Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

It is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and I associate myself with his remarks about the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her desire to clarify and improve the Bill. In no way should her motives or actions be impugned.

Because this will be a long debate, I will speak only briefly about Amendments 21 and 22, to which I have added my name. If we are to legislate and to put this regime on to the statute book, we must have absolute clarity. The amendments establish that degree of clarity in relation to criminal and civil responsibility. I attach particular importance to the issue of criminal responsibility because in such a matter, it is very important that we keep alive elements of deterrence to show that the law can act swiftly and clearly if people corruptly misconduct themselves in public office or go much more seriously into criminality in authorising crimes. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, set out with admirable clarity the changes that are required. I would not think that assurances given by a Minister would be adequate in this case. A statutory regime must start and end with a statute.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I sit on, welcomes the introduction of this Bill to Parliament. We strongly support the principle behind the legislation. Covert human intelligence sources, or agents, provide invaluable information to assist the security and intelligence agencies in their investigations. They play a vital role in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots. They save lives. In working undercover, CHIS need to be trusted by those they are reporting on, so that they can gain the information the authorities need. This may require them to act in a certain way. Put simply, if they are to be believed to be a gang member, they need to act like a gang member. If they do not, it is no exaggeration to say that they could be killed. CHIS may therefore need to carry out criminal activity to maintain their cover. Their handlers must be able to authorise them to do so in certain circumstances and subject to specific safeguards. The Bill places the existing powers that certain organisations have to authorise such activity on an explicit statutory basis. We believe that there is a need for such authorisations and we have seen real examples where this has saved lives.

For these reasons, I oppose Amendments 1 and 2. CHIS who have been asked by the state to commit criminal acts should have some certainty that they will be afforded protection from prosecution—now of course on a statutory basis, not the informal basis on which it was done before. When carrying out often dangerous work on behalf of their authorising organisations, they need that certainty.

Having said that, I am reassured that the Bill does not prevent the prosecuting authorities considering a prosecution for any activity outside the specific conduct authorised in the CCA. That properly authorised conduct is now lawful makes it all the more important that these provisions be subject to rigorous safeguards and oversight. In that vein, I strongly support Amendments 21 and 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord West. I am not a lawyer but I have had the privilege to serve in both Houses for nearly 50 years now, and prior to that I was in Her Majesty’s forces. I specialise globally in south and south-east Asia, where I worked for a number of years. I am essentially a practical man. I have suffered a death threat from the IRA, so I have seen the rough side of political life as well.

We need to understand what it is that we ask the men and women to do who safeguard our communities, our society, our country. That cannot possibly be an easy job. It is a very taxing job and we need it to be done within a framework of surveillance and some control, but not such that they are restricted or confined, as the noble Lord just pointed out. There is a practical side. It would never work if you went too far that way, and frankly, Amendments 1 and 2 do that. I am not reassured by the views of Justice. I am particularly not reassured by the stated views of some of the NGOs and others in what I would call the human rights vehicle. Therefore, I will not support Amendments 1 and 2.

I understand why Amendment 3 has been tabled. As I read it, it seems to weaken the current situation, but I will listen to what my noble friend the Minister has to say. I also understand why Amendment 4 was tabled, but perhaps it would undermine the Bill in a way that is not obvious to me, as a non-lawyer.

Turning to Amendment 21, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is a very persuasive and clearly very thorough lawyer, and I am pleased to hear that he has had discussions with my Front Bench. I shall listen with care to what the Minister says on Amendment 21 in particular. However, I urge all of us to reflect on the reality of life today. We live in a very difficult world, and we need to make sure that the honest, genuine people who want to help maintain the security of our country and to keep our people safe can do their job properly, so that our society can flourish.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I can be brief on this, currying some favour, I hope, with the Government Whip that will be taken on board when I speak in a later group to my own amendments once more. It is a great privilege to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Your Lordships heard it from him: when is a crime not a crime—when it has been pre-authorised with immunity attached in advance? That would be a difficult thing to explain to most members of public. However, it is not so difficult, perhaps, when you compare it with intrusions into our privacy, which is where this model comes from.

The complexities of this debate just make me sadder about where we got to in the previous one. We now have to decide about safeguards, because your Lordships have potentially created a breath-taking immunity. Under existing surveillance law, there are different models: it takes a magistrate to authorise an intrusive search of your premises; it takes a Minister to authorise the tapping of your telephone; yet inserting an undercover agent—more intrusive than either of those two measures, because a human will change your behaviour, not just monitor it—is internally authorised. Now, we have gone further, and a crime can be committed, authorised by the Executive, authorised by the police for their agents, authorised by the intelligence services for their agents, and so on.

Clutching at straws for safeguards, I have to support some kind of external authorisation at the very least. If it is good enough for search warrants and telephone taps, it must be even more necessary when criminal conduct, including violent conduct, might be authorised. As for which model, I have heard the arguments either way, and I tend to think political warrantry of something so politically dangerous is problematic, and it has proved so in the past. Former Government Ministers have written in their memoirs about how tired they were when, late at night, they were making endless intrusive surveillance authorisations. It is not about hollowing out the state; it is about trying to insert independence into the realm of criminal law. I admire the thrust of the eloquent speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft: if Government are to do such a thing, they should take some responsibility, not just for legislation but for authorisations.

We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Butler, with his enormous experience, his prediction that there will be some low-level warrants here and a very large number of them. This would present a real problem if it was political warrantry, because Secretaries of State have a lot to do, and there are going to be a lot more warrants under this legislation than those limited to, for example, the security services.

These are all imperfect checks and balances but, on balance, at the moment I prefer judicial authorisation, even though that will, in my view, bring dangers for the judiciary. Post-notification authorisation is a very weak protection but, if it is to happen, I agree completely with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that Amendment 33 without Amendment 34 is pretty much a nonsense.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. She kept me well aware of civil liberties for three years when I was the Minister with responsibility for security, counterterrorism and cybersecurity, and she did it with complete purity of purpose. I do not think that anyone should have a go at her for anything other than that, so it is a pleasure to follow her.

An awful lot has been said already and time is running short. I am strongly supportive of judicial oversight of these powers. Looking at the package of amendments before us, Amendment 33 appears to be a balanced and practical proposal, and I rather like it. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has convinced me that, in a sense, it has to be looked at in conjunction with Amendment 34, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, because the two sit well together. The Minister needs to look at them, as together they would achieve what we want in this very sensitive area.

On Amendment 16, I have considerable sympathy with having a Minister involved, but there is an issue with how many things one has to sign. I found that, when I was a Minister, I had all the dross and had to pass the really meaty bits up to the Home Secretary, who seemed to think that she was rather overloaded anyway—and that was after I had taken a hell of a lot of the weight away. So there is an issue there.

We also need to look at the wording of that amendment very carefully. Saying that one of these people is “employed” is quite specific and tricky. Similarly, the wording of Amendment 23 is slightly unclear, and we need to be careful. However, the amendment that I really like is Amendment 33, probably in conjunction with Amendment 34.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is an absolute pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord West of Spithead.

There are some amendments in this group that I object to, and I shall vote against them if they are pushed to a vote. I want to restrict my remarks to two amendments—Amendment 16 and Amendment 33 with its consequentials.

I am a bit confused about Amendment 16 in the same way as my noble friend Lord West has just alluded to. I have massive respect for my noble friends Lord Hain and Lord Blunkett. I operated as Minister of State for each of them for a year—at the Northern Ireland Office, under direct rule, and at the Home Office. In both cases, my role involved purely domestic policy—the only time I got close to anything remotely related to this was at the Northern Ireland Office on two of the 13 duty weekends that I did in a year.

However, as I made clear in Committee, I simply do not agree that the Secretaries of State should be involved in the issuing of authorisations. We are talking here about a level of detail and relationships with people—probably long term, in the case of many CHIS—that means it is just not possible, practical or, in my view, proper for Secretaries of State to be involved. I agree completely with the arguments put forward, both this time and the previous time, by the noble Lord, Lord Butler.

As for paragraph (b), which would require the CHIS to be an employee, as my noble friend Lord West has just referred to, I am at a slight loss to understand it. The Bill is not talking about undercover police officers who are employed as police officers, or undercover security officers employed by the security services. We are talking about a range of people with civilian occupations who are employed by other authorities—I will give some examples in a minute—or about common criminals, who are probably not employed by anyone. So I do not understand the idea that they have to be an employee of the authority. That simply cannot be done; it is a contradiction.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. She mentioned complacency in the speeches of a few noble Lords, and it seems that people are missing the point of the measures in this Bill. The Government make a great play of “This is all to catch paedophiles and terrorists”, whom obviously we all want to catch, but they ignore the human rights legislation that will inevitably be transgressed. We know the long history of abuses by undercover police, and the thought that humans can change is absolutely ludicrous, in the sense that human nature will always involve a group of people who think that they can get away with doing things that the rest of us should not. I am afraid that in the past officers have been allowed unlawfully by senior officers to do things, and this does not mean that they will not do it again: they will do it again. For example, the undercover inquiry has taken years to reach a point at which there is a judge in control—one who, I would argue, is not doing a very good job. The progress is incredibly slow and survivors of this sort of abuse should not have to wait so long for justice.

This group contains important amendments on two issues: ensuring that these powers are used only against serious offending and ensuring that they are not used to encourage offending. I have signed only one amendment in this group, but they are all sound. I wish that I could trust the Government and the authorities enough to make Amendment 11 an absurdity, but history shows that this state can and does misuse power in order to undermine and stifle dissent and opposition. The face of the Bill should make clear beyond any doubt that agent provocateur conduct is illegal and can never be authorised, otherwise we can be sure that sooner or later this power will be used for that purpose.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I join in passing best wishes on to James Brokenshire. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked about the calmness of debate with him. We have been talking now for some hours on an issue which a lot of us feel very strongly about in all sorts of directions, and it is rather good that it is carried out in such a sane and balanced way, with people putting very strong points of view without storming buildings—but enough of that.

I wish to speak to Amendments 8, 9 and 11. These would impose limits, albeit somewhat vague ones, on the types of criminal conduct and activity that could be authorised. The Intelligence and Security Committee supports the Government’s decision not to place limits on criminal conduct or on the activity which can be authorised on the face of the Bill, as this would undermine the effectiveness of future operations and put agents’ lives at risk.

It is unsurprising that there is speculation about the more serious forms of criminality and calls for curbs to the power and for limits to be put in the Bill—I understand that. However, there are clearly concerns, and the committee strongly supports the Government’s decision not to put them in the Bill—although, of course, this places an even greater emphasis on the need for robust safeguards, which we were talking about and voting on earlier this evening.

As a member of the ISC, I can offer some reassurance by saying that we have had full briefings on how MI5, for example, uses these authorisations at a very secure, secretive level, and we are reassured and satisfied that it uses them appropriately. I can also point to the European Convention on Human Rights: all public authorities, including those covered by this Bill, are bound by the Human Rights Act, which commits them to adhere to the ECHR, which includes the right to life and the prohibition of torture. The Bill is clear that all authorisations will be compliant with the ECHR and that the activity being authorised will be “necessary” and “proportionate” to the criminality it is seeking to prevent. On that basis, I will vote against the amendment.

[Lord Beith (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I add my thoughts for James Brokenshire, who was a member of the Justice Committee when I chaired it; I respect him and hold him in the highest regard, and I wish him well, as others have.

It is pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord West; I recall taking evidence from him when I was a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Now that he has gone from poacher to gamekeeper, I hope he is applying similar zeal to the scrutiny and examination of these very issues. I hope that the ISC will take a continuing interest in this legislation when it is on the statute book.

During my time on the Intelligence and Security Committee, I was concerned about the unspecific and broad nature of the “economic well-being” justification as a basis for approving various forms of action. Of course, that was in relation to intrusive surveillance powers, not the sanctioning of criminal acts, which we are discussing today; indeed, since that time, the economic well-being justification has been qualified in the same terms as those which Amendment 9 uses.

I raised my concerns in Committee on 3 December, and they echo the concerns expressed by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, in its report on the Bill. It was disappointing that, on 3 December, the Minister’s reply did not answer or even refer to the concerns I had raised. She had had a long day, and she has had an even longer one today, but I hope that I can provoke her to make some things clearer.

In that debate, I said that there are obviously threats to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom that are as serious as physical threats to that security. I included

“action by a hostile state or a terrorist ... group to destroy or disrupt key elements of our critical national infrastructure, energy supply, transport or banking and financial transaction systems”—[Official Report, 3/12/20; col. 870.]

as well as government communications and many forms of cyberattack.

I will suggest three other areas which might involve action by hostile states or extremists and might be candidates for authorisation. I do this simply to illustrate how broad the concept of economic well-being is. The current pandemic is, undoubtedly, a threat to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Could there be a future pandemic situation in which we believed that the reckless behaviour of other countries or deliberate action by extremists was making the spread of the pandemic significantly more dangerous? Would that qualify if some form of participation by an agent or human intelligence source seemed likely to help us fight the threat? I think it probably would.

I will give another example. The way the Brexit future relationship agreement is implemented could certainly affect the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Could that justify deploying intelligence resources, including covert human intelligence, involving themselves in criminal acts? That is not quite so clear.

I offer a third example—that of a major overseas defence and civil engineering contract, affecting perhaps as many as 10,000 jobs in Britain, where there are fears of bribery, corruption and money-laundering, and of those distorting the outcome. What if a different British company is involved in the rival bid for this contract—these bids normally come from consortia involving companies from several countries—and that company considers that it would be very adversely affected by action which might have been begun by someone qualified through this legislation? The economic well-being justification is clearly not a simple matter in such a situation.

I am not asking the Minister to comment on those three hypothetical examples individually. What I want her to consider is, first, whether the economic well-being justification should be so broad. Secondly, if it is not to be qualified by reference to national security, as Amendment 9 in the name of my noble friend Lord Paddick requires, how else can we be confident that it is not inappropriately used? The use of this justification for serious criminal action has not really been the subject of much ministerial comment, and its scope will depend heavily on how future CCAs will be viewed in retrospect by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and by the commissioners. This approach does not give us much confidence that applications to authorise criminal conduct in relation to economic well-being issues will be considered by authorising officers against a well-understood test of what is justifiable. We have to bear in mind that these authorising officers are in a wide variety of organisations, some of which have long experience of intelligence work and some a great deal less.

The Constitution Committee said in its report:

“While we recognise that threats to the ‘economic well-being of the United Kingdom’ may justify a security response, we are concerned about the use of such a broad concept to authorise serious criminal conduct. The House may wish to consider whether the authorisation of criminal conduct should require more specific justification than a general invocation of the need to protect economic well-being.”


That is what we are doing in this short debate tonight. I would like to hear a clear statement from the Minister on how we might establish clear principles against which to test whether authorising criminal action under so broad and vague a headline as “economic well-being” will, in any future instance, be proportionate and justifiable. Would it need to be a threat to economic well-being of a kind that would, in effect, be a threat to the security of the United Kingdom? That is really what the amendment suggests.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I am honoured to follow that excellent and very moving maiden speech by the noble Lord, Lord Walney. He talked of Walney Island, and I know that area. What he did not mention was that it has an airport built at right angles to the prevailing wind and about as long as this Chamber, so if any noble Lords are thinking of visiting there, they will have a very fun arrival if they go by air.

I have known John, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for more than 10 years. He is a highly principled man, and I was particularly impressed, first, by his confrontation of anti-Semitism within the Labour Party, which he drove through with great vigour; and secondly by his passionate support for an issue very close to my heart and those of his ex-constituents, which noble Lords heard him mention—the UK’s independent deterrent and nuclear submarines. Neither issue made him popular with the last leader of the Labour Party, but he refused to compromise his beliefs. Rather like his namesake in the 17th century, he was martyred, although I doubt that—unlike his predecessor—he will be beatified by the Pope. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, will be of great value to this House. We already got that from what he said, and I look forward very much to working with him.

The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, of which I am currently a member, welcomes this Bill. Agents provide invaluable information and play a vital role in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots. Basically, they save the lives of our people. However, can the Minister assure the House that, in putting the existing powers on a statutory basis—which needs to be done because of the legal shenanigans going on at the moment—the Bill does not extend them in any way at all? It is essential that these powers are properly circumscribed and used only where necessary: they have to be proportionate. They should be compatible with the Human Rights Act—let us face it, we are all responsible for ensuring that—and subject to proper oversight.

The Minister will be aware that the Intelligence and Security Committee proposed an amendment to the Bill in the other place relating to parliamentary oversight. I have lost sight of where that has gone; perhaps the Minister will let us know where that proposal stands. The committee clearly knows the agencies very well, but it has also taken evidence—very sensitive evidence—from the police in a number of its inquiries, and from that knowledge would support their use of these powers. I would, however, need convincing that a number of the other authorities really do need these powers.

The Intelligence and Security Committee strongly supports the Government’s decision not to place limits on criminal conduct in the Bill itself. My own operational experience would reinforce that because of the risks it would place on our agents. Clearly, that means even greater emphasis on the need for robust safeguards. I can offer reassurance to the House that the Intelligence and Security Committee has had comprehensive briefings on how these authorisations are used, and we are reassured and satisfied that they are used appropriately by MI5. Will the Minister say, however, what percentage of criminal conduct authorisations—they have been mentioned already—the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will actually examine?

I reiterate that I strongly support this Bill, subject to the caveats I touched on. I have not had time to go into other areas, such as the use of children, but I hope that these things will be investigated in Committee. There is no doubt that these agents save lives and are at great risk themselves. We must be careful not to pass legislation that, with amendments, leads to agents being killed.

Hong Kong British National (Overseas) Visa

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Wednesday 29th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The BNO visa is a very generous offer indeed to BNO citizens, which is proportionate to the unique situation that has arisen. The new route will not set a precedent. In terms of the 4 million people who will possibly come over, we estimate that up to 2.9 million status holders are eligible for passports, and at the moment there are around 350,000 passport holders. In reality, a large number of those who are eligible will want to stay in Hong Kong or relocate to other countries in the region. It is not possible at this point to predict with accuracy the number of BNO citizens likely to choose to come to the UK.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, as captain of a ship based in Hong Kong in the early 1970s, I had a number of locally enlisted personnel in my ship’s company and during my career came across a large number of Hong Kong Chinese serving in the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary around the world. They took part in a number of actions, including Korea and the Falklands, where some lost their lives. Indeed, after my ship had been sunk, I remember commiserating with my Hong Kong Chinese laundryman about the fact that he had probably lost all his money. He cheerfully said, “Don’t worry sir, my father sunk with Royal Navy in last war so if in water, in package on my person, all safe.” Does the Minister agree that these loyal veterans who served in Her Majesty’s Armed Forces deserve priority approval now? Has the wish of the 64 members of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps—which was raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, at an earlier date—for a full British citizen’s passport, which other corps veterans received before 1997, at long last been agreed to?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I knew that the noble Lord would get a ship into his question somehow. I fear that he might have stolen the thunder of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, by asking that question although I am sure that the noble and gallant Lord will ask it again. The Government are giving careful consideration to the representations from those campaigning for that right of abode for former British Hong Kong servicemen. The new visa creates a pathway to citizenship, as he knows, and it will be available to those who elect to retain their ties to the UK through registering for BNO status. We expect that that will include the majority of Armed Forces veterans in Hong Kong.

Reading Terrorist Attack

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is right. It is very easy to take a piece of religious text and twist it so that it has a different meaning or to wind people up by saying that God wants something from them which is not the case. He has talked a lot about religious literacy and ensuring that those who preach whatever religion do so not in a biased or twisted fashion that takes away from the original text.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I share the concerns of my noble friends Lord Rosser and Lady Ramsay that the ISC has not met recently. It is too important to be messed up by internal party-political shenanigans. Having been deputy chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee for some three years, I have no doubt about the competence and dedication of the men and women in the agencies. They are in danger of being overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of potential threat suspects, whether additions from abroad or whatever. Is there not a need to further enable technology to assist us? This could include the greater use of CCTV and other electronic items, enabled by 5G; the use of artificial intelligence; utilising big data, and so on. Clearly, there are risks and we must not become a surveillance society. The Investigative Powers Act may need amending. Are these avenues being reviewed with some urgency, bearing in mind the numbers involved?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord makes a valid point. Technology has its place in keeping us safe. We need to advance that technology in a way that strikes a balance between privacy and protection. Sometimes by breaching people’s privacy, you give them their freedom. There is so much advanced technology available to help keep us safe and it is important that we use it.

UK Borders: Surveillance

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 18th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I note what my noble friend says—but, as we move towards exiting the European Union, Border Force will make sure that its recruiting plans are flexible to ensure that its approach can be flexed as future requirements become clearer.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister makes rather light of the real problem. There is no doubt whatever that all the departments and assets looking after our territorial seas and exclusive economic zone are not being co-ordinated at the moment. I know that there are plans to move forward, but it is not being done. The intelligence from the NMIC, which was established some five years or so ago, is very good but we are not co-ordinating assets, and we do not have enough assets. However, my question relates to our British Overseas Territories, each of which has territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. Indeed, we have responsibility for the largest area of ocean of any country in the world. In that circumstance, does it not make sense not to get rid of the offshore patrol vessels, which are relatively new, when the new ones come online, and to use those to look after these vast areas of ocean that at the moment are not being properly protected?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord makes a valid point about our offshore patrol vessels—and there are no plans to get rid of them. However, my point, which I hope I was not making lightly, was that the most effective work we can do at the border is intelligence-led work that is successful at pinpointing areas of high risk.

Mohammed Mirzo

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend makes a really important point, which is that if you are a Syrian you want to return to Syria in improved circumstances. I can give him exact figures by letter. Indeed, it is in all our interests to get a more peaceful situation in Syria so that people can return to their country of origin.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, people of many nations fought in the British fleet at Trafalgar, but I am pretty certain that there was not a single Bulgarian. The 212th anniversary of that great battle is on Saturday, and as this is the year of the Navy, according to the Secretary of State for Defence, I wonder whether the noble Baroness will pass the best wishes of this House to the Royal Navy on this very auspicious occasion.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can always rely on the noble Lord to say something vaguely related to the Question. I most certainly will pass on those best wishes. Thank you.

Security: ID Cards

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Thursday 20th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the Government’s Verify system helps in regard to identity. We are certainly looking, for when the UK leaves the EU, at just what that residency document will look like.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, as well as the very persuasive arguments by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, all the work we have done in the cyber world has shown that the best way of stopping identity theft is for people to have a card with biometric data that they can use when accessing things such as the Government Gateway. More work is being done digitally online. This will become something that people will almost certainly have to have. A passport does not really cover that. When you add all the other benefits—for example, recognising who people really are–surely it is overwhelmingly desirable to go down this route.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord mentions the Verify system, which is a very good way for people to prove who they are online. There are a mixture of different ways in which people can prove identity for different purposes, and the noble Lord is right to raise that.

Brexit: Crime Prevention

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Thursday 30th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It depends which intemperate remarks my noble friend is referring to, but yes, I think we all have to be very careful about what we say.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I am afraid I disagree with my noble friend Lord Kinnock on the reading of this particular piece. For some seven decades now, the US and the UK have been the prime safety net for Europe in defence and security terms. We must not allow this very complex web of agreements somehow to be damaged in these negotiations. The security of Europe is crucial for us. Everyone knows that, and we must not be let it be damaged by some silliness in the negotiations. Does the Minister agree?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am very pleased that the noble Lord has put this in the broader context. He is absolutely right about our co-operation beyond the EU. The sharing of intelligence with the EU and international partners is far broader than simple measures within EU laws. He is right in that broader context.

Illegal Imports: Dangerous Materials

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 13th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can tell my noble friend that we take a very robust approach to maritime security. Border Force and partner agencies use a combination of cutters, radar, onshore assets and area surveillance to detect and stop small craft. We also work closely with domestic and international enforcement colleagues on an intelligence-led approach, allowing us to tackle the criminals involved before they leave for the UK. We have more cutters on order.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, 260 years ago tomorrow, Admiral Byng was shot for upsetting the Government. At the risk of falling into the same danger, the co-ordination of the very limited assets around our inshore waters—seven craft for the Border Force—is a complete and utter dog’s dinner. Does the Minister not agree that that there is a crying need to establish a command and control centre to co-ordinate action that the National Maritime Intelligence Centre provides, so that we can actually protect our inshore waters, because at the moment we are absolutely not doing that?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can assure the noble Lord that I am not going to shoot him. The NMIC brings together 14 maritime security stakeholders to provide the UK with a unified picture of maritime threat around the UK and globally. As I think I pointed out in previous Questions, a multi-agency, multi-effort approach to intelligence and security and control of our borders is the way forward.

Prevent Strategy

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Tuesday 20th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Sorry, my Lords—Berlin. It must be a terrible time for those families coming up to Christmas. As to public confidence in whether the programme is working, we are confident that it is. This country remains a tolerant and inclusive society for people to live in and we must not be poisoned by the words and actions of those who seek to disrupt it.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, every day one can see on the web a mass of efforts by Daesh to recruit people in the West, telling them to kill people—by gun, knife, lorry, car, whatever. We have some of the best people in the world working in the web environment. Does the Minister believe that we are doing as much as we should to stop this, to take down these sites, to get attribution of those who are doing some of these things and to make actual attacks—taking down main servers and hard drives, which we are able to do, getting in among them and indeed spreading separate propaganda, dissention, worry and concern?