Strategic Defence Review

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, am grateful for the opportunity to debate the strategic defence review that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, is leading for the Government. I will start by raising a point that is formally outwith his remit but is fundamental to the issues that he is addressing—the defence budget. NATO has calculated that for its members to contribute military capabilities adequate to the challenges that the alliance now faces, they will need to spend around 3.7% of GDP on defence. Even if NATO has overdone things a bit—it is not at all clear that it has—it is certainly the case that investment in defence needs to be above 3% of GDP, not the 2.5% that the Government say that they aspire to but for which they have not so far set out a firm plan. It is worth saying that 3% of GDP for the UK, allowing for all the accounting changes that have taken place in recent years, would not be much more than we were spending in 2010, when Europe was not facing a severe threat from Russia. It is important to make this point today because, if the issue is not addressed, the current defence review would be like someone deciding whether to buy two or three fire extinguishers while the building is burning around their ears.

This dichotomy is thrown into stark relief when one looks at the substantive issues that the review will need to address. A good starting point is the recent report from your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee on the implications of the Ukraine war for UK defence, to which the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, has referred. It is a good analysis and my only real criticism is that the compelling chapter on the importance of building mass focuses almost exclusively on the British Army, whereas the shortcomings in this area are being felt across all three armed services. On current plans, for example, the UK will have only three combat air squadrons by 2040—that would not even have filled one main operating base in my day. Given the lessons from Ukraine about the importance of air power, can anyone really think that this is acceptable? Numbers of airborne early warning and control aircraft are also woefully inadequate. In the case of the Royal Navy, the operational availability of nuclear attack submarines verges on the derisory. Even before our donations to Ukraine, stocks of weapons came nowhere near what even the most optimistic observer could regard as satisfactory. I could cite many other examples.

If we wish NATO to exercise a powerful deterrent effect on Russia, these issues must be addressed. The platforms in all three environments need the trained people, the weapons stocks, the logistics support and the defence industrial base to sustain them through the draining effects of protracted combat. Then there is the vulnerability of the home base. The necessity for significantly improved deterrent capability within NATO reaffirms the importance of the north Atlantic link, but that will be of little avail if the UK end of that link is not secure. At the moment, we could not counter the kind of missile attacks that Iran has launched against Israel. The requirement for a robust integrated air defence system can be ignored no longer. Effective defence requires an integrated system, which cannot be had on the cheap. It requires sensors, information management technology, surface-to-air weapons and air-to-air platforms and weapons.

Control of UK airspace will not of itself be sufficient, though. Again, the experience of Ukraine shows that trying to fight a land campaign without air superiority is a recipe for, at best, a long and bloody struggle and, at worst, defeat. There is nothing new in this. Neither El Alamein in 1942 nor Normandy in 1944 would have been successes without air superiority. The precise means of achieving that superiority will of course change over time, as technology offers new ways of doing old things, but the suppression and destruction of enemy air defences will continue to be a keystone of that effort. This is a complex and challenging role that involves cutting-edge and constantly evolving systems and technologies. It will also require the ability to operate effectively in the face of a hostile electronic and cyber environment, which of course will be true of the Armed Forces and their capabilities more widely.

The electronic warfare challenge that has emerged in Ukraine is well beyond anything we have ever seen before and we must expect that kind of challenge, or even greater, to be a feature of future battle spaces. This will require a response that goes beyond the purchase of certain kinds of equipment. It will need the fusion of experts and technology in an organisation with the agility, and the requisite industrial capacity, to respond to constantly evolving threats and the ability to adapt front-line platforms and tactics accordingly. Such agility and adaptability will be needed more widely across the entirety of our defence capabilities.

I could cite many other examples of the kind of improvements that will be required to defence in the years ahead, improvements across all three environments, and I have not even touched on the crucial issues of people—their recruitment, training and retention—that will be fundamental to our capabilities, let alone the question of wider national resilience. Time does not permit me this afternoon to do much more than to scratch the surface. Suffice to say that we face a double challenge: we have to make good the shrinking and hollowing out of our Armed Forces that has been the handiwork of successive, delinquent Governments. At the same time, we have to adapt those forces to meet the stark and pressing challenges of the future.

There will of course be debates about precisely how those future capabilities are to be provided, but two things seem beyond doubt. The first is that those capabilities will be essential. The second is that they are well beyond the financial guidelines under which this review is operating, so I end where I began: with the Budget. The mantra seems to be that no more money is available for defence. Of course the money is available; it is a question of choices and priorities. If the Government say that they cannot afford more than 2.5% when the need is so apparent, what they are really saying is that the safety and security of this country and its people are not their top priority. Looking back at our history, they would not be the first Government to say this, nor would they be the first to reap a frightful harvest if the current severe risks were to materialise.

King’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, an incoming Government inevitably consider that their predecessor got most things wrong, but the Prime Minister has already conceded that on some issues—Ukraine, for example—his Administration will continue the policy of the last Government. Given the things they said in opposition, I assume that the Government agree with the previous Foreign Secretary’s assertion that

“the lights are absolutely flashing red … on the global dashboard”.

The accuracy of the last Administration’s analysis was, unfortunately, not matched by the adequacy of their response. I fear that this, too, is an area where the new Government seem tempted to tread the same path as their predecessor. They have committed to increasing the defence budget to 2.5% of GDP. Why? Presumably, it is because they have correctly reached the conclusion that the current budget is insufficient in light of the circumstances in which we find ourselves as a nation and as an alliance. But we find ourselves in those circumstances now, not at some indeterminate point in future, so saying that “Defence expenditure will be increased, but not now” is completely illogical.

Some might say that we cannot increase the defence budget until the defence review has reported and set out how the money should be spent. This argument fails on a number of counts. Do we need a defence review to tell us that Putin is a clear and present danger, that there is a growing strand of isolationism in America whatever the outcome of the forthcoming presidential election, that weapons stocks across the Armed Forces are perilously low, that the Armed Forces are failing to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of the engineers and technicians on which modern military capability so crucially depends or that the current defence budget is inadequate to address these issues? The answer to these questions is no. In truth, the defence review will need to set out how far and quickly we should go beyond 2.5% of GDP and the balance of investment to be made in future capabilities. It cannot wish away the current deficiencies, which are so pressing in light of the present threat and which require urgent investment.

I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who is leading the review. He conducted a similar and well-regarded exercise in 1997-98 when Defence Secretary. Unfortunately, the Treasury refused to fund it adequately, to the tune of between £500 million and £1 billion per year. It was in trouble almost from the moment it left the starting blocks—and then we were spending 2.6% of GDP on defence, which would equate to an even higher figure today, given changes in accounting practices.

The mantra seems to be that we will increase the defence budget when fiscal conditions allow. This reflects an amazingly unrealistic view of international relations. Much though we may regret it, the world will not wait upon our pleasure. Putin will not wait upon our pleasure. I suppose we could send him a note saying: “Dear Vladimir, we know that you’re a dire threat to the peace and security of Europe, but would you mind holding off until we get the books straight?” I doubt that he would pay attention. Given the lessons that Russia has learnt from the war in Ukraine and the extent of its military expenditure, we have perhaps five years to put NATO’s own house in order. We will need every minute of those five years to redress the hollowing out of the Armed Forces that has been the dominate feature of recent decades.

I suspect that the Minister might agree with much of this, no matter how straight a bat he may of necessity play in winding up. My remarks are aimed less at him, and more at the occupants of Downing Street. I urge them to heed the words of Shakespeare’s Richard II, as he languished imprisoned and uncrowned in Pontefract Castle. Having squandered his many opportunities, he lamented:

“I have wasted time, and now doth time waste me”.


It concerns me not at all if politicians are wasted by their squandered opportunities, but it concerns me greatly when it is the security of this country and its people that they risk wasting.

Ministry of Defence: Expenditure

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. I think she slightly gets in front of herself. We have made a commitment to 2.5%, and that is a cast-iron guarantee. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is in his place and has heard the points she has made. We look forward to a deliverable, affordable plan that will meet the threats we will face in the future—not the threats now or in the past, but in the future. That is why the review of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is so important. The money that we spend has to be spent to deliver the capabilities needed to meet those threats. That is the fundamental principle that underlies what we are doing, and it will be maintained.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, we are still awaiting the outcome of the review, and in the light of the undoubted financial pressures it faces, can the Minister assure the House that his department will not view as easy options for in-year savings levels of training upon which military capability so crucially depends, and the adequate maintenance of infrastructure, which is already in a poor condition and is an important factor in the retention of experienced personnel?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes an important point. Of course there are competing pressures on any budget, whatever its size, but infrastructure—the hangars, runways and accommodation—is an important consideration. He also makes a point about the level of skills training. He will know, as will many Members in this House, that there are serious skills shortages in all the Armed Forces, and we face a challenge to meet the requirements we have because of that skills shortage. Skills training, accommodation and infrastructure will play an important part in any review that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, conducts.

Tempest Global Combat Air Programme

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his important Question. The strategic defence review is a root-and-branch review to look at the capabilities that our Armed Forces will need as they meet the threats of a changing world. It will look at defence in the round—and, of course, it will look at programmes across the whole of defence. Can I just pick up on one point from my noble friend? As he says, in the review we do emphasise the importance of the deterrent as well as support for Ukraine and AUKUS.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

With the global combat air programme, will due weight be accorded to the importance of breaking into the Japanese defence programme for the first time in any substantial way, with the associated financial and technological benefits that will bring and the linkages it will create in a crucial strategic area?