Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Main Page: Lord Wallace of Tankerness (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wallace of Tankerness's debates with the Attorney General
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is an interesting discussion but, as the House will know, the Bill has three purposes, all of which are about changing the succession to the Crown. One is to allow women to inherit if they are the eldest; the second is to allow people not to have to forgo their place in respect of the Throne if they were to marry a Catholic; and the third is to allow people to maintain their position should they marry, in certain circumstances, without the monarch’s permission. Those are the three changes to the laws of succession. It seems to us that nothing in the Bill alters the current position that only a natural-born child of a husband and wife can succeed to the Throne. Interesting though these questions are, we would not seek to have them included in this Bill and therefore do not support these amendments.
My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord True and Lord Elton for bringing forward these amendments. As my noble friend Lord True said, he brought forward a very similar amendment in Committee and it is important that he has given us an opportunity to debate these issues again. Following on from the Committee stage, I assure my noble friend and the House that I have given this matter thought. It is an important matter. When the phrase “heirs of the body” was incorporated into the Act of Settlement no one could conceivably—possibly—have anticipated the kind of advances that we have seen in the past 50 years, which raise these kind of issues, particularly with regard to human fertilisation and embryology.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, the laws governing succession to the Crown require that the descendant be the natural-born child of a husband and wife. As I indicated in Committee and, indeed, as I said to my noble friend Lord True in the letter from which he quoted:
“Although the Adoption Act 1976 and the Family Law Reform Act 1987 refer only to the succession of titles being left unchanged by their reforms, the Lord Chancellor stated at Second Reading of the Bill that became the 1987 Act that there was no intention to alter the rules on the descent of the Crown”.—[Official Report, 28/2/13; col. 1217.]
My noble friend Lord Elton raised the important point about Section 48(7) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 concerning England, Wales and Northern Ireland, which has the effect that nothing in the sections concerning parenthood in cases of artificial reproduction,
“affects the succession to any dignity or title … or renders any person capable of succeeding to or transmitting a right to succeed to any such dignity or title”.
Although I acknowledge that the Crown is not expressly mentioned, it is the Government’s view—we have given this considerable thought, and the phrase “the lesser must include the greater” has already been used—that if titles are not affected by this then, a fortiori, neither is the Crown. Therefore, we do not believe that there is a need for this amendment.
The Government also consider it unnecessary to define marriage as is set out in subsection (1) of the proposed new clause under this amendment, as only a natural-born child of a husband and wife can succeed to the Throne. We believe that that is clear as a matter of common law, as I think my noble friend Lord True acknowledged. I do not think that my noble friend referred to this in moving his amendment, but my noble friend Lord Trefgarne did pick up on proposed new subsection (3), on which I was going to reflect, because I think my noble friend Lord True said that the last thing that he wanted to do was engender controversy. I fear that this could become quite a controversial matter if Parliament is asked to pass a resolution on whether proposed new subsections (1) and (2) would apply, but it may be that he was not particularly pressing that leg of his amendment.
Before my noble and learned friend sits down, perhaps he could clear up one thing in my mind. I certainly support my noble friend but if he were to withdraw at a later stage, I would be minded to continue unless I was satisfied.
My noble and learned friend has again rested importance on the definition within the HFEA 2008, but he preceded that by saying that the real defence was in the interpretation of “heirs of the body” and “natural-born”. Therefore, that is not relevant, if that is the full defence. If the lesser must include the greater, the Crown is the fount of honour and if you imagine it as just that—a spring of water—it can be pure until he upsets his picnic basket into it. It seems to me that the picnic basket defence is in what he proposes but the actual spring water is not protected.
Without a lot of thought, I am not sure that I want to embrace that particular analogy. The point I was seeking to make was that if the transmission of a title of the peerage is not affected by the developments that appear in the legislation, a fortiori nor should the succession to the Crown be affected. It is obviously far more significant—I am searching for the right adjective—and of far greater importance than the transmission of a title. Therefore, our belief is that that would not be affected and that in this case the lesser must include the greater.
I have also indicated that with regard to the heirs of the body, it is the position, which my noble friend Lord True accepted, that only a natural-born child of a husband and wife can succeed to the Throne. That is quite clear as a matter of common law. He then went on, as my noble friend has done, to raise more recent statutes. However, as I have indicated, my noble friend Lord Jopling raised an important point about where the child is the natural child of the mother and father. I want to reflect on that; it is only proper to do so. I shall certainly advise and write to my noble friend, and copy the letter to others who have taken part in this debate. On that basis, I invite my noble friends not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend and all those who have contributed to this short debate. I fully accept the comments made on subsection (3) of the new clause proposed by my amendment.
As I said at the outset, I do intend to press this matter, although I remain troubled even after what my noble and learned friend has said. I make it clear to him that, although I accept his argument that a marriage is a man and a woman and natural-born child thereof as a matter of common law, my concern arises that, as the law may evolve, that understanding may be challenged. I hoped and thought that I had made that clear to your Lordships. Once same-sex marriage becomes part of the settled life of our kingdom, the law will inevitably evolve in response to that reality. A birth of this kind would not be open to a monarch who was in a same-sex marriage. The question would therefore arise about whether such a monarch could have a legitimate heir of the body.
This may seem fanciful to some; it may seem long in the future. However, I believe that Parliament should reflect on the points made in this debate—I was grateful to hear my noble and learned friend say that he would do so—including on the very important point raised by my noble friend Lord Jopling.
The position as I understand it as a layman is that there are certain defences against a potential claim. One is the common law, which may or may not evolve and which may or may not be challenged in the European courts. I hear what my noble and learned friend said, although I have heard that said about many other things which have come to be challenged in the European courts. Furthermore, as I said, the position may not be challenged absolutely on the question at the moment of succession; it could be a matter that arises within the Royal Family. A right is established, and then a right of family and right of property, and then, by accident, that person at a later stage becomes the heir to the Throne. I remain a little concerned as to whether that is a defence.
I heard what my noble and learned friend said about the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. I was extremely grateful for the assurances that he gave and the promise to look at it further. The Crown to my mind is something sui generis; the law of the Crown is something separate. It seems to me, as a humble layman construing that reference to dignity and titles of honour, that that was not intended to refer to the Crown.
Therefore, the question potentially lies open and I submit with respect to your Lordships that, at some stage in the future, the matter should be closed. I do not intend to press my amendment, but I shall watch with interest what my noble friend Lord Elton may do at a later stage. However, I hope that, at some point, any scintilla of uncertainty—and I believe that there is uncertainty—will be removed. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as we said in Committee, the Duchy is about property, business, title and, indeed, money. Although we agree that those are, as my noble friend said, important issues and we would undoubtedly welcome the end of the inequality—the mistreatment, we might say, of women—as regards the Duchy, they do not concern the Crown succession and therefore, along with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, we feel that they are not appropriate for the Bill.
I also repeat the comment that I made in Committee in response to the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, about the experience that that gives to a monarch. I said then that the current monarch has done extraordinarily well without having had that title. Perhaps we can take this moment to hope that she is soon fully recovered.
My Lords, I immediately associate myself with those wishes of full recovery to Her Majesty. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for raising the issue, which gave rise to a very good debate in Committee. I certainly valued the input from those who contributed, as I have today, on what is a very important issue with a great historic heritage. The noble Lord referred to the founding charter of 1337 and offered to pass me a copy. I was not sure whether he was going to pass me a copy in Latin or the translation. My higher in Latin from 40-odd years ago is probably so rusty that the translation would be better.
As I sought to explain in Committee, the Dukedom of Cornwall can pass only to the eldest son and heir of the monarch. I will come back to the points made about the exceptions to that. Therefore, when Her Majesty was Heir Presumptive as Princess Elizabeth, she did not hold the title of Duke of Cornwall, and we believe that the position would be the same now if there were a female heir, because of the terms of the charter. It is important to bear in mind that, because of limitation to the eldest son and heir of the monarch, the title cannot pass to a younger brother. The two exceptions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley—that of Henry VIII, Prince Henry when his brother, Prince Arthur, died and of Charles I, then Prince Charles, when his elder brother, Prince Henry, I think, died—were interesting. The noble Lord made it clear that exceptional steps were taken. That almost proves the point that it was not an automatic transfer of the dukedom. In the case of Charles I—Prince Charles, as he then was—King James asked the courts to make the alteration.
I also indicated that if the monarch has a son who is the heir apparent and that son dies before the monarch leaving a son of his own, the grandson of the monarch, the grandson will become heir apparent, but will not become Duke of Cornwall because he is not the son of the monarch.
It was recognised by those who contributed to the debate that this Bill is not the vehicle for making some pretty fundamental changes to a charter that has not changed, with two exceptions over the years involving parliamentary or court intervention on a one-off basis—if you can call Henry VIII a one-off. To make fundamental change is not the purpose of this Bill.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, asked whether I can give a guarantee that the Government will bring forward legislation. I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. A huge amount of consultation would be required before we were in a position to do that.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, the purpose of this Bill is important, but very limited. I do not believe that it would be appropriate to use this Bill as a vehicle to change the charter. I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Lexden on the valuable experience which the present Prince of Wales has undoubtedly had with regard to his involvement in the duchy. I shall reiterate something that I said in Committee: although the title cannot pass to a female heir, there is nothing to stop her being actively involved in the running of the duchy or, should the reigning monarch so wish, chairing the Prince’s Council. If that was what the monarch wished, that would be entirely possible and would give that valuable experience to which my noble friend Lord Lexden referred.
My noble friend Lord Trefgarne asked about the creation of the Princess of Wales. As he acknowledged, the title of Prince of Wales is not automatically conferred on the heir apparent on his mother or father becoming sovereign. In the case of the present Prince of Wales, it was bestowed upon him some six years after the accession of our present Queen. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, said—my noble friend disagreed with the disparaging way it was put—the Crown is the source of all honour and dignity, and I agree with him. It would be a matter for the sovereign, but if the Crown is the source of all honour and dignity and the sovereign chose to establish a Princess of Wales, it would be a matter for the sovereign. However, I do not think it is very helpful to speculate on what might happen at a future date.
For those reasons, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for his reply and to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. It seems to me that there is a precedent for Parliament or the courts to change what is in the original charter. It is quite clear that the sovereign, Parliament or the Government—because the sovereign and the Government are both Crown, the same Crown, under certain circumstances—can make this change if they so wish, so the whole thing probably does not matter anyway. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Cormack for introducing this amendment and allowing the House a further opportunity to discuss what, from our debates at Second Reading and in Committee, is quite clearly a very sensitive subject and one that quite properly has engaged the interest and concern of a number of Members of your Lordships’ House. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I particularly thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Guildford for giving us the benefit of his rich experience and giving us an understanding of how these matters are approached by the Roman Catholic Church. It has helped to inform our debate.
As I understand the position, my noble friend Lord Cormack seeks to give guidance to any royal couple who find themselves in a mixed Protestant/Catholic marriage as to the expectation that a child be brought up as a Protestant if they are one day to accede to the Throne. Perhaps the first thing I should make clear—indeed, my noble friend Lord Crickhowell summed it up very well—is that the relevant legislation simply requires the sovereign to be a Protestant and in communion with the Church of England. There is no statutory provision that the heirs should be brought up as Anglicans. The important point is that the sovereign be a Protestant. Therefore they could be brought up as a Methodist or, like my noble friend Lord Kilclooney, as a Presbyterian. That is the position. The Act of Settlement also requires the sovereign to be in communion with the Church of England. There is no statutory provision with regard to being an Anglican.
That point should also reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Flather, if it is reassurance she is seeking, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, that there is nothing in this Bill that changes the position that the sovereign must be a Protestant. Given that requirement, the expectation is also clear that should royal parents in a mixed marriage wish for their child one day to accede to the Throne then they must be Protestants. I am sure that it is a matter that a couple will consider very carefully indeed. As was clear from what the right reverend Prelate said, couples throughout the land in mixed marriages have these considerations. As the representatives of the Bishops’ Conference of the Roman Catholic Church said to me when I met them, the overriding concern is the indissolubility of marriage and unity of the partnership and, as the right reverend Prelate said, the importance of praying with the family for the grace of Christian unity as the Lord wills it. That is the background. It is a choice. It is a position that royal parents know they must address.
My noble friend Lord Marks very eloquently and very concisely highlighted the serious practical difficulties that could arise if my noble friend’s amendment were to be incorporated into the Bill. Who would determine whether the upbringing continued to be Anglican? It is important to note the consequences of my noble friend’s amendment. As drafted, it would not only be the child’s prospects of succession that were affected if they were not being brought up as an Anglican; it would also mean that the parent who was in the line of succession to the Throne would have to drop out if the maintenance of the upbringing was not continued. As the noble Lord, Lord Fellowes, indicated, that would affect the succession to the Throne as someone would have to cease to be in the line of succession and that would engage the other 15 realms. Therefore it is not something that is purely a domestic matter.
I note that this amendment would apply to children born of mixed Catholic/Protestant marriages only, not, for example, to a mixed Protestant/Muslim marriage. The intention of this Bill in one of its parts is to remove a specific piece of anti-Catholic legislation with regard to the bar on heirs to the Throne marrying Catholics. It is a bar that applies to Catholics only and to no other faith. I believe it would be unsatisfactory on the one hand to repeal a piece of discriminatory legislation only to replace it with a new stricture that would apply only to those entering into mixed Catholic/Protestant marriages. Indeed, at Second Reading my noble friend Lady Falkner of Margravine highlighted something that exists today—that is, people entering into mixed Protestant/Muslim marriages.
Can the noble and learned Lord clarify one point concerning the relationship between this legislation and the other Commonwealth countries and what the implications of change would be?
My Lords, this is an agreement that has been reached with the other Commonwealth countries. This question may arise in relation to later amendments, but the preamble to the Statute of Westminster Act 1931 gives an expectation that in matters of succession to the Crown there will be the engagement of the other realms of which the Queen is head of state. It is not a matter of binding law but it is certainly an expectation and one that we have considered to be very important in taking forward the proposals in this Bill. As I indicated, the implication or consequence of my noble friend’s amendment is that it would affect the succession, and we would need to consider that with the other realms of which the Queen is head of state.
My Lords, I am very grateful to everyone who has taken part in this short but fairly vigorous and interesting debate. I am particularly grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Fellowes and Lord Kilclooney, and others. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, it is of course possible to be both an Anglican and a Methodist. The two churches are in communion, so there is no impediment there at all.
I am obviously grateful for the speech of my noble and learned friend the Minister and I shall bear in mind everything that he said. However, whatever is in this Bill, it remains in effect, in his words, discriminatory because there is an insistence that the heir to the Throne cannot be a Roman Catholic. I personally accept that and support it, as will have been apparent from my earlier remarks, but you cannot have it both ways. With this amendment, I was merely seeking to remove an element of ambiguity. I am particularly grateful for the excellent exposition of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Guildford, but he, too, ended his speech by saying that he would welcome the removal of ambiguity. He hoped that either in the Bill or in some other manner—perhaps in an exchange of letters or whatever—there could be some form of wording that would make it less ambiguous than it is at the moment. I am grateful to him for that because that is an extremely important point.
Obviously there are strong feelings in all parts of the House and around the country about this. I am conscious of the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Fellowes, who pledged his support, also said that he would reluctantly go into the Lobby. I will not make him reluctant tonight because I do not propose to press the amendment to a Division. There is still scope for further discussion. I was delighted to hear from my noble and learned friend that Third Reading will not come until after the Easter Recess. That gives all of us with an interest in this and other matters relating to the Bill, such as my noble friend Lord True, plenty of opportunity to consult, discuss and then decide whether or not it would be prudent to table another amendment at Third Reading. I certainly have not made up my mind on that score.
I will not detain the House further by referring to every speech but there is the clear issue before us that we are dealing with the succession to the Crown. It has been decided that gender should be no impediment as far as the first born is concerned. It has been decided that marriage to a Roman Catholic, subject to the sovereign’s permission, can go ahead. It has also been reiterated by my noble and learned friend that anyone succeeding to the Crown cannot be a Roman Catholic. Although he introduced—as did my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames—references to other religions, that is not what we are concerned with in this Bill. We are concerned with what is explicitly in the Bill. I still believe that it would be helpful if we had some form of safeguard either in the Bill itself or in an exchange of published letters with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, but we can all reflect on that over the coming weeks. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I will live up to what the noble Lord, Lord True, expects and disappoint him. Not everyone was here in Committee, when this was discussed at greater length and there was an amendment to reduce the number—I think to four, or even to zero—so it was not as clear-cut then that the number should be increased. Indeed, the number six is not the full number of people who will necessarily always have to seek permission, because they have to seek permission at the point at which they marry. It could well include far more people. Someone who may not be heir to the Throne within the first six at any one point could be in that position by the time that they want to marry. It applies at the time of their marriage, so more people may well have to seek permission.
As we said when this was discussed at greater length in Committee, with more evidence given than perhaps all noble Lords have had a chance to read, we feel that this is not an exact science. We know that five were probably as many as were ever needed, so we thought that six gave a useful additional margin.
We certainly do not think that it is sensible to involve an unnecessarily large number of people in having to seek permission of the Crown in order to marry when they have no realistic possibility of inheriting the Throne. We do not know on what grounds a monarch would debar someone from a particular marriage if it was not about religion, although one noble Lord suggested that. We do not know what sort of reasons a couple would have to consider when deciding whether to go ahead with the marriage and give up their place in line. It seems to us strange to put a young couple through that when there is no good reason for doing so.
I should add that although this was not in the original Perth agreement, it is part of the agreement that has been discussed with all the other countries, with all the hard work done on everyone’s behalf by New Zealand. It would need an enormous amount of unscrambling to change the number now when it has been discussed at great length. I am sure that it is in no way the intention behind the amendment that it should be wrecking or delaying. However, I fear that changing the number from six would have that effect. I am sure that we would not want to risk the other really important parts of the Bill, the two bits that the whole House strongly supports—the succession to the Crown of the first born, should it be a woman, and the ability of someone in line to the Throne to marry a Catholic—by delay. We support the continuation of the Bill as it stands.
My Lords, again, I thank my noble friends Lord Lang, Lord Hamilton and Lord True, who have signed the amendment. My noble friend Lord Lang raised this issue at Second Reading and again in Committee and on each occasion stimulated a very good debate. It is clear that a balance needs to be struck somewhere between mitigating a remote but potentially catastrophic event, on the one hand, and the risk of impinging unnecessarily, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, on the lives of those who are more distant from the Throne.
My noble friend Lord Lang said that there were two differences in what was being proposed from what was there before. I think he said that, before, consent under the Royal Marriages Act 1772 related to religion and marriage to a Catholic. In fact, it went much wider than that. As my noble friend Lord True said, it was George III’s concerns about his siblings that prompted it. It was not actually to do with religion because the provision on religion was such that if you married a Catholic, you lost your place in the line of succession. I suspect that you also still had to get consent, being one of the descendants of George II, otherwise your marriage, albeit one that took you out of the line of succession, would have been void. Nothing is changing there. It is not related solely to religion.
My noble friend also said that the other change is that rather than the marriage being void, as is the case under the 1772 legislation, the person and their descendants from that unconsented-to marriage lose their place in the line of succession. Hitherto, failure to get consent did not cause the individual concerned to lose their place in the line of succession, as the examples given by my noble friend indicated, but their children did not have any place in the line of succession because by definition the marriage was void. Therefore, the children could not take up any place in the line of succession. Being the children of a void marriage, they would not be legitimate.
This change has taken place first to reduce the very large number of people who are today the descendants of George II. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, I just do not know how many consents Her Majesty has given during the 61 years of her reign. If my memory serves me correctly, I think I said in Committee that no one seems to have any record of consent having been refused. I would not like to suggest that information about how many consents have been given might be available. The fact is that as each generation comes to bear another generation, the number of descendants of King George II increases. Indeed, it may well be that some of them do not know that they are descendants of George II and may be contracting marriages which are void. That is one of the principal reasons why we wish to change this, so that the consequence of failure to get consent or of consent being refused is not that one’s marriage is void, which has considerable consequences for the couple concerned and their family, but rather that the person loses their place in the line of succession.
As the House will be aware, I indicated that we believe that the six steps provide sufficient proximity to the Throne. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, made an important point about consent at marriage: people who at the time of the consent for their marriage were in the first six may subsequently no longer be within the first six in line to the Throne, so the number at any one time who have had to receive consent will almost certainly be greater than six. If one looks at the 240 years of history since the Royal Marriages Act 1772 was passed, the person furthest away from the Throne at the time of marriage who subsequently ascended the Throne was William IV, who was third in line to the Throne, so the position as it stands provides twice as many steps away from the Throne than have ever been necessary in more than 200 years.
The Minister referred earlier to a possible catastrophic but remote event. The fact of the matter is that in this day and age, very sadly, catastrophic events are too common. Members of the Royal Family are by their nature public figures and they are often together. The possibility of a catastrophic event should be taken into account. I, for one, am still not at all convinced by the argument from the Front Bench and am inclined to support the amendment as it stands.
My Lords, the point I made is that we need to provide a balance between militating against a potentially catastrophic event and the risk of unnecessarily impinging upon the lives of those who are more distant from the Throne. While it is reasonable for different rules to apply to the Royal Family, a requirement to obtain consent to marry is a real restriction on people and as such a very strong argument should be made to extend it. I have heard various people say why six is not acceptable. However, I have heard no reason for 12, with the possible exception that it is the number of apostles or the number of former pennies in a shilling. It is also said that it is the number of jurors on a jury, but of course in Scotland that is 15. It is not a question to which there is a mathematical answer.
My noble friend has moved on from the point that I wanted to pick up on. He is treating the necessity of getting permission from the Crown to marry as if it were a great disincentive to marry and a great burden for these people to suffer, but they are not going to be forbidden to marry; they are only going to be told that they are not in line for succession to the Crown, and I should think a great relief to many of them that would be.
I hear what my noble friend says, and he makes that point well. It is, indeed, as I and the noble Baroness indicated, an additional requirement and impinges on the lives of individuals. The Bill is trying to seek that balance. It is not a question to which there is one, and only one, right answer. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, it is a matter of judgment. While my right honourable friend the Deputy Prime Minister would no doubt love to take credit for everything that has been put into the Bill—he has ministerial responsibility for constitutional matters and this legislation—I pay tribute to my right honourable friend the Prime Minister who, like his predecessor, sought to get agreement with the other realms and was party to the announcement of the agreement that was made at Perth. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, rightly says that this was not part of the Perth agreement, but it was flagged up at the Heads of Government conference in Perth that we would be seeking changes to the Royal Marriages Act 1772. That was followed by Prime Ministerial correspondence, on which agreement was reached on the number six.
My noble friend Lord Lang referred to a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, in which I said that procedural matters would not require the consent of all the other realms. Indeed, there are procedural issues in Clause 3 as to how, for example, the consent has been obtained and signified. However, substantive matters on the succession to the Crown—to which I referred in the debate on the previous amendment and which get into the spirit of the preamble to the Statute of Westminster Act 1931—would require the agreement of the other realms. This impinges on the succession to the Crown. Indeed, the New Zealand legislation, of which I have a copy somewhere here, specifically makes provision for six with regard to those who would require the consent of the sovereign to marry.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked about civil partnerships. Civil partnerships do not require monarchical consent, as a civil partner does not necessarily assume the public role expected of a spouse as sovereign. She also raised same-sex couples, which came up in an earlier amendment moved by my noble friend Lord True. The Government believe that marriage as stated in Clause 3 of the Succession to the Crown Bill means marriage as defined by the jurisdiction in which it takes place. If we take this away from the issue of same sex—to take away from, as my noble friend Lord True said in moving his amendment, the controversy that might surround that—different jurisdictions very often have different rules on marriage. As a simple example, the age for marriage without parental consent was different from that in England. If it was a legitimate marriage in the law of Scotland, it would be recognised as a marriage, albeit that it would not necessarily have been a legal marriage under the law of England.
Before my noble friend leaves that important point—and I accept what he says about civil partnerships —is he saying that the Government are knowingly legislating for a position where the monarch’s Ministers in one country may advise that a same-sex marriage should be disqualified from the succession to the Throne, but in another of the Queen’s dominions, the Crown’s Minister will give opposite advice? Is that what the Government are recommending to Parliament?
My Lords, that is not what I am saying. It depends on the jurisdiction of the place where the marriage is contracted. I believe I am right in saying that under the law of Canada, same-sex marriage is legitimate. If, therefore, hypothetically there was a same-sex marriage by someone perhaps well down the line of succession to the throne in Canada as of today, and that was lawful under the law of Canada, that would be a marriage. It hat is not a question of Canadian Ministers giving consent, which might be different because the law in the United Kingdom is different. There might even be different laws in the near future between Scotland and England, depending on the timing of legislation. It is not a question of Ministers giving consent; it is the actual law that is in place in a particular jurisdiction at a particular time.
It is a matter of judgment. I say that quite frankly to the noble Lord, Lord Deben. The Government believe that six is the appropriate number. That is what history suggests is necessary. No more than three have been required in the last 240 years, and there is some added leeway. As I said, with any legal restriction, if we impose a legal restriction we should limit it as far as possible. While I fully recognise the strength of the arguments that have been put forward, I have not heard sufficiently strong arguments that we should extend this legal restriction more than we believe is necessary to take account of the historical number of places to get to the throne, and double it up for that matter. I know how strongly my noble friend feels about this, because we have discussed it in the past. If he feels that it would be helpful to have further discussion on it, I am more than open to that suggestion. In the mean time, however, I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
May I ask a practical question? If this House took the view that 12 is preferable to six, how would that deal with the problem as to whether this Bill was then in difficulties with the other countries, which have agreed the Bill as it is?
My Lords, when we come to a later amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Trefgarne, I will be able to explain what the position is in the different realms. It would require agreement among the other 15 realms. I will explain this in detail when we come to a later amendment. I am not introducing a parliamentary procedure. As I have indicated, New Zealand is, and it already has a Bill before its Parliament with the number six in it. It would therefore require agreement; it would not necessarily require a parliamentary process. It is up to each individual realm to decide what to do, and some of them do not believe that they need a parliamentary process.
Are we simply saying that an exchange of e-mails would be quite adequate?
I am sure that if it was just that, it would be simpler. Certainly, the experience of reaching agreement was far more painstaking and more work was put into it than a simple exchange of e-mails. I know that when the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, who participated in some of our earlier debates, worked in the previous Administration in No. 10 Downing Street, this was one of his responsibilities when the previous Prime Minister was seeking to get agreement. I know how much effort was put into getting the agreement at Perth, and subsequently into getting the agreement on this provision. It is not, therefore, as simple as an exchange of e-mails.
If we pass this amendment this evening, it will simply go to another place, which will give extended time for sounding out opinion in the rest of the Commonwealth realms. If a negative response to those soundings was received, we could of course think again, and the Commons might decide to reject the amendment. We are simply expressing this view of this House on a common-sense matter. I very much hope that we shall be able to do that.
My Lords, we touched on this matter in Committee. Under the present provisions, the Bill can be brought into force, bit by bit, by order of the Lord President of the Council, who is, of course, Mr Clegg at present.
This is not a personal matter. My complaint is not that it happens to be Mr Clegg in his present role but that there is a single Minister at all. A Bill of this nature and this importance should not be brought into force, bit by bit, at the request of a single Minister, however senior and distinguished. That is the essence of my complaint, so I propose that it should be brought into force by statutory instrument, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament. I hope your Lordships will agree, and I beg to move.
My Lords, my noble friend very succinctly makes his point about the commencement of the Bill. I fully accept that this has nothing to do with the personality of the Lord President. As I explained earlier, it happens that he has ministerial responsibility for constitutional and elections law.
There is absolutely nothing unusual in a Bill including a power for a Minister to commence provisions in an Act on a date and at a time to be specified by order and without that order being subject to any particular parliamentary procedure, negative or affirmative. Parliament will already have given its approval and the Act that is brought into force will be unamended; it will remain unchanged. Therefore, there is no reason for it to return to Parliament so that Parliament can confirm what it has already agreed.
My Lords, I came to Second Reading with one major concern in my mind. By Committee I had two and now I have three. Perhaps I should stop coming to these debates because my list will only grow. It leads me to wonder whether we are here with unreasonable haste on something that should not have great haste: namely, an important and challenging constitutional issue.
We all know that there will be a happy event around midsummer this year. I hope that we are not being overinfluenced by that, because it is not the gender of the unborn baby that should guide us at this moment but the continuity of the lady on the Throne, whom we should not seek to embarrass or put in any predicament that could be adverse to the continuity into the future of her glorious 60 years. It is possible that in time, having made a full recovery now, she will exceed her mother’s years—and may she reign for all of those years, too. In that case, what is the haste that we are looking at? We have had many instances in our history when the succession has fallen on an individual who has been born long before they came to the throne. Whatever happens in June or July this year, we do not need to make any commitment.
By the way, I can assure the House emphatically that the Duchess of Cambridge did not intend to use the “d” word and say that she was going to have a daughter. It is a very important point. In my earlier career I was the recipient of a great deal of training in lip-reading. It is one of the few things at which I can claim to be an expert, so I ask noble Lords not to mock me. I have watched the five-second clip of the incident many times. The Duchess never had her tongue out of the roof of her mouth. That enabled her to say the “d” very emphatically. From there she could have gone either to an “au” sound for “daughter”, a “u” for “duke”—but she would not use twee language and say, “I will give it to my duke”—or to an “o” sound to say that she would give it to her dog. She brought herself up on the spot because she realised how hurtful that would be to the kindly donor of the little dog. She had to change direction, and in order to avoid one brick she stubbed her toe on another. Unless the Deputy Prime Minister has plans to so overhaul our constitution that we have a dog on the throne, I cannot see that there is anything here about which we should be concerned. The more we look at constitutional issues, the more it appears that Mr Clegg may have misidentified them and that he is in fact Mr Baldrick Clegg, creator of some very cunning plans.
As I said, I have three major concerns. The first is the one that I began with: namely, that we are putting the Crown in an impossible position. We expect to receive a delegation of the prerogative of consent, which I do not believe the Crown is entitled to delegate to us. Secondly, because of those factors, we should look very closely at the issues of entrenchment and the laws that are being changed. We have heard that one Parliament cannot bind another, but this occurs frequently and in this case it is emphatically there. The third factor is that without any doubt the Bill, in particular Clause 4, virtually wipes out the Act of Settlement with Scotland and renders unnecessary a referendum. If this Bill were passed, Scotland would float off towards the Arctic and a very cold economic future. We should be very concerned not to create these appalling outcomes.
The matter of entrenchment is something that we need to think about very hard. When my noble friend Lord Marks and I had our dialogue in the debate at Second Reading, we were misleading each other and were both under a very big misapprehension. We were talking about alterations to the declaration of rights. In the half hour the Minister was kind enough to give me last week to discuss this, he and his team made the same mistake. The declaration of rights is not the issue here; it is the Bill of Rights. We are confusing them because of the interregnum. There was no monarch at the time. Therefore, there was no way that there could be a Bill leading to an Act, as happens at the moment. There was a declaration of the complaints of the citizens of this country, which was answered by a Bill that eventually became an Act. The Bill of Rights that was presented to William and Mary repeated word for word the declaration of rights. However, it ended at the word “accordingly”, whereupon Joe Browne, the Clerk of the Parliaments, signed his name. A space was left for William to sign, but in fact he signed a separate piece of vellum that was stitched into the Bill. This was perhaps the first instance in England of a political stitch-up.
The document sets out the suggested oaths that could be sworn by future monarchs. However, they are only suggestions and not part of the Bill. As such, my noble friend Lord Marks was wrong, and the Minister remains wrong, because the alterations to the oaths that occurred in the past do not constitute a precedent by which one can alter the Bill; one cannot. I will read two phrases that sum up how far the entrenchment goes. First, the two Houses of Parliament should,
“with royal concurrence make effectual provision for the settlement of the religion, laws and liberties of this Kingdom, so that the same for the future might not be in danger again of being subverted, to which the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons did agree, and proceed to act accordingly … to the same in all times to come”.
There is not much wiggle room there.
Towards the end, the document states that the provisions are,
“enacted and established by authority of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain and be the law of this realm for ever”.
That is what we are asking to pass back to Her Majesty, with the request that she should forgo her coronation oath by altering something that was put into the laws of this land for ever and is, I submit, incapable of being changed. I return to my objection on Second Reading. We do not have the authority to accept delegation of the prerogative to this House, and any noble Lord who voted for it would be in breach of their oath on joining your Lordships’ House. I have raised this with many Members on these Benches. No one will give me an answer. They all say: “I’m sure it’s all right but I don’t know why”. I want to know why. I cannot vote for this and I suggest that no noble Lord should vote for it unless we are assured that we are not forcing Her Majesty into an impossible predicament by so doing.
The situation is very straightforward. We have a constitutional monarchy that is committed, first, by its commitment to the oaths of proclamation. There is a very different wording for England and for Scotland, whereby it is much tougher for Scotland. Then we have the coronation oaths, which bind the Crown to abide by what is in effect the entrenched law of the land, which we are now proposing significantly to change. The legal bounds of the Crown’s authority of governance are breached if the Crown’s constitutional limitation is exceeded. This defines the point at which a constitutionally limited monarchy has a duty arising from the commands of the law and constitution to refuse assent to a measure. If a measure is demonstrated to require removal of the constitutional law defining the duty to enforce, it is a breach of that duty, and constitutionally must be disallowed. We in this House can have no authority to pass a measure that collides headlong with the existing rules of our constitution. The limitations of the Crown would need to be breached to remove those duties, and this is an impossible and intolerable situation to place the Crown within.
In allowing the Bill, we would violate principles emanating from these enactments, which limit the Crown and the constraints imposed by the oath of office. At that moment, we would place the Crown in breach of its solemn and sworn duty, a duty undertaken as a reign-long obligation by Her Majesty. We cannot do that. Furthermore, we can hold no authority whatever to seek to do it.
I want to hear the answers to these points. I am very happy at what this Bill tries to achieve and would oppose none of it, but I am wholly opposed to the process by which we seek to do it. The advice that we have had on our legal position is undercooked, and I want to know a great deal more.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for setting out his concerns. I was grateful to him for taking the time to elaborate on the rationale for his concerns at a meeting to which he referred, which we had last week. As I understand it, he has two particular concerns. The first relates to the coronation oath, which the sovereign is required to make to maintain the established Protestant religion. He is concerned that there might in this Bill be something inconsistent with the coronation oath that Her Majesty swore. I disagree and I make it clear that we are not amending the provisions of the Bill of Rights or the Act of Settlement, which say that the sovereign has to be a Protestant. That was debated under an earlier amendment. One could conceivably argue that as a result of the Bill more people might come out of the line of succession, because one of their parents was a Catholic and the parents intended to bring up the child as a Catholic, but that is simply not the same thing. Given that the prohibition on the sovereign being a Catholic remains, there is no conflict between the Bill and the coronation and accession declaration oaths. Therefore, I believe that my noble friend’s opening premise is wrong.
I also disagree with his assertion that the Bill is inconsistent with the oath that the sovereign has to swear with regard to maintaining Presbyterian church government in Scotland. I declare an interest as an elder of the Church of Scotland. As a young student during Her Majesty’s Silver Jubilee Year in 1977, I sat in the gallery of the General Assembly when Her Majesty opened it and reaffirmed her coronation oath with regard to the Church of Scotland. Again, nothing in this Bill in any way conflicts with the oath that Her Majesty took on her accession, which she has subsequently reaffirmed.
My noble friend also made reference to Scotland, and his amendments very much relate to the position of Scotland. He seemed to imply that the Bill would somehow lead to the break-up of the union. In our view there is nothing in this Bill that conflicts with requirements set out in the Act of Union. Given that my noble friend’s amendments focus on the territorial extent of the Bill, it would be helpful to consider that matter as well. The Crowns of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are united by the various Acts of Union. Any changes that the United Kingdom Parliament makes to the laws of succession will apply automatically across our United Kingdom. The succession to the Crown is a reserved matter, as is clearly stated in the Scotland Act 1998, and the Scottish Parliament would have no competence to pass a resolution in relation to succession. At least, it would have no legal effect, as proposed in my noble friend’s amendment. However, the devolved Administrations were provided with drafts of the Bill ahead of introduction. Similarly, the Bill applies not only to the UK but to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories by necessary implication, following the precedent set by other Acts concerning the sovereign. Again, Crown dependencies and overseas territories were also consulted.
I seek to reassure my noble friend, who I know is deeply concerned about these matters, that there is nothing inconsistent with the provisions in the Bill before your Lordships’ House and the coronation oaths sworn by Her Majesty. I hope I can allay his concerns and persuade him that this is a perfectly proper matter that we deal with in this Bill.
My Lords, I am concerned—I think that there was reference to this in the letter that my noble and learned friend very kindly wrote to me the other day—about the possibility of different parts of the Bill coming into force at different times in different parts of the Commonwealth. For example, it seems possible for one nation to agree that the eldest child of the sovereign became its head of state and for another nation not to agree, or at least to delay agreeing—and therefore it might be the second child of the sovereign who became its head of state. That seems to be a confusion and complication that we would not wish to see. My amendment proposes that we should wait until all the nations that want to agree have agreed, so we avoid that difficulty. My amendment proposes that the Act will come into force when all the relevant Commonwealth Parliaments have given their consent to all its provisions. The word “relevant” relates, of course, to the fact that some Commonwealth nations do not have our Queen as their head of state. Therefore, their consent is irrelevant.
I hope that my noble and learned friend will be persuaded as to the point that I have made. I beg to move.
My Lords, my noble friend makes an important point about the simultaneous implementation of these provisions in all the realms of which Her Majesty is Queen—and clearly for the right reason, as he gives it. It would not be helpful, nor would it be the policy intent of any of the realms that have agreed to this, that there should be divergence between different realms as to the head of state. Indeed, it is the intention that the effect will be given once all the realms have done what is necessary before the Bill is brought into force, as indicated in response to Amendment 5. I noted the interest that the House has taken as to how changes will be given effect in the different Commonwealth realms, and I have given an undertaking that the Government will lay a Statement before Parliament ahead of the commencement order to indicate how the realms have given effect to the Perth agreement.
It may help the House if I give an update on how the other realms are taking forward these changes. I have referred before to the preamble to the Statute of Westminster 1931. It states:
“And whereas it is meet and proper to set out by way of preamble to this Act that, inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position of all the members of the Commonwealth in relation to one another that any alteration in the law touching the Succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the Parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom”.
This being part of a preamble and not being in the body of the Act, these words impose no legal obligations. However, the Government recognise that they carry considerable political weight and as such have undertaken to agree these changes with other realms’ Governments and to seek their consent to the legislation before introducing it into Parliament.
The New Zealand Government have co-ordinated this discussion, which culminated in all realms giving their written consent to the introduction of this Bill and their assurance that, based on the Bill as drafted, they were in a position to give the policy the same effect in their country. In doing so, some realms decided that legislation or parliamentary consent was required. Others have been clear that no further steps are necessary and that the changes will be brought about by the changes effected by the United Kingdom Government. In our view, it is in accord with the principle of the Statute of Westminster that it should be for each realm to decide what, if anything, is necessary or desirable to give effect to the agreement. Thus, although the preamble refers to the assent of the Parliaments of the dominions, we do not believe that it is for the United Kingdom to insist that parliamentary approval is obtained. I can confirm that in the case of some realms a referendum is necessary before changes to their constitution are made. However, we are not aware that any realm intends to amend its constitution, so the question of its undertaking a referendum on this issue does not at present arise.
As regards the detail of each realm, the Pacific realms of Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands are all content that because of the wording of their constitutions no changes to their laws will be required to implement the changes to the law of succession in their respective countries. We do not believe that they intend to consult their Parliaments further on this matter.
As regards Australia, on 7 December 2012, in a meeting of the Council of Australian Governments, the Prime Minister, state premiers and territory chief ministers reiterated the support of all Australian Governments for the changes to the rules of royal succession proposed by the United Kingdom. Australia has not yet reached agreement with all states and territories on the specific method of implementation in Australia but legislation will be required, probably at both Commonwealth and state levels. Indeed, Queensland has already introduced its own Succession to the Crown Bill.
The New Zealand Bill was introduced on 18 February and its provisions mirror those of the United Kingdom Bill, although it additionally amends, where necessary, New Zealand specific legislation: for example, the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988.
The Canadian Bill has now been introduced into the Canadian senate. The Canadian Government’s view is that the laws of succession are UK law and not Canadian law. The Canadian Bill therefore does not seek amendments to the rules of succession. Instead, the Bill states that Parliament has assented to the changes set out in the United Kingdom Bill. The Canadian Bill will come into force on a date set by an Order in Council.
Jamaica and Belize have stated that, based on the nature of their constitutions, no legislative change will be required to give the changes effect domestically. We do not believe that they intend to consult their Parliaments further on this matter. The relevant oaths under the constitutions of Jamaica and Belize make reference to:
“Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Her Heirs and Successors, according to law”.
The constitutions do not contain any express provisions defining “Her Majesty” or setting out the rules of succession, but we understand that Jamaica and Belize take the view that the reference in the oath to the heirs and successors of Her Majesty is to the heirs and successors under UK law—or, in other words, that it is implicit in their constitutions that the question of succession to the Crown in right of Belize and Jamaica is resolved by the law of the United Kingdom.
We believe that it would be open to the other Caribbean realms to take a similar view, but it is, of course, for them to decide how best to give the changes effect. The United Kingdom and New Zealand are in ongoing discussions with each realm to support the work they are doing.
I thought it would be useful to put that on the record because I know that in earlier debates interest was shown in that matter. I reiterate that it is intended that these measures will come into effect at the same time when all the realms of which Her Majesty is head of state have concluded their appropriate arrangements. In responding to an earlier debate, I indicated that the Government would make a Statement to Parliament prior to introducing the commencement order, indicating what has happened in each realm. Indeed, the reason why there is flexibility in the commencement order is to achieve that very purpose. In light of those comments, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Before my noble and learned friend sits down, has he any view as to the earliest possible point when the realms will have completed their work and the measure can be implemented?
No, my Lords, I do not, and I do not think that I would help the House if I tried to speculate.
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend. He has gone further than he did at the previous stage of the Bill and I am grateful to him for that. I am also grateful to him for his letter—five pages, no less—which he wrote to me since the previous stage, which has likewise been very helpful. He has said that he will lay a Statement before Parliament as each step is reached. If I may assume that that Statement will be a situation report and will perhaps describe the other nations where progress has not yet been achieved, I am content. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Just so there is no ambiguity or misunderstanding, I think I said that before introducing the commencement order, we will make a Statement—it will not be a sort of running commentary—indicating what has been done in each realm to give effect to these changes.
My Lords, that is all right. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.