII clauses—that is, adding something that is technical, that fills in some gaps at some point, but that does not change the main thrust of the primary legislation at all and merely makes it perhaps more easily implementable. That is an acceptable Henry VIII clause in principle. However, we are faced with the following in Clause 68(9):

“The Lord Chancellor may by regulations amend this section by adding, omitting or amending matters to which the court must have regard”.

In other words, the Lord Chancellor can rewrite the whole of the clause. That is an extreme form of a Henry VIII clause. It would probably be better described, by using some rather sinister terms from European history, as an Ermächtigungsgesetz or a plein pouvoir. To use a commercial analogy, I suppose that it is rather like a bidder or tenderer in a commercial contract who sends in a bid and says, “The price will be the following, the delivery date will be the following, the specifications will be the following”, and then adds a final clause saying, “The bidder may, at his discretion and without penalty or limitation, change any of the above at will”—in other words, devalue the whole document. The whole thing is complete nonsense because you cannot be certain that any of it will actually remain or that any of the apparent purposes in the text will actually influence reality in the future. The whole of this could be a complete waste of time by Parliament because, as I read subsection (9), the Lord Chancellor could go away and change anything in this clause at all, including the major substantive provisions: the terms, conditions and criteria by which a costs capping order can be considered. For the reasons that I and others have set out in this debate, that is actually a very important exercise.

Again, this is a completely unacceptable clause for government to put forward in any legislative context, and certainly in this one. I hope that the Government will withdraw the provision. I hope, better still, that the Government will withdraw the whole clause.

[Lord Woolf]

This costs capping provision was brought in because the nature of current litigation means that the costs of exercising your rights, whether as a claimant or defendant, are often prohibitive. Perhaps I may refer to one of the first matters where costs capping came before the courts. I was personally involved, so I hope that that does not make it inappropriate for me to refer to it. It was an action against tobacco companies that was brought by those who had suffered as a result of smoking. It illustrates that a situation can arise where, even with the help of conditional costs orders—of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, was the original author—it is not possible for proceedings to be brought because the costs can be so great that no law firm could take the risks involved in bringing an action against the tobacco companies, which were going to fight them intensely and had huge commercial reasons for doing so. I suspect that the matter came before me because the precedent for those was, in fact, the litigation across the Atlantic. It is an indication that we have to take care to try to control costs capping orders. I refer to that because it seems to me questionable to regard these provisions as appropriate, if appropriate at all, only in regard to judicial review. I do not think that the reference to public interest proceedings would, for example, cover the tobacco proceedings of which I had experience.

In general, however, I agree entirely with the comments and points that have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others who followed him, which are the basis of the amendments. It is also quite right to say that there is no possible justification for this to be done. I know that I am reiterating what I have argued before in relation to other provisions. However, this is not an example of the Government doing something that Parliament cannot do; it is an example of the Government doing something that they should not seek to do. Bearing in mind the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature, the legislature should not seek to impinge on a judicial discretion where there is no suggestion that there is any need to do so and where the court—in the case to which the Minister referred, the Corner House Research case, in 2005, 1 Weekly Law Reports 2600—set out its views and the principles at that time. Those principles have had to be modified in the light of cases that have come before the court subsequently. Here is a natural process being developed whereby a problem arises—not of great dimensions, but very relevant to the very small minority of cases to which it refers—and the courts react to it.

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[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, Amendment 82 would introduce a new clause to prevent the Lord Chancellor from using the powers which he was granted under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—LASPO—to alter eligibility for legal aid in judicial review proceedings. Amendment 85 would ensure that the new clause comes into force on the enactment of the Bill and so would not be dependent on the discretion of the Lord Chancellor.

Your Lordships will recall that during the debates on LASPO—and they were detailed, anxious debates—Ministers repeatedly gave assurances that restrictions on legal aid in the Bill did not affect and restrict judicial review. Had the Bill contained such restrictions, I have no doubt that Ministers would have found it difficult to secure the approval of this House. Instead of bringing forward proposals for restrictions on the availability of legal aid for judicial review by way of primary legislation, so that they could be fully scrutinised, the Lord Chancellor has limited legal aid in judicial review by subordinate legislation. As your Lordships will know, such subordinate legislation receives only limited scrutiny in this House: amendments cannot be tabled and the convention is that we rarely table—far less approve—a fatal Motion, however foolish the regulations may be.

To give one example, your Lordships may recall that on 7 May this House debated a Motion of Regret, which I had tabled, in relation to the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014. Those regulations made a fundamental change. They provided that the Lord Chancellor must not pay legal aid fees unless the court gives permission to bring judicial review proceedings, or, if the court neither refuses nor grants permission, the Lord Chancellor thinks it reasonable to pay legal aid remuneration. Eleven noble Lords spoke in support of the Motion of Regret. The Minister batted at both ends, bowled and fielded on his own with no support from any noble Lord.

Legal aid for judicial review is too important a matter for secondary legislation. If the Lord Chancellor wishes to reduce legal aid in the context of judicial review, let him bring forward proposals for primary legislation so that they can be properly scrutinised and fully debated. Amendments 82 and 85 would secure that objective and would nullify the regulations that we debated on 7 May.

I have also added my name to Amendment 82A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I will say something very briefly about it. It addresses the residence regulations that would have confined legal aid to those resident in this country. In our debates today on Part 4 of the Bill, it should not go unrecorded that on 15 July the High Court declared those regulations to be an unlawful exercise of the powers conferred by the 2012 Act. That was because Parliament had identified those services qualifying for legal aid by reference to need, and the regulations adopted a different criterion. Indeed, under the regulations, many people with the greatest need and whose cases are properly arguable would be denied legal aid. The case is the Queen on the Application of Public Law Project v the Secretary of State for Justice, 15 July 2014.

At paragraph 60 of the judgment of Lord Justice Moses, with which Mr Justice Collins and Mr Justice Jay agreed, the court referred to the comments of the Secretary of State for Justice, Mr Grayling, in the Telegraph newspaper on 20 April. That was two weeks after the argument in the case had concluded in court, and before the judgment of the court was given. Mr Grayling, the Secretary of State, said that,

“yes, you’ve guessed it. Another group of Left-wing lawyers has taken us to court to try to stop the proposals”.

The High Court commented on this newspaper article at paragraph 60 of the judgment. Lord Justice Moses said that these comments by the Lord Chancellor were,

“unrestrained by any courtesy to his opponents, or even by that customary caution to be expected while the Court considers its judgement, and unmindful of the independent advocate’s appreciation that it is usually more persuasive to attempt to kick the ball than your opponent’s shins”.

At paragraph 83 of the judgment, the court added that the Lord Chancellor’s reliance in that case on “public confidence” in his defence,

“amounts to little more than reliance on public prejudice”.

This is a quite remarkable judicial rebuke for the Lord Chancellor, and I hope that he will reflect on what the court says.

This is the last group of amendments that we are considering on Part 4. As this Committee leaves this part, I suggest to noble Lords that that judgment of three judges in the High Court confirms the criticisms that this Committee has heard about the Lord Chancellor’s lack of understanding of the central role of judicial review in maintaining the rule of law, and it provides yet further reasons why this House will want to give the most careful scrutiny to Part 4 of the Bill on Report in October. I beg to move.

[Lord Woolf]

My Lords, I have added my name in support of the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has advanced so elegantly. It is perhaps appropriate that it should be considered this afternoon because it will be recalled that this morning I was gently—but I do not think appropriately—chided by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, for going too far in my comments about legal aid provision with regard to judicial review and the effect of the action being taken in that respect. I respectfully suggest that what we have just heard indicates that there is real reason to be concerned at the reduction of legal aid in respect of judicial review. The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with regard to the shortcomings of regulations being used in respect of this area of legislation are very well founded.

[Baroness Campbell of Surbiton]

My Lords, I speak in support of all the amendments in this group, and in particular Amendments 82 and 85 in the name of my noble friend Lord Pannick. I must say that he has put down some very sensible amendments, which spoke to me—so much so that I decided to change my holiday plans and be here on the last day.

The issue of legal aid is inherently linked to the provisions in Part 4. It is part of a package of reforms that seem to have a very strong common thread—they make it so much harder to challenge public bodies when they act unlawfully. That right to challenge belongs to every citizen, whatever their background or means, but without legal advice and representation it is a truly empty right. That is particularly true of those at the margins of society who may be most affected when public authorities get it wrong—and sometimes they get it very wrong. I am particularly familiar with that territory due to my long career in social care and disability public services.

The legal aid reforms, which restrict its availability for judicial review, are one of the most damaging elements of this package. Coupled with the proposals on the costs of interventions and costs capping, they make it nigh impossible for the vulnerable to bring a claim. I supported my noble friend Lord Pannick in his Motion of Regret on the regulations that came into effect in April—not only for what they said but for the way in which they were introduced. The Joint Committee on Human Rights was highly critical of that. In their response this month, the Government say that legal aid for judicial review does not require a higher level of scrutiny. Honestly, that shows a remarkable lack of understanding of why judicial review is so important to the rule of law and why legal aid is so crucial to its effectiveness. Two weeks, ago the High Court ruled that the Government’s proposals for a residence test for legal aid were unlawful. We all remember that one. The Secretary of State had exceeded his powers and the test was discriminatory. The judgment confirms that the Government have been pushing the boundaries of what Parliament intended.

The Government’s approach to legal aid and their view of its importance to judicial review is deeply disturbing. However much the Lord Chancellor may disapprove, those who campaign for justice are entitled to legal aid to challenge the Government—or any other public body—when they get it wrong. Campaigning is in my DNA, which is why I support these amendments. I am a campaigner; not a left-wing, right-wing, or middle-wing campaigner. I am just a campaigner, who has been involved in judicial review to make society and our communities bigger, wiser and more effective. Again, that is why I support these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Woolf]

83: Clause 73, page 71, line 29, leave out “supplementary,”

[Lord Woolf]

I hope to be very brief in my submission in support of the amendments which relate to the consequential and supplementary provisions in Part 5 of the Bill, which is headed, “Final Provisions”. Clause 73(1) states:

“The Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State may by regulations make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision in relation to any provision of this Act”.

Subsection (2) states:

“The regulations may, in particular, amend, repeal or revoke legislation”.

I am not quite sure of the distinction between “revoke” and “repeal” and would be glad to hear about it and be educated as to the difference. I suggest that subsections (1) and (2) are very wide indeed. The regulations will be made by statutory instrument, and subsection (5) states:

“A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section that amend or repeal”—

it does not mention revoke—

“a provision of an Act (whether alone or with other provision) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament”.

So it is true that the consequential provisions have regulations that require approval. Despite that, I suggest that the powers in Clause 73 are too wide. The amendment to delete “supplementary”—and deleting appeal or revoke—is desirable. I would prefer to see the whole power removed, especially in an area that is as important as the provisions covered by the Bill. Noble Lords will be only too well aware of the provisions contained in each part of the Bill, so there is no need for me to recite them again. They all contain very important issues that I suggest deserve to be dealt with by primary legislation rather than delegated legislation of the sort referred to in Clause 73.

The position with regard to Part 4 is particularly acute. Already this afternoon we have heard submissions with regard to the other Henry VIII clauses that are contained in Part 4. In my view those submissions are equally applicable to Part 5. I beg to move.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, as the House may be aware, I am always unhappy if we have debates that become either a military-fest or a legal-fest—in other words, that the only people who discuss these things are lawyers. I suggest to my noble friend that we have already had sufficient evidence in Committee that there are in the Bill very serious matters over which the House has had very considerable disagreement. I suspect that he knows that Report stage will not be easy on a number of these issues, which reach way beyond party and which are about the nature of civil liberties and this country’s legal system. Therefore, I look at this particular proposal with a considerably jaundiced eye.

I want to say something that he may find inconvenient. There was a time when the Lord Chancellor was very manifestly not a political figure. Yes, he was appointed by the Government and he sat in the Cabinet, but he was seen very clearly as a legal figure. For reasons that I wholly disagree with and are all about a mistaken understanding of these things under the previous Government—this is not a criticism of him or present company—we now have a different situation.

Parts of the article read by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, point to the position where the Lord Chancellor feels he is able to make statements that can be seen only in a context that is very strongly political. That means that the natural willingness of this House to accord to the Lord Chancellor a different kind of approach from that which one would to the Secretary of State for this or the Secretary of State for that is very much diminished.

Having debated this Bill in such detail and having shown so many moments when noble Lords of very different political views felt unhappy, we then come to this catch-all clause. My noble friend may explain that it does not really mean what it seems to mean. In that case, can we please write it so that it does seem to mean what it ought to mean? But if it does mean what it seems to mean, the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State can—depending on what the situation is—make changes subject to the most exiguous parliamentary control.

Having been a Secretary of State, I know very well that once you get a properly worded document and present it in accordance with the rules, it is quite difficult for it not to pass—let me put it as delicately as that. That same element is in this. I thought the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was more than polite when he reminded us that there was this “saving” bit, because it does not seem to me to be a “saving” bit at all—that it not what happens. Given the mechanisms of the two Houses, if such supplementary legislation is put properly and is not wrong, it will, in normal circumstances, pass.

If my noble friend cannot give the House the assurance that the wording means something wholly different from what it appears to mean, most of us would prefer not to have it at all. We would therefore want to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in his contention, if not now then on another occasion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

As a lawyer, I have a particular regard for precedent. The fact that the word “supplementary” has found its way into other Acts of Parliament is at least some indication that previous Parliaments have approved its inclusion. The fact remains that any provision is worthy of analysis, whether it has been in a previous Act of Parliament or not. None the less, I am sure that the noble Lord would agree that it is important that we give, quite properly, the degree of power necessary to the Secretary of State to implement those parts of the Bill that become law. I can reassure him and the House that such powers are narrowly construed by the courts and are available only for the purposes of implementing what is in the Bill, not what is further to the Bill, not in the Bill or what the Secretary of State might like to have been in the Bill.

Amendment 84 proposes to remove Clause 73(2). This would prevent any provision necessary to give full effect to the Bill being made if it required amendments to any existing legislation, whether primary or secondary. Similarly, with the powers subject to Amendment 83, provisions permitting amendment to primary and secondary legislation for these purposes are commonly found and have been approved, and we are concerned that their absence would hamper the Government’s ability to bring the Bill into force.

Of course I accept that it is right that these provisions should be subject to proper scrutiny. That is why we have provided, in accordance with the expectations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, that all provisions made under this clause will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Where provisions amend primary legislation, any regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure. With that reassurance, I hope that I can allay to some extent any residual anxiety that the House may have.

These provisions are not novel and we say that they are necessary to implement the provisions of the Bill properly. During the Recess, among the many other things that I have been invited to reflect on, I will reflect on the precise use of the adjective “supplementary” in this context. At the moment, I do not give any indication of a desire to amend it, but I will of course reflect on it. In the mean time, with the reassurance that I have endeavoured to give the House, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Woolf]

I am grateful to the Minister for responding with such care and elegance to the speeches that have been made. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was not present as I am sure that he would have taken great pleasure from hearing how the Minister was comforted by what he said in his speech. I heard that speech and reacted with surprise at the time.

In his response, the noble Lord said that it was of course right for him, as a lawyer, to rely on precedent. I wonder whether the precedent in this context indicates the dangers of a Henry VIII clause of this nature. What happens in practice is that, once you have a precedent, you think that until somebody protests you can go on making better and better precedents to achieve your purpose, meaning that the powers of this House to scrutinise legislation are thwarted—not totally but to a significant degree. It is because of what has happened in the past that Henry VIII clause after Henry VIII clause appears in legislation, so that now it is considered almost a matter of course to put in a provision of this nature, and it is suggested that legislation cannot work without a Henry VIII clause. I respectfully suggest that that is a most unfortunate situation, and I have a great deal of sympathy for the helpful remarks that were made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in his very wise comments on this clause.

I suggest that the time the Minister spends contemplating the language of Clause 73 during the coming three months will be very well spent. Bearing that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I do so while making it clear that I may well come back to the subject on Report.

Amendment 83 withdrawn.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Woolf]

70: Clause 64, page 64, line 35, leave out “must” and insert “may”

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, there would have been a time when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, could have been here, but I think he is in the Supreme Court at the moment. In those circumstances, I hope that your Lordships will not mind my leading when I was looking forward to being junior counsel with regard to the submissions that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was due to make. I hope that my presence does not mean that I get it all wrong in this different capacity in which I now find myself.

I am reminded of a time many moons ago when I had to be at the same time in the Court of Appeal before Lord Denning and before Lord Widgery in the Divisional Court, in what are now called the Senior Courts. Having investigated the matter very fully, I came to the conclusion that the appropriate thing to do was to go before Lord Widgery and leave my pupil watching the situation in the Court of Appeal. As fate would have it, as normally happens in these situations, the matter came on in quite the opposite way from that expected and the pupil had to rise to his feet in the same way as I do now. Unfortunately, he did not appreciate which side he should be on and he made submissions to great effect before Lord Denning, which were diametrically opposite to what I was meant to be advancing on behalf of the Crown. Lord Denning was not at all put out by this. What he did was to say, “Those were very clear submissions, Mr So-and-so, but perhaps what you really meant to say was X, Y and Z”, and in that way justice was done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Woolf]

I am grateful to the Minister for drawing the attention of the Committee to that point. I am well aware that that is the situation. The Minister was entirely right. I am saying that each of these provisions is not only wrong in its application but the collective effect should be considered. The provisions need to be considered together because, if I am right in what I am saying, there has been wholesale interference in one provision after another in the discretion of the court in an area of the greatest importance to the ordinary citizen and to the rule of law in this country. Perhaps the Minister will allow me to come back, if need be, but I do feel that it is possible to deal with this only holistically, and that is what I hope I have been doing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, but with very great respect I think that we are going over the same ground again. I hear the argument; I have said that I will consider it, but I want to consider it in a way that does not emasculate Clause 64, which is there effectively to prevent cases in which it would make no difference from proceeding to lengthen expensive litigation. But I acknowledge that there is a potential force in the argument made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and picked up by other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about the possible benefit of a declaration, whether it is in the form of a judgment reflecting the point that seeks to be established but does not involve the expense and time of having a full-blown hearing. I do not think that I can take the matter any further at this stage.

In the approach that we suggest to what is essentially a desire to get rid of technical objections, we wish to refer to Lord Denning’s reasoning—and I am glad that he was mentioned earlier as he gets insufficient citation in the courts nowadays. He held that the court,

“should not find a breach of natural justice unless there has been substantial prejudice to the applicant as a result of the mistake or error which has been made”.

That is a reference to a case in 1977—

[Lord Woolf]

Would the Minister be grateful for a copy of De Smith?

[Lord Faulks]

The case is George v Secretary of State for the Environment. I omitted one or two pages of my speech in order not to weary the Committee but I am most grateful for the offer of an autographed copy of De Smith.

I reiterate that, where there is any significant doubt over whether the flaw complained of was highly likely to have made a substantial difference, permission can be granted, and judges will continue to perform their established role. I remind the Committee of a significant judicial discretion which will remain under the clause. Crucially and properly, this discretion will extend to whether it is highly likely that the procedural defect would have resulted in a different outcome for the applicant in any given case and whether any difference would have been substantial.

Amendments 72D and 73E are intended to replace the requirement to refuse to grant permission where it is highly likely that there would have been no substantial difference with an option to refuse permission. It is worth examining that. It postulates the position where the judge says, “I think it is highly likely that it would have made no difference at all, but still I should allow this to progress”. Similarly, Amendments 70, 70A and 71 are intended to replace the requirement to refuse to grant a remedy, including a financial remedy, where this is the case. The Government’s view is that these amendments would significantly weaken the utility of the clause in dealing with minor technicalities in a proportionate manner.

Under Clause 64 as currently drafted, the High Court and the Upper Tribunal will retain significant discretion over the application of this clause. Crucially and properly, this discretion will extend to whether it is highly likely that the procedural defect would have resulted in a different outcome for the applicant in any given case and whether any difference would have been substantial. Indeed, the term “highly likely” will, as I have said, be interpreted by the courts. Where the court comes to the conclusion that it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different, the Government’s view is that the court should not grant a remedy. I can see no merit in continuing a case where there is no real prospect of a difference in outcome and a remedy such as a quashing order would be futile.

In conclusion, I trust that I have reassured the Committee that the Government absolutely understand the importance of judicial review and do not wish inappropriately to interfere with the exercise of the discretion by the courts, nor substantially to disturb the approach that the courts have taken in this very important area of the law. In fact, I submit to your Lordships that Clause 64 is modest in ambition and beneficial in effect. I hope that, with that reassurance, the noble and learned Lord will withdraw the amendment and I urge the Committee to agree to Clause 64 standing part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I am glad to have that intervention from the noble Baroness. In fact, it reminds me that I did not specifically answer a question that she raised in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I reassure her and indeed the Committee that the Government’s view is that the reform is compatible with Article 6. As the Committee will appreciate, the enshrined right of access to the court is not absolute. The Government’s view is that this is a proportionate approach to securing the legitimate aim of having judicial reviews based on minor technical defects determined more quickly with fewer resources.

I am unable to respond now on the Bingham centre but I will write to the noble Baroness and the Committee to inform them of the current position.

[Lord Woolf]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the careful way in which he has sought to reply to the issues raised. I also hope that I am not misinterpreting him when I detect that he is prepared to look again at the provisions in Clause 64 to see whether some of the points that have been made may be of substance.

[Lord Faulks]

I am sorry to interrupt but I do not want to raise expectations inappropriately. I think that the only area where I said that I would look again was in relation to the very valuable point made by a number of noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, about the possibility of a declaration at an earlier stage. Beyond that, I am afraid that I did not give any undertaking at all.

[Lord Woolf]

One has at least to be thankful for small mercies, even if, in your view, they do not go nearly far enough. I am certainly not indicating that in due course there will not be a Division in this House on the appropriateness of this clause.

What the noble Lord has not done in his reply is to deal with the question that has been asked very clearly and has been emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies—that is, what are the powers of the courts now? The position as I understand it is that everything that the Government want to achieve through Clause 64 can be achieved by judges now. If in fact it is said that they cannot, why is it not left to the rule committee, which of course the noble Lord knows about? He knows that it consists of an expert body looking at how the law should be changed in order to obtain improvements. The noble Lord, Lord Hart, in his very helpful intervention, pointed out that significant improvements can be made in planning matters.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lord, Lord Horam, mentioned the problems that exist in judicial review. I am certainly not suggesting that it would not be preferable if consideration were given to adopting improvements where they can be made. However, I still suggest that the best and only way to bring about real improvement is through the sort of process that, at the behest of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, I undertook in regard to civil procedure generally, including looking at judicial review. The fact is that you cannot do these things in the piecemeal way that the Government are seeking to do in these clauses. If you do, the result will be that you inhibit judges’ ability to carry forward what they have done so far, not perfectly but to the best of their ability.

Perhaps I may give one more example in relation to declarations which the Minister might want to consider. There are cases of judicial review where a matter comes before the court and it is at that stage or during the course of the proceedings that it is accepted that a particular result should be produced. None the less—and I should add, so as to make Clause 64 relevant, despite the fact that the applicant will receive no benefit—it is still thought by the court that it is in the public interest not only to give a judgment but to grant a declaration. That can now happen.

There are also cases where the court now can be asked to make a future declaration in order to clarify the law. The declaration is a remedy which is emerging to its full extent in this jurisdiction, and there are cases where other steps can be taken that are in the interests of good administration, the interests of the rule of law and the interests of justice. I repeat: it is not that this cannot be done, but this is not the way to improve the system of judicial review.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes)]

Would the mover of the amendment confirm that he is seeking leave to withdraw it?

[Lord Woolf]

Yes.

Amendment 70 withdrawn.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I said everything I wished to say about secure colleges and the proposals when I spoke to the amendments in my name on Monday. However, I associate myself with the positive suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Cormack, backed up by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol and others, that, given the very serious difficulties that face the present proposals for the implementation of the clause, this might be an opportunity for the Government to consider withdrawing it and coming forward with something else.

I repeat that we all applaud the proposal to give young offenders in the prison estate more educational opportunity. We all share the view that young people in the prison estate are there often precisely because they have not had educational opportunities in the past. In a sense, it is not what is in the Bill—the provision that the Secretary of State may provide secure colleges—that we object to; secure colleges would be capable of having all the aims that were set out in our amendment, but would be provided in a very different way from that which is presently proposed. Our concern, which my noble friend now understands is shared across the House, is that the proposal for implementation by the single pathfinder college that is now envisaged runs counter to all the evidence on the future of our penal system for young offenders. For that reason, I suggest the Government may wish to reconsider the whole future of the secure college proposal.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I am not as expert in the matters raised as many who have already spoken in this important debate, but I have one advantage, which is that I am fully instructed by the Prison Reform Trust. The second is that, at one stage, I had to make a report—known as the Strangeways report—into deep problems in our prison system. Certain general lessons were set out in that report, which I think I am right in saying all those who are knowledgeable in this area still regard as being the right recipe for positive progress. We have had great advantage in hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, based in turn on what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. I urge the Minister to take the very wise course that is being pressed upon him. We do not want to make a mistake of the sort that has been indicated could happen.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, as noble Lords have already demonstrated, there is no shortage within your Lordships’ House of people with not only an interest in but considerable expertise of—derived perhaps from professional or even judicial experience—the problems that we are discussing. However, I think we would all agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that there is none with the particular degree of involvement and expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. The House is indebted to him for his continuing interest in this problem and for the positive way in which he seeks to assist the Government and, through the Government, society in dealing with an intransigent and difficult problem affecting numbers of our young people.

I was particularly interested to hear from the noble Lord today about the local academy which is to start, I think he said, next year, and also about the Missouri experience. If indeed there is—and it is clear that there will be—an opportunity to see how the proposed academy, which I think he said would be built in Haringey, works, then surely it would be sensible to learn from that experience and, if it is successful or even if it is not, to build on that experience in order to craft a way of dealing with the Government’s proposal here. As I said at Second Reading, and again on Monday in Committee, we all agree with their proposal to the extent that we recognise the importance of providing education as part of the way of dealing with the problems of these young people. If, instead, the Government go ahead with their own proposal, next year there will be built an institution catering for 320 youngsters. There is a widespread view in this House and certainly outside it that that is simply too large a number of young people to afford a realistic possibility of attending adequately to their problems.

It so happens that I had tabled an amendment which proposed a much smaller college as a pilot. The number of places that I suggested was 50. I did not know about the Missouri experience in suggesting that figure but, on the basis of some of the discussions that have been held outside this Chamber, it seemed to be a reasonable size. I am reassured by the noble Lord’s confirmation that that appears to be a very successful project. Again, I commend that kind of approach to the Government in looking at how they might carry forward their very well intentioned objectives. I also refer them to the experience of Finland, which has a very good record in dealing with youngsters who have committed offences, and it has a successful record in ensuring that they emerge from care—let us call it that rather than “custody”—into society.

I do not know the extent to which the Government have looked beyond these shores, as the noble Lord suggested and as I am now suggesting, to see what the experience of other countries and jurisdictions might contribute. However, as matters stand, many of the criticisms that were voiced earlier remain unanswered. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked a perfectly valid question about her local institution. She asked where the secure unit in Exeter will go. The same question remains to be asked about a whole range of institutions that are currently operating at, as I acknowledge, different rates of cost.

In Committee on Monday, I referred to the fact that the number of places in secure children’s homes has been reduced to 138, so there has clearly been a reduction—of 28 places nationally—in that area. It remains to be seen what the future will be not only of those homes but of the other training facilities, because it is envisaged that some of those who are currently in other institutions will transfer to this new college and presumably any other new colleges that might come on stream. Therefore, there is a very real risk to the kind of institutions that the noble and learned Baroness referred to.

As the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby said, there is so little detail in the proposal that it is difficult to be confident that, at the end of the day, we will emerge with a fully developed project that will do the job which the Government intend—we agree with that intent—to see carried out. I do not expect the Minister, just two days later, to answer the questions that I posed on Monday. However, some of them are worth repeating. As is his normal, courteous practice, he said he would identify questions asked by noble Lords, write to us and place the reply in the Library. I will touch on some of them as a gentle reminder of some of the issues that were raised. One was the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and, in particular, its concern that there was no equality impact assessment. That seems particularly important in relation to gender, as there is a real concern about the current proposal of having girls in the same large institutions as boys. A second concern was the requirement for special educational needs to be catered for.

There are also questions around the secure children’s homes, to which I have already made reference. The Minister implied that there were, perhaps, some shortcomings in these establishments. What improvements in service have been identified as requiring attention? We have heard from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that a place in one of those homes costs around £200,000 a year. If that is regarded as too high, what do the Government consider an appropriate figure, both for the individual, on a per capita basis, and in terms of the aggregate cost? Reverting almost to the question posed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, how many children now in secure homes do they envisage will transfer to the larger college? It is slightly disturbing that the duty to use best endeavours to ensure that the needs are met of children who have been assessed as needing EHC plans would be placed on the principal of a secure college. On Report in the other place, the Minister said that,

“a great deal of further thought will be given to how those needs can be met”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/5/14; col. 538.]

It is only two months since that observation was made, but can the Minister indicate—not necessarily today—that that has been followed up and with what result?

Many noble Lords are concerned, as I am, about staff to children ratio. Can we be assured that it will not simply be left to the contractor to opt for a figure just in terms of numbers, but that these will be numbers with the sort of qualifications that, as noble Lords have indicated today and in previous debates, would surely be required to attend to the complex needs, including the educational needs, which are the main object of the project?

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Monday 21st July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, it is with some considerable hesitation that I speak now, with two views having been expressed—one by those who support this measure and one by those opposing it. It is only right, however, having heard what my noble and learned Scottish friends have had to say about this that I should mention my experience. I have the greatest respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, whom I was glad to serve under when he was Lord Chancellor, and for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, as well, who is a colleague in the House. With great respect to them, though, neither of them, if I may say so with all due deference, were judges who were sentencing in courts at first instance.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

That is not correct. The case that I referred to was at first instance in a trial in the High Court in Glasgow.

[Lord Woolf]

I stand corrected on that but again, if I may say so, their experience was not, because of the way in which their careers developed, in accord with mine. I sat as a judge in the higher courts at every level, first as a High Court judge, then as a Court of Appeal judge, then as a House of Lords judge and finally as the Lord Chief Justice, in relation to these matters.

The one thing that I want to emphasise is that the right way of sentencing in the ordinary way is not for Parliament to lay down what the fixed sentence should be; rather, it is for Parliament to set out the framework and for the judges, within that framework, to deal with matters specifically. Four-month and six-month fixed sentences amount to tinkering. To think that that sort of sentence is going to be of any significance—again, I speak with great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Blair, whom I know and respect—is not right. Four-month and six-month sentences, as has been said already, just do not work as far as either the authorities or offenders are concerned. If someone is the sort of person that this provision is aimed at, who caused someone’s death by the carrying of a knife, I am afraid I cannot begin to believe that their conduct will be influenced by this. That is contrary to the experience of the great majority of judges and, as I have said, amounts to tinkering. That is what we should not do.

We have powers in the court to deal with these matters. Both the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, put their finger on the point when they said that the courts can send messages in the same way that Parliament can send messages. However, there are situations where it is appropriate for Parliament to send a message, but there are situations where it is much better done otherwise, although I do not say that it has to be the judiciary. We have heard in this field that both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and Lord Justice Judge sent messages and were indicating. Although it is right, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, says, that if you have a fixed sentence there is more of a likelihood that someone might know what the fixed sentence is, it is also more likely that injustice will be caused by the fixed sentence.

When we legislate, we have to hold the balance between doing justice and ensuring that people are safe so that we do not get into a situation where a court finds that its hands are tied and it is forced to give a sentence that it would prefer not to. The provision that is a safeguard in this case is based on one that is well known to courts south of the border and, I suspect, north of the border. The difficulty with this provision has already been indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Mallalieu. What does it mean? It is a matter that I do not mind saying—[Interruption.] I am sorry, the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu. I apologise to the noble Baroness and I know that she will forgive me for that discourtesy.

The position is this: Lord Bingham took one view of what a provision of this sort made, and I took a different view. I said, and you can find this in the Law Lord reports, that the only way you can make sense of this provision is to say that the right way of interpreting it is that a judge’s hands are not tied if that would cause injustice, because it is obviously not the intention of Parliament that judges should impose an unjust sentence. Lord Bingham said that that made this provision a non-entity. I realise that and I agree, and if that is so then we are better off without it.

Legal Systems: Rule of Law

Lord Woolf Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Woolf]

That this House takes note of the contribution made by the legal systems of this country to the international standing of the United Kingdom and the observance of the rule of law in this country and abroad.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I disclose my interests as in the register.

The title of the debate refers to legal systems. I emphasise that at the outset because, having fulfilled the role that I have, I would not want it to be thought that I was not conscious of the importance of the other legal systems within the United Kingdom.

I say at the outset that I am most grateful to my fellow Cross-Benchers who voted to select this topic for debate. I am even more grateful to each noble Lord and to the Minister and shadow Minister who have agreed to take part. They are all extremely well qualified to contribute and collectively they have an extraordinary record of service to the system of justice in this country. Their involvement in the debate is testimony to its importance.

It is uncontroversial that our legal systems have benefited many countries, as well as our own. They have made a unique contribution to improving the global observance of the rule of law. Other countries look to this country for guidance as to what needs to happen if they are to bring their country up to the standards required by the rule of law. With this leadership comes responsibility. However, I now have a concern that there is a real danger that we will not continue to set the example that we have in the past. If we do not, it will be extremely damaging to this county, as well as to other countries which could benefit from our experience.

Today, there is considerable debate about what constitutes British values. The previous debate has a very real relationship with this debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said. Whatever the right answer is to the question “What are British values?”, I am confident that hitherto those values would generally be regarded as including justice and fairness, which observing the rule of law requires. After all, this country fought the last world war to protect those values.

Since the end of the war, the importance of those values has increased immeasurably. Our legal system, based on observing the rule of law, is a major contributor to this country’s economic health. Internally, it is part of the essential infrastructure required for a healthy economy. Externally, it is now an important constituent of our global exports. The Bar, the Law Society and the Public Law Project prepared briefing papers for this debate. I refer noble Lords to each of those papers, as they provide very useful information on the background to this debate. Even a glance at them makes clear the importance of the contribution made by legal services to this country. We should be very proud of what has been achieved by our lawyers and legal system.

Why, then, my concerns? To understand them, you have to understand how our legal system developed. It is necessary to remember that our legal system, unlike those on the continent, was not the creation of a single code; nor is our legal system, like almost all other developed systems, protected by an entrenched written constitution which sets out explicitly the functions of the different entities of the state. Instead, there was the creation of the common law, which today is subservient to the will of a largely sovereign Parliament. It is also dependent on the Executive for its resources. This brings with it dangers for its independence, as was pointed out by my noble and learned friend Lord Browne-Wilkinson when he was vice-chancellor. He warned that as the Executive paid the piper, they would inevitably be tempted to call the tune. Fortunately, at least in relation to the role of the judiciary, the Executive have usually exercised commendable restraint. Despite its vulnerability, our system, without an entrenched and dependent common law, is not without virtues. It combines a considerable flexibility with a critical core of common-law values. This enabled the common law, during the expansion of our empire, to be absorbed into and to take root in more than a third of the countries around the globe, including the USA.

Common-law values are important in any legal system, whatever its source. This is because they are a basic requirement of any developed justice system, and closely allied to the values to be found in conventions such as those on human rights. They are also essential ingredients of any effective democracy. In the case of common-law countries, values have a long history, usually traced back to Magna Carta by members of the Commonwealth and the USA. I understand that another contributor may make reference to Magna Carta in that context, particularly as next year is its 800th anniversary. Although it has an ancient pedigree, the common law is still very much alive and kicking. A visit to any Commonwealth law conference will confirm that. Perhaps its values are incapable of being rigidly defined, though fortunately, before his untimely death, Lord Bingham of Cornhill was able to bring considerable clarity to the subject and his work is being continued by the Bingham Institute, under its director Sir Jeffrey Jowell. It has also received detailed attention in the World Justice Project, which has just published this year’s Rule of Law Index. This sets out four universal principles of the rule of law. The project also indexes the extent to which the rule of law is observed in 99 different jurisdictions. No country gets a perfect mark but I am rather disappointed that this country only manages to be the 14th most observant of those countries that form the 99.

Undoubtedly, there is still a very high regard globally for our legal system. This results in multiple benefits to this country. Our courts—especially the commercial court—are used by litigants from around the globe. Our lawyers and judges are universally admired and branches of our international law firms are prospering. Their integrity and ability is not open to question. Because of our judiciary’s reputation both before and after they retire, our judges are in great demand to assist other jurisdictions, which they do willingly. I hope that some of my judicial colleagues who are down to speak will inform the debate with their experience. I will not speak to mine, except to say that I cannot resist mentioning in the presence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, that we were once called upon by President Chirac in Paris to give him advice, which we happily did. I have also sat in overseas courts.

While the position may look comfortable, at present we cannot assume that in the future it will take care of itself. It needs appropriate support and that support has not always been forthcoming as rapidly as it should. Instead, over the past decade, there have been a series of events that collectively suggest a lack of appreciation in government of the importance of ensuring that our legal system remains fit for purpose. This is a new era in which other jurisdictions wish to compete with us for the benefits that our legal system has already earned for us.

I referred to disturbing events. Let me mention what I have in mind. I have already indicated that we have no entrenched constitution. It is essential, therefore, that our constitutional arrangements include checks and balances to protect our rights and freedoms. Here, the historic office of the Lord Chancellor played an important role. His responsibilities included speaking up in Cabinet for the judiciary, of which he was a member, and for the legal system generally. The former Labour Administration attempted to change one aspect, also involving judicial review. It was vigorously opposed by the legal profession and the judiciary, and I am glad to say that it was withdrawn.

The former Labour Administration also attempted to change our constitution by altering overnight the status of the Lord Chancellor. As a result we now have a situation where there is a Minister in the Commons who combines the roles of Lord Chancellor and Minister of Justice. He is not a lawyer and he has different and wider responsibilities than those of his predecessors. Inevitably this affects his relationship with the judiciary, the profession and our legal system. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 says he should “be qualified by experience” but so far I am not sure of the precise form that that experience took. This is no doubt a handicap for him, and I commend him for establishing excellent personal relations with the senior judiciary. I hope that he will forgive me, however, if I say that it would be natural for there to be suspicions. Unlike the old-style Lord Chancellor, he sees his current role as being only one more step in what will no doubt be a glittering political career. This is not what the profession and the judiciary expect from a holder of this still high office. I am sure that he recognises that at times the impression he could give is of a politician in a great hurry, which will not make it easier for him to obtain agreement that would facilitate the changes he is anxious to make.

Our lack of an entrenched constitution supported by a constitutional court means that we require an effective legal mechanism for ensuring that public bodies do not exceed or otherwise abuse their powers. This need has become much greater as society has become more complex. The judges responded by developing a streamlined procedure of judicial review which gives judges wide discretion to hold the balance between the Executive and the citizen. As the citizen requires judicial review to protect his position, it is essential that he has a right of access to the courts to achieve this. The procedure is one where the involvement of lawyers is particularly important but the availability of legal aid has been drastically cut, and that interferes with the ability of some litigants to appear before the court. What is more, the Lord Chancellor is now proposing in legislation to interfere with areas of judicial discretion which were working perfectly satisfactorily and were so regarded by everyone concerned.

I know that the Minister will pray in aid the need for austerity. But even if savings could be achieved by what is proposed, which is highly doubtful, they would be modest. Part 4 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill discloses a failure to attach sufficient significance to the importance of ensuring that justice is done in an area playing a vital role in achieving the balance to which I have been referring.

Judicial review may at times be inconvenient to the Government but it achieves better administration, which benefits the Government. It is their task to accept that it is a critical part of our society. The changes are being made contrary to the wishes of the senior judiciary. They show signs of being ill considered and rushed. While reforms to judicial review are perfectly proper this is not the way they should be made.

I turn to the area of criminal justice, where I fear that the unintended consequences resulting from government action could be grave indeed. The quality of our judges is dependent on the quality of the legal profession from which they are drawn. As a result of the changes being made in funding, it would be difficult today for any responsible person to advise a youngster coming into the profession to take up a criminal practice. It is essential that standards do not fall, because if they do the effect will be serious. Moreover, the position is not confined to newcomers. We also have problems with the heaviest cases, which are well known, so I will just draw attention to what was said by Lord Justice Levinson when giving a wise judgment.

These are some of the concerns, and I look forward to the other contributions to the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Woolf]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be able to say that this debate has exceeded all my expectations. This is because of the quality and spirit in which contributions have been made. It is not for me now to take up the time of the House by going over the various contributions, but I think that your Lordships will forgive me if I echo one or two points that have been made.

First, I particularly thank those who are not lawyers who have taken part in this debate. Their contributions were of huge value and the debate would have been the lesser without them. I also congratulate those noble Lords who managed to take part in two debates this afternoon and made very distinguished contributions to each. I was much moved by the idea of this being a picnic, and I was wondering what we could bring as presents for people to take away from the picnic after it is over. I am very glad that the Minister was able to provide us with something to take away—I will certainly regard it as an important contribution, as I know will many other noble Lords here—in his assurance that the Government have no intention to either repeal or amend the Human Rights Act.

I think that both the spokesman for the Opposition and the Minister also deserve to be congratulated on the way that they have tackled the issues before us in this debate. I agree with the Minister that there is a lot left to argue over, which will no doubt occur within this Chamber in the future. I do not think that there will be reference again to the days when I was a student so long ago in University College London, when I had the huge advantage of having the noble Baroness, Lady Flather, as a fellow student. I am bound to say, and know only too well, that she has weathered over the years so much better than I have.

Motion agreed.